CyberWire Daily - Iranian threat actor exploits N-day vulnerabilities. Subdomain hijacking vulnerabilities. The Discord Papers. An update on Russia’s NTC Vulkan. And weather reports, not a Periodic Table.

Episode Date: April 18, 2023

An Iranian threat actor exploits N-day vulnerabilities. CSC exposes subdomain hijacking vulnerabilities. More on the Discord Papers. An update on Russia’s NTC Vulkan. Joe Carrigan on the aftermath o...f a $98M online investment fraud. Our guest is Blake Sobczak from Synack , host of the podcast WE'RE IN! And threat actor nomenclature: a scorecard, and a Periodic Table no more. For links to all of today's stories check out our CyberWire daily news briefing: https://thecyberwire.com/newsletters/daily-briefing/12/74 Selected reading. Nation-state threat actor Mint Sandstorm refines tradecraft to attack high-value targets (Microsoft Security) An Iranian hacking group went on the offensive against U.S. targets, Microsoft says (Washington Post)  New CSC Research Finds One in Five DNS Records are Susceptible to Subdomain Hijacking Due to Insufficient Cyber Hygiene | CSC (CSC) DOD Assessing Document Disclosures and Implementing Mitigation Measures (U.S. Department of Defense) After leak, Pentagon purges some users' access to classified programs, launches security review (Breaking Defense) Why Did a 21-Year-Old Guardsman Have Access to State Secrets? (Vice) U.S. officials have examined whether alleged doc leaker had foreign links (POLITICO)  The Air Force Loves War Gamers Like Alleged Leaker Teixeira (Military.com)  FBI Investigating Ex-Navy Noncommissioned Officer Linked to Pro-Russia Social-Media Account (Wall Street Journal) Pentagon leak suggests Russia honing disinformation drive – report (the Guardian) Dragos Analyzes Russian Programs Threatening Critical Civilian Infrastructure (Dragos)  Microsoft shifts to a new threat actor naming taxonomy (Microsoft) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Starting point is 00:00:00 You're listening to the Cyber Wire Network, powered by N2K. Air Transat presents two friends traveling in Europe for the first time and feeling some pretty big emotions. This coffee is so good. How do they make it so rich and tasty? Those paintings we saw today weren't prints. They were the actual paintings. I have never seen tomatoes like this. How are they so red? With flight deals starting at just $589, it's time for you to see what Europe has to offer.
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Starting point is 00:02:13 Joe Kerrigan on the aftermath of a $98 million online investment fraud. Our guest is Blake Subcheck from CINAC, host of the podcast We're In. And threat actor nomenclature, a scorecard and a periodic table. No more. From the CyberWire studios at DataTribe, I'm Dave Bittner with your
Starting point is 00:02:43 CyberWire summary for Tuesday, April 18th, 2023. Microsoft this morning reported that the group it's tracked as Phosphorus, morning reported that the group it's tracked as Phosphorus, and will henceforth refer to as Mint Sandstorm, has developed a specialty in weaponizing end-day vulnerabilities, that is, vulnerabilities for which a fix or mitigation is available, but which some organizations have failed to patch. It's also been known mostly for reconnaissance and cyber espionage, but that may be changing. As there are signs, the group is turning its attention to critical infrastructure. Microsoft writes, Mint Sandstorm is known to pursue targets in both the private and public sectors, including political dissidents, activist leaders, the defense industrial base, journalists, and employees
Starting point is 00:03:45 from multiple government agencies, including individuals protesting oppressive regimes in the Middle East. Activity Microsoft tracks as part of the larger Mint Sandstorm group overlaps with public reporting on groups known as APT35, APT42, Charming Kitten, and TA453. Over the past two years, the group has been observed carrying out attacks against infrastructure, and Microsoft states, given the hardline consensus among policymakers in Tehran and sanctions previously levied on Iran's security organizations, Mint Sandstorm subgroups may be less constrained in carrying out malicious cyber activity.
Starting point is 00:04:29 And of course, we note in full disclosure that Microsoft is a CyberWire partner. CSC released its Subdomain Hijacking Vulnerabilities Report, in which it shows that over 21% of the 400,000 DNS records it queried were likely vulnerable to subdomain hijacking. Subdomain hijacking occurs when threat actors take over a subdomain and use it to host their malicious content, which could lead to further threats like phishing or hosted malware. The report also showed that 63% of the queried DNS records
Starting point is 00:05:04 showed a 404 not found or 502 bad gateway error. CSC explains, DNS records housekeeping is historically one of the most frequently neglected tasks due to a long history of different owners, policies, and vendors. owners, policies, and vendors. The U.S. Department of Defense has decided that the Discord paper's leaks are unlikely to affect relations with allies. The department is also working to make future leaks of this kind less likely and less troublesome. The Secretary of Defense has directed a comprehensive review of DoD security programs, policies, and procedures, with a report due in 45 days. This study is in addition to ongoing daily attention to investigating and mitigating the Discord leaks. Two big questions have arisen in the Discord paper's case. The first involves opportunity. How did the alleged leaker have so much access to highly classified
Starting point is 00:06:06 information? Vice argues that expanded access as a result of the U.S. assessment, that excessive compartmentalization and poor information sharing led to the intelligence failures that enabled the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Increasing information sharing was neither pointless nor necessarily ill-advised, but in this case, at least supervision and proper control appear to have been lacking. Inside Defense reports that the Pentagon is tightening up access to classified information. The second question involves motive. Why did the alleged leaker do what he allegedly did? involves motive. Why did the alleged leaker do what he allegedly did? Politico reports that investigators are looking, so far in vain, for some foreign connection that would make the incident a familiar, if regrettable, instance of espionage. But it seems increasingly likely that the leaker
Starting point is 00:07:00 was motivated by social media cachet, not by cash, or conviction or compromise. It's all apparently just the frenzy of online renown. The FBI has the blogger and podcast host Sarah Bills under investigation, the Wall Street Journal reports. Ms. Bills appears to have been involved in spreading the information from the Thug Shaker Central Discord community to the broader but still fringy internet. A U.S. official told the journal she is actively under federal investigation, but the circumstances of the content of the investigation are unclear at
Starting point is 00:07:37 this time. Ms. Bills says she's the victim here, and the Bureau is investigating death threats made against her. She said to the Journal, I have been forthright and honest with the FBI and NCIS in regards to what my clearances were and what I had access to, which was literally nothing. I didn't leak the documents, and they've never even been in my possession. Since the end of March, the media have reported on activities of NTC Vulcan, a corporate operator working against OT systems under contract to the Russian government. The Vulcan Papers, as the leaks are being called, revealed that Vulcan is engaged in supporting a
Starting point is 00:08:18 full range of offensive cyber operations, espionage, disinformation, and disruptive attacks intended to sabotage infrastructure. On Monday, Dragos released a study of what the Vulcan papers mean for that last class of activity, infrastructure disruption. Dragos took as its point of departure the coverage in the Washington Post, and its researchers focused in particular on one of Vulcan's tools, a malware suite known as Amesit-B. The researchers found four key takeaways. First, the papers represent genuine leaks. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that the documents reviewed are legitimate and were leaked or stolen from a Russian contracting repository.
Starting point is 00:09:03 Second, it is unlikely that these tools and platforms are exclusively used for testing or training purposes. They represent a real operational capability. And finally, Ameset-B represents a clear potential threat to the rail transportation and petrochemical sectors. Dragos says modules contained in the Ameset-B platform could allow for a range of impacts in rail and petrochemical environments, which could result in physical consequences, including damage to physical equipment or creating unsafe conditions where injury and loss of life are possible. And what Ameset-B seems designed to do comes from a familiar Russian military intelligence playbook.
Starting point is 00:09:46 As Dragos puts it, the capabilities described are consistent with previous attacks attributed to various units of the Russian military's GRU with tactics, techniques, and procedures overlapping with multiple identified threat groups. The Ameset-B platform shows an interesting convergence of cyber operations with traditional signals intelligence and electronic warfare operations, and it's very much a combat support system intended for battlefield use by a combatant commander.
Starting point is 00:10:18 Before we leave you today and let those of you who are just getting around to it to get back to filing those tax returns that are due before midnight, not you, of course, but those other people, let's return to threat activity nomenclature. Why change from phosphorus to mint sandstorm, as Microsoft has just done today? It's a shift in the way Redmond names threat actors. The company is moving away from giving them elemental names and toward giving them meteorological ones. Henceforth, they'll
Starting point is 00:10:52 name them as follows. Blizzard will mean Russia. Sleet, henceforth, stands for North Korea. Typhoon represents China. Sandstorm, as in this first usage, will designate Iranian activity. Storm will be used for groups and development. Tempest denotes financially motivated groups. Tsunami will be reserved for a private sector offensive actor. And finally, flood will denote an influence operation. So you'll be able to tell the players by the scorecard without reference to the periodic table. Coming up after the break, Joe Kerrigan on the aftermath of a $98 million online investment fraud. Our guest is Blake Subcheck from SYNAC, host of the podcast, We're In. Stay with us.
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Starting point is 00:13:32 over one-third of new members discover they've already been breached. Protect your executives and their families 24-7, 365, with Black Cloak. Learn more at blackcloak.io. Blake Subchak is head of communications at SYNAC, editor-in-chief of the newsletter Read Me, and host of the podcast titled We're In. I spoke with Blake about the goals of the podcast and of course, how they came to choose the title. I mean, you've seen many cheesy hacker movies, I hope, right? And I feel like once you had that seminal line, we're in, you get that moment when you've breached the network, you're into it. And so the goal of the show is really to get inside the brightest minds of cybersecurity. And so the name was kind of a riff on that. But we did consider a number of alternative names and Warren was the clear favorite. So the goal is really to interview newsmakers, innovators, government officials,
Starting point is 00:14:36 anybody really making waves in the cybersecurity industry. And we want a good mix of people on the show. So we're not just going for those sort of InfoSec household names, although they are more than welcome and have appeared on the show. But also lesser known folks like Edna P. Kahn, who's a solutions architect at Synac, who have a lot of insights to share, but maybe don't always get to seize the main stage. And what is in it for Synac here to support your efforts? What's the benefit? That's a great question.
Starting point is 00:15:06 And CINAC definitely has, I would say, some unique, what I call brand publishing initiatives, really. And I'm editor-in-chief of ReadMe, which is a cybersecurity publication that covers, on an independent basis, editorially independent from CINAC, just the top happenings of the day. So we have our ChangeLog newsletter, we have our ReadMe.Security cybersecurity publication. And We're In is really an extension of that. It's a way to give back to the cybersecurity community and actually offer some insights and really share
Starting point is 00:15:37 all of the knowledge amassed in our huge, diverse community. And so that's kind of where SYNAC's stake in this is, is really a chance to give a platform to more people and again, build that community. And it's not like a Synac marketing vehicle where we're always trying to hawk Synac products or share the next big Synac solution or something. To the contrary, really, we're trying to draw newsmakers, right? People like the head of the NSA's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, officials from DHS. We had Nicole Perlroth on the show recently, known as a renowned author and former New York Times journalist. And so that's really the goal,
Starting point is 00:16:19 is to kind of give back to the community, really increase everybody's knowledge and lift all boats. And I think that's just so important in cybersecurity, as you well know at the Cyber Wire. And it sounds like that really is the value proposition here. I mean, there's no shortage of cybersecurity shows and lots of shows where folks interview each other. I take part in a few of them myself. What do you suppose sets you apart when you're convincing folks that they should give a listen? That's a great question. And honestly, being here interviewing with you is a little bit intimidating in some sense, because you do obviously such a fantastic job with your show. But it's great to be here. And I will say that I do have quite an extensive background in
Starting point is 00:17:03 journalism. Before joining SYNAC, I worked actually at Politico as an editor, and before that covering cybersecurity for a publication called E&E News, short for Energy and Environment, where I covered a lot of critical infrastructure cybersecurity issues. So I think that's that knowledge base. And what I bring to the show as host and trying to keep things both conversational, but also drawing on that knowledge of reporting and just asking even tough questions of our guests really does set the show apart from some of the others. But I won't say from yours, but we'll just leave it there. I've only been in the podcast business for a little bit here. Oh, you're very kind,
Starting point is 00:17:44 Blake. You're very kind. So are there any particular conversations that have stood out to you, things that perhaps are unexpected or exceptional? Well, I will say one unexpected moment was when a red-tailed hawk landed on the window of Proofpoint senior threat intelligence analyst Selena Larson in the middle of our conversation, which was kind of funny. She's like, wait a minute, there's a hawk. I'm sure you've experienced your fair share of podcast interruptions from various pets and whatnot. Typically, it's chainsaws, jackhammers, and leaf blowers are our natural enemies. Oh, yes.
Starting point is 00:18:18 I don't know that I've had it. Well, I have dealt with the people who've had cages full of birds in the room that they're trying to record in. So that's always fun. That is not advisable, I would say, when you're recording a podcast. But yeah, I try to keep my orange tabby in the other room when I'm recording. But on a serious note, I will say from a content perspective, one of the more memorable conversations that I had was with Wired journalist Andy Greenberg. And he had a new book just come out, which I actually would encourage everybody to check out. It's just a fantastic read called Tracers in the Dark, really documenting this history
Starting point is 00:18:59 of crackdowns on cryptocurrency and actually managing to follow the money back to some of these absolutely abhorrent kingpins and cybercriminals using what they thought were anonymous cryptocurrencies. And I'm using air quotes here. But in fact, actually, with the right mix of expertise and government intervention could be traced back to where it all started and actually wound up with some multilateral international law enforcement takedowns for some of these sites, which was really, it's really riveting stuff.
Starting point is 00:19:32 And so I really enjoyed that conversation with Andy. Well, Blake, the show is called We're In and we are thrilled to have it join us here at the Cyber Wire Network. Any final thoughts before we wrap up today? Well, I actually wanted to ask you a question. We always ask of our guests something that we wouldn't know about them just from reading their LinkedIn profile. So I'm actually curious if you could share something that we wouldn't know about you, Dave, from reading your LinkedIn profile.
Starting point is 00:20:06 your LinkedIn profile? Oh, gosh. I would say this all started with a puppet show. When I was a wee child, I believe the first puppet I ever got was a Cookie Monster puppet for Christmas from Sesame Street. And I started doing puppet shows for anybody, my poor suffering parents, friends, family, neighbors. And that led to actually someone realizing that I could do voiceover work when I was about eight or nine years old. And decades later, here we are. So thank you, Sesame Street. Thank you, Cookie Monster. Who knew, right? Who knew? That is a fun fact. I don't know if we'd find that on your LinkedIn, but maybe you should put it because honestly, puppet show skills underrated, I think, in the scheme of things here. It's generally not something you'd lead with at a
Starting point is 00:20:50 cocktail party, but also no shame in it either. No, no, absolutely not. Well, I really appreciate you having me on the program, Dave. It's great talking with you. And yeah, I hope some of your listeners will consider checking out the We're In podcast. It's available on all your go-to podcasting platforms. All right. Well, Blake, thanks so much for joining us. Thank you. That's Blake Subchak from Synac. He is host of the podcast, We're In.
Starting point is 00:21:16 You can find it wherever all the fine podcasts are listed. And joining me once again is Joe Kerrigan. He is from Harbor Labs and the Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute, and also my co-host over on the Hacking Humans podcast. Hello, Joe. Hi, Dave. So, interesting story here from Bleeping Computer. I suppose some good news. This is an article titled, Five Arrested After 33,000 Victims Lose $98 Million to Online Investment Fraud. What's going on here, Joe? So, this starts off with a very simple social engineering ploy that we talk about frequently over on Hacking Humans. And it's from organizations. It doesn't really name them, but I'm going to go ahead and say this in here. Good old organizations like Google and Facebook and Trade Desk and all these other places that have ad networks. One of the ways these guys make money, and they don't do this deliberately,
Starting point is 00:22:26 but it does attract this kind of person, is they sell ads to people that are running fraudulent businesses. So there were ads on social media talking about opening an account with us will make you huge returns. And people would open accounts with this business that didn't really exist. And the first thing they do is deposit 250 euros into the account. My hunch is that immediately that money's gone. But once you gave them all the information, someone would call you then.
Starting point is 00:22:59 Because when you open a bank account pretty much anywhere in the world, in the industrialized world, you need to provide a bunch of information. And banks say, hey, it's part of our know your customer requirements. We need your name. We need your address. We need your phone number. Right. So all that has to be legit.
Starting point is 00:23:15 And then these guys called them, pretending to be financial advisors, and they promised even higher profits on bigger investments. Right? You know how much money you've been making that little 250 bucks you put in. Why don't you put in like 2000, $3,000. Take it to the next level. We'll take you to the next level. Right, right. They were dealing in something called binary options. I had to look this up. I've never heard the term before and it doesn't really happen in the US a lot, but basically in a regular option is the right to buy or sell a stock at a particular price. Yeah.
Starting point is 00:23:49 And when you buy that option, you lay down cash in order to secure that right. If the stock goes up and you have the right to buy it at the low price, then whatever the difference is between the option price and the price that you can actually sell it at, that's kind of your profit. Binary options don't work like that at all. Binary options, you don't have any right to buy or sell the stock, right? All you have is the right to – or all you do is you bet that the stock price is going up. It's kind of like, I would liken this to almost placing a casino bet based on a stock price movement. So you buy an option for 40 bucks. The price goes above the option. You get a hundred bucks, make 60 bucks profit. If the price doesn't
Starting point is 00:24:37 move above that strike price, you just lose your initial investment. And that's how these guys were getting money out of these folks. I don't know if they were saying, hey, you won today. Here's your 60 bucks. Look, it's in your account. Don't you want to make a big purchase on the next option? I think this one's going to go high. Oh, I was wrong about that. Sorry. I don't know what kind of social engineering attacks were going on inside, but they were running illegal call centers out of Sofia in Bulgaria. They also had call centers in Ukraine and in Cyprus. And they were taken down in a joint operation a little while ago. And now they have just arrested five more people, which is really interesting. One of the things that the article talks about, it says,
Starting point is 00:25:23 today's announcement comes after Ukraine's cybersecurity police and the Europool identified and arrested five key members of another international investment fraud ring behind estimated losses of more than 200 million euros that was lost over a three-year period, small potatoes compared to this other 200 million euros every year that these guys were making. Yeah, I mean I wonder to what degree are the social media platforms responsible here? The social media platforms and the ad brokers. Yeah, exactly. That's where I was going with this. I think, I would argue that ethically and morally, they have more culpability
Starting point is 00:26:10 than they might think they do. But legally, they probably don't have very much at all. Right. Right. They probably just have to demonstrate they're putting forth a good faith effort to not let this kind of stuff
Starting point is 00:26:21 come onto their platform. And they're probably doing the bare minimum legal requirements to keep this stuff off. But in the end, Dave, it's still money that they make. If they thought this was fraudulent and they go, no, no, that's fraudulent, they're walking away from a sale. And there's a real, I don't even know if I'd call it a conflict of interest on their part, but it's a social conflict of interest here. Yeah, a perverse incentive. Yeah, there is a perverse incentive. That's what I'll say.
Starting point is 00:26:48 That's a good word. That's Dubner and Leavitt, right? They coined that phrase. Or maybe it wasn't them. They just used it a lot. Okay. And that's where I read it. Yeah.
Starting point is 00:26:57 All right. Well, as we say, it's nice to see some good news here to find some folks facing justice. Hopefully these guys will enjoy some time away in a nice, comfortable European prison cell. There you go. There you go. All right. Well, Joe Kerrigan, thanks for joining us. It's my pleasure.
Starting point is 00:27:45 Thank you. is a full suite of solutions designed to give you total control, stopping unauthorized applications, securing sensitive data, and ensuring your organization runs smoothly and securely. Visit ThreatLocker.com today to see how a default deny approach can keep your company safe and compliant. And that's The Cyber Wire. For links to all of today's stories, check out our daily briefing at thecyberwire.com. The Cyber Wire podcast is a production of N2K Networks, proudly produced in Maryland out of the startup studios of Data Tribe, where they're co-building the next generation of cybersecurity teams and technologies. This episode was produced by Liz Ervin and senior producer Jennifer Iben.
Starting point is 00:28:36 Our mixer is Trey Hester, with original music by Elliot Peltzman. The show was written by John Petrick. Our executive editor is Peter Kilby, and I'm Dave Bittner. Thanks for listening. We'll see you back here tomorrow. Thank you. AI and data products platform comes in. With Domo, you can channel AI and data into innovative uses that deliver measurable impact. Secure AI agents connect, prepare, and automate your data workflows, helping you gain insights, receive alerts, and act with ease through guided apps tailored to your Data is hard. Domo is easy. Learn more at ai.domo.com. That's ai.domo.com.

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