Endgame with Gita Wirjawan - Bilahari Kausikan: The Future is Multipolar (ASEAN's New Normal)

Episode Date: January 20, 2021

Singapore's former senior diplomat talks about the new realities Southeast Asia has to face and how the forgotten Indonesian adage of 'national resilience enhances regional resilience (vice versa)' now rings truer than ever. Mr. Bilahari Kausikan is the Chairman of the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. Mr. Kausikan was Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2010 to 2013. He was subsequently Ambassador-at-Large until May 2018. His earlier appointments at the Ministry include Deputy Secretary for South-east Asia, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, and Ambassador to the Russian Federation.

Identity politics is upon us. That's a new reality. But we have to fight against it. And it's the role of the state. I see Indonesia struggling against it, which is a good thing. I applaud you and I hope you succeed. Hello, friends, time. Hello, teman. Hello, time. Today, we're in a good time our professor, Bilaari Kosykan, and the and he was a good the Uttal University of Singapore and he also has been jabat

as a dutte in several and after after this he was a pinpinman in Middle East Institute at National University of Singapore.

Today we will talk about geopolitic in the kawasan and also in the world. Bilahari, how are you?

I'm fine, I hope you're right too. I'm okay and I hope, you know, we can stay safe and well, you know, in the near foreseeable future given this, you know, massive, unprecedented episode of COVID-19. Yeah, we're living in weird times, sir. I want to talk about a few things today. And of course, we're going to venture into the geopolitics of the world and the region. But let me start off with your early years. Talk a little bit about how you grew up.

And I know your dad had the opportunity of gracing Indonesia quite a while ago. Please. Well, I grew up in Singapore. I was born in Singapore and grew up in Singapore. It was a different Singapore. And my father was the first Singapore ambassador to Indonesia. So Indonesia is actually the first foreign country I ever visited when he was there. I never actually lived in Indonesia when he was posted there for the simple reason there wasn't any good foreign school.

This is in the 1967, 68, 69. It's a different Indonesia. I'm pretty sure that many young Indonesians may not believe me if I tell them what Jakarta was like then. So they shouldn't grumble about Jakarta now you have come a very, very long way in the right direction. I was just born a few years earlier back then. I was a young kid then, you know, I was in secondary school. And then you stayed on in Singapore, right, at Raffles, and then what got you interested in the international affairs? how you grew into it.

Well, since my father was ambassador, after Indonesia, he went to Australia and then the former Soviet Union. And I visited him in all these places. So I guess the interest was natural. Anyway, if you live in Singapore, I've always had the view that you have to be interested in the world around you, because Singapore is a small place. Okay. And that's how I agree. I didn't intend to be a civil servant or a diplomat, although I did spend my entire working life as one.

I wanted actually to be a journalist or an academic, but life takes many unexpected turns and you just go in one direction that you don't really expect to. But anyway, I'm now a pensioner. I saw that. You know, you were quoted a number of times. if everything that happened to your life was accidental, including your career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Pretty much so, you know, because when I left school, left university, I did my undergraduate in Singapore, I would be an academic. And I was fortunate enough to get a scholarship to do graduate studies in the US. But kind of like halfway through my PhD, I realized that I'm not temperamentally suited to be an academic. make a bit too impatient and want to do things rather than just talk about them.

So I came back and we had a, when you get a scholarship in Singapore, you have to serve a bond. You know, you have to serve the government for a certain period. In my time, it was eight years. So they asked me where you want to serve and since my father had been the foreign ministry, without thinking too much about it, I said the foreign ministry. And I didn't intend to stay there. I intended to stay there only to finish my bond, but I forgot to leave. By the time I realized I had forgotten, it was too late to leave.

Well, you've been there for quite a long time. Well, by the time I retired the second time, I retired twice. I like retiring, so I do it as often as I can. By the time I retired twice, the second time as Ambassador at Lodge, it was 37. years. Wow. Wow, that's a long time. Hey, let's, let's, you know, talk about the world. You know, you've, you've written so many books, you've written so many articles about so many places and so many situations. Let's, let's pick the U.S. for now. Tell us your views about what's going on. You know, I know this is before the results of the elections are finalized and, you know,

tallied up and announced, but tell us what you think is likely to happen and how it's going to impact the world, particularly Southeast Asia. Well, first of all, I think the election is pretty much over-bar the shouting, and there will be quite a lot of shouting. Biden has got a commanding lead in electoral college votes, which is what counts. 264 to 214 as we speak. There are five states left to be counted. He needs to win only one of those five states. Whereas Trump needs to win all of them, and just by the loss of probability, this is not going to happen. I don't say it's impossible, but it's unlikely to happen, very improbable.

So we'll have a Biden presidency. But if I look at the results, but there will be a lot of legal challenges, there will be a lot of confusion, we shouldn't get confused. This is a confusing thing. It takes much longer to do everything in a democracy than absolutely necessary. But this is the system, this is how it's going to work. And by and large, I must say, when I look at it, the system did work in America. It did work. Okay. So after a period of confusion, we're going to have a new president. But I think we shouldn't expect that just because you have a new president, everything is going to change for the better.

Not everything Mr. Trump did was bad. Not everything his predecessor did was good. And in fact, in life, very few things are wholly bad or holy good. Old people like us knows that, Agita, but young people may not know that. All right. What we can we expect? First of all, I think it's quite clear that America is polarized. It's not merely polarized because a considerable number of people still did vote for Trump. The Democratic Party itself is polarized.

We saw that during the primaries between the so-called progressive wing and the traditional Democrats. That's not going to go away. away. And that is a subset of a larger phenomenon because I think politics in many countries, including yours and mine, is getting polarized. There are very few countries where there isn't some degree of polarization in politics. So to me, so we're going to have a Biden presidency. Now, to me and I've said it over and over again, to us in Southeast Asia, in fact, to the world, The American politics, the American president, the American we can't do anything about the weather. Whether it's rainy or dry, whether it's hot or cold,

we can't change it, we can only adapt to it. Because America is a vital factor in this region. Right. There are two, the biggest geopolitical reality of the late 20th century is the right of China. Correct. There are good things that flow from the rise of China is better to have a prosperous China than a poor China fermenting revolution as in the past. But it does pose challenges and those challenges can only be met with America around. One thing that Trump did much better than his predecessor was to use hard power.

Now, I'm what would be called. what would be called a realist in international relations, you need hard power. Soft power alone just doesn't cut it. You need both. Ideally, you need both. But if you have to choose between one or the other, choose hard power. Because if you have hard power, soft power naturally follows at some point. But if you have soft power, it doesn't mean that hard power will follow, all right? So we'll have to see what we have to see. But as I said, America is like the weather. we will have to adapt to it. There are certain big changes in global politics. I mentioned one. Politics, domestic

politics, which is the foundation of international politics, is getting polarized in almost every country. Right. There is a certain disillusionment with globalization in many countries, including yours and mine, although we may express it in different ways. And in, and, and, and, uh, But I don't think globalization can be reversed. I don't think America that Trump represents will be reversed either. You look at it this way. I look at it this way. For 40 years during the Cold War,

America made a lot of sacrifices, took a lot of risks in order to maintain its vision of global order. And then they got involved in all kinds of silly wars in the Middle East, for a further 10, almost 20 years, right? 17 years to be precise. And Americans are tired. For them, it's time to focus on domestic issues. When Mr. Obama talked about change you can believe in,

he wasn't thinking about change abroad, and American voters did not vote him in to bring about change abroad. They voted him to bring about change at home. In other words, to use Trump's slogan to put America first. And Biden will also face the same reality. It's a fact. It's not that America is not going to get involved in the world.

This idea of America in retreat is just simply not true, but it's going to be more transactional. The difference with Trump and Biden is one of degree, not of kind. It's a new reality we have to adapt. How do we adapt? I think we have already begun to adapt in the sense that countries in our part of the world, right? East Asia, by which I mean North East Asia, South East Asia. We are doing more things together. We are not neglecting America. We are not

neglecting China, but we are doing more things together. Well, Indonesia is not a member of it, but the TPP 11, right? In which Japan took the lead is an example of that. Some of the things that ASEAN is trying to do, not always very coherently, but we are at least trying. It's another example of that. We have two new realities. The new realities is a more assertive, perhaps sometimes aggressive China and a more transactional America. We have to work with them, and the way we work with them is to work with each other much more. Yeah, let me, let's pause. Going back to your earlier statement about the use of hard power, right?

And the fact that Trump probably would have tried to project more hard power. Now, assuming a Biden presidency, to what extent do you think that's likely to continue the projection of, or at least the effort to try to project hard power? Or we can just automatically assume a swing in the other direction so that, you know, there's likely to be a lot more soft power projection from the US. Well, I think it's too early to tell, really, right? It's too early to tell. I can say this. The Obama presidency was very uncomfortable with using hard power.

And I think China misread this particular and there's a lot of consequences. A lot of the new the new situation, for example, is probably a result of Now, whether he was, I don't know the extent to which Mr. Biden was directly involved in those decisions during the Obama administration, those mistakes I would say, but he will be held responsible for them anyway. Life is not. So people will be watching him very carefully. Whether you are a friend of America or whether you are a competitor of America, you will be watching him very carefully for any sign of weakness. That's a fact he has to live with. I think he knows it. A second fact is that I don't think Biden will come to the White House with completely free hands.

As I said, he inherits an America that is polarized and he will have to take that into account. he will have to take the divisions in his own party into account. Third, I think the mood in America towards issues like trade, like China, has changed. Yeah. And he has to. So he's not going to change direction abruptly. He will probably, because don't forget, Biden is not an inexperienced person in international relations diplomacy. He has been in the Senate foreign-in-leash-he and even his chair.

Or, you know, he will probably implement the same policy, more or less. In a more calibrated way, in a more orderly way, he will be more considerate of the interests of friends and allies. And that's all welcome. But what people will be watching is how he uses hard power. Because that's where I think the Obama administration, of which he was apart, fell short. He will probably do some things quickly to distinguish himself from Trump. And I think one of the things you'll do quickly is to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change.

I agree. Yeah. He will also take multilateralism, the WTO and so on more seriously. And this is all to be welcome, but it's not a fundamental change of direction. One last point. He has a lot of good people around him who are willing to, work with him. Republicans as well as Democrats because he has got a lot of support in the foreign policy sphere from both Republicans as well as Democrats. He has good people to choose from. And because he will have to spend a lot of time on domestic issues because of the pandemic,

the health and the Secretary of Defense, who he appoints to be Secretary of State, National Security advisor will be much more important than usual. So we'll have to wait and see. I have an open mind about him, but I can see that he doesn't come to the White House with completely free hands. Yeah. You wrote about that in the Niki, but let's go back to your earlier statement about, you know, China is being assertive and the US is being transactional. Talk about how you see China are unfolding in terms of its assertiveness? China has never made any secret about its goals. Since the late 19th century, when the contact with the West

made the Qing dynasty realize that it was weak, it was much more weak that its own self-image was, they have been in search of wealth and power to regain what they believe is their rightful place in the region and in the world. And they have gone through a lot of trauma, a lot of political experiments in search of their wealth and power. And whatever we may think about it, we cannot deny the fact that the most successful of those experiments has been the post-Maoist Communist Party after Deng Xiaoping opened up and reformed China's economy. So now Mr. Xi Jinping is reaping the benefit about that. But I think they have also miscalculated a bit. We talk about Trump having a terrible foreign policy, and that's true.

But we forget that China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping has been quite terrible too, you know. I cannot think of a single major country, in a very minor countries, that does not have at least some concerns about China. All right. But if there is a global anti-China coalition, it's not due to the efforts of Mr. Pompeo and so on. He came to Indonesia and he behaved rather clumsily to my mind. Right. If there is to the efforts of China itself.

Is China sensitive to that? Well, I would say that China cannot not know, but I don't think they are particularly sensitive to it. because there is one fact about China that is so obvious that we always overlook it. And that simple fact is that China is a communist country, not in its ideology anymore, but in its political structure. In other words, there is a vanguard party that claims a monopoly of political control over everything. And the maintenance of that position is always the primary consideration. Now, I don't think there's anybody in China who believes in communist ideology, class struggle and all this, the classic Marxist-Leninist, Maoist kind of thing, right? Right.

So their legitimate ideology is nationalism to reclaim the place in the world they believed that they had lost for a century and a half. And that nationalism naturally makes them what they call reclaiming their rightful place. other people find assertive, if not aggressive. I mean, look at their claims in the South China Sea. Their claims are based on history. Their claims, in essence, is, hey, this was all mine. When I was weak, I lost it. So now I'm strong. I'm taking it back. Sorry. It's going back to the old 14th century map. Yeah, no. And it's not, I mean, I've had this quarrel with Chinese friends. I say, look, you know, not quarrel, a debate, I would say.

They always say, look, all these features in the South China Sea and so on have got Chinese names. I said, yeah, but you look in the, if you look, they were used by, they were used by sailors of all nationalities. So they have got Malay names, they've got Japanese names, they've got Portuguese names, they've got English names. You know, they've got all, and they probably have Arabic names because Arab sailors from the Persian Gulf came all the way to China in the 14th century as well. So what does that prove? It doesn't prove anything. It proves that you were here, but there were other people here too, you know. For example, I think you know this. There was a Chinese colony in Java. Yeah. In the 14th century.

Correct. There was a Chinese corner. Does that make Java Chinese? Singapore had a Chinese name. Singapore had a Chinese name. It was not just called Tamasai or Singapore. There was a Chinese name. Does that mean that we were Chinese territory? but it's all domestic politics. I don't blame them I'm just pointing it out as a phenomenon

because this is how they legitimate their rule legitimize their rule but other people it causes other people concerns if you are a big country you are always going whether you do anything or not to cause a certain amount of anxiety for small countries around your periphery

And that's, by the way, of Indonesia. Sohato's big achievement is to understand that. Sukarno didn't quite understand it. That's why you had confrontasi, you had all this. But Park Suhato understood this. And that's why he decided to join ASEAN and work within ASEAN. Yeah. Right?

And that's a huge difference. But China hasn't quite understood this. He was always good not to try to dominate. And he would also give space to the other countries in Southeast Asia. No, he understood. That's why ASEAN worked. Correct. Where that's earlier kinds of regional organizations didn't work.

Correct. And Indonesia, I think, still understands. You don't have to be overtly assertive. You are there, you are so big. People will have to accommodate you in some way anyway. It's very obvious, right? Nothing can get. Yeah, it's obvious. And it's obvious too of China. They don't have to, you know, go around dumping the table. Because, no, okay, I said everybody, there's no country in the world, big or small, there doesn't have certain concerns about China. But there's no country in the world that wants to have a bad relationship with China either. But, you know, I'm just thinking, you know, within logic, China should be able to recalibrate, right? I mean, if you're

if they're sensitive to how they're being perceived, whether or not it's mainly driven by domestic politics. But I do sense intuitively that they're likely to recalibrate for the benefit of everyone on the planet. Okay, they have recalibrated, but it's tactical adjustment. I tell you why. It is quite clear that towards the end of Hu-Chintao's period and it's become a much, more intense under Mr. they have abandoned the Teng Xiaoping policy of hiding

your capabilities and biding your time right because they have showed their capabilities and they are in a hurry and in fact Mr. C. Chimping has set certain timetables in his speeches so

they will have to work harder, much harder and because it is a communist party if there is a conflict between recalibrate and the party's interests will always dominate. They have recalibrated. They have toned down, for example, the wolf warrior diplomacy. They have stopped boasting so loudly about their capabilities, but people don't forget, because you can't reverse a policy of hiding your capabilities and biding your time once you have abandoned it. This is a one-way street.

But I must say, in fairness, in fairness, just one thought, Gita. I think everybody has the same attitude towards the US too. Yeah. The US and China are both too big to be ignored. They're both vital parts of the strategic equation. They are vital parts of the economic equation, but nobody particularly trust them either. Right.

Right. That's why we have to work more together. Okay, a number of questions are popping out of my head. But going back again to how China you think is likely to be more assertive and how China's recalibrating will still be underpinned by its own domestic politics and the U.S. is being transactional going forward. How will this impact Southeast Asia? Right? And I can just see the decoupling between the U.S. and China intensifying.

No matter what Biden or whoever wins is likely to continue doing in the U.S. and what Xi Jinping is likely to continue doing. How do you foresee all these? Okay. I think, first of all, deep coupling is real, but we shouldn't exaggerate it either. Right now, it has been decoupling in certain sectors, technology, even within the broad technology sector, certain sub-sectors, right? If you look at the triggers, you look at the investment figures, there hasn't been that much decoupling. Sometimes, this new period of relations between US and China has been called a new Cold War.

I mean, quite often, right? I actually don't think that's an appropriate metaphor. If you look at the relations between the US, the majoringly they were really connected only very marginally with each other. Their main common interest is to avoid mutual destruction. In terms of other kinds of relationships, it was only very marginal, trade, investment, all that, only very marginal. But you look at the US and China, they are both central, irreplaceable part of the global economy.

and they are linked by a web of supply chains of a scope, of a density, of a intricacy that has never before existed in the world economy. There have been supply chains in the past, but they were supply chains of products. You know the classic Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, right? You make beef, I make wine, you exchange your beef for my wine. when we both live happily after drunk and full. But those are products. You look at the supply chains nowadays.

They are not just intermediate goods. They are intermediate, intermediate, intermediate goods. And they are so intricate, they never exist. And it's not so easy to decouple or disentangle, that kind of thing. Some has occurred already. Some will occur. But I can't see them completely separating. It doesn't mean that they won't compete.

it doesn't mean there won't be tension, but it is a different kind of competition and tension. That's why you have things like techno-nationalism, competition using technology as a strategic weapon and so on. Now, what does it mean for Saudi-Sahia? We are in the middle of this, and I can see countries like Japan, Australia. I mean, we are not, we are strategic crossroads. What does that mean? It means that this is going to be a naturally multipolar region. There will be many countries that have interests in Southeast Asia, outside countries. You have Japan. It's not going to disappear. You've got Australia. It's not going to disappear. You've got India. It's got problems now, but it's still a big country, and it's not going to disappear.

Indonesia is not a small country, and you are right here. You can't disappear, even if you wanted to. You've got Vietnam, which is not a small country. You've got certain European countries. So once you are a naturally multipolar region, you have space to maneuver the rest of us. If there's only the U.S. or the only China, we have no room to move. When they say jump, can you only say how high, sir? If they are only the U.S. and China bipolar, we have a bit more room, but not that much room. But this is naturally multipolar.

We have got quite a lot of room provided to, conditions. One, we don't panic. We have been here before. The old coal is a lot more dangerous than the current state of US-China tension. But we survive that. Second, we must stay united. We now I mean ASEAN. We may say cohesive. It's not going to be 100% perfectly cohesive. That's, you know, perfection is only to be found in heaven, not on earth. But we should be cohesive and then not panic. We can see and use the maneuver space that we have. People want to work with ASEAN. ASEAN is often criticized, very often criticized, and some of the criticisms are valid, but still people want to work with us. So we have agency.

We have the possibility of maneuver. We can advance our own interests, whether they are our national interest or regional interests. And by the way, national interests and regional interests are not alternatives. They are compatible. There used to be an Indonesian saying about ASEAN, which somehow has not been used for a long time. You know, national resilience increases regional resilience, and regional resilience increases national resilience. That's a very wise saying, Kohato period, and we should revive it.

Yep, I still believe that. Correct. Yeah, I still believe it. That's the basis of how ASEAN works. But the analogy is sort of like, you know, we've got this multipolarity and it's like a bunch of people that are watching a movie, right, in a movie theater, right? And the movie could be a comedy, it could be a horror movie, it could be an action movie. And as soon as somebody shouts fire, right, there's panic. You talked about this panic thing, right?

But what would it take for everybody to panic? I think there's been a number of people that are actually kind of like shouting fire in that movie theater. But everybody's not running to the escape or exit door. So that to me actually gives optimism about how we could actually continue to multipolarize. despite all these aberrations that we've been seeing in the last few years. Right. So there is this inertia of peace and stability, at least in an ASEAN context. So doesn't that speak positively for the future of ASEAN, despite whatever we're likely to see in China and the US?

Or between the two? I'm not pessimistic. I'm not at all pessimistic, actually. I'm realistic, but not pessimistic. First of all, we are not just passively watching the movie. By our own actions, we can affect the plot of the movie. It's an interactive movie, put it that way. Because we're not just a passive audience, nothing to do but watch, right?

Yes, people are shouting fire, but why are they shouting fire? Both the US and China are basically saying to us, although they deny it, Look, there will be disaster. Why should we follow either? We should follow our own interests, national as well as regional interests. So I think it is a very good sign as you do, I think, Gita, that we are not, not everybody is panicking. We are, we shout, you know, we are South East Asians, we are quite polite people, right? Maybe not Singapore and South, but Indonesians certainly are very polite, right? You tell us things, you shout at us, we listen politely, but we make up our own minds. And that's important.

Up our minds for us, but just because they are shouting from different corners of the theater. When people shout fire, first thing you must do is look around and see whether there's any smoke or not. Right. Whether there's really fire or not, right? Because they may just want to panic you. People may be shouting fire, so you panic and run away, and then they steal your wallet. Okay. Okay. So let me ask you more specific.

Specifically, ASEAN has been voicing this need for adhering to the code of conduct, right? To what extent do you think that will hold true in the future? And to what extent do you think all parties will be respectful of the need for a code of conduct? I'm talking about the South China Sea, yeah. I know, I don't think the code of conduct of the South China Sea is going to amount to very much. It is a process for us to engage China, and that's not completely useless, but we shouldn't expect too much about it. And we shouldn't let it be a constraint on our own actions. What is absolutely vital to us is not just the Code of Conduct, but that the South China Sea dispute,

are handled within a framework of rules. And the rules exist. It's called unclos. Right. Now, unclos is not like a magic wand. You wave it and everything will be solved. But at least it keeps things fairly orderly and reasonably peaceful. It's not the law of the jungle where Mike is right.

Right. So we should insist on that. But we shouldn't sort of hope for everything on put all our a code of conduct because that's not a a very frail foundation than that

look at it's not going to go to the 90s in the 70s, in the 70s, 80s, where Indonesia, where Singapore, where all the Saudi Shia grew and prospered. It's going to be more complicated. That is a fact.

We have to work more closely together in ASEAN and that's not going to to be easy because Asian is an interstate organization. It's not a supran national organization. That means the base of Asian's cooperation is all our domestic politics. You can't have a regional consensus unless you have a domestic consensus on anything. And the fact of the matter is all our domestic politics has become more complicated. It's not impossible to get domestic consensus, it's going to take more work by our political leaders. But that's a new reality. There's no point of complaining about it.

Now look at the original ASEAN, the original five members. Thailand and Philippines were under military rule. Singapore and Malaysia were formally parliamentary democracies, but really one-party systems. with very strong leaders. that is why Asian in his early days was able to hold together and form. Now I'm not saying that we should go back to that kind of authoritarian rule because it's clearly not possible and even undesirable for many reasons. Right. So we have a new reality and now we have 10 members instead of five.

It's going to take longer to have consensus. But all of us must never forget that however complicated our domestic politics is, however in whatever direction our domestic politics takes the definition of national interests, some part of our national interests must have the regional interest in mind. And therefore, then we can work together. Let me ask you, I mean, some member countries of ASEAN, they have a multi-party system, right, where there is evidently fragmentation of the political landscape. That, to me, makes it a little bit more difficult to think long-term, right, because you're shackled by the cycles of five years or four years of political episodes, right?

And a way that I think dilutes the ability to basically as opposed to, as you suggested, I think you'd be a lot more predisposed to domestic politics or domestic political interest. That, to me, makes it a little bit more difficult. Well, that's a new reality. It's the case in Philippines, is the case in Indonesia, it's a case in Thailand, is even the case in Singapore. But I don't think it is, it is possible to think long term, provided you have a very basic consensus on what you want for your country,

that strides, that goes across the political spectrum. I, if you don't mind me, let me use Indonesia as an example, right? Indonesia is not just a place. Indonesia is an idea, right? I mean, how many, 17,000 islands and every day you find some new ones, right? Okay. We lose once too, every day. The idea of, yeah, you lose some, but you find several also, right?

So, you know, the idea of Indonesia has always been a contested one from the beginning, from 1945. It has been contested along two main axis. One, is it going to be a secular nationalist idea of Indonesia, or is it going to be a secular nationalist idea of Indonesia or is it going to be a more Islamist idea of Indonesia? The second sort of axis, is it going to be a unitary idea of Indonesia or is it going to be some looser idea of Indonesia? Right. Now I think there is well-nigh consensus across the political spectrum. It should be some form of unitary Indonesia. Right. I think the people that are looking for a united states of

Indonesia and so on, there was that idea as you remember long ago, right? Yeah. that has gone away. I don't think you look at the thing. Where are there? These movements, serious ones in Indonesia anymore? A bit in Popa, that's all. Previously, Sumatra have, within Sumatra, you have Ache, you have all over the place. So I think that that part of the debate over the idea of Indonesia has been settled.

However, a secular and a secular- a more religiously-oriented idea is not over. That debate was suppressed by the first two Indonesian presidents, Sukano and Suhato, but it's now a very major issue in Indonesian politics. You can't wish that away, but you are also having another debate about Islam-Nusantara. And that's a very important thing. So I don't give up. I mean, you know, it's just a huge country, right?

I mean, you got, what is it now? 260 million people. 17,000 high islands. It's very, right? 270,000 million people, right? And very diverse peoples, right? Very diverse people. Consensus like that is not a joke, you know?

Right? You know better than me. Well, you are you are important here because you are trying to Indonesia Islam-Nusantara, which is, I think, a very important idea because how Islam is conceived of in Southeast Asia has changed considerably over the last 30, 40 years, under the influence of Islam from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. You know better than me, Islam in Southeast Asia, Indonesia in particular,

used to be very open, very syncretic, very inclusive. Whereas the strands coming from Saudi Arabia, which claim to be more authentic, are actually inward-looking, somewhat-and-not-tolerant, but I'm very happy to see that Indonesia is trying to revive or to insist the region. Now, it's not going to get easy to get a consensus about whether it's going to be a nationalist secular Indonesia or Islamist Indonesia. It's not going to get consensus. But the fact you've got consensus on a unitary state

certainly shows that consensus is possible, even in a large, complicated country like Indonesia. And the idea of Indonesian Nusantara, to me, is a blending of a nationalist idea as well as a religious idea. So it's not binary choices. And that is, I think, a very important point for me for everybody to understand.

When we look at the geopolitics too, because ours is a naturally multipolar region, our choices are not binary. It doesn't have to be A or B. It doesn't have to be China or U.S. To me, the choices before us are never binary.

The idea of Indonesian Nusantara is an idea that is both nationalist and religious. I mean, sorry, Islam-Nusantara is an idea that both nationalists and religious. And that is a broader lesson. When we look at the geopolitics, it's not just U.S. or China. We have our own interests. We have a multipolar region. We have the space to pursue our own interests.

I think you understand this, Gita. I understand it. People who are interested in international relations, understand this. but we need to get our own people to understand this better. And then it may be easier to get domestic consensus in our respective systems. You know, that sounds optimistic in a way, because we've, you know, like countries like Indonesia, you know, we've gotten, you know, what's needed, basically done to preserve the, you know, unity and the unification and that's basically capital right for the regional stability

then let's let's let's let's go back to how you think asian should basically behave going forward fast forward to two thousand forty five twenty five years from today where where do you see as a in terms of its dealing with the rest of the world, be it China, be it the US, and putting that in the context of the South China Sea. You mentioned that the code of conduct is nice, but I think it should be done differently. You refer to the unclosed. How do you see or foresee ASEAN? I see that a balance of power is the necessary foundation for the implementation of the implementation of the of any kind of rules-based order, whether it is based on anclos or a code of conduct or some combination. That is the foundation.

That foundation, I think, will get a bit more diverse. Right now, it is very largely the 7th Fleet. But I think increasingly the Japanese Navy, the Australian Navy, the Indian Navy, and the ASEAN navies working together will play a role. So I don't, I'm not pessimistic about the South China Sea. I tell you why. As long as there's a balance of power, it is basically strategically a stalemate. Nobody can force or coerce any claimant state to give up its claims. China is not going to reverse its claims, but coerce others to give up their claims.

And as long as there's a balance of power, we can all. use the South China Sea as a right. All right. Let's switch a little bit here to the Middle East. This is a topic that's very close to you. You've been running the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore. And how do you see things developing in the Middle East

and how that would impact the world, particularly Southeast Asia? First of all, there is not one Middle East, there's at least three Middle Easters. There is the Gulf region, there's a Gulf region, there is the Levant, the Northern thing, and then there is North Africa. And the dynamics there are actually very different. If you look at the Northern tier of the Middle East, that means everything from Turkey, down Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Africa, but that's, I put it in one category. First of all, the hard fact is a bunch of failed states.

You have Syria, it's a failed state. You have Iraq, it's a failed state. You have Lebanon, it's now failed. It was doing very well, it's failed. You have Turkey and Iran that, because of mismanagement, are not in danger of failing, but they are really underperforming. really underperforming drastically. I don't think either Iran or Turkey will fail,

so they will hold together as states, but they are really drastically underperforming. Egypt, too, for a different reason. So the only really viable state down there is Israel. And it's got its own dysfunctionality, by the way. I go to Israel often and I have a lot of friends there, but I don't ideal because they have a lot of political dysfunctionality, as you can see, if you follow it. Then you have the Gulf.

Now, the Gulf is undergoing a very, very interesting experiment. They are trying to wean themselves from economies that are basically dependent on one commodity energy, whether it's oil or gas, and diversify their economies and put it on a much more sustainable basis for the long term. Because fossil fuel, the secular trend is down. The price secular trend is down. There may be spikes and so on,

but the secular trend is down and for a whole variety of reasons. So they are trying to diversify their economies. Countries like UAE and Qatar have done it fairly successfully. Oman also fairly successfully. Kuwait trying, Bahrain trying, not very successfully Bahrain. But the key is Saudi Arabia.

The key is Saudi Arabia. It's the key in many ways because you can't transform your economy without transforming your society. The two things go hand in there. Some aspects of the Saudi experiment under Muhammad bin Salman have been very good. I was in Saudi Arabia last September. and I had not been there for a number of years and I was very impressed by some things I saw

I saw for example women no longer having to cover their heads it's their choice of course their family has something to say about it but I wouldn't say a lot of them but you know appreciable number you can it's visible when you walk around I saw even more important and not covering your head I saw women working in serious jobs

I mean, I mean, something like that, you know, but it's serious. I went, I went to a number of institutions there, and there were women working, and I met them, and, you know, they're smart. They do things. And of course, women now are allowed to drive. Young people can go and see movies, they can have concerts and so on. But I still have a question mark, because of the economic transformation. To transform the economy, you will have to transform the economy, you will have.

to transform the educational system. Because right now you have a lot of, you have a very young population in Saudi Arabia, right? I think something like almost 70% is around 30 or so, you know. Right. Now that can be a great advantage. It can be a great problem too, you know. It's a question of giving them proper jobs. To give them proper jobs, you have to give them a proper education. Right now, the education system is not ideal for a modern 21st and economy. You know that changing educational system is not something that can be done overnight. It basically takes a generation because then you have to hold together the society somehow while you transform it. The good part is a big huge challenge, but the good part is Mohabab bin Salman is still a young man, so he has time.

The bad part perhaps is that he has been a bit impatient. Quite a number of sections of Saudi society are not exactly very happy with him. So where the balance will go on, I think is still an open question. But we must all see it as in our own interests in Southeast Asia, which has not an inconsiderable number of Muslims that they succeed. because where Saudi Arabia goes, a lot of the Muslim world will follow. Because they are the custodian of the holy places after all. If you put it that way, right? So I think it's still an experiment in progress.

Now, the other thing about the Middle East is the Sunni-Shiah divide, which has become much more pronounced. It was always there, of course, but after 79, the Islamic revolution in Iran, it became more pronounced, and it's getting even more and more pronounced. I think the very important thing for us in Southeast Asia to understand is that this Sunni-Shiya divide,

of course there is a religious element. There's always a religious element in the Middle East, but it is fundamentally a geopolitical issue. It is a contest for regional dominance, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Now, that context for regional domains, the geopolitical aspect has got nothing to do with Southeast Asia. We are concerned, we are interested,

but fundamentally, it is not our business. We shouldn't get too involved. And I unfortunately see something of this sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia being imported into Southeast Asia, mainly for political reasons. Look, how many Shia are there in Southeast Asia? A minuscule number. And for most of the time, even in my lifetime, I didn't see any Sunni-Shiya conflict. People live together quite peacefully. And we should go back to that. And we can go back to that if we understand that the religious aspect is only basically a cover for a geopolitical contest that has nothing to do with us. Now, the other part of this is the so-called Abraham Accords. Of course, of course, and the Gulf states in particular have had their own unafinousial relationship for a very long time. But now to our states in terms of, okay, because of the geopolitical conflict between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf in general and Iran, the Gulf has reached, the Gulf and Israel have reached a new accommodation.

You know the UAE has normalized relations. Bahrain has always had unofficial relations, and I wouldn't be too surprised if they normalized pretty soon. There have always been unofficial relations with Oman, with Qatar and so on, right? And I think that's a good thing because Israel, as a very advanced and creative economy, has a lot to offer the Gulf in their own effort to transform their own economies. and it's good they are working together, right? But that leaves the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue is a very complex one. It cannot be completely brushed aside, but I think we'll have to be very, let me be very brutally frank. I think the key to resolving the Palestinian issue is the domestic politics of three entities, I would say, one state and two entities. The domestic policy of the domestic politics of the domestic politics the Gaza centered around Hamas. I came to the very sad conclusion quite some time ago that the right wing in Israel,

the leadership of Fatah and the leadership of Hamas have one common interest. The common interest is not to have a solution. Because if there is a solution, they will lose relevance almost immediately. almost immediately. Their interest, very cynical interest, is to keep some kind of low-level conflict going on, or at least prevent a solution. Because then they remain relevant. Now, I don't think it is impossible to have some kind of accommodation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, right?

But it's a question of leadership. Leadership of the Israeli right, leadership of the Israeli right, leadership of Fatah, If you go to Israel often, if you go to a high-far, which is a very large Arab population, and you know, they're Israeli Arabs, but they are essentially the same people as the Palestinian Arabs. I can tell you that if you go to a university of Haifa, all right, except for most of the women covering their hair, you can't tell the difference. They can't tell the difference. They are the same people. They're all Semitic people.

That's true. So the conflict is a manufactured one for political gain. Just as the importation of Sunni-Shiya sectarian conflict into Southeast Asia, where it never existed before, is a political move, which should be resisted. Now, let me ask you, the fact that we've seen in recent times normalizations between Israel and a number of Gulf countries, does that vote well for countries like Indonesia and others in Southeast Asia for purposes of a couple of things? Number one, hopefully mitigating the risks of a sectarian conflict.

And number two, you know, I've always looked at countries like Israel as a place for technological innovations. If there's one thing that Southeast Asia could actually learn from Israel, that would be it. And I think normalization in a way could be viewed as being good. How do you foresee the future in Southeast Asia? I think normalization is a very good thing. And I think countries in Southeast Asia with mostly majority populations, basically Indonesia and Indonesia and Malaysia, of course, of course, you will have to make your own calculations. But I think it gives you a new bearing, a new reference point. And you are absolutely right, Gita. I mean, I think Israeli technology,

is really entrepreneurship, is really creativity. There's a lot to offer Southeast Asia. Countries like Vietnam are already benefiting from it. To some degree, Myanmar too, because they have diplomatic relations with Israel and they are benefiting. I mean, but you know, of course, each country has, you know, and Singapore has a very close relationship with Israel. I mean, it's not a secret, or if it's a secret, it's the world's worst cap secret. Okay. But, you know, I think things have progressed. Things have progressed. A couple of years ago, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is a controversial figure, even in Israel, came to Singapore, and there wasn't a great fuss.

Whereas in the late 80s, Herzog came to Singapore and there was a complete uproar as if we did something terrible. You know, I mean, look, so people, attitudes change. And, you know, I am not saying it's going to be easy for either Indonesia or Malaysia to, you know, to recalibrate relations. It'll be probably slightly easier for Indonesia than for Malaysia, but it's not going to be easy anyway. But I think it's not something that you should dismiss, because there's a lot to be gained, particularly in economic development, in technology. Let me pick up on that, that point. And you've written a number of times, and one of the stuff that you wrote about

with respect to Singapore as being a multicultural right and this is for Singapore in the future and because of that strength or that

multicultural meritocracy being a strength for Singapore you've been able to basically rise economically in a fantastic manner in the last few decades right I'll highlight a few stats, okay? of FDI per capita, you're getting about $19,000 per person from an FDI standpoint.

Compared to countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, each one of which has only been getting about $91 worth of FDI per capita. Okay? Huge difference. And I think a lot of that is correlated with the fact that you've been able to sustain yourself as a multicultural meritocracy. Now, how do you think that could rub off in a positive manner to neighboring countries in Southeast Asia?

Well, I would say that Indonesia, the Indonesia I first went to in 1968, had a very promising beginning in that direction. You know better than I, Gita. But once upon the time, you know, of all, Indonesia is a naturally multicultural place. Even more multicultural than Singapore. Right.

Okay? Just Sumatra is more multicultural than Singapore. Let alone Java, let alone all the outer islands. Unfortunately, and that was true, through the 1980s, began to change in the 1990s a little bit for maybe the domestic. political reasons. It was not unusual. You know better than me to have Christians and Muslims in the same family. Right. I think it's still there, but now it's not so, how shall I say, public. But I see Indonesia pushing back again. this trend I have called me in my own country as well by the way what I

call the Arabization of Islam in Southeast Asia or the Wahhabization of Islam in Southeast Asia. Look when I was growing up in Singapore I mean it's always been Muslims in Singapore is 15, 16% of a population but in Singapore in Malaysia and Indonesia it was rather rare to see a Muslim woman cover ahead. I mean some were, some did, but you know, frankly, that's an Arab thing. It's not a Southeast Asian thing. Right. So you have this idea that things coming from the Middle East is a more authentic form of Islam. And that is eroding the multiculturalism, the diversity in a number of places. And even in Singapore, we struggle against it. we have to struggle against it. By the way, it's not just a Muslim thing, because there is evangelical

Christianity, there's radical Buddhism, there's even radical Hinduism. Now, radical Buddhism and radical Hinduism is an oxymoron because these are not radical religions. But it does exist. It does exist, not very far away from where we are speaking in our respective countries. In Sri Lanka, in Myanmar, it does exist. It's part of this polarization of politics. It's part of this polarization of politics. politics in the world that we began to talk of in the very beginning. Identity politics is upon us. That's a new reality, but we have to fight against it. And it's the role of the state. I see Indonesia struggling against it, which is a good thing, I applaud you and I hope you succeed.

I see more to it, and Malaysian politicians not resisting the temptation to use it. to use it. And I don't think that's a very healthy strand. But this is no a new reality. We'll have to do something about it. The role of the state is to be neutral and to hold the ring as the neutral empire between different cultures, whether the culture is defined ethnically or religiously or in some other way. And that's the only way you can maintain social cohesion and leverage the social cohesion

a diverse cohesion for a long time you know this Indonesia for a long time you know this right but it's very unfortunate that Panchasila was was kind of like associated with the new old order

if you know what I mean or the old new order right because I think it was a very very wise compromise by the founding fathers of Indonesia. I agree. But, okay, let me, let me pick up on another point then. You know, I've talked about how the multicultural meritocracy in Singapore has been able to, you know, attract so much financial capital, so much technological capital. Essentially, it all boils down to productivity, right? And how you can be competitive.

And if I take a look at the productivity of Singapore, it's at around $140,000 U.S. dollars per person per year, compared to a much lower figure for a number of the neighboring countries. Indonesia, namely at about $24,000, much lower than $140,000. And Thailand and Malaysia also much lower than $140,000. So we could somehow intuitively draw a correlation, right? the extent to which you can actually establish multicultural meritocracy with basically your ability to basically attract financial capital, technological capital. So I think it's definitely in the interest of each of the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia.

But I think the bigger picture is that it's in the interest of the region, you know, as for itself to stay stable and peaceful so that we could be even a lot more cohesive. and we could be a much better union compared to some others in the world. Absolutely, but I just want small qualification, Gita. The kind of per capita figures you cite are perhaps a very, and best a rough indicator because of the disparity in population size between Singapore and all the are. Probably, I haven't looked at the figures, but probably if you just say compare Jakarta or Surabaya with Singapore, you will have

a different disparity would not be so great. Yeah. You're right. You're right. But still lower. Still, still quite meaningfully lower. Yeah. But much higher than the national average.

Yeah, because I tell you why it's very, this multiculturalism is very, it's becoming a more and more crucial factor, provided it's a cohesive multiculturalism, not a divisive multiculturalism. It's a cohesive factor because going forward, people are are going to be much more important than machines or as important or proportionately more important. Talent is going to be much more important than anything else. And talent is mobile. Especially the high end of the talent in the world is extremely mobile. It can be anywhere. They don't have to come to Singapore or Jakarta. They can be in New York. They can be in Portland, Oregon. They can be anywhere, you know. And that's going to be the new reality.

So you have to create an environment, an ecosystem that is welcoming to this global talent, globally mobile talent, not just welcoming, but where they feel comfortable. Because talent, where? Because of the pandemic, in fact, even all you need is a smartphone. You can work anywhere, you know? I mean, there are other downsides, but in principle it's possible. So talent is very mobile. You have to make sure that we have, perhaps not in the whole country, if it's a huge country, but there are pockets where multi-cultural, globally mobile talent will feel comfortable and want to anchor itself there. The kind of new things which is going to be the economy of the future are digital.

of course you will still need some manufacturing but that can be done by robots and so on you know I mean more and more of manufacturing is going to be done by robots more and more services including legal services including some medical services are going to be done not by human beings but it doesn't mean the human factor is unimportant in fact the human factor becomes even more important

and even more competitive and that's where the future competition is going to lie I think We started, I did, I was in the foreign ministry, 37 years. Last year I gave a commencement address to NUS, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. I'm not sure all the professors were very happy with me, but I basically told the kids, look, I did basically one thing for 37 years.

I did it in different places around the world, but basically I only did one thing. None of you is the one thing. going to have the same career. It's impossible. Therefore, what you studied and you graduated in and I congratulate you for it is irrelevant. Or it will soon be irrelevant. I don't think the professors were too happy, but that's the fact. Because what you start with is not what you're going to do in your life, you know. I told my own daughter that, right? And that's again, talent, talent, mobile talent. How do you attracted how do you keep it happy how do you anchor it

yeah let me let me let me let me push on with with azean then since we all care so much about asian in recent times you know if i meet up with friends of mine in Singapore Malaysia Thailand and all the rest they seem to be questioning right about the status of ASEAN, right? And also the leadership of ASEAN, right? Do you have any views about that? Yeah, I think the, a lot of the criticism about ASEAN is actually tantamount to criticizing a cow for being an imperfect horse. There are some things ASEAN can do and there are some things we can't do.

So if you're going to criticize a cow, criticize it because its milk is not enough, the quality of his meat is not good enough. You know, what cows are for, right? Don't criticize a cow because it can't run as fast as a horse. You know, that's pointless, you know? Because no matter what you do to a cow, it will never run as fast as a horse. Now, what does ASEAN, what can ASEAN do? ASEAN manages relations among its members pretty well. If you can't remember, you can't remember, I believe,

if you remember what Saudi Arabia was like in 1967. We were in a mess, a complete mess. I mean, there were war. On the mainland there was war. Indonesia had just stopped fighting an undeclared war between Singapore and Malaysia. There were all kinds of problems within Malaysia and Thailand and Indonesia and Southern Philippines. It was a bloody mess.

Right. Look at it now. We are not perfect. It's not perfect, but we have managed it. Yeah. No, it's not miraculous. It's a lot of hard work. And acceptance of the idea that the regional interests must be some part of your national interest.

Now, going forward, it's going to be more difficult. That's true, because it's harder to get consensus among 10 than among 5. That's for sure. It's harder to get consensus in pluralistic systems as we were talking about than in more authoritarian systems, but not impossible. The greatest challenge is that I think some of the new members do not understand this idea of regional resilience leading to national resilience, and national resilience. leading to regional resilience well enough. They see national interests and regional interests as kind of alternatives. They are not. They are compatible. They are self-reinforcing. But it's not impossible. We can go forward. And ASEAN manages not just manages relations between between his members pretty well. I'll give you another because of the pandemic, right? We all have had to take

pretty drastic measures against each other to cut off each other, right? But was there very high level of bilateral tension? No. The level of bilateral tension was much higher in the EU. Now, compare this to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the level of bilateral tension during that crisis was much higher within Assyan countries. So we have evolved.

The other thing that ASEAN does very well is to use convening power. I made the statement a while ago that Southeast Asia is a naturally multipolar region and that's a good thing. Well, the purpose of forums created by Asian, like the East Asia Summit, the Asian defense ministers' plus meetings, the Assyan Regional Forum, is to encourage the natural multipolarity. And they use those anchors.

I don't say it's the most important anchor because they're most important. But they do use them. They may criticize ASEAN, but they still come to the meetings. So we are doing something right. It's not all wrong. Where we are probably we can do better, we have to speed up the economic projects of ASEA. We are now in phase two of the economic integration project. We have to take it, we have to try to move within all the constraints. Because the world is changing at a great pace, and it's not is not one example one of the phase two of the asian economic community

project is to create a common production platform in Southeast Asia a common production platform implies a certain conception of supply chains but the conception of supply chains is changing even as we speak as I said earlier I don't think there can be completely coupling between the US and China, for that matter, because of robotics, because of artificial intelligence, the cost advantage of widely distributed supply chains is being eroded. Some industries can actually be brought home. So where does that leave us if we are too leisurely in our approach to creating a common production platform? right we need to do that we need to make individually as well as collectively

nationally ourselves and attractive business ecosystem so that businesses will come right i think uh part jokkoi in unisha understand that's that's the whole point of the omnibus labor bill that was passed possibly it was not explained well enough before the controversy but you have pushed to hear that's the right. No, we've got to make ourselves a welcoming place for visitors and for investments and for anything that's economically enhancing, right? I agree with you. As much as so many people have been arguing or rooting for this de-globalization of the supply chain from China on to other places, including Southeast Asia, I don't think it's straightforward. I don't think it's simplistic on the basis that you have mentioned earlier because of the intertwining of the

U.S. economy and the China economy but also at the same time you know Southeast Asia has got to get its act together in terms of you know cohesively collectively making itself a welcoming place for money and and that I think you know some countries in Southeast Asia have got their work cut out still and omnibus I think is a good thing it's It's a step in the right direction. It probably was not socialized as well as it should have. But I do believe that in the long run it is going to be welcoming of smart capital for Indonesia. No, definitely it is the right thing to do. And it took some, as you said, it could have been perhaps socialized or explained a bit better.

But anyway, it was the right thing to do. We have to make ourselves attractive. attractive. Nobody owes us a living. We have to create welcoming ecosystems so that if a particular business is thinking or relocating, they will think of us. They don't have to think of us, you know. It's not that, you know, it's an automatic process, right? All right. Let me ask you a futuristic question. Where do you envision ASEAN? in 2045. I mean, some of the cheerleaders have been saying that

ASEAN's economy will be the fourth largest in the world by then. That's assuming linearity, right, with respect to a number of things. Other than that, or do you believe in that? And do you believe in other things that will coincide with that? I don't believe in elite. I don't believe in automatic linear projections. This is not how the world works. But I don't believe it is an impossible dream, provided we work at it.

We do all the things we have been talking about. And we don't stop doing them. We don't get complacent. We don't start resting on our laurels. Of course, I am assuming there's no huge catastrophe. No war, for example. No huge environmental catastrophe. And one of the things we have to do is environment.

You're a businessman, you know better than me. Green capital is going to be an important thing in the future, more and more important thing. So we will have to show that we are adapting to that too. Yeah. Right? So the one thing is an automatic linear projection from where we are now. That is not really how anything works. It's not impossible provided we work at it, we know how, we know what to do, and we do it.

We find the political will and the energy to do it. Let me ask you this. Using that thinking and what you alluded to earlier, will ASEAN be still a cow in 2045, but it'll be a prettier cow, a stronger cow, or assuming that there's a more, assuming that there could be non-linearity, it may metamorphosize into a horse by 2045. I certainly think, or at least I certainly hope, because I said we have to work about it, wishing of it. It will be a better horse. I mean a better cow.

We will produce better beef, we'll produce more milk, creamier milk, greater good stuff for all of us. Whether we will metabolize into a horse is another. a horse is another matter. I am not so sure we will and I'm not sure it's a good thing if we do. Because I put it this way, nationalism is a fact of life. A lot of liberals in Asia as well in the West, think of nationalism is a bad thing. I don't. I think of nationalism as a good thing because it's a very powerful motivating force to make countries, people, try harder, work harder. And nationalisms can be made compatible. One of the functions of ASEAN is to make nationalisms compatible.

So they are not compared to be more competitive. Now, I take the metaphor of becoming a horse, meaning becoming a supranational organization. I don't think that's necessarily a desirable thing because it's against a basic human instinct for identity and national identity. identity. Europe works fine. World worked very well until it overreached itself, where they thought that they could overcome nationalism instead of harnessing nationalism.

It's an essential difference between the EU and ASEAN. The EU is like the Soviet Union with human rights because the Soviet Union tried to say we can create a new human being, who is not Ukrainian, who is not Russian, who is not Kazakh, who is not Belarus, who is not Belarus, who is not Belarusian. He's just the new Soviet man. That was a delusion. Overnight, the new Soviet man became Kazakhs, became Russians, you know, Tajiks, became everybody, right? And the EU is finding out the hard way that everybody is still French, Germans, Spanish, Italian, Polish, Hungarian and so on, right? We never made that mistake in Asia. and we shouldn't make that mistake. We are Indonesian, we are Malaysian, we are

Filipino. That's the way to go. Make a better cow. Don't try to create by genetic manipulation or something. All right, I'm going to pick up on what you mentioned earlier, and I'm going to treat this as the last topic before we end this fascinating session. You mentioned green. Right? And climate change is a topic that I've been talking quite passionately about in recent times. And the other day, I was asked to speak about, you know, the role of China and the role of the U.S. Let's assume Biden is going to be the next president of the United States, right? intuitively you would you would think that you know the US is going to be more inclined towards a more environmentally friendly type of posture including

reverting back to the climate accord in Paris and at the same time China I think has been very very proactive in embracing you know what it would take for the planet to stay environmentally clean, you know, you know, you know, mandating electrification of automotives, mandating, you know, the decrease of the use of fossil fuel, you know, mandating the decrease of the use of coal generating, power generating capabilities and all that. I actually think that if China continues on its path with respect to the climate change, proposition, I think we might see a very different China, more positively from the climate standpoint. And if Biden were to actually embark on a policy posture that's going to basically trigger more and more conversations that would basically preserve the planet,

I think that's going to be net good for the world, don't you think? Of course it's going to be net good, but all this is easier said than done, you know, that. Okay, China has said it's going to be carbon neutral by 2016, right? And that's a very important symbolic statement, a statement of intent. But if you look at the hard facts, it's still, and in fact, it's increasing its reliance on coal. It's not that they are being hypocritical, they are being perfectly logical. because they have to grow and that's the easiest way. You have to grow, you need energy.

Detail for America. I think Biden will change course. The one thing he will do very different very quickly is on environment, climate change, go back to Paris and so on. But these are very important symbolic acts. To change, look, we are all, all of us, without any exception, we are all part of a fossil fuel civilization. What we need to change to create a new civilization that is not based on fossil fuel or less reliant on fossil fuel.

We know we need to do it. How to do it is a different matter. There is a fundamental political problem in doing it. And I tell you what it is. It's not unrelated to what we were talking about earlier, right? When you're talking with the problem over the very long term. It's a problem where you have to pay the cost up front and you reap the benefit 50, 100 years down the road. For any electoral system, this is not a very attractive proposition.

But we have no choice because it is an existential issue for all of us. We started talking about this as a means of attracting investment. of attracting investment and that's important. But that's the short-term issue. In the long-term, it's a life-and-death issue. But Singapore is a small place, a low-lying place, we are fortunate, because we have the resources,

we can build dikes, we have already changed a lot of building standards and so on, right? But Jakarta is built on a Delta. I guess you are old enough to remember Jakarta, fuller canals. Jakarta still has canals not as much as you use there because they are built up. That means if there's sea level you're in trouble. Sea level rise, you're in trouble. Ditto Bangkok.

Ditto, Hanoi. So it's a long-term existential issue. Seave of politics, how we conceive of civilisation, how we conceive of civilisation, how we conceive of society. But I know there is no choice. And human beings are very creative. When there is no choice, we usually find a way. Maybe after too long, after a lot of delay, but we usually find a way.

I'm quite optimistic, you know, because I come from Singapore. It's such a small place. If we were pessimistic, we have all killed ourselves long ago or immigrated somewhere else. No, I mean, the benefit, I could be wrong about this, but the benefit of being in Singapore, being in Singapore is that you you do not have as much of a multi-party scenario. And if you do not have a multi-party scenario, you can think long-term intuitively, right?

Better, easier than if you have a multi-party system because you're shackled by the cycles of four or five years. Then you're forced to be short-termist. but the good thing I see about Singapore politics, even with these changes, is that there is well-nigh a consensus that across the political spectrum, that this is an existential issue for Singapore. So if there are arguments about climate change, there are arguments over detail. It's not like I don't find, I don't find, there are no climate change deniers in Singapore. I hope it remains that way, but you know, I don't know.

I can't resist asking one quick question to end our session. Do you believe in a common currency for ASEAN in the next 20 to 30 years? Look what happened in Europe. You cannot have a common currency without a common budget. You cannot have a common budget without a common government. It doesn't work. I just want to align our thinking. I'm on the same planet with you on that one. Yeah, I know, I know. Okay.

So it doesn't work, though. That's one of the European Euro-overreach. Yeah. Yeah. Hey, Bilahari, it's been, it's been a ball, just talking to you about a bunch of things. I know it's early but I want to thank you for participating. No, I enjoyed it.

Thank you for inviting me. I only hope we can meet in person before too long and continue this conversation in person. You make sure the green lane is relaxed. Yeah, okay. All right. We are discussing it. It will be there sooner or later. But I want to be able to go to Indonesia in the old way in the old days.

I used to go in the morning and come back evening. Let me know. Let me know when you come out here. And ditto when you come here. Okay. All right, man. Okay. Good talk to you. Bye. Thank you so much. Yeah. Thank you know.

that's it's about our time that's about about the world and the development geopolitic in several places in the world and, the most important, is the part of the future Asia-Tengara.

Thank you. This is N-GEN.