Endgame with Gita Wirjawan - Nabil Fahmy: Brokering Peace in the Middle East

Episode Date: August 25, 2021

With the great-power competition on the rise, multilateral conflict management is now more valuable than ever. Nabil Fahmy (Egypt's former Foreign Minister and Dean at the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy - American University in Cairo) talks about Egypt's role as an arbiter in various disputes, including the Arab-Israeli peace process and the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

But I've also been saying, Zen and I say this now, you and I have to talk. You and I, Indonesia, have to talk. I need to talk with Indians. I need to talk with the Pakistanis. I need to talk with Singapore. I talk with other countries. The world has to talk much more about how we develop the future. It should not be only the big powers that decide where we're going.

This is Endgame. We're here we're here we're at a manned Manan Mentiary Lernergary from Mesir, and he also is now the dean of the School of Public Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. Nabil, thank you so much for coming on to our show.

It's a real honor and pleasure. Thank you, Jeter. The pleasure is all mine. of mine. You know, not a lot of Indonesians get to hear or listen to viewpoints coming from experts from the Middle East and also expert views on the Middle East. I think it's a rare opportunity for me, at least, if not for many Indonesians and also many people in Southeast Asia to be able to have this opportunity. But before we get to the, you know, the substance of, you know, what's going on in the Middle East, I want to just hear a little bit about your story on how you grew up. You were born in, you know, in Egypt and you're a son of a diplomat. And then you grew up to study

mathematics and physics and somehow you ended up being a diplomat. Please tell us. It's a very interesting but complicated story. I was actually born in New York. Okay. To a diplomat and no, that's fine. I'm not an American citizen. I never took to nationality. That being said, I am passionately Egyptian. My, and I come from a family that in many ways reflects my outcome, although it wasn't planned that way, on the parental side, on my father, side, it's a family of civil servants. My grandfather was Attorney General. My father was for a minister and a career diplomat. On my mother's side, they were entrepreneurs. I see. Hardworking entrepreneurs who basically built themselves and faced obstacles as they went along.

And having been born in New York to a diplomat, we traveled back and forth from New York to Cairo to Vienna, Austria, and then did that tour again. I ultimately, if I may say, became sort of an international mixture with an Egyptian flavor to it. I was passionately Egyptian, highly defensive of anything that came related to Egypt. But my experience was part of New York, part in Vienna, and part in Egypt. And throughout that, I was at English language schools. So you are your make. It's not simply your nationality.

You actually are your experiences. International affairs for us and the family were day-to-day issues. They were part of life. They weren't something you read about, something you lived through. My father was extremely hardworking diplomat and very strong-willed at the same time. His peers had tremendous respect for him,

and he was successful in his career. Therefore, we met high-level people all the time. It was, again, the normal thing. What was strange about all this is that as successful as he was, and that, of course, leaves, if you want, leads you towards a certain direction. He was adamant about his children living their own life. I was not the one who was supposed to be a diplomat.

As you said, I studied physics. My older brother was the one who wanted to be a diplomat, and he became a very successful businessman. The basic direction my father gave us was learn from experiences, but make your own choices, live your own life. Don't try to relive somebody else's life. But if you're whatever you're going to choose to do, you have to put in the best effort behind it. And he, of course, gave certain advice that was interesting. I'll get into it in a second. But my role to the foreign ministry was

completely unnavigated. I mean, I studied physics because I was good in math. for no other reason. I did not know what I wanted to do. So I chose liberal arts to give myself more of a chance to think about it as I moved on. And I had not decided by the time I had to major. So I did what I found easy. I know this appears pompous to find physics and math easy, but that's just the way I thought. When I graduated, Egypt was coming after the 73 war, starting to open up the economy. I decided I wanted to join the private sector. That's where I was going. First attraction was to the banking system, new banks, but I just didn't think I wanted to sit in the bank all the time, although the incentives were quite substantial. The end of the day, people won't believe this, but the reality is the foreign ministry advertises for new applicants.

And a friend of mine came to me and said, why don't we join the foreign ministry? And I said, I'm not interested. And his answer was, oh, it's because you'll fail the exam. The exam is rigorous and it's tough. And there are, I mean, it's a two-level exam. There's no favoritism whatsoever, at least in the first level, which is completely secret numbers and all that.

So it was basically the challenge of youth to see whether I would sit for it. And the irony of all this was I was sitting for an exam that I did not want to attend. When my father found out, because he was the foreign minister at the time, he said, stop joking around. You're just going to create a lot of promotion and you have no intention of joining anywhere. And if by way you find a way to pass, people will always judge you as my son rather as on your own merits. So I am completely against this. That's what he told me. Anyway, at the end of the day, he was foreign minister,

but he was also my fault. So he was not going to stand against my desire in terms of what I wanted to do. And I ultimately sat for the exam after closing my room for six months and studying for six months because they don't ask you to talk about physics in the foreign ministry exam. I passed the test.

I did reasonably well in that I was tempted by the banking system again, not to sign up for the foreign ministry. And my father actually said, okay, you've proved yourself, now go do business. But I came back the next day and I said, I think I'm going to do this. He was, again, for me, my father is my own, my one and only mentor. So, and I say this quite proudly and without hesitation, he was adamant about each one. of his son, his children, living their own life. So he basically said, okay, I'm going to give you one piece of advice and then you're on your own. You have to preserve your credibility and your integrity during your career. And you're going to have to work 10 times as much as anybody else

just to get out from under my name. So my only advice is you get, at the time, we weren't working on emails and computers. It was files. So you get a file, you read it from the first page, not from the last. Don't base your opinions on somebody else's. Look at the fundamentals. And then on that basis, come up with your own opinions, and you have to be able to, as I said, preserve your integrity and credibility with people. Because diplomacy is not about transactions, it's about relations.

Correct. And you will have to be ready to speak truth to power if need be in your career, even if it affects your own career. And then he basically said, okay, now you're on your own. And I can tell you, I did, and I say this proudly, the two years that I was in the ministry when he was still minister, I attended every committee you can possibly think of and was asked to write reports about numerous issues, frankly, at the time, some of which I did not think were particularly important, but it was just to prove that I'm not being the pampered minister's son. But anyway, I joined the ministry. I had, again, my background in physics developed how I thought. It didn't limit. what I thought about. But it did develop how I thought. And I tended to want to look at concrete things, but also look at what is out there that is not clearly defined at the same time. What's looking towards the future, much more than analyzing only the past, learning from the past, but looking towards

the future. And I tended to focus on Middle East security issues, disarmament issues, used. When I went through my career, and I won't give a recital here on that, you know, one of the reasons why I'm so happy to be here with you today, my peers in Egypt, and I, if you will not me, I think also the same may be in Indonesia. We tended to look towards the big powers, towards the U.S., towards Russia, recently now more towards China, and you may have been looking more towards China and so on. Rather than looking at each other, even though we have a common history that is extremely important.

So later on, towards the back end of my diplomatic career, when I was appointed to Japan, I was enthusiastic about going because I knew nothing about it. Japan. But I was also embarrassed that I knew some little about Japan. You spent quite a number of years there, right? 1999. I spent two years. Oh, two years. Okay, more so in the U.S. then. Okay. Yes, nine years in the U.S. But since finishing my career, I've been going back to Asia before COVID four times a year. And I do have opinions on what I think my country and yours should be doing towards the future. So anyway, it's important to be much more global, much more

international. And I'll conclude my long initial answer to you by the following, given that you've announced my age. I have children. I haven't. That's okay. I'm not proud of it. My children and grandchildren are Egyptian, and they're passionate about that as well. But they're also much more global than not even I am. Because it's not only physical globalism, which was my case, but it's actually day-to-day internet globalism, physical globalism. My three children got their job on the internet. They didn't get their jobs. That's amazing.

applying how times have changed times have changed and then you know you were born in the 50s and you know even when you were a teenager or while you were a teenager you went through the six-day war then you went through very very difficult and interesting times in the region in the 70s and just out of curiosity how would you compare those days with some difficult moments that we've been seeing in recent years. Before we, we're going to have to jump back and forth here, but I'm just curious, you know, connecting to your earlier point, you know, growing up in those days.

Quick question. Really great question. 67, for example, created societal change in Egypt. I was literally going to my school the day the war started. Just before finishing high school a year, year later, looking towards the future, the confidence of youth. And on taking the school bus to the school, we were hearing reports about how the war was being successfully won by Egypt and so on. By the time we got to the school 20 minutes later, the stories

were the exact opposite. And we all, as a youth, as a generation, started to lose our confidence towards the future, as was also the case for a large portion of our society. This was only resumed or regained after the 73 war. If you look at what is being described as the Arab Spring, post-2010, and so on, again, it's a reflection of a society that is striving to build something towards the future. but is really carrying the burden of mistakes of the past. So for me, 67 was a shocker. It really shook my confidence in my country, myself, and my country.

And it was only really regained in 73. But it's, again, it's not who won or lost the war per se. It's really the whole relationship with society, with the government, with the region, how you look towards building the future. And I think the questions that were raised then, the questions may be different, but in essence, they're the same. How do we build a Middle East that is better than what we have? and how do we build it in a fashion that's commensurate with the times rather than only with history.

History is imperative to learn from and it entails enshrining certain rights that we should never ignore. But in essence, we're building for the future and that's really where we need to be going. You know, the collective history between our two countries, Egypt and Indonesia, is not to be underestimated. It's so rich, given the fact that our, you know, leaderships in early days, Nazir and Sukarno, were considered some of the best of friends. and, you know, they met up in Bandung, you know, a few decades ago to celebrate, you know, the Asia, Africa movement and moment. And I don't know, it must have been very different back then, you know, compared to how perhaps the Egyptians and the nations relate to each other nowadays. You know, what is it that we have missed out? I would guess that it's partly attributable to some of the great forces coming from different directions,

but I'm sure there's hope for rekindling that old history, if not even enriching it even more going forward. I'm just curious what your views are with regards to that. Let me start with the hope and then move to the reasons why we are where we are today. If one looks at economic reports that relate to Indonesia generally or Egypt presently, the projection for Indonesian development and the Indonesian importance to the world economy is quite significant as you move forward, especially if certain programs are implemented and pursued. If you look at the Egyptian economy and society today, vis-à-vis the Middle East, a quarter of the Middle East lives here in Egypt. And even in this pandemic times, which are difficult for everybody,

we're actually the only Middle Eastern country that has not been in recession for two quarters. Wow. And we're growing at a low rate. At a low rate, we've only, we only had one quarter of recession. Now, we're growing at a rate that's not sufficient for us. But there is, what happens in your part of the world will affect what you do in your country will affect your part of the world quite significantly and beyond because of globalization and among other forces. And the same thing applies to Egypt, per se, in the Arab and the Middle East and in Africa. But I have been since leaving diplomacy professionally, I've been writing quite frequently and teaching on public affairs.

And the point I keep harping on is if one looks at the non-line movement or, for that matter, Pan Arabism, both of them made the same mistake, although both were tremendous trend-setting directions. The nine movement defined itself as not wanting to be Easter West in the bipolar competition that exists. We knew what we did not want to be. And as long as they were arguing with each other, we were defined very well and worked together very, very well. Where we, I think, didn't do enough as an online movement is we should have then sort of delinked our identity from what they were doing. and starting then to move to the face of this is what we want to be. And we're a player as such, irrespective of whether you two have a cold war or don't have a cold war. We started a little bit into that by going on the G77 and developing country groups and all that.

But as you correctly said, Socarno, Nasir, Suharto, Sadat, other Asian and African and Arab leaders, they were defining the world where the world should go. They were raising a voice that was not East West. We need to raise that voice again because the global system is really being challenged and is being redefined. The same problem happened with Pan Arabism, by the way. Pan Arabism started off by being against occupation, against violation of national rights and so on and so forth.

which is valid. And it has a strong base in that there's a large percentage of Arabs in the Middle East. So that's also valid. But where it lost its identity is, well, okay, besides being against something, what are you offering for the future? And my point here is whether it's in Indonesia or in Egypt for Pan-Arabism, the majority of our population is youth. So unless you define you help define the future, they will tend to sort of not be engaged in the governance process.

And then you will have here for the Arab world, Arab countries splitting on their immediate needs and immediate priorities rather than the strategic ones. So we need to go back to your country and mine. And I think we have a very good foundation to do that. We need to go back to building blocks, building towards the future, in parallel to opposing use of force or aggression or occupation or violation of international law. But our voice has to be raised. Right. You know, you've been spending a lot of time in the academia.

And, you know, eerily similarly. I've been trying to spend more and more time now in the academia. What made you pivot to academia from policymaking or from physics? You know, again, when people ask me to talk about my career, I always start up by saying, I'm not a good example to follow because I kept shifting. I was just very curious. And because of the way I was brought up moving from one country to the other, my parents who insisted on each one of their children making their own opinions, I was never afraid of changing course. So I joined the foreign ministry out of a challenge, not because my father was the foreign minister, which would have been a good enough reason, but that wasn't the reason.

I finished my post in Washington after nine years, nine wonderful years, but exhausting years, especially that they came with 9-11 and all of that, and basically came back home and said to my colleagues here, including the foreign minister, I've done my job, I'm going home, I'm going to rest, anything you need for me, phone me, I will come and do it, but I'm finished. I had no plans, absolutely no plans for the future. Within a few days, the president and provost of American University in Cairo came and knocked on my door. Literally, literally. They asked for a woman.

They came in. And they said, you came back. Why don't you come and create a school of global affairs at the American University of Cairo and be the founding dean? I said, what does the dean do? I have no idea what a dean does. I have no idea how you academics think. And they said, that's not important. want a global leader. They want somebody who thinks about global affairs will help you manage

the admin part of academia, which is a challenge, by the way. So I, my initial reaction was no. And my initial reaction was, given my experience, don't ever put, don't start a negotiation with somebody who's not serious. And I wasn't serious because I, not because I wasn't serious. I wasn't decided. But the intellectual challenge that kept being put forward to me. We spent seven or eight months of negotiations and I only finally decided because my wife stopped and started getting bored with my raising the discussion at dinner. And she said, either say no or say yes, but don't prolong this. But to be honest with you, I was intrigued by the intellectual challenge of trying to create a vision for the future and skill sets for students looking at the future, even though I didn't know what the future would be.

Because in my experience, I had lived through the end of the Cold War. I had lived through the, if you want, the implosion of the Soviet Union. So everything I was trained to do. It's seen it all. You had changed. Yeah. And I now understood that I don't have to teach. them history, I'll have to help them get those sources, but I actually have to teach them

how to deal with things they don't know about yet. And that's really what drove me into academia. I've been there for, well, since 2009 with a break as foreign minister. Don't regret a minute of it, but there are a good size and bad size to that. It taught me that as a practitioner, you need to take a break every now and then and look at the fundamentals. You shouldn't be overwhelmed by the policy issue of the day. But it also taught me as an academic that as much as fundamentals are important, you need to use them. So you cannot endlessly debate the fundamentals if all you end up with is a peer-reviewed article,

which is debated among 10 highly distinguished academics. And it's, I'm simplifying it. It's not either one or the other, but it's how we merge this. And that's what we're trying to do at the school I've created. We give them rigorous fundamentals. At the same time, all of our courses have a practical tone in them. because they're going to come out of that classroom and face real life after that. Let me let me close.

Yeah, go ahead, go ahead. Over my career, I mean, again, it's a character deformation, if you want. Over my career, my reputation was, if this guy is there, there's a problem. Seriously, one of my close friends, foreign diplomat friends told me, look, look, if you appear at a meeting, there must be an issue because you're normally sent out either to come up with a new proposal or to solve a problem. You don't show up at a meeting simply to push the issue of the day. But again, that's really been a function of, and I'm proud of that, frankly, and my friend was commending me. He wasn't criticized.

but that's really a function of having had a liberal arts education and having lived in so many parts of the world. So while I would be hyper-defensive on anybody criticizing Egypt, if I was traveling, I was also always had an open ear to listening to somebody else's point of view because I had lived part of that in so many different countries. Well, you've definitely solved lots of problems, you know, both for the country and the region. Look, I mean, you're a renowned global thinker, right? But I want to push on this a little bit.

You as an academician, how do you deal with, you know, the exponentiality with which things are evolving outside the public space? Because that's the kind of issue that, you know, I quite frequently talk about in classrooms, you know, compare that with the seeming linearity with which policymaking is moving with. How do you narrow the gap between the exponentiality of what's happening outside the academic space or policymaking space, vis-a-vis the linearity or less than exponential nature that's within the policy-making space? Sure. Great question. Well, essentially, what we try to do, what I try to do, is, focus much more on developing critical thinking skill sets for the students. Because again, they're going to face cases that I don't have models for.

I don't yet know about them. So it's about them having good judgment to deal with the issues rather than taking my advice. And again, taking my father as an example, even though he was very prominent until he passed away. We actually, after he retired, we did not discuss foreign policy on anything related to my career. He would discuss foreign policy issues I wasn't dealing with, but he would refuse to discuss foreign policy issues that related to me because you would always say, your world is different from mine, even though it was one generation, and you make every decision. Don't make them because of what I did.

And I say the same to the kids or the students. You're going into a world that I'm not completely aware of, but I can tell you how best to deal with these issues, not what the issues are. But there are, of course, some common issues. We try to embody the idea of a collective social conscience. We live in a global environment today. Don't look at this as a transaction that's only how much you get out of it in the short term.

If you're looking at policy issues, look also at the medium and long-term consequences of what you do. Try to move from our world, which is if you want a balance of power world, at least post-World War II, to a balance of interest world as you move forward. And again, this sounds very simple and actually is quite simple. We always tell the students, listen, listen, very, very careful to what is being said and even watch features of those you're talking to. not necessarily to agree with them, but to understand the importance of these issues. And let me just add a point here when I was in my diplomatic career.

We have a very rigid compartmentized system. And as much as the government works together quite well on practical issues, it doesn't do that with the same level of relaxation on theory. In other words, if I was to ask the Ministry of Defense a specific question, they will give me a specific answer, and they will do so quite easily and constructively. But if I was to come up with different theories and want to sort of discuss different options with them,

that's not their game. They don't like that kind of theoretical discussion. So, but I had to lead arts control negotiations for my country with the neighboring countries. And therefore, I needed the advice of the Ministry of Defense. And as I said, they are very cooperative, but it's just the mindset of thinking is different. So I would have to, I would literally, between every negotiating session, hold simulations for our delegation. I would be the adversary. So I would bring him the whole group.

I would be the advocate. I'd be the one throwing out the difficult questions. I'd be the devil's advocate. I'd be the one of putting out the embarrassing issues. And the team would ultimately be the best prepared team going into negotiations. If I hadn't done it that way, I would have never been able to get the answers to the questions in real time as we were sitting in a conference room. So it's important to understand your interlocutor or your adversary or your partner. Give him what he needs, not what he wants.

Got it. And again, on policy issues, it's not a transaction. It's a relationship. No. Let me ask. Yeah. I want to ask you a number of questions on what's happening within the Middle East or within the region. The first is with regards to, you know, a position that you've expressed with regards to the Girt, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

I mean, it's, I know it's a pretty existential issue for not only Egypt, for not only Ethiopia, but other neighboring countries. You want to just talk a little bit about that? I think it's important for many of us here to have a better understanding what's going on there. It's one of the most frustrating issues for me as a professional because it is a solvable issue. It's not an issue where it has to be solved on favor of one side versus the other. Secondly, it's a if you want a case study. in what not to do. Right.

Had the three countries looked forward rather than only backwards in terms of their development needs, their water needs, their power needs, they would have been cooperating with each other over the last 10, 15 years with plans for the next 25 years. And I say this because there is enough water in the larger Nile Basin. to cover needs of all the countries there. There is the landmass, the natural resources, the manpower is enough there to create the development models you need to do all that. And these three parties don't need conflicting things.

Ethiopia needs development. It's not a lack of water. It's trying to create electricity to help create development. Sudan doesn't need water. It simply needs the regulation of the water flow, so it's not a flood and then a drought. And Egypt needs more water because we have a population growth rate of 3%, which means our numbers go up very, very quickly. But there's water going into the Mediterranean from the Nile, significant water that's not being used. had we looked together over the last 20 years looking forward dealing with this issue,

we would have come up with solutions that are all agreeable. The problem today is we're looking at it as adversaries, not as stakeholders of a common interest. So there's a lot of lack of confidence. moving forward. My suggestion, therefore, and there is a problem, by the way, that with waterways going across more than one country, by international practice, no country has the sole right to determine the flow of the water and the, but again, for me, solutions are there, but the confidence

level is not there to provide that solution today. If one, if there's a shortage in water due to droughts, Egypt will not have enough water to cover its needs, and that is an existential threat. So if we don't find the solution, I actually believe there's going to be serious conflict. I don't necessarily mean military, but I'm not ruling that out. I basically mean there will be tension in East Africa and tension between Egypt and Ethiopia, which is not wanted. But I would add to that, what drives me, what really angers me is that

with the present confidence, lack of confidence, I don't see a solution being possible in the short term. Therefore, my suggestion is to have a transitional period, not an interim agreement, but a transitional period, where nobody, and I'm just going to simplify it for you, where nobody does anything that unilaterally affects significant interests of others for a number of years, where day-to-day decisions that are not of major significance be easily taken by Ethiopia alone, where decisions that have significant effect be taken by the three countries together, and because this is going to happen,

where there may be differences, these issues are given to an arbitrary commission appointed from the very beginning of three to five people that have to take decisions within 60 days and whose decisions are obligatory to the three parties. This would go on for a period of time during which all three countries need to develop confidence-building measures between each other.

To enable a fine solution. And let me just add a point here. When I was foreign minister, this was the second topic on my agenda given the years that I was minister. And I remember telling my colleague, Minister Tudoros, who's now WHO, Secretary General, that I will fundraise for Ethiopia and I will bring in Egyptian money, but I will go around internationally fundraising for Ethiopia and for this down. Who's funding this now at the moment?

Well, again, it's being funded because the negotiations gave the impression that there's progress. The doors for funding from international agencies as well as some of the major donor countries opened. In 2013 and 14, they were closed because there was no indication of progress in terms of negotiation. We signed an agreement in 2015, not an agreement, a declaration. Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, declaration of principles on how to resolve this, with the assumption that we would resolve it within a year or 18 months at the latest. Now, that has not happened, but that sort of opened the door for funding. Anyway, there still is reason to believe a solution is possible,

but the confidence level isn't there. So I would argue we need a transition that is not endless. So it's not an interim agreement that ultimately becomes fact. And during that transition, we need to develop a more comprehensive project of cooperation. between the three countries as well as you want a Marshall plan for the Nile Basin countries. Right. Speaking of the word comprehensive, I want to ask you on this other comprehensive thing called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA. You've been pretty expressive about this and I like how you, you know, you try to build that in the context of how you're proposing this. you know, dual pillar strategy for the region and beyond in terms of, you know, enriching,

if not augmenting the security architecture for the region and beyond. Please talk about that. Sure. The JCPOA is the agreement reached between the five plus one, the five prime members and Germany and Iran on nuclear agreement, which after that, President Trump withdrew from and is in a bit of a limbo. My initial position was the agreement had not been done with enough consultation with the Arab countries. In other words, the other regional players there, and I had reservations on it because of that. That being said, I found if I wasn't satisfied with that decision, especially that he did not deal with some of the Iranian policies in the region, which we found rather aggressive, I found withdrawing from the agreement probably worse than the agreement itself

because you ended up with not controlling Iranian politics or policies or their nuclear program. So you ended up with neither of the two. I would have used the agreement to move forward. And that's really what I'm suggesting here is that the nuclear agreement is important. We need to free the Middle East from nuclear weapons and their potential threats. threats, the only country that is not a member of the NPT in the Middle East is Israel, actually, not Iran. But the problem with the Iranian program is that there were questions about implementation.

So given that it is out there and given that the President Biden was interested in re-engaging it, my approach is, okay, how do we take that and take advantage of it? So the suggestion was, let's take the J. ACPOA and build on that dealing with the disarmament and nuclear issues for the whole region. There are limitations on enrichment in JCPOA that don't exist in the NPT and things like that. There may be verification procedures which one can deal with regionally. So the first pillar would be hardcore arms control issues, nuclear, and then weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological, and so on, and possibly missile

systems. The other pillar is, as much as I'm an arms control nerve, if you want, these things don't work, except in a larger security discussion. Right. Now, you can't keep everything waiting until you draw the whole master plan. You never get anything done by doing that. But the reality is, like the world, the Middle East is changing. So Arab security has to be taken into account. Security of Iran has to be taken into account. Security of Israel has to be taken into account. Security of Turkey has to be taken into account.

And they have to take into account for security of others. So I was looking at... arms control on the left pillar, on the right pillar, thinking and learning from the experiences of the OSCE that happened during the Cold War and from the experiences at the arms control region security working group that emanated from Madrid peace process, uh, Middle East peace process adopted in Madrid, where we actually drafted a declaration of guiding principles on how we should, would be operating with each other, but then ultimately it failed on two issues. One, self-determination for the Palestinians, and the other was a reference to nuclear issues. I think taking these two pillars, a hardcore asset arms control pillar and a security policy pillar, and building together, you can develop a new architecture.

And again, to do that, there will have to be a significant degree of confidence-building measures in the process. I recently wrote a book, which I published last year, and I was very hesitant about writing the book. But then, ultimately, I was driven by pressures from my peers to write about the experiences that you asked about some of them. And my ultimate decision to write was because I felt that my generation was leaving the Middle East in a worse situation than we had actually taken charge of. And I wanted the next generation to be able to learn from our experiences, good and bad. They weren't all bad, of course, but we should have done better. And I wanted them to learn from these experiences and move forward. We need to live together.

It does not mean foregoing rights. It does not mean accepting aggression or occupation. But we need to work together. And that's really my two-pilite approach. Now, it's going to take a long time. I doubt I'll be on a podcast when this fond of ultimately comes together. I'd be happy to turn over when it happens. But talk about, I mean, I'm curious as to what you think in terms of the hope for

the reactivation of the JCPOA. And to the extent that it does get reactivated between Blinken and his counterpart, or counterparts rather, the hope for that two-pillar strategy to actually get implemented within our lifetime. I think if the... How do you excise this out?

Sure. First of all, I don't think that the Americans or the Iranians have a problem with the JCPOA as it originally was put together. Even though after the Iranian election, it appears they're going a little bit to the right, while in the Americans are going a little bit to the left. So JCPOA, in its old hat,

I think would live through and would be resigned again. There are pressures to add issues of ballistic missiles and some other things in there. I'm not sure how far they will go. I'm not day-to-day following the negotiations, at least beyond the media. But I think, and I, by the way, I had this discussion with Secretary Kerry when we were both dealing with portfolios. He had told me then that JCPOA was one step towards a wider regional discussion about practices. So as much as I would like to see the resign JCPOA include these wider issues, I doubt that will happen in the short term.

But I do believe that both the Americans and the other five, as well as the Iranians, prefer to have a JCPOA because it gives Iran re-entry into the international community at a much higher level. it gives them huge resources to pursue whatever policies. Yeah, economically too. And vice versa. The Americans believe that one of my senior Mexican diplomat, whom I learned a lot from when I was dealing with disarmament, years ago once told me, never makes the best enemies a good.

So I think the Americans don't want to make the best deal the enemy of a good deal. Where I think there's a problem is, given that Trump withdrew, unilaterally, the Iranians are now asking for assurances, international assurances. Not going to get withdrawn again. That will not withdraw again. Right. Now, beyond having a security council resolution acknowledging the agreement, which is what happened last time, I don't think the Americans will swallow a security council.

resolution that apply sanctions against them if they withdraw. That's not how the world is working at the present time. And furthermore, even if the Iranians were to say, will have Congress formally ratify the agreement, I don't think the American president will do that now. He has an economic agenda of major consequences. that he wants to push forward. He has elections of Congress in two years, less than two years, going now. And I don't think he wants to make the Iranian deal a major debate here.

They're still worried about a – I'm not sure if – I'm how strong a football fan you are. But I think they're worried about a Trump – Tadda, I mean, whatever the term is, coming back from behind and winning – again. So, remontada. Remontada. That's what they call it in Spanish. Yeah. So again, I honestly believe Iran and the U.S. will ultimately agree to start the agreement. But time is not on its side. But what would it take for countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia and the likes to feel comfortable with this? I think the sound is, well, I think the Saudis and, if you want, the Israelis both gain from the deal much more than they lose, especially the Israelis.

Because as aggressive as the Iranians are being, they're not really pursuing aggressive policies against Israel. And the Israelis would not want an Iranian nuclear capacity to exist. The complaint of the Saudis is not that Iran may or may not have a nuclear program. it's more that they're day-to-day being aggressive on policy issues. But I honestly believe that neither the Saudis nor the Israelis will object to a deal if the Americans and the five agree to it with Iran. Despite the fact that, you know, we have a more right-wing leadership in April, in the name of Bennett.

You don't think that's going to make it even more complicated? Well, complicated, yes. Middle East, the middle name is complicated. And the Israelis will, as they always do very intelligently, asked to get some gains in exchange for not getting too angry about the deal whether it bothers them or not. But being said, the Iranians have actually agreed. in the nuclear basis to go beyond the NPT. I mean, this deal includes measures that don't exist in the NPT. All the Arab countries have joined the NPT, Israel hasn't even joined the NPT.

But I believe, nevertheless, that if one looks at, again, my two-pillared approach to this, where you see some hardcore arms control measures that are tangible, verified, and measurable and some policy measures that you can get, you can provide this, make it more attractive both to the Israelis and to the Saudis. And also, for that matter, even more attractive to the Iranians. But presently, again, it goes back similar to the GERD example. Right.

There's so much suspicion between parties that coming up with a creative solution to from experts like yourself or practitioners like myself. I mean, you need good ideas, good timing, and good opportunities to make something move. I'm curious as to whether or not China could play a role in this. I mean, given their increasing relevance, right, to everybody's day-to-day life anywhere. around the world. Thank you for raising that. If you were to ask me that question today, can it play a role today?

I don't think that many people in the Middle East will bet on the Chinese role today in terms of security. But, and this is why your point is so important, if one looks at building towards the future, there's no question that China will have a more important role in the world in the future, but also even in the Middle East. dependence on oil in the Middle East, their interest in markets in the Middle East, on minerals in the Middle East and Africa, is going to grow quite significantly. So I would argue that, yes, if you're trying to build a security architecture for the future, it will have to be endorsed by

China, by the U.S., by Russia. I'd wanted to be endorsed by like-minded countries, like Indonesia and Egypt and these kinds of countries. But if you go to the Saudis or to the Israelis, by the way, are trading with the Chinese Oh, yeah, in a big way now. Very significantly, including on military issues. Correct. But that being said, if you go to them today and say the Chinese will be your security blanket, it's not going to fly very strong.

But the Chinese have made an offer to the, I forget the figure, it's something really significant like 400 billion for the next 25 years of cooperation and projects with Iran. Wow. That's so that's a significant. It's very significant. Yeah. Yeah. It's you. And that provides them leverage. Now again, my figure may be a little bit off, but it is a huge figure over the next 25 years. Yeah, 40 would have been reasonable about 400 billion. That's just staggering. Not an impossibility though, given, given China Well, I honestly believe it is much more than significant because it surprised me when I was one figure. But again, this is not loans, by the way. It's actually projects. So, but anyway,

it's a very significant number and I send to be corrected if my figure is wrong. Yeah. I want to shift gear here to to what's going on, you know, in Palestine. You're close to what's been happening there with the Hamas and Israelis. You know, I've been hearing so many different views from friends from both sides. One would argue for a two-state solution. One would argue for status quo. One would argue for, you know, some sort of a binational, secular state. What are your views, you know, in terms of how you think this thing could be fostered in a much more peaceful manner?

within our lifetime. If we're looking at a solution that solves the problem, one has to define the problem. The problem is there are two peoples that want to express the national identity over a limited piece of land. Since that's the problem, the only solution to have independent national identities is a two-state solution. Now, do I see that to be something possible,

in the near term, given the situation as it is on the ground and the positive of today, no, I think the potential for distribution has decreased over the last 10 years rather than increased. But it's the only one that provides national identity, separate national identity for each one of them. A unipolar state or a unnational state, let me rephrase that, a binational state, Yeah. It doesn't give the Israelis and Palestinians independent national identities. It's probably more probable now, but that's not a solution. That's a reality.

Now, and the status quo is always dangerous, because status quo can allow you to fall back and relax. Frustrations continue to build. I've been in occupied territories and in Israel many, many times over the years. And I remember walking in occupied territories in the West Bank post the Oslo Agreement, which was at the time, immediately at the time, something very well received. And literally, without exaggeration, it was walking to the foreign minister and myself, walking there and we were heckled by Palestinian living there.

And we stopped. And we said, why are you heckling us? And they said the roadblocks today are worse than they were before this process start. So our day-to-day life is actually worse than it is, even though you guys are talking about the big issues, the configuration of area C and area B and area A and who's allowed to go where and which go goes over where. Every one of those steps has a huge dimensions. And you walk there and you see the Palestinians have to go in one aisle.

Israelis and foreigners go in much quicker through other aisles. You can't ignore frustration. They will ultimately burst every now and then. So my answer to this is we're moving in the wrong direction on the Arabis-Vity peace process. But there's only one solution that if we're looking for a solution, our choices are looking for a solution or accepting the fact that this conflict will be with us and erupt again and again over the next couple of decades. I honestly believe, and I've been very close to negotiations when I was in government, we were very close to solving this. Yeah.

Had at the very beginning of the Obama years, first of all, post-oslo. Who would have wanted for a two-state solution, right, Obama? Yeah, I'll tell you. Even before Obama, had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated, he had Arafat on the Palestinian side. They did not really like each other, by the way. But they were strong enough leaders to ultimately bring this to a conclusion. They hesitated. And I would argue the Israelis hesitated more because they didn't. want to deal with settlement issues. And then Prime Minister Rabin, and I'll tell you a quick story about him, was assassinated. And that sort of broke down the Israeli peace trend, and you had Prime

Minister Netanyahu elected a few years later and so on. But let me tell you a quick story here. I met Prime Minister Rabin when he came to visit Egypt once. And I was a senior diplomat, but I was not the minister. But anyway, I was standing standing in a room with the Prime Minister, waiting for him to go in and see our president. And I walked over to him and I said, Prime Minister, why did you accept Oslo? Why did they accept to deal with the Palestinians as people, not simply as citizens, but as people, as a nation? And he said, I realized there were only so many bones to break. So you saw here a hardline politician understanding that, force only has certain limits.

And if I want some realism. The same discussion I had with Arafat. Arifat I knew much more because I used to go frequently to see him. And I remember seeing him changing from when long way before that, when my father had to convince him to come to the General Assembly without the pistol in his holster and come speak there and accept resolution 242 two years later when we were trying to convince him to take charge of the passing authority and move forward

and he said exactly the same thing. He said this is not the land, the size of the land that we were offered back in 48, but if they give me a sovereign state, I made to compromise with the condition that I need to have the capital in East Jerusalem because I want to give my people back their national identity. There was an opportunity there. I mentioned Obama because I felt that when he came into office, we were very close to closing this, and he had the right intentions.

And something you and I had discussed, he had discussed this with Palestinian academics in years past and of course with Israeli academics as well. And he understood this was about rights. And he gave marvelous speeches afterwards, one in Cairo and one in Israel, speaking to the Arab and to the Israeli community. So both in each of the speeches, by the way, I was there in the one in Cairo. But then he chose to negotiate the process incrementally by saying, okay, in exchange for lack of issuing statements, let's slow down the settlement process and so on. That's what I think was a mistake. It was important then, because we were so close, to bring it to closure, put on the table the full package, Palestinians and Israelis. This is what you get in terms of territory.

This is what you get in terms of security, refugees, all these issues in exchange for peace. You sign on to this agreement, the case is closed, and we have peace. I don't think we can split hairs any longer. It has to be towards closure. And I don't see at presently big leaders that will allow for that, but I don't see any other solution. Let me make the point in both. I always tend to push my own people because of my belief in the importance of Egypt's role. I always push my own people.

Be creative. Bring out ideas there. Accept the criticism, if half to be. But we have a court of the Middle East living in our country. We have a responsibility to not only our people, but to everybody around us. So come up and be creative and let's push these issues. Look, I'm not very close to the situation. and I'm looking from afar.

And with full recognition of the fact that I don't have authority on this, but as somebody from afar, I think it's fair to condemn the acts of launching rockets, right, onto the Israelis and to condemn the settlements in the occupied territories. What's not helping is how the government is shifting, right, more to the right, which I think makes the conversation, I think, slightly more difficult now. Again, I ask the same question. Is there a role for countries like China here, given the fact that, you know, I'm not sure the Palestinians, you know, would want to put a lot of premium on what the U.S. would say, say now or in the future.

What do you think about this? The Chinese foreign minister was just here in Cairo about a week ago. And he repeated a proposal that he had enunciated a few weeks before, I think in China, about security and cooperation. in the Middle East of how to move forward. And my colleagues here told me that they said, oh, that's fine, but you need to put some more meat on the table here. You can't simply make a general principle.

The mere fact that the Chinese are coming up with these proposals that are really general is progress from where they were in dealing with the Middle East two or three years ago. I know the foreign minister well. I've met him frequently. And as I said, I used to go to Asia before the pandemic very frequently. And I know also the diplomatic advisor to the president, who was my counterpart in Washington when I was there.

They were not ready to engage in the Middle East two or three years ago. They're not yet ready to engage, in other words, put political weight behind their proposals. But they've started to come out with proposals. I would not bet on China alone short term, but I have been arguing that asking the Americans to be the only sponsor of the peace process is wrong. Right. Because it puts too much pressure on the Americans per se. They have to deliver a loan, and they have their domestic and foreign policy constituencies

that won't necessarily justify bold action. the Russians to do it alone, well, they won't have enough weight with the Israelis. They may have a little bit more with the Palestinians, but not with Israelis. Asking the Chinese, they may have more moral authority, but they don't have enough weight without any of the parties to push them there. So my argument has been, actually, let's bring in the Americans, Russians, Chinese, and the UN. I agree. They should be the sponsors of the...

The tenets of the peace process are known, but you bring in the UN, that means everybody, including Indonesia, Asia, my country, all that. Bringing in Russia means there's a balance for America, and America can say, I need to move this far because the UN wants this, and I need to push the Russians forward. And the Chinese, using their voice, is frankly a contribution towards the future. But going Chinese or going Russia or going to America alone, I don't think works any longer. Yeah. I'm not in disagreement there. And I think at the rate that China is, you know, growing interest, economically speaking, with, you know, your regent, I think it just is fitting, you know, to be considered, you know,

at least in a conversation better yet in the negotiation. And I'm off the view that countries like Indonesia, I think, should be at the table. But we're not there yet because economically we're not as intertwined with the region as we, as much as we should be. But from, you know, we're the largest Muslim country in the world. That brings about, you know, quite a significant relevance for us. but I want to talk about the future here of the world. I'm quite sensitive to how the decoupling between China and the U.S.

is not attenuating, even though Joe Biden is on board now. The China phobia within the U.S. has not receded ever since last January. I'm off the view that the decoupling is only likely to continue, at least if not intensify in the near foreseeable future. But how do you see the world shaping up by way of the decoupling that we're all seeing and how that affects your region, your country, and how you see that affecting my country, my region, in the next 24 years? As I said, I'm a, if you want, I'm old school. I trained and practiced in a bipolar world for most of the period of time and then the last 15 years or so post-Cold War. But it was about a balance of power.

It was all about a balance of power. When I became foreign minister, after two revolution, in three years with people on the street saying we want to hold you accountable. We want to be part of determining the future. I literally four days after becoming minister gave a press conference and laid out my plan for the whole year and said this is what I will do for the next year and I'm going to leave. And the comments I got were quite amusing but one was when did you do this plan? Secondly, why did you announce all that?

They're going to hold you accountable for that. And my answer was we just had two revolutions people wanting to share in governance. They deserve to be told what's going to happen. They deserve to have a right in holding me accountable. It's not the world that I worked in as a professional diplomat where we did not deal with the public except if we had to. only every now and then. It's a new world.

I say this because one of the points I made at that conference is my only priority is Egypt's national interest. Right. But to achieve that, I'm going to go out and get more friends so that I have more than one option all the time and have the ability to choose the best option from my own country. And I'm not going to replace one friend with the other. I'm going to add an energized relationship.

And this was, of course, mostly addressed to the Russians and the Chinese and the Americans. And when I flew into Russia, and I met Sardiel Lavrov, a press conference there, and I said, by the way, I'm not coming here to replace the Americans by you. And Sergey laughed after the conference and said, I'm very happy you said that, because if you hadn't, people would have asked you that. I said, I didn't come here to have one option, that being the Russian option. I came here to add to my options,

and I'm going to go to China and say the same thing. And a few weeks later, I flew, I took a night flight to China. Actually, it was a day flight, but given the time difference, it was a night flight, arrived in the morning, had a full day of sessions, and then flew out again and slept on my way back to Cairo and said exactly the same thing there.

It's a new world. And when I was in America, I told the Americans, I've been to China, I've been to Russia, and I'm coming here. I want to develop this relationship as well as the others. But I've also been saying then, and I say this now, you and I have to talk. you and I in Indonesia have to talk I need to talk with Indians

I need to talk with the Pakistan I need to talk with Singapore I talk with other countries the world has to talk much more about how we develop the future it should not be only the big powers that decide where we're going we were speaking much more

actively when we were newly independent or just coming out of colonization when there was a Cold War, and we should be doing that more so now. For practical reasons, guys, not only is it something that theoretical of interest to me, but the reality is the shirt I'm wearing is Egyptian cotton sewn somewhere else, or vice versa. In other words, the market there affects my market here. pandemics don't stop on sovereign borders.

We can't simply, and then we should not. Let's put the pandemic as an example. Pandemics happen all over the world. The distribution of the vaccinations are completely irregular and determined by the quote unquote owners of the technology, be they big countries, big companies. It can't work that way. Correct.

It shouldn't work that way. I'm not looking at a utopian society. But the reality is if people understand that your interest as a major economic power, I'm talking about, for example, the U.S., is affected by your production in Thailand, in Indonesia, in Egypt, and Africa, then you have to have an interest in ensuring that all these countries progress. And we as developing countries have to stop countries. complaining about what these big countries do if they don't hear our voice. Yeah.

They need to hear our voice. I don't hear our voice loud enough. No, I mean, I'm just saying, you know, as big as the United States economy is, people tend to forget that it's only a 200-year civilization, you know, and this decoupling is... you know, basically a projection of differential civilizations, one being, you know, a little over 200 years, and the other one being, you know, four to five thousand years.

Whereas you come from a country with a few thousand years worth of civilization. I come from a country that's been around for, you know, almost 2,000 years as a civilization. The Europeans have been around for a few thousand years. So I do believe that countries are, nations that share civilizational similarities with China could be helpful, right, in basically trying to help in bridging the gap with the United States. And I think the United States should take a look at, you know, other countries or nations

that have long, you know, civilizational history so that they could better understand how, somebody from China that's been around for four to five thousand years, things and does and acts. Don't you think? Sure. I agree with you, but let me add a point here. And I said this to my American colleagues. It's annoyed them a bit, but I say it again because I say it in the constructive spirit. I have a problem with this idea of American exceptionalism.

Americans have a wonderful success story to tell. But the fact that their story is so exceptional that they have exceptional rights, or we all need to enunciate what they did is in my mind, even contrary to the American way of thinking. They're a competitive society. Success is the name of the game. And yet, when they feel that China is competing with them economically, they define it as a threat.

Why is it a threat? If they're just simply competing with you economically, a threat should be different from competition. But it's this idea that they succeeded so well in the point you're making in a short period of time that they tend to ignore history. And they tend to contradict even their own conceptual fabric. They are a country of different ethnic communities.

And yet you want the communities to accept America per se. And you ignore the fact that there's Mali out there, there's Niger out there, there's Taiwan out there, there's China. I tell my Chinese colleagues, people will not be convinced simply by you saying you have no interest beyond common goodwill and all that. It's not going to convince people. You need to be more precise. But I also tell my American colleagues, just because somebody is doing well, it's not a reason for you to look at them as a threat. You have to work with the competition. But that takes me back to my basic theme is that this should be about collective interest.

Correct. A balance of interest, not a balance of power. I honestly don't see the geopolitical, if you want, hard asset potential. Well, I know where it exists, but it's not as large and it appears China, US as it was, for example, Russia, US. And even beyond that, given that we're... Now not only talking about throw weight and ballistic versus strategic missiles and so on, but more so about cybersecurity. It's not only about traditional warfare.

We need to think differently. Yeah. Wow. Nabil, I'm going to ask you the final question. What's your take or view on? you know, the hope or prospect for lasting peace in the Middle East. Short term, I'm not optimistic at all. I think you're going to have a status quo period for a while.

Then you're going to get a new generation of leaders. And they will either turn to the extreme right and go ahead to head. head or hopefully become more if you want forward looking and courageous in looking at solutions. I'm not saying this because I'm a naive optimist, but and I have openly said that I think our generation has failed our own region. I think our region can do much better. I think will do much better in the medium and long term. I'm not sure about the short term because I honestly believe that with the large number of youth that exists, living now in an empowered world, they will not rest easily if we tell

them, we do the business, you do the living. and they're going to hold us accountable as we move forward, and they will do a better job. Let me add a point here on this issue of authority. One of my grandchildren, a couple of years ago, I took him to buy a newspaper. He walked into the store, and he said, what are you doing? They probably laughed at you.

Yeah, he was eight at the time. He looked up to me and said, old school. I still like to hold the newspaper. Anyway, I took him home, went up to his mother and said, your son just called me old school and said, what do you do? Didn't do anything. He just bought a newspaper.

Well, we don't buy newspapers. We just read it electronically. Anyway, I went down to my grandson and I said, Adam, you need to be aware of current events, blah, blah, blah. It's stuff that we always talk about. And he looks up at me and says, yeah, but newspapers tell you what to read and how much to read. On the iPad, I choose what to read and how much to read.

Now, that's not exactly correct. But the point here is, as an eight-year-old, he's already gained authority to make decisions that when I was a seven- or eight-year-old, I would never have even thought about gain. When I talk to these young kids today, they're a bit older now, it's a discussion. Every question is a discussion.

I need to focus on their mind, not on their muscle. And that's really the shift here. And again, I'm not naive. We have some serious problems in the Middle East, a lot of serious problems, and we have some serious challenges, and they will require sets of priorities, building assets, building thought processes, and so on. But they can't be either or.

We need to find a way to do both, as we move forward because these kids will not accept less. And I think they will keep us on our toes and hopefully keep the younger generation on their toes as well and build a better future. But it's important because it's a wonderful region. When you look, when you walk around and you see the youth, you have to be optimistic. But then you worry where are they going to solve these problems. I want to close by, again, re-emphasizing. Indonesia and Egypt need to speak out more and more about the world,

how it should be developed, not only about our own interests. It's not theory about the future. And I wish you the best in your 100th anniversary coming up soon. Yeah, thank you so much. And it's been a fascinating conversation. I wish I could see you in person as soon as the dust settles. Inshallah. And my best to all my energy business.

Thank you. And likewise. Thank you so much, Nabil. Thank you. You. Teman, that's Nabil Fahmi, mantan Mantan Menteri

Mnterrey Lernergrey. And now, the Pimpinan at the School of Public Affairs and Public Policy at Cairo, at American University. Thank you. Endgame is a podcast

by the School of Government and Public Policy Indonesia. The first Indonesian Policy School to offer a full-time master's program in English, and is a production of the cinema, Indonesia's award-winning entertainment and technology company. Oni Jamhari and Angad Wima Sasonko are our executive producers. Ahmed Zaki Habibi and Jimmy Kuntoro are our supervising producers. Hannah Humaira and Farah Abida are producers. Bobby Zarqasi is our director.

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