Endgame with Gita Wirjawan - Oriana Skylar Mastro: Taiwan Invasion: How Soon and How to Deter It?

Episode Date: March 31, 2023

Just four days prior to the airing of this episode, Taiwan's former president, Ma Ying-jeou, made a historic visit to China amid rising tensions between the two countries. In his speech, he stated that "We are all Chinese," making this the first major political action of its kind since 1949. Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, Taiwan's current president, Tsai Ing-wen, embarked on a diplomatic journey to the US and Central America over the following two days. This highlights the dynamic nature of the issue. Speaking in her civilian capacity, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Chinese military expert and strategic planner at the United States Air Force's INDOPACOM, helps us to get into the minds of the Chinese military in seeing what she describes as “the most important issue to the Communist Party.” She also expresses her frustration to leaders across the globe for failing to take significant measures to deter a potential Taiwan war. She boldly predicts that the flashpoint is likely to occur in 2027. #Endgame #GitaWirjawan #OrianaMastro ----------------- Episode Notes: endgame.id/eps132notes ----------------- SGPP Indonesia Master of Public Policy: [e-mail] admissions.sgpp.ac.id wa.me/628111522504 Other "Endgame" episode playlists: Global Thinkers Wandering Scientists The Take Visit and subscribe: SGPP Indonesia Visinema Pictures

One thing I think some people overseas don't understand is how much the United States actually believes its narratives about sort of protecting those that can't protect themselves. Right. But the United States has learned historical lessons that when we stay out of things, things, you know, become a huge mess. I understand why China is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure for Taiwan, given where it falls in their narrative, given, given. party's legitimacy is based on standing up to the aggression and exploitation of foreigners if we do pursue arms control with China. I think we should trade in some of our nuclear capability for them to downgrade their conventional capability.

And we never done those types of asymmetric arms talks because usually it's like, you know, I give up some nuclear weapons, you give up some nuclear weapons. You know, on one hand, you should say like Southeast Asia should have all this influence. But does it? Hi, friends and fellows, welcome to this special series of conversations involving personalities coming from a number of campuses, including Stanford University. The purpose of the series is really to unleash thought-provoking ideas that I think would be of tremendous value to you.

I want to thank you for your support so far, and welcome to the special series. Hi, today we're with Oriana Schuyler-Mastro, who is a current. courtesy assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, but also a center fellow at the Fremont Spokly Institute at Stanford University. Oriana, thank you so much for coming on to endgame. Of course. Happy to be here. You've been very vocal lately about, you know, a situation in Asia. But I want to know how you actually got hooked with this thing, you know, when you were a kid and all that.

Were you always interested in geopolitics and security issues and all that? No, I would have to say, you know, when I was younger, I played the piano very seriously. I originally got it. I went to Stanford undergrad. I got in for piano and drama. I was kind of an artsy kid. Came from an artsy household. I started becoming more interested in the world because I spent my junior year of high school overseas in Italy.

And that's the first time I had really been overseas. And I was like, what is this about? So I did want to learn more languages because I do love learning languages. And so I started taking Chinese as an undergraduate. And from then, you know, I went and spent some time in China and learned basically the language first. And it was looking more at history, literature, culture type of topics. And then discovered international security my senior year of college. And then obviously my whole life took a very different turn after that.

And you're still active in the military in the U.S. Yes. Yes. So I'm a special type of reservist. It means I'm like a part-timer. I'm on duty about three months a year. So I don't do kind of the weekend or the two weeks, but I get called out to augment important missions.

So of course, here with you, I'm speaking to you in my civilian capacity. And my views do not represent those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of Defense. Is it tough combining the two being in the academic domain? and in the military domain? Yes. There are, the way that I do it, they also complement each other.

A lot of my research questions are driven by questions I'm asked at the highest levels in the U.S. government for which I feel like we have inadequate answers. And so that helps me do policy relevant research. And then to the military, what I bring is this expertise that is rare for junior officers of my rank

to have, be able to go into government, have the access and clearances that I can go in and help directly support versus writing an appet and hoping someone reads it and maybe makes a change. The real difficulty is common just the standard work-life balance of where do you find the time. So my daily schedule, it's like, you know, one hour a day I'm on the phone with like a general and then one hour a day I'm doing a podcast with you and then I have to go teach and then I do consulting.

So kind of fitting everything. then media appearances, so it's more fitting everything into the schedule can be stressful. But if I was supposed to be a strategist on important issues like China and Asia, if I can't figure out my own daily schedule, then maybe people shouldn't trust me on the broader strategic issues. Well, I want to thank you for the time. I know you've been very, very, very busy. But how do you find China today versus how you saw China when you were first learning how to speak?

Andrew. So I have to say part of it initially, I went through a number of evolutions. I think initially there was some naivete on my part, let me say, about the role of power in international politics. This is less about China and more that as a younger person, you know, I thought I wanted to grow up to be the ambassador to the UN because I felt like the UN was the most powerful entity in the international system. It was later when I got more involved in studying military capabilities that I realized how much the security realm can really drive politics overall.

My evolution with China, I think, follows China's evolution itself. I mean, I guess I'm considered a China hawk, but not by the Chinese themselves. I mean, people are always surprised to know I spend a lot of time in China. I love spending time in China. I have a lot of columns in China. But I talk about sensitive issues. So I'm less of a hawk than most people because I think the problem is China has conflicting interests with the United States and countries in Southeast Asia. I don't think there's anything inherently bad, inherently wrong or inherently evil about China.

I think they just want things that are not, at least in the U.S.'s best interests, and I would posit not in the best interest of many countries in Southeast Asia. So originally, and I'm finishing a book on this right now about China's approach to competition, they recognize. they were in a far weaker position, right, economically, politically, militarily. And so they had to be careful in building that power in a way that wasn't going to spark really strong responses. And so what I argue is that they do things somewhat differently than the United States, because then we fail to recognize the challenge, whether it's Belt and Road Initiative or gray zone activities in the South China Sea versus direct seizure of islands, having strategic partnerships instead of alliances,

all these sorts of things have allowed China to increase its power. And then it's not surprising that it's now gotten to a level where it wants to be treated in its mind as an equal to the United States

and doesn't want to be told what to do. And that's the stage where at now that, you know, my senior colleagues would argue that they were just better at diplomacy than my generation is. I don't think that's true, you know. They're like, oh, in the 70s and 80s,

you know, just so good at convincing the Chinese. I mean, the Chinese didn't have any choice, but to listen to the United States then. And now they have a choice. And so I think that makes things a lot more complicated. You've written so many articles, one of which alludes to how conversations are costly, right? Explain that. Right. So I wrote a book. I have it here, you know, on wartime diplomacy. Correct. So the question that I ask, you know, people, don't look at this as a separate issue, right? They assume like war start, then there's some sort of negotiated end. So I start with just this empirical fact that it's a separate obstacle to get countries

to the negotiating table that the strategic calculus that leaders make about whether to talk is independent from that of whether or not to actually end the war. If it wasn't, then we wouldn't see it be months, sometimes years between decision to talk and decision. to end the war. This is very relevant now and we're talking about Russia and Ukraine, right? How do you get the two sides to the negotiating table? And so what I argue in the book is, first, what is the obstacle? The obstacle is that

leaders think that their approach to diplomacy could hurt their fighting. No, we get it the other way around. I think it makes common sense. It's common sense that, you know, maybe you're at the negotiating table, so you increase your bombing efforts or something to get a better deal.

So we often think military impacts what you get at the table. But what I argue is that actually how you approach diplomacy might impact the war effort. For example, you know, if you go and it looks like you're willing to end this war

compromise, you know, with your enemies, it's possible that the people who are fighting for you might be like, why am I fighting this right now? Right. Are you going to end this war quickly? The opponent could, and this is the main driver, your opponent might think his strategy is working.

Right? If they're attacking and you're in this war effort saying, suing for peace might suggest things aren't going well for you. And so the other side might think, actually, this is a great time to really hit them hard. And so it's really this fear of escalation

that keeps countries from chalking. And so in the book, I go through a number of cases in Asia of wars there. And I have an article that goes through one conflict that's relevant to Southeast Asia, the 1979 war between China and Vietnam. And basically show that until states can get over this fear that a willingness to talk will look weak and encourage their

opponents to increase the violence against them, we don't see talks. And so I have a number of suggestions of how we get there, but it's sort of first identifying that primary challenge. What are some of your suggestions? Well, first and foremost, I think a country like the United States, which fights a lot of wars, you know, so it might be more useful for us than other countries, but I think we should have a blanket policy that day one of any conflict we're in, we're willing to talk. What this does is it takes away the information.

You know, if you're always willing to talk, then that switch from no, no, I'm not to I am, doesn't tell you anything. While that switch could tell you, I kind of won out of this war, it's not going well if you make that switch later. So having, we have some of these policies, like we don't negotiate terrorists, right?

That's like a blanket policy. We could just have a policy that for all conflicts in which we're a part of the United States is always open to negotiations from day one. Another thing, and this is more relevant for not great powers fighting, but smaller countries, is often having a mediator that has some influence in the conflict to, one, give you some deniability, but two, maybe offer positive incentives so that countries can be like, well, you know, yes, I feel like this war is going great for me. but you're giving me this benefit. So, okay, I guess I'll talk. So it allows you to deflect that sign of weakness. So in historical cases, like in the war in Korea, for example, China reached out to the Soviet Union and said,

hey, can you propose talks to the United States? See how the United States. Reddit responded. If it looked like the United States was going to think China couldn't continue fighting or something, then China could easily also say, no, we don't want to talk either. This was the Soviet's own initiative.

So it gives a different and unique role for mediators to give deniability to the different countries involved. And if it's powerful enough, provide guarantees that an escalation of violence will not occur once the side degree to discuss the issue at hand. I want to ask you about how China has become a lot less collective in terms of its leadership And how that would impact the viewtaking by Japan, South Korea, the United States with respect to what's going to happen with Taiwan. What is your assessment or view on this? So I know how in the West in particular in the United States, obviously, you know, democracy is the best of all systems.

And so there is this viewpoint that some sort of democratic consultation, you know, more more, more. players involved, the more likely you are to get to the best result. It is true that with democracies, you have less variation. You know, I'd like to say with like autocracies, you can have like really bad, you can also have good. The problem is it can be unpredictable and that variation is huge. With democracies, the variation is as much less, but sometimes it's kind of like, eh, you know, it goes for good, from good to a little bit better. Incrementally. There are downsides. in a decision-making process for a war and a democracy, right? The time it takes to deliberate. One of the main issues for the United States is how long it takes us to get to Taiwan's aid.

Well, you know, Xi Jinping can make this decision on the dime. So in one hand, you know, people say that he might have, you know, not useful information. He's personalistic. So maybe he's going for something like Taiwan for personal reasons. And so he's not weighing costs and benefits to the country at large. And then that is difficult to deter. right, because it's hard to impose costs on the individual versus the country. I have to say in the Chinese system, I don't really see that right now.

Xi Jinping has been very clear to his military that he wants to hear more about their failures and successes. In Chinese military, writings are very open about where their weaknesses lie and how to fix them. So I don't think that Xi Jinping is just getting a, don't worry about us, everything's going really, really well. is also getting, we're not ready yet for Taiwan.

This is what we need to do to get ready. The Chinese military has also undergone this massive military reform process, which has led them to now be close to having the military they need. And that type of reform was so massive and had so many hurdles. I mean, Xi Jinping's predecessors

recognized that the way the military organization worked, one of the key features was that it was dominated exclusively by the army, couldn't conduct a type of operation needed for Taiwan. It took a centralization of power and someone like Xi Jinping because he basically got rid of the whole system and built it from scratch.

It's like if a U.S. president got rid of the Pentagon and all the combatant commands, that takes a massive amount of power. And so, you know, I don't work on domestic issues. I will, you know, people say, and I believe them, they're experts that domestically, you know, there's fewer freedoms in China, economically, you know, maybe his constraints are hurting the market or innovation, or have you.

But in the military realm, it has led to a stronger, more professional military. And the ability for him to make decisions on his own quickly and the confidence that his military will execute what he says does give him an advantage. What's the likelihood of something not so good happening? with Taiwan. I think it's more likely than not in the next couple of years. So the reason I put the timeline, there is no deadline. Right. So it's not like they have to do this, they have to do it a certain period of time.

I do agree with kind of the 2027 timeline, but that's more connected to Chinese military capabilities. When after a series of exercises, I think their reforms will be in place smooth enough that they'll be able to do an amphibious landing on Taiwan successfully. In the meantime, if the United States or its allies and partners made any changes to their force, posture, foreign policy, economic approaches to convince Xi Jinping that he can't take Taiwan quickly without a major fight, then they're not going to do it. The problem is that we've been talking about this Taiwan issue for a long time, but no one's

actually making any of those changes that are necessary to enhance deterrence. We talk a lot about it. But we're not taking, I think, in capitals all around the world, we're not taking the degree of steps that are necessary to convince Xi Jinping. No, actually, this is not worth doing. And so in my view, in 2007, if the situation, you know, the pieces are on the board in a relatively similar manner,

and his military says, we can do this, we can do it quickly before the United States can intervene with force, countries in the world, in the region, in Southeast Asia, are obviously not going to get involved militarily, are going to be very reluctant to impose any serious sanctions on China. So maybe they face three to five years of token economic sanctions.

I don't think that's enough to convince Xi Jinping not to, you know, resolve this most important issue for the Communist Party. This is primarily because of his being resolute about Taiwan's being part of his legacy or... That's one part of it. I mean, one thing I like to remind people

is it's not like Xi Jinping's, He said, Taiwan was important to China. Like none of, he is, he has now been given the military that can do this because his predecessors have focused on modernizing the PLA precisely for Taiwan missions for the past, you know,

25, 30 years. So part of it, of course, I think, is Xi Jinping that he's more forward-leaning. He's more, seems a little bit more risk-accepted, though we're not talking about another Putin type of person. I think he's very pragmatic. If the costs that way the benefits, he won't do it. But he would like that to be a part of his legacy. But in my mind, that's only one component. If he didn't have the military to do it, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

Do you think that the United States is going to recalibrate its posture? Japan would, Korea would. As for that to be enough to deter anything that's probably, not going to be so good. So if you had stopped at the first half of your question, like, are they going to recalibate their posture? The answer to that is yes, right? Japan is already recalibrating, increasing their defense, spending, investing in offensive military capabilities, strike capabilities, which they've never had before.

The United States has been very focused. We just signed an agreement with the Philippines to open up, you know, some new bases. That is critical. I mean, the basically the only two places that are in combat radius, of Taiwan or the southwest islands of Japan and the northern Philippines. And so that was really a game changer. But then you go to the second half of your question

of like, is it enough? The bottom line with this Taiwan issue in my mind is there is a threshold that if we don't meet it, we can't deter China. So I'll give you a hypothetical example just to highlight this point. The United States, if we need 30 days to really come to the aid of Taiwan,

Taiwan needs to be able to hold out for things. 30 days. Right. So right now, the United States is invested in Taiwan's defense. Right. If during this investment process, we have great achievements in progress. And Taiwan goes from being able to hold out for seven days to 20 days. It's, it doesn't matter. We need them to hold out for 30. Right. So whether it's seven or 20, there is a minimal threshold for things. And so right now, a lot of countries are recalibrating. The question is, what they're doing, is it enough to meet some sort of minimal threshold

so that Beijing starts thinking, wait a minute, this isn't going to go my way. And I had an op-ed recently in the Washington Post, which I spoke about Japan in particular, that it's great that Japan is starting to take its own defense seriously. But they're not at a point where they're saying they're willing to defend Taiwan, right? So does that help us on the margin to have that Japanese support?

Yes, absolutely. Or is it just a typical Japanese who don't want to say it? Well, the problem, so let's talk a bit about strategic ambiguity, right? Because what the Japanese might say is like, we're not going to come out and say we're going to defend Taiwan. The United States doesn't do that either. The problem is they're very clear that they won't defend Taiwan. You know, so the strategic clarity is kind of going the other way. I don't need the Japanese to commit and 100% say, hey, we're going to, you know, be willing to attack Chinese ships making their way across the Taiwan straight.

But my sense from my trip there is that they're reassuring China that they won't do it. And so I would just like a lot more ambiguity, if anything, on what they're willing or not willing to do. Another thing I hear a lot not only in Tokyo, but in other capitals, so I don't want to pick on Japan. It's the same in the United States, is people will say, well, once the war starts, then we'll get our act together. I mean, that's just too late. Like in my mind, we talk when we can talk about what this war looks like, but my whole purpose is to deter the war from ever happening. So for us to be able to deter it, anything that is crucial has to happen before the war starts, right? And so that's why I need, you know, countries to make, especially the United States to make significant changes beforehand.

What about Korea? I don't want to say Korea is a lost cause. I just did. You know, Korea, in their defense, right, they have North Korea deal with. Okay. Fair enough. They are really inflexible, not only about involvement. The Koreans are not going to be involved in this war, but they are relatively inflexible

about allowing U.S. assets that are stationed in Korea to be used in this contingency. Their primary concern, maybe unlike some other countries who might want to sort of stay out of it or they don't want to upset China. I mean, South Korea is really just concerned of the United States. States leaves to go defend Taiwan that opens them up, makes them vulnerable to attacks from North Korea. So I had a piece in the Washington quarterly recently on, you know, what could Korea do to contribute? And a lot of the framework, I think, is more about Korea taking on additional responsibilities for their own defense so that if necessary U.S. forces could be freed up to do

something else. But we're not talking about any sort of direct involvement on the part of the Koreans. So you're saying that the probability of something not so good happening to Taiwan by China is not small. At the rate, you know, all these countries are actually recalibrating their military posture, right? How do you think the war in Ukraine is affecting the thinking of Xi Jinping and the Chinese with respect to whatever they might have in mind, you know, on Taiwan? So I think for the most part, it only confirms the things that the Chinese believed already. So it didn't fundamentally change their thinking. You know, from the lower level operational issues of the Chinese military would write extensively

about how important command and control logistics were to war fighting, right? And then we see Russia has issues with command and control and logistics. So China's like, okay, we were right to do all those reforms 10 years ago to get that stuff together. They were surprised with a degree of sanctions on Russia, but I don't think that makes them think that that is coming their way as well, largely because they have much more economic clout than Russia does. And even before Ukraine happened, Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, we're very focused on sanction-proofing China.

I mean, that's what made in China 2025 really is about, is having indigenous capabilities in certain areas, not relying on foreign technology, so that, you know, the outside world doesn't have this influence over you, putting overland pipelines for oil and other resources. This is largely the result of what they call the Malacca dilemma or the concern that in a major war, the United States would blockade the Strait of Malacca and they couldn't get access to material that they needed to continue to fight. And so they've been in this mentality and have planned for, of course, that the United States and potentially allies and partners would want to respond.

But they've also done the political work that Russia didn't do. I mean, in most of those strategic partnerships that are signed with the vast majority of U.S. allies and partners, there is a clause about, you know, how they're not going to let Taiwan get in the issue in the way of the relationship, right? The United States has a one-china policy that says that we recognize that the Chinese and both sides of the straight believe there is but one-China. We don't say that we believe that, right? There's nuance there. But there's some countries around the world that have a different kind of. of one China principle in which

they say, yeah, Taiwan is a part of China. And so then politically, there gets to be these questions of like, so wait, why would we fight China? If they take Taiwan, if we have said that Taiwan is already theirs, right? So they've done that political work as well to increase,

sort of decrease the likelihood that countries would come to Taiwan's support. I mean, even Japan has this, 2015 law and collective defense that they would say, you know, doesn't apply to Taiwan because Taiwan's not a country. So there's a lot of this that makes China's position on Taiwan different and stronger in some ways than, you know, Russia didn't prep the battlefield. I think we would say in like military terms.

They didn't prep the battles based enough before they went in. But China's been focused on this issue for a decade. Okay. We've kind of talked about this before. You've alluded to the asymmetry between China and the U.S. from a nuclear capability standpoint. Wouldn't that be enough of a deterrent? Which side? Which side do you think would be deterred by that? China, just intuitively, would be deterred by the much higher degree of nuclear capabilities of the U.S. So I think of nuclear weapons. If we go back to the previous threshold conversation,

the way that Chinese think about it is, you know, once you can inflict a certain level of pain, you know, the fact that you can destroy the world once, the fact that you can then destroy it seven times is irrelevant, right? Like, yes, the United States has many more nuclear weapons than China. But the question still remains like, what are the, what is the situation under which the United States is willing, not to use those nuclear weapons,

but because China also has them, the real question is, what is the situation under which the United States is willing to absorb a nuclear attack? And I just don't see it. Over, you know, whether we're right or wrong, a lot of elites in both China and the United States believe that they can fight this war purely conventionally.

I think we're lucky that the Chinese believe that. The Chinese have never. even when they were far weaker militarily, threatened to use nuclear weapons to deal with any sort of conventional issues. This isn't a Putin or a Pakistan that when things aren't going their way, they're like, okay, you know,

we might use nuclear weapons against you if you intervene. I mean, China has never said that to the United States. As much as they say all sorts of things about potential intervention, they never say that. And so because of that, I just think, like,

what would be the situation under which nuclear use would be credible from the U.S. standpoint. I feel the same way about Japan when they talk about getting nuclear weapons. I'm like, how is that going to help you? Tell me this scenario under which you're willing to have a nuclear war with China, like over the Sankakos?

Like, a conventional war, maybe, but a nuclear war, I just don't see, I just don't see that that's likely. So I don't think it's enough. I think the bottom line is, you know, both sides have nuclear weapons, yes. But

I think that has, that has not been enough, that might deter nuclear war, but that is not enough to deter conventional conflict below the threshold of nuclear war. So you're suggesting the asymmetry is actually going to inevitably force a situation to be a lot more conventional. Yes. Also, because of China's view on nuclear weapons. They just don't believe they have a war-fighting purpose.

You know, in the United States, right now, I'm really reluctant. You know, there's this panic about China's nuclear buildup. Right. And so I'm in all these discussions, which they're like. like, do we need to get more nuclear weapons? And I'm just like, you know, there were points in time, not that long ago in the early 2000s, which the United States spent more money

on its nuclear enterprise than China did on its whole military, right? China doesn't have tactical nuclear weapons. You know, the United States, a third of its budget on nuclear weapons are tactical nuclear weapons, you know, smaller, lower yield nuclear weapons you can use on the battlefield. Right. Part of this competition is also the fact that we have limited resources.

And so there is no difference in my mind between, yes, I think we had 47 more times nuclear weapons than China did 10 years ago. And now we're going to have like 40 times more than they did. But I don't think that really changes Chinese calculus significantly. I think their main concern is whether or not they have a second strike capability given U.S. advancements and missile defense. And so I would much rather see the United States investing conventionally. capabilities. And I'm working on a paper right now for CSIS, in which I argue somewhat controversially, that if we do pursue arms control with China, I think we should trade in some of our nuclear capability for them to downgrade their conventional capability. And we never done those types of

asymmetric arms talks, because usually it's like, you know, I give up some nuclear weapons, you give up some nuclear weapons, but I think it would enhance security in the region greatly if instead China was willing to give up some of those. of their missile capability is conventional. Yeah. And in exchange, the United States could, you know, get rid of more warheads. That is a trade that I'm willing to make. Interesting.

But somewhat of a controversial recommendation, I think. Okay, I'm going to try one more. If we take a look at, I'm going to try to, you know, figure out ways that would deter this. Oh, there's so many. If you take a look at the collective trait between the two countries, we're talking about $7 to $800 billion, right? That involves hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific. Don't you think that's going to put some sense or sensibility into the minds of the

leaderships of both to not do anything nasty? So first, let me say, there's so many things we can do to deter this. Yeah. I mean, that is like the number one part of why this is so frustrating. I think we started this conversation with you. Actually, if you keep talking about this, it's probably going to help deter. I think you initially said that I'm very vocal on these issues. I think that's like the nicest way that someone has put my position,

you know, on the sense of urgency that I'm creating. Because there's so many things the United States could do, as I've argued, if Japan said it would defend Taiwan, that's enough. If the United States was able to develop intermediate range ballistic missiles of significant numbers and put them in range of the Taiwan's trade, that would be enough. If the United States you know, Ford deployed enough forces

in southwest of Japan and in that Northern Philippines area and in particular anti-ship capabilities probably mostly submarines, more torpedoes, if we just managed to build more munitions so that we had enough munitions to sink the ships we have to sink, that would be enough. If countries said,

we're not going to trade with you, China, if you attack Taiwan, that is more than enough. So the saddest thing about all of this is, you know, it actually is really easy to deter China. And if this war actually happens, beyond the devastation of the war itself, I don't see a world in which if the United States is involved in the war in any way that we have a relationship with China, which is like the saddest part of all of it, because even though our countries have some, some conflicts, at this

stage in our competition, maybe this is anecdotal, but I don't sense any ill will between the people of China and the people of the United States. Right. You know, when I'm there, we're like, I talk to my colleagues and friends and we're kind of like, yeah, you know, we don't see eye to eye on this issue, but, you know, it's great to see you. You don't have a drink with them. You know, and we're still at that stage. The problem is that there are no indications. I mean, even with Russia, it's not like the United States seized Russian assets in the United

States. Right. We still kept the sanctions at a much lower level. We didn't go nuclear in the sanctions realm. So when people compare trade and things like that, the question is, just trying to think all that trade goes away forever, or is it just momentarily disrupted during the course of the conflict?

I mean, most large political science studies show that even in the largest scale of wars, like World War I and World War II, you know, on average, it takes economies five to seven years to go back to their previous pre-war levels. So the question is

like, is it enough? And I don't think countries have said, you know, I go to Southeast Asia, I was in Singapore recently. And this won't be shocking to you. I ask around, like, are you going to cease all trade with China if China attacks Taiwan? And the answer is no, right?

So that's why they're not deterred. We need the handphones. Right? That's why China's not deterred because countries aren't willing to impose those costs. But theoretically, if they were, yes, I think that would be enough. Okay. Meaning you're sort of like an agreement, that economic relationship. could be some sort of a deterrent in a big way, right?

But I see weaker wills on the economic side than I do on the military side. You know, I would like to see more European-NATO military involvement in Asia, not because I feel like they have any military role. I don't foresee any NATO involvement in this conflict. But more of a signal of their willingness to maybe absorb some costs that would tell Beijing that maybe they would take economic steps. So doing more military patrols or exercises with the United States and Asia that they know upset China might tell China, listen,

Europe's not afraid of upsetting you. And so I know we often focus on the economic side to signal your willingness to engage militarily, but a lot of countries, their main powers, their willingness to engage economically. And so how do you, you have to have that willingness first to suffer economically for the sake of, you know, making sure a war doesn't happen in Asia.

And what I like to say is, you know, deterrence is expensive, but war is more expensive. Right. So in my mind, it's worth the cost. But a lot of countries are still so hopeful that it will never happen so they don't actually have to do anything to prevent it from happening. And I think at least we have enough evidence to suggest that more has to be done on all of our parts. One final question on Taiwan. Do you believe or think that Taiwan,

ought to be an independent state? You can't ask me that question. I have no opinion about that. Or should we just play along with the strategic ambiguity? I see all sides. You know, it is my job. So, you know, I have different hats. My bread and butter is I'm a China specialist.

So I have to understand things from the Chinese perspective. Right. And the Chinese perspective is very compelling on this Taiwan issue. I understand things from the government of Taiwan's perspective. They're over there doing their thing, and they don't want to lose that freedom, especially the political freedom that they have. I get that.

I also get that the majority of the people in Taiwan maybe don't want to fight and lose their lives over that because they have no access to weapon or training. So what do we expect them to do against what is now one of the strongest militaries in the world if they're invaded? you get the U.S. perspective that, you know, one thing I think some people overseas don't understand is how much the United States actually believes its narratives about sort of protecting those that can't protect themselves. There's always this view that we're very geopolitical, right?

Like, this is for the oil and this is for this and this is for that. But there's actually this very deeply held belief of like, you know, the United States is the one that makes sure that the world. doesn't just go down a dark, dark hole that we're not in some sort of Hobbesian state of anarchy. And it's our job to protect those that can't protect themselves and like, who are we as a people if we think freedom is only for us? You know, so I get, you know, I get the U.S. perspective as well. That's what makes this so very difficult to, you know, wrap your head around. It's not the case that, you know, no one, you know, one side is clearly right. one side is clearly wrong. I understand why China is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure

for Taiwan. Given where it falls in their narrative, given parties legitimacy is based on standing up to the aggression and exploitation of foreigners, what is more of a symbol of the aggression and exploitation that they've had to suffer than the fact that Taiwan is still not a dejure part of China, whether it is the Japanese first taking Taiwan in their view. And And then the United States supporting the nationalist government, which did not have the support of the Chinese people. That's why the communist won, then fled to the island of Taiwan and set up a brutal dictatorship. And then the United States continued to support them with arms and all and all this stuff. And now Taiwan is a vibrant democracy.

But of course, that wasn't the case always. And so, you know, from China's perspective, this has always been like, why do you know, why United States? It's like, why can't you just stay out of this? but the United States has learned historical lessons that when we stay out of things, things, you know, become a huge mess. You know, maybe we can also complain that the United States make some messes,

but what we do know is when the United States has said... Well, the U.S. has made some mess in some other places, right? Right. But when we say, like, we're out, the mess gets bigger, right? At least that's the view in the United States. What I explained to my Chinese colleagues is there's the view that, To defend the U.S. homeland, we have to be in Asia.

Yeah. Right. If we leave Asia, then that's going to become a very dangerous place. And then those threats will inevitably reach the U.S. Right. And that's why it's so important for the United States to continue to have a role. And that role is being the security partner of choice. Two entities like Taiwan, you know, Japan, Australia, and others.

Without that, the U.S. role is greatly diminished. To what extent is it geopolitical or it is symbolic or it is technological? Taiwan is to China. I mean, there's TSMC there, which I think plays huge importance. I have never heard anyone in China bring up like TSMC when I talk about why they want Taiwan. Maybe they don't want to. So I will tell you that, and of course, their desire to have in their words like reunification was just as strong before TSM existed. Right.

So of course now, there's a difference between maybe motivators, like what would actually make or break this? Like if TSMC tomorrow moved all their fabs to the United States and there were zero fabs in Taiwan. Yeah. That would not change China's desire for this at all. But, so it's not really a motivator in my mind, but it absolutely has cascading effects. And it's an extra bonus, obviously, for China if they did control that industry. So that's just like another reason to do it. But again, to the threshold argument, we were already sort of maxed out on resolve to do it.

So adding this one more component, I don't think makes a big difference. I think it's largely security-based and sort of an ideational emotional thing that China believes that the United States will continue in their view to try to weaken them from within by playing the Taiwan card, as they call it. And so, you know, they can never finish this progress of rejuvenation, which is recovery from that exploitation that they experienced at the hand of foreigners for so long. as long as Taiwan can still be a tool for foreigners to disrupt or destabilize

or undermine what they're trying to do. So it does also serve as this component to say, you know, I haven't made it yet until I get to do this thing. You know, I think in all of our lives, we all have those things, right? In your own career, in your own job, you might have this like,

well, once I do this, then that's, you know, the end of, be all, and I can check it off my list. I've done everything. I need to do in life. And of course, then sometimes you realize once you get there that maybe it wasn't the endobial that you thought it was, but we do have these emotional attachments to certain goals.

And it's not only the Communist Party, it's the Chinese people that are really attached to this idea as well. Let's switch over to Southeast Asia. What's your take on South China Sea? I mean, is it a greater risk that China is going to be doing something there as opposed to Taiwan? Is it something that the Southeast Asia? Asians need to be a little bit mindful of more?

So there's a few different levels to this of the South China Sea. First, let me say, you know, before I started focusing more on this Taiwan issue in 2019, for 10 years, all I did was research it right on the South China Sea. I mean, one of my first projects, first jobs in government was to assess what China strategy was in the South China Sea after the 2009 impeccable incident when we had the first case of a Chinese harassment of a U.S. ship. South China Sea. And the, so we should be very worried, but less worried in some ways, only because of how much more easily China can win without fighting, which is not good for anybody, but it's

good for China. So let me sort of unpack that. The first is, unlike Taiwan, in which for China to have complete control over the island of Taiwan, like the government of Taiwan has to capitulate to that, right? I don't see a situation under which that happens that China is not occupying Taiwan for a period of time. So it's a different threshold of violence that is necessary to achieve that. What it looks like in the South China Sea to date is that China can establish full control over the South China Sea short of a large-scale war. And the other hand, China's full control of the South China Sea is worse, geopolitically

for the region, I think, in some way. than maybe, or at least equally as bad, to maybe be less controversial, equally as bad to them physically controlling Taiwan. Because they control the waterways, they control all countries' destinies. And when I was in Southeast Asia recently, one colleague said, you know, Oriana, you overblow, you know, this China threat is overblown. If you just do whatever China wants, then you're fine. And I could do nothing but agree with that statement. That is true. And I admit that different countries might have different levels of acceptance of how much a foreign entity can control their destiny.

I guess it depends on whether or not you're a claimant, right? I don't think so. Because for China, it's actually not about the islands, right? It's about controlling the South China Sea. And if you're a country like Indonesia, I would suspect. that you get a lot of what you need by ship. Yeah. And if China gets to decide whether those ships come to you,

and we know that when China has power and you do something they don't like, it doesn't end well for you. Right? So that might be, some countries might say, listen, I would rather live at the whims of China and not fight a war with China than, you know, then try to stand up to China. and fill. I will tell you from the U.S. perspective,

the United States of America has zero percent tolerance for foreign governments to determine our future, right? We have that luxury as... For a long time. The most powerful country in the world, and sometimes we forget that. And not all other countries have that luxury. I talk to people in the region,

and they're like, well, it's either the United States or China dictating things to me, but someone's dictating to a degree, you know, what can and can't be done. So I think this is a broader. question. And so for the South China Sea, that's what it's about, is really about the sovereignty of countries to make the choices that they feel are best for their people and their futures without having to worry about what China's going to do about it. And so every country is going to make their

own decision on that. But China's control over the South China Sea is going to largely, that will make China the hegemon in Asia and the United States will have a difficult time supporting countries. Now, on the other end, the reason, so I'm more concerned because it's so impactful, because I think China can achieve it without a huge military battle. And the reason I don't think at this stage that they would go the military route is, you know, besides maybe a situation with the Philippines, where the United States is not going to be involved. But they can't really project power effectively over the South China Sea right now. It's just too vast of a distance. You know, when I was in Beijing interviewing people about the South China Sea, I sort of asked about no fly zones, air defense identifications.

zones. Are you going to declare the waters between the Spradley's internal waters like you did for the parasols and aid is around? And the consensus was like absolutely China wants to do all those things. It just doesn't have the military capabilities to implement it yet. And so I think this is a similar thing that in around 2019, 2020, we started to panic about Taiwan because China's military capabilities was bringing a few things online that suggested they might be able to do this pretty soon. So with the South China Sea, things are just delayed. you know, probably in 10 years from now, we're going to be having the same conversations of

China can take all these islands by force. They can push everybody out. They can control all the water-wise. They could, you know, defeat the United States. So now we're all worried. But right now, if the United States were involved, they would have serious difficulties achieving their military objectives.

Is that likely to have? That the U.S. be involved? I think we, I think, the U.S. position on the, the South is trying to see that we tie it to our alliance commitments is actually not about our alliance commitments. This is, this is Oriana Master's view. You know, don't quote the U.S. government on this. But, like, it is about the U.S. role in the region and our ability to protect our own interests and security. And given what it means for China to be able to control

the most dynamic, economically important place in the world for the United States, I think that is something that we want to prevent from happening, regardless of whether it's the Philippines that they attack, or it's Vietnam that they attack, or it's, you know, Indonesia that they attack. I think the United States, it's still in the U.S. interest, as they say, to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. I think it's safe to assume that most Southeast Asians just don't think something that's going happen in the South China Sea. That's that's the psyche on the on the ground, you know, whether or not it's going to happen, we don't know, right? But I guess it's like, what does

bad mean? I'd be very surprised, like, what does China want this? Like, what is the viewpoint of what China wants in the South China? I mean, if China goes to the extent of controlling traffic on the water. And, and the other observation that I can share with you is that most Southeast organizations don't feel that they got to choose one or the other, whether they got to use a Huawei or an iPhone. It's like we seem to think that we're going to have the optionality for a long time. So the first thing I will say is that by not choosing is choosing. Because what China wants, what China wants is neutrality. Yeah.

Right. China wants... So it favors them. So it favors China. You know, China is asking countries, just don't do anything. So when countries say, okay, we're not, you know, we're just not going to do anything. China's like, great, I'm glad we're all on the same page with that. That's what China needs to win, right? China needs countries not to stop them.

That in some ways is it easier ask than what the United States needs, which is countries to support the United States and its efforts to, you know, push back on Chinese aggression. So China's ask as much easy. easier. It's a lot less risky than what the United States is asking, granted. But it is a choice, right? But it's it's a region of pretty large scale, right? We're talking about 700 million people with $3.5 trillion worth of economy. I just don't see Southeast Asia being able to be pushed that easily into thinking nothing is going to whatever. So I am not an expert on Southeast Asia, but let me just say a few things. The first is my senses, from what I know, that Southeast Asia is not acting in a coordinated

fashion, the degree that which we would talk about a NATO on the military side or a European Union on the economic side. We don't have a supranational type of. That is acting as a block in predictable and credible ways. So when you talk about the amount of people on scale, or the amount of people on scale. the amount of trade-on-scale. The question is, is that how China and the United States

thinks about it? Like, we do something wrong and we either gain or lose the support of Southeast Asia. I think for the most part, there's this view that you can pick people off, pick countries off, right? And say, oh, I got this country,

you got that country type of things. The other thing I will say, and this is a broader question for people working on Southeast Asia, there's some countries that we say, like, punch above their weight. Given all the same, stats we know about Southeast Asia. If I could make an initial assessment, I would say that Southeast

Asia punches below its way. And so the question is, you know, on one hand, you should say, like, Southeast Asia should have all this influence. But does it? And if the answers no, then the question is why. And that's, that's historical, cultural, right? That's how we've been able to eschew fatalities. Agreed. But at least when you come to great power. You know, we don't.

When you come to great power competition, right? Like what was China's, China's changed its approach completely 25 years ago. That's how it went from, you know, being a country whose economy was smaller than France's. Its military was smaller than that of Taiwan's, right, to be in the powerhouse it is today.

Yeah. if anything, if there's just one takeaway that I have from my research on my current book is that you have to think in an entrepreneurial and different way. You know, when I hear things, whether it's at Stanford or in government, I'm like, well, why do we do this? Well, that's the way we've always done it. I have zero respect and patience for that. Like, to me, that is like the most non-answer answer answer.

It means that you have no reason to do this thing. Like, give me the stats. give me, like, has this worked? Does it work for the United States to do the following? And how do we know? And have we ever tried anything different? And so we're entering a new realm. And maybe in that realm,

Southeast Asian countries want to continue this policy of, you know, not choosing, not having to be involved. But what I would posit is that even if that is the strategic end you want to achieve, as the international environment changes, your policies and your approaches are going to have to change to achieve the same goal that you've always wanted to achieve. If you just want to be chill and stay out of it, you're still going to have to do things differently than you've done the past couple of decades to be able to reach that stage. Fair. But you've got a guy that earns $1,000 a year.

Not a guy that earns $72,000 a year. It just seems kind of tough to get everybody in the same room to try to project some sort of a great power capability. in a collective manner. I mean, China, you know, when we talk about military afraid, we talk about unit cohesion, right? The idea of getting everyone to believe they're on the same team. I mean, China is so obsessed with this idea that they only have one time zone, you know,

when you're like to better change down. It helps if the society is homogeneous, right? Or if you create even a false sense of homogeneity, right? Like, I will tell you, like, China obviously is what they say, 52 ethnic minorities. Right. You know, I wouldn't, I wouldn't support their approach to how they promote homogeneity. But even in the military, when people talk about, you know, as a woman.

But they're hun. They're hun. For the most part, right? 90-something percent, 99 percent. So you have sort of how to deal. And in a lot of times, the approach to homogeneity. And again, not to say that this is a way to go, but I just think of like the U.S. military. People always say how women have been incorporated in the military.

But women have been incorporated by making us masculine. You know, like, why do we have. to have a three-year debate about whether we can wear ponytails. I think it's pretty clear that all of a sudden the fact that we have longer hair, it's like disruptive to everyone. I mean, we're supposed to look and act and talk the same way as men.

That's how they did that. Right? And so I'm not an organizational theorist or what have you, but there seems to be or, you know, with the European Union, obviously trying to appeal to some sort of higher purpose, hire something, have better coordination.

mechanism something so that the European countries decided that they would have more power as a block and they do, economically at least, than the EU. So maybe things just have to get really bad before Southeast Asian countries

come to a similar conclusion because it might be like, yeah, China's a problem, but so is the guy who lives next to me. So, you know, I'm going to deal with the most immediate challenge first. So that makes sense. That makes sense to me. I think what the United States is trying to do, and if we do it right, is to give countries

like in Southeast Asia, the idea that what the United States provides is ability to make those sovereign decisions. That what the United States wants is not for you to do what we say, but for you to have the power to make your own decisions. And that's something that we can give countries and want to give countries, that China does not, right? China wants weaker partners that it can control. That's not the U.S. approach to its partnerships. Hey, you've painted a pretty dark picture, but, you know, I know your time is very valuable. We got to go. Paint an optimistic picture for Asia, hypothetically.

Well, I think this is actually quite, I mean, Asia is the most dynamic region in the world, right? And so it's not, it's not, you know, the motivation, the pace of change, embracing. You know, I think about going to be, you know, going to China. And they didn't even have cash registers. They used to have like cardboard boxes you would throw money into. And they didn't even see a credit card. And now it's like in the United States, I'm still writing checks. And, you know, people in China, all they paid with their phones.

If we can establish like this military deterrence, a conventional deterrence in Asia so that China does not think that it can gain advantages. For both Taiwan and South China Sea. Yeah. Like, you know, it's not where they can't gain any sort of military advantage. from being aggressive and that the United States and China approach competition such that we're not fighting to the lowest common denominator, right? But we're both, both countries are inspired and motivated to be better partners, better investors, better players in the international stage, you know, so that this then benefits everyone in the world. I can see a place in which the

United States is more involved in Southeast Asia and so is China. And Southeast Asian countries are more focused on, you know, what, what they want to see out of those relationships and how they want the future to evolve. And we're all more prosperous and we're all safer. And that, you know, that is the future that I hope to create, obviously, for the people in Southeast Asia as well as for, you know, my own offspring, that they will be going to Beijing and going to Taipei and going to all these places when they're older and that they feel safe. and secure. And this is also why I don't support policies of decoupling or really harsh policies against China because I don't think it should be the U.S. policy to keep hundreds of millions of people in poverty. That's not how we should be thinking about this competition.

So if we can get the military component out of the picture and as a military expert who's criticized for talking about war all the time, I will tell you the only way to get in on the picture is for countries to have those military capabilities in place. so no side thinks that war is the answer. That's a great way to understand you. Thank you so much, Arnda. Yeah, thank you for having me. That was Oriana Scholar Mastero from Stanford University.

Thank you. This is Endgame.