CyberWire Daily - Click here to steal. [Research Saturday]

Episode Date: July 12, 2025

Today we are joined by ⁠Selena Larson⁠, Threat Researcher at ⁠Proofpoint⁠, and co-host of ⁠Only Malware in the Building⁠, as she discusses their work on "Amatera Stealer - Rebranded ACR St...ealer With Improved Evasion, Sophistication." Proofpoint researchers have identified Amatera Stealer, a rebranded and actively developed malware-as-a-service (MaaS) variant of the former ACR Stealer, featuring advanced evasion techniques like NTSockets for stealthy C2 communication and WoW64 Syscalls to bypass user-mode defenses. Distributed via ClearFake web injects and the ClickFix technique, Amatera leverages multilayered PowerShell loaders, blockchain-based hosting, and creative social engineering to compromise victims. With enhanced capabilities to steal browser data, crypto wallets, and other sensitive files, Amatera poses a growing threat in the wake of disruptions to competing stealers like Lumma. Complete our annual ⁠audience survey⁠ before August 31. The research can be found here: ⁠Amatera Stealer: Rebranded ACR Stealer With Improved Evasion, Sophistication Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Starting point is 00:00:00 You're listening to the CyberWire Network, powered by N2K. Hey everybody, Dave here. I've talked about DeleteMe before, and I'm still using it because it still works. It's been a few months now, and I'm just as impressed today as I was when I signed up. DeleteMe keeps finding and removing my personal information from data broker sites and they keep me updated with detailed reports so I know exactly what's been taken down. I'm genuinely relieved knowing my privacy isn't something I have to worry about every
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Starting point is 00:01:05 Just go to joindeleteeme.com slash n2k and use promo code n2k at checkout. That's joindeleteeme.com slash n2k, code n2k. Hello everyone and welcome to the CyberWires Research Saturday. I'm Dave Bittner and this is our weekly conversation with researchers and analysts tracking down the threats and vulnerabilities, solving some of the hard problems and protecting ourselves in a rapidly evolving cyberspace. Thanks for joining us. One of the main initial access vectors that we have been very closely tracking are web injects, which of course are injects on legitimate
Starting point is 00:02:06 but compromised websites that have been observed delivering a variety of different malware. Many of those payloads do tend to be information stealers. And so in this case, we were able to see a malware that became known as Amatera Stealer, or that's what we later identified it as, being delivered via web injects. That's Celina Larson, threat researcher and lead for intelligence analysis and strategy at Proofpoint. The research we're discussing today is titled
Starting point is 00:02:36 Amatera Steeler, rebranded ACR Steeler with improved evasion and sophistication. improved evasion and sophistication. We also saw a number of samples in open source, like on VirusTotal. Some of our colleagues at other research teams also observed it in other tech chains. But what's really interesting to me is the fact that the stealer landscape right now is so dynamic. And this particular stealer is basically a rebranded stealer known as ACR Stealer, but it's got a lot of updates to it.
Starting point is 00:03:20 And I think that one of the most important things from a cyber criminal perspective, especially now in the landscape are taking a look at information stealers, taking a look at this landscape, trying to figure out, you know, what are threat actors using? How are they, you know, developing workarounds for defense? What are the different delivery mechanisms that we're seeing a lot of? Because, you know, as we've talked about previously on various podcasts, Dave, the information stealer landscape right now is booming and that's where, you know, it's a very, very serious threat.
Starting point is 00:03:50 And so, yeah, so this was an interesting sort of little deep dive that we were able to see about this pretty interesting information stealer. So you mentioned ACR stealer. What set Amatera Stealer apart that it's not just a variant of ACR, that it is its own unique thing? Yeah. So, there are significant portions of code overlap that exist with ACR Steeler analysis in the public.
Starting point is 00:04:17 And so, that's kind of where we're like, oh, is this just updated or ACR? But it's really featured a full rebrand. So, Amatera Steeler is actually sold as a malware as a service, which is what we see from a lot of these very prominent information stealers. Luma, for example, was pretty much the most popular malware as a service in terms of the information stealer ecosystem, and then it got disrupted.
Starting point is 00:04:40 And so, that's also, we can talk about that as part of this conversation too, but that's why we're kind of keeping an eye on how the InfoStealer landscape is moving. But what we did find was this particular malware had a bunch of new, interesting anti-analysis features. There was some improved sophistication of the malware, the command and control operates a lot differently. The actual, where you can purchase it or manage it from, you know, the panel, we were able to get eyes on a panel. It's called the Amateras dealer.
Starting point is 00:05:15 So, you know, you can actually see like the payment structure and the tier structure. And what was interesting is that back in July of 2024, the ACR support channel, which is of course on Telegram as many of these things are, basically they said, you know, we're not going to sell ACR Steeler anymore. You know, we're closed for an indefinite period, but you know, there will be no problems. We do not say goodbye. This is of course all in Russian, but we included a machine translated version of that message.
Starting point is 00:05:45 So, I said, okay, this is not goodbye. And so then, around December, towards the end of last year, this new ACR, Amatera Steeler, sort of popped up and the panel began surfacing. And so, we were able to kind of see some of those overlaps in terms of the timeline of the Steeler and sort of the rebrand with a bunch of new features. I see. So your belief is that this is the same group who created ACR Steeler. This is an updated version. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Yeah. So the research talks about how Amatera is distributed via clearfake campaigns and also these click-fix
Starting point is 00:06:27 techniques. For anyone in our audience who might not be familiar with click-fix, can you give us a quick description of how that works? Yeah, of course. And I do, you know, I have to say, I recognize that it's very tough to keep a full understanding of the threat landscape. We're saying things like clear fake and click fix and you know we talk about this technique called ether hiding and all these things and certainly
Starting point is 00:06:52 clear fake is just one of many types of web and check campaigns so you know I just want to say that if you're not if you're wondering what is clear fake I've never heard of this before you know what what? That is totally fine because. Don't let your imposter syndrome kick in because it's not you. No, it's the landscape. It's so crazy right now. Like the amount of web inject campaigns that we're seeing,
Starting point is 00:07:18 many of which use the ClickFix technique, which I'll describe in just a second. So there's so many out there. So yeah, so ClickFix is actually a really interesting social engineering technique whereby threat actors will either through web injects or direct URLs or in some way essentially show you this dialogue that says you need to update for security purposes or that says you need to update for security purposes, or you need to solve this CAPTCHA in order to actually access this content.
Starting point is 00:07:50 And what that basically does is it tricks into copying, pasting, and running PowerShell on their own host. So what we saw, for example, with this ClearFake campaign, and again, ClearFake is a type of web inject campaign, that when they go to a website that's compromised by ClearFake injects, they were presented with this fake capture. So it says, complete these verification steps to prove you're not a robot. And then the instructions that it actually gives you are numbered one, two, and three. One is press and hold the Windows key plus R,
Starting point is 00:08:25 then in the verification window press Ctrl V and then press Enter. So it's literally the step-by-step, this is how to do this. But ultimately what it is, is you're running a click-fix PowerShell command. So it's click-fix, the technique is this click to fix, basically copying,
Starting point is 00:08:47 pasting, and running PowerShell. And this is something that we've seen from just tons of actors. It's completely overtaking the landscape. Yeah. I mean, it really seems like it is the flavor of the month right now, right? Oh, absolutely. Yeah. And we've even seen it with espionage threat actors using this sort of click-fix technique. We see a lot of different sort of styles of the click-fix technique. We see it with just, of course, update your Chrome browser. Of course, we see it with that. We see the Captcha prove you're not a robot.
Starting point is 00:09:17 But we've even seen it with very specific and customized software that a specific target might be using for transportation logistics, for instance, and it'll be like, oh, you have to update this very specific software. So threat actors are taking this idea of the click-fix technique to copy, paste, and run PowerShell on a host, and just making it unique for whatever their purposes are. And I think that that is one interesting part of this whole story actually is this click
Starting point is 00:09:45 fix technique, just one exploding all across the landscape, where you have these web inject thread actors like ClearFake, Land Update, a lot of the other thread actors that were trying to see PHP. A lot of these different clusters are using these sort of fake web inject style things compared with click fix. We see it with email directors as well, distributing URLs in ClickFix. It's just everywhere.
Starting point is 00:10:07 It's like that meme, it's like ClickFix, ClickFix everywhere. Like you see at the Toy Story meme, it's like it's everywhere. Right, right. Which we assume means that they're seeing great success with it. That is how I am interpreting this.
Starting point is 00:10:24 I mean, yeah, the thing is, is typically when you see an explosion of a technique proliferate like this across the landscape, it tends to be very effective. I mean, you know, we're not going to see all of these actors using the same technique if it's not working, which is what actually kind of, you know, it kind of freaks me out. And they're well designed whores too. Like I have to say,, they're very like, it's a believable capture if you don't really know the steps that you're taking or whatever.
Starting point is 00:10:53 It is pretty believable. So earlier in our conversation, you alluded to this technique called ether hiding. Can you unpack that one for us? So ether hiding is kind of interesting. Basically, it uses something called a Binance Smart Contract that has this JavaScript is stored in that smart contract. And then that is what will kind of generate the capture
Starting point is 00:11:19 and malicious command on the actual host. And what the actor can do is like modify the smart contract instead of like the inject itself basically. And it kind of has like, it's kind of complicated. And it's really just like the Clearflake cluster is one of the only ones that we see regularly kind of adopting this ether hiding technique. But yeah, but it's essentially using the blockchain to store this command in a way that they can update that when they need to. Then oftentimes they might just leave it and not modify it at all.
Starting point is 00:12:08 it and not modify it at all. So it's kind of, yeah, it's basically, you can block the domain on which the script is actually hosted, which is like the actual smart contract. And that is kind of what the thread actor is using, as opposed to injecting the JavaScript directly on the website, for example. There's a lot of different techniques that web and Jax thread actors use. And ether hiding is one of them that we see with ClearFake. We'll be right back. Compliance regulations, third-party risk, and customer security demands are all growing and changing fast. Is your manual GRC program actually slowing you down?
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Starting point is 00:14:32 CSOs and CIOs know machine identities now outnumber humans by more than 80 to 1, and without securing them, trust, uptime, outages, and compliance are at risk. CyberArk is leading the way with the only unified platform purpose-built to secure every machine identity, certificates, secrets, and workloads across all environments, all clouds, and all AI agents. Designed for scale, automation, and quantum readiness, CyberArk helps modern enterprises secure their machine future. Visit cyberark.com machines to see how. So what are Amateras goals once it lands on a victim's machine? What sort of data is it looking to steal? Yeah, so as you might imagine, stealers nowadays just have a lot of different capabilities.
Starting point is 00:15:26 Of course, they're going after passwords, they're going after crypto wallets, stealing files on disks, browser cookies, web forms, things like that. Then of course, you have Amateras Stealer that is also capable of running secondary payloads. So it could potentially download and execute files like executables, or you can download and execute PowerShell.
Starting point is 00:15:47 So it has both the stealing functionality as well as the ability to run file-on payloads. Is the malware's configuration static or does it have the ability to dynamically adapt? So what's actually interesting is it used to use command and control using Steam or Telegram dead drops which we see on a lot of times with various Steelers. We actually covered it before in one of our blog posts with VDAR Steeler for example where they will regularly use Steam or Telegram for command and control. But in this case, they actually
Starting point is 00:16:25 started using NT sockets for command and control. So this increases the stealthiness of the C2 communication. So the way that the command and control is set up, it bypasses commonly used Windows networking APIs, which a lot of times your endpoint detection analysis tool will rely on for visibility into the HTTP requests. Another thing that's interesting in terms of the malware capability is not using DNS.
Starting point is 00:16:58 It will use C2 via IP address, and the IP address in the cases that we were looking at was not owned by ThreatActor but was using a CDN endpoint address. In this case, it was CloudFlare. So yeah, so it has a little bit of interesting C2 communications that make it a little bit tricky. So for example, if they're using an IP address that's associated to a public CDN like Cloudflare, security operations might be reluctant to just block the IP address by default, right?
Starting point is 00:17:29 It's not like you can just block a C2 domain that we often see using like malware, command and control for malware. But with an IP that belongs to this public CDN that's probably used by a lot of different things, it might be like, okay, we might not block this because it could be used by legitimate websites that are also using CDN. An addition to that, not using a domain name or DNS for C2 also means that it can't be blocked or alerted on through DNS monitoring.
Starting point is 00:18:00 There's no DNS lookup for the domain name. There's some of these other C2 functionalities that are trying to evade detection in a way that previous examples of similar malware you don't necessarily see. looking at the landscape here, Loomis dealer was disrupted. Do we think that Amatera is stepping in to fill that gap? So I feel like it's a little bit early to say yes or no, but I do want to point out in terms of the actual pricing structure with Amatera and how because of these mass, which is such a funny word, malware as a service, mass offering. The way that they work right is that you pay to be able to access and use the information stealer and it was very similar.
Starting point is 00:18:55 And it's actually not too expensive. So for three months for 500 bucks or like a full year for 1500 bucks, like this is what the pricing information for the publicly accessible panel we were able to see. And so I think that, first of all, having a mass offering can sometimes lower the barrier to entry for a lot of cyber criminals. But also it does enter the scene at
Starting point is 00:19:24 this moment where people might be leaving Luma Steelers for a variety of reasons. Luma isn't fully eradicated. A lot of the infrastructure was disrupted. It was obviously a big win for law enforcement and private sector. But we're still seeing some Luma activity even after the take-down, certainly not what it was. But what's great about a lot of these disruptions,
Starting point is 00:19:48 in addition to actually disrupting infrastructure, doing takedowns, all of that stuff, is it really makes it so that the criminal who's operating this, doesn't have the same sort of trust and brand recognition and authority in the marketplace, right? And so what you often see is when these things happen is you'll have the criminals who are using whatever malware is go to greener pastures, so to speak. You know, maybe malware that isn't quite so under the microscope, maybe they try and build their own thing.
Starting point is 00:20:23 Maybe they stop doing crime, which is the ideal outcome. Yeah. What an adorable thought. I know. In a perfect world, if you're like a criminal is doing crime and then the tool that they're using gets like it's like busted and targeted by law enforcement. Like imagine if they decide to change their behavior and just leave the game. Yes, time for me to step back and rethink my life. Right. Yeah. Like, oh, okay. Maybe I can go in a different direction here. Yeah.
Starting point is 00:20:51 So, yeah. So I think the market is now, I think, a little bit more open for some of these people who are like, okay, do I not trust Loomis-Steeler anymore because it was a target of law enforcement disruption? Should I be spending money elsewhere? And if I was a malware author marketing my malware as a service, I'd be like, hey, I'm not that guy. Right, right. Yeah, I don't have law enforcement breathing down my neck with all of these big blogs and reporting coming out about how I operate and all these things that have been taken down and made my life a little bit challenging.
Starting point is 00:21:30 So yeah, I think it is an opportunity for cybercriminals to find, okay, what's next? But that's why it's so important to really be sort of monitoring on top of the information stealer landscape because certainly Luma was big and popular, but it's not the only one. And certainly what we're seeing, certainly with Amaterasu, for example, is it's under active development. So, you know, we're seeing them continuously modifying, updating, making changes to this malware
Starting point is 00:21:59 to make it from their perspective, better, more effective, more useful for the cyber criminal operators. And of course, you know, we wrote a bunch of sections for it, we have coverage for it, published some rules associated with it. But it's, you know, it's very important to sort of stay on top of these things because they are under active development. And at any point, something like the Luma disruption could happen and everyone flocks of something else.
Starting point is 00:22:27 So, I do think it's still too early to say for sure, like this is definitely replacing Luma Stealer. But, you know, having other options on the market and making sure that we have detections and defense against it is super important. So what's your recommendation then for defenders? How should a security team go about protecting themselves against this? Yeah, so first of all, update, make sure you have existing network signatures that will detect this traffic and the command and control checking and exfiltration, the traffic, things like that.
Starting point is 00:23:00 There are rules that we published that are associated with this. One thing that I really, really want to make sure to hammer home is that people are aware and incorporate click fix technique into their existing security training. Making sure that people are aware of the new types of social engineering and techniques that are being used by threat actors is very, very important. Also, restricting your average user from running unauthorized PowerShell is really important here because, like, literally copy-pasting running PowerShell is like they're infecting themselves. And making it so that end users can't do that is something that is very important. And yeah, I think those are kind of the two main things is to make sure that you're aware that this is happening
Starting point is 00:23:54 and doing, you know, practicing defensive depth and making it so that users can't, you know, be running PowerShell. There are other ways that we've seen Amateria delivered as well. So, things like SEO poisoning, fake software downloads, things like that. So that's also very, very important. Restricting downloads from unknown domains, unrecognized domains really block traffic, especially from newer, just registered domains,
Starting point is 00:24:20 things like that are impersonating enterprise software, for example, and also not downloading unauthorized software. So oftentimes you'll see a lot of information stealers will be masquerading as, for example, a VPN app or a PDF reader or a document reader, things like that. And so, you know, making, restricting those, the downloads from those types of tooling and only authorized, like making sure if you need something like a PDF reader, go to your IT department and ask for that, is I think important to note here as well.
Starting point is 00:24:57 User education, I think is really important and really big, but also making sure that you as an organization have defense in depth, and if a user does take an unsafe action, then they're blocked from the subsequent actions that could happen as a result of that activity. Our thanks to Celina Larsen from Proofpoint for joining us. The research is titled Amatera Steeler, Our thanks to Celina Larson from Proofpoint for joining us.
Starting point is 00:25:25 The research is titled Amatera Steeler, rebranded ACR Steeler with improved evasion and sophistication. We'll have a link in the show notes. And that's Research Saturday brought to you by N2K Cyberwire. We'd love to hear from you. We're conducting our annual survey to learn more about our listeners. We're collecting your insights through the end of this summer. There's a link in the show notes. Please do check it out.
Starting point is 00:25:49 This episode was produced by Liz Stokes. We're mixed by Elliot Peltsman and Trey Hester. Our executive producer is Jennifer Iben. Peter Kilpey is our publisher. And I'm Dave Bittner. Thanks for listening. We'll see you back here next time. And now a word from our sponsor, Spy Cloud.
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