Empire: World History - 119. The Last Shah

Episode Date: February 1, 2024

Reza Pahlavi rules but he is still bedevilled by the interference of the great powers. Britain has its claws in deep with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (the future BP) which makes more money from Iranian oil than Iran does. But it is the Second World War that lays this foreign meddling bare when Reza is forced to abdicate after a British invasion. Will his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, known to many as the Last Shah, be able to resist the foreign powers better? Join William and Anita as they are once again joined by Ali Ansari to discuss foreign interference in Pahlavi Iran in the middle of the 20th century. For bonus episodes, ad-free listening, reading lists, book discounts, a weekly newsletter, and a chat community. Sign up at https://empirepod.supportingcast.fm/ Twitter: @Empirepoduk Email: [e-mail] Goalhangerpodcasts.com Producer: Callum Hill Exec Producer: Neil Fearn Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

If you want access to bonus episodes reading lists for every series of Empire, a chat community. Discounts for all the books mentioned in the week's podcast, add free listening and a weekly newsletter, sign up to Empire Club at www.mparpoduk.com. And welcome to Empire with me, Anita Arnan. And me, William Dharimple. And we are once again delighted to say we are joined by Ali Ansari, Professor of Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews. author of many, many books, including his brand spanking new one, Iran, published just last week. And Ali is going to be holding our hands through four episodes here on Empire,

taking us from the bejoled end of the Khadha dynasty to the austere robes of the Ayatollahs who now reigns supreme in Iran. And where we left off last time, Ali, was the rise of a man called Reza Shah, the first palavi, who chooses his name because... I loved your detail. Everyone had to choose the name for bureaucracy because you needed to know which column to put ticks in. I mean, I love that fact so much. But we now have a state where a soldier became a prime minister, became a king, became a Shah. And what kind of man, what kind of king was he? Yeah, paint a picture for us of him. Yeah.

I mean, it's quite interesting because Vita Zakville West attends the coronation in 1926, and she paints a very interesting portrait of him. I mean, he's over six foot. She considers him to be quite regal, actually, in his, even the British who initially encounter him. The British fall out of love with him, actually, I have to say fairly quickly. But the initial encounters with him, they see him as, you know, a very powerful nationalist, a serious player, if you will. There's a hint that he's ever so slightly vulgar, but I think that's a sense of snobbishness

that comes around because he's certainly not aristocratic, but someone who, as Sackville West said, had a certain regal bearing. I mean, he held himself quite well. And interestingly enough, one of the figures he studied very, carefully, he was Nade Hshaar, and how Nardos Shah basically came to the throne. So he was very calculating in the way he moved forward towards the throne. Well, I mean, there are parallels as well. I mean, sort of the bearing of a military man, over six feet tall. I mean, people say that about Nathashah, a voice. Yeah. They say of Nardosha that carried over

miles and everyone had to obey. Is Rerza Shah a shatter or a whisperer when it comes to being a leader? Do we know? I mean, we've got a few recordings of him actually speaking. Actually, I don't think he is a shout. He does have a temper. I describe him, really, that the intellectuals, the intellectuals around him with a sort of velvet glove around his iron fist. He was the man who was going to drag Iran kicking and screaming into the modern world, and he wasn't going to take prisoners doing it. Whereas Nathar Shah was the iron fist around an iron fist. I know, yeah.

As my late colleague, late lamented colleague Michael Axwood, you said, we used to chat about how Nader Shah would never be a man for a human rights seminar. No. Not one that lasted very long. And one of the other characters that we sort of just touched on in the last episode, it was the slight bubble of oil and Brits sort of marauding around the land with divining rods trying to find these great wells of oil in the Iranian territory. By this time, we have the Anglo-Persian oil company.

Now tell us what have they been doing in the years that Reza Khan has been coming to power, where have they been and what have they been up to? So basically, I mean, the critical difference here is that in the run up to the Great Wall, the Royal Navy moves from coal-fired ships to oil. And this makes this oil resource a strategic interest for Britain. So whereas Iran was basically a buffer zone originally, you know, basically to keep the Russians away from India, now it becomes a strategic interest in its own right. I mean, basically the British need that resource. Is that the first time it happens? Is this the first time people really now need their own oil fields?

Yeah. And what's fascinating about the Anglo-Persian oil company for all its ills, I have to say, of which we will discuss, is that basically it's the first industrial development in Iran. I mean, it's the first major significant industrial. And with all that follows, I mean, it's the first time you actually get a proper labouring class in Iran, a working class, if you will. Ali, just paint us a picture coming on from that of where Iran is in 1925, for example. Still caravansarise around the place. Tarmac roads, any electricity?

No, no. I mean, it's still, the political economy of Iran is still very, very. very, very basic. We're talking about a vast country. I mean, it's shrunken from its imperial grandeur, but it's still vast. You know, the modern Iran is still the size of Western Europe, large deserts, large mountain ranges, very disconnected. You wouldn't call it a single market in the standard sense. I mean, it's a very disparate group. It is still, as I describe it, as sort of an imperial kingdom made of different sort of sections. We mentioned in one of our last episodes, Robert Byron, who's traveling around this sort of time. Yeah, yeah.

And he's seeing a country that's beginning to be forced into sort of hypermodernization. Everyone's being made to wear hats, for example, and women are being stripped to the veil. Is that Reza Shah, who decides that? That's Reza Shah. Yeah, he does. Yeah, yeah. So on what basis does he suddenly wake up one day and say, you've got to look Western? Well, he doesn't. I mean, the point is, is what happens is, is that you have to remember that the people who bring him effectively to power, who will him into power, are these intellectuals. And they have a blueprint for modernisation.

and it's a blueprint for modernisation that's largely been written during the Constitutional Revolution. And there is continuity between the two, is that? Yes, absolutely. I mean, this is, I have to say, my thesis, but it's one that I think is fairly easily to substantiate. He says a number of these intellectuals go to him with manifestos. And they basically say, this is what you need to do. And does he have time for intellectuals? I mean, he's a military man.

He likes his soldiers. Yeah, he doesn't have time for a prolonged discussion. He wouldn't have time for this podcast. No. But he wants things done. He sort of says, you know, tell me what, you know, I will enable it. So a number of things he does on a whole range, I mean, the two most significant changes he makes in some ways are to do with the development of a distinct judiciary, appeal code,

you know, the legal system in Iran, which the constitutionist could not do. He basically gets it kickstarted, but there's intellectual heft behind it. There are people who do this. And then education. Education is the other major thing that he develops. Even for women, which is an astonishing thing. Yeah. Well, I was going to say, my ovaries are aching because we haven't spoken about women at all, very much.

So what was their position pre-Rez-A-Shar and when he comes to power? One of the things that Reza-Shah does, but again, what I have to emphasise is this is not an instantaneous change. I mean, it's basically over a period of 15 years. So one of the things he changes is the dress coat and also the role of women. And the key element in the role is he abolishes the veil. Now, the reason for this is not what's going on in Turkey. It's actually that the Afghan king and queen come to visit, and the Afghan queen in 1928 is unveiled. Really?

Yeah. And of course, for the Iranians, this is quite shocking. They go, oh, bloody hell, if the Afghans can do it. Because people in Iran tend to think of the Afghans as backward. Yeah, yeah, exactly. So they went, blimey, if they can do it. So was it mandatory for women to wear veils before that change? Yeah, yeah, I mean, basically it was, yeah, yeah.

And then afterwards it's mandatory for them not to. Yeah, and that's the problem, of course, is he imposes it. There was that wonderful show of Persian art and civilization at the VNA a couple of years ago. Yeah. And in between two different rooms, you moved from the late Khadjar period where you had pictures of women in Haram's, veiled, all grouped together, very much women together. And then suddenly by the 1930s, you've got women in dresses sort of sitting in meetings. Well, I've seen those photographs. There's something out of madmen, you know, just, you know, very, very stylish, very super sort of styled, shorter hair.

I mean, it becomes a serious problem. In what way? Well, in the sense that, you know, liberalism imposed from above. Oh, you don't want liberals out there, liberalizing women. You know, can be a bit difficult because, you know, obviously what predates this is, is men. So men have to change their clothes. And, you know, the model they take basically is what the Japanese did. What sort of business suit and a hat?

Yeah, yeah. Yeah, wide-brimmed hat. A sort of trill be. Yes. Yeah. First of all, he had a sort of a kepie. Then they had a sort of a nice hat. And of course, they always say these are Sasanian.

You know, we've inherited this from the Sassadians. I mean, just to give it a certain sort of national authenticity. Right, okay. Complete nonsense. Because the Sasanians loved a fedora, apparently. Well, that's right. And trilbies. Never went out without a trillby.

Absolutely, trillbies. But of course, as you know, from your ancient Iran thing, you know, they could lay claim to the trouser. Yes. You know, obviously this is what nationalist do. Yeah. So the men, the dress code for men changes first. And then he takes, you know, in the 1930s, the leap for women. But of course, for women, the issue is, of course, is that it comes with a whole cultural change for them.

Because previously, you know, if a woman went out, you know, they're heavily covered up so you don't know what they're wearing underneath. And they could wear anything, basically. Now women had to sort of basically learn how to behave in public. There was a public persona. You know, the problem with this, I think that people misread is they always see this as a sort of a driven by Rez Oshar. Rez Oshar was the enabler of other people's ideas. Interesting. You know?

And it was intellectual. who are pushing this. Okay. Does he then appoint all these intellectuals to his cabinet positions and all of his ministerial positions? I mean, he falls out of love with a lot of them eventually and they fall out of love with him. But initially, there's a whole range. I won't go into the names of them all. But there's also, I should say, you know, there's one very prominent Iranian literary sort of intellectual who wrote an article about women.

And he does compare them basically to post boxes and so. I mean, he says, you know, all these invisible women. I mean, I say that because someone later also drew this analogy. And so there was a lot of this sort of scathing. said, you know, women, 50% of our population have no voice. You know, we need to educate our women. We need to bring them into the public sphere. You could man that man, yeah. I mean, you'll be amazed by the way, Anita, that people, certainly in the Islamic Republic Republic think this is an atrocious thing for him to have done. But, you know, what's not to like?

Yeah, I grew up on Robert Byron reading that and thinking of him really is rather a sort Mussolini type character. But he did amazing things. I've got a figure here that attendance at schools went up from 55,000 in 1922 to 457,000 in 1938. That's just over a decade, 15 years, a 10 times increase in education. The real weakness of this period is this, I think, and this is what I have criticised and I write, is that Reza Shah basically developed the country, the political economy of the country. What he failed to do was to complete the process of the constitutionist promise of basically sort of rights for the citizens. So whereas he developed the state, he didn't really develop a sort of individual human rights? Yes. Okay. But then he had 15 years.

And in that 15 years, basically the foundations and the architecture of the modern Iranian state is laid. Okay. And he also, I mean, he's a soldier at heart. What does he do to the army of Iran? Well, he's in love with the army, obviously. I mean, he sort of wants the army to get all the money and all this sort of thing. He uses the army essentially to reestablish control. I mean, it's a domestic police force in many ways. I mean, he has fanciful ideas about what it can do, but it can't do that much. But it's there to establish order within the country. Yes, who is external enemies?

Who's he eyeing up with his army? I mean, he doesn't really, I mean. No one. Because it's a big army. So it's 100,000 men and 300,000 in reserve. It's a considerable army. I mean, the enemy turns out to be the Anglo-Russians in the Second World War. But, I mean, at this time, it's not.

You know, he has a good relationship with Turkey. He has a very positive relationship with Atatur, who's really his best chum, effectively. and he signs up to various agreements. His focus is basically on domestic development, but he imposes even some of his more liberal reforms really quite harshly. I mean, you say Atatek is his best mate. His best, yeah. It's his bedfellow.

Yeah, but really interesting because you also mentioned maybe earlier in this podcast and one of the other ones that we've done, that, you know, Iranians don't like to think about Atatek having any position at all or influence at all or anything at all to do with the way Iran developed. It's not so much that. I'll tell you what the problem is. The problem is that in academia and other places,

most people study the Ottoman Empire and then come to Iran afterwards. So, for instance, if you look at language reform, everyone says that Reza Shard did language reform in imitation of Ataturk. It's chronologically incoherent. I mean, that's not true. What's language reform? What is when you say language reform, what do you mean? They don't abandon the Persian script.

Not at all. The Turks go to the Latin script. So basically, the Turks go to the Latin script. And overnight, most Turks basically become illiterate. Whereas the Iranians never do that. I mean, what the Iranians do is they have a, they want to, and this is the other interesting thing. They say, are they purged the language of Arabic?

They don't. They don't purge the language of Arabic. What they want to do is basically, you know, if you're setting up a statewide, nationwide, education system, the first thing you have to do is know what, in what language you're going to teach it, how are you going to teach the language? Are you going to have a grammar? Are you going to have language that is understandable by ordinary people? So are there lots of different languages going on until this point, until he,

decides to reform it. It's that basically what you have, I mean, certainly you do get different dialects and there's things like Kurdish and Gilecki and other things, but my point is, is that really what you have, like Ottoman Turkish, Raja Persian of the bureaucratic kind, is a fairly obtuse type of language, full of florid phrases and stuff like that. And it's really designed, like all bureaucracies, to stop anyone else actually understanding what the hell's going on, you know. It's for lawyers. Yeah, yeah, it's exactly. I mean, any bureaucracy, Anita, you know, I mean, if you try and they always put in jargon. So what they do is they simplify the language.

And the biggest influence in Persian at the beginning of the 20th century actually comes from French, not from Arabic, from French. So Rezachet, they say, we don't want these French words in our language. So there was a famous, a fairly notorious, quite entertaining moment when, you know, Rezachar got very frustrated because sort of slightly pompous intellectuals would keep saying, oh, you know, I've been to the Universitaire, you know, I've been educated in university. He said, what the hell is the university?

And, you know, what are you talking about? And so they construct a word, a very elegant word, which has lasted to this day, which is the place of learning, Danish, Gha. And then, you know, the airport, another new thing is a Fulud, Gar. You know, and it's a very simple construction, which then is easy to sort of educate your public. Yes, it is. And also, there's always, whenever I've seen language reform,

and particularly in India at the moment, where you've got the sansatization of language, going on there. There is a nationalist aspect too, that we are one nation, one language. And, you know, those things always seem to go hand in hand. Well, of course, in Iran, they have this tremendous advantage, by the way, and the intellectuals at the time understood, they said we have for our sort of development of our national identity, the Shahnau. And the Shahnau is a repository of both our history and our language. And the right words. Yeah. And the words. Yeah. So they basically pull it out. But obviously there are things like telephone or any

sort of technical. They just borrow European words. That's not in the Shaname. Yeah, it's just, they just borrow European words. They don't get anxious about. There's not many telephones in the show. Yeah, yeah. Not really, no. There are some, there are some wonderful moments where... Ristam gives Raksa call to... I know. Iranian intellectuals come out with the most obtuse language construction, and Rezaa actually tells us to go back and think again. It sounds like he's doing very, very well. Did this make him beloved of the people? No, no. I mean, nobody likes change. And the thing is, as I said, the problem he has,

is that while he develops the political economy, so for instance, with the judiciary, he develops a judicial structure. But as I said earlier, he doesn't develop a sort of a system where citizens have rights. You know, what he's developing, what he's interested in as a military man is the state. He's not interested as much in society. So he does develop education, but education is there to serve the state. And what's his relationship with the oil company? Well, I mean, obviously all these nationalists are very angry at the Rajas for having signed such a dreadful treaty with the Anglo-Persional Company. So he basically takes the Anglo-Persional company to court. He tears up the concession. Originally, they get only 16% of the profits.

And that's the absurdity. 16% of the profits. I mean, think about it. So as you know, with any company, startup company, you know, they'd say, well, we haven't actually made a profit yet. I mean, so there are, but there are other aspects of the agreement that are seen as a offensive by Iranian nationalists. One is the extent of the concession, you know, the territory they can control. And how much territory we're talking about? I mean, how much do you have the rights to explore for oil and basically, as far as I can tell, almost most of southern Iran. I mean, it was vast. It was absolutely vast. They didn't have northern Iran because the Russians wouldn't have allowed them there. I've seen those films from later from the 1970s where

Abidjan was a completely sort of foreign state. Is that already beginning to happen? Well, the real growth in Abadon really occurs in the 1930s when you start to get oil becomes a genuine sort of industrial project. I mean, it's growing slowly and effectively. Basically, Reza Shah renegotiates the treaty. He gets a severe curtailment of the area of the concession, but he also organizes for a different way of calculating the payment. Up to 20%. Well, they also have a minimum guaranteed payment. Do you see what I mean?

So there's a sort of thing that he's going to get something. whatever. It's not a great deal, but it's better. It's better than the rubbish they had before. Yeah, yeah, definitely. You've got a man who's growing a state, but growing an unpopularity of a growing estate and not the rights of the people in said state. And then you have war breakout. The Second World War breaks out. Now, how does that change things for Iran? So the problem is that, you know, Reza Shah is adamant that Iran should stay neutral, as it tried to do in the First World War. Which is no small achievement. Well, that's what he wants to do. Yeah. I mean, they weren't really neutral in the First World War, but he was very adamant.

The trouble is there were a lot of German expatriate workers and industrialists. And you have Hertzfeldt at this period digging. Oh, yeah, yeah. Digging Persepolis, yeah, the Germans. And I think you need to explain. Hertzfeld is a German archaeologist who makes his name finding, yes, extraordinary things. I mean, actually, one of the things that does actually is to bring the antiquities, you know, there's a new antiquities law.

He controls that because the French were actually pretty good at basically. taking stuff out, which they probably shouldn't have. And ends up in the Louvre, exactly. A lot of it's still there. So the French and the Germans are the ones that really have a bigger hand on the archaeology, actually. It sounds like the Germans are there, the British, is there? They must all be trying to talk sweetly into his ear to get him to do something. The real problem that they have is obviously the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

And, you know, what happens is that that German threat becomes existential. And it's not simply the fact that the British get anxious over the possibility of a, a German attack, which I don't think is quite as realistic over the Caucasus. What they were more worried about was the fall of France led to Syria and other places going under Fishi control and the idea that the Germans could position fighters and bombers within region of Abid Khan. I mean, you know, if the Germans had wanted to disrupt Abidon, it would have been relatively simple in some ways for them to do it.

So the key was to basically bring Iran under much firmer allied control, shall we say, and to allow Iran to be a land bridge really for supplies to the Soviet Union. And because the German advance had been so rapid, geographically Iran was it, I'm afraid. Right, okay. I mean, you've also got in Iraq, you've got anti-British protests in 1941. And that that must rattle them completely because this is a regional fire. I mean, you have to understand that the Arbadan oil refinery is the largest oil refinery in the world. And it's basically, it's the resource that the British need to keep the war going.

Do the British have troops there? Is it all armed and anti-aircraft guns and everything? Not initially, but when they obviously launched their Allied invasion in 1941, I think August 1941, the Soviets from the north, the British from the south. It's slightly surreal and somewhat tragic because the Iranians had no idea. A royal naval ship comes up in the Persian Gulf, and the commander of an Iranian ship sort of salutes it, you know, welcome or something, and the Royal Navy ship sort of bombards it in response, which isn't great.

and he suddenly realizes things are going on. I mean, basically, the Allied invasion takes about a week. Because they think RZA is pro-German or what? I mean, I've heard, I mean, tell me that I've heard things even more than that. They thought he wasn't. That he favours the non-I's a pro-Nazi. I mean, basically that comes from propaganda. It comes, Anita, from the BBC Persian service,

which was sort of set up to, I mean, it was basically there to undermine his credentials. But I think historians now look at it, and he was not a pro-Nazi. Okay, but it gives you a reason. to come in and take over? I mean, Churchill famousists, he privately noted, I have to say, that we had the justification, but we didn't have the right. I mean, it's an interesting, does it? He felt they had to protect their resources,

but they knew what they were doing was a bit dodgy. And it's famously in Tehran that Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill meet up, don't they? Yeah, in 1943, the Tehran Conference, which basically, I mean, it's a very, very interesting episode because it's where they outline their plans for the future of Europe, There is a tortoise in that famous picture, and I've met the tortoise. Have you? But when the Brits invade Iran to secure their interests, you know, they need to do that, and they do do that in 1941.

What's going on with Reza's enormous army, 100,000 on active duty and 300,000 in reserve? I mean, that's quite a number. Well, I mean, basically, again, if you look at the, you know, it collapses within six days. It's a huge embarrassment, obviously. I mean, Reza Shah is appalled, but it seems to be that the officer class didn't have the sort of the desire to fight. The cahunas, as they're saying, in military circles, right? But it's, you know, it would have been difficult. I mean, interestingly, afterwards, you know, the Iranians covered themselves a little bit by saying, well, you know, the French lost in six weeks and they only had to fight on one front.

We had to fight two and, you know, what the hell? But was there fighting? Was there sort of combat? There was some, very limited, very limited. But not much. Not much. But by and large, they just rolled in. Yeah.

And when they rolled in, what did they say to him? that they say, right, you have to... Initially, they didn't want him to abdicate. I mean, initially, there's an account by the British minister there, Rita Bullard, that said that he could stay, and he seemed to be a fairly... But ultimately, they then decide that, you know, it's best that he abdicate. He goes initially, I think, to Mauritius and then South Africa. Mauritius is all right.

Not a bad place to be an abdicated Shah. Yeah, so they force him to abdicate and bring in his 21-year-old son, Mohamed Reza Shah. So they've pushed the old man aside. They've appointed anointed... anointed, or whatever the word is, his 20-year-old son, Mohamed Reza, the last Shah of Iran. Join us after the break where we find out how that goes. Welcome back. Just before the break, we had been introduced to Muhammad Reza Shah,

who all of us know as an old man at the Iranian Revolution, that gourd, handsome face looking troubled as the Ayatollah flies back into Iran. but we're very unfamiliar with him as a young man fresh from boarding school in Switzerland, a man who doesn't get on very well with his father, his father thinks he's not quite military enough. Well, hang on, how do we know this? Do we know this? Tell us, Ellie. Well, I mean, I thought that was quite a good pen portrait, actually.

He was exceedingly shy, very uncertain, did live under the shadow of his father. Remember, his father's this six-foot, you know, two giant cast a very, very long shadow. So a lot of people who fell out of love with Reza Shah still were impressed by him. I mean, there's a sort of feeling that at least he did things. Mahmah Dazhar comes in. He's 21. He's uncertain. You know, it is a very unnerving situation.

Your country's just been invaded. Your father's been sent off into exile. But his relationship, and this is where I'm with Anita on this, by the way. His relationship was his father actually was not as bad as some of the psychological pen. Yeah. But it's undoubtedly that he did live in his shadow. I mean, you know, he wanted throughout his life.

to basically be seen as, you know, surpassing his father. Okay. So he's educated in Switzerland. I mean, is this the case that he is more sort of European than he is Persian? You know, with kids sent away from home, yeah, let's psychoanalyze now. Come on, let's do it. This is the interesting thing. And it is, it is very interesting.

So Reza Shah, I've always had this notion. Reza Shah never really left. He had one international visit, and that was to Turkey. He is born and bred from Iran. And yet Rezarsha, in some ways, was more persuaded by elements of the Enlightenment by his intellectual followers than his son becomes. His son is educated abroad, fluent in three languages. So he can speak French and English very well, much better than his father can. But whereas his father was quite ruthlessly cynical about things, Mahamad Azashar is deeply superstitious, actually.

I mean, he has this sort of element, yeah, he has this element of religious spirituality that his father would have seen as ridiculous. What shape? I mean, what do you mean? He said, I get visitations and, you know, I've seen dreams where the Shia imams have come to me. And, you know, all of this is very intriguing. I mean, a lot of the intellectuals who surrounded his father, for instance, would say, you know, what are you talking about? Are you off your rock? Yeah. What are you talking about?

It's absolutely pivotal when it comes to the revolution in 1790s. Because what Muhammad Reza Shai is much more susceptible to is a very classic Persian sense of fatalism. So when the tide turns, Mahmadrasa shall get stuck. He's like a rabbit in the headlights. And he won't. He won't fight. Interesting. Oh.

Okay. Wait, wait, wait. Let's not. You're doing a dial rumple, people. You're jumping ahead. Retreat. Highlighting themes. Okay.

No, it's fine. But it's a thing. It's a thing. It is cool doing a dial-ruple. Ali, yes, clarify for us what his constitutional position is. Is he actually an autocrat or is he? So his father. was an autocrat. The Allied occupation ends the autocracy. The Allies allow, essentially

interesting enough, for a degree of political activity. And the Shah, Mohammed is a Shah, is basically a reigning monarch. He's not a ruling monarch. He's a reigning monarch, as the constitution dictates. And what you see in Iran, which is very interesting, is competition between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans for the hearts and minds of Iranians. And that has quite an important effect in politicizing Iranians, because the Soviets are pumping out radio programs about, you know, Marxism and workers of the world unite. And the Anglo-Americans are saying, hang on there, this is not a good idea. So what you find is this tussle and you get a lot of politicians who hadn't been very active, obviously under Reza-Shar, coming back into the political frame. And the free speech is okay.

I mean, people can take to the streets and stand on soapboxes and start spouting off. Yeah, up to a point. I mean, it's certainly when you get the release of the pressure cooker, you get a lot of it. I mean, you get a flurry of political activity. I mean, a flurry, within limits, but you get a flurry of it. Certainly much more than you had under Reza Shah. Ali, later, the communists, the two-day party is going to be very important. Is there much sense of it yet rearing its head or not? Yeah, yeah. I mean, there is. There is a, and it's basically also, you know, comes about with Soviet sort of like, you know, during the Soviet sphere. But its origins are obviously at the end days of the Rezaa period, because Rezaa, the first

power he found the University of Tehran. So the University of Tehran, one of the most important institutions in Iran, is founded by Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi. And what this obviously generates is it becomes a sort of a knowledge factory. And of course, you get people who are interested in Marxism and this sort of thing or whatever. And so you start to get, you know, left-wing ideas start to circulate. But then, of course, the other area where you're getting a strong sort of two-day communist party sort of interest is in the Anglo-Iranian oil company, because it's the first industrial sort of giant company that you have in Iran. Big bubbling black capitalism right in front of your eyes, yeah.

Yeah, so basically you get, and of course, the way the workers are treated and sort of, I mean, the Anglo-Iran oil company is a relic. I mean, it's a relic in a way of a previous age. And in some ways, it's quite like the East India Company, isn't it? It occupies a kind of chunk of the country. It's separated. Not as successful, I'd have to say. With its own villages, its own towns, which are kind of quite ethnically separate.

It sees itself as a highly progressive force. It sort of says, you know, we're providing this, that and the other for local workers and stuff. But of course, when the Labour government comes into power in 1945 and they send inspectors to it, they sort of say this is very archaic. You know, what the hell are you deliver it? You need to improve the standards, the welfare standards for your workers. But what about the last Shah then, Mohamed Reza Shah. What is he thinking?

So there's this tussle for hearts and minds. Where is his heartbeat? And what are his sympathies? I mean, he's got the spiritual aspect about it. And what's his politics? What are his politics? His sympathies with Cyrus, certainly. He wants to go back. Yeah, his sympathies are basically that he's got a very strong sense of Iranian nationalism. He sees himself as his father's heir. He wants to play a much more dominant role in the politics of the country, but senior aristocratic politicians and others don't want him to.

He actually comes to prominence at the end of the war when the Russians, when the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from Azerbaijan. You know, basically they provide an umbrella protective force around nascent separatist forces in Azerbaijan and parts of Iran and Kurdistan. And actually, the Iranian politicians who negotiate the removal of the Soviet troops with a little bit of American backing, it has to be said. The Shah then plays a role as a sort of leader to come and reunite the country. And of course, that brings him to prominence. The reason this is quite important looking forward is that one of the reasons Stalin withdraws his troops from Azerbaijan is because the then Persian Prime Minister had offered him an oil concession. in the North and the Caspian, and then reneged on it. Or didn't deliver, shall I say, I wouldn't say reneged on it, but didn't deliver on it.

Which leads us to this next super important person, Mossadegh. Yes, Mossadegh. Yeah, now, my God, is there a name that divides Iranians more than Mossadegh these days? Not in the diaspora, certainly. No, absolutely. So, all right, tell us who is this man and why is he so important? So, Mahmahad Mousadr is sort of an old-school constitutionalist. He was active in the constitutional revolution. I mean, he's not a young man at this stage. He opposed the Caesar of the throne by Reza Shah.

So the Pahlavi's viewed him with a little bit of suspicion. And he did so partly because he was also related to the Rajas. I mean, he's a sort of aristocratic politician. He was trained in law. He's rather a Nerovian figure. He's tall, austere. He looks like Nero. And he's a lawyer.

I mean, I always think he reminds me of Naira as well. Yeah. He studied law, I think in Switzerland. Big nose, bald. Where's white pajamas? That, well, yeah, I look. Does he wear an air who had? I mean, how far are we going to take this? There's a bit of mythology in either direction about Mossadena. But he's a patrician type. I mean, he has the air of a patrician, right?

But he's a strong nationalist, very strong nationalist. I mean, he's a product of the Constitutional Revolution. I mean, he's that generation. He's a product of the Constitution's Revolution. He believes in the Constitution. He thinks the Shah should reign and not rule. He thinks that there should be a constitutional separation of powers. And above all, he looks at this oil asset in the South and he says, well, we denied the Soviets an oil concession in a North. Why can't we do the same to the British and the South?

And here I have to say, the Anglo-Iranan oil company stands among a number of institutions of similar size and West who really couldn't see the writing in the wall until they walked into it. And it's one of those tragedies in Anglo-Iranian relations. despite attempts by the British government to get the governors of the Anglo-Persian, Anglo-Iran oil company at this stage to actually make the changes that were necessary, they simply refused to budge because they had this sort of ridiculous notion that they were there by legal right through treaty and, you know, this was international laws and we don't mess with that. And they're making a lot of money.

But it's ridiculous because, I mean, they are making, God, there was a crazy statistic through taxation, the British government was getting more profit from the Iranian oil industry than Iran ever was. There's a lot of mythology about this, and we need to be very specific about it. It's quite true that what the Excheca was getting, because they raised corporation tax in the war, really in the run-up to the war, that then that's when the Anglia Arnold Company was delivering more to the British Exchequer. But it's because basically the British Exchequer was taxing it more. I mean, that's basically what it was doing. And there wasn't any comparable system in Iran, really, for taxing. So, all right, you've got Mossadegh, who is definitely a son of the constitutionalist and as a nationalist.

And what is he saying at this point? How comfortable is the relationship between Mossadegh and the new Shah? So I think there are two things, as I said, that Mossadegh, one is that, as I said, he's a constitutionalist who wants the Shah to reign, not rule. So he's very firm on that. He also sees one way of changing Iran's relationship with the outside world is to challenge the dominance in the monopoly of the Anglo-Iranian oil company and to redefine that relationship. Now, I think posterity has painted Mossadegh as an anti-imperialist. Is that wrong? him firmly as a constitutionalist. No, what Mossadegh says basically is we have to redefine the nature

of our relationship with Britain because it will help us, you know, as a nation to grow and move forward. He never was a sort of an anti-imperialist and a sort of a, he's not a Che Guevara type of figure. I mean, he's not, he didn't want the British to leave. But abroad, that's not understood, is it? Both America and Britain looks at him with great suspicion. Well, I mean, you know, But the other thing about Mossadegh is he was a very loquacious, right? I mean, he liked to give a good speech and he liked to talk. And even a lot of Iranians found him a bit dull. I mean, you know, they thought, you know, he goes on and on and he likes it.

But, you know, to ordinary people, they loved it. I mean, they loved the fact that he basically said it as it was. The mistake Mossadegh makes, really, I think, is to misunderstand Iran's capacity at this stage to challenge the British, but also to challenge the British in the shadow of the cold war where, you know, it was going to be difficult at the end of the day for the Americans not to side with their wartime ally. And the British also need this cash. This is the 1950s. Britain is post-war. It's got huge debts. It's got rationing still. Yeah, but just before we get to the 50s, isn't there a really pivotal moment when a radical communist group

tries to assassinate the Shah in 1949? Now, that is going to concentrate the mind. Yeah. So who is this? The blame is certainly put on the two-day party. are other people who argued that the Tuday were not behind it. Today the Communists. Yeah, but it basically resulted in the outlawing of the two-day party. So the Tuday Party was seen as illegal after this. So, I mean, they get the blame. You're not sure whether they deserve it or not, but they certainly do.

I mean, I haven't seen anything to suggest they didn't, but there are people who dispute it. But it must also just push the Shah really wildly against anyone who smells like a communist. If the plot has a whiff of communism about it, it's going to completely turn him off them, isn't it? I think the more important thing, really, about the assassination attempt is that the person fired five bullets and didn't kill him. And the five bullets from quite close range, and they were pretty serious. And it's the first of a number of assassination attempts on the Shah, the most serious, I have to say. And of course, what it does is it reinforces the Shah's sense of spiritual destiny. I mean, this is the important thing. That's the important consequence. He thinks,

I must be here because God has wilted it, you know, and that's my sense. It's not that it's good luck. That's retro. That's retro in Iran, isn't it? People haven't thought like that for a very long time. Well, I mean, no, there's a whole, no, no, there's a lot of people. I'm sorry to say, there's a lot of people who think in very superstitious terms. Yeah, yeah, and they do. And they're very superstitious. And the Shah basically was convinced. I mean, he basically said, ah, you know, and, you know, who's defaulting for it?

I mean, I think if I'd been shot at close range and nearly been murdered and sat in hospital with a bulletwind through my cheek, by the way, I might think, hmm, someone is keeping an eye on me. So, Ali, in 1951, Mossadek rolls his dice, and he nationalizes erasing. oil, which is an incredibly bold and possibly slightly foolhardy move. So what happens is that, you know, the British government is telling the Angleran an oil company, you've got to come to some arrangement. We cannot continue in this way. And the director of the Anglo-Ran oil company, a Scot, well, he called Sir William Fraser, says no.

A Fraser, no less. They're very difficult to move. The foreign office loathe. The foreign office think that William Fraser is completely ill-suited to this job. And the great hero of the hour in some ways, Ernie Bevin, who sort of writes this long note in 1946, actually, and says, we are nationalizing everything in this country. We cannot tell the Iranians, they cannot nationalize their own industry. I mean, this is just absurd.

Anyway, to fast forward a bit, what then happens is that the Anglo-Iran oil company eventually has its arm twisted and they offer Iran a 50-50 agreement, you know, joint ownership effectively. Now, the trouble with this is that the prime minister who is able to secure this, a former general by the name of Rasmara, who's a very interesting fellow actually worth of an investigation, before he can present the 50-50 agreement to Parliament is assassinated. This happens quite a lot. Yes. There's a lot of controversy about how and why this man was assassinated. But obviously, for the British, this is a major blow because they go, you know, bloody hell, you know, we wanted to get this done.

Just between us, who do you reckon did it and why? Well, the people who claimed it were the Fedain Islam, a radical Islamic organization. But the Persian sources seem to indicate that a much wider group of politicians knew it was about to happen, that basically the assassination was being encouraged because nobody wanted the 50-50 agreement. So in the wake of the assassination of Rasmara, there's a brief interlude while there's someone else becomes prime minister who doesn't want to become prime minister. And eventually, with some reluctance, the Shah is persuaded to appoint Mossadegh, Prime Minister, in 1951. And with the 50-50 agreement dead, it opened the door for the nationalisation, which many in Parliament actually were not in favour of for the simple reason that they thought

it would lead to a confrontation with Britain, which is obviously what happened. Which it does. How does Britain react? It can't do without these revenues. It can't do without the oil. Well, basically, Britain tries to come. But obviously, once you get into nationalisation, the thing is, you know, you've got two points of principle that never the twain shall meet. And basically what the British do is they withdraw their staff. They close down the refiner. I mean, you know, the Iranians have no capability of running this refinery. And then put a blockade on any oil being sold, you know, a boycott, essentially, not a blockade, a boycott.

So anyone who buys Iranian oil gets a legal note. And, you know, obviously there's, you know, Iran's revenues dry up completely. I mean, this is the problem. Okay, that's really interesting. So it is just a threat of we will come after you if you do deals with the Iranians. And Mossadegh seeks a loan. from the US, but the US think he's a commie and tell him to go back home. Well, again, it takes, it's a good 18 months before relations really start to fray. So the Americans, first of all,

and I do think, for looking at imperial competition, by the way, the relationship here is a trilateral one. So the Iranians are competing with the British. The British are competing with the Americans. This is the same time as Sue is. Well, just before, obviously. I'm glad you raised that, actually, because basically the Americans had been involved in the coup in Egypt in 195. right okay so the americans are basically overthrew you know got the young officers in and whatever so the british you know when we came to the coup in 1953 i mean there's a few among the british that well the americans are quite keen on this sort of stuff i mean interestingly the americans are not that keen on it initially they're what the americans are more keen on is to get their hands on iranian

oil okay i mean this is this is what you've got so people tend to see this as a very black and white you know anglo-american capitalism versus you know plucky iran don't it on one of the level, yes. But actually, the relationship is a bit more complex. Americans got their own interests. Yeah, yeah. That's the thing. And people tend to forget that. What the Americans are doing is they're saying, actually, we want to break Anglia-Aran's monopoly on uranium oil and we want to get on it too. But there is a joint CIA MI5 operation. Eventually. And what happens is the British talk about, they say in classic World War II, and my view, the coup in 1953 is a hangover from the Second World War

I have to say, all the operatives who work on this coup are all ex-S-O-E-OSS individuals. They all did all sorts of shenanigans in Second World War. And the British set up all sorts of contingency planning. The contingency planning for a coup occurred under the Labor government, by the way, not under the Conservative government, under the Labor government, because they were looking at all different types of things that they might need to do to protect their interests. As you quite rightly said, Britain, after the Second World War is bankrupt,

it's busy setting up a welfare state, it needs money, India's gone. in independence. The last thing you want to do is lose this vital resource, which, and this is a crucial point, which prices oil in pound sterling. So you don't have to spend foreign exchange on, you know, converted to dollars and buying oil. The Americans are very keen to stop this. The Americans actually want basically a monopoly of their own in terms of oil supply. They want oil to be priced in dollars. Do you see what I mean? So, as I said, there's a trilateral argument going on. Very interesting. I never heard that said. So what happens? is, is the British try to find a different way of getting Mossade d'Ehran seated, that they fail.

Mossade d'Hsievo's diplomatic relations with Britain, all the embassies are closed, they're off, they're expelled. It then devolves upon the Americans to take action if they want. And it's really in about March, 1953, that with a new administration in the United States, the Eisenhower administration, with Churchill in government in Britain, but Churchill had a stroke at this time, was out of action. It's really the Eisenhower administration that then decides in March that they can't get a resolution with Mossadegh, and they will activate the plan with their British allies to get him unseated. Is there a code name for this plan? There's always a good code name. Ajax is what the Americans call it. I think the British call it Operation Boot. Right. Imaginative. Yeah.

And who is the kind of, is America already the big daddy here, or is it more MI6? MI6 is. I mean, MI6 has got the expertise on the ground, but it's the CIA who have CIA operatives on the ground, if I can put it that way. So the British, Because the embassy had all been closed and everyone had been expelled, the British were essentially running this from abroad, whereas the Americans, Kermit Roosevelt, classic name, whose Theodore Roosevelt's grandson, I understand, was basically the CIA operative from the ground.

And he's dealing with things on the ground. But it's a joint, it's a joint operation. Okay, so, you know, look, Kermit done a coup. Okay, I like that as a headline anyway. But how do you do a coup? I mean, what are the mechanisms then to unseat Mossadegh? How does it start? And just, you know, take me things.

through the days in which he's toppled. Basically, what happens is, I mean, to cut a long story short, really, is that the problems of economic austerity comes in, you know, because they don't have the oil revenue. So Mossadegh is increasingly having to sort of pare back on the budgets and whatever. Eventually, Mossadegh starts to take on a little bit too much, you know, for a constitutionalist, he starts to overturn elements of the constitution. He wants to restrict the powers of the Shah even further,

but he also dissolves the Majlis. When he dissolves the Magillus and begins to govern almost by Dictats, Like an autocrat, yeah. People start to criticize. Even his supporters start to move away. Well, where is the Shah? You mentioned the Shah. Where is the Shah in relation to all of this?

I mean, the Shah is basically an observer. I mean, he's in Tehran, but he's an observer. He's very, very overawed by Mossadegh. He thinks Mossadegh, he calls Mossadegh are demosthenes. You know, he says, you know, I don't know how we can deal with him. You know, he's very popular. And the age difference is about 40 years. Yeah, yeah.

About 70 and the Shah is still in his 30s. I mean, the Shah always felt that Mossadegh patronised him in this all. But, you know, he'd been quite reluctant to appoint him prime minister, but Salavi, I mean, this is what happens. And because of this sort of the weaknesses, Mossadegh then faces when the coup goes into plan, it is based on the premise that the Shah can dismisses Prime Minister, you know, under the Constitution, the Sharcan dismisses Prime Minister, right? But the Shah is very reluctant to dismiss this Prime Minister. And basically the CIA and others go to Shah's sake, for God's sake, sign this, we'll get the military to go at a Mossadegh's house

and dismiss him. Mossadegh, there fatally, when he receives this dismissal, doesn't act. He doesn't act. I mean, he basically says,

you know, I'll deal with it later. And the initial attempt for a coup actually fails. I mean, this is the interesting thing. The coup plotters lose their nerve.

I mean, they realize it hasn't worked as they planned. The Shah that gets on a plane and goes to Italy, says, I need to go on a holiday. He panics, doesn't he?

He leaves, yeah. Yeah, yeah, he's not a dictator at this stage. Which he didn't need to do. Yeah, he could have maybe gone somewhere in Iran, But anyway, he decided to go. There's a huge outpoint.

There's actually a moment in Iran where people say, we need to set up a republic, you know, and all this. And then there's this general, General Zahidi, who's a monarchist, who's running the armed forces.

So Zahidi is someone who, interestingly, had served in one of Mossadev's cabinets. So Zahidi was brought as the strong man, you see, as the person who was going to basically lead the coup. And he's related, I think he's related to Mossadev and someone.

And he had a bit of a dodgy time in the Second World War. I mean, the British had imprisoned him for Nazi sympathies, interesting enough. So he's brought back and he's seen as, and he thinks he's the saviour of Iran. And eventually, of course, what happens is that Kermit Roosevelt launches a second attempt at the coup, and this time it succeeds. And there's a huge firefight at the Prime Minister's office.

I mean, people who say it wasn't a coup, I think it's fanciful. It was a coup. No, there's definitely shooting. We've seen the footage. As I said, you don't send tanks to the Prime Minister's house. I mean, it's a coup. And Mossadegh eventually is arrested and there's trials on. and the Shah then hears that, you know, he thinks my people love me and I'm going to come back.

But the interesting thing is, is that the coup could not have succeeded had there not been constituencies within the country who supported it. I mean, this is the thing. There is a view among Iranians who don't want to take responsibility for it, to blame it all on the Anglo-Americans. And certainly the Anglo-Americans were pivotal in orchestrating it. But they had to pay someone. You know, money had to be paid. I've had many a party where Iranians have blamed me personally for the action of Britain.

Well, it's Sir William Fraser, you see, Willie. Yeah, well, I mean, you know, if the cap fits. So, Ali, what's the practical result of the coup? The coup is that Mossadere is overthr. He's then arrested and he's put on trial. He then ends up essentially being under house arrest until his death in 1967. So what this does, though, this coup is it sort of aligns U.S. interests with the Shah. because he's their man. But they've invested in him. You know, they want him. How does that go down with the people of Iran? I mean, are they not sort of thinking, oh, God, all this foreign meddling

have had enough? Or is that not even a notion at the time? I think that just dates, and I think that basically simmers away, and then by the 70s, you begin to see this. But I'm very wary of drawing a direct line from 53 to 79. Okay, interesting. Why are you wary, Ali? Because it's 25 years. There's 25 years, you know. I think there's a lot that can happen. I mean, basically, and we'll see as we do the next episode, I think, on Mohamed Reza Shah himself and how the American relationship was with him. You know, the Americans also found Mohamed Reza Shah quite difficult at times. And there were, you know, there were a lot of things that could have happened that could have prevented a revolution happening, is why I'm saying. Okay, well, you've teed up our next

episode beautifully. That is all from us. Join us next time as we start to get into the run-up to the Iranian revolution. But if you can't wait, and I know some of you just can't wait, because you'll like that. You can join the Empire. Club as a friend of the show and you'll be able to hear the rest of the episodes in this series right now. So if you're on Apple Podcasts, all you do is you sign up in a few clicks on the Empire page for everybody else. All you need to do is go to EmpirePodukuk.com and you can sign up there. Till the next time we meet, it's goodbye from me, Anita Arnan. And goodbye from me, William Duremple.