Endgame with Gita Wirjawan - Glenn Diesen: “When the World Is Multipolar, You Diversify”

Episode Date: January 30, 2026

Get your copy of Gita Wirjawan’s book, “What It Takes: Southeast Asia”, NOW: https://sgpp.me/what-it-takes-ytAnd leave your review here:https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/241922036-what-it-takes------------------Join Gita Wirjawan and Glenn Diesen in a conversation about world politics, democracy, and the future of Europe. More on this episode:00:00 - Intro02:00 - What is Eurasia06:23 - “When the world is multipolar, you diversify.”11:29 - Should Europe prioritize economic or security?16:46 - Public opinion-policymaking divorce20:23 - Good governance24:00 - The tragedy of great power politics29:33 - Ukraine resolution34:45 - Trump’s strategic ambiguity45:00 - Genocide55:00 - The US is becoming a tribute economy57:00 - Paradox of Multipolarity1:11:15 - Global political1:19:41 - Redefining democracy1:31:50 - Future of the EU#Endgame #GitaWirjawan #GlennDiesen ----------------------------About the Guest:Glenn Diesen is a Norwegian professor and geopolitical analyst specializing in Russian foreign policy, Eurasian integration, and the shift toward a multipolar world order. A professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, he is widely known for his critical perspective on Western hegemony and NATO expansion, often arguing that global power is tilting toward a "Greater Eurasia" framework. About the Host:Gita Wirjawan is an Indonesian entrepreneur and educator. He is the founding partner of Ikhlas Capital and the chairman of Ancora Group. Currently, he is teaching at Stanford as a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy.___________________Episodes you might like:1. https://youtu.be/eRRMurnQnJU2. https://youtu.be/CXUgsJYpfvs3. https://youtu.be/_AbeVh1JRcg------------------Special thanks to our ‘Future Narrators’ channel members:Mariko Yoshihara, Yemotto IBRAHIM, hobi kluyuran, Fajar Prasetyo, Dyah Firgiani, keetkaat, Excel-lent, Arie Gunardi, Yayi Trisnawati D, Teddy Chow, Wwertyssnb, Crispy_Cracker58, Priyanithi Dharsania Negara, Widi Aphrian, hndraable, hendro trihatmojo, Muhammad Taufik Evendi, QunÔºáan Syukrilah, azam adnani, Charles Andrew Tang, Ariyo Arinsa Putra, Reda Bellarbi, Jaz Simbolon, Muhammad Ismail Mubarak, Stefanus B. W., KATE WOLSKA, pixelcadet, Itje Chodidjah, Geralt Fajar Bukan, Jack Duan, Elmi CK Ong, Lucy March, Anggun Noventina, Irawan Purwono, Krishna Putra, Agnes Pranindita, Darso Arafa, nazaruddin nasir, 747sgw, benget yakub, Patricia S, ferra febrianti, De Guda Kessa, Gusko Adnyana, mjk939, Jerry Budiman, Mawan Darmawan, diah anggraini, Ainur Rofiq, Adrian Baskoro, Bambang Haryanto, Ezwan Zakaria, Marilyn C, Kianti Darusman, Revolution R, liza dewi, Joanna FKG, Susanto Uno, Taswin Munier, M Firaldi Akbar Zulkarnain, Super ‚ÄúBuupy Pub‚Äù Bondon, Ferdy Reza, Elnasdi Moda, Hendry Ahen, Aria Widyanto, Ilham R, Ayu Arman, Haju Ara Podcast, Flores Exotic Tours, Meilisva AA Taniel, nonik martyastuti, Niki S, Anita Amalia, hardianiati, Salwaluna Maryam, Dewi Risnawati, birgietta katherine, Derry Harnanda, Aleyandra Rizka Amalia, Ridwan Sakidja, Rita Sahara, Sanityas Prawatyani, Teddy Sutendi, erna girirachman, Alvin Rivaldi, Ronny Wijaya, Sam K Nugraha, Arif R3 Vibration, FBC Ponto, Stella sinaga, chandrawati Saragih, Kawal Jakarta, Elmi Dignity, Yufud Rahayun, Calvin Go, Freddy Wijaya, Toto Parminto, Bambang Made, Nova Rahayu Yusuf, Oktavianto Dwi Wicaksono, Muhi Futon, Sophia Alizsa, fsoenardi, Hadzunda Laga, ULFA, R K, Dina Siswa, Daniel Tagu Dedo, adam fadrian, muhammad afif, Okvina Juita, Yoggi Dinata, Nofliyana, NOVEDY HUSAINI, Kacamata Indra, Asyraf Mursalina, Cindy Permatasari, tanto thesman, Jarry Rinaldy, RACHMAD ARIFUDDIN AMKL, eka nurlita, Arief widyanto

that the United States doesn't have that much interest in Europe anymore. Because the gravity of power has shifted long ago to Asia. So the Americans want to go there. And the Europeans don't really know what to do. So now they're essentially betting everything on trying to get the United States to stay in Europe, to maintain their own economic partnerships and security and relevance in the world. But the thing is they should be doing the exact opposite, as we see the rest of the world doing. When the world is multipolar, you diversify.

If you go aligned with one great power and you go against the other, now you become 100% dependent on the one and a vassal status is unavoidable. Hi, friends. It's a pleasure to tell you that my book, What It Takes Southeast Asia, has been released in English and Bahasa Indonesia. You can buy it through books.endgame.ID or at any of these stores. Now back to the show. Hi, friends.

Today we're graced by Glenn Deeson, who is a professor, at the southeastern university in Norway, but he's also a famous podcaster that has dealt with a number of geopolitical issues around the world. Glenn, many thanks for coming on to our show. Well, thank you, and thank you so much for a very kind introduction. I want to just go through the usual set of questions about how you grew up. Tell us about your process of growing up and why you decided to go to Australia. of all places from Norway and then focus on your area

of expertise of geopolitics. Please. Well, I left Australia kind of early when I was about I guess 20. I just finished my military army service and I

was going to go study at university and it did strike me. This was in around 99, 2000. and it was interesting to see what could really be ignored unless you wanted to, which was this powerful rise of Asia. Of course, you have India, but, I'm sorry, China, but also India and large countries like Indonesia, which is often neglected. And so, yeah, I decided to study in Australia.

And, yeah, I liked it down there, so I stayed about 14 years. but I initially began focusing on business, but when I later on moved to Russia for studying politics, now for studying language and history intended for business, I also had a sudden huge interest in politics, so I changed and shifted and got reeducated in politics instead. and yeah, went also back to Australia and, yeah, shifted a bit between Russia and Australia. You've been quite big on this narrative or thesis of Eurasia. Explain that in layman terms. Eurasia, well, when I speak of Eurasia, well, often Eurasia is an interesting term.

It can sometimes it's referred to the region between Europe and Asia, as a separate territory, but I use it more in the greater Eurasia term, which is everything from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so this massive continents. Now, I use it as an approach to explain the developments taking place, because we see that most of politics is organized around geopolitics, that is why geography matters in politics. And most of geopolitics tend to focus then on Eurasia, with people. such as Macinder in the early 1900s explaining how, well, how essentially world dominance and competition for power or the focus of geopolitics overall is organized around Eurasia.

Now, from his argument being a British, he argued that if the British would dominate the world, they would have to dominate the Eurasia from the periphery. That is, you have your bridgehead on the periphery of Europe and Asia, and ideally some placements in the Middle East. And then you make sure that the great Eurasian powers remain divided. So the Germans have to be divided from the Russians, the Russians from the Chinese, the Chinese from the Indians and Indians from Iranians. So if all the major Eurasian powers are divided, then you can organize from the periphery.

And again, in those days, early 1900s, the main concern was that we had the development of transcontinental. railways. So suddenly the Russians were connecting, well, Moscow with Vladivostok in the Pacific. They were pushing down towards India. And suddenly, the main argument was that the whole ability of dominance from the periphery by maritime powers was suddenly undermined. Now, I thought this is an interesting approach, simply because how much influence it had over British policies. Indeed, if you look at American policies, they, in the security strategies, all throughout the Cold War.

You see it pops up this talk of the Eurasian heartland, the Eurasian strategy, keeping the Eurasian giants divided. So this is a common theme that has always gone through. So when I use the term Eurasia, it's not what would have been in the 19th or 20th century, because at those point it was essentially the British maritime or American maritime powers who wanted to compete against Russia, who then had hegemonic, ambitions and capabilities for Eurasia. These days, Eurasia is not a hegemonic project.

No one power can dominate Eurasia. You need for the great powers, the Chinese, the Indians, the Russians, the Iranians, the Iranians, do all have to cooperate in order for Eurasia to be connected. So for this reason, we see that the maritime powers still act to a large extent as imperial, That is, they dominate through divide and rule, while the Eurasian powers they really need to the opposite. This is why you see, for example, China, they're trying to bring together the Iranians and the Gulf states. This is necessary to connect. And so it's a good framework to understand some of the things which is going on at the moment in the international system.

So, but of course, one shouldn't oversimplify because it's not either your maritime power or you belong to Eurasia. We see the Eurasian powers also having a lot of maritime capabilities. We see countries like India. They don't want to only lean towards the Chinese and the Russians. They also want good relations with the Americans. And, of course, countries like Indonesia is island stated, but it still kind of fits within this Eurasian context. The traditional or the conventional thinking until recently would have been,

in the context of Europe, would be for Europe to. outsource its energy to Russia, outsource its trade to China, outsource its security to the United States. That thinking seems to be dissipating in the last few years. Do you see that recurring or recalibrating at some point in the near future or distant future? you're thinking about well I think Europe has put itself in a very vulnerable position

I mean that the interdependence is fine and well you can be dependent on other states what you usually don't want to do is get trapped in very unfavorable asymmetrical interdependence that is if you're more dependent on one state than this state is on you then you're in a very vulnerable position So, and you can get out of this by either having more strategic autonomy or diversifying your partnerships.

Now, for example, with Europe, they're entering now a different world. They used to be too dependent on the United States, and they had ambitions. Let's try to split this dependencies a bit broader out in the international system. Let's connect with other centers of power. But as the unipolar moment went away, that is the collective hegemony of the political West, there's been a bit of a panic and more efforts to shore up the political West as an entity. But in a multipolar system, they're seeing that the United States doesn't have that much interest in Europe anymore. Because the gravity of power has shifted long ago to Asia.

So the Americans want to go there, and the Europeans don't really know what to do. So now they're essentially betting everything on. trying to get the United States to stay in Europe, to maintain their own economic partnerships and security and relevance in the world. But the thing is they should be doing the exact opposite, as we see the rest of the world doing. When the world is multipolar, you diversify. And this is a great opportunity, because small, medium-sized countries can have greater

political autonomy now. If you have good links with all the major powers, then none of them will effectively own you. This is the problem of the Cold War. If you go align with one great power and you go against the other, now you become 100% dependent on the one and a vassal status is unavoidable. Now, the Europeans have been doing this now. This is why they're becoming almost vassals of the United States, but the US doesn't really want to be there. So the peak of this problem was evident when the vice president, J.D. Vance, said, you know, we want European partners, not vassal states. So when your almost imperial master have to tell you to stop being vassals and grow a spine and stand up for your national interest, you know, things aren't going very well.

But I think things have to change in Europe because at the moment we see national interest being ignored. The economies are going south. Well, the security is obviously terrible. We bet everything on this proxy war against the Russians, a war which we have lost. we thought we would isolate the Russians, it didn't work, then we kind of put some pressure on the Chinese and put pressure on the Indians, and at the end of the day,

the Europeans are beginning to isolate themselves. So my hope is that Europe will wake up and see the world as it is and begin to adjust to it. And yeah, that means not outsourcing its security, but it needs to stand up for its own security, build its own defenses, but also avoid this proxy wars against Russia. That is, we have to learn how to have some internal cohesion without this external enemy. We have to begin to develop some economic autonomy as well.

We can't just rely on all the US technologies and industries. We told ourselves for so long, oh, the West has all the best digital platforms, but it's not the West, it's the Americans. And we soon will recognize that we're not one entity. And overall, we have to start also in diplomacy, can't go around lecturing. You know, when I meet with Chinese leaders, Indians leaders, you can't go with the point of departure that you should lecture them and try to dictate and pose ultimatums and threats. The 90s are over.

There's a new world which has emerged. And we end up isolating ourselves effectively. So I think Europe has a lot of things to do. It needs some strategic autonomy. suggested to take control of its own security, economy, all of this, more autonomy, but it also needs to diversify and link itself to other centers of power. This is the key for strategic autonomy and independence, and this used to be the aspirations of the European Union, aspirations which they seemingly have given up on.

The economic activities in many European countries seem to have been slowing down, and much of that is probably attributable to the cost of energy, which has risen in recent years. I guess two follow-up questions to this would be, you know, to what extent would you attribute the economics of things more than security? And if economics matters more than security for most Europeans, what do you do? you think explains the divorce between public opinions and policymaking that seems to be continuing on a path of prioritizing security over, you know, the economics of things? That's a great question. I think, well, part of the energy problem, though, it began a while

ago, that is, with this all green shift and trying to transition to new energy resources. But common rule is you shouldn't burn down the house you live in before you built a new one. And that appears what the Europeans did. In my opinion, there was some strategy behind it. That is you build down more polluting energy sources in order to make the green one more competitive. So some have stated this more openly than others. But by shutting, like the Germans, for example, shutting down the nuclear power plants and saying, oh, we're going to go wind and solar.

It's all nice and well. But if your economies aren't competitive anymore, then this is a huge problem. So they're not going to be able to make this shift. But I think this goal was for Europe to become a leader in green energies. But of course, if we look around the world now, it's not Europe. It's China by far. And of course, it went even worse now with this proxy war against Russia,

because the first thing the Europeans did was to cut. themselves of Russian energy. Now, for countries like Germany, who has a lot of heavy industry, which is energy intensive, it meant that all of them weren't becoming competitive anymore. And you saw a massive deindustrialization begin. And making matters worse, the Nord Stream pipeline was blown up, destroyed. The main LNG, no, sorry, not LNG, but the main gas infrastructure, energy infrastructure of Europe. And because of this relentless hatred of anything about Russia, everything was just blamed on the Russians,

even though it was quite obvious from day one that it was the United States or likely in cooperation with the Ukrainians. But again, Europeans are also captive of narratives, so they can't point out the obvious. So once it became evident and exposed that it had been, well, the Americans blamed Ukrainians, I think everyone knows who was the Americans, at least Americans knew. The media just stopped talking about it. The politicians would never mention it again, as if Nord Stream never existed. So it's just how it's become. But now, of course, we see Europe deindustrializing.

The Americans have different incentives for European companies, which are failing in Europe to just come across to the United States. The European leadership is celebrating that we know, longer dependent on Russian energy, but we're buying instead American energy, which is many times more expensive. And let's be honest, also less reliable as the supply, future supply is not secure. And no, it's a true disaster. I'm not sure why national interest isn't coming first. it does appear to me that again, the enduring conflict with Russia is part of it

and not just the past three years or 11 years, but again, for decades now, because whenever you say, well, buying energy from Russia, this is something the Russians want. That means we can't do it. But what's in our interest is always denounced for being pro-Russian.

So if you want to prospect, in Europe, you have to have Russian energy, but we're afraid that this is pro-Russian, so we can't do it. If you want security in Europe, maybe you shouldn't re-divide the continent, re-militarize the continent, begin this fight over where to draw the new dividing lines. Maybe you should revisit former agreements about indivisible security and ending the dividing lines in Europe. But again, we consider this to be something that the Russians want. So it's pro-Russian, so we can't do it. So we have to stick to this Cold War block politics. So we're cursing ourselves and there's no course correction because the assumption is always,

if it's good for Russia, it's bad for us. So we always have to go and confront. And I think this is part of the reason why Europe is unraveling. I want to get to the Russia and the proxy war situations. But I want to deepen a little bit on the earlier question on this divorce between public opinion and policies. and policies are promulgated by the elites. And you've embraced this unconventional way of disseminating information and ideas and thoughts to the public, right? The mainstream seems to be stuck and dogged with the usual party line, the usual narrative,

which unfortunately doesn't resonate with the pulse on the ground. Do you have hope that what you're doing and with what other? others might be doing unconventionally, might be able to reconnect public opinions with, you know, policymaking? Well, hopefully. I think, well, I spoke to some colleagues in, or former politicians in the, in some Eastern European countries who are now EU members. And they kind of made the point that during the communist era, they had to, if they couldn't,

if the media was already captured, which is obviously was, you have to create new platforms, alternative ways of communicating and spreading information, because I don't see facts and reality anymore being part of the media. I think they are primarily narrative-driven. And I live in a country where every single parliamentarian is for sending more weapons into the war. We see that every single one think we shouldn't speak to the Russians for three and a half years, despite all these people dying in the trenches. We all this strange consensus formed around everything. And you notice as soon as there's some dissent, it's crushed immediately.

It's either who supports the official truths or it's the people who are almost, enemy of the people. It just becomes a very nasty and difficult environment. So I think it's, yeah, it's, I think, yeah, these digital platforms have an alternative. I mean, on the topic of, for example, of the Ukraine war, when this began, I was making some comments. Like, you know, why, for example, on the first day of the Russian invasion, they Salensky confirmed they were contacted by the Russian to discuss restoring neutrality. This seems like relevant information in terms of their motivation and how to bring peace, but none of the papers would mention it because they already had a narrative to sell. That is that the Russians were going to restore the Soviet Union. There's no point to talk to them.

Only more weapons will stop them. I mean, this is the only message and anything else was seen as possibly being Kremlin talking points. So even clear facts, which can be verified, cannot be, cannot end up in the media if it doesn't conform. So, this is why I have lost a lot of faith in any traditional media. It doesn't matter what

argument you make. The counter argument will always be, well, why are you pro-Russian? Why are repeating Russian talking points? Don't you care about Ukraine? Because if you cared about Ukraine, you would ignore that the majority of them wants an end to the war. You would ignore the coup that was done against the country. You would ignore

the elections they had were the voted for implementing the peace agreements. So this is what we think pro-Ukrainian mean. Anyways, on the wider topic, though, what's happening in Europe, there's a, it appears to, yeah, that the center has become very radical, because they have kind of dug themselves in. Often what we refer to as the far right or the far left, they're the only ones talking about peace in Europe.

They're the only ones talking about not demonizing our adversary. So things look strange, but as this happens, you see the political elite become less and less popular. I mean, the main political leaders you have in Europe is not just the EU bureaucrats like Wanderlein and Kallas, which aren't really elected politicians, but you have people like Starmour from Britain, Macron from France, Merz from Germany. But these people are some of the most unpopular people you will find. And yet they are the ones who are leading the continent. They are not doing well on the polls at all.

And once they're not delivering on national interest, you see obviously that new essential power will emerge. But what is the reaction? Are they going to change policy? Are they going to let democracy go along? No. When Le Pen becomes the most popular one in France, they use essentially lawfare against her and have arrested.

Now the opposition is taken care of. In Germany, a political party established only in 2013, IFD. They're now the number one party in Germany in the polls. So what do they do? Well, they already began criminalizing the party. They labeled it an extremist party, which means that the intelligence services can go after it. And the media and politicians are very openly discussing whether or not to ban the most popular party in the entire country. And you saw in Romania, the president was elected.

They didn't like him. he was against the war. So they just said, well, there's probably some Russian interference. You know, they looked into it. There wasn't any Russian interference. But nonetheless, he has been cast aside and they got someone else in instead. So it's just, yeah, the democracy itself and not just democracy, but good governance is also falling apart. And yeah, there are the few places where people are pushing back, such as in Hungary, they are now saying that

the EU is already planning to have a regime change in their country. This is what the Hungarians are saying. So things aren't looking well at all. And you can only do this for so long before something begins to crack. And the worst thing of all this, if all of this suppression was to fight some nefarious forces, there was in national interest, it would be one thing. But this is so much self-harm being done. And there can't be any correction because of this really powerful,

authoritarian impulses? Well, I can tell you the situation in Europe is not unique. You know, you see that in other places, in other parts of the world. Including in some countries in Asia, as you amply pointed out, the popularity

for some of these leaders in Europe is in the 20s, you know, and their policymaking just doesn't resonate to what the public wants to hear. Part of what we're doing here through our podcast is to better democratize. ideas and thoughts.

And at the rate that the mainstream seems to be doggedly, either on the far left or on the far right, and they seem to be, as you aptly pointed out, you know, just continue narrating what has been narrated before without showing open-mindedness. I want to touch upon the topic of Ukraine. And, you know, you've had a number of conversations with Jeffrey Sachs. I've had a couple. And then one interesting that came out in our conversation recently would have been that he alluded to the principle of reciprocity within the Monroe Doctrine, which not many people talk about, you know, that the same principle applies to other places around the world. And how do you put that in the context of what's happening in Ukraine?

why can't Russia have a buffer state through Ukraine or other places nearby? Well, I think it's a wider reflection of the international system which has emerged. But I don't think it's a good idea to have spheres of influence that is along the border of great powers, that the great power should have exclusive influence. This is by definition a sphere of influence. I think sphere of interest is a good idea. idea. When you recognize that what's happening on the borders along great power is also in the interest of the other great power. So we have this now slogans, for example, in Ukraine,

that, oh, Ukraine should choose its own alliance systems. And, you know, if you want to join NATO, Russia's not allowed to say anything. Otherwise, it's an empire. You know, Ukraine doesn't belong to them. It sounds very moral. It sounds virtuous. But it's a principle which has never existed. That is, if the Chinese or the Russians would begin to set up missile systems and military base in Mexico, you can be very sure that this principle would not be supported by the United States. They would bomb that country to the ground. So this is just common sense, that an international system also has to be taken to account the principle of indivisible security. That is, you can't enhance your security at expense of others.

But it is a problem in great power politics. that is, if you live next to a great power, be it to the United States or Russia, most likely you're going to have your sovereignty violated a few times throughout history. That's what happens with this different power distribution. It's unfair, it's unjust, all of this. But the solution can't be for another great power, seemingly for all altruistic reasons, establishing itself on the border. The Chinese end up in the American border.

The Americans try to set themselves up on the Russian border. Then it becomes an existential threat. then you have a great power war, which is what we're heading towards now. But I think the reason why this very simple common principles that, you know, if you're on the border of Russia also take into consideration their security, you know, don't put up advanced missile systems, you know, give some security guarantees. But we don't do this. And I think part of the reason is the whole principle of international security based on indivisible

security was thrown out the window after the end of the Cold War. Because as we saw then, the United States set up a whole new security doctrine, that is a hegemonic peace. It wouldn't accept a multipolar system based on the balance of power where everyone is constrained. And you have to take into consideration of security of other states. No, they said exactly the opposite. From now on security will be dependent on hedge money. And this was very explicit and their security strategies that no state or group of states should be able to even think about challenging the dominance of the United States. So now the US should be so powerful that other states, it doesn't matter if they feel threatened or alienated. There's nothing they can do.

This is the hegemonic peace. So suddenly, the principle of indivisible security is then thrown out the window. And we complement this with ideology because we say we don't have international law anymore. we have a rules-based international order, which means that we also throw in humanitarian law, democracy, which means we should be allowed, well, sovereignty can't be equal. We can't have sovereign equality because human rights and democracy must come first. So we should be allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries to spread it or even go to war if necessary to protect human rights.

But because we are the champions of these values, this is our purpose. prerogative. Others can't do it. So this translates, we can interfere in your country in terms of interfering the political process. We can topple governments. We can bomb. We can set up military bases. We can do what we want. However, the other side cannot because they are not the champions of liberal democracy. So they don't have this exception to international law, exemption, that they can violate the principle of sovereignty, indivisible security and such. So I think this is all going back to a hegemonic system. Because if we have a balance of power, it's based on indivisible security and sovereign equality.

In a hegemonic system, you have sovereign inequality, and you don't have indivisible security, but you have the premise of the hegemon being a force for good. So yes, we dominate, we can put our military bases on your border, but it will bring peace and liberal values to the world. This is the basic premise. And this is also what's being rejected and falling apart very quickly. How do you see the Ukraine situation being resolved in on the back of this narrative of hegemonic peace with Russia not likely at all being able to accept that narrative? Well, I think Ukraine is the ultimate showdown for the hegemonic system in Europe.

because it's worth remembering that when the Cold War came to an end in 1989, we actually began to negotiate a premise for a new Europe. In 1990, for example, we had the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Everyone signed. It was agreed it would be a Europe without dividing lines, indivisible security, and sovereign equality. Again, all the principles of a traditional Westphalan system. We refurned this in 94, but then, as we saw the Russians being weak,

and the possibility of a hegemonic peace was there, the decision was made instead to pursue a hegemonic peace. And NATO expansion became the manifestation of this, because when you expand NATO, you make it clear. We enhance our security at the expense of the Russian security. We say, well, we have full sovereignty. The other sides do not. And instead of removing the dividing lines in Europe,

we're just gradually pushing them further and further to the east. Now, this was always problematic. Everyone knew that this was something that agitated and was seen as a huge threat to the Russians. I mean, ambassadors, politicians, military leaders. The list is a long. I published a whole book on this because everyone recognized from the 90s this would be a disaster. And also everyone recognized that the critical point was Ukraine because the Russians would see this to be an existential threat. You had Angela Merkel back in 2008 said that, you know,

If we tried to offer Ukraine membership in NATO, Moscow would interpret that as a declaration of war. You had the CIA director, William Burns, saying, predicting in 2008, well, likely this will trigger a civil war in Ukraine and the Russian military intervention. So everyone could see that this was going to happen. It was kind of obvious. So what we're fighting for in Ukraine is not that all about Ukraine at all. It's about what kind of an international system, European and international system, which will follow. And the Russians have said that this is an existential threat. So there's no way that the Russians will walk away from this.

I mean, I think we're going to have nuclear war long before NATO troops get to march through Crimea. So we're in a very, very dangerous spot. And again, the Russians want this more. They have the logistic advantage because this is on their border. And also they have a much better industrial production. So there's no way that NATO can win this war. But the problem is so much there's writing on this. That is, for the Europeans, they see if we can defeat the Russians,

this will give us an army of a few hundred thousand Ukrainian soldiers, which could be our shield. Any future challenging against the Russians, it would also lock the Americans further into Europe, so they would stay. In the contrast, if we lose the Ukraine war, The Americans will likely shift their focus to Asia. Yeah, Ukrainians probably won't be that pro-European in the future

because, you know, despite all this talk about helping them, very little of what has been done to Ukraine has had their support. And John Meerschimer said that already back in 2014-15, that we were leading them down the primrose path. And we did it anyway. So I think this could be. Yeah, the end of the, this is the end of the unipolar moment. And this is the beginning then of a multipolar system where the Europeans don't really have a role anymore.

And indeed, the internal cohesion of Europe is probably in question, one where America doesn't have a prominent role in Europe. And also where the national interest of the different member states begin to diverge more. So I think there's a lot at stake. And this is the problem. When the actors, when you have a strategic situation where the actors believe they have everything, to win or everything to lose. They're willing to take great risks. That's why we see now, yeah, the casualty or how little they seem to care about the possibility of triggering a nuclear war. This casual, the EU foreign policy chief casually saying, well, if we defeat Russia, it would be

good because, you know, if it's broken into smaller countries, they either would be better, easier to govern, with less authoritarian, you know, trying to make this sound like a mission for democracy. You're having political leaders talking about missiles being deployed and sent into Moscow. It's how Russians, not just the military, but Russians civilians have to be able to feel the war more in order to oppose it. I mean, this is quite a dangerous game we're playing, and it can go, yes, severely wrong very, very quickly. But again, I think this is because, again, as I said, it's everything to win and everything to lose. This is not simply about Ukraine. You know, Trump ran on a pro-peace ticket.

And I think more and more people are kind of disappointed with the fact that, you know, he's much more pro-war than he had promised the world. Do you think what he might have meant or the team might have meant when he was running for president was a hegemonic peace as opposed to just pro-peace? and with what happened in Alaska at a meeting between Putin and Trump how do you see this unfolding I mean not to mention that if they were to continue on this war I just don't see

the Americans having the necessary productivity being able to produce as many bullets weapons as needed for this to sustain for a very long time Well, I think Trump he recognized multipolar realities, but he has ambitions for restoring unipolarity or hegemony. And so he hasn't given up, I think, on the idea of defeating Russia. But again, as the Biden administration and all many people in political leadership in Washington stated many times was,

that China and Russia getting closer together is a bad thing. However, if we can use the Ukrainians to knock out Russia, then the United States can focus its resources on containing China. This would be a good thing. This has failed, and I think Trump is recognizing that it's failing, and it's also exhausting the United States and preventing it from pivoting to Asia. And given that the war is lost, it's bleeding the United States as well, and preventing the pivot, I think the logical solution, if you recognize multiple polar realities,

is you want to scale back your presence in Europe. Indeed, if you can sell your weapons to the Europeans who can then use it to kill the Russians, then yeah, you can weaken Russia, you can make some money of it, you can keep some European loyalties in place. and you know, Sharp is based at home and it will allow him

to pivot more to Asia. So I think also as the words being lost, it would be great if the Europeans could take the blame that he can say, listen, I did everything I could. The Europeans didn't want peace.

And, well, the Europeans gave him this effectively. He said, well, we're going to pull away and then the Europeans said, well, we're going to try to fill their shoes. We'll take this over. So I think he might get what he wants. Of course, this idea he would solve it in 24 hours. I'm not sure if he ever actually believe this.

He seems to have excessive belief in the meaning of having personal relationship and personal negotiation. But I don't think he understands Russia, the fact that this is an existential threat for them. I don't think he understands that this isn't primarily about Ukraine. This is about the European security architecture being. having collapsed. Again, this whole premise that stability in Europe depends on continuously moving NATO and its military infrastructure closer and closer to Russian borders.

And this is a force for good, something that Russia shouldn't worry about, that this is the main source of the conflict. I'm not sure if he's, how much he recognizes this, because at times what he says and what it does is very different. So I do have some difficulties in reading Trump because immediately after he returned to the White House, you had people like Hegset saying, well, they can't be in NATO membership, there won't be any security guarantees,

and you have to accept territorial concessions. That was it. That was the recipe for peace. And then suddenly he began to speak of a ceasefire. It didn't make any sense. Seasfire goes against this. I mean, this is one of those things that sounds lovely. Who doesn't want an end to the war?

But what it also means is we don't have to discuss any political settlement. I mean, why would the Europeans accept a stop to NATO expansion or putting European troops in Ukraine or missiles on the Russian border? The only reason why we have to make this concession is because the alternative is that the Russians will win this war. But if we ask for an unconditional ceasefire, it is like a capitulation as the Russians is winning. It doesn't make any sense at all from the Russian perspective. But yet Trump went with this. then he meets with Putin and Alaska and suddenly the ceasefires off the table.

We're not doing this anymore. So it's very hard to understand where he's actually going with this. But he might have a plan. I tend to sit a bit still on the fence. Either he's gradually bringing the Europeans and the Ukrainians slower towards a deal with the Russians. Because keep in mind, only a few months ago, the Ukrainians refused to even talk to the Russians. The Europeans still don't want to talk to the Russians. But at least it's moving in that direction.

So maybe this is a great plan. Alternatively, he's just full of talk and not really doing anything different. I mean, now he's talking about sending thousands of missiles to Ukraine, how they have to go on the offensive. So, you know, how is this different from Biden? No, so I'm still undecided on Trump. And I think the Russians are undecided. So the Russian strategy for that reason is, you know, if they want to have peace, we have set our conditions.

We would like to continue diplomatic talks and find a solution. But unless they can come to these terms, which they call Istanbul Plus, then we'll essentially just continue and the war will end on the battlefield. And I think, yeah, that's the direction we're going. Well, I can tell you, your guess is as good as mine on Trump. He also said he wanted an end to the Forever Wars in the Middle East and then he called for the full ethnic cleansing of Gaza and then bombing the Iranian nuclear reactors. I mean, this is just crazy stuff. So it's crazy. But often people then point, well, is he just, you know, appeasing his own hawks so he can move a piece forward or, you know, or is this just him being owned by the hawks?

So, yeah, it's hard to say. And I think his strategy, as his administration has said many times, we don't want people to know what we're thinking. It's better to keep them guessing. So this strategic ambiguity is either stupidity or is part of the strategy. So again, it's hard to tell. So I'm not sure if he will bring peace to the world or if you'll destroy it. It remains to be seen.

Well, at some point he's got to calculate on how to collision between this war narrative with respect to his MAGA narrative, right, would entail some sort of recalibration. Because I'm pretty sure the MAGA constituents are pretty disillusioned with some of the stuff that he's doing, which is completely opposite with his pro-peace narrative earlier on. Do you think that serves as some hope for recalibration of policy postures? Well, I think some things are changing. I think in his goal, he would like a new division of labor in Europe, instead of America looking after European security.

I think he would like Europe to take over the containment of Russia. So by all means, he'll sell the weapon. They can continue confronting Russia, but they would like to have some distance to it, so they can improve bilateral ties with Russia to prevent them drifting too far towards China and also the ability to change American resources away from Europe. But I'm not sure. It's, well, something has to change because this whole relationship isn't, it's a bit unstable. I mean, throughout the whole past few decades, the discreements between the Europeans and Americans was always,

the Americans said, well, you have to carry more of the weight within NATO. and the Europeans wanted more strategic autonomy. But this was kind of the trade. The Americans look after European security, and in return, the Europeans outsource some of their political autonomy and their foreign policy to the Americans. So, you know, the buying influence. Now, of course, Americans, they want more.

They want Europeans to still be more obedient because they shouldn't buy Chinese or Iranian or Russian products. And also they should put pressure on India, if America tells them to. So America wants more, but is able to give less. And so far, the Europeans are playing ball, but that comes at the expense of national interest. So as Europe becomes more fraught with conflict, economic stagnation, decline continues, and the collapse of political relevance in the world takes a dive.

I think at some point new political forces will come into play, which will then reconsider the whole relationship with the United States. It's just there has to be some pragmatic logic behind this. You can't just taper over everything with democracy, slogans and ideology. Well, I mean, on the assumption or presumption that the United States were to focus on its real arch-rival China, call it China. I mean, spending more time in Europe or in Ukraine is just seemingly misallocation of resource. but that I think has to be supported by the conviction on the Europeans that it's going to be able to provide its own security, but also gets its economy going. I want to switch over to Gaza. You've talked about this a few times. The genocidal activities are just blatant with belligerens.

condescension and arrogance. To the point, I think Mirzheimer aptly pointed this out in that they act as if they can get away with anything and everything because they can write and rewrite history for a long time by way of their controlling, you know, mainstream, you know, movies, media, what have you. and what's your take on all this? Does that or has that significantly diluted

the ability of the West to propagate values all across the world inclusive of human rights distribution of public goods, call that democracy or what have you? Well, first of all, there's a reluctance, I think, in the West to deal with the reality of what this means. Because, you know, if in Israel and Palestine or what Israelis would like to be greater Israel, if you don't recognize a Palestinian state,

the problem is that this is only half of them being Jewish. So it's about what, seven, seven and a half million Jews, seven and a half million non-Jews. And if you want a nation state, it doesn't work if you reject a Palestinian state. It doesn't work if you reject a Palestinian, in state. So how can you solve this problem? It's not much you can do. Either you can have full ethnic cleansing, just remove them from the land, or you can apartheid laws like in the West Bank, where they have just one set of rules for the Jews, another set of rules for the other, or you can kill them all. I mean, these are the only three options. That is, but again, I would like to know what other options will be. If you want a Jewish nation state where the Jews are no longer a majority,

because this is what is required if you don't recognize the Palestinians to have a state then I think these are the only three options but I think quietly some are just hoping for Israel to take care of the business, wipe them out and then we'll recognize something Palestinian as a token gesture or something that doesn't actually have any meaning on the ground

make some statements about how awful this is, we'll send some food, which won't get in. But overall, I think this is the only solution they see, because no one's going to go against the United States and Israel on this. But, yeah, so from my perspective, this is what should be at front and center, what we're discussing. What is the role of Palestinians here? Should they live in apartheid? Should they be ethnically cleansed or genocided? I mean, otherwise, we have to have a solution where they have some independence, but we're not having this. Instead, everything is, it's a bit like with Ukraine crisis where everything began with Russian invasion. We do the same there. Everything

began in October 7th. That is, Russia, sorry, Israel has the right to defend itself. Anyone who opposes this idea are an anti-Semite. And this is pretty much the only thing they come armed with. These slogans, but no, of course, nobody wants to discuss whether or not the Palestinians have a right to defend themselves or that there should be some accountability on the Israeli side. So I think this is a disaster. I think at some level in the West we had so much narrative control in international media for so many decades that the assumption is still there, but it's slipping very quickly. And I think the image of the West, I mean, we're still lecturing countries about their

human rights and all, picking on small things like, you know, why aren't you having more LGBT parades or something? Why don't you do? But meanwhile, we're backing a genocide. But we're kind of thinking, yeah, we can make this go away. We made some statements about how we want human rights to be protected. So, you know, we're doing everything we can to make Israel stop killing besides, you know, stop sending the weapons, of course, or stop sending them the intelligence or anything else

they need. So, yeah, I think the West is losing its image, and it's losing narrative control. and much of the world sees it as being very hypocritical. And so again, I see this as being immense self-harm, but you have to be careful. If you criticize the West too much within the West, then you're accused of being anti-West. But no one explains to me how any of this is in our interest.

This will predictably lead to disaster. It's not even pro-Israel. This is also going to result in horror for Israel. It's seen now as a pariah around the world. I don't think Israel could be heading towards suicide if it continues down

this path. His adversaries are getting stronger, more agitated, his friends are getting weaker and also more distanced. So this isn't going to go

well at all. But there's no course correction unless you have some freedom of speech and ability to discuss these things. But we're not. We're just either,

you know, it's all the right to defend yourself otherwise you're an anti-Semite. This is where the kind of the discussion ends. Well, it's to the point where many people are afraid to express any ideas or thoughts about what's happening out there.

It's so systematic because of that presumption that, you know, these guys can get away with writing and rewriting history at the rate that they control so many of the pillars or domains that can control the mindset and thinking of. humanity. And that I think is not to be underestimated. But to say this as a hypocrisy is an understatement about the West at the rate that the West has been spreading the message of magnanimity, the message

of benign nature of living all across the world within its diplomatic endeavors. You know, we in Southeast Asia, you know, we're still trying to climb up the value chain. We're still trying to climb up the geopolitical global order. So there is this inkling to want to cling on superpowers or great powers for our ability to move up those two ladders. I want to just ask you as to whether there's hope for the West to actually be able to knock itself on the head and realize that this is really. really moving in the wrong direction.

And hopefully there could be a two-state solution somewhere sometime soon. Yeah, there could be. It's going to be very hard to do now because of all of the settlements there is on Palestinian land. I'm not sure how, yeah, it's just one double down so many times now over so long time. It's difficult to get a solution, which is why I think, Many now decide to just back this genocide, looked out of the way, and afterwards it will be problem solved, you know? It's quite, I don't know, the whole thing is so gruesome. This is, of course, the most televised, or at least on social media, genocide there is.

But this quite almost consent in the media is, you know, some token comments about, oh, yeah, human rights, but then, you know, no uproar. This is, I'm not sure what a solution would look like, but just uncommon to only clinging on, I can see why many countries think, you know, they have to cling on to the great powers in order to rise. I think this was a lesson in the beginning of the Cold War. Because, you know, in the Cold War, the United States

was quite, gave generous trade agreements to its allies, the frontline states, because he wanted Western Germany to be better than eastern Germany. It wanted Taiwan to be the good China versus continental China as the bad China. They wanted South Korea to be the good Korea versus North Korea. So they always had this incentive in the Cold War. But of course, now the world is very different now. The capabilities are a very different ability to give generous trade agreements different. If you look at the United States today, they're becoming more of a tribute economy. They're seeking tributes from their vassals. telling the Taiwanese we want your semiconductor industries over here.

We want the money from the Japanese. Denmark give us Greenland. Panama give us the canal. So this is a time of economic downturn and possible collapse. So I think now they want their payday. So you don't have possibility anymore. But even China, I mean, they're behaving quite responsibly in the international system. But I wouldn't bet everything on one horse either.

You don't want to put all your eggs in one basket if it's an asymmetrical dependent relationship. For example, we have Indonesia, China, Indonesia will always be more dependent on China than Chinese on Indonesia. It does mean that China is not an important partner. Indeed, I would say it's the most important partner in the region

and it should have that priority. However, at the same time, one wants to diversify. So it also linked to the other Southeast countries for collective bargaining power, India, Russia, Iran, And ideally, United States as well, just avoid being sucked into alliance systems, because alliance systems are devised for having, you know, splitting regions into dependent allies versus weekend adversaries.

And the good thing is in a multiple system. This isn't that possible anymore. You see this now from the US putting all this pressure on India do as you're told. Otherwise, will give you 50% tariff. Well, what does India do? Does it bow its head and do like the Europeans? and accept a diminished economy and relevance in the world and do as they're told, become vassals? No, they say, we do the opposite.

We're going to diversify. If you punish us, then we're just going to have to decouple. We'll link with the East instead. And if the Americans change their mind, great, then the Indians will continue trade with the Americans as well. So I think this is the way to go. This is, again, as I said before, why not just small, medium, but also other large powers have more ability to have political independence and sovereignty in the multipolar system because they don't make themselves excessively dependent on one actor, which is much more powerful than them.

And I think the good news in Asia is that China hasn't expressed hegemonic ambitions. You know, when countries like Russia are saying, yes, China's the most important partners, but we also want to diversify. So Iran, India, so we don't become too dependent. So we have more equality in the relationship. The Chinese aren't even opposing this. They're not expressing this hegemonic ideology either. They're saying, you know, we need sorry.

of inequality, every civilization have their own path to development. This is what you want to hear. This is reassuring. But still, diversify. I think this is the ticket. Don't hang on only to one great power. No, I'm with you. I'm in a camp that believes that we're sort of like shifting into a new kind of multipolarity. It's a more structured type of multipolarity where you can better identify who's a friend, who's a foe, and who can swing. Southeast Asia with 700 million people and $4 trillion worth of goods and services produced could quite easily be a swing state.

We could swing anywhere we want to. And this is manifested in Indonesia's participation in the BRICS, you know, as off the 6th of January this year. But we're also participating in a discourse with the West, you know, as with the OECD, as with the APEC, as with the RSEP, the regional conference. comprehensive. So I think we're trying to show that we have optionalities, but I think the on us on the developing economies in Southeast Asia is really to invest in educating ourselves so that we can, you know, rely on ourselves to be able to move up the value chain and the global geopolitical order. The reality, however, is that most of the households in Southeast Asia, if you skip over Singapore, of course, do not have heads of households with university education, majority of them. And then most of the electorate do not have university education.

So the onus is on us to actually invest and lower those percentages so that most people who are voting, most people who are heading up households. you know, have the necessary academic world with all. That, I think, is the only way to, you know, be able to move up the value chain and the global geopolitical order while enriching optionalities going forward. But I think that's, yeah, that's definitely the way to go. It can't be done overnight, but as you said, climbing up this way is a good place to go. But I'm also I'm also a fan of replacing a bit the geopolitics with geo-economics, because in geopolitics, balance of power always means, you know,

to have a bit of balance of missiles would point at each other. But in geo-economics, I coined the term a balance of dependence instead. That is, you can still have a hegemonic power. For example, the way the US and Britain before them are a hegemonic power, just make sure the whole world depends on their technologies, their industries, their transportation corridors, their banks, their currency, their payment system, and kind of have a hegemony this way. But in a multipolar system, you can have a geo-economic balance of power.

That means avoid excessive dependence on any one state or region. And I think this allows less of this coercion. Because look at sanctions in the unipolar era in the 1990s. If the US and Europeans together will put sanctions on someone, your only option is fall in line or become impoverished. There is no alternative because you have to use their maritime corridors. you have to use their technologies, their industries, you have to use their banks and their reserve currency.

So there's no alternatives. Sanctions in a multipolar world, you see the aggressor or the one imposing the sanctions or coercion. They're isolating themselves because now the world is looking for the alternatives. And for me, this is the lesson now, as we see Modi meeting with Xi'in and Putin in China, is, you know, why did the Chinese do this? The Americans keep saying, oh, the Chinese, the Indians, they're choosing, China and Russia over us, but they didn't do this.

It's just that the Chinese and the Russians never told anyone. You have to choose between us or them. They never told any countries this. They say, you can trade with all. You can diversify. Don't make yourself too dependent. It was only the United States who said, us or them. You have to choose.

If you don't do, as we say, then we put sanctions on you. So they're forcing them away. And this is what sanctions do in a multipolar system. You isolate yourself. So there's a natural mechanism in the place to punish aggression. And I think this is why I'm a bit more hopeful that multipolar, multipolarity in this geo-economic era will be different than the 19th century, more geopolitical multipolarity, where we have a balance of military forces and sometimes something

goes wrong, you know? Well, you know, ironically, though, I mean, I am with you, but ironically, multipolarity entails a greater degree of difficulty to multilateralize

you're kind of like push to the corner to bilateralize and that's plurrilateralize and that

unfortunately or fortunately requires higher marginal productivity without higher marginal productivity

you're not going to be able to bilateralize I mean if the other guy can stitch 10 shoes

in a day you can only stitch four shoes in a day you're exposed right and

And the only way to level the playing field is to be able to stitch 10 shoes in a day, equally competently as the other guy who's negotiating with you. Whereas in the old days, in a much more unipolar order, you know, multilateralization was very much robust because you can sort of like depend on this principle of single undertaking by, you know, not agreeing unless everybody, agrees, you know, everybody of those 160, 170 countries within the WOT's TO system. So I look at the global south, which makes up 84% of the planet, I think having to take advantage of this new multipolar order, but the only way to take advantage of this is to really get their act together in educating themselves, without which I think they're just going to be

naked and exposed, unnecessarily. Well, I agree, and I think this is why multilateralism will become a bit more tricky, but also because I think the completely free trade is not necessarily going to work as it never really had fully either, because if you have a, again with your, there's stitching the shoes, What we saw in the 19th century with the Americans developing the American system was the idea that if we have completely free trade, then the British, because they have the most powerful technologies and industrial capabilities, then they will dominate everything because their mature industries, which are high quality and low cost, will always be able to outcompete the infant industries of those countries trying to climb up, who have lower quality and higher costs. So how does industry mature? And what they said is, well, we need a fair trade instead of free trade, which means sometimes you have temporary tariffs or subsidies to give some temporary competitive advantage to domestic industries

to allow them to build up the maturity, to build up the quality and drive down the cost, before, you know, loosening. So I think it's not a perfect solution, but I do think we will see more of this in order to have some competitive But also you have the ability for groups of countries such as Asian, if they can come together, do some collective bargaining power where they protect the industries they need and open up where, there's always been a negotiation. The Europeans were always the same as well. They wanted to protect their agriculture. They wanted to protect move industries. There's many things they wanted to protect. also I think a lot of countries will begin to use both temporary subsidies and tires

for example to build up a more digital ecosystem or more digital autonomy because we're living in an industrial revolution where the digital technologies are now beginning to take a greater greater role in all industries you know not from building cars to sending people to space and it's the tech platforms which are doing all of this, as the digital technologies can begin more and more to manipulate the physical world. So if you don't have industrial independence, you don't really have political independence either. So I think countries will begin to seek more industrial and technological sovereignty as the

foundation for political independence. And so this is just an assumption I kind of have, which is why multilateral trade agreements is going to be, we bring like 50 countries together. it's going to be more and more difficult. But, no, so I don't see a easy solution. It's just the direction we're heading. What do you think China could do to help the United States re-industrialize? I just intuitively think that the imposition of terrorists will not answer the desire of the Americans to re-industrialize

until and unless they really shape up on a productivity. they really shape up on the connectivity. They really shape up on, you know, some of the major infrastructural requirements, you know, for the supply chains to work. I mean, China initially was a cheap labor narrative for the West and the world. But in style become, it's shifted, you know, into a supply chain narrative or capability narrative. It's no longer a cheap labor narrative. And for the United States to be able to equate, much less replace that, will take a long time. It's not going to be remedied by way of an imposition of tariff, so to speak.

I think the tariffs alone won't do it. Again, the problem with the American system in the beginning of 19th century is if you've got tariffs on a horseshoe, it's not a very complicated supply chain. You know, you get to the metal. you form it. My point is often now they put tariffs on a lot of products which enters the American

supply chain. So if you're building a car and half of your components are outsourced and you put tariffs on all this, now your end product is going to be much more expensive and you can be competitive. As you mentioned with China, they kind of built it up from scratch. They began with the very basic

production and then they climbed up the value chains and yes, they got the know-how and the different platforms, they develop better, better technologies. And, yeah, but they, yeah, they did this very well, but this took decades. I think the efforts by Trump to do,

to re-industrial America, not over a 20-year period, but ideally two years, it's not going to work. But overall, I think it's a question about what capitalism means as well, because I think we became too ideological. Everything now is Milton Friedman always. But keep in mind that the 19th century capitalism, as we saw, for example, in the United States, it was very different.

People were advocating for the, you know, they were cautioning against rent seekers, for example. They're ones extracting revenue without contributing to the productive process. You have free marketeers from Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stewart, Mill. They all warned against this that you will, that will build up a more powerful class, too much capital gets concentrated, and then they begin to extract. And you see this in the United States.

They financialize their economy too much. They're not competitive anymore. This is why they can't compete with the Chinese. Everything needs a lawyer or some finance. Everywhere you're bleeding money. Now, in the past, in the 19th century, in the U.S., you had people or then advocating, well, we have to put tax on some of these rent seekers. So today it would be real estate owners, banks, some areas where the capital concentrates too much.

And then you use the revenue from this tax. For example, as you mentioned before, the education or the infrastructure. Why? Well, this is something not just that elevates the standard of living among your own population, but it also makes the country more competitive. Now you have higher skills. You have more. you probably have some government support for, for example, digital platforms or some corporate

structures such as they did in Japan and South Korea. And of course, infrastructure, better roads, rail, all of this. This also increases the efficiency and the competitiveness. So it's good for standard of living. It's good for the competitiveness. So you take money from where too much capital is concentrating, which is reducing the productive process, and then you finance it in areas which enhances. it, which would be the education or infrastructure.

But it's very difficult to do it these days. I mean, in the United States, if they propose something like this, they scream socialism or communism. Sure. And, you know, demanding that the oligarchs are left by themselves. It's a very strange. So I think, yeah, capitalism has to be, the ideology has to be taken a bit out of it, because I think many trap themselves. Well, I want to pick up on this.

ideology. You aptly pointed out the financialization of a bunch of things, including the fiscal space, which has been tremendously financialized, and it has entailed massive financial capital, which unfortunately has not been democratized. And when we're seeing this empirically, you know, rising genie coefficient ratios. And then we've also seen how technological innovation hasn't really democratized capital. It's actually elitized the economic order. So on the back of this presumption that there has been rising genie coefficient ratio, rising inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunities,

and also some degree of centripetalism of economic development where we're seeing higher economic growth in primary cities versus that in secondary, much less little towns or villages, conversations are getting much more polarized now. days. You go to the far right and to the far left at the expense of the center or centrality. And I just seem to think that those that campaign on the far left, they have to campaign on a message of hope. But they get destroyed as soon as their credibility is destroyed when somebody points out that he or she plagiarized in college. Or as the guys on the right get away with campaigning with a message of fear and or intimidation. If you don't vote for me, they're going to rob you, they're going to rape you, they're going to whatever, whatever.

That doesn't require credibility. Is that the right way of thinking in terms of how the political calculus and geopolitical calculus are likely to shift going forward? We're seeing this in Europe already. We're seeing this in some parts of Asia. Is that likely to continue? Well, this is also a media problem, though, because it's become, well, is a bit of a circus. Part of the reason is, I think,

simply under neoliberalism, when, well, let's just look at it like this. After the Industrial Revolution, capitalism develops, you have a natural political left and political right who is seeking to have their own areas of responsibility. So the political left recognizes that capital has a tendency

to concentrate too much. I mean, even David Ricardo wrote about this in the early 1800s, 1800s. And so the political left wants to redistribute wealth. The political right is more worried that the society becomes an appendage to the market. So what is the role of the family, the church, all of the different elements of society should only follow where the market goes. So it's too expensive to kids. Okay, people stop having kids. You know, this is kind of the the logic of the market. So the conservatives usually want to preserve traditional institutions.

Then again, primarily family, but also religious communities and all. Now, the problem under neoliberalism for the past 40, 50 years now, is once you agree, reach the consensus that markets should be unfettered, that there should be minimal interference in the markets. And to some extent, you need this under globalization, because, you know, for example, France, if they have too many benefits or something, thing to workers, then suddenly they're not competitive and they go bust.

So you can't balance this anymore. Anyways, my point is under neoliberalism, neither political left or the political right can actually still deliver on their ideological promises. So I think often we end up in this culture wars where they instead discussing this very superficial, strange topics instead. So this is excessive focus on personalities, you know, who did. this, who said what when they're in high school, instead of the actual topics.

And you see this being a huge problem. Everything is around personalities, you know, who's going to be president or prime minister. At the end of the day, they're not going to do many different things if the market dominates. But the polarization, I think it was, I think it was predictable. Again, using the United States as the case. study. If you saw what they were doing in the late 80s, early 90s, all the trade agreements

were effectively organized around the U.S. taking some of the areas in the international value chain. So they could do the high tech, the banking, finance, marketing, essentially the high revenue aspect. And then this was achieved by making sure that it would be extended intellectual property rights. Meanwhile, the production assembly, all of this could be outsourced through free trade. So you ended up then, on paper, this looks great. The US got to do all the top stuff and the rest was outsourced.

But the problem, of course, is it was great for the coast. It was west coast, east coast in the US. The ones who do tech, finance, all of this became the greatest time ever. And all the people in the middle who had traditionally been in industry, they lost their jobs. socially, economically, everything went worse. Then you have a split country. And instead of talking about how to look after each other,

the discussion then is, why don't they get a you-hole, just move. They're not adjusting to the new realities. And effectively, instead of being states with an economy, a state with an economy, they're becoming an economy with a state. So they're not living in the same country anymore. And I think I think the sociology aspect has to be able to reenter into the discourse because once you have this economic and social polarization,

it's very hard to have political stability because they're living in two different worlds and they see each other as their main enemy. And I think this is not just in the United States. You see it in Europe as well. You have some of the people who benefited from global. They look at the rest as being backwards or bigoted or failing to adjust. And then you have the people who have a run over by globalization who are saying, well, you are serving globalist ambitions, deals. You're not, you know, your loyalty isn't to the country, it's to international capital.

And both sides are kind of a bit correct in their assessment. But no, I, it's not always easy to figure out how to solve this. But once the problem is once you have a situation where the larger part of the population no longer have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, they're willing to begin to experiment with more and more radical alternatives. And also what makes democracy and capitalism work is if you have a big middle class, because it might be born, poor, but you can end up rich. Once that middle class dies, which it is dying, but then you either poor or

you're rich. Suddenly capitalism takes on the language of exploitation, the exploited versus the exploiter. And now you have an ideological battle added to the political polarization. So I think, especially in the West, we're seeing all of these things now. And there's no easy solutions. So we just focus on personalities and keep on going. But nothing is being solved. And the problems are are only occurring. Well, I have a slightly more refined definition of democracy where I don't think it should just be manifested in the distribution of power and voice. I think it should be manifested in the distribution of public goods, including intellect,

education, health care, welfare, social value, moral value. To the extent that any system does not distribute those public goods, well, you know, it might as well stop short, you know, stop short of defining itself as a robust democracy if it only distributes power to the hands of many or minds of many. Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world by sheer population, but it still has its work cut out, you know, for purposes of distributing many public goods, particularly education and like health care, welfare, you know, also moral value and social value. You've mentioned the media or the role of the media a few times in the past.

And I'm completely with you in the sense that, you know, the contemporary media, particularly the social media platforms, they seem to have gotten away with equating democracy with algorithmic amplification. And, you know, it's all for clickbates, right? And then this has not, you know, manifested in how and the extent to which ideas have gotten democratized and ideas, I think, have gotten polarized. And I do believe that, you know, an unconventional platform such as yours and hopefully mine could do more justice in better democratizing ideas and thoughts. that I think will help in countering the ill effects of equating algorithmic amplification with democracy by many of these social media platforms. And people just have great difficulty in separating facts from opinions. And to the extent that they don't master the facts, they would rather just opine. And they get judgmental.

Being judgmental after being opinionated, I think is a very. real cancer to humanity without especially knowing the facts. I don't know, I'm just sort of like ranting, but I'm curious as to what your take is on all this. No, I couldn't have put it better myself. I think democracy has been reduced to now participation every couple of years to put in a vote, but power resides something in other places. So I don't think, yes, as freedom of speech, a lot of things are falling apart very quickly. Yeah, I think decentralization is the solution.

As you suggested to democratize some of this. But no, I don't have a great solution, but I do recognize. recognize that this is where the problem lies? I want to just, you know, there's about 140 million books. Last time I checked on Google, of which only 375,000 books written about Southeast Asia, which is about 0.26% of all the books published. It's a bit of a mockery for a region that is populated by 700 million people, roughly 9% of the global population.

So I've been saying to many of my friends that Southeast Asia is one of the most under-narrated regions in the world. As a European, as somebody who's traversed over Southeast Asia and lived in Australia, what do you think Southeast Asians could do to better narrate themselves so that people in Norway understand better what happens in Chiang Mai,

what happens in Penang, what happens in Cebu, what happens in Malang in places in Southeast Asia? Well, I'm not sure if I have any good specific recommendation, but I do think that as Southeast Asia continues to rise, it becomes more prominent in the world that more ice will be on it. Again, when you look in East Asia, at least, you know, in the past, people just looked at Japan because, you know, they're prosperous.

Now suddenly people are discovering, that China is not just a bunch of factories, you know, putting out cheap consumables. We see, yes, no, I think as it rises, I think it will be more focus. But I agree. The focus, especially on Indonesia, when they're, you know, coming towards bricks, that this is, for me, this was a massive earthquake. This is, this changes a lot, but it didn't even make, make it. make the newspapers. It's very strange. So I don't, I think the media focus will be a bit

changing as the distribution of power continues to change. But it's also a different issue, though, which is the actual media. That it's for a long time, it was very, well, not just even Western-centric, also British-American international media. So I think a way of getting more input into the what is it called international media in getting a bigger voice in this landscape I think that has to be taken because no one will give it to Southeast Asia so I think yeah program like yours is a good step in that direction Amen.

Yeah. I do my own podcast where we do different things on international events. And I realize that as well when there's things happening around Indonesia, Thailand and all places that I have very few sources. I don't know who to talk to. So I'm assuming this is something that will change, a process that it's in networks will be formed. But it is Yeah, someone has to tell that story because ignoring it is going to leave a lot of people in the dark

because there's big changes coming. Well, our mission is to educate as many people as possible in Southeast Asia to tell stories better to each other and to the world. My last question, Glenn, I've taken so much of your time. It's an hour and a half already. What do you think would be your country? could be the story about Europe in the next 20 to 30 years? Well, Europe, I think it can be two different possibilities.

I don't think it's been written yet, but I guess I'm longing in the pessimistic camp. For me, it's how it adjusts to the new world, because for most of its history, well, not most, but for the past 500 years, the Europeans became quite powerful. They split up the world among themselves, but after two world wars, of course, Europe is broken, and then it's replaced by a bipolar system in this. The Europeans outsourced a lot of their influence to the United States. The world's still largely Eurocentric, as this is the main focus of the great powers, the two great powers.

After the Cold War, the Europeans thought, well, what is their role in the world today? the United States pushing for this global dominance or global primacy. The goal of the Europeans then shifted to collective hegemony, that is, the political west will be the one center of the world, and it will stand on two legs, that is the United States and the European Union. That was the large extent the key purpose of the EU, that is, to have some equality or in relations with the United States. and then something happened which is now forces are completely in new Europe to have to be reinvented,

which is what happens in the multipolar system. Because as I mentioned before, the Europeans are now, sorry, the Americans are now, have fewer relative resources compared to the rest of the world. They don't have that same dominance anymore. So they're not that powerful partner. And also their priorities are different. They will have to shift more to other place of the world. They have to look at their own part of the region, Asia. But either way, they have to begin to prioritize, which means it can't be anywhere, everywhere,

and Europe is simply not as important as it was before. So what happens to Europe? Why would the Greeks and the Latvians have the same foreign policy? It's going to be very difficult in the multipolar world where the interest becomes more divergent. So there is less to hold them together. The main goal should be to have maintained some of the collective bargaining power, not to be too weak and divided. but my concern is that Europe will do what they're doing now.

They're essentially trying to reinvent the unipolar world. They're just betting everything on the United States who doesn't want to be there. They're still lecturing other great powers, that is the Chinese, Russians, Indians. And to show their own loyalty to the United States, they're cutting ties with the countries that the US is competing against. And the EU therefore is becoming less secure, because now we have this predictable war with Russia. We have less economic prosperity.

We don't have digital platforms. We don't have energy cheap. And things are going from bad to worse. And we don't have any real political influence in the world either. And my fear is that we'll simply double down on this. And until we're going to crisis, Now, this is one path, and my great concern is this is the path we seem to have chosen. The other path, I think, is look at adjust to multipolarity.

And this entails diversifying ties. That is, when China comes up more powerful, this also have incredible opportunities. Instead of linking ourselves only to a declining America, we can connect the greater space. We can find new trade ties with the Russians. Instead of having this block politics with this Cold War relic, NATO. We can link ourselves closer to India. Again, China, Indonesia, we can, there's a lot of fascinating opportunities. If we can just divorce ourselves from the block politics, which belong to the bipolar and unipolar order. Now, if this can be done, I think Europe could be prosperous. It could do well for itself. But

But first, it's important to see the world as it is. And I often quote a Machiavelli, who said this 500 years ago, that men tend to see the world as not as it is, but how they want it to be. And that's what leads to their destruction. And I think that's exactly what's happening here. We would like to see the world being unipolar, still all Western-centric, the US and Europe with this exact same interest as if we're best buddies, and the rest of the world, one to be more like us. So diplomacy means that we go out in the world. We tell others how they should

govern themselves and people more or less follow our lead. This world doesn't exist. And pretending that it still does is only annoying and alienating the rest of the world and leading to a further decline. So I think this is a challenge. After 500 years of Western dominance, we now have a world where the leading economy in terms of purchasing power parity is not Western anymore is China and you have to learn how to adjust to this world, not just fight it because it's impulse

now, oh, we can't, we have to confront Russians, the Chinese, oh, we have to pressure the Indians to do as they're told. Now we're going to have snapback sanctions on Iran. I mean, this is, it's just beyond absurd. But this won't work. We end up isolating ourselves. So

I really hope that we're going with that path, where recognize reality as it is and make the best of it. I can't resist, you know, asking you one more question, one more follow-up. Do you foresee an evolution to the structure and membership of the EU in the next 20 years? And I guess a follow-up or a little follow-up to that is, you know, we get criticized in ASEAN for not being super-nationalist. the way the EU is.

And I can argue for the argument, but I can also see the benefit of having some degree of supranationalism, you know, to be infused into ASEAN for stuff like education. But I'm just curious what your views are with respect to those two little questions. Well, I really like a British scholar. David Mitrani, he wrote in the 1960s about what he thought the future of Europe would be. And he recognized then the European community was pursuing integration, and he argued it's not either integration or supernatural structures or not. It's the form and function, because you can

take two different approaches to integration. You can take functionalist or federalist. The functionalist looks at in what areas would it make sense to integrate, in terms of enhancing the good governance, economic competitiveness, and security. And if this entails having some else, elements of supranational structures, then go ahead. But this is the functionalist. In other words, the function has to be primary, and then the form will depend on the function. Now, the alternative is the federalist approach. And he argued this is where the Europeans were heading, which was a mistake,

because they already decided on the form. They wanted Europe more or less to look like a nation state. They wanted the United States of Europe. So the form had already been chosen, and now they have to pick the functions in order to make this forum happen. So when it doesn't make sense, you know, you put some pressure tactics, some ideology, and you invent some external threats,

anything to keep this federalism going. And suddenly the function isn't really there. Now, for me, the problem of Europe then is the heyday of the EU was when it was able to deliver tangible goods for its member states. I think the breaking point is when the British decided that they want to vote to leave. And the thought was, well, how can we punish them to stay? I think once you're no longer able to use the carrot, then you have to resort to the whip. Then you're forcing the system together.

I think this is the first indication that the function isn't really there anymore. And ideally, then you have to question the form it's taking. So I tend to be a bit optimistic about Asia and not having this following the same EU structures. I often make the same thought about bricks, that it shouldn't be about centralizing everything, you know, having parliament or something. Often having a decentralize is good. It allows the state, the national state, to have more autonomy. And I think this can be a good thing.

Again, if there is some trade rules, something that benefits a supranational structure, Great, but it has to be argued from the functionality. The idea of forcing things together, I think is very dangerous. That's why, by the way, Mitrani wrote in the 1960s, he thought Europe would not so much like the United States of Europe in terms of his freedom, but more like the Soviet Union, in which everything was more forced and with less freedom and less competitive. And I think, yeah, that was a very good way of describing what's happening at the moment.

That was fantastic. Thank you so much, Glenn, for your wisdom and thoughts on various topics. Oh, it's my great pleasure. And I hope to see you all in person sometimes in Indonesia. I hope so too. The world focus is shifting towards you now. Yeah, and you can count on me on anything if you need anything from Southeast Asia, if I could be helpful in any way. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. All right. Take care. Bye.

Friends, that was Professor Glendezin from Norway. Thank you.