ETF Edge - Preeminent Charles Ellis is “Rethinking Investing” 2/10/25

Episode Date: February 10, 2025

A founder of the index investing movement and author of “Winning the Losers Game”, Charles Ellis offers his new take on the markets. Fifty years on, find out what’s changed radically… and what likely never will.    Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The ETF Edge podcast is sponsored by Invesco QQQ, proud provider of access to innovation for the last 25 years. Investco Distributors, Inc. Welcome to ETF Edge. The podcast, if you're looking to learn the latest insights on all things, exchanged, traded funds, you are in the right place. Every week we're bringing you interviews, market analysis, and breaking down what it all means for investors. I am, your host, Bob Pazani. After winning the losers game 50 years ago, one lauded financial author is now rethinking investing. Here's my conversation with financial writer Charlie Ellis along with financial futurist Dave Naughting.

Charlie, thanks for being with us. You've got a new book out this week, Rethinking Investing. I read it. It summarizes your investing philosophy. You've been a champion of index investing and staying with the markets, not trying to beat the markets for 50 years. Here's a copy of the book we're showing right here. You were a very early champion of ETFs. This show is about ETF, so let me start with that.

What do you like about what? what you see in the ETF world right now? And is there anything that worries you about ETFs? Sure. What you've got to be really positive about is a terrific increase in the variety of ETFs are available and a reduction, some steady, steady reduction in the fees that are being charged. That's all good news. What you've got to be worried about is some of the ETSs that are being produced are much more for the salesperson.

than for the buyer. And they're too specialized, too narrow, or the ones that really bother me, and the ones that are highly leveraged so that you get explosive on the upside, but also explosive on the downside. So you've got to be careful. ETFs are an absolutely wonderful device. And what very, very effective, I use them. And everybody I know who's really with it with regard to investing uses ETSs. But you've got to be careful enough to use the ones that are appropriate for who you are and what you're trying to accomplish. Yeah, good point there. You, I want people to understand your place in history here.

You, along with, I guess, Burton Malkiel, who wrote a random walk down Wall Street, and the Vanguard's founder, Jack Bogle, you, three of you were sort of the intellectual architects of index investing 50 years ago. You were talking about this. That approach, indexing has clearly won out. But now we see the active investing community sort of reacting. some of them claiming passive ownership or indexing is approaching dangerous levels. Is there any truth to that? Does that concern you at all? Or is that just sour grapes by active

management? I think sour grapes primarily. It certainly doesn't bother me at all. When people talk about peak passive and other ways of describing, there are too damn many people going into passive investing, so it's got to be really wrong. They forget that the only thing that really matters is if you drive the really good active investors out of the business, then maybe you've got a problem because passive has got to be dependent on active managers who are really good. But candidly, the number of people that get hired into active management keeps rising. And we're way, way overloaded with talent in that area. And we're going to stay there as long as it's great fun, high pay.

and you might also make a small fortune on your own account while you're in there actively doing something for other investors. So this nonsense about peak passive, this is candidly just nowhere near on the money. The real problem will only be when people stop being active managers. And that's a long, long, long way off. Dave, you've written a lot about this. Peak passive, active managers. There's still plenty of active managers out there. I think there's still plenty of active managers around.

I understand Charlie's point here. I do think that there are places in the ecosystem where the prevalence of passive flow really does have an impact. If you look at things like just derivatives trading, you look at the amount of money indexed against the same 500 securities all around the world and swaps, derivatives, futures, you name it, that does have impacts mostly on the plumbing of how markets work day to day.

And let's remember also that almost all the new money coming into the market is coming into passive funds. And because of that, there is the sense that we're constantly bidding up the same securities and the same proportions, that leads to momentum effects. Do I think it's destroyed price discovery? Absolutely not. You can look at any given day and see the enormous divergence

between the best and worst performing stock in the S&P 500 to realize that price discovery is still happening. So the argument here is, I'm paraphrasing the ETF haters, the argument is passive investing essentially has been driving up growth stocks, and it's shrinking the pool of price conscious investors out there. And value investors bitterly complain that they don't have enough firepower anymore. But is there any merit to any?

There is some truth to that. But also it has to be put. Go ahead, Charlie. I always said there is a little bit of merit to each of the different points that's been made. But if anybody tried to measure it and you know darn well that every PhD candidate across the world is trying to find a way to outsmart the idea of past. or indexing. And the same thing is true with ETS.

They're just searching and searching and searching for something that they could report. Because if you're a PhD candidate, that would be gangbusters. They're not able to find it. We can talk about it must be there. And I will agree that it must be there. But the magnitude is so darn small that nobody's been able to measure it and say, Eureka, I've found it. Look, here it is.

It's not there. Yeah. I certainly don't think that there's any evidence that we're all of a sudden going to end up in a world where people are beating the market on the regular, right? I mean, I think the math here, which, hey, I learned from reading Charlie's books, right? The math here is inexorable, that it's really impossible to beat the market consistently. I mean, Charlie in his own book, in the recent book, points out that, hey, active management outperformance is possible.

You'll just never find it in advance, and that's the problem. Yeah. So the corollary is passive inflows continue. equity valuations might continue to climb sharply because it's just sure but we should point out there's no evidence that so just had the best year for active management inflows in the ETF market we've ever had yeah so it's not that nobody thinks active management should exist or it should exist in the ETF wrapper it's just the vast majority of new flows because they're coming in

from fairly unsophisticated individual investors go into big indexes and big target date funds. Charlie I want to get back to the fundamentals here for people who aren't familiar with your history here, your new book emphasizes the keys to long-term investing success. And they are saving, first of all, the power of compounding interest and using index funds and ETFs to minimize fees. This is sort of like Charlie 101 here. And you've devoted decades to studying this whole thing, active versus passive or index investing,

whatever you want to call it. One of the things that you will bring up regularly is S&P's annual spivis study, which shows over 10 years. years, 90% of large-cap fund managers underperform the S&P 500, 90%. So can you just, for people who aren't familiar with your work, because your work is seminal in understanding this, summarize why active managers almost invariably underperform their benchmarks for us? Well, the ironic but true answer is they're all so damn good at what they're trying to do

that they cancel each other out. They all have fabulous computing power. They all have access to Mike Bloomberg's terminals. They all have terrific models, quantitative models that they can follow. They have access to the most extraordinary amounts of research information available worldwide, and they've got terrific striving focus as individuals. They're really terrific people. They're very good at what they do.

The only problem is everybody else knows exactly what they know, as soon as they know it, and everybody else is smart as the Dickens, and they're all competing. And it's a little bit like playing poker with all the cards face up on the table and then betting for real money. It's really hard. And the problem they have is there are some modest cost of execution and operation, and that's what's showing up. Right.

The point is, this isn't because, Charlie's point is not because active managers are stupid or dumb, it's just the opposite. Most are now professionals and they're really smart, but they're all just competing against each other. It's a simple insight, but it's very profound. And Charlie's got a great section in the new book on this where he talks about how technology, far from being a competitive advantage for this firm or that firm, has actually been this unbelievable equalizer across active managers. So where once you might have had a better model, a faster computer, a better connection to the market, now every. everybody's got that. So if everybody's got all the information, to Charlie's point, getting an edge is extremely difficult. And the idea you as an individual investor are going to get access to that manager with that edge, danishingly small. And so why is active management still so

prevalent? Go ahead. Charlie. Go ahead. It's very helpful. You know, at my advanced stage, I'm 87. So what the hell am I doing paying attention to investment management these days? because I was around in the 60s. Then in the 60s, you could call it any corporate executive and say, I've done my homework, I'd like to come and meet with you. They usually invite you to stay for lunch. Then you get an hour of in-depth information from the corporate executive, trying to be sure that their stock price was fair,

or as high as it should be, as the best protection they had against corporate raters. Today, that kind of a conversation is a gap. the law. Nobody does that anymore. It's illegal. Greg FD. Yeah, and you know, arguably should be, but it is a leveling of the playing field that makes outperform it's incredibly difficult. Yeah. So the question people ask me all the time is, well, all right, if they always underperform, why do so many still use active managers? And you have what I guess you would call it a recency bias. Those who outperform get the publicity.

The financial press does this. We highlight whoever the active, hot active manager is and them stars. We're always chasing the hot dot. But again, another great part on behavioral finance in his book, Charlie talks about the fact that everybody thinks they're above average, right? Everybody thinks they're in the top 1% and therefore, therefore they'll be the one that will be able to pick that active manager who will outperform. It's very hard to convince people that they have to accept the average.

I want to talk about fees, Charlie, because you did a lot of work in this 50 years ago and we note this all the time. It's sort of conventional wisdom, but a lot of people think, well, you know, look, what's a 1% fee? or a 2% fee if the market goes up 10% every year. But as you point out, those fees dramatically eat away at long-term returns. So here we have a chart of returns on $100,000 investment.

This is from your book, 6.5% annual return. And you have a, look at the sort of 1% fee over 20 years. The return is 300,000. But if the fee is 2%, your return is 250,000. And if you're paying a 3% fee, your turn is only 200,000. This is a very simple way to understand how 1% compounding over many, many years. This is a lesson in compounding makes a huge about of difference here. And there are various ways to do this.

I'm taking this right out of your book, Charlie. But again, I think people have a much better understanding that, yeah, actually 1% does make a difference or even a half percent. When you're dealing with decades, when you're dealing with a lot, a long period of time. Fortunately, fees have come down, Charlie. I mean, remember, back in the 60s, it wasn't unusual to see 2% mutual fund fees. Right now you can get S&P 500 for three basis points. Typical ETF fees are below 30 basis. Yeah, 25.

Yeah. 25 or so. So it's a huge difference. One of your main thesis is, I'm going on here, I'm hitting Charlie 101 here, has been to stay invested and don't try to time the markets. Now, you had a chart in their book. I'm going to reproduce this right here that looked at 10,000 trading days between 1980 and 2016. I like the round number here, 10,000 trading days. U.S. equities returned 11.4% in those 10,000 days.

That's 1980 to 2016. But if you were not in the market on the 10 best days, just the 10 best days out of 10,000, your return instead of 11.4% would be 9.2%. And if you were out of the market, the 20 best days, the return was lower to 7.7%. And if you took the 30 best days, you were out of those days, you're 6.4%. The obvious point being here is you have no idea when these best days might occur. Therefore, market timing, you think you can go in and out and choose those best days.

And the math doesn't work the other way, by the way. If you avoid the worst days, it doesn't make it. One call on the best days. They're usually followed. they usually follow after the worst days. Yeah, yeah. But the point here, but if you're not in the mark on the worst days, you do have.

Yeah, the counter to that chart, I put that chart up on slides before too. Some people will say, yeah, but you're out of the bad days. They're more good days than bad days. That's why markets go up over the long term. I mean, that sounds really silly to say out loud. But if you're missing the 10 best days in the market and you miss the best, the worst 10 days in the market,

you're still much worse off than if you just stayed in best. The math on that's pretty hard to argue it. I'm going to stay with Charlie 101 here. We're going to go right through the key points, but several chapters in your book discuss behavioral economic biases. Did you want to say something, Charlie? I'd just like to emphasize. At my advanced age, I've been around for a long, long time.

I put down everything I thought was important for someone else to know, and it took only 100 pages. And anybody can sit down and read through 100. pages. That's why I think the book, which I call rethinking investing, has a real offer to many, many people. Okay. So I want to go back to this point here. Again, we're doing Charlie 101 here, several chapters talk about behavioral economic biases. And those of you aren't familiar with, these are biases that literally infect your thinking and throws off the way that you look at things. And it's a problem for the overall market. Now, you list several different

kinds of behavioral biases in the book here. Let me summarize a couple of them here. Overconfidence, which is probably the most common one, we sometimes called the gambler's fallacy, belief that because we're right picking a stock, for example, we'll be right picking all other stocks. Overconfidence. Jumping to conclusions, where you act on only partial knowledge,

so you allow whatever your first piece of information you have to dominate. Confirmation bias is another classic one. You only seek information that confirms your pre-existing You don't look out for other comments that might contradict what you're thinking. Herd mentality where you're blindly following the actions of other groups, very typical as well. There's what's called a framing effect.

And again, this is all in Charlie's book. The way outcomes are described affects the judgment. So for example, you could say people react differently when they say you have a 90% survival rate versus a 10% mortality rate, even though that's virtually the same thing, people react differently when you frame it differently. Then there's the availability bias of being influenced by. easy to see information, whether it's on TV or not or tips from TV, commentators, or commercial, and that's all you do.

You just use that. Let me go through one or two more. There is anchoring, which we talked about before. First piece of information and hindsight, the belief that you predicted event after it occurred. Finally, and I'm going through a lot of these here, but there's a sunk cost one. You're investing in a failing investment. You don't want to take yourself out of that. And this is related to loss aversion, that your fear of a loss is much.

much greater than the expectation of a gain. So people tend to hang on to their losers a lot longer than letting their winners ride. And then there's an endowment effect, assigning a higher value. I own the stock. I own this coin, whatever, I think it's worth more than it actually is. There's a lot of them in here. But, you know, this is one of the reasons, Dave. Stock prognosticators are so terrible.

These biases literally infect them. Dozens of them. They infect your brain and they throw off your ability to make accurate. Absolutely. And that's why I love the example Charlie uses in the book of like, nobody actually wants to be on an interesting airplane flight and you don't want to be in an interesting investment for the same reasons. Indexing works because it's boring and it helps you overcome an enormous number of these biases simply because you'll pay less attention to it. The quote I have down here is benign neglect has worked great for index investors. I think that's the quote

of the book. Yeah, absolutely. So go ahead, Charlie. But most of the time, if you go back 50 years ago, everybody really focused on trying to beat the market. Now, if you look at the reality, it's virtually impossible to beat the market. So what could you do? And the answer is, work away attacking the other direction, instead of trying to get more, try to pay less. And that's why ETFs, as you pointed out, over and over and over again, have made such great sense. And then avoiding behavioral economics and the penalties. If you look at the data over time, everybody who studies it comes up with about the same answer,

it costs the average investor 2% a year to make the kinds of mistakes we all make. It's not some other guy makes them. We all make these mistakes. Then we make them in an unrelenting focus. So when you look at it in all fairness, if you could avoid the cost of high fees and you could avoid the cost of behavioral economics mistakes, you'd really be well off. And that's where you come back to your point about benign neglect is such a good thing to have going and investing. And the great thing about indexing and ETFs is, as you pointed out, they're boring. So we leave them alone.

and they do work out over the long run very, very handsomely, in a way that we all ought to be really looking for. You don't mind I drop in one last thought. Most of us say long term is six months and ten days. That's what the tax man says. That's not us. We start investing in our 20s. We're still investing in our 80s.

That's 60 years. How many of us actually think about and put to good. good use, that long, long, long term reality. It's terrific opportunity for all of us to rethink our investing. Yeah, that's a great point. But people, there's a couple chapters in my book about this, citing Charlie too, about why people are so bad at predicting the future. And it's astonishing, if you're a stocks report, I've been 35 years at CNBC.

And the first thing you'll notice, even after five years is everybody's terrible at predicting the future. The individual investors are terrible, professional investors are terrible. The Federal Reserve is a terrible track record. But there's a very good reason. It's because we're people, right? All the things that are going to happen in the future are happening because of people. So people trying to predict people always works out terrible. Well, but the point is that there's a couple of reasons why it's in bed.

As Charlie points out, or the research points out, the behavioral biases infect your thinking, number one. And number two, the inputs that go into predicting the future are really very big. I always take the example of a caterpillar analyst. His job is to predict where caterpillar's price is going to be in earnings one year from now. You'd think, how car could that be? It's one company. It turns out there's millions of variables that go into determining that, including the health of the CEO or the macroeconomic picture. So the complexity of the global environment combined with these biases makes it really, really difficult to predict what the future is.

That's why staying investing is sort of the lot. alternative. I want to move on. I'm still on Charlie 101 folks. One of the things Charlie talks about is what he calls the total financial portfolio, which is a way of looking at your total net worth, not just what's my 60-40 stock bonds and my 401k. And Charlie, your point is that when you look at assets, total assets, things like Social Security, for example, they, Social Security should be considered a bond-like investment. Essentially, it's an inflation-protected annuity. And an average investor, your point has been, should be able to tolerate a higher level of stock ownership.

Can you sort of explain that when we talk about total financial portfolio that includes everything like bonds, home equity, social security, other assets? Yeah. I just think all of us make the mistake of looking at stocks and bonds and cash and saying, that's my portfolio, and then what's the mix? And I think it would be really helpful if everybody would take a look at the present value of that wonderful stream of future incomes that are going to come from Social Security. That's a for most people, that's a very substantial asset. We don't talk about it. We don't measure it. We don't quantify it.

But it's a substantial asset. Now, it would be very surprised if you don't have something on the order of $250,000 to $350,000 coming your way through Social Security. program. And then if you look at the home, that each of us said, I'm not going to sell my home. I agree with you. But your children or grandchildren or great-grandchildren will decide that want to live in a different neighborhood, then they will sell the house. So it's got an economic value. Why not recognize it when you're thinking about what is it that you're dealing with? And if you blend those two, and if you want to add in collectibles, if you happen to have art on the wall, that's really terrific, or if you have wealthy people,

parents that are going to give you an inheritance of the future, any of those things that you really know are value. Why not include them in your thinking so that you won't overweight yourself in fixed income? And the other side, if you don't mind my adding on is almost anybody looking at the reason for holding bonds talks about the desire to reduce the fluctuations. Well, you can reduce the fluctuations another way around. The way in which major universities, have all developed a spending rule that draws on their endowment a certain percentage every year. And they then average that over 10 years or 20 years, whatever length of time you want.

I would personally go for 10 years as being plenty. What was the price on your birthday for 10 straight years? What was the price on your wedding anniversary for 10 straight years? What was the price Fourth of July for 10 straight years? I don't care what date you choose. but really care about getting a spread over a decade. And then use that as your base, you don't give a damn about the fact that the stock market goes up and down because the flow going into your spending will be so much more reliable.

Right. So his point about Social Security makes a lot of sense to me. People say, I have too much risk. I can't have 60% of my 401k in stocks. And yet when you look at your total portfolio, as he is saying, and you consider Social Security as a bond-like investment, actually you could tolerate much more stocks. What we just did was make the case for financial advisors, to be honest, because a good financial advisor does exactly this. They sit down with a client and they say, okay, great, here's your portfolio, let's talk about your house, your job, your career, your kids.

All of those things have to fit in when you're deciding how much risk you're going to take with a given part of your wealth in the market. So whether you're doing that on your own, in which case you need Charlie's advice here to really go. through and build your own household portfolio, your total net worth, or you work with the financial advisor who will help you figure that out. Yeah, important thing here. Charlie, what about other assets out there? How about gold and Bitcoin? Are they parts of, you could see the Bitcoin industry trying to convince the average investor

that cryptocurrency should be an asset class by itself. How do you look at something like that? Well, I've always thought it was a very good idea that Warren Buffett shared. which he didn't like to invest in anything. He didn't think he understood. I don't think I understood Bitcoin. And so I've just accepted the fact that that's not me, and I don't know how to do that sort of thing.

So I'm not going to. And gold? I've been covered gold for 25 years now. A lot of people argue it should be 3% to 5% of your portfolio. Gold was money. Gold does have certainly make an argument gold's been around a lot longer. It does have some aspect as a store of value. been money in the past. Any thoughts on that?

Yeah. Again, I don't think I understand gold and gold pricing, but the things that I have learned lead me to believe gold is not an investment because it doesn't produce increasing value. It's a speculation on what other people are going to decide they think gold is worth in the future. And candidly, that's not the way I'd like to invest. Now it's time to round out the conversation with some analysis and perspective. to help you better understand ETFs. This is the Market's 102 portion of the podcast.

Financial Futurist Dave Nott. It continues with us now. A great discussion with Charlie Ellis, one of the great investing legends. But I want to talk about 2025 ETFs. We have seen a rash of sort of wild filings from ETFs. Single stock leverage. I don't know.

UFOs. UFOs? I missed that one. There's a UFO disclosure ETF that's been filed. And at least those have been filed. Look, here's the honest truth. We are in the wild west of the ETF development. There is an assumption being made by most of the ETF industry that everything is now fair game and that the SEC is going to rubber stamp anything that comes over the desk. Why I think there's some truth to that is normally what happens is you file a slightly weird or crazy product at the SEC. It sits there for two or three days and then miraculously those filings get pulled because the

made a phone call and said, we'd rather not have to actually disprove your product, we'd like you to make it go away. That's how the process has worked my entire career. So what's happening here? Now we're seeing these things file and they're sitting there. Well, what things? Give me a... So Tuttle filed for the UFO Disclosure ETF. We already have leveraged versions of the Trump and Melania meme coin ETFs. Now, none of those have been approved yet, but usually what happens is these things get pulled very quickly. Most of these most of the stranger products that have been filed are filed as regular old boring 1940 act ETS, right? Which means that after 75 days they kind of rubber

stamp automatically getting approved unless the SEC proactively stops them or asks them to be pulled. We haven't seen any of that yet. So do I think all of them just slide through into the market? No. Do I think a lot of stuff comes to market that investors and advisors are probably not ready for? Absolutely. So yes, as you pointed out, single stock leverage, a rapid expansion of what's available on the crypto ecosystem. So this is a buyer beware market? It is the most buyer beware market of my lifetime. Because everything is so crazed and speculative. Yes. Look, there have been 100 products already filed this year, which puts us on pace for about the biggest year ever. That would be 1,200 products in the course of a year, which would by far be the largest long year ever. We're on track

roughly for another trillion dollars coming into, we're 106 billion inflows so far three six weeks into the year. So it's gonna be a big year. But the new stuff, the stuff that's making the headlines is almost exclusively either what I would, let's just call it all hot sauce, crypto leverage, single stock stuff, really narrow and wild themes, and then a little bit of rational stuff, the rational stuff being some of the products doing things like defined outcome, trying to put buffers on portfolios, some of the products generating yield from volatility. Some of those products are good.

Some of them are chasing very, very volatile underlying stocks where I'm concerned what's going to happen when we actually have a bare market for five minutes. Is there a systemic risk in any of this? I think the systemic risks are in probably two places. I'm always concerned when we start throwing leverage into the system and nobody's really paying a lot of attention to where it's landing. of the leverage in the single stock complex is ending up in swaps, which means they just disappear from scrutiny. That leverage lives on balance sheets. Largely, it ends up living in the margin

inside the options and futures markets themselves. But it's not being particularly well-tracked by anybody in the industry. There's no regulator monitoring that on a day-to-day basis. We just, if people want to make the options market- We don't even know how big the derivatives market is in general. Well, this is my point is if the options market wakes up tomorrow and decides to be four times is big and all of the counterparties want to do that, then the options market is just four times as big tomorrow. That's a tough thing to do in say here at NISI where you have to actually go IPO a new security. Like you have to get somebody to pay attention and put new money in.

You don't have to do that if all of a sudden people want to trade five times more Tesla options tomorrow than they did today. Yeah. And what about crypto filings? We're talking Solano now. We've got other things. Yeah. And here's the problem with this is we're doing this way ahead of the curve on regulation. I'm very pro-cryptial. I'm very pleased that Hester Pierce is the one doing this work at the SEC. Lots of other things I can complain about, but I've been pushing for this for a long time. Stable coin regulation, understanding what's a real security. All for it, let's get that.

These filings are way ahead of any clarity on that front. So when you're filing for a 2x Trump coin ETF, how do you even know what regulatory environment? We don't know what a meme coin is in this new environment. Is it a security that you can roll up in any? I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. So we're actually getting close to that point where we're going to launch products without understanding anything about the regime that they're living in. Yeah, yeah.

It is a bit of a wild west situation right now. Yeah, a lot of it depends on what ends up being, I mean, you could sort of say this about 2025. The disconnect between the big scary headlines and what actually ends up happening is going to be wide, and we're not going to know that in advance. And yet, most of the money still goes into boring plain vanilla ETFs. ATFs, it's still pretty small. Even the so-called active management is really just index plus stuff, a lot of it.

A lot of it, although, you know, 20% of flows last year, those are real numbers, right? That's real money flowing in active management, and it's not all just, you know, S&P Plus. You know, there's a lot of real active management under the hood there, too. So I think that we will see flows into this stuff. I actually think that this is where the next leg of growth is coming from on an assets basis. It's not like there's a giant. So what we need is it's sort of, you could argue, that a modest correction would stop a lot of these flows. I mean, historically, when we'd had these irrational exuberance moments to bring that back, they tend to have blow off tops and then a lot of the speculation ends up going away.

I suspect we'll see something like that. Dave, thanks very much for joining us. It's pleasure, as always. That does it for ETF Edge, the podcast. Thanks for listening. Join us again next week or head to etfedge.cc.combec.com. How does InvescoQQQQQRewRewrink Possibility? by rethinking access to innovation and the NASDAQ 100.

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