Dwarkesh Podcast - Robin Hanson - The Long View

Episode Date: August 31, 2020

Robin Hanson is a professor of economics at George Mason University. He is the author of The Elephant in the Brain and The Age of Em.  Robin's Twitter: https://twitter.com/robinhansonRobin's blog: https://www.overcomingbias.com/ Robin's website: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/home.htmlMy blog: https://dwarkeshpatel.com/My Twitter: https://twitter.com/dwarkesh_sp00:05 The long view 15:07 Subconscious vs conscious intelligence 20:28 Meditators 26:50 Signaling, norms, and motives 36:50 Conversation 42:54 2020 election nominees 49:25 Nerds in startups and social science 54:50 Academia and Robin 58:20 Dominance explains paternalism 1:09:32 Remote work 1:21:26 Advice for 20 yr old 1:28:05 Idea futures 1:32:13 Reforming institutions Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkesh.com/subscribe

Okay, Robin Hansen needs no introduction. So let's begin. So you've written a few essays on the long view, how there's no significant players that are optimizing for it. But isn't the most obvious explanation for that, that optimizing for the long term is ineffectual, given how unpredictable the future is, or even counterproductive, given that you might be ignoring present circumstances? Well, if it's unpredictable, then optimizing should take that into account. but it does look like people are deviating from what they would do optimally trying to take the long term into account and take into account the actual amount of uncertainty. That seems so for example, there's something called discount rates in economics and interest rates.

And so if you have the long view, you would take a very low discount rate that is you would think the future was just as important, although with uncertainty that might make it hard to make some of their choice. But for example, resources are just generally useful. So if you just invested in collecting resources, you don't have to know exactly what's going to happen in the future to know that resources are going to be pretty useful, whatever happens. And so if you are discounting the future and not being interested in collecting resources, that's a pretty clear indication that you're not so interested in the long-term future relative to other people who might. But if it's true that thinking about the long-term future is useful, then wouldn't you expect the most powerful, institutions today to be the ones that thought about the long-term future in the past? Well, that's part of the question I raised in my discussions of it. So you might think that in the very long run, there would be selection for thinking more

about the long-term future because that would win. If we look at biology, we can think that there's been a very strong competition in biology for influencing the future. And in some sense, that is what evolution is about. Species and individuals compete to influence the future. Like having more descendants is the main way that biology influences the future. Now, animals sometimes make plans, and you as a human might make a plan to save up resources and pass them on to your kids. And we know that that sort of planning has a discount rate that goes with it because your kids only share half your genes.

So your individual genes, they can't save resources for themselves. They can only save resources for this whole creature that you are, which is a bundle of genes. And this whole creature that you are, when it passes on and has descendants, those descendants only have half as many genes. And so that means that your genes have a choice between doing things that promote the genes right now versus doing things that collect resources and have a 50-50 chance of promoting that gene later on because its descendants may only have a 50% chance

of sharing that gene. So that produces a discount factor of once a generation a factor two, and that's in the ballpark of what actual human discount rates are. And so that is a plausible explanation for human discount rates, is that we evolved in this context

where when we had a choice to save resources in order to pass it on to the next generation, the next generation only shares half our genes. So see, the challenge is to come up with a unit of selection that can pass on resources to itself over the long run. And so what that might be, perhaps, is a nation or a firm or religion or some organizational unit. And I think we should reasonably expect that in the long run,

organizations will find a way to collect resources and then promote themselves in the long run. But they haven't done that so far. because mostly organizations don't really have so much of a separate existence in our world. They are a way that our genes or our individuals use, genes use individuals, and individuals use organizations to further their ends. But if the organization wants to just take over and says, I don't care about you genes or individuals.

I just want to promote myself, then the individuals and the genes will rebel and, you know, bring the organization back in line. And that's kind of what's happened so far. Our organizations haven't really been able to promote themselves as much as they might like. So the closest you might get is say religions encouraging proselytizing, where they're promoting the religion, right? But they found a way of doing that via the individuals proselytizing and promoting themselves. And so they found a win-win deal where the organization can promote itself and the individuals can promote themselves.

But, you know, that's hard to find. And so organizations haven't made able to just collect resources. because what happens is if a church collects resources or a firm or a club, well, later on, some humans are in charge of that organization, then they just take the resources. They just grab them. They say, the heck with this organization, those are tasty resources. I can promote myself and my genes by just grabbing their resources

and taking them away from the organization. So, you know, for the long run, the question is, how can organizations find a way to collect resources and keep it directed for the purpose of the organization as opposed to allowing the people who run the organization, organization to grab those resources for themselves. Have you considered doing this yourself, raising some money, and then like building an institution to shepherd and distribute it in the future?

Well, I mean, I've thought it through just in terms of the, just understand what's going on. I'm not, you know, I'm not rich. I don't have that many resources. But one of the big things that's happened is this might happen if we used contracts to make it happen. So, for example, I might make an organization and then I make the constitution of the organization a certain way. And then I say, everybody who wants to join this organization, you have to agree to this Constitution, and then we're going to use law to insist that the Constitution be obeyed. And if we were allowed to write a Constitution that specified saving resources and that constitution would be enforced, and then the organization was just not going to be taxed or

destroyed, then this would work. And what's gone wrong in history is that when organizations tried this, people associated went to the courts and said, no, no, no, no, we want those resources. and they push the courts to interpret law so that these contracts are not enforced. So we do not allow arbitrary organization contracts that allow the organization to save resources into the future. That's specifically something that law has prevented. What you just described sounds like a nation state.

So is a nation state the unit that's figured out how to act as like an evolutionary agent and grow more powerful? No, because nation states can't just collect resources and save them. The people who run the nation state, they get dispensational. them. So in a Democratic nation state, for example, if the country collects a bunch of resources, then the voters go, hmm, tasty, and they can vote in a politician who will vote to spend that, you know, will choose to spend those resources on the voters and not save it for the future. Similarly, even when there's a dictator, the dictator doesn't set it up forever for the organization.

They're setting it up for themselves, or perhaps their children. And again, they don't set it up to just keep collecting resources. But so, so just walk, let's walk it through. Today and for a very long time, almost, you know, as long as we know, interest rates have been higher than gross rates, that is rates of return on assets have been higher faster than the economy grows. So if the economy, you know, doubles in 20 years,

and assets double in 10 years, you see, then any organization that chooses to grow assets will grow as a fraction of the economy, until it comes to dominate the whole economy. And then at that point, interest rates would fall until this organization really couldn't get a rate of the economy,

but that's an opportunity that's been sitting there for a long time and not really successfully taken advantage of it. Nobody's really managed to create organizations that just keep lasting and collecting resources growing faster than the economy and therefore growing as a fraction. So what happens?

Well, either the people running the organization decide to take it, or outsiders decide to take it. You know, the local city or the local government says, hmm, tasty, and they decide to tax it or just grab it or in war. Invaders come and take it. And so consistently over the long run, we just haven't been able to do that. But it's a thing that remains possible.

And I predict that eventually there will be some sort of unit of selection that will take the long view. That will be able to collect resources and make choices and promote itself with a long view in mind, and that when enough of those units exist, then they will drive interest rates down to not exceed growth rates, and then at that point, the world will be full of creatures who take the long view. And then long term will not be neglected.

So today you may well fear and worry that there are things that will happen in the long run that could kill us all that will destroy us, but nobody really takes the long view. So nobody's very interested now in working. to prevent. And that's because we just don't have any units who take the long view. Individual humans don't because we have these discount rates. Organizations don't because they are run by the humans. And other biological species, they really can't even plan and think about the long run. So, you know, that's it. But as you describe, if religion implicitly at least

acts as if it's planning for the long term, then in some ways, but not others. So that's the key thing know. Organizations are not like agents who can plan everything with autonomy. They're just a collection of strategies that humans use. And in some ways, they can manage to promote themselves and other ways not, but that they aren't these conscious agents planners who, you know, have a utility function and can make complicated plans to achieve the organization Zets. But isn't that exactly what you'd expect in like sort of an evolutionary landscape, just like this sort of eventually, right. So that's the whole point. Eventually. But, you know, if organization are new. I mean, the key point is, humans have been around for a long time. Humans with

organizations, you know, initially, for a million years, human organizations were like 50 people. And that was quite a distinct thing from other primates. We took a lot of work to agree able to make human organizations with 50 people and have them functioned. And those were human bands. And then with farming 10,000 years ago, we managed to make like organizations on the scale of a thousand people for a village and then maybe empires but empires only control a very limited range of things that people do in villages so for most part empires were just things that handled the military and if an empire came by and they wanted your sons for soldiers and they demanded taxes well you gave it to them but otherwise they didn't really run things sorry so i meant like isn't that exactly what you

expect in the long term as and like you'd expect these unconscious basically memetic um units to succeed in the long term meaning even in the future we might just have these like cultural units succeeding and not in organ what's to say that organization will be more successful you need a unit that can plan in order to predict that a unit will successfully plan to promote itself right so if you just talk about a meme well a meme is just one tiny piece and it really can't promote itself except in conjunction with a bunch of others at former organization just like genes right genes really don't promote themselves by themselves genes promote themselves via or organisms, and organisms are big, complicated collections of genes because individual genes,

they can't plan, they can't start resources, they can't make strategies, you know, they're very small pieces. It's the whole collection of genes that is capable of doing those things. And similarly for organizations, you know, they have to be, they have to have a lot of parts that all work together to make an organization work. And the question is, can, you know, can you do that? So Tyler Common Rights and Stubberant Attachments that if you really care about the long term, the best you can do is just promote economic growth. Do you agree with that? Well, I mean, it depends on what you care about the long run. So if you only just care that everybody's happy in the long run, regardless of whether you're allied with them or whether you like them or anything like that, then you just want the future to be big, right?

And economic growth is the future being big, right? So, like, I mean, that's almost sort of by definition, right? If you say, well, I don't really care who's in the future or what they're doing or what's happening, I just care that there be a big future and there would be a lot of things happening, well, then you want growth. Because growth literally is the measure of like how much stuff is happening. Right. How big it is, right? So the question is, what do you care about? Now, when I predict there will be organizations with a long view, I'm not predicting that kind of preference because that doesn't, you know,

you know, that's not very stable to competition. So when we think of, say, biological organisms having a long view, well, they have a long view to promote themselves. They have a long view to create descendants. That's not the same as wanting the entire Earth to have more biomass or something. That's them wanting to continue. So that's, to me, the easiest thing to predict is that eventually there'll be units of selection organisms, organizations that take a long view view.

with respect to themselves. Yeah, but the rivalries that exist today, you wouldn't expect them to exist in the far future. So why would you even consider them when you're planning for the future? Why wouldn't you just try to lift all votes? Well, that isn't selected for it. You can if you want, I mean, you don't have to choose

to have yourself represented in the future. You can just choose to promote the future. If you can and will, then you can just do that, right? But what we predict is that the future will end up being dominated by creatures who do promote themselves and who take a long view about how they promote themselves. That's the thing we should be able to predict the future as. So, you know, you have a choice about whether you want yourself reflected in the future, whether you want to be part of a unit that's competing like that and taking the long view.

But if, I mean, so say you take a long view, but you don't promote yourself. Well, whatever it is in yourself that makes you take the long view, that's dying out. you aren't taking a long view on the long view in that case you're having a current long view that you're acting on but you're not acting to preserve the long view that you are yeah and have it last if you want a long view that lasts then you need to focus on preserving a long view on promoting the thing that embodies the long view and having it last yeah that makes sense okay let's talk about the elephant in the brain um so you you split um You explained there that we have hidden motives where we actually want one thing, but we pretend we want something else.

Our subconscious and conscious intelligence is different, like our capacity to actualize our implicit goals, and then our capacity to justify them explicitly. So let's back up so we make sure we don't confuse people. We are complicated creatures, and there are many sort of levels at which we make choices. And so we can talk about causes of our choices that are proximate, that are close to the choices, and distal, far away from our choices. And we can have different ways we think about the causes, distal and proximate. So that's the key thing here. So when we are talking in our book, The Elephant in the Brain, about motives, we're focused more on distal motives. We're focused more on from a distance, what are the sort of fundamental forces that are pushing choices when we are the other?

those forces may or may not produce different sort of conscious thoughts just before the choice is made. So if we think about proximate choices, you might ask, well, just before I made the choice, what was going on in my head, what ideas did I have, what was I talking about, what would I have said if you had asked me about it, those would be proximate causes. Those would be the things closest to the choice. but those are complicated and context dependent. And in many ways, I think it's more robust and even easier to focus on distal causes, what the fundamental forces are that are driving choices one way or the other,

and those forces can reflect themselves differently in different final choices or context. So for example, in different times and places in history, people have thought differently about different things, And they say different words about it and they, you know, different thoughts come to mind. But often it's the same fundamental forces back behind all of that that push people to do things. You could take romance, for example, you could say, you know, the idea of romance and what appropriate things are for relationships and, you know, which kind of relationships we approve of. And when you're thinking of entering relationships, what's in your head and what are you saying about it. Now, those things have changed a lot through history and places, right?

have thought very differently and they're changing them now. But if we stand back and say, why do relationships exist? Well, it's a simpler theory. It's a simpler story. Well, we get why relationships exist because, you know, that's how biology reproduces. Without relationships, there would be no descendants. And so from that level, it's relatively easy to find this robust explanation for, you know, some of the major elements, at least, of relationships that are independent of time and space and a relatively simple. So similarly, in our book, Elephant in the Brain, we're talking about sort of the more basic fundamental motives behind many things we do, the motive being just a force, a thing that produces it. And so we're less interested in what's in your

conscious mind at the time, and whether you're aware of it and what you would say about it, and maybe even how much that varies across nations, across time, across social classes. So because those are all interesting, but I think the first priority would be to just sort of get the common elements. Like if there's a common element behind schools or medicine across time and space and social class, we should probably know that first before we try to figure out how, you know, rich people do it differently from poor people or Europeans do it different from Asians or it was done differently now versus a century ago. I mean, those are all interesting to some extent, but, you know, the first cut should just be what's the common? element. But so if we go along that demarcation, the question then is, is our capacity to realize our basic motives? Is that correlated with our ability to explain them later on with our

conscious mind? Well, so the key idea in our book is to say your conscious mind has a purpose. It's built for a reason, but it's not the being the king or president that you think of or perhaps have been told, that's not what your conscious mind is for. So your conscious mind is more a press secretary. Its job is to watch what's going on and come up with good explanations that make you look good, and in particular that protect you against accusations of norm violations. And so your job isn't to know why you're actually doing things. Your job is a good reason to explain why you're doing things.

But then the question is, is there some sort of correlation between how good the president is and how good the press secretary is. Because people have differing abilities to justify their actions, and people also have differing abilities to actualize their base motives. Is there some sort of correlation there? I mean, there probably is just because there just seemed to be this overall correlation and abilities of all sorts. IQ and wealth and just good things tend to be correlated.

So I would expect they're correlated, roughly, not finally, but roughly, just because people who are more capable of A tend to be more capable of B for almost all A and B. That's just a general thing for people. Hmm. Okay. Would you expect meditators to signal less to just be more upfront about what their motives are? No. Could you tell me why you would expect that? They're more self-conscious, so they can't elude this. Maybe they can't fool themselves as easily, and so they're less likely to fool others? Well, first of all, I'll ask, how do I know they're more self-conscious or self-aware? I think you mean self-aware, as if they're more aware of what they're doing and why.

I don't know that they are. So let's talk about sort of the truth-oriented community. What does that mean? So a lot of organizations and groups and, you know, people in the world tell you that they are part of the truth-oriented part of the world. And that's part of their identity. They tell you, well, those other people there are diluted, but we are into truth. It's one of the favorite worlds and say among Christians use. Christians are telling you we care about the truth. We don't, you know, we have a strange

religion, but it's true, and we are into truth, and those other people are not into truth. So just everybody likes to think themselves as the people who are into truth and who are less deluded than the other people. So I just can't take people at their word for saying that they are less deluded. They might be, but merely the fact that they like to say that about themselves isn't enough for me. I want to see some concrete evidence that they are actually more truth-oriented. But you have no reason to suspect that a practice like meditation would reduce a distance between who you present yourself to be and who you actually are. Well, then I'd have to dig into what I know about meditation. Now, you may well know a lot more than me. I don't. Yeah, I will,

I could defer, but the last time I did a bunch of reading about meditation was just before my interview with Sam Harris, because he was in meditation. We never ended up talking about it. But reading about it, to me, I saw this focus on a certain sort of meditative state of mind. So they seem obsessed really with a certain sort of state of mind. They are really, really trying to achieve that. And they see that that's good for themselves and they somehow think it's good for the world. And right there, that looks a little diluted. I got to say, you know, because whatever the state of mind they seem to get into,

I'm not seeing much evidence that it's like this thing that helps the world a lot. I'm not even seeing that much evidence that is the thing that helps them a lot. What I see is that it's very prestigious in their world. That is their ranking pecking order. The pecking order is who has achieved this higher level of consciousness in their meditation. And okay, I mean, every world has some sort of pecking order. I mean, why not that one? But I don't see much of a practical use of it, really, compared to all the resources they're investing in it.

They put a lot of time and trouble into this thing, which have a lot of opportunity. People take a decade off to go meditate or something, like just so later on they're going to be better at something. I mean, there's almost nothing you can do for a decade, which will somehow change you in a way to make you more productive later on. I think San Harris did you do that. A decade is like huge. Yeah.

You know, the opportunities cost is enormous. So right there are some of the specific things I know about meditation. they don't give me much confidence that these people are less diluted on average than other people. Because, you know, they're into assess a relatively religious kind of frame of mind where they've got a particular pecking order. They tell themselves that, no, no, I'm not doing this for me. I'm doing this for the world and consciousness and whatever. And I've met people who, you know, who get together and think, well, the way we're going to create world peace and the way we're going to make innovation, and the way we're going to make world better

is they're going to go meditate for a bit long time. You go, what? You could feed the poor or stop wars or no, you're going to go meditate? They might even be right. I mean, I could be wrong about this, but you can see where I'm coming from in terms of on the face of it, there's a reason for skepticism. Yeah, no, I don't meditate.

But let me try to steal man their position. So the claim is you're more aware of the next thought that enters your mind. And because of awareness, you can choose, you can realize that your own motivations are false to some extent. And so you're less likely to project that false motivation to others. Do you buy that chain? Well, so we wrote this book, The Elephant in the Brain,

that takes 10 areas of life and talks about how the motives are different. If you showed me a book on meditation that went area by area of life and showed me specifically how they had figured out that the motives were different, I would be impressed. If they just say, I can see that my motives, I'm lying, and I say, well, what exactly? of the lies, you know, because a lie is where you say A and B is really true. If you could make a long list of the specifics A's and B's, I think, you know, I believe A, but B was really true, and that

applied to a lot of people. Well, that would be impressive, right? You show me the meditation handbook that gives me those long lists of A's and B's, and I would then say, yep, those people seem to get, you know, self-deception and hidden motives. Without that list of A's and B's, you know, Lots of people in the world like to say, I seek truth, and they like to say that once upon a time I was deluded and then I saw the truth. Yeah. And they don't like to get in the specifics of what exactly they are deluded about other than the fact that they had yet to join Christianity or yet to join effective altruism or whatever it was. The usual thing they're happy to tell you about being deluded about is not having joined the new group they're part of now. If I want a longer list of other things they were deluded by, that's sort of missing.

So Robin Hanson won't be meditating anytime soon. I might, but I mean, I'm not going to put this huge glory priority on it. I scratch my back sometimes. It's nice. A meditation can be nice too, but it's like I don't say scratching my back I'm doing for the world or it's going to create world peace or we're all going to have a unified world together or scratching our back. No, scratching your back is just nice. That sounds like a straw man, but Robin Wright actually wrote a book where he claimed exactly this. Okay, your back makes world peace.

Okay, so along with the faculty to like fabricate pro-social reasons for what we're doing, why don't we have the capacity to consciously detect other people's false explanations of what they're doing? That seems kind of useful. Well, we do. When we have rivals, we are unusually able to sense when when they might be hypocritical and when they might be lying about their motives. Of course, we go even farther than that and attribute falsities and delusions to them that they don't have because we're really eager to trash our rivals. What we have a harder time doing with, of course, is noticing our own things and things in common.

So in our book we talk about, you know, many kinds of hidden motives, and some of the hardest ones for us to see are the ones that we all share. So, for example, you might say that your rival doesn't care about their grandma because they won't take their grandma out of the hospital. And the rival doesn't care about their country because they won't pay for more national health care for the rest of their country members. But if all of us are diluted about medicine actually being helpful, that's not going to show up in those sorts of accusations about rivals because those are sort of appealing to share senses of what's. important and then saying this particular person doesn't share what the rest of us share about what's important. And so, you know, the more that motives vary across people, the more you're going to be able to be able to notice that a rival might be having a different motive than they say.

But when motives are more common, it's harder to see. Why have we even retained social norms? Why has society even evolved to have the norms it has if if it's so easy to skirt them by just like pretending to uphold them. It's not that easy. So I'm just to be clear for our listeners. Humans are unique compared to other animals and having norms, that is rules of what people should or shouldn't do, that we enforce via collective groups.

That is, if I see you breaking your rule, I'm not just supposed to do something about it. I'm supposed to appeal to other people around me to tell them that you violate the norm and discuss with them what we should do about it so that we collectively punish. And if I see you violate the norm and I fail through that, and somebody else notices that that's a violation on my part. So that's the key idea of norms.

And norms are what we have before law to make people behave. And norms are still very important. And in some sense, norms are more flexible and fluid. And so we use norms when they seem sufficient, and we resort to law for things that norms don't seem up to the task of in our modern world. up until, say, 10,000 years ago, there was no law. Norms were everything.

That's how we dealt with all problems between people was norms. So norms are still this, you know, superpower humans have, and we continue to use norms. We've augmented it with law. And the context in which we enforce norms has changed in the sense that we have much larger communities of talking. So, you know, in the old world of a small band, I saw you break a norm.

I could tell my friends, they could tell their friends, and pretty soon like, all 30 of us have hurt. And we're done. We've all gossiped about it. Of course, if you have counter argument, you gossiped your counter argument and maybe we all get around the campfire tonight and talk it out and make a decision.

And in our larger world, we have troubles with that because we're in larger communities and we just can't spread the word about everything, everybody. And we have to decide who to tell what, and people have to decide what to listen to and what to believe in context where they don't know as people, as well and don't have as much context about the accusation. And that makes it harder to handle norms in our world, but they're still pretty important.

Shouldn't the power, shouldn't we be signaling less over time? If it seems, it seems that like social norms are getting less rigid over time. So shouldn't the amount of signaling go down in the distance between our fabricated and real cells go down over time? So I'd say the opposite in the early transition. So if you think about foragers, say they live in a group of 30 people, these 30 people have been with each other their entire life. They know each other pretty well. So whenever they hear about something somebody's done or an accusation of what they've done, they can put that

into a lot of context. Now, those 30 people have been spending their entire lives trying to impress each other, but in any one moment, they don't have to make sort of a crude signal that it's hard ambiguous to interpret. You know this person pretty well. And now you are slightly adjusting what you know about them in the context of this thing they did yesterday. But that, that much more sort of integrating the information about what they did into a solid impression. Of course, people don't change that much over a long time. So mostly you just keep reconfirming what you already knew about their abilities and inclinations, right? Once you moved, say, to a village side's world in the farming world of a thousand people,

now you didn't know everybody that well. And now anyone thinks somebody did is much more of a potent signal about them. And so I think people paid a lot more attention to crude and potentially misleading signals. once they were a lot more ignorant about the person who the signal is about. So in a group of a thousand people, you know, somebody comes to you and wants to marry your daughter. Well, you haven't been around that person your entire life. You can use your connections to talk to other people who maybe have and try to get information that way. Or if there's an accusation that somebody's done something bad, you have to decide whether to support that.

But you don't know that much about this person. and you hear what they said and who's accusing them. And so in some sense, signaling matters more because you know less, but you still have to make key important decisions. And in our modern world, you know, you could see that continuing on. I mean, there are many people we suddenly read about in the paper we've never heard about before ever in our life, and we're making judgments about them. And so we have to make these crude judgments based on where they live or what degree they have

or their gender or their age. And so there's a lot of their age. Therefore, in some sense, signaling becomes very potent in that context. All of a sudden, say the world is accusing somebody of something, you have to decide whether you're against them or for them. And all you have is a small number of clues. And so they've known their whole life that they need to try to make those clues look good so that at this moment, if it should ever come, that you will be favorably inclined target.

But isn't there another sense in which each person matters less than more people you have? If there's only 30 people in a tribe, some young boy is very likely to marry your daughter. But if there's thousands of people, the next guy you meet is very unlikely to marry your daughter. So you're less likely to be observing the signals or displaying signals to the random person because they're less likely to be important to your life. Right. But a lot of the signals you say it doesn't cost anymore to send it to any one extra person than you send it everything. So you build up your muscles and then they show up. And anybody who happens to see, you can see your muscles, right?

And you have a beautiful singing voice and anybody hears your voice. voice can hear it and you know you have wealth and you've got gold jingling on your chain on your wrists and anybody who sees you can see that and so in a lot of ways your signaling isn't targeted at particular audiences you are just collecting signals that are seen by a lot of people but what about signals that are powerful only because they're targeted like narrow casting well so that's a very different sort of thing so loyalty signals I would think are are much more of that and so when people think of signaling they mainly think about signaling ability or capacity, but in fact, loyalty signaling matters about as much as ability signaling. And loyalty

signaling is about who you're loyal to in what ways. And of course, that's a signal about a particular or other people, right? So now, for example, I say that medicine is largely a loyalty signal. That is, you spend money to help somebody else get medical care. And that's a signal to them that you care about them. And of course, you'll have to target that at them. But, you know, the question is, how much more do they know about you in order to interpret the signal? So, the better they know you, the less they're going to miss to badly judge you on the basis of this one signal. But even when people know a lot about people, they still put a lot of weight on things like this. So, I mean, honestly, if you are suddenly injured and you are feeling really scared

and you really are scared of your life and whether you're going to be taken care of, having somebody known all your life like quit work for a bit, coming to take care of you, like be around you all the time, say nice, say things. That feels, that means a lot to you.

So clearly in some sense, even if you've known this person all your life, you aren't making further inferences about them in that context. And there's a sense in which if you've never felt at risk of your life and this is the one moment when that happens, you've never had that signal from them before.

and this is your chance to get it. Are we signaling more now than ever because of like social media? That's not obvious. We're signaling to different people in different ways. I'm not like, you know, honestly I would say, you know, 80% of what we do is signaling in some sense. And that's been true for a long time and social media just moves it around. But if we're if we're consciously like putting up an image on Instagram or Snapchat, that, that must increase the effort we're putting into signaling.

Your ancestors were doing a lot of things consciously too. I mean, your ancestors, you know, bought a house, and they wore certain clothes, and they went to certain meetings, and they made sure the fence was painted, and, you know, they were polite when they talked to people. I mean, almost all people always have always been doing most of the things they do with an eye toward how it will look to other people. Okay, interesting. I wanted to ask you about your chapter on conversation.

So you explain that conversation is, actually, I'll let you explain first what conversation is for. Well, so I mean, we haven't said that much about the book, so let me just set. The setup of the book is the first third is making it plausible that people might not be aware of their motives. And then the last two thirds of the book goes over 10 different areas of life. And for each one, it says, in this area of life, if you ask people what their motive is, this is what they will say. Here are a bunch of puzzles that don't fit that very well. And here is our better explanation of the motive that's really going on, which is hidden, one that people don't usually admit to.

And conversation is one of our chapters. And so in that structure, the first thing we have to ask is, well, why are people talking? Now, we want to set aside very practical talk. So if you're ordering a pizza or, you know, testifying in court, there's a lot of context in which the purpose is pretty straightforward. and mechanical in the context it's in. We're asking about conversation. So as you know, we're often just talking

without much of a purpose in mind. So what we're asking is, what are you doing there when you're shooting the breeze, chatting, talking about a wide range of topics that aren't very directly related to anything you're doing? So if we ask you, what are you doing when you're talking? Because you're doing a lot of talking. The most common explanation I think you'll get

is, well, we're sharing information. I know a lot of things you don't. You know a lot of things I don't. We just share back and forth things we know, then both of us will know more. And that will be great. And that's not crazy. Of course, all of the things we say as motives aren't crazy,

they do apply some of the times. That's why they work as an excuse. When we say they aren't our real voters, what we mean is that's not our main most common motor. It applies less often than we admit. So yes, we do exchange information and that is useful. But it's not the main reason we're talking. And how can I say that?

Well, there are these puzzles that don't fit so well. So if we are exchanging information, first of all, we'd be keeping track of some debts. I'd say, I've told you three things useful. It's your turn. Tell me something useful. We'd be less eager to talk and more eager to listen. And we'd be talking about important things. What's the point of talking about random, trivial things when you're trying to exchange information?

But in fact, of course, what we do seem to, we seem to follow this rule where the conversation is supposed to bounce around at random, and wherever it goes, you're supposed to have something to say, you're not supposed to try to make the conversation go where you want it, especially not too important things. And we do try to talk more than we listen, and we don't keep track of debts. So what's going on? What is the better explanation of conversation? So our story is, you can think of yourself as having this mental backpack of tools and resources. Every time a new topic comes up, your job is to find something in that backpack that's relevant and interesting and even impressive. But more consistently and often you can do that, play this game, whatever subject comes up, you've got something relevant and interesting. The more impressive that backpack is.

That means if I'm your friend and associate and some problem happens to me and I tell you about it, you're going to use that magic backpack to bring out something useful and that'll pretty be helping me. And so the ordinary conversation is the game where we test each other's backpacks, where we check to see, well, how useful is it? How full is it? What do you got in there? So that we could say that we want to get access to it later, just because they'd always be around.

OK. But the fact that we want to talk more than listen, isn't that a problem for this theory that we're just looking for potential mates and allies? Because we'd also want to listen to the signal our potential mates and allies are sending us. So shouldn't we want them to talk about as much of the other? as we do anyways? Well, we always both want to listen to other people's signals and send our own.

But of course, we are usually more interested in ourselves than other people. And so often we think we've roughly got a pretty good gauge of them. And slight variations on them aren't so important to us. But slight variations on us are much more important. We want to edge ourselves up just a little bit more so that we can seem to be better. if you thought of somebody who spent, you know, who was a really good judge of other people,

but didn't look very impressive themselves versus somebody who looks really impressed themselves, but who doesn't seem that good a judge of other people, who are people most impressed by? Yeah, that makes sense. But just as a tool in judging people's, I guess just in terms of how useful it is, shouldn't we expect people to also care as much about what other people are like? because if you're talking one-on-one, it matters just as much of like... Right. You care, but the question is just on the margin, how much extra effort are you going to put into it.

Right. So, I mean, it's often a fact when people are talking, they can either listen to whether the other person says or they can be planning the next thing they say. And it's just a matter of the relative priorities there. If you think you've got a pretty good judge of them, then you may just want to focus on moving yourself up. Another way might think about it is for each person,

there's a threshold of whether they're good enough for you. and what's mainly important is whether they're above or below that threshold. And it might be relatively rare that they're right near the border of the threshold where you're really trying to make a judgment about whether they're good enough. You know, sometime on first date, say, or interview for hiring. Now you are trying to, they might happen to be near the threshold and then it's really important. For yourself, though, there's no threshold effect. You would just always want to be better.

Right. Because you never know. In respect to any one person, you might be good enough, but they might talk about you to other people, and you just want to go up. Okay, I see. That makes sense. So you wrote in that chapter, because you're saying that conversation

is mostly a way to judge people's capabilities. You write in that chapter, we do not routinely expect mumbling, stuttering, scattering, scatter-brain politicians. So you're going to add to explain the nominees of the 2020 election to me. Well, I mean, there's no doubt that relative to a median citizen,

the two presidential candidates are impressive. You might think there's even better options out there, but now you have to look at all the other constraints. So, you know, leaders have to meet a lot of different constraints that you want to select for leaders. And politicians, like Democratic leaders, have even more constraints, and then there's a lot of randomness going on. So again, you know, our book and our analysis is focused much more on the average

case than on individual deviations. But, you know, both presidential candidates, I understand at a rough level how they got there and why they're there. And often it's a matter of compromise between different groups. If you can separate groups into distinct groups, each group has a sort of their favorite person. And that's not necessarily who goes up. It's often a compromise between different groups. And that compromise isn't necessarily the best from any one group's point view. You know, if you just want to be an impressive speaker, you know, having a simple, absolute disposition that you take to the extremes is much simple and cleaner and clearer and clearer to explain. But of course, that's not where the median voter go. Political

process is when to choose compromises. And compromise positions aren't as easy to explain or rationalize or inspire people with. And so there's a tradeoff there between, getting a person who sits in the middle of a large group who everybody can, you know, at least not hate too much, and having a person with a simple, clear message that resonates and inspires people with the message. So are you saying that being articulate could in some ways harm you as a politician? Because... Oh, yes.

Okay. I mean, you know, there's a standard observation about politicians is that they are not very specific with their positions. They are often purposely ambiguous. and they often seem to speak different things to different audiences. The ambiguity is part of a way to cover for that is to say, no, no, I didn't really say different things because these words cover different purposes.

But yes, politicians, if they were very clear about their positions, that would be a big turnoff to a lot of people for whom the clarity is not the position they want. So if they can be vague, the vague words can encompass a lot of possibilities. And, you know, that's only articulate in a certain sort of, of politiciany sort of way. If you look at politician's speeches, you know, there's a certain style in which they're articulate, but it's a very ambiguous style. It's a very not clear and precise style in which they are inspiring. They're supposed to sort of throw out words that are emotionally

loaded and evoke images in your mind without committing them to that much specifics. But if you think of somebody like Bill Clinton, he was somebody who was articulate, but was also, you know, many people thought that he represented them. With the current nominees, it seems that they don't have the same faculty of clarity and conversation. No doubt that varies. Although, you know, the word articulate is often a class-loaded word. So, for example, you know, Trump went out of his way to not project high-class, you know, signals. His winning in 2016 was basically saying there was a group of people out there who felt that they were being ignored and he basically credibly signaled, I'm one of you and I'm not with them and

therefore I will represent you. In order to do that, he had to show an affiliation with them different than the others and so he had to be a contrarian signal in some ways. If he just gave the usual sort of political prestige signals, that would not convince them that he was one of them. And since they felt that they were on the out, so one of the things they felt is that they were being ignored by cultural elites. And so Trump needed to not be a cultural elite in order to say, I'm with you and not with them. And they were also more rural and working class and things like that.

And so Trump explicitly, purposely, said, I'm one of you by choosing cultural styles that were like them and specifically different from the others. and in ways to make the other people yell at them. You know, what better way to convince you that I'm not one of them is to make them yell at me, then I'm not with them. I'm with you. This all makes sense, but it seems to contradict your explanation

in the chapter on conversation. If conversation is a way to judge whether we want somebody in leadership, either just not important at all or... So conversation, everything we do, I mean, importantly to know, everything we do has many different. motives that are relevant. So there's the most, the one will most often mention, and then there's the one that most often matters, but there's always a lot more. So in many kinds of conversations, loyalty signaling is just as important as ability signaling. That's not so much in one-on-one

conversations, although it's important there. It's important, for example, when your friend complains about something that you show support. That's a loyalty signal. You're not being very impressive with your support. You're just being loyal with your support that you, that you're You said, yes, when you did the direction for them, they were wrong and you were right. And we do those sort of loyalty signals all the time when people around us complain or indicate some sort of rivalry. And that's a very common thing we do. And of course, in politics, loyalty signals matter all the more.

So honestly, ability takes a second place to loyalty in politics and in many other areas of leadership, even for a manager or a CEO. often when they are looking for subordinates promote, loyalty matters more to them than ability. That's a common truism about organizational promotions and organizational coalitions. And so, yes, you often have to show loyalty before you show ability. That makes sense. So Peter Thiel has often says that it's interesting how the people who are the most successful startup founders are somewhere on the Asperger's spectrum. and it suggests that they're oblivious to the hidden motives or others or don't feel the need to put a pretense on top of their hidden motives.

I'm not sure which one. But does that make sense to you? And do you think you've said yourself that you're a nerd? Is that kind of explaining your success in coming up with social science ideas? So there's several different things going on here. So first of all, we're just talking about startups. You know, the most fundamental thing about a startup person is they're just on the tail of a distribution of optimism. basically the vast majority of startups fail.

And if you're going to be starting a startup, you have to be weird. Not only be weird, but have a weird expectation that you can succeed where everybody else is failing. And so you're just being selected from tail of distributions. And so I just expect them to be weird in lots of different ways, not just asperkeri, but lots and lots of ways, right? So that's just because it's just being weird. Now, in addition to being weird, it's going to be contrary, right?

A startup is not just another restaurant in an area where there's lots of similar restaurants. I mean, a startup is a kind of business where you are being contrarian with the business, right? You're choosing a different business concept, a different product, etc. So it's got to select for contrarians. I mean, it's not going to make sense to be part of a startup unless you have a contrarian take on the business. You have to think that you have a different idea for how the business can go. And of course, you have to be pretty confident in it and weird enough ways to actually go for it. So, you know, the things you're selecting for in a startup firm is

obviously somebody who's not comfortably going up on an organizational ladder somewhere else. They have decided to leave that and take this big chance on a big contrarian idea. And of course, there also need to be more of a generalist. A startup is just you have to do everything. You can't just be a specialist. So a startup, you know, we can just make as long list of things startups they're selecting for. And, you know, autism could correlate with the number of those. But, you know, not necessarily the strongest thing, but certainly one of the other things it has is that a startup founder, you know, just have to have analyzed a business, right? You have to have this theory of this industry, even if it doesn't exist.

and what the customers want and what the costs are and what the business competition strategy will be. That's kind of an abstract thing. You have to have some system theory of this industry that explains to you and your investors why this isn't crazy. So right, you know, Osbergers' people, they are systems people, right? They think in terms of systems. So right there, that also explains.

I mean, so it seems to me like pretty overdetermined, but there's going to be this correlation, what the fundamental strongest cause is, I don't know, but I'm not sure why I should care. But do you think you being a nerd helps you come up with all these astonishing amount of social science ideas? Well, so the story I tell about that is simpler, is just to say, most people who are socially skilled, they function well in their social worlds. And if they talk social science, they talk about social science theories, and they won't necessarily notice if those two are in conflict. They will talk about how, you know, we're all

egalitarian here at this company, and then they will be dominant in their activities and make sure they win out over their rivals, and they won't notice the competition, contradiction. It won't occur to them to notice the contradiction because they are so smooth and intuitive at doing the right thing and saying something else and, you know, how do they know? Because almost all our social activity you see is intuitive. It just comes subconsciously and we just do it and we don't know why. We just don't even notice it unless it doesn't work. So nerds, in contrast, are people who don't have this social capacity

to let's us smoothly glide through the social world, just always doing the right thing. We're doing the wrong thing all the time and wondering why it's wrong. And so we just have much more to gain from explicit analysis and thought about our social world. that still doesn't make us as socially skilled as someone who's just intuitive with it, but it makes us a little better because we think about it. So now if you're a social scientist or a social analyst, in addition to just being a nerd, now you have more of a chance of noticing the contradiction.

You say this one theory, and then you see yourself doing something else, and you notice that these things don't fit, because you see yourself doing things more because you're being more conscious about what you're doing, you're thinking and observing, and therefore having a better chance to notice whether your theory applies. So nerds are better able to notice when their own behavior, the behavior around them, doesn't fit the theories they say because they will have more explicit theories about the world

around them and what they're doing there and more of a chance for those explicit theories to come into conflict and to be tested against each other. But even still, it's incredible how many original ideas you've had. Is that a sort of indictment of the academia around social science ideas? Because if it was efficient with regards to social science ideas, you wouldn't expect all this free energy to exist that you can gobble up alone. Like if a stock market, a single person could, you know, put the market consistently. So let's talk, so we did this conversation, chapter on conversation.

We can, I can say that academia fits a lot of that model of conversation. So academia, if you say, what is it for? Or people will say, intellectual progress, advancement of the frontiers of research. Yay. That's like saying conversation is for sharing information. It's not true. What academics are trying to do mainly is to show off, just like individuals are showing off. So most academics are trying to produce their next paper and have it be impressive.

And when they submit it to a journal, that journal will evaluate it primarily in terms of how impressive it is. That is how difficult was it? How many people could do this? And so the referees who are looking at it do not ask how important this is or how original of this is or how useful this is. They ask overwhelmingly, how impressive is this?

Does it use difficult methods? Difficult to obtain data? Did you take a lot of time polishing it? Can we find any flaws whatsoever to pick on or does it seem to have been very picked, clean, to be very carefully constructed and elegantly put patched together? other, that's what people are looking for. And if you can pass those tests, you are impressive,

and therefore, academia credentials you as impressive. And so academia is the collection of people who have been credentialed at being impressive in different areas. And that's what the world wants from them, because students want to go to the schools with the impressive professors. Reporters want to interview the impressive professors when they call up a look for quote. Funders who hand out money for research, they want to fund the impressive people. The whole system is trying to be impressive. is not trying to be original or useful. So there's not much of a surprise that it would be possible to be much more original or even more useful

than most academics are because that's not what they're trying to do. And if you do do it in contrary to them, you won't be rewarded much. You won't gain a lot of praise or prizes or money or fame. You will just have been more original and useful and still mostly ignore. But your example seems a clear contradiction of that. I mean, you're quite a famous economist,

famous enough that I, thousands of miles away know about you. No, no, no, no. I'm not a famous economist. I'm on the margin. I'm lucky to have survived in academia. I'm lucky to have found a place and gotten tenure so I can do a lot of things. But in terms of how I'm counted by academics, I'm not very famous at all. So I might be more famous in a world of amateurs out there who talk to each other,

but academics don't care about that. They don't care if you've somehow managed to become famous among a world of amateurs. It doesn't, it's not what they're competing for. That doesn't get you a job. in academia, it doesn't get you a journal editorship, it doesn't get you a grant from the NSF. Having amateurs like you out there is pretty useless for an academic, so go for it if you want, they say, we don't care.

But that incentive to have thousands of fans who will buy your books and pay attention to what you're saying, that's not persuasive to anybody? No. No, best sellers are not made of thousands of sales. That's just a little better than an academic book, which is almost nothing. You want to make a bestseller out there. You'll need, you know, hundreds of thousands or millions of, millions of sales. That's where you might make a career out of selling books.

Oh, interesting. Okay. So let's talk about some of the essays you've been publishing recently. You have an essay called Dominance Explains Paternalism. So it makes sense why we'd want to dominate our rivals, but why would parents want to dominate their children? Because it should seem like they have a vested interest in their children. So let's go back to basics here. Social animals all through history of biology have organized themselves within the social group via dominance. The dominance is the one most common way that social groups of animals organize themselves. So it's say the chickens pecking order, right? Chickens peck at each other.

Whoever's better at pecking is the better pecker and there's a pecking order of chicken. And if you think you're mispecked in the order, then you peck up and down and see if you can change direct, right? That's true of all sorts of social animals all over the world. It's, of course, always this mixture of personal advantage and social advantage. I mean, social groups, you know, the ideal thing that social groups are somehow trying to do evolutionarily is finding a way to organize the group better while having each participant's actions be in their self-interest, right? You're trying to make it be in their self-interest to help the group. So, for example, there are these babbler birds we talk about in our book,

and early on in the book, and they are trying to achieve status, but one way they do it is by going into the top of the bushes and looking out for predators and calling for predators if they see them. So that helps the group, and it's somewhat at their own expense of being more at risk for the predator, but they gain status by it, and then that helps the group. So the group is found a way to get this striving for status to be in the interest of the group as a whole. And in addition, often the high-status birds are found cramming food down the throat of low-status birds who are resisting.

So they managed to share food through this mechanism of status, whereas if you give away more food, you're a higher-status bird. So dominance is this thing that's all through all animals, and humans have it too. And so human dominance has many functional pieces, not just dysfunctional pieces. Individually, we have selfish reasons to be dominant over and beyond how socially useful it might be, but it is useful. And parental dominance is one of the more useful forms of dominance we've all agreed to, I think, in the sense that when there are parents and children, parents need to make children do some things that the children aren't initially at the moment inclined to do.

And that's important. If the family's moving, the parent needs to drag the kid along, right? And if the kids at risk of hurting themselves or someone else, the parent may need to step in and limit that, etc. So parental dominance is functional in a great many ways, and therefore child submission is functional in many ways and acceptable. This is also important to mention. You think of dominance as something that the dominant party is trying to be dominant

and everybody else is resisting the domination, and that's just not true. So we talk about status moves in our chapter on body language. And what we say is that humans are constantly negotiating a relative status in their conversations and interactions. And it's not an equal status, but they're both agreeing to it. When you see people awkwardly interacting, that's often when they have not agreed on the relative status. Typically, they do come to an agreement, and that's not an equal agreement. And then one party is dominant and the other is submissive, and the submissive party is okay with it.

basically, they are choosing to be relatively submissive. We actually like being submissive in many ways, although we don't like to admit it. So, you know, BDSM, right, is a thing. And in that world, it's not just the dominant parties who are joining it. It's the submissive parties as well. And we like submission in many ways that we don't admit to. So dominance is mission is very functional.

In humans, we have the separate kind of status called prestige. And that's the one it's okay to have and to acknowledge and to accommodate, whereas we're not supposed to be acknowledging or seeking or accommodating dominance. So a lot of human hypocrisy is about pretending that dominance is prestige. So, for example, bosses. Most people, when they think about other people having bosses, they don't like the idea. It's a bad idea. It's not right that somebody should have to do what a boss says.

Their boss, however, is usually okay. Similarly with politicians, of course, most politicians are corrupt, but not your politician. So what's going on? Well, in modern workplaces, you kind of need somebody in charge who gives orders. That's kind of basic to the setup. And so there needs to be a boss, and they have to be able to give orders, and that's dominance. And they are threatening to take away your money, and money is dominance too. So, like, they've got a double dominance whammy there.

And so the usual human rules are you're supposed to resist that. You're not supposed to accept that. We're all supposed to get together and defy that and denounce it and make it stop. But we're all going to work and obeying our bosses. So what gives? Well, one of the things that's going on is our boss's main job in many ways is to project prestige. See, the key idea is in these ancient human groups, if somebody in the group would say, you all have to do what I say because I'm bigger than you and if you don't do it, I'm going to punch you.

Or I'm the best hunter and if you don't do what I say, I won't feed you. That's dominance and that's not okay. But it's okay if somebody's just the best hunter and we all just want to watch him and see how he does it and we're impressed. Somebody's the best singer, the best firemaker. Whatever it is, it's okay just to be the best at someone and have people say you're the best and have people admire you as long as you don't seem to be using it for dominance purposes. You are self-effacing and you deny it and you say, no, no, I'm just ordinary. But other people say good things about you. So that's what a boss needs to do.

So often, as you may notice in modern workplaces, boss is very rarely one. to give direct orders. They would rather indirectly suggest things because they don't want to take on this explicit dominance role. They want to be prestigious. And so we pay a lot for bosses who have, you know, impressive degrees from impressive schools who are tall, or handsome, who are articulate, who have immense stamina, work many hours, because that makes them prestigious. And when they are prestigious, it's okay for us to do what they say or suggest because we can say, that that's prestige, and therefore we can actually go to work and do what we're told. And that's an important thing to people go to work and do what they're told because otherwise

the thing doesn't happen. There was a lot of fascinating stuff there, but I want to ask you about how much of our domination of children is actually helpful. You've been publishing on Twitter these tweets about how teaching our kids' music is, it seems to be ineffectual. How much of that You mentioned even previously about the dominance explains paternalism. Yeah. So paternalism is this way that we, we all treat each other that's like how parents treat children. The word comes from parents

treating children. So as we know, parents often tell children what to do and what not to do. And then by analogy, we often tell each other what to do and not to do. Through the government, through the homeowners association, through all sorts of mechanisms, we treat each other terministically. Now, sometimes we tell each other what to do because what you do might affect other people around you and we need to limit the damage you can do to them. But often we are justifying our paternalism in terms of how you're hurting yourself or how we need to make you help yourself.

And that's often what we do with children too. And my argument was that in both cases, we are not admitting to ourselves how much we're just wanting to be dominant and not actually being helpful. So often we are making somebody else do what we think they should do and we say it's for their own good, but what really happens is that we make them do what we say

and everybody sees that we are dominant because we made them do what we said. And that feels good to us because it raises our status because everybody sees, ah, you're the dominant one. We need to like respect you more and associate you with more because you're the one in charge. And that's true with parents too. So with children too.

So even though there are some things parents have to do to keep the children from running into the street or things like that, parents quite commonly go well beyond that. to make kids do things for their own good. So the example is teaching a child to play an instrument that came up in Twitter recently. And the thing that came from was the study that said, well, if you look for academic or cognitive benefits,

like they're better at school or more disciplined or more practice or something, that's just not there. On average, kids who play an instrument are not getting any of those benefits out of it. You could say, well, yeah, but they like to play music. okay, and I was saying, well, if they don't like it and it's not giving these other benefits, what's the point? Maybe that's a big waste. Now, obviously, one of the things that's going on is a lot of parents have heard, rightly so, that in many social worlds, it's very prestigious to play an

instrument. And you are seen as cultured in high class if you play an instrument, and maybe those high class colleges will give you a better look if you are seen as being a high class sort of person who plays violin, et cetera. And so many parents push their kids. to play an instrument so that they can be high class, not only supposedly gives the kid a leg up later in competition for class, but also makes the parents be able to brag about the kid. But honestly, I might say this is a case where you're pretending to do something for their benefit and it's more for yours.

Some of them might even just be for bedtimes, for example. I mean, very often when we tell a child to go to bed at a bedtime, we say it's for your own good. You'll be cranky in the most. morning if I don't make you go to bed now. And be cranky now. Right. But, you know, more plausibly, it's because you want some time alone after the kids go to bed.

And that's important to you. And, you know, it's also, if they're cranky in the morning, that will affect you, not just them. And this is about you. But you're not so much willing to admit that. And so you tell yourself you're doing things for the kids. And so a lot of paternalism towards kids is also going farther than necessary for helping them. It may help you, and maybe that's justified in the sense that, hey, you're part of the story here, and what you want should matter too.

But parents often are uncomfortable with admitting that they're just doing it for themselves. But the reason parents might prefer their own preferences over their children, is that just because of the discounting, because they share 50% of your genes? Yeah, of course. I mean, that's just an evolutionary point of view. If we just look for proximate causes, of course, we know that we care about ourselves above 300 children. Children aren't the only thing we care about in the world.

Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Oh, yeah. And so you had another post recently about remote work, where you said it's going to be a very big deal in the future, among other things. But if it's going to be such a big deal,

and we've had video conferencing technology for so long, why hasn't it happened until now? Or why would we expect it to happen in the future? Right. So when you're thinking about the long run, there's two kinds of things to predict that will happen. There's the expected and the unexpected. Among the expected, you know, over decades, there have been this long list of things that people have been predicting will happen. And when you're thinking of the future, those are the easiest things to predict in the future, the things that people have been predicting for a while. The unexpected thing that nobody sees yet, that'll happen too, but it's much harder to predict. So the most basic. prediction game is to look among all the things that people have been predicting and ask, well, which of those is finally going to actually happen? Because a lot of things are predicted well before they happen. It's easy to confuse a clear view with a long distance. You know, you're standing on a mountain, you see across the other mountain and you see it clearly, but that

doesn't mean it's close. It just means you can see it clearly. Right. And so when you just think about the future, there are just many ways in which people say, ah, that's got to happen eventually. And then they often think, and so it's about to happen now, which is not quite the same thing, right? So obviously, space is a very dramatic example of that. People have been able to see for quite a while that eventually space is going to be a really big deal. That doesn't mean it's happening yet.

And clearly, maybe, you know, not obviously now. Or fusion energy. If you look at the fundamental sources of energy that are possible, you say, look, fusion, look how powerful that is. Look how, you know, that's got to happen eventually. Eventually we've got to tap into that. Probably, yeah. Is it going to be right now?

Not necessarily, right? So the game for most of these things is to ask, well, when will it actually happen? Not just in principle that it will eventually happen, but to look at the details of what it takes to enable. So with telecommuting, many people have been predicting that way in advance when not much happened. And people then struggled to say, well, we were predicting telecommunity 30 years ago, but it didn't happen much. Why didn't it happen? And I think if you, one of the things that goes on is you make these predictions based on naive theories about how things work, and then you need to refine them. So for telecommuting, many theories of telecommuting were based on very simple-minded theories of what people are doing at work.

And people have correctly said, well, you know what? At work, you have to not only sort of do your job, you have to negotiate politics. You have to form alliances and people have to be able to read you in your loyalty. and you need to lobby for your side and your allies. And those are all things that are harder to do when you're back at home, especially with very limited communication mechanisms, such as we had in the past.

But, you know, the question is, are those obstacles sufficient to block it forever, or do they just block it for a modest period of time? So in order to think about a change like this, you want to think about two things. You want to think about the things in the way, like I just talked about sort of playing politics and negotiating things, you know, on line versus in the office. And you want to think about what's the draw, like how big a payoff could this be? And so I think people have correctly understood the sort of political obstacle,

but they haven't really fully appreciated what the big draw was. And that's the thing I was trying to call attention to in my recent writing was to say, the draw here is much bigger than most people realize. And that's why this is going to be a big deal. And that's why these obstacles will be overcome because there's such a huge draw. So I say the huge draw is agglomeration. Cities, bigger cities are much more economically productive than smaller cities or no cities. And the reason is when you are in a big city, there are just a lot more different interaction

partners you can have. And so there's a lot more room for specialization. In a small town, there might be one Chinese restaurant. In a big city, there can be 100 Chinese restaurants. We can then specialize in different areas of Chinese food and different kinds of restaurants and you know, specializing being low quality or high quality. There's just lots of room for specialization. And that gives a lot of payoff, all these different specialized roles. Remote work allows sort of planet-wide specialization. That's the key thing to realize. It's it can be as if the entire planet was one big city. And that's an enormous increase in productivity

when you are able to take away advantage of the specialization. So that's the thing not to realize. So there are many industries today where they have sort of specialized internationally as it is. So for example, Google or Apple, there isn't one of those in every city or one of those in every country. There's one of those in the world.

And so people in those companies, can specialize in one particular task and then the benefit of what they do spreads across the entire world. They make the iPhone slightly better in one way. Everybody in the world gains from that by getting that iPhone. There are many other jobs that we do that we haven't been able to specialize so that there's sort of a world involved. So think of a plumber or a hairdresser. Your local hairdresser doesn't have to be the best in the world at what they do, like the person at Apple working on the phone has to be, because you can't go around the world to get a hair cut. You have to go near where you are. So your local hairdresser is only competing with a limited number of hairdressers in your area. And they can't specialize that

much. The number of people they would work on is limited. So there's only a limited number of kinds of hairdressers that can be in your small area. Similarly with plumbing, right? Your plumber is not specialized in one particular kind of plumbing job. They have to do most all kinds of plumbing jobs that will show up in your area because you're going to have to have a local plumber who's close enough to drive over and work on your pipes. And so those are kinds of jobs that we have not gained this specialization where there's just somebody in the world who's best at each thing and they're doing that one best thing. Well, with remote work, if you could actually have people remotely cut hair or remotely work on pipes, now they could come from a very long way.

and so there'd be this huge region from which you could draw people to do it and so they could specialize there could be the person who knows about just your kind of pipe and you're just your kind of job and during the job there's five different parts of the job each part of that job we've been done by a different person who specializes that part of the job and that's an enormous potential productivity and that will be the draw that makes us willing to pay these extra costs to figure out how to do things online, which are harder and so far have been the obstacle. Okay. Let me offer up two concerns and see how you assuage me.

One is Caleb Watney wrote an article in the Atlantic a little while ago where he said, remote work might actually decrease innovation and productivity growth because there's no way to replace the physical agglomeration effects of just being in a big city and then two engineers and still like their value run into each other and quit their jobs and start a company. That remote work won't replace that. And the other is that specialization will mean that like the 10% best plumbers will be doing all the plumbing and 90% of plumbers will be out of a job because they're just not good enough if they can just compete with each other. So that second thing is exactly what we want and exactly what we get in other areas. Yes, we want the best people to be doing it and the other is to go do something else.

And that is the nature of the modern specialized economy. And yes, that's what we want. more of that, please. And with respect to the first, it's about what to what extent can you have more interactions and to what extent is being physically close important for that. So in the past, you see, you know,

most of your interactions were physical and direct and you had this minority of weird interactions online. And that minority of weird online interactions just could not fill all the social roles in your life. if you tried to do that, that didn't work very well. Because most people weren't doing those social roles online, they were doing them in life. So if you and your co-workers, you stop by their office and chat,

they go out for drinks after work, come over to their house for a birthday party, those are all important social interactions. And you could chat with somebody at the birthday party about your new idea for engineering product, and then you might be off from there, right? Or you might have a speaker who comes into town and you'll go off and listen to the speaker

and you chat with other people after the speaker about this talk, et cetera. Again, the key thing is, you know, when you're in a city, there's just more of those things you can do. And the closer you are to someone, the less farther you have to drive to get to whatever their birthday party. And so you just get more opportunities to do things. As we do through more things online, then those things can happen online instead. If you have the birthday party online, then you'd be chatting with people at the birthday

party online. If you're going out for drinks online, then you're going out for drinks online, then you're that's where you would chat with people. If you're working, if you have a business meeting and you chat afterwards at the business meeting, it happens online, well, those things would happen there. So the question is just, can all those things happen there? That's the big question.

So as we slowly move more kinds of interactions online, then they can become the basis for innovation. They can become the basis for serendipity and new conversations and new groups do you form. But we have to work to make a business. those things happen because we haven't been doing them online. And initially when we try to do online, they're awkward and not very satisfying. We have to work to find ways to do them so that they can be more natural, fluid, and satisfying. And that'll take a while. And that's why I was making this

prediction that it's the biggest thing over the next 30 years, not the next five or even 10 years. I'm going to be willing to say 30. So when people make predictions about the next big thing, they usually talk in the next 10 years. And I've learned enough over the years to go, no, stuff doesn't happen that fast. 10 years is too slow. You want to be predicting maybe over the next 30 years. That's enough time where big things can happen. I say maybe a third of work would be done online in 30 years, maybe even two thirds.

And that's, you know, a challenging thing to do over 30 years. Okay, so I'm studying computer science and university. Is there something I should be doing differently? or some way I can give myself a competitive advantage, knowing that remote work is going to be a big thing in the next 30 years? Well, many, I mean, certainly computer programming has been at the vanguard of remote work. And so that's an area where people are creating more best practices and standard practices that are using remote work. And so as you, as you may or may not know, most work done outside of school is collaborative.

So in school, you tend to want to do your own projects and not collaborate with other people, but for the purpose of learning what it will be like to be out of school, it's better if you try to do more collaborative projects in school. If the teacher won't assign them, then assign them yourself. Do projects where you work with people. And as long as you're working with people, try some of your projects to be online collaborations. Because, you know, that's how you'll learn how to do it. Okay. And do you have any other advice for like a generic 20-year-old?

Sure. Yeah, what kind of problem? So life is a long time. You will live a long time. You have a long life. So don't tell yourself that if you screw up right now, the life is over and it's too late ever to fix it. That's just not true. So I started my PhD program at the age of 34 with two kids, they'd zero and two. and, you know, manage to get a PhD and become a professor later in life than most. So whatever you pick as a thing you're going to focus on, if you stick with it for many decades, you can do a lot.

So just know you have a lot of options out of you. You don't, it's not all about right now or it's too late. And, you know, early in life, you want generic skills. like learning the latest particular programming language or toolkit, you know, programmers are often really into that. They're just, they're very fattish. They're always, what's the new skill? I'm going to learn that.

And I'm going to put it on my resume. Look, I'm doing blockchain or whatever it is. And that's a pretty short-term investment. You want to, in early in life, you want to be making the long-term investments, sort of learn about, learn how to write, learn how to talk, learn sort of basic analysis, but learn how social groups work, how to course. coordinate with people, learn sort of basic skills that you can use all your life. That's just a factor of all people, all young people everywhere.

You know, this is your time of life for skills and abilities collected now can be used across your entire life, but across a changing and varied life. So don't make so many bets not exactly what you'll be doing with stuff. Collect a lot of relatively general, long-lasting skills. And that includes social skills of like having associates and convincing, you know, convincing them you're with them and that you like them and that you know you're listening to them. If you were 20, would you still, would you still go into social science or academia or would you be working on another set of problems? So my path, the way I saw it at the time, was focusing on what

seemed the most interesting topic to me. And then once I learned key things about it, that changed what I thought were the most interesting topics. And then I switched to what were now the new more interesting topics. And I repeatedly did that until I got to a place where nothing else beat that as a more interesting topic, which to me meant it seemed to be very important and, you know, have high potential. I don't see an easy way to shortcut that in the sense that unless you happen to stumble across the most important topic right at the beginning, you won't really know what the most important topics are, the most high potential topics are, until you think about that. them and dive into them.

It seems like a time and attention expensive algorithm. Right. Yes. So basically it depends on how much you're going to sort of take on the task of finding the most important things. So most people you see just stumble into a local world and they say, this world seems like it'll take me. And it seems like a world I might be happy enough in.

So I'm just going to be in this world and succeed in this world. But I'm not going to make the judgment. the relative importance of this world compared to other worlds. That's a lot of work. How do I know? These people say that I'm good for them. They seem to like me. They seem to have sufficient prestige and resources to be okay to be with them,

and so I'm just going to stick with them. Or, of course, they reject you, and then you go look for the next thing, and you keep going until somebody accepts you, right? Somebody seems good enough. When people do it that way, they're sort of trusting the world to know what's important. the world itself is telling you, oh, you're good at this, we're willing to pay you,

then you say, okay, I guess I'll do it. Which is fine, that might be perfectly fine for most people to do, but it seems to me that some people should be asking, no, no, what's absolutely important? What overall matters? What's missing and neglected, such that somebody should do it, but nobody is because it's missing and neglected. So that in some sense is what I specialized more in the same,

I'm going to take an overall evaluation. I'm going to look at as many things that I can. I'm going to look for missing and neglected things, and then I'm going to try to do those. There's no way to look for missing and neglected things without taking on yourself the judgment of looking at a wide range of areas and asking how important they are.

So it seems like a case of asymmetrical information where if you're already burrowed into a path, you're not aware of what somebody else might know about what the neglect areas are. Is there a way you can kind of fine tune the problem? So honestly, it's not as hard as you might think. That is, if you go to most people and you ask them, why is what you do important?

Most people don't have much to say. They've got a few memorized phrases, but if you try to probe them on it, they just haven't thought about it. So the very first step is just to push into that level of detail in different subjects, just ask, well, why is medicine important? Or why is advertising important? or why is transportation, you know, air of transportation for it,

just to have a simple enough model of the world where you have each piece of it, and there's a simple reason why that would matter and how it matters relative to other things. And most people just don't even bother to construct that sort of a model of things and why they matter. But if I've read the elephant in the brain, wouldn't I be susceptible of others' claims

or even my own claim that tries to justify why what I'm working on is important? Sure, but even when you're broken and biased, like actually trying to look at a question beats not doing it. Yeah. You know, this is just a basic fact about, you know, often in areas, you know, there's this old saying, two people come across a bear in the woods. One guy starts putting on his tennis shoes, the other one says, you can't outrun a bear. And he says, I don't need to outrun the bear, I just need to outrun you. And so in a lot of areas of life, it's about, you know,

how well other people are doing at it and whether you can do better than what other people are doing. So you don't have to be great at it. You don't have to be spectacular. You can actually be pretty bad, but if everybody else is worse, you'll be the best. Okay. That's a very good advice. I think it's the best advice.

I've been asking everybody that I interviewed about their advice for young people, and I think that's the best advice they've gone so far. Let me ask you about idea futures. So if even a few firms adopted using prediction markets for their internal decisions. If you're right, you would expect them to become more successful and over the long run become dominant.

So would you expect in the future to be the dominant firms that have integrated these sorts of practices? So I have a post somewhere whose name is escaping me where I list 20 some odd different facts, things that firms are doing that don't seem to be maximizing profits. So profit maximization of firms is the simple default. theory that we economists tend to invoke. And it has a simple justification, which is to say that firms that don't profit maximize will lose out on average in competition with the ones that do. So that's not a crazy theory. But when I can make 20 odd examples of things that don't seem

to be profit maximizing, I have to revise that theory. I have to say, no, that's enough data to say that's not quite right. It doesn't mean firms aren't profit maximizing across many margins, We've talked about many organizations have a long view on some margins, but how many margins, how many areas are they taking a long view? The same thing we could ask for firms, along how many dimensions are they proxamizing. So, for example, a firm might well be profit maximizing in terms of how many ounces of peas are in the can, for how thick the wall of the can is, or how long they stew it for, right? There might be a limited number of parameters where they just really carefully tried to maximize promise with profits with respect to those parameters. Because those are pretty important parameters, and it wasn't really a problem. But if you look at this other list of features that firms don't seem to maximize profits on,

that tends to be where politics gets in the way. And so I'd say, well, the first approximation of firms is as a forum or battlefield in which different political coalitions fight. And the rules and procedures that will be adopted will be the ones that favor each coalition in its conflict with the coalitions, even if that's not at the benefit of the firm as a whole. So for example, telecommuting is an example. You can say, well, there are many ways in which we should have expected to see more telecommuting now, even though it is hard in many ways, but political coalitions that have their members

telecommute lose out in political contests with others. That is, it's important for each political coalition to show up at meetings and push their coalition's point of view. So if you've got workers that are out there but don't showing up at meeting someone, much, your point of view is being lost relative to the others, and so you're losing out. That's why a reason why a coalition might not want its members to be telecommuting, even if it wants other members to do so. But even if that's true, then over the long term, you'd still expect the firms that have

optimized for minimizing the impact of politics to, you know, be dominant. And so- And that's very hard. So, I mean, the important thing to realize is we are still early in the stage of optimizes. organizations. Two centuries ago, there were basically not large organizations. They didn't exist. Almost everything was done by small organizations. Even nations were run by small organizations. And over the last two centuries, we have gained a lot of experience organizing people into larger organizations. And we've learned a lot, and they've changed a lot over that period. And we are still a long way from optimizing organizations. I don't know how long it'll

take, but it could well take several more centuries at the rate we've been going to figure out how to set up organizations so that they actually do maximize profits. Because again, the temptation is to say you're maximizing profits and then do whatever helps your coalition. Because firms are run by people in coalitions. They're not run by some abstract algorithm. And so until you can get those people to do what's in the organization's interest, they will do what's in their interest. So you seem skeptical of the odds that primary players will reform their institutions and how they make policy. So when I wrote that post where I just kind of imagined the press conference with reporters who care about the betting odds of different policies. You said it's not likely because reporters aren't going to care about policy effectiveness.

But couldn't I say that the American Revolution was a time when our founders did care about how the incentives and constraints of the institutions they created? So maybe it can happen once, it will keep happening again and again. So there's two things to keep track of. One is that things change sometimes, and the other is that people on purpose change things to be better. Now, we tend to focus on that second process on people looking at institutions and deciding what to do so because they think that would be better. But honestly, that's probably a smaller process and matters less than the first. first fact that sometimes things change. The key to innovation is just that sometimes things change. When you don't change, you can't innovate. And a lot of these things just don't change that often.

You talk about the U.S. Constitution, well, there's a lot of ways now, 250 years later, to say that we don't have a very good constitution. Maybe if it was state of the art back then, but it's not now. But it doesn't change. And similarly, for many sort of things, business practices, often they're just standard business practices and everybody does it that way, and so those don't change. And the fundamental thing that needs to happen in general for innovation is just for there to be changed, for a range of possibilities to be tried, and it doesn't much matter why they're tried. It doesn't matter the motives of people for trying them or what they had in their hand or what their goals were, because there's just a wide range of those motives and goals, and

there's just a wide range of mental states people can be in and rationalizations they can make for doing one thing or the other. The main thing is that stuff is tried, because sometimes when something is tried, it works really well, and people go, ooh, let's keep that. That's the key process

is when people look at something that was tried for whatever reason and notice at least some part of it that's going really well, and then they want to keep that. Well, of course, even at a finer level, you notice a thing that seems to be going well, except some other part of it is going badly,

and now you try another variant. You say, well, what if we did this thing instead? Because maybe that'll keep this good part and cut away the bad part. And so you need people to not just try it at this high level of having a new constitution. You need places where people are trying and trying and trying by exploring a space of variations for looking at what works. That's the key to innovation. And of course, that's how most, I mean, if you know in software, of course, that's how

software innovation works, right? You know, when you write some code, you try it differently. then it breaks in one part and another part doesn't do what you thought and then you keep having to retry it and re-change it until you find a thing that all works. So the conventional wisdom on the sort of on our constitution is that it was a good thing that our founders made it very hard to pass new laws because there's more ways for things to go wrong than to make things better. But you would disagree with that. You would think it should be both are both are true. So the vast majority of innovations are bad.

The vaccine in the area of the world are bad. That's true in medicine and everything about, nevertheless, we're only going to have a net change if we try things out. So we both have to try a lot of things and expect most of them will be bad and we'll expect to throw most of them away so that we can accumulate some better things.

Unless you're willing to try some things, even though most of them are bad, you won't get to get to better things. So you'd prefer like the British parliamentary system where they try socialism and it doesn't doesn't work and so they go back to some sort of capitalism. Is there like- Well, so, I mean, for always for innovation, you know, you can go too much.

It's certainly quite possible to have too much innovation. What you want is enough innovation and of course to have people have incentives for choosing the better ones. So, you know, you do have better innovation if you can give people better incentives for picking things that would work better. So that's why say a venture capital system of innovation might work better than say some government agency that just tells people to try things because they might have better incentives to pick better things. And of course, if you just change everything at random, that's too much change. You know, you need to usually just be changing a few things while you keep most other things unchanged and paying close attention to whether it's working better or not and being ready to abandon it if it's not working well or change it at least. What's your favorite political system in the world that does this well? Well, as you know, I have a proposal for something called Futarky, which is based on betting markets.

And so that would be the thing I'm proposing. But an existing system? Well, Demarchy is interesting where you put people randomly in office and see how they do. That was something the Greeks had. Random, Sortion is another name for it. They randomly assign people to political offices. Did that work well? Well, that's the question of whether Greece worked well or Athens worked well.

Okay. It was time consuming and expensive, but, you know, there's a wide range of governance. So I think people glamorize governance too much. I mean, people are focused on, say, the United Nations or the World Bank and international or national organizations. But honestly, most governance happens at a local level, your church, your homeowners association, you know, your firm. And most innovation should happen at that level, too. And mainly what is innovation at those small levels,

and then the larger organizations will copy the things that work at smaller levels. And so I'm actually not that interested in the international governance or the internet and the national governance, because it's just something so many people are lobbying to influence. I won't have much of an influence, and it's not really a place to do innovation. You innovate again in small organizations and then, you know, adopt the best practices at the larger ones.

Okay. So your view of governance is very much evolutionary, just like random mutation and selection. Not so much random, but like you'll need a lot of it. Okay. Even when you're trying not to be random, you are, in fact, being pretty random. I mean, the basic fact is there's a lot of things you don't know. There's a lot of context you're not taking into account. So when you're making your best guess, you're still being pretty random.

So I sense a lot of skepticism towards experts who think, who are sure that they know what the next step is, is it's just like a hundred. It's very easy to be overconfident, but of course, you definitely want people who know best when you can, unless they are being so overconfident as to destroy their advantage. I mean, that's just generically true. There are many areas where, you know, the person who's most known for being best is so overconfident that you might be better off picking random people in that role than somebody who's that overconfident. But if you actually have the best person out of it and they have a decent incentive to not be overconfident about it, then of course, yes, you want the best person. person.