Dwarkesh Podcast - How Hitler almost starved Britain – Sarah Paine

Episode Date: September 5, 2025

In this lecture, military historian Sarah Paine explains how Britain used sea control, peripheral campaigns, and alliances to defeat Nazi Germany during WWII. She then applies this framework to today, arguing that Russia and China are similarly constrained by their geography, making them vulnerable in any conflict with maritime powers (like the U.S. and its allies).Watch on YouTube; listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify.Sponsors* Labelbox partners with researchers to scope, generate, and deliver the exact data frontier models need, no matter the domain. Whether that’s multi-turn audio, SOTA robotics data, advanced STEM problem sets, or even novel RL environments, Labelbox delivers high-quality data, fast. Learn more at labelbox.com/dwarkesh* Warp is the best interface I’ve found for coding with agents. It makes building custom tools easy: Warp’s UI helps you understand agent behavior and its in-line text editor is great for making tweaks. You can try Warp for free, or, for a limited time, use code DWARKESH to get Warp’s Pro Plan for only $5. Go to warp.dev/dwarkeshTo sponsor a future episode, visit dwarkesh.com/advertise.Timestamps00:00:00 – How WW1 shaped WW200:15:10 – Hitler and Churchill’s battle to command the Atlantic00:30:10 – Peripheral theaters leading up to Normandy00:37:13 – The Eastern front00:48:04 – Russia’s & China’s geographic prisons01:00:28 – Hitler’s blunders & America’s industrial might01:15:03 – Bismarck’s limited wars vs Hitler’s total war Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkesh.com/subscribe

It turns out that the possibilities for maritime and continental powers are a little different. Basically, a small subset of countries can defend themselves primarily at sea, and that opens certain possibilities, and others can't, and that opens and closes certain possibilities. And I'm going to talk at this story from Britain's point of view, the country with the 360, you can't get me moat. and it's an instructive case for the United States of the possibilities and the perils of having this sort of position. So that is my game plan today. And you can look at the great peninsula of Europe where Britain is located. And you can see this northern coastline for Britain where it's uncomfortably close to the continent and its enemies are sitting there. It's an interesting. interesting neighborhood. So here's my plan. I'm going to talk about these continental problems that

Britain has been dealing with. If you think about it, Britain was always fighting France, and then in 1871, Germany unifies, and then the problems, Germany. And I'm going to pick up the story in 1939 when things are really bad for Britain. So I'm going to talk about first these continental problems. And then I'm going to talk about how Britain tried to deal with it. And first, it has to do with getting sea control. And then once you can do that, finding some peripheral theaters where you might be able to fight and deal with the continental problem, and you probably need allies. And so those are the first, the first four topics. Then, so that was then, and now is now. The continental problems now are China and Russia. And to see of what this case study might reveal about the ongoing things.

All right, so here's Britain, uncomfortably close to the continent. If it wants to get to Russia, which is his big ally in World War I and World War II, it's either got to go way up north around the Norwegian coastline, and you get up into places like Murmansk and Archangel, or it's got to go way around through this very narrow sea, the Mediterranean, through the choke point of choke points, which is that Dardanelles and the Bosporus, into the Black Sea, and the main port back in the day was Odessa.

And then if you compare French and British, access to the high seas. France has got a pretty good coastline that just gets it right into the oceans. But Germany, if it wants to send merchant traffic or naval traffic, it's got to go through these narrow seas. And then it's got to get by Britain, which is its big enemy in the two world wars, which is the dominant naval power. So that's complicated. For Britain, if it wants to get to its empire back in the day, it wants to go through the Suez Canal. That requires a cooperation of Spain, France, Italy, and if it wants to get to Russia, Turkey as well. Well, Turkey didn't cooperate very well in either war. And if you think in World War II, well, fall of France,

fascist sympathies of Spain, and then Italy is part of the access. Britain is in real trouble. And what do you do about this? Britain has this big empire that it wants to protect. It's got a massive basing system, more bases than anybody else does, in order to protect this empire from this, which is a very resentful Germany, doesn't much like the Versailles settlement of World War I. It's a divided country in that a Polish corridor separates East Prussia, and the Germans start trying to solve this problem. Initially, they're taking Austria, the Sudan-German parts of Czechoslovakia in 38, then they take all of Czechoslovakia in 39. And they've already, and they've already dealt with the Rhineland, which is supposed to be demilitarized, per the terms of the Versailles

treaty. Will they ignore that, remilitarized in 36? And this is important because there are a lot of industrial resources and factories and things there. It turns out that Hitler's plans require, it's not optional. It requires the resources not only of the Rhineland, but also Czechoslovakia and Poland and Romania, which is going to have the oil for them. So when you get to 39, when you get to 39, when Russia and Germany are dividing up Poland between them, this is the part of the history that Russians don't like to talk about, but it's exactly what they were doing. This triggers World War II because the French and the British honor their alliance with the Poles to help deal with this. All right. So in 1940, Britain's in a world of hurt. It faces this massive blue problem, and then

there's this green, growing green disaster. It's facing two continental powers, Germany and Russia that both have these expansive empires they want to create, they want to divide Europe and then the rest of the world. Bad news for Britain. But 1941, when Hitler decides he needs Russia too, and then Russia decides, ah, the one that's attacking me is probably the major problem, not the other one. So Stalin is going to swap sides,

and he's going to be coordinating with Britain. So that's better from Britain's point of view than having two continental powers trying to deal. deal with it. So now it's down to one. So once the United States has gotten into the war, this is what the world looks like. You have a big cancer in Europe from the British point of view, but it's all surrounded by oceans that Brit can get to. And a lot of allies are neutral states. So Britain has access to those places. And then there's a separate cancer in Asia where Japan's trying to work its magic. And I say separate because the access never coordinated these two theaters.

So this is looking at the world from a maritime perspective. What you're looking at is all the oceanic roots that connect everything. So Britain's problem is how to leverage the miracle of sea transport that basically can access you the whole world versus an logistical nightmare of land transport where you have to, you can only drive through countries that will let you drive through. The seas give you mobility. they give you access to theaters, markets, resources, allies, and they also give you sanctuary at home if you're surrounded by them. It makes it harder for people to invade.

So Britain's trying to leverage all of that against the armies of the continental armies by it's going to try to strangle them economically, diplomatically, and militarily. Now, the generation that led World War II in Britain, and not just Britain, but elsewhere, they were the conscripts of World War I, which was supposed to end all wars, and they knew full well as in the midst of World War II that it did not remotely achieve that promise. And so they learned a whole series of lessons, and I'm going to do a comparison of what was done in World War I versus World War II. And they are the greatest generation, not their children who claim the title. Lesson number one is don't go beyond the culminating point of attack. What's that? The terminology

comes from Klausowitz, Carl von Klauswitz, who is the Western guru on conventional land warfare, which means as if you're attacking in a battle, if you go too far, you'll weaken yourself because the enemy will counterattack,

send you further backwards than you would have otherwise. In the case of World War I, you're sending young men over trenches into ongoing machine gunfire. What do you suppose is going to happen to them? And this profligate waste of life in these assaults out of trenches.

Maybe you took a little territory in the first two weeks, but after that, nothing. These offenses will go on for months and months, racking up hundreds of thousands of deaths. No more doing that in World War II. And you can look the death figures for World War I and two. So in World War I, the British Army gets the multi-million man army that they had coveted.

They deployed on the main front from, start to finish, and they chalk up twice as many deaths as they did in World War II when they have a peripheral strategy. In World War II, they do make the mistake is they land the big army on the continent, opening move, but it doesn't do well, and then they reassess, and they get that army off the continent immediately. This is what the Dunkirk evacuation is, where the French are covering the British as they're decamping from the continent, saving the British Army, and this is why France has such large casualties. It is doing this, even though France is in the war that long. So it's going to be a long wait before the British get back on the continent again. Long wait,

also for the United States to get in the war. There's no more going beyond the culminating point of attack. The way diplomacy is run is also completely different. In World War I, there are exactly two conferences trying to coordinate things among the Entente powers. and they're the December, 1915 and November, 1916, Chanty conferences, and all they are are the military heads. Well, the Russian Romanov dynasty is overthrown in early 1917. It is too late. What happened in World War I is the Germans focused on the Western Front in 1914,

Eastern Front, 1915, back to the Western Front in 1960. Well, in World War II, the idea is you want to squeeze them simultaneously from all front so they can't divert people back and forth. And if you look at the coordination, it begins even before the United States is in the war with the ABC staff talks, and then the Atlantic Conference, which yields the Atlantic Charter,

which is talking about what war objectives are, unconditional surrender of Germany, and also what the post-war situation is going to look like. And there's coordination not only among military leaders, but civil and military leaders as well. there's a combined command of U.S. and British forces. We have offices in each other's capitals, but we're also coordinating with the Russians so that you're setting up not only also war termination and what post-war institutions are going to be like to hold the peace. It's a completely different

event from World War I when Russia falls out of the entente because there are bread rights in St. Petersburg and Russia could not supply its troops with adequate armament. well, that's not going to happen in World War II. Russia comes with a really large army. Germany has another large army. You've got to have a big army to deal with Germany's army. So in World War I, there is no Len Lysaid. No one would have thought of giving that much stuff to each other.

It's like everybody first. And it's like, okay, everybody lasts doing that one. The railways had not been completed in World War I. The Trans-Siberian doesn't get completed until 1916. and the Murmansk Railway, you can see Murmansk up there, isn't completed until early 1917. The Romanov dynasty is gone. It's too late. In World War II, three quarters of Lenle's aid would go over those completed railway systems. Now, to the British credit, they did try to break the blockade on Russia. The way to get into Russia in those days and hook in with the railway

system would be to get into the Black Sea in Odessa. Because Russia, had all the men, but they didn't have all the war material to fight. So this is where the Gallipoli campaign comes in. You could argue about whether you think it is good strategy or not, but it was miserably executed. So first of all, it wasn't a joint operation. What's joint? Joint means you're coordinating your different military services, in this case, Army and Navy. So what goes on? The British Navy tries to run the Dardanelles for two months. That does not work well. Do you suppose the Ottomans might think something was up? Yeah. And when you get up there on the Darnel's, all the high point, it's a very steep place. So the Ottomans are all busy sorting that all

out, getting troops in place. So two months later, when the British, New Zealand, Australian, and French troops all land on a given day, the Ottomans are there with a welcome party, essentially. And that invasion stalemates in three days. But they keep at it for eight months, taking 190,000 casualties, 55,000 of whom are dead men, totally miserably executed. And it comes with collateral damage. As the British are trying to run the Dardanelles

with their navy, this is when the Ottomans are terrified of their Christian subjects, Armenians, and they're starting to round them up. They're pulling them out of the army, and then days before the landing, the Turkish massacre of the Armenians began, and between 1915 and 1921, 23, 1.5 million Armenians are killed. That's a lot of collateral damage. All right, the Normandy landings

are a completely different event in World War II. This is another contested landing of trying to get armies in. First of all, the buildup of war material goes on for years to get all the landing vessels in, the equipment, the forces, all ready to go in Britain. And then the disinformation campaign kept the Germans completely disinformed. They were expecting the landing to be at the Pad de Calais, which is the shortest place, and it's way off in Normandy. That works. So everybody lands on a day, and they're up and over and into places inland. Another lesson learned. The Royal Navy did not think that convoy duty was the manly thing to do. They would convoy troop transports, but they wouldn't deal with the Merchant Marine until 1918. Well, the Germans almost sank a

terminal quantity of that stuff. So the Navy is not thinking about the economic dimensions of warfare. They're just focused on all the military things in World War I. In World War II, the British would be convoying even before they got in the war. Another difference between the World War II and World War I. At the end of World War I, if you look at the disposition of German troops, they're abroad. They're occupying Belgium, Luxembourg, parts of France. Nobody's in Germany. Yes, the Germans had really lousy meals during the war. But German civilians did not feel the full brunt of what their government had done. And therefore, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt felt that it was really critical to have boots on the ground in Berlin to let the Germans know

exactly what had happened to them and let them feel the war that they had inflicted on others in order to end it. Even so, the Allies win this thing and they wreck the continental powers, but they almost wrecked themselves in the process. It's a Pyrrhic victory for France and Britain. It really weakens them. So World War II is going to be a different event. So that's the being in this continental situation and the lessons learned from the last time around. And now for what the British did in World War II to deal with a continental problem. The opening move of a maritime power in a really high-stakes war like this is typically blockade. What you want to do is cut your enemy off from the oceans and force it to cannibalize its own resources and those of occupied areas.

And because of the geographic position of a maritime power, you can quite often do this to a continental power on narrow seas. And Britons were well aware that Germany is a trading country. most of it trade goes by sea, and it's also on these narrow seas. So geographically and economically, it's really vulnerable to blockade. And I get it. Germany gets alternate resources. But they come at a much higher cost. They're much more difficult, and so that you're really putting a stress on the German

economy and causing inflation and other things. But if you blockade, a continental power can't blockade you back. why they're on the narrow seas so they can't deploy a surface fleet you'll sink it and also um they can't easily blockade a coastline that faces the open seas the high seas that you can do other things on narrow seas but it's pretty tough so what do you do if you cannot blockade ships in port well then what you're going to try to do is commerce rating to try and uh sink things when they're out and about and that was what Germany did in World War II, and why its occupation of France was so important, because once it took the French coastline, it then set up U-boat pens in Bres, L'Oriand, San Nazaire, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux.

And they're going to be using these to fight the Battle of the Atlantic. That's the game. So maritime powers do blockade. The response of continental power is commerce rating, and then the maritime response to that is going to be a convoy your merchant ships. Okay. As the war begins in Europe, the United States is not in, but Roosevelt is coordinating with Latin America to set up a big neutrality zone all around the Americas, 300 nautical miles. And then the Len Least Act, also before U.S. belligerency, there's pieces of it, which say the United States is going to take over British bases in Iceland and set up bases in Greenland. and why do we care about those locations?

They're really important if you're going to send convoys back and forth across the Atlantic, both to attack and to defend. So that's what we're up to. But even so, the Axis visits a real nightmare in the Battle of the Atlantic. A lot of things are going down. So how does that all work? So before the United States gets in at the very beginning, these U-boats turn the North Sea into a kill zone,

and then Britain is losing an awful lot of stuff off of its shores and also off the shores of Africa. And the Germans get really good at commerce rating really fast. And there's also the fall of France, which is a mess, because prior to the fall of France, Britain is only convoying just to be on Ireland. Once you get the fall of France and all of those submarines on French territory,

then the British have to convoy 400 miles further west, and they've lost an awful lot of destroyers between the fall of Norway and then the Dunkirk evacuation. So they haven't got enough ships to convoy properly. And then the Germans are really creative. Admiral Dunnets who runs the submarine service at this point. He uses Wolfpack tactics

where you concentrate a whole bunch of submarines on a convoy, tack it at night, and bad things happen to the convoy. Also, the Germans have captured some of the British codes so they have a sense of where the convoy's are, and they're sinking almost a terminal tonnage of this traffic. 850,000 tons of Allied shipping is going down. So this is Hitler's happy time when he's sinking an awful lot of stuff.

Then there's a big Greenland gap. This is where there's a lack of air cover. And so you'll see a lot of things are going down in this Greenland gap. But meanwhile, the British have gotten pretty good at espionage, and they've captured a lot of enigma machines. Those are what the Germans are using to encrypt their messages. Well, the British capture some machines, some rotors, some code books in 1940 and 41. So by the summer of 1941 through February 42, they can actually read the codes or some of them decrypt them

so that within 36 hours they can get the information out. And this allows convoys to go, oh, Wolfpack there, we're going to do evasive routing of the convoys somewhere else. and that may have saved up to 2 million tons of allied shipping. But meanwhile, for the Germans, General Rommel is in North Africa, and he's having troubles because he's supplied across the Mediterranean and the British and friends are sinking too many of his supplies. So Admiral Dunnets is told to reroute some of the U-boats in the Atlantic to go help General Rommel up in North Africa.

the United States isn't in the war, so all quiet on the eastern seaboard. So it's looking like it might be okay for the British for a while, except Duned's think something's up. And so they add a fourth rotor to the Enigma machine. And so the British are then blind again for most of 1942 until they can get a capture a four-rotor enigma machine, all the rotors plus the co-books. It takes a while. So they're in a world of hurt. The United States enters the war, which you think would be good for Britain, except it produces Hitler's second happy time.

Why? Because Admiral King, like his Royal Navy predecessors in the previous war, doesn't think convoying is the manly thing for naval officers to be up to. So he's not for convoying. Also, Americans don't turn off the lights. And therefore, as merchant ships are going up the... East Coast of the United States. The lighting is just highlighting their silhouettes,

making them much easier to sink. And, oh, by the way, in those days, Louisiana, Texas oil, which is supplying the East Coast where a lot of American industry is, is coming up by ships on the eastern seaboard, and particularly by Cape Hatteras, shoals, which are like 30 miles wide,

become a total kill zone. So Admiral King rethinks it after losing more than a million tons of tonnage in the first three months of 42 and goes, oh, gee whiz, maybe we should do convoys. Yes. And the United States does interlocking convoy system by May of 1942, but then Dunnitz just starts hunting things a little further south in the Caribbean. So the Brits get their four-ruder enigma machine and they're able to decode things again.

But there's another problem. The British think that there's something up with their admiralty code. in August of 42, but they don't change them out until June of 43. There was something wrong. The Germans were reading them. So you can see this back and forth in the Battle of the Atlantic. But eventually, the air cover gap is closed. This makes a tremendous difference.

There are new technologies that are introduced at ruin Admiral Dunnets. Here was what happens. The United States had radar. Germans never did. American radar improves, so you can see through. the fog. The United States adds hedgehogs. What are they? Not the cute little critters. It's rather, if you have a ship and you have hedgehogs, they deliver an elliptical spray of depth charges. So anybody who's anywhere underneath you is in a world of hurt. In addition, the United States

introduces two new classes of ships, one auxiliary aircraft carriers, little ones. That means you're going to have air cover for the entire journey, right? When you get beyond land-based air, then these folks will take over. In addition, small destroyer escorts were introduced instead of the big ones. And these little ships, they've had all sorts of fun things on board, sonar, radar, depth charges, headhogs. And so they transform commerce rating into a low life expectancy profession. So that in May of 43, the Germans lose 41 U-boats. That's unsustainable. That's a massive percentage of what they have. And in one of those, in I think it's about 25 U-boats going after a convoy of 37 ships, sink nothing, lose three U-boats, plus another one damage. And on one of these U-boats is Admiral Dunnets's 19-year-old son Peter, who dies in all of this. So Dunnets, as a result, redeploys the U-boats out of the North Atlantic because it's unsustainable for Germany south of the Azores. And yet there are problems going on with the Arctic convoy. that takes a quarter of the Lenleese aid to Stalin.

And it gets called off from much of 42 and much of 43, and I'll get into it. But that problem gets solved. And then you can see where all the kills are. And their Germans are losing U-boats closer and closer to home shores. So the Battle of the Atlantic is won by the Allies, in part by reducing merchantman losses through convoyes, evasive convoys, and also increasing U-boat losses through all these different technologies and also reading their mail, which helps to find them. But one could argue even more important was the civilian side of it.

The United States' ability to just overwhelm Germany with the construction of U.S. naval and merchantmen. Here are the stats. Look what happens with naval strength. 43, U.S. Navy hulls and personnel are tripling. That's quite a lot. And then naval hulls are going to double in the next year. That's a lot of ships and a lot of people in the Navy. Here's some more fun statistics. So if you look in 1941 and go over, that's a bumper year for U-boat construction, 1941. Going to 1942, really ugly if you're a merchant-brand crew member because it's double the number of tonnage of merchant ships that are being sunk, but then keep moving over. Look at merchant hull construction up by four times, and the next year that's going to double. And oh, let's look over for 1943. Look how many U-boats are being sunk. It goes way up with all those new technologies that

I've just told you about. So even though the Germans produce a lot more U-boats, the kill rate is so high that there's hardly any net gain. And then here's some more fun ways of looking at it. So you look at new ships. As soon as the United States gets in the war, new ship rates go up, up and away. But the losses are really high through mid-1943. And then it's in mid-1943 that you can see the big divergence between construction and what's being destroyed. And the Germans just can't keep up with this. There is just way too much stuff out there for them to sink. All right. So Admiral Dunnitz did get one thing right. His boss there, Admiral Rader, who's ahead of the Navy, had said, the pocket battleships were the thing to use for commerce raiding,

and Dunnets proves him wrong that U-Boats are the way to go. And Hitler agrees, so he cashiers-rater, makes Dunnets the head of the Navy, and then Hitler goes one step further. He scraps his surface fleet because it's useless to him in this war. You cannot deploy it in this kind of high-stakes war, something that countries like China surrounded by narrow seas ought to think about. All right. So if you look at why the Battle of the Atlantic turned out the way it did, is Germany and Britain have very different geographies. And arguably Germany bought the wrong

Navy before the war. It should have bought a lot of U-boats and forget the surface, minimize the surface boats that you're buying. And so Britain could do things that Germany just plain couldn't. that's just part of the geography. So the effects of the blockade were really significant. You're really straining the German economy. But the German commerce rating was also very effective. The Germans almost sank a terminal quantity of British trade. It's close because Britain is dependent not only on oil imports, resources, but about half of its food supply.

So the Germans tried and came close. And then you go, well, the counter-competent. commerce rating strategy did work, but it was very, there was touch and go back and forth, and it required a lot of things that had to be coordinated. You needed the intelligence. It really helps reading other people's mail. You needed a whole set of new ship classes. You need to be able to construct adequate quantities of naval hulls, merchant hulls. You need to coordinate with allies. You've got to get food and other things to Britain. There are a lot of things going on here. You need air cover the planes that are capable of doing it. So there are a lot of things

going on. Remove any one of them and the outcome may have been different. If you're developing frontier models, you know that high quality data sets the ceiling on performance. Labelbox is the rare data partner that works hand in hand with researchers throughout their entire process. Not only will they get you the data that you need, they'll also help you figure out what data is needed to make your research ideas work in the first place. To give you an example, I've talked before about why I think that fully automated computer use will be difficult. You have to build thousands of environments where language models can practice long horizon problems using common pieces of software.

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audio for multi-turned voice, action data for robotics, or problem sets or physics. Labelbox can get you the best data and fast. Learn more at Labelbox.com slash Dwarkesh. All right, back to Sarah. All right. So that's it on the Commerce rating. So once you command the Atlantic, which means that a sustainable amount of traffic is going to get through from the Allied powers, then you can start thinking about peripheral theaters.

Okay, what's a peripheral theater? The main theater is Russia in this war. Not what you think. Why? Because between two-thirds and three-quarters of German ground forces were always fighting Russia. That means these other theaters, which are peripheral to the main theater,

take up between one quarter to one-third of German forces. That makes them peripheral. Doesn't make them unimportant, but they're not the main theater. and by the way, who would want to fight on the main theater if they're alternatives? People die on droves in the main theater. So this man, Sir Julian Corbett, very fine naval theorists of Britain, who was heartbroken in World War I that Britain ignored his naval strategy,

which was don't do the continental commitment and run the war through these peripheral operations. And it wrecked his health. But here's what, according to Corbett, are there prerequisites for a theater that makes a really good one? for a peripheral operation. One, it has to be overseas so the enemy can't invade you or wreck your productive base. Secondly, you need local sea control to get in there, but that local sea access has got to be better than the land access, because you want to have it easier for Britain to get in and out than it is for the enemy because then attrition rates will favor Britain.

Britain also should deploy a disposal force. What's that? it means those forces you have who are in excess of what's necessary for homeland defense. It's not disposable force. It's rather a force that if everything goes south, you won't ruin the homeland. But you can afford to risk it on potentially very risky, but potentially war-changing operations. In addition, they've got to be joint operations. Joint means cooperation of land and sea in this era.

And in order, you're going to come in by sea, you're going to supply by sea, you'll be fighting online, you better coordinate all that. And it's got to be combined operations. What does that mean? Coordinating with allies. You need friendly locals who are going to help you do all of this. And then you need to command your own forces. Why? Because you want to determine how they come in, how they go out. If it all goes badly, you want to be able to leave, which is what they did at Dunkirk. As much as the Continental Power might want to play this game, they cannot because they don't have the requisite sea access to pull it off. All right, the war winds up with Britain and the United States going through four phases. Well, Britain all four are some of the later ones of four peripheral theaters.

First, the North Sea, that's essential for British homeland defense. And there are three keys to the North Sea, Scapa Flow, Strait of Dover, coast of Norway. Britain always controlled the Strait of Dover and Scapa Flow. So Germany went after Norway to try and open things up that way. And Norway is not an ideal peripheral theater for Britain because the Germans had better land and sea access to that theater. They take Norway. And then they set up sub-bases at Bergen and Trondheim,

in addition to the ones they had at Kiel, Hamburg, and the Heligoland archipelago, and these are the things that are ruining those Arctic convoys. So that one does not go so well for Britain. It winds up facing a totally hostile continental Europe shoreline. The Axis has it all. All right, in the Mediterranean, there's certain keys that Britain controlled Gibraltar. That's access to the Atlantic, Suez Canal, access to the Red Sea.

Crete, that's access to the Black Sea. And then the British had a fallback position, a midway point at Malta, if things went really bad. So the Germans attack the fallback position because they're trying to, they're trying to bail out the Italians and fighting in North Africa. And so they're trying to take Malta because who are. whoever's got planes there can cause convoys all kinds of problems or they can protect their own things. And so Malta is blockaded by the Germans. It's not relieved until the end of 1942. So that is not great for Britain. It's threatening, well, it's access to the empire. And the problem for Britain is Italian belligerency. Italians had been part of the entente in World War I. Well, they're part of the Axis in World War II. And three of the

these keys, Malta, Crete, and the Suez Canal lying the center of Italian admissions because they want an empire where they go down the Balkan coast and then they're going to go deep into Libya and Ethiopia to unify their empire around the Red Sea. And so Mussolini kicks this thing off, except then he gets stuck in Greece. And so the Germans have to come and bail them out. They chase the British out of Greece. The Britons are then on Crete, and then that falls to the Germans. So the Britons are in a world of hurt. The Suez Canal is under threat. Think about it. Fall of Norway, fall of France, blockade of Malta, fall of Crete. It is really bad news. However, when the United States gets into the war, the United States can help Britain retake some of these keys to the Mediterranean. And this is what is going on in

North Africa. So Admiral Dunitz had saved it initially, but after the United States is in with more assets, Dunnets is oil, the tanker supplying his oil. 60% of them are getting sunk because Malta holds and Malta is supplied and these tankers are getting bombed out of existence. And so Ramel loses in North Africa, not because he's the inferior general, he's a better general, he's just not supplied. And this is the key. And once you take North Africa, that peripheral operation, it opens the opportunity to go into Sicily and then the rest of Italy. And once you get that going, there's a possibility to do the Normandy landing. So there's four different peripheral operations. Some would argue that the air campaign over Germany was another peripheral campaign. You're bringing the war home to Germans.

you're wrecking their productive base. And also, it's a major help to the Russians. Why? Because once the British start brawming Berlin, Hitler calls off air squadrons from the Eastern Front and these anti-aircraft guns can be used against tanks or aircraft. He pulls those back, and that means the Germans no longer own the skies of Russia,

and you're no longer going to be taking hundreds of thousands of POWs. Okay. So that's how the... the peripheral strategies worked out, but they're coordinated through allies, figuring out how to make all of them work. And here are the stats on allies. Alliances are additive, right? You should ideally add up all the complementary capabilities of you and your friends and then share them, divvy them out, in an optimal way to deal with things. Well, the Axis Alliance was also additive in the sense that the Germans added to their GDP, the GDPs of all the places they occupied, that pretty much accounted

for GDP growth in Germany, except that whole way of doing things involves big occupation forces, which are big overhead of these conquered places, and you've also damaged them in the conquest, whereas the allies are all game to help each other. And also when Germany took over continental Europe, it's taking the big petroleum deficit zone because Europe doesn't produce petroleum. The North Sea oil, those things hadn't been discovered in those days. Yes, Romania has oil. Yes, Hitler takes Romania. But Romanian pipelines ran to pre-war customers, and it's very difficult to find the manpower and the steel to reroute all of your pipelines in war time. So that's a whole other part of Hitler's problems. So as you're putting together these complementary capabilities,

the Russians have a huge army. Most of the fighting takes place between Russia and Germany. The Russians wreck the German army. You know, millions of Russians and Germans are dying here. But if you look at Operation Barbarossa, which is Germany's initial invasion of the Soviet Union, they suffer a nearly 30% casualty rate. That's called catastrophic success. You have too many successes like that, it'll be catastrophic. And here's the mathematics of the main front. Only two countries have really big armies, Germany and Russia. Once the Germans take, maximize their territorial conquest, they've reduced Russian population because they've conquered all these areas to less than that of the United States, yet nevertheless, the Russians mobilize twice

the army that the United States does. And if you look at the mathematics of munitions, the Russians on their lonesome produce more munitions than did Germany. Once the United States gets in the war, we produce a hundred billion in whatever dollars it wasn't on munitions. And in that period, the Germans produced less than 40 billion. So bad news for Germany on all of these numbers. The trick is getting the munitions to the men, whereas in World War I, that wasn't feasible. But now these railway lines have been completed and it's pouring in. And the Lenle's aid, you look at it, wow, Britain's getting a lot. Russia quite a bit but less.

China and nothing. What's going on there? You can only get aid in if there are ports and railways. Japan blockaded China, proof of concept. It can be done. The Japanese did it. And you could not get stuff in. So what the United States was trying to do,

the British thought we were insane. They're probably correct. We were flying things in over the Himalayas, called the hump. Great. So you're going to fly in the aviation fuel to land that's going to be the same aviation fuel that's going to get you back and however many other bombers that you can deal with in China. It's not workable. And Russia, even though it got a lot less than Britain because it's not getting ships, but it's getting equally valuable, useful things. For instance, Russia produces a lot of planes, but it doesn't produce, didn't produce adequate high-octane aviation fuel. The United States

had loads of that. The United States produced all kinds of vehicles. all kinds of rolling stock, locomotives. And this is what Russia used to transport everything. And the United States prevented Russia from going into a famine in the winter of 42, 43. We fed them. And this spam and a cam, this is horn mouth, inner foods, contribution to the war.

Everyone had so much spam during the war. It's canned pork. No one ever wanted to see it again. But a little can of pork, it goes a long way. It doesn't spoil in a can. And this lend-lease aid goes, a quarter of it goes up through Murmansk, a lot of it gets sunk up there and not reliable. A quarter of it goes through Persia and then half of it goes over the Trans-Siberian.

And you go, well, what's this Axis alliance about? Why aren't the Japanese sinking any of this, right? Talk about a dysfunctional alliance. All right. So this is to tell you what happened with those Arctic convoys. You can see in 42 a tremendous number of them were sunk. And this is fully laden ships with scarce war material. So we and the British called them off for most of 42 and most of 43.

And Stalin was beside himself. And so in 43, he's sending out feelers to Hitler trying to do a separate piece. And luckily, Hitler was not interested. Hitler wasn't wasting his time with targeting empty ships on the home voyage. He was only going after the laden one. Okay. So what is all this Lenleese age? support. What does it add up to? Well, in Barbarossa, you got 3 million plus Russians going after

3 million Germans. That's a lot of people to supply and tie up. And as you watch that go, the Axis is killing Russians or making the POWs by the millions, but it's suffering 15% losses of its forces, and it's going to add up. So that when you get to August 41, that's when the siege of Leningrad, St. Petersburg begins. By December, the axis are within 25 miles of Moscow. It is not looking good at all. But once the United States is in the war, you can start doing peripheral theaters, like in North Africa. And then these casualties, while they aren't as significant as what's going on on the main front, it's cumulative. So Stalingrad, the largest battle, the war is going on. You've got North Africa. And then when you have Kirst, which is the largest set piece, battle the wars, big, big tank battle. This is when Sicily is happening and moving up the Italian peninsula. And you can see the cumulative effects of these sequential operations and adding up both the main theater and the peripheral theater. So that when you get to Normandy, the Russians are tying up 228 access divisions. There are only 58 access divisions all in

you're at Western Europe, Italy and everywhere. So that's what makes Normandy possible, is the Russians really holding on to things. But when you start looking at the main front, the peripheral operations in Italy, and then Normandy, and they have additional fronts in France, and then the Balkans,

this continental cancer is into remission, that the Germans just can't sustain it. Okay. To summarize, before Britain had allies in this war, it was in a world of hurt. It was just losing one thing after another. But once you get the big continental buddy,

don't dismiss the importance of a big continental buddy that is in the area where the fighting is taking place, not separated by the seas, but there with a big army, that was essential. And then once the United States gets in with its big productive base, then you can really start doing things. Because if you can command the seas, that's what the Battle of Atlantic is about,

then you can connect the world. and connect allies, theaters, resources. So here are the operational effects of these peripheral operations. You start with one where you can. If you win there, it'll open up a menu of more promising locations, all the while you're atriding your enemy's forces, and also if you're doing it right, you're relieving pressure on the main front for Russia,

which is doing the heavy lifting. The strategic effects, if you can do this success, is you're going to control resources for yourself, deny them for people you don't like, and this will help put time on your side. You're strengthening your alliance system because you're essential to each other's survival as you coordinate things, and you're dividing your enemy's attentions among multiple theaters over extending them. So you start by trying to contain the problem, and as things go on, you try to roll it back, and then you go for regime change. So you're producing cumulative effects from these sequential operations. So that's how it works.

Churchill, the great wit, talked about the hassles of dealing with allies, right? These are high-stakes discussions. They don't always go pleasantly. But his idea is there's only one thing worse than fighting with allies. That's fighting without them, because they'll be toast. You need these complementary capabilities, different locations, and coordinating it to gang up on your continental problem. Also, if you stick with it, you can help establish precedence, laws, institutions that will hold the peace after the war. So that's his take. All right, so I've given you a big exposition on maritime solutions to continental problems, which are in a global war, which is blockade and then countering their commerce rating, peripheral operations, massive production,

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Okay, back to Sarah. So that was then. How about now? Okay, this is what NATO looks like. And you can look at the United States with our western and eastern coasts that are unencumbered. You wouldn't be able to blockade those. The two narrow seas are the Sea of Labrador and the Caribbean. But basically, hard to imagine that the United States Navy wouldn't be able to deploy in wartime

with a same thing true on the big peninsula of Europe yeah i get it uh turkey may not be able to deploy but spain france and uh norway there there are these unencumbered coastlines they'll probably get their navies out eurasia is a completely different story this is where china and russia live no one's done this to them this is just the way it is it's all of these narrow seas that become kill zones in wartime i've described it to you how it works and i get it there's the Arctic up there, but there's no economic activity or population. So being able to run things in the Arctic doesn't do you very good. Do you very much good. So nature naturally contains both Russia and China. It's just the way it is. So let's start with Putin here, Vlad the Bad, on his

little Mongol pony, a continental mode of transport. If you live there, what can you get out of it? It's a long horse ride if you're going to do it that way. So whom can he blockade? Well, he's got one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been under repair since 2018, a long time to be in the shop. It required the largest dry dock that Russia has to repair it, and then it flipped the dry dock, which then gashed the hull. And there's been all sorts of charges of embezzlement, various fires on board,

It's not getting repaired anytime fast. And it's just like an occupational hazard problem. So that one's not doing any good. He's got Putin has got two liquid playgrounds that he likes. One's the Black Sea. Before he got involved with Ukraine, in theory he could have blockaded, I guess, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia if you wanted to.

That was why he's so interested in the Kersh Strait, which would blockade the Sea of Azov because he wanted to take Ukraine from east to west. was part of the plan. Oh yeah, and he used to have, maybe still does, unknown, one overseas base, Tartu, Syria. Talk about a garden spot. And I guess if you want to go bomb civilians, that would be a location for you. But now that Bashar al-Assad has moved to Moscow, it's unclear how that works. But in any case, it's a useless base because in wartime, no one gets through the dardanelles. That place can be shut down with mines. And the Ukrainians have shown that, you know,

you don't even need a Navy to stop a Navy in narrow seas. It should be a real wake-up call to anyone on a narrow sea that just by using drones and shore ordinance and planes and things that you can wreck navies, and in fact, the Russian naval base used to be at Sevastopol on Crimea. Putin's had to move it to Nova Rasek. Great, so he can't do too much there. Have fun with that one. So there are many fewer possibilities for him nowadays. The second favorite liquid playground is the Baltic. Kaliningrad is sovereign Russian territory. So back in the day, I guess, if they wanted to blockade the Baltic states, they could try it.

But after the latest iteration of the Ukraine war, Sweden and Finland of ditch neutrality, they're part of NATO. Baltic states are also NATO. So the Baltic is really a NATO lake. There's not too much Putin can do there. So his latest gig is cutting undersea cables. That's about where he's at. I mean, look about trying to leave the Baltic.

It doesn't happen in wartime. You're stuck in there. So it turns out that Putin, Russia, is much more vulnerable to blockade than the other way around because it's very easy to close up the Baltic and Black seas. You look out on what's going on, and they're hemmed in, and it's all way up north. Russia has two really big naval bases, one on the Bering Sea, one of the Bering Sea, the Barents Sea. But the problem is when they deploy out of those bases, they have to go by NATO territory. So if the Barency, you can see why Greenland and Iceland are so strategic, because

for Russia to deploy, it's got to go in between those places. And then on the Bering Sea, the more promising one for Russia has to go by the United States. But the problem is, how do you supply the thing on the Bering Sea? It's just a long way from any industrial base. So another part of Putin's sad story has to do with NATO. So if you look at it, NATO, you can look at its accession in arcs, initially in the Cold War, the early Cold War, it's all of these smaller European nations, and everybody's smaller than Russia. It's by far the biggest country on the planet and why they need more territory. It remains a mystery. But initially, it's the smaller places joining NATO to protect themselves. And then at the implosion of the Soviet

Union, it's all its former satellites fleeing at the first possible moment and saying, NATO, NATO, let me in. And then with the Ukraine, 2020, part of the Ukraine War, Sweden and Finland, which long had preferred neutrality, said, oh, no, no, we're going to join NATO. Now, the Russians look at this and they go, well, this is NATO coming at us in ARCS. They're ignoring their complicity in all of this. If you occupy places and brutalize them for generations, this is what you get. So here is Putin's muse, or I don't know if it's his muse, but it's a guy who expresses a lot of ideas like Putin's Alexander Dugan. Here's his view of how the world should be. It's not over

a universal rules-based order where we all trade with each other. It's rather we're going to divide it up into these spheres of influence where each is a world into itself. Dugan's worked it out for all of us. But here are the places that Russia has actually taken lately. At the end of the Cold War, it took Transnistria from Moldova. In 2008, it took Abhazia and South of Hesians. from Georgia, and then 2014, it's taking Crimea, Luhanska, and Donatz from Ukraine, and then look how it really works. This is a continental view. You want to color it all in. That's what the 2022 invasion of Ukraine is. It's the way a continental power looks at territory. All right, the United States thinks that Putin is just all worried about us and NATO. Actually, Putin's

problem is China. NATO doesn't want Russian territory. Who? would want it. It's full of Russians. Stay at home, please. Just don't leave. But China might want. And also Putin has said, you know, if you really feel deeply about a place, forget about boundary treaties, you should be able to take it. Well, Zaris, Russia took a lot of places from China that the Chinese might feel deeply about that have precisely the resources that China needs, not only energy and all those sorts of things out in Siberia, but water. Lake Baikal holds 20% of the world's surface freshwater, and China's been blowing through its water table in North China. And that one, I think the topography works that you could do a fairly, you could pipe it all in. So here's Putin

dumping his ordinance on Ukraine that never wanted to invade while he's letting this problem mishastasize. Oh, speaking of the problem, here he is. What are Xi Jinping's possibility? You like the little natty upgraded moussuit? Here's his world. Welcome to it. And what he's got are 20 neighbors. 13 by land, 7 by sea, many of which despise China for excellent reasons. Not all of them, but some of them. And if you look at it, it's all of these narrow seas.

If Xi Jinping wanted to blockade somebody, I guess you could try Korea because you got the yellow sea and then the sea of Japan, except Japan sits out there. That's a complicating factor. Better bets in the South China Sea because Vietnam, Brunei, and Cambodia, they don't have alternate coastlines.

If they want to reach the open oceans, they've got to transit the South China Sea. However, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, all have other coastlines that face the high seas. And remember, I've just given you a whole discussion about the Battle of the Atlantic, where when people get to have a high sea, high seas access, it's really difficult to shut them down because China would have to go all

around to be on the far side to shut everything down on the other side or maybe they're just going obliterate it. I don't know. But anyway, the South China Sea is such a legal mess. No one knows who owns what. And in any kind of war, you're going to have all these neutrals who might suddenly join sides if they don't like what's happening. But you can get a sense of what the possibilities are there. It's very difficult. Usually in a war, we've already done. narrow seas, right? The North Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, they shut down in wartime to commercial traffic. It simply can't make it through, and surface fleets have great difficulty. And if the neighbors, as Ukraine has shown, just by the right drones and since the

seas a little bigger, buy some submarines, some plains shore artillery, that might be enough to just close down China's merchant marine, certainly the merchant marine, but also its Navy. So If you want to go the other way of, well, what about Xi Jinping doing a surprise visit on the West Coast? There's a lot of open ocean. Hawaii would be the nearest big island, and it's a long way away, and Hawaii's dependent on imports for everything. It's not very useful. But for the United States going the other way, the islands get bigger and better, the closer to China that you get. So, to leave you with Alfred Thierman, captain and leader admiral, by far the most famous person ever associated.

with the U.S. Naval War College, where I spent my career. Here are his prerequisites for playing the maritime game. One, you need a moat. You've got to have insulation from attack if you want to play this game. You need a dense internal transportation grid to get the goods out in peacetime, reliable egress by sea, to get the Navy out in wartime,

a dense coastal population that's going to be running all the trade, commerce-driven economy, and then you need a government that's stable that is going to support funding a Navy and supporting commerce. Okay, let's line up Russia and China with these prerequisites. Well, neither one's got them out. They got more neighbors than any other two other countries on the planet. So definitely not that.

Internal transportation grid, Russia's remains lamentable. China's is getting better. Neither one has reliable egress by sea with these narrow seas. Sure, Russia's got the Arctic, but there's nothing up there. I mean, they're polar bears. Great. Go get bitten. And as for dense coastal population, yes, China has a dense coastal population, but Russia doesn't way up north. Russia's never had a commerce-driven economy. China was more so under Deng Xiaoping, but under Xi Jinping, he is privileging the crony sector over the private sector, and neither one has stable government institutions. The litmus test of that one is whether you have transparent, regular transfers of power, usually through elections, and dictator for does not remotely qualify. So, sure, China and Russia remain continental problems, but I don't think they understand the maritime limitations of where they're at. And of course, peace would be the better thing, keep compounding growth and war as the Ukrainian war shows daily. What a waste of Russian

assets. But sadly, the enemy gets a vote. All right, that's what I had to say for you this evening. And thank you so much for coming and being such a wonderful audience. Thank you. Okay, first question. The lecture is framed as explaining Britain's strategic wins in how they prosecuted World War II. But it seems like we really have to explain what seems to keep happening is that Germany and Hitler specifically keep making mistakes. So

1940, 1941, Halifax is saying, look, we need to come to a peace with Germany. We've lost a battle of France. We've had to evacuate Dornkirk. And then Hitler could have done a blockade of Britain and could have just kept prosecuting the war. But instead, he decides to open him a second front against the other biggest army in the entire world, against the Soviet Union. And then when Japan does Pearl Harbor, which again was an unforced error. He makes another error on top of that of declaring war on America,

which he didn't have to do, and which made it much easier for America to lend support on the war against Germany. So this seems much more about Hitler continually bungling than about Britain getting the strategic picture right.

It's both. But I don't know that Germany ever blockading Britain. It was more, he was planning to invade Britain if he could. And then he was,

he lost so many naval assets doing the Norway campaign, which he really needed to do, that he doesn't have the naval assets that he had at the beginning of the war. That's unlike World War I, where the Germans basically, they had their whole fleet, most of it at the end of the war, and then it gets scuttled at the end of the war. This time, Germany did the smart thing, which is to use that fleet, get something. They get Norway, but then they don't have a fleet. So I don't think invading, it's difficult. And then I think because he's in the big petroleum deficit zone, he's got to get moving.

I'm not clear that he had tons of choices, but he's got to go for resources, right? The oceans have been shut off for him. The whole proposition of what he's up to is questionable, right? But it doesn't mean that it isn't a really bitter struggle and difficult. And even though you go, well, Germany's GMP, if you add it up, compared to the totality allies access, allies have so much more stuff. Yeah, I mean, you can go, I think the allies are going to win this thing, but after how many millions of losses?

And I showed you the Battle of the Atlantic, it goes this way, it goes that way, it goes this way, it goes that way. A lot of people are dying all this. So, yeah, the Germans made errors. The first one is, why even go to war? If you want to dominate Europe and you have a really great growth rates, World War I they did, they would have taken over Europe years ago by just growing, right? Now, don't do either World War. Just keep growing your economy. And then you're going to have all

these good business relations. So the ultimate error is even going to war for these things, but it doesn't mean these wars couldn't have gone the other way. And you're right. You look at blunders, but you call it a blunder now because it didn't work out. At the time, you don't know, right? A lot of people get away with really risky things, and then you say they're brilliant. And then the ones who don't get away with the risky things, you say they're idiots. But it's dicey. But I want to come back to the question of how much, when we're trying to explain who wins a big war like this, how much should we be looking at the specific strategies used in different battles

versus just the total tonnage of industrial output that America especially contributed? And so by 1942, what is the way? even if they had much better strategy, what is the way in which Germany would have won? Define when, right? What is it would win? If Germany's win means controlling the entire continent plus Britain plus Russia,

you come up with one answer. Right? If Hillary had just done the Anschluss, right, that's Austria joins and maybe done the Sudeten number, which is a large German population in Czechoslovakia and quit, he'd be called Bismarck the Second, a genius.

Like, no losses gets to keep that bigger area. But that's not who he is. So you need to define what win is for both the Germans and then both for the allies to determine what's feasible and what's not feasible. Germany is potentially can be invaded overland everywhere, whereas Britain can't. And then Germany just cannot deploy a Navy the way Britain can.

It's just geography. And therefore, Germany should have bought a completely different Navy. Skip the surface fleet. a lot more U-boats. Maybe they would have zapped the British before the United States gets its act together in either World War.

Right? Do it fast. They didn't do it. I found your thesis that Britain fought this very effective maritime strategy really interesting,

but let me just try out a different theory for you. I can't our argument. Here we go. Yes. So after the fall of France in June 1940, Germany has all these U-boats

and they're actually themselves running a very effective maritime strategy. They're not in the Atlantic. They're not in the narrow seas, right? They can actually go to the ocean and cut off British straight through the Atlantic. In October, I think October of 1940, I think they sink like close to 400 or 500,000 tons. It's huge. Of British shipping. So, you know, the Germans are running this like a very effective blockade of Rindon. And the reason it fails is just that the Americans eventually can just produce many more ships than the Germans can even sing.

And so ultimately, it wasn't a matter of who ran the better maritime strategy. It was just that who could keep up the industrial output to sustain this strategy. So it comes back to industry and not strategy, even for these maritime operations. I'm curious they're not blockading Britain. Britain's getting all its stuff out, but then they get sunk somewhere else. Blockade is when you're actually keeping things in. So Germany has exactly zero merchant marine going anywhere, right? The stuff that you're talking about being sunk,

their naval ships, but a lot of it is merchant marine because the British are getting things out. Tremendous amounts of it are getting out. So that's just a difference. And then you're correct about the importance of productive bases. Britain's problem in World War II that's different from the Napoleonic Wars. is when you change to oil as what's powering your ships and things,

Britain doesn't have that at home, whereas coal it does, it's some A-less coal. So when you're doing age of sale and coal, the British are okay. But then when you're changing energy sources, they're definitely not okay. So there are other factors that are going in with them. But you're right about the productive base. but then there's another game to play, which I think is worth playing.

It's the game of takeaway. So you're telling me there's this factor, which is economic size, and it's decisive, that this will determine the outcome of wars. And you're absolutely right. That's important. Air power enthusiasts will say,

no, no, no, that's nonsense. It's all about controlling the skies, that when you control the air, you got air cover for your convoys. That's what does it. So let's talk about why the Battle of the Atlantic turns out the way it is. If I take away

cryptography, would it have turned out the same way? Negative. If I take away not just sheer amount of technology but certain key pieces like radar and those things, what happens? Does it change? Yes, it does.

What happens if the United States just doesn't like alliances that you don't coordinate things particularly well? Does it change things? Yes, it does. You can go through a list of this, of different people are designing

different types of ships and are also determining that you're going to share things with the Britain. Britain's providing a lot of free stuff. So if you play, remove any one of these things, that Battle of Atlantic turns out differently. So the story is probably a package of many

things. And this whole game of takeaway, when you have people who will come up with a mono-causal explanation for you, they'll go one cause, and they'll probably be right that their one cause is really important, but then they are just ignoring all these other things. So that's the more important thing in strategy. So your thing is, it's truly important. I guess the question then is, what is changing things mean? Does it mean that the war could have gone on longer,

shorter, et cetera? Yes, of course, anything would have changed that? There's another question of, would it have changed who won the war? And I'd claim that cryptography, radar, even oil, even if Germany had a huge reserve of oil, maybe it would have lengthening the length at which Germany could have sustained itself. But if you change the fact that the Axis had one-fourth of the GDP of the Allies combined,

I think that, switching that genuinely changes who wins the war, whereas these other things actually wouldn't change who won the war. Well, it depends whether the war is a war for limited or unlimited objectives, because you can play that game with the Russo-Japanese War. Japan, all the data you talk about Japan, it's a fraction of Russia, and Russia gets trounced in the Russo-Japanese War.

So there's something up of what's going on, whereas Japan's having a very limited objective, and Russia has other problems at home and is willing to bail. That's one thing. But there's another thing. If Germany had simply never bought a surface fleet, if they'd been sensible, surface sleep, yeah, it's great Britain's got one,

but it can always deploy that thing. Germany will never deploy its surface fleet. It'll get it sunk, which is what happened in the Norwegian campaign. At least from the German point of view, they got Norway out of it. But if they had simply bought U-boats instead, I don't know whether it would have to do the math, and I haven't done that, what their goal would need to be is to knock Britain out before the United States ever gets into the war. Oh, definitely do not declare war on the United States.

Because maybe if you can keep the commerce rating going for another six months, maybe Britain falls. Maybe that's the pivotal error. It has nothing to do with what you're talking about. It's simply Hitler shouldn't have declared war. I don't know, but there are many factors that go into these things. And that's why it's a reason why you should listen to people who disagree with you that they may see some of these other factors, right? we all have blind spots and we rely on other people to find them but then you have to be receptive to listening. When Germany and the Soviet Union split up Poland,

there's this just 2,000-kilometer border from the Baltics to the Black Sea that they've signed themselves up for for sharing with the other largest army that has ever been assembled. Did the Soviet Union think that in the long run that this was a sustainable proposition

or did they just think that we could we could wait Hitler out or in the long run, you know, we'd be in a better position to wage war against him. Did people think that this was a sustainable arrangement? Oh, well, I don't think Hitler was about sustaining any arrangement. He was about taking over Labrism, in Slavic lands, Russia. But flip it the other way, which is what the Soviet Union is thinking is it'll be great when the Germans go after the British.

What's not to like about that one? And then they will, it's the pounce and absorb, is that they will so weaken each other that will open opportunities for Russia. So that would be the plan. And then he's looking at it, and I don't know the details of what his timeline is on whether he thinks it's just a delaying act.

I have not gone into the archives to read what Stalin was up to in great detail. But I think it's basically that one, is thinking that the British and the Germans can go at it. Also, the Russians had tried to be working out some deal with the British prior to all of this. And the British are, because the communists have been trying to destabilize them ever since the Bolshevik revolution, and they didn't get just how lethal the fascists were in Germany, that they weren't just run-of-the-mill authoritarian.

They had this whole genocide component that went with them. And so the British are thinking, well, the real threat or the communist in Russia. And they're right. Long term, they are the real threat, but in the more medium term, the Germans are. And so it takes Blitzkrieg for the British to go,

uh-oh, and then they're willing to team up with Russians. And well, and Russia's willing to team up with them, right? When German invasion transforms what had been primary enemies, he takes that role, being primary enemies for both Britain and Russia, then you're going to glue. another alliance. So that's the trick in our own day. You do not want to do things that the United States is the primary enemy of those two of Xi Jinping and Putin. Currently, we're not, right? It's Taiwan or

India or Vietnam, whatever. Xi Jinping's going to steal currently. That's the way his primary problem, and it's definitely Ukraine for Putin. And you want to keep that all divided up to the extent that you're able to do that, right? A lot of things aren't feasible. These are high stakes. things. But you want, do not want to, this is where being really, just not thinking about your foreign policy. It takes a lot of experts and a lot of people to guess game out. What is your best course of action? What is your least bad option? That's usually what foreign policy is. It's not what the great option is. There are none of those. It's what the least bad one is. And it takes a lot of thought and gutting the State Department will not get you there.

Yeah. It's just, it's profoundly dangerous. You described Hitler's strategy as pursuing a continental strategy, and that was sort of his undoing. But it seems like there's many other wars where a more reasonable person can pursue a continental strategy and do just fine. So Bismarck does multiple continental wars, Franco-Prussian war, Austria-Russian war, and achieves his objectives. And Hitler is just freaking crazy. Like, he continuously does things. he knows that going to war with Poland in 1939, France and Britain will join. He's like, I will fight both of them for Poland for some reason. Resources, big resources.

Somehow that works. Then he gets, somehow France falls in a few weeks. Instead of stopping there, he decides, now I'm going to go to war with the whole of the Soviet Union. He decides, in what way is it a continental strategy to then declare war on America, which is an ocean away? It's not even an adjacent continental power. So it seems like him being crazy explains more than him pursuing. Let's talk about Bismarck.

Bismarck did not, this is the difference between limited and unlimited objectives. And these concepts, which I've tried to transmit in these lectures, I think, are useful and you apply them to other things. So an unlimited objective means the state in question is not going to exist at the end of the war. And if it's really unlimited, and Hitler does the most unlimited variant, he's going to kill all the people. Like, it's Slavs. He's going to literally butcher them all. So that's one kind of war. A limited war means you want maybe a hunk of territory, something less. The opposing government's going to live. So Bismarck runs three wars. One is the Danish war. Then there's the Austro-Prussian war and then there's a Franco-Prussian war. In the Danish war, it's about a couple of provinces in the far south of Denmark that Bismarck covets because he wants to reunify, well, unify for the first time all the these Germanic states. And he trounces Denmark in that war. Does he go for regime change in Copenhagen? No way.

He just says, see this place that you shouldn't have had anyway because it's got a bunch of Germans in it. And so if you think about this is another concept, value of the object, how much is victory worth to you versus the other guy? For Denmark of just making Bisnard go away and this little state, the value of the objects lower to them because they aren't thinking in terms of creating a greater Germany, which Bismarck is. So you have two things going on. You're not, you're giving the Danes, given how much the Prussians trounce them a generous peace. You're saying just get rid of this Germanic part that you don't really much care about. So he gets away with that one. Then in the Austrian, the war against Austria, he just slams them. He's got this railway system that allows them to

deploy where the Austrians can't. And there are all these little Germanic states watching all this going on, and they're starting to confederate sort of with Prussia because they're scared of all of this. And so instead of doing regime change in Vienna, it's just saying, hey, let's seat a few more of these things to Germany. And it was a big empire where you have pieces, you own pieces, you lose pieces, you lose pieces, you own pieces. You lose pieces, you own pieces. So for the Austrians, the Vallevik object, again, is much lower. Given how they were slammed in the war, it seems to be a generous peace. And then when he gets into the Franco-Preschen war, all these little Germanic states are joining with Prussia, and that's going to create unified Germany.

And then he takes a bite too far when he takes Al-Sas-Larentin, which the French are totally upset about it and becomes they never give up on that one. But all of these objectives are limited objectives. He's not overthrowing the Danish government, the Austrian government, or the French government. And the value for Prussians of unifying the Germanic states is far greater than the places that are losing these any-bitty places. Also, they don't get the big picture. They don't see it until it's done that, whoops, by doing all of this, Prussia has transformed itself from the weakest of the five great powers of Europe to second only to Britain. And that's ex post facto, and it's a real reason why you don't want royalty running stuff. You want people who get their jobs based on merit rather than who their dad was.

Because the world of Bismarck's dealing with is kings who are just clueless what they're up to. I interviewed last year, Daniel Yorgan, who wrote this big history of oil. And he has like 300 pages in his book about World War II. And specifically that his claims Barbara Rosa was motivated by Hitler's desire to get the oil field. Yes, yeah, he needed it because he had this big petroleum deficit zone. Right.

And so when you say stupid to invade Russia, probably it's once you've done this number, you have to go into Russia because you've got to take those oil fields. Then you can go, buddy, don't go for Moscow. Forget those people. Just go straight for the oil fields. Take that only.

That would be more of the blunder. Is there any world in which Hitler would have surrendered by 1943 when it was clear that the war was going to go the other way? Dictators don't.

They just double down. This is the beauty of elections. I get it. It's a mess with a multi-party system and with all the crazy politics

that come and go with it. But elections are a moment to reassess when the party and power sufficiently screws things up where people finally go, ooh, this is a mess.

The elections... The party in power isn't reassessing. the election is reassessing for them. You know human beings. We've all met many. Most human beings don't like to change their mind. I think it's a terrible mistake. And that's why I like the argument, as you know, counterargument structure to try to take some of the sting out of changing our minds. Because doubling down in bad decisions, it's a mistake, but we human beings do it. And then if you have a dictator, you're guaranteed. Putin is not going to dictate, is not going to

back down in Ukraine. He's going to be going after it from now until doomsday. And then if he wins there, he's going to then go after the Baltic states. It's not going to end. So sadly, the enemy gets a vote, and you may go, well, these are idiot decisions. Yeah, but they're very dangerous ones, so you have to do things to counter them.

I mean, in World War I, you do have a lot of powers which have at least some amount of franchise. And in that war, I think people should have just... It would have been much better to lose the war at 1914 or 15 than to continue waging it until 1917. But even Britain doesn't back down or France doesn't back down. Well, the problem in that war, this is another thing that I think is really helpful to do, is to the best of your abilities, write down primary adversary, secondary adversary,

tertiary adversary. So take all the powers in World War I and both sides and do their primary enemy, secondary, third. And you find out it is a mess. nothing aligns so that if you try to get out of that war, somebody's not going to like it because that's their primary objective. And there's a lot of bad overlaps and who's going to get whatever parts of the Balkans they think at the end of this war. And so in a way you have World War I, you really have to sit down and look at it. I mean, if I were doing a lecture on that, I have a whole other slides that would show you this where they're fighting parallel wars.

and it's really not a good idea to either have royalty running the show or World War I is the war where militaries on all sides are running the show and civilians are doing the backseat saying, well, I don't really understand military operations, we're going to let you boys do it. Disaster.

That war sets communism and fascism, it puts them on steroids. And you can argue, we've been dealing with that mismanagement in one way or another ever since. Because for most of the most of the, of my life I thought we had put fascism back in its box, and so we were down to dealing with communism, but now it seems that this very authoritarian vision, which seems to rhyme with

fascism, and then you can get in a big argument what precisely is fascism, and you try to define it. But it seems like we've come full circle in the collective West, and it's toxic in a way dealing with all this. So World War I is the absolutely mismanaged war. And then the people who live through that set up these institutions that have held the peace until the present day when irresponsible leaders across the globe are not cautious enough. And here we are. And then there's a price to pay if you're there, if you have a bunch of reckless drivers on the road trying to play chicken with each other, how this will all end. And I don't know the answer. So anyway, that's my reason for doing lectures on strategies.

I'm going to give you concepts, some data to think about, because you're going to have to form your own opinions and your own conclusions, but try to make it evidence-based and think about things. I recommend reading things more deeply. Don't take what any one person has to say, come to your own terms. That's the reason for doing all this. We're living in really portentious times where people may make decisions where there's no going back.

I mean, if we blow our alliance system, we're going to be dealing with China alone. That won't go well. Particularly if we think we're going to corner them in some way, going to go corner a great power like China and think that'll go well for us. It won't. The reason I brought up earlier, the primacy of industrial output and population size in determining who wins a war, is at the end, you sort of made the comparison that Russia and China today are in a similar position as, you're in a similar position. as the axis was preceding World War II, or at least the disadvantages that they had. No, I just tried to, maybe I wasn't clear.

I was just saying, okay, we saw how it all worked in World War II of people blockading or not blockading or doing peripheral operations or not. So if you occupy Russia's position or China's position, it's not about who's going to win or who's going to lose, it's going, well, both of them are much more vulnerable to blockade, period. Right. Yeah, then it depends, well, do you think that was more central?

then the fact that during World War II, the allies just set three to five times the combined output of the access. And so today, if you looked at the manufacturing output of China versus the United States, the shipbuilding capacity of China versus the United States, even if you looked at the international trade of China, like China has more international trade

than the United States does, then you ask who is in a more similar position to the United States during World War II? China or America? More concepts. So I did limited unlimited objectives and I did value of the object, how much winning is worth to you. Another one is what is when? So if you're talking about the United States invading China insane, who would ever do that, right? If that's what, if you're thinking of whatever conflict you're imagining, if you're thinking about, I don't know, is when China, I mean, tell me what this war is. Who's going for what and what's when going to look like? And then we can talk about,

what feasible is. I mean, the most likely thing would be a war over Taiwan. Okay, so your idea... The value of the object is clearly higher to China there. If you look at Taiwan, okay, maybe China can take it. It may have to leave it a glowing embers. That lovely chip foundry that everyone cares about, I imagine would be the first casualty of that war.

That will be blown and be gone. There's no way you'll capture that intact. And then everybody else is going to be terrified of this. And they're going to do the, it's not placate in our day. It's rather sanctions of saying, okay, if you're not going to play nice, we're not going to trade with you. You're going to have a massive timeout from the global order. And China is very trade-reliant. And so, okay.

But it's precisely because that's such a dominant position in trade that would be difficult to coordinate a coalition against them. Why? If the entire world benefits more from trading with them the United States, which there's more volume of trade with China than the United States globally, then it would be difficult to coordinate a coalition to say, look, you've got to stop trading with the person you're trading most to you're trading most. I think the story is on sanctions. They don't have to be leak proof. All you're doing is if you can knock off one or two percentages of points of Chinese growth, just because some people are sanctioning like war material. That would be a very likely thing.

Then after Taiwan, maybe you're trading with China, but you're not doing certain categories of war material with them. The cumulative effects of doing that to a country over generations is the difference between North and South Korea. It adds right up. And you can do the math better than I can of if you knock off 2% growth per minimum, I think the doubling time of an economy, I don't know, if you knock a couple of percentage points off, it goes from like 25 years to 75 years. You will be able to do the math better than I can rapidly. But it's very consequential.

And China's neighbors will be scared to death of this. And also, you're right that trade patterns don't go overnight. They go gradually over like a 10-year period and which China will find it's already happening

is supply chains are moving out of China. Yeah. Slow. I guess a larger thing I'm trying to get at is in the immediate term, it seems like

if the thing that mattered in World War II was the fact that the United States was outproducing all the access combined in planes and munitions and tanks. And then who is in a comparable position today? Well, you'd say it's China. And then over the long run, perhaps we can collaborate together a coalition, which over many generations reduces China's growth or ability to compete. But then I'm not even confident that the coalition would, you know, center around the United States rather than non-China. Not today. No one's centering around us right now because we're not playing nicely with allies right now. But rather, I think you will find that there are so many countries that are eager to follow the Chinese model for development. They have cheaper labor now, places like Vietnam. And India has also been doing all sorts of things. And my impression with India is it isn't one of India's problems. It needs a better infrastructure and their investments going on in that.

So there are many other people in the world who are interested in making money, and they've watched how China did it. You can emulate that. So I think if China is foolish enough to do Taiwan, these will be the long-term ramifications. It's a mistake. As annoying as other countries are, it's better to just argue with them at international institutions.

And China has a big presence at these international institutions and should be able to get others to go along with however it wants to change rules and do it that way. If they're going to do it the Putin way, you can look at it. It's negative sum. And they will get a timeout from the global order. Ever since the Industrial Revolution introduced compounded economic growth, this continental solution is a mistake.

It is much better. Forget about invading territory. Allow the free traffic of people, trade, goods, ideas, and then we'll all grow together. On the general framework of how should Continental Powers Act and how should Maritime Powers Act, I wonder if it's worth even designating the optimal strategy based on your geography versus to the extent that you think positive some trade is better than invading and doing bloody wars. That's true regardless of whether we have a maritime. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Oh, the Continental Maritime, I've just discussed geography because it's something I think most people don't think about. And so, and particularly what's hilarious about people who buy navies, and I've read all these, I've sadly had to read these naval theory books. They never look at the geography. I mean, they occasionally do, but it's sort of, I'm going to get a big navy. Well, it depends where you live. So I've just finished and edited books about fleets and being. Just like, if you have a fleet, what does that foreclose for whoever's around you? What does it open for you? And then it makes really, it's not a great read, but I learn a lot from doing it. It becomes really clear that, like, oh, you can see that map there. You see Italy. And you have in World War I with that particular position, the Austro-Hungarian Empire has quite a good little submarine fleet.

Captain Front Trapp, you know, Sound of Music. He was a war hero. He was a submarine captain. and just by having that submarine fleet in there, it forced Britain to convoy the whole Mediterranean. It doesn't mean Auster-Hungary wins the war, but a very simple investment prevents anyone from invading over its oceans, which is important,

and it wrecks British, makes British do very expensive convoy duty because Captain von Trapp is quite good at sinking naval ships of the British. So that's the difference of your geographic position limits what you can do. But now we have a whole rules-based order so that if you join the party, you have a massive alliance system. That's why I look at China, it doesn't have any allies. It has itself. And it likes to have bilateral relations. But actually, these international institutions for those who actually are serious about them, it's a de facto.

NATO is most certainly an alliance. If you are the biggest trading partner with, say, 100 countries, do you have a lot of alliances? I mean, if not, then that seems more significant than just calling yourself an ally. You just have an incredibly strong vested interest in the other country. I mean, the reason America has a lot of alliances is because we have a lot of trade. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's important. It's just the Chinese also come with this little piece of baggage that we're big, you're small, so we get to tell you what to do.

Is that true, though? I mean, like, what does it actually tell? Oh, they've literally said it over and over again. They'll tell it to their neighbors like these Vietnamese, just basically shut up in color because we're a big country and you're little. Vietnamese don't like it. Yeah, I mean, one thing I often hear in these discussions is that it's the United States, which actually has a stronger preferences.

And, for example, how your political system works, which may be reasonable to have. But China is usually more willing to just trade with you if you're willing to trade. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. We've been really intrusive in other people's domestic politics, without a doubt. Right.

And that is the American business. busy body gene that's gotten us into a lot of trouble. So, oh, yeah, no one's perfect in this world. Far from it. We all make horrendous errors and then do things we shouldn't do. And that's an excellent place to close. Sarah, thanks so much. Thank you.

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