Empire: World History - 245. Inside The Good Friday Agreement with Alastair Campbell

Episode Date: April 9, 2025

What ended The Troubles? Why was 1998 the right moment for a peace treaty? Which issues caused the most heated debate? What was the food like in the negotiating room? Exactly 27 years on since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, what does its future look like? Listen as William and Anita are joined by Alastair Campbell, the lead strategist for Tony Blair’s New Labour government at the time, to discuss what it was really like to negotiate peace in Northern Ireland in 1998.  _____________ Empire Club: Become a member of the Empire Club to receive early access to miniseries, ad-free listening, early access to live show tickets, bonus episodes, book discounts, and a weekly newsletter! Head to empirepoduk.com to sign up. Email: [e-mail] Instagram: @empirepoduk  Blue Sky: @empirepoduk  X: @empirepoduk goalhanger.com Assistant Producer: Becki Hills Producer: Anouska Lewis Senior Producer: Callum Hill Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

If you want access to bonus episodes reading lists for every series of Empire, a chat community, discounts for all the books mentioned in the week's podcasts, add free listening and a weekly newsletter, sign up to Empire Club at www.mpowerpoduk.com. Hello and welcome to Empire with me, Anita Arnan. And me, William Turimple. As you know, in the last four episodes, we have been talking about the troubles. and we have a very, very special guest on today. I mean, you might have heard of him.

Alistair Campbell, our pod buddy on Goalhanger. Hello, Alistair, welcome. Hello, nice to see you both. They're very lovely to see you. But you're here in your capacity because you were the man on the spot during the Good Friday Agreement. And if you're listening to this, as it is released,

today it is exactly 27 years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Just first off, did you ever think it would happen or right until the last minute, did you think, oh God, something's going to go wrong here? There's a long history of British attempts to try and pull something like this off, which have gone spectacularly wrong for 120 years. That's a very good question, because no is the short answer. No, I don't think we did.

And I think sometimes people think that we did, because Tony Blair did one of his most famous quotes, soundbites, close quotes, not long after we arrived in Belfast a few days before what, became the Good Friday Agreement when he did, this is not a time for sound bites, but I feel the hand of history upon my shoulder, I really do. And, of course, because he said that,

and because it became memorable, it only became memorable because of what happened, not because of anything special about that moment. And I think people looking back, think, oh, well, they must have known something was coming. I don't think we did. I don't think we'd have been at all surprised if it had just been one more,

in as Willie says, the long list of noble attempts that never quite came off. When you were saying, the reason I paused a bit is when you said about the feeling of the thing and where optimism and pessimism clash, even to this day trying to explain how it all fell into place at the last moment as it did, I find it very, very hard to explain, really hard to explain because I can tell you where we were and what we were doing and what Tony Blair was doing and who was seeing and what have you. But you only have a sense of all the other bits of the jigsaw and whether they're getting closer or more distant from where you're trying to get them to be. So it was an incredible moment and we definitely had a sense of it being

incredible. But also the reason why I'm probably still even now being hesitant is because even though it felt like this is a moment, we also were aware that this was only a moment. It was a big moment, but it was the beginning of something rather than the conclusion of something. Well, I mean, I appreciate the hesitation and we're going to go into that background to the agreement and what was going on and the characters, because, I mean, you have a unique insight into the people who did come to the table and did sign the document. But just before that, I mean, this is a yes, all. no question. Did you write the hand of history quote for Tony Blair? No. Because it's a good one. Well, was it? I didn't, I, the reason I say no, and it's true that so often these things, we do sort of discuss them in advance. That one, we didn't really. It was, we've arrived in Belfast. I think David Trimble was coming to Hillsborough Castle for dinner, and the media were just sort of hanging around. It was just a question we've arrived, let's say something, let's give them

something, they'll go away. And Tony just went out and said it. And what was really interesting, Jonathan Powell, who was Tony's chief of staff and became sort of our main negotiator on Northern Ireland, and he and I was standing. I'll never forget this, because the entrance to Hillsborough Castle, there's this kind of black and white diamond floor. And Tony, we set up the camera, we had a pool camera, set it up. Jonathan and I sort of pulled back so we were out of shot and we were just in this doorway. And as Tony sort of did his, you know, and I feel the hand of history. This is not a time for soundbys, but I feel the hand of history upon my shoulder. I really do.

We both look to each other and went, what fuck is that? And it was like, because it was so corny. And Tony, by the way, Tony would be the first to admit he's a great communicator, but that's not the same thing as being a great soundbite merchant. He is ultimately, but he's a communicator. And so we said to him out, what was that about Hand of History? So I don't know, just, you know, but just came into my head. So no, the short answer, Anita, is no, I did not come up with that one. So, so let's go back and introduce some of the characters involved in this peace agreement, because they're very familiar to you and to Anita and I, because we grew up with this very much in the news. But a lot of people listening, particularly broad, will not know any of these characters at all. So let's, first of all, you mentioned Trimble, but let's start with the people on the Catholic. side of the divide. Talk about John Hume and Jerry Adams, first of all. Give us a quick sort of

sketch of them and where they were at that moment. Well, John Hume, who was the leader of the Social Democrat and Labour Party, so essentially the closest that you'd get in Northern Irish politics at that time, to a Labour politician identifiable as, you know, a Neil Kiddick, a Tony Blair, whatever. The thing I would say about John Hume is whatever was happening, he had a sense of optimism. Now, sometimes that could be infuriating because even, you know, in the darkest moments, he would like, you know, I remember John Holmes, who was one of the civil servants, who was a very, very important part of the team at the Good Friday Agreement. And I remember he sometimes used to say, oh, God, here comes John Hume, we'll have another plan, and it's all going fine. and, you know, the shinas are coming on board. But in fact, that sense of positivity and optimism

became very, very important. Jerry Adams... What was he like? Well, I mean, I guess Jerry Adams was the one who had the highest profile within the UK political scene. Such a sort of homespun character when you see him on the TV. He wears those woolly jerseys,

and he looks like a folk singer from the chieftains or something. and yet all the indications are that he was involved in a lot of the nastiest IRA atrocities. To meet, is he the folk singer or is he the villain from IRA bombs? Well, of course, it's possible to be more than one thing. And I think that one of the most important moments, I think, in the whole process came when Tony Blair just made the judgment that he actually felt that Jerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, And it's hard to separate them because, not just because physically they were always, we tended to see them together, but also because they were in a sense, they operated very much as a team. Martin McGuinness was much, I think he was much more open and avowed about his past.

Yes, he said quite openly that he was an IRA member, which, as we all know, Jerry Adams has to this day, realize. To his own, denied, exactly. Yeah. And Martin McGuinness may be more straightforward. more blunt often, more brutal in his language quite often. Jerry Adams very much portraying a sense of himself as being a bit of thinker, which he was, by the way, is, and also being something of a strategist. You always had a sense of him that he genuinely was thinking a few moves ahead, and we had to weigh that into our thinking as well. But I think the point is that you

have to be realistic, you know on both on all sides that you're dealing with people who've done some pretty bad stuff. But the fact is, and you know, and fair play to John Major and what he'd done before Tony Blair became prime minister, because he'd kind of crossed that Rubicon. And then Tony genuinely reached a point, I think, where, and this is a combination of reading history, but it's also political instinct, he had a sense that these guys were serious. about trying to do things differently. And he never ever lost the sense that they were doing that as some considerable political and personal risk.

You know, because it was possible to get very frustrated when the blinding logic of what needed to be done that was so clear to us. And yet whether on the unionist side or on the nationalist side, then putting up the obstacles to get in the way. And I'll never forget Tony once saying about Adams and about McGuinness, he's, listen, you've got to remember with these guys. they're walking around with the not inconsiderable risk

that somebody's about to put a bullet in the back of their heads. And someone had tried to assassinate Jerry Adams just a couple of years before this, certainly they'd come up to the car next door to him and taken a shot. Absolutely. And then I'm sure that some of your listeners in hearing that will think, yeah, well, that's the world they lived in, that's the world they were part of, that's so what.

But from our perspective, with all of these different characters, and this is the other thing I think there's when I sometimes talk about the magic of the Good Friday Agreement, if you put all the different characters together, and not just the people who are well known, but also lots of the smaller characters as well, it becomes this amazing mosaic,

and you sort of say, well, without any of them, we all know we're all replaceable on one level, but had it not been Adams and McGuinness, had it not been Trimble, had it not been eventually Ian Paisley, who came into the fold, had it not been Clinton, who was President of America,

had it not been Bertie Hearn and the relationship he had with Tony, and on and on and on we go. So their personalities and their characters and what the unique things that they all brought to the process was part of the success. We've talked about Hume and Adams. Give us a quick sketch of David Trimble because obviously Hugh's a crucial character too in this.

Hugh, David Trimble, very complicated, very mercurial. I always felt with David Trimble that it was always like he felt that he wasn't a politician. Now the fact is, very, very, very few politicians have as part of their legacy what he and John Hume were given the Nobel Peace Prize for. So he clearly had unbelievable political skills on one level. But I guess what I'm saying is he wasn't the conventional politician. He was very, very traditional unionist on one level.

And that might say to some people, so you kind of keep your emotions in check and you're very small C conservative as well as large C conservative as it were. but he could be very, very emotional and very mercurial. He was hard to read. He was hard to read sometimes. And I think that what, again, to go back to the characters and the personalities, though, Tony's strength was that he was able to absorb and explain the positions of everybody. So that sometimes David Trimble would be his own worst communicator in terms of trying to get something out of the other side.

whereas what Tony would do would be able to package up what David Trimble actually was asking for, but without all the barriers and the resentments that then would make the other side push back against it. The baggage. Not just the baggage, but also the styles were so different. We talked about the kind of jeopardy that Jerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had on their shoulders, but also David Trimble, too. I mean, this is, you know, he's representing a body of people who themselves were very, very divided and very unsure about this. whole entire process and, you know, sort of people on his own sides are getting up and walking out

sometimes when they didn't agree with what came out of his mouth. I mean, just the pressures on him. Can you describe that a little bit to us? The thing about, and again, there was a difference, or whenever you were in the room with Adams, McGuinness and the collection of people that they used to bring to meetings, and Adams and McGinnis would be doing most of the talking, but you had a sense of this is a solid tea. Now, we know from all sorts of things and not, least from some of the history books that have been written since, that there were divisions going on, but they projected and presented as solid.

Whereas back to John Holmes, remember John Holmes once saying, the thing about poor old David, he has to bring the argument in with him. What often would happen is he would come in and John D. Taylor and Ken McGuinness and Reg Empie and these guys would be there, and they sometimes would have the argument in front of him.

And John D. Taylor, oh, David, David, David would say, David, I'd be very careful. I'd be very careful there. And so you knew there was just a little. And again, that would sort of, you could see David bristle at some of this, this stuff. So it was a sense of one team projecting absolute unity and the other team projecting, not disunity, but living their disagreements in public. And then, of course, don't forget, outside the talks.

And at one point, I mean, if ever this is made into a feature film, this would definitely be a seat. at one point, as one of our several deadlines passed, I think it was a midnight deadline that passed. And who should we get a message from the police has appeared at the gates of Stormont, you know, with a crowd of people. But Ian Paisley, you know, shaking the gates. I remember that. Yeah. Yeah, there you go.

So he's got all those pressures. Before we go into the negotiations and the ups and downs, shall we just paint also sketch a picture of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s, the final phase of the troubles, what's been going on before this? Because the IRA has been armed very successfully by Libya at this point. It's not like it's necessarily something that's winding down and leading to a happy conclusion. There's been a whole enormous crate of arms delivered to Northern Ireland. Gaddafi has provided material for the tragic and its kill and killings of 1987, where 11 Protestants are killed. Only five years earlier, they'd been the Harrods bomb and the famous Grand Hotel of Brighton, where Mrs. Thatcher famously sort of emerged from the wreckage like some sort of valkyrie out of the rubble. And so there was no sense in which, or was there a sense, that this was something ready for resolution. I think there had been this progress of sorts under John Major. I don't think you could, it was necessarily shaping public opinion

in a different way because part of the progress was the fact that John Major, to his credit, was doing something that had it been known publicly at the time, would have added to his already very considerable political difficulties. In other words, he was, in a sense, he was starting a dialogue with the IRA, even though they had not committed to giving up the armed struggle. But I think you're right that those, when you go through those milestones, the fact that you're mentioning the Brighton bombs, you have to go back, quite a few years for that. The fact that you're mentioning Ennis-Killandin, the fact that you're mentioning, I mean, the Libyan thing, you're right, there'd been a big arm shipment within that period,

but actually the Libyan relationship went back a fair bit too. I think what there was was a sense of general fatigue about the whole thing, and that was what gave something of an opportunity. Allied, too, and this is something I remember Jerry Adams once said, is that actually the change of government in the UK and Tony Blair as Prime Minister, they brought into this idea that there's a lot of change going on here. How do we tap into that? You have so many constituencies to represent and think about when you're in a negotiation like this.

So, I mean, fatigue, yes, on their side, because, you know, my God, they've been going through it for so long and they have lost so much. But also your own constituency, because it was the Manchester bombing was only in 1996. You know, just a year before, one of the largest detonations of explosives, since World War II.

And just to remind people, I mean, again, you know, those of you who are listening overseas may not know this, but there was a van that was parked on a street near a shopping centre. So, you know, high civilian casualties possible. And some one and a half thousand kilograms of explosives were detonated, 200 people injured. Now, that's only 12 months before. So were you worried about, you know, your own constituents? You've got a change of government. This is still so fresh in the minds of the grieving families.

those who were wounded, you know, that was all so present. Did you worry about that? Well, put it this way. Yes, is a short answer, but a longer answer is this, that the change of government, and let's be frank, you know, we won on a very economic, public services, minimum wage, all the stuff that people know that we did after the 1990s, the election. Tony Blair did not go around the campaign trail talking about bringing peace to Northern Ireland. It had not formed a big part of the buildup. However, it had formed a big part of his thinking about what he wanted to do in his first term. And the point I'm making about Jerry Adams saying that he felt that change, the change of government was important and the identity of the prime minister was important. And those first

meetings that we had, you could sense it was both sides basically working out, is there a possible relationship of trust here? And what I think Tony felt was that, that if it was possible to get to a place where the troubles could be brought to an end, that constituencies didn't really come into it. There was a bigger picture that people would understand we were trying to pursue. And don't forget, through the course of the whole process, remember the Parry family and from the Warrington bomb, I mean, how at various points they were really important in terms of that's a young boy, gets killed, and his parents and his dad in particular, Colin Parry,

constantly trying to push for peace. And so there were moments where I would argue things like the Manchester bomb almost became like an impetus to do more. When we get onto the Omar bombing, for example, which was a really bad moment, we thought the whole thing was falling apart, that in a strange way became one of the drivers of the process itself in a positive direction. Does that make sense? It does. It makes perfect sense. And Ennis Killen too, which was only 1987, I think, was something which made the IRA pariahs often in their own community. Jerry Adams had to apologise. He said he'd hit the wrong target. There were 60 wounded, 11 civilians killed. These horrors empowered people like John Hume and took the wind out of the

sales. Well, particularly Ian Paisley. I mean, it's sort of Ian Paisley had carte blanche to say, I told you so. This is what you get. What hasn't we haven't talked about, though, you know, of government here in Britain, but also in Ireland. And Bertie Ahern is somebody you have an enormous amount of respect for. So he was the T-shock of Ireland. Also 1997, he comes into power, same time as you do. What was the relationship before, between Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, and why was that so pivotal? And what was he like? Well, what was he like? What is he like? I think a very, very, very, very nice guy, smart, politically quite cunning, very proud of his working class roots and his sense of being an ordinary kind of guy. And the relationship before

was, you know, inevitably in opposition. You do develop some relationships with leaders in different parts of the world, but it would have been a very, very brief. I think they met maybe a couple of times, but it wasn't something that was profound. I think they both understood, this goes back to the point about change again, is that they both understood there was a brief opportunity and that the fact of two new prime ministers coming in with a little bit of wind in the sails, a little bit, that that was an opportunity.

And that relationship worked really, really well in terms of, yeah, the honesty between them, the frankness between them. I'd grown up as a journalist with Charlie Hockey, as Irish Tishuk and Margaret Thatcher's, as Prime Minister. I mean, they did not get on. When I was a journalist going around European summit,

the way I used to find out what was happening, it was not to bother with what the British were telling me. I'd just go and find the Irish, because, you know, it was the best way to find out what they didn't like about Thatcher. But Tony and Bertie did get on personally, and these personal relationships matter, because it's about how you can know when to press a certain button,

know when to put on an extra pressure, know when to pull back. and they just had a very, very good sort of rapport between each other and ended up working well together. Alistair, two final actors before we dive into negotiations. One, Bill Clinton and the Americans and George Mitchell, and then more improbably, but actually I think very important, the church. The church played quite a major role too, didn't it? Father Alec Reid was one of the initial people bringing everyone to the table.

Could you talk a bit about that? It's interesting how often, I mean, as you know, I don't do. God and Tony does, but some of the more memorable discussion sometimes between some of these people were when they were talking about their different understandings of faith and the history of faith and the church. So, Alec Reid, you're absolutely right, by the way, was fundamental. I think in relation to the Americans, again, I would definitely put both Clinton and George Mitchell into that category I mentioned earlier where had it been a different sort of personality,

then would it have been as effective? So, you know, Bill Clinton genuinely said, wake me up any time, day or night, if there's something you think I can do at a particular point, I'm there to do it. And knowing that was really quite important. And when Clinton did come in, it had an effect. And likewise, I think it being known within Northern Ireland

that he really was engaged, really did care, really was trying to help bring this thing together, that was important. George Mitchell, just patience of a saint. I think he once said, we listened our way to peace. You know, he absorbed everything. He took all the heat. We interviewed him in our podcast, Roy Stewart and I recently, and he talked about some of the early meetings with Ian Paisley, and Ian Paisley making no bones about it. You should not be here. I don't respect you, your position. And George just has to sit there and absorb it, but then think, well, yeah, me, but one day this guy's going to have to be brought into the fault.

We started sort of with a quote from Tony Blair, which you hadn't written, and you were quite surprised by, you know, the hand of feet on his shoulder. But I'll leave you with another one just before we go to the break, because in May 1997 on 16th of May, Tony Blair was in Belfast, talking about the peace process. And he said, the settlement train is leaving. I want you on that train, but it's leaving anyway, and I will not allow it to wait for you. Join us after the break where you find out what exactly that meant. Hello, welcome back. So did you write that one, The Settlement Train? Not that I remember.

You did. Look at your face. You absolutely did. Yes, you did. No, let me tell you. Let me tell you something about speech writing. Never ever underestimate the importance of speeches as really big, important building blocks. And it's interesting that one of the first really big speeches that Tony made as Prime Minister was out about Northern Ireland. It was in Northern Ireland. It was seminal, and I'll tell you why, because in a way, if you read that speech, the whole thing, I know you've done, the quotes the news out of that, first visit to Northern Ireland, first big speech to Northern Ireland, the news was that we were actually going to be talking to the IRA. That was kind of, that was the big sort of thing, that he deliberately chose quite a unionist community audience, and the message was very much about reassurance to the unionist. community about consent. There'll be no change to the status in Northern Ireland without

consent. But then there also has to be equality, human rights, justice, etc., etc., etc. And the speech became almost like a strategic frame. And this is, I think, why Tony was so much the right guy in the right place at the right time, because that was kind of how he thought about it thereafter. these are the kind of strategic pillars and everything else is just negotiation around them. And once we've got people to agree, yeah, of course it's wrong that Catholics get treated really badly. Yeah, of course people of Northern Ireland should decide their own future. Yeah, of course it's bad that there's all these weapons kicking around and all the issues were actually quite straightforward.

Everything else became negotiation. And I would say that the issues and the ups and downs they followed, but the strategic frame was set in speeches. So I always say to politics students, you know, you can scoff at speeches and say this speech is boring, that speech is boring, why can't they get their message down to a 30 second clip? But actually, sometimes it's only through a big set speech that you can say what you want to. Talking frameworks, when it came to the Good Friday Agreement, three main strands that you needed to have everybody agree to, a new government structure for Northern Ireland, cross-border relations between the two parts of Ireland and British-Irish relations. which was the biggest headache to get people to agree to? Well, I think you couldn't have one without the other two.

I mean, in practical, this is just my sense of it, in practical terms, the Anglo-Irish stuff became the most difficult, I would argue, for the unionists for fairly obvious reasons. So, for example, if you think about the Irish government, the Irish government changed their constitution. That was quite a big thing to do. So that's from their perspective, a big ask. The unionists were being asked to accept certain things on trust

from people that they frankly do not trust and did not trust. So that was a very, very big thing to ask for. But the reason why I talked about it being a jigsaw, the three really had to go together. They all produced their own individual difficulties and challenges, but any one of them could have brought down the other two. Just some behind the scenes. I mean, we heard sometimes as lay people about the kind of tensions in the room.

You talked about David Trimble having to, you know, sort of being undermined by those on his own team. But did that actually end up with people walking out just because they really disliked the trajectory? And at the point of a walkout, when you've got people walking out on that side of the table, how do you bring them back? Well, possibly by recognising that there's just been a flare-up and it'll calm down. I mean, are we talking shouty, shouty flare-up? So we're talking about people sort of, you know, we've know. ever been privy to these. So, you know, they're not cameras. These are off camera so you don't see them. How does it do? And, you know, what happens to, what's their atmosphere in the room?

Do you see, oh my God, it's all turning to custard and it's coming? Or is it a surprise when it all flares up? And what do you do? Generally, what happens is that the meeting might come to an end. And then you try and regroup. You try to say, well, has he got a point? Was there a specific thing there that was needling. Don't forget, a lot of these talks were happening when people were really tired as well in this grottie building where the food was pretty awful. Yes, physically, where are we? I haven't got a picture of where this is going on. Well, that's a very good question because I'm immediately, when I needed to start to ask about when things are going a bit tits up and people are shouting to each other, my mind immediately

went to the building at Stormont where a lot of the talks were going on. And it's this grey drab sort of council block type building. Tony being the, you know, the UK Prime Minister, I think we had the best room in the building. And I remember thinking, well, this is the best room of the building. God help, you know, the ones are a little bit down to the political food chaise because it wasn't great. I remember I'll give you a very good example when we had a meeting where both Tony and Bertie

Hearn were there. And that wasn't often the case. They were usually, but there was a meeting where David Trimble and his colleagues, came in and they were literally at one point shouting at Bertie Hearn. And pair of mind, this guy just lost his mum, and he's been off to, you know, his mum's died, he's gone back, then he's gone down, and he's come back, and he's wearing a black tie. And it just got very, very personal. And this is one of the reasons why I admire Bertie so much. He just sat there, he took it, the meeting ended, they walked away, and then we sort of, you know, laughed a bit and

joked a bit and black humor comes into it when we're talking about pris the release and which was one of the most contentious issues and I remember I won't say who or whom but somebody's saying if I go kill him now will I mean I had two years there's black humor that that goes through it but yeah it's it's it's passionate stuff and what's the kind of format are you all having long meetings late into the night are you eating together for example are you having sandwiches round The only food I can remember were these bacon sandwiches that kept being brought in. It wasn't healthy. It really wasn't healthy. Endless cups of not very nice coffee.

I mean, other times, you know, don't forget, we got to the Good Friday Agreement, but then after that, there were loads and loads and loads of other meetings and went on for months and still going on now. So sometimes you'd be talking about rather grand splendid dinners at Hillsborough Castle. I'll tell you one thing that was important. The full Irish fry-up at Hillsborough Castle was about the best. way possible to start the day. But once we got distortment, the food was pretty grim, I've got to say. The thing about statecraft is that you do try, you do try to develop the connections

that make these meetings maybe go better than they otherwise would. Mo Moe Molem, for example, Moe was very much... Again, sketch her for those who don't remember her. Who was Moe Moe Moleum was Labor MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and became a really important part of the whole thing, not least because she took risks, including risks that when she took them, we thought, oh my God, what have you done now? But they sort of paid off.

I mean, she, you know, went into the jails to talk to some of the really bad guys. And she was somebody who, in terms of her natural character and personality, she was not, you know, I mean, I can remember she used to sort of put her feet on the desk and, you know, she was. quite good at belching quite loudly. But people loved her for that, you know, sort of blunt, kind of real.

Yeah, but I think the unionists found her harder to take. So, okay, now can I fact check a story? Go on then. An Irish journalist told me once that there had been some kind of cross-table conversation between Momolam and the unionist, at which point she had got, she was undergoing chemotherapy at the time because she was battling with Canada. Was wearing a wig? And was wearing a wig.

And at one point that she seized the wig from off her head and threw it at him. Is that a true story? No, I don't know. I don't know, because I can't say it was in every meeting. It's a good story. She did take her wig off. I think if you get my diaries, you'll see there's a picture of me wearing Momohelms wig. Right. And she didn't throw it at you. No. I mean, I'll give you one example of a very uneasy conversation when we were trying to persuade people to move on prisoner release, I think. And Ken McGuinness saying, it's quite difficult to take this from you guys when, you know, you're also asking me to sit down with some. somebody who tried to kill me and my family. So you did have, you had people bumping into corridors

who had, you know, a lot of history, a lot of baggage. So yeah, the point I was making about Mo is that Mo would be just sort of going out, picking up gossip, talking to people, going into different rooms, being very Moish in a way that some would find difficult, others would find incredibly, you know, would lighten the mood. But she'd come back with something. Things were just being they're being shaped by endless conversations and people coming back with their different interpretations. My point is that over time

you develop ways of reading people. People bumping in with others in corridors which might make it awkward. We did actually one of the first re-letchers I hosted with Margaret Macmillan in Belfast and Peter Walker, fantastic BBC journalist, had managed to convince somebody who had been fighting with UVF and somebody who had been with the IRA and both had served lengthy prison terms.

And we sat them and, you know, there was an aisle between them, but they were basically on the end of aisles. And I spoke to each individually, you know, and basically the question was, was it worth it? And it was the longest pause from both. And both of them lived barely two streets away from each other. But it was kind of the first time they'd been in close proximity with each other to talk afterwards, or, I mean, to talk through me. They didn't actually turn around and talk to each other.

but they talked to each other via the chair. And it was electric, absolutely electric. Because, I mean, for those who don't know Northern Ireland politics, and even, you know, my children don't know it, I've got a 15-year-old, he doesn't understand what it was like. But these were two intractable sides who may have lived one street away from each other or two streets away from each other, but were absolute sworn enemy. So I think it's just worth reminding people what this peace agreement had to bridge.

And it was an absolute chasm between people who lived meters away, and sometimes could be sitting metres away from each other. There's a story that Jerry Adams tells about when he and David Trimble bumped into each other in the gents. And of course, David Trimple had been clear that he would not speak to Jerry Adams. And so there's Jerry Adams trying to make small talk because they're having a pee. And David's just, you know, looking at the wall. Oh, he just looked at the wall.

Gosh, that's interesting. Sorry, Willie. I cut across with that. So finally, by Holy Week, April 98, the two sides are nearly coming together. Can you remember the moment you thought that we're near to getting this? This is actually going to happen? No. It's a knife edge right up to the edge, was it?

Totally. And it was also, I mean, put it this way. There were more things that seemed to be getting in the way than actually were leading in the right direction. I think what, and to this day, I don't fully understand what happened. But one key moment was when David Trimble, who, as I said earlier, was often bringing a sense of division within his own ranks to the table. turned up and had moved. And one of the reasons he had moved, we could sense in the body language of John D. Taylor and Ken McGuinness.

They were just in a different place. They had moved. And likewise, for me, the key moment was so tired. It was actually a former colleague of yours, a leader, BBC guy Dennis Murray, who was BBC Ireland correspondent, Northern Ireland, a great guy. and he I remember him saying saying to me are you going to let the cameras in you're going to have some sort of ceremony I remember thinking all I'd been thinking of right we've got to get we've got to get away we're so tired

and Dennis was because he was northern Irish himself and and he'd been such a it's hard to explain this but he was he was one of those guys you knew he was taking every word seriously because he knew it had an impact and that's the other thing we haven't really talked about but it's important is that within the talks going on, there's all that's going on, but often they were directly affected by what was being set outside. And that's why it was, you know, people were going about spinning all that stuff. That's why it was so important to try to keep the sense of narrative going. But Dennis saying, we've got to get in and see this.

That was when I realised, oh, God, this is really, really quite a big deal. And in the legend, the last minute. Bill Clinton. Yes, so you're thinking the same thing. The Bill Clinton phone call, yeah. Was that not a big game changer? I mean, I think it was definitely one of the things that moved the jigsaw into the right place. And that's where Tony had been right to hold on to the idea of Bill Clinton phoning.

And essentially he was saying, look, you guys have come so far. It's a leap. Make the leap. Make the leap together. This is the only chance you got. And just saying all the right things. No small thing getting a phone call for the White House. Absolutely not.

I mean, I can remember on one occasion when it wasn't there. But I do remember once being in the room when David Trimble took a phone call from from the White House and it was Bill Clinton on the line and and David he stood up I always said to and he sort of bowed he said it's the president it's the president and I always thought he was going to salute you know but no it is we we shouldn't I mean because of what's happening in the White House these days you know we shouldn't underestimate that that did have a power a real power and using that power carefully was it was an important element in it so all of these things came together. We had this very big hiccup in the late stages where suddenly the issue of

the Ullons language became a big thing. We had another big hiccup. And this again, black humor, Maryfield, which had been an important government building. And this was sort of, you know, it had become a real bone of contention because of the history. And I remember Tony as a joke saying, you know, why we're suddenly talking about Scotland's rugby ground, Murrayfield. has been the thing that's sort of bringing the whole thing down. There were big things like issues like decommissioning and prisoner release, but often these seemingly smaller things. The Irish wanted a longer and longer list of the Anglo-Irish bodies

that would kind of, you know, cooperate together. The unionists wanted them shorter and they wanted them to be more minimalist. So these, you had a mixture of these very, very big issues and themes and quite small things. But I think by the end, it was once that move had happened, in David Trimble's team. I think it all felt like people were willing it in the right direction. So on Good Friday, the 10th of April, exactly 27-year-olds today for listening on the day this is going out, the momentous agreement is reached. But you still have to put it to the people of Ireland.

You're not there yet. You've got a referendum. Tell us how that played out. Well, it played out well in that we won both north and the south. I don't think there was any doubt that we were going always to win in the Republic. So this is a referendum that was going to be put to people in the Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland, and also in the Republic of Ireland. 91% in the Republic of Ireland. Yeah, but 71% in Northern Ireland. I mean, that's not a given, but it happened, you know. That was at the, if you just said right from the word go, that was a very good result.

There were moments during the campaign when we were less confident. It was Ian Paisley, formidable campaigner, and he was out there, and he was making it very, very difficult. In a sense, you had tensions between the messaging that ones that the nationalist, wanted to push for the agreement, which is, this is the way to United Ireland. That was, you know, part of their messaging against the messaging on the pro-agreement unionist side, which is, this is a safeguard, this is the way of keeping us locked in and so forth. So there was tensions there. I think Tony's visits were important. We did one of, one of the most effective

poster campaigns, I think we did, was a succession of handwritten pledges that he made about what the agreement was as opposed to the misinformation that was sometimes put around about it. And again, you know, in their own different ways, Trimble, John Hume, both good campaigners in their own communities. So yeah, I think when 71% came through, that felt pretty good. That felt really, really good. Willie, you'll love this. Just part of the moment when I realized it was kind of really something special had happened.

And you've got to remember, we've gone, God knows how long without sleep, we're definitely. desperate to get away. Tony's family are waiting for him on a holiday in Spain. You know, it's Easter. And I think we were taking to Hillsbury, get the helicopter, get taken to the plane. And as we're walking up the steps of the RAF plane, Jonathan Powell has his phone and he says to Tony, oh, the Queen wants to, wants a word. And the Palace had been on saying that the Queen wanted to have a word. Now, and I don't remember that ever happening before or since where the Queen wanted to say something as we were in the middle of something, as it were. Gosh.

You know, that was, I'm not the world's biggest bodice by any manner of means. Tony Blair, of course, is. But that again brought home, oh, this is like really, really is quite a big deal. Do you know what she was trying to say? What was the message? Go ahead. Well done. Yeah, it was well done.

And it was, this is, you know, let's hope this is the beginning of something really good. But interestingly, on the plane, from, we were dropped off at North. So the plane flew to Northall, we were dropped off. Tony went on to Spain. And on that first leg of that journey, Tony was sitting down with a pad and a pen and going through. We were already onto next steps, referendum,

how do we do a Paisley? How do we build this thing into the campaign? So, I mean, you've got your framework. The people have spoken. but you've still got those who say no, absolutely not. So, you know, you've got the real IRA that suddenly springs to life. The Omar bombings of 1990. I mean, you must have just thought, how are we going to get through this?

We should give a timeline, shouldn't we? April was the Good Friday Agreement. May is the referendum. And then the Omar bombings 15th of August, 1988, this horrible detonation of a car bomb and it kills 29 people. and injures over 200. It's one of the largest of all these atrocities, the deadliest single incident of the entire troubles.

Did you feel it's all over? It's going to fall apart. Definitely had a... Everybody was on holiday. Tony was in France. I was in a different part of France. Jonathan was somewhere. Everybody was on a holiday.

And definitely had a sense of, oh my God, this is truly horrific, horrific, because of what it was and what it represented there and then. but also the potential for this to be devastating to the whole process. But what became clear very, very quickly was that everybody who had been part of the process thus far was determined to do and say the right thing. And that thereby became an incredibly important moment. The necessary crisis.

It was also the first time really that, you know, if you remember that Adams and McGuinness had been famous in a way, Mrs Thatcher changed the law. Their voices couldn't be heard directly on television because they would give excuses for these kinds of things. And the condemnations were real. So there was a sense of unity of purpose around it. And then back, you know, I remember Tony went back to Northern Ireland.

Then there was another Clinton came over a bit later. I'll never forget that. He and Tony were just in this room full of people who had lost children. and parents and brothers and sisters and just talking to them. And it was almost overwhelming the extent to which people were all saying the same things, you mustn't give up, you mustn't give up, you must keep going. So in a really powerful kind of way, it became an impetus to keep going. And it almost gave a sense of hope.

I can't describe it. It was really, really remarkable. I mean, the remarkable nature of this, you can see it in the sense of the. the relationship of two men in particular, I think, Martin McGuinness and Ian Paisley, you know, who would have thought, who develop a real friendship after all of this is over, after everything has been said and done, they do become friends. In fact, when Paisley died, McGuinness goes to the house to pay tribute over the coffin and is said to be in tears, you know, and says, I've lost a friend. Who would have thought? Who would have thought? I mean, that that would

ever be a possibility? Nobody. Can I ask you a little bit about the future, though, because Brexit must have been a moment when you thought actually Good Friday Agreement, how's it going to impact all the work that was done there, the friendships that were made? I mean, those kind of unthinkable things that have happened, like the Paisley-McGinness friendship. The architects of Brexit seemed to have completely forgotten about Northern Ireland, didn't they? I mean, you know, Tony and John Major both went to Northern Ireland during the Brexit referendum campaign to point. out the potential dangers of Brexit and the impact of Brexit upon an agreement that depended in part on the support and commitment to the European Union. So yeah, it was a big worry and it remains part of the difficulty and it remains part of the reason why we've got to keep our eye on this thing. What I think that said, though, was how remarkably quickly we'd actually moved to a place where

people felt they could take the peace process for granted. Yeah. And what, you know, there have been, there have been many occasions since the Good Friday agreement when people have realised you can't take it for granted. It either goes forwards or it goes backwards. It doesn't stand still. But I mean, it has something like the Windsor Framework sorted it out, do you think? Or is this just a very tenuous holding?

Just explain it to those who don't know. It's a revision of the protocol that was agreed between the UK and the EU. So green lane and for goods and, you know, all of that kind of thing. I mean, to be, look, in a way, to some extent, Northern Ireland has ended up with the best of both worlds. That is not how the Brexit people want to project this. But the remain real tensions within when you have economic borders, the eradication of which was a fundamental part of the peace process. And I think the Windsor Framework was a good piece of work, but we shouldn't pretend that there aren't still tensions between our new relationship. with Europe and the outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement.

Alistair you've now had, what is it, 27 years of peace, relative peace, I mean with the odd blips, but relative peace in Northern Ireland since the agreement. How far do you think it could be a template for other conflicts, most obviously, Gaza, Palestine? There seems so little hope there. And yet, if you'd looked at Northern Ireland only 10 years before the Good Friday Agreement, you'd have said it's an impossible conundrum to unscrabble there too. You might even have said that a few weeks before the Good Friday Agreement.

And that I think, look, I went over for the 25th anniversary. Queens University of Belfast did this huge thing and Clinton was there, Hillary was there, George Mitchell was there, Tony and Bertie were there, all the, you know, Jerry Adams was there. Sadly, both McGuinness and John Hume and David Trimble dead by then. but what was coming through loud and clear was that sense of, back to my Mandela quote, everything is impossible until you make it happen.

And I think right now, today, 2025, and I know you've got very, very strong views on this, as have I, occupied territories, Gaza, Palestine, Israel, looks utterly impossible. It looks utterly impossible. But there were many, many, many, many, moments where Northern Ireland looked utterly impossible as well. And it came back and it came together around these agreed principles. Now, even the principles right now in Israel, Palestine,

seem impossible to attain because that sort of sense we had of a vague agreement of a commitment towards a two-state solution doesn't feel like even that is there right now. That doesn't mean, though, that it can't come, can't be brought back. And I think that those, that sense of a understanding that in the Northern Ireland context, constantly killing each other is not the best way to go about things. Democracy might actually be a better way of trying to sort this out. The nationalists have got absolute justification in claiming the historic injustices and discrimination and so forth. Likewise, the unionist community is entitled to understand that any change in Northern Ireland's future must be dependent upon popular consent. These were the

principles. And once you'd won the argument with those principles, all the negotiations became possible. If you don't have that basic support for fundamental principles, everything becomes a lot more difficult. Even then it's not impossible. Even then it's not impossible. Well, thank you so much for your time, Alistair, really great for, and thank you so much for listening to this episode of Empire. Now, if you're listening for the first time, maybe your arrest is politics fan. I'm so happy you found us. Welcome. Welcome to our merry band. Just press the follow button at the top of your podcast platform and that way you can stay up to date with our very latest episodes and our next one is a bit of a dozy, isn't it, William? It certainly is. It's the wonderful Fintinotou, who I adore. He's coming on to tell us about modern Ireland and how we move from that very conservative, very Catholic word of de Valera to the country that produces the most Viagra. and where Maine Newth is no longer remembered as the home of the Catholic Church,

but the largest Intel chip factory in Europe. So all interesting stuff and improbable and unlikely stuff and how Ireland ended up the third highest per capita income in the world, according to some calculations today, very, very different story to how it was in the 1920s and 1930s, where we left it. Yeah, and let me tell you, Fintinotour is an absolute star turn. He speaks with passion, knowledge,

and is deeply rooted in the history of the time. So look, if you want to hear that episode right here right now, all you have to do is sign up to our Empire Club. That's EmpirePoduk.com, EmpirePodukuk.com. You get quite a lot for that. You get early access to our mini-series. You get access to very special bonus episodes and you get our rather excellent weekly newsletter.

So till the next time we meet, it's goodbye from me, Anita Arndon. And goodbye from me, William Durhampool.