Fresh Air - Could the Iran war lead to WWIII?

Episode Date: March 17, 2026

With the Strait of Hormuz blocked, policy expert Karim Sadjadpour says the war in Iran is becoming increasingly complicated: "I don't think President Trump ... understood what he was getting into." Sadjadpour spoke with Terry Gross about the historical context of the conflict, the four priorities for the U.S. government, and the likelihood of escalation to WWIII. To manage podcast ad preferences, review the links below:See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for sponsorship and to manage your podcast sponsorship preferences.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

This is fresh air. I'm Terry Gross. Iran's new supreme leader, Morshtubukhammi, is the son of the former supreme leader Ayatollah Khomey, who was killed in an Israeli attack at the start of the war. How does Morshtonab compare with his father? And what kind of leader might he be? Before the war, the Ayatollah's regime massacred thousands of protesters. President Trump sent the protesters this message. When we're finished, take over your government. It will be. be yours to take. But has this war helped the protesters? And are we on the verge of World War 3? Those are some of the questions my guest Karim Sajapur will address. He's one of America's leading experts on Iran. He's a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. He's also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and a contributing writer at the Atlantic. His parents are Iranian, but he was born and raised in the U.S. We recorded our interview yesterday. This morning, we learned that an Israeli attack killed Ali Larajani, the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He was close with Ayatollah Khomeini and was expected to be a close advisor to Moshiba. This morning, we asked Karim Sajapur about the significance of Larijani's death. He says, quote, Larajani was one of Iran's most powerful men.

a ruthless pragmatist. After the Ayatollah's death, Larajani was one of the men running the country. At a time when the regime's survival is at stake, Larajani's decades of domestic and foreign policy experience make his loss a significant blow. For a revolutionary regime whose political ideology is premised on martyrdom, the central question is whether these assassinations will ultimately extinguish the ideology or help revive it. Unquote. Here's our interview.

Karim Sajadpur, welcome back to fresh air. So, the official successor to the Ayatollah is his son, Moshiba. He hasn't been seen by the public. We don't know what his injuries are.

Do we know if he's the one who's even running the country, even though he was voted by the council who does the official voting to be the successor? Well, it's great to be with you, and the honest answer is that the inner functionings of the Iranian regime are right now for us a black box.

It's inaccessible to us. On paper, Mujah Bha-Kamani is the most powerful man in the country. But I think in practice, really, it's the revolutionary guards and the military who are the power behind his throne. He's inherited an incredibly difficult position in that he's been injured, the missile strike that killed his father and his mother and his wife injured him. He was reportedly in an adjacent room. What I've heard from sources inside Tehran is those injuries are not life-threatening, but he has been injured. He's obviously got to be an enormous emotional distress, given that he's lost many members of his family. And the Israelis are actively trying to kill him. So he's probably in hiding underground somewhere.

and he's not someone who has really any experience in senior leadership roles, even though he operated in the shadows. He was his father's right hand for many years. He's never formerly held a senior position. The Iranian public doesn't know him. His image, his voice are not familiar to people. And so he's inherited this incredibly difficult position in that he's now meant to rule a country,

which I would argue overwhelmingly, dislikes him in the regime, and he's fighting a war against the greatest superpower in the world, the United States, and against the greatest military power in the Middle East Israel. So you said that the Revolutionary Guard and the military right now are running the country. Are they all on the same page? So the Revolutionary Guards are approximately 150,000 men, and so they're not a monolith, and you have internal views amongst them. but the senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were all handpicked by Ayatollah Khomey,

who ruled Iran for 37 years. And so they, by and large, are individuals who are loyal to what I call Vision 1979, the principles of the 1979 revolution, chief among them being antipathy toward America and Israel, and this ideology of resistance. And what the regime decided to do before it was attacked was essentially to decentralize their military structure. Instead of having one general in Tehran who's commanding orders to everyone, they have essentially 31 different units that are, as far as we can see, operating somewhat independently from one another.

It's like 31 legs of an octopus. And for that reason, you've seen an Iranian retaliation. strategy that has really been all over the place. Because there's no central commander. But do they agree on the basic principles of upholding what the father, the Ayatollah Khomeini, stood for? Absolutely. On that point, they all have seemingly closed ranks around, obviously, number one, paramount for any dictatorship is regime survival.

And two is this belief that we're not going to abandon our. principles. We're going to uphold our principles of defiance against America and Israel. And up until now, Terry, I think they believe that their strategy has been effective in that they've been able to spike the price of oil and they've been able to negatively impact popular opinion in the United States. We see from polling that perhaps three out of four Americans oppose this war. And they're hoping that President Trump is going to be restrained by popular opinion in the United States and be forced to abruptly end the war. So if Israel succeeds in assassinating Moshdaba, the son of the Ayatollah, who's next in line, do you know? So I'd first start off by saying that I don't think this is a one assassination regime, even if they manage to kill Moshabaham.

which Israel has really penetrated the inner workings of the Iranian regime. And so it is well possible that they do succeed in killing him. I suspect if they were able to do that, there will be another senior cleric with a very similar worldview to Mujtabha. There's different individuals who have been mentioned. There's one guy called Eiji. There's another guy called Adrafi. they, I would say, all kind of will broadly support the principles of 1979, vision 1979,

and whoever would potentially succeed Mosheba Khomeini would likewise, in my view, be really controlled by the military, at least early on. Yeah, in 1979 was, of course, the year of the Iranian revolution. That's right. So Trump has said that Moshtaba might already be dead. Is that speculation or did he have some kind of grounding on that? Well, obviously, the presidency's intelligence that I'm not privy to. What I've been told from people inside the country who some of them know Moshab almane is that he's alive. The injuries that he suffered were not life-threatening.

but, you know, that could also be incorrect information. We don't know, and part of the reason why we don't know is that Iranians haven't given any concrete evidence that he's alive. Most of a Khomeini gave his first message, his first speech as supreme leader, but it was read on official state television. He didn't deliver that speech. What someone told me is that he's not someone who's capable of public speaking. He's never really spoken publicly. Whereas his father kind of rose to power because of the power of his oratory, the son was in many ways kind of a coddled dictator's son.

And that was given to me as the explanation for why he didn't speak publicly because his first public speech would not only be watched by 90 million Iranians, but the entire world is waiting for him to speak. I suspect that they also don't want to give any information about where he's currently located for fear that he's a strong target of assassination. Let's continue the comparison between father and son. The way you describe it, the son is not nearly as smart, as good as speaker, as well read. He doesn't speak English like his father. His father studied Western and Islamic texts.

He was a great speaker. He was smart. He was more charismatic. So I'm reminded of an observation which the North African historian Ibn Khalduin made in the 14th century. He talked about how empires are built and destroyed over three generations. And the first generation are men who have fire in the belly. They're the builders. When it reaches the second generation, they're the consolidators.

They consolidate power. And when it reaches the third generation, by no fault of their own, the third generation are born as princelings. And they're not born with the grit and the fire in the belly of their grandparents. And the Islamic Republic of Iran has entered its third generation leadership. Mosheh Bahamini is the third generation. The father of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was Ayatollah Khomeini. He was the guy who had the steely determination and fire in the belly to create this theocracy.

He was succeeded by Ayatollah Khomeini, who ruled for 37 years and consolidated the power of the Islamic Republic. And now when we arrive at Moujtahomani, he's someone who, as I said, is operated in the shadows all of his life, whereas his father spent many years in prison as a revolutionary political prisoner. suffered torture. You know, he did a lot of dastardly things to rise the ranks of power, and he oversaw a state which during his watch probably killed tens of thousands of its own citizens, as recently as last January when there were popular protests and a massacre which took place. And Mosh Tabah Khomeini has not served in any of those roles. He wasn't a revolutionary leader. He wasn't a revolutionary. He's inherited power. And so by virtue of that fact,

I'm skeptical, Terry, that Moshabah Khomeini is going to be Iran's new powerful leader who's going to be with us potentially for decades to come, like Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. You think that one of the reasons why Moshiba might not last long, or even the person maybe who would replace him if he, if Moshiba is assassinated, is that Iran for its own survival needs to switch from its basic organizing principle being like the U.S. and Israel are the great Satan's to nationalism, to something more positive like building the economy, modernizing, like a lot of the Gulf nations have, including Saudi Arabia, which have moved away. from dependence on oil and gas to, you know, modernize to create an economy based more on tourism

and, you know, other things that they can export. Can you elaborate on that? So that's a very good question, Terry, because if you look at the countries in the Persian Gulf, who I would argue have kind of this rivalrous relationship with Iran, the three ones that get the most attention are the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. And the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular have very different national visions for the country than the Islamic Republic of Iran. As I mentioned, Islamic Republic of Iran's organizing principles since 79 has been death to America, death to Israel, the mandatory veiling of women, which Ayatollah Khomeini once called the flag of the Islamic revolution. And those Persian Gulf countries,

Their visions are forward-looking visions. Saudi Arabia calls its vision, Vision 2030. The United Arab Arab Emirates has a version of that, Vision 2031. And they have very different outlooks for the region. The Gulf countries, their security is premised on partnership with America and Israel. Those countries are really trying to socially reform. You know, the UAE, for anyone who's been there, is socially a person. pretty free place. Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, is trying to lead a social revolution,

whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is anchored in social repression. In the regional context, they also have very different visions. Iran is a country which had been dominating five Arab lands, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. What did all those five places have in common? There were all essentially five failing states. And Iran's ideology, the Islamic Republic's ideology, thrives when there are power vacuums and state failures, and it can fill those vacuums with its militias like Lebanese, Hasbullah. Whereas the Gulf countries, they need stability. You know, they are trying to become international hubs for tourism,

for transportation, for technology. And you can't have that if there are constant wars or insecurity or, you know, your airports are being threatened. And so these countries are very different visions for their future. and the Iranian public has no interest in vision 1979 anymore. It's a population, the vast majority of whom were born after the 1979 revolution. My line about them is they want to be South Korea, not North Korea. And Mosheba Khan's vision is for a Shiite North Korea.

And I just don't think there's many takers for what he's selling. And everything you mentioned about the strengths of the Gulf countries who are modernizing, those are the things that Iran is attacking, the hotels, tourism, modernity itself, like the airports. So Iran's strategy seems pretty smart, like horrible, destructive. But for Iran itself, for its survival, it seems like a smart strategy, including not allowing ships into the Strait of Hermuz and threatening to shut down the Red Sea. You know, Terry, I did a Fulbright scholarship in Beirut two decades ago, and one of my biggest takeaways from that year in Beirut, a country which Lebanon has suffered from terrible civil war, Beirut, which once used to be the Dubai of the Middle East, is that it takes decades to build

places and it takes weeks to destroy places. And those countries have spent decades, and trillions of dollars trying to become, as I said, hubs for artificial intelligence, transportation, media, entertainment. And they recognize that the Islamic Republic of Iran can come by with its missiles and pretty cheap drones and destroy what they've sought to build. And you see that economic asymmetry in their attacks on the global economy as well. So on the Strait of Hormuz, which on any given day, 20% of the world's oil passes through that corridor in the Persian Gulf.

A lot of the world's natural gas, a lot of the world's fertilizer passes through that. And these are $100 million tankers filled with hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo. And Iran has been shutting down the strait and harassing these ships with $20,000 drones. And so it's a poor man's strategy, which up until now, has worked for Iran and frustrating the ambitions of President Trump. And I think Iran's strategy, like closing off the Strait of Hormuz, and, you know, you could try to get through with a ship that accompanies you, but the people who had been America's allies are reluctant to really get involved in this war.

Trump has alienated NATO. He's alienated China who is asked for help. So it's making, the Iran's strategy is making Trump look weak. You know, Terry, General David Petraeus, who used to command U.S. troops in the Middle East, also former CIA director, said something that was quite perceptive. He said that America's seemingly swift victory over the Taliban in 2001 kind of distorted our understanding of how difficult the Iraq war would be two years later. And that's relevant here because Iran is a country in which, as I said, we haven't had an embanky. there for 47 years, so we have very limited understandings of the inner workings of the regime, limited diplomatic contacts with the regime. And I don't think there was a great amount of planning.

The hope was that we were simply going to subject Iran to enormous political and economic pressure in the hopes that either it would capitulate or if it didn't capitulate, we would quickly attack it, kill its leader, and then do a deal with the success of leadership. I don't think President Trump, in his own words, frankly, understood what he was getting into. For example, Iran telegraphed from the very beginning that they planned to regionalize the war. And President Trump said that that took him by surprise when Iran started to attack the Persian Gulf countries or close down the Strait of Hormuz. And I think, Terry, we were now in a situation in which

This began, in my view, it was a war of choice. It was not a war of necessity. There was no imminent threat that Iran was about to acquire nuclear weapons or launch missile strikes on the United States or our partners. But what began as a war of choice, in my view, has actually morphed into a war of necessity, meaning that I don't think that President Trump is going to simply be able to end the war and claim victory so long as you have a war. a pariah government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has the world economy hostage and can

control this critically important not only energy corridor, but agricultural corridor, given that Strait of Hormuz is also a major thoroughfare for fertilizer. Well, we need to take another break here. If you're just joining us, my guest is Karim Sajapur, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, formerly an analyst with the international crisis group, and at that time he was based in Tehran and Washington. So we'll talk more about the war with Iran after another break. I'm Terry Gross, and this is fresh air. Let me share with you two of my biggest concerns about how this will affect the U.S. and the world. And the biggest one is World War III. And we're in a partial world war now with, I think, like 13 countries,

involved in some way. But I'm talking about a real full-blown World War III with the threat of nuclear weapons, depending on who allies with Iran if more World War breaks out, because Russia, North Korea, China, who all have nuclear weapons, have some kind of alliance with Iran. So what are your thoughts about a larger world war and the likelihood of one breaking out. Well, fortunately, Terry, I don't think that is a high likelihood, and I'll tell you why. Thank you. Yes. Reassure me. You know, the countries that Iran has been attacking most over the last few weeks are, as I said, these Persian Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates in particular. I think, as I mentioned, they've been the target of over 2,000 Iranian missile and drone

attacks. And when you look at those countries, they actually have probably more robust relations with China and Russia than Iran does. And so it's not the case that, you know, Iran is this country with very strong allies who have its back and those Gulf countries are only allied with America and Israel. In fact, the Islamic Republic of Iran is probably the top of the top one or two most strategically lonely countries in the world. It really has very few reliable allies in the world. And so I think that the Chinese are not going to come and fight on Iran's behalf against Gulf countries with whom they have even closer energy relations.

And Vladimir Putin actually has strong relations with the leadership in Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, with the leadership in the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed. So I'm not concerned that this will deteriorate into a World War III, but you are correct that this has just set a very dangerous precedent. And I don't think that the world or, you know, especially the Middle East, is going to feel like a stable place for this foreseeable future. to a senior leader in the United Arab Emirates recently said, we're a country which has been changed forever. And they realize, as I said, how fragile what they've built is. And I don't

think any of those countries are going to sleep well at night so long as this current Iranian regime is in power. One of the goals, I think the primary goal that Trump initially stated for attacking Iran was to get Iran to give up all of its nuclear material. They said in negotiations they were willing to compromise and give up, you know, any aspiration for a nuclear weapon. And the only thing they really wanted to hold on to was uranium enriched enough for medical purposes, which isn't usable for nuclear weapon. That doesn't mean they were being truthful about it, but it's what they said. And Trump wanted a complete, no, you can't even have that. You have to give up everything. And now, now that we're really at war with Iran, what's the likelihood that they would

give that all up? And what's the likelihood we could, you know, attack it? We've already attacked the main places where it's buried. We'd have to, like, go in and take out the nuclear material, which is like really dangerous and really complicated. So are we in worse shape now than we were before? We're in a predicament. And I think that there really are four main priorities when it comes to our potential negotiations with Iran. One is obviously nuclear. And that highly enriched uranium, which is ostensibly under rubble now,

after the bombings of last June, that needs to be accounted for. Because if Iran gets its hands on that uranium, highly enriched uranium, and tries to convert that into fuel for nuclear weapon. Now, my sense is that given how penetrated their system is, it would be very difficult for them to make a mad dash for nuclear weapon. but it's something which needs to be addressed. It can't be neglected. You know, second point now are there missiles and drones.

And again, speaking to officials in the Persian Gulf, they say, you know, before all of this, we would have been happy with just a nuclear deal, but now no longer. We need a deal which also addresses their use of missiles and drones. A third issue are their proxies. Their support for groups like Hezbollah and Lebanon, the Houthis and Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias.

Now, these proxies have been degraded, but they still do pose a real threat to regional stability. And then the fourth issue is the reason why we're even in this situation, which is Iran's brutality toward its own population. If you remember, Terry, last January, Trump on nine occasions warned the Iranian government that if they killed protesters, the United States would intervene. And that was his red line, he issued, as I said, on nine occasions. And Iran tore up that red line. And that's what actually motivated for him to start this military buildup in the Persian Gulf. But what we've seen is that the president has kind of been all over the place when he's asked what his goal is. Some days he says it's just to get a nuclear deal.

Some days he says he wants a Venezuela deal. Some days he wants to implode the regime. And that lack of clarity, in my view, has been deeply detrimental. Because, you know, if you don't know what it is that you're trying to achieve, then you're putting both, U.S. military and our partners in very difficult positions. My guest is Karim Sajapur, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before that, he spent four years as an analyst with the International Crisis Group, and he

was based in Tehran as well as Washington during those years. We'll hear more of the interview. After a short break, this is fresh air. So when President Trump expressed support for the Iranian protesters, many of whom were massacred and then decided to attack Iran. He said, when we are finished, take over your government, it will be yours to take. It would be impossible now probably to protest. People would be just totally massacred. I mean, do you agree with that? When I listen to President Trump's language, Terry, it reflects someone who probably hasn't spent any significant amount of time under

a brutal dictatorship. Because when you're living under brutal dictatorship, it is very scary when you go out in the streets and the people of Iran are unarmed and unorganized. And you see many thousands of Basij militia or revolutionary guards who are carrying automatic weapons and have their fingers on the trigger, that's an incredibly intimidating atmosphere. And I think one thing that people don't really understand about dictatorships, when people ask, well, how much support does this regime have? And it doesn't matter so much what is the breadth of your support if you're a dictatorship. It matters much more the depth of your support. So in my view, this is a regime which probably has at best 20, maybe 15 percent,

popular support, but their supporters, at least for now, are a ruthlessly devoted minority that believes that if they lose power, they're going to be killed. It's a killer be killed for them. And that has been proven

to them even more the last three weeks, that not only does their own population want to unseat them, but obviously America and Israel do as well. And for that reason, they've shown themselves willing to kill potentially tens of thousands of people to stay in power.

And I don't think that that calculation for them has changed. It's probably only been amplified, given the events of the last few weeks. And so I think that simply the president telling people, go take your institutions, without having any whole-of-government strategy about, okay, how did the United States, during the Reagan administration, help to bring down the Soviet Union. What were the institutions, the policies, the language, the strategic communications used during that period?

And this isn't eight-minute abs. You can't simply order something, and two, three weeks later, it happens as nice as that would be for people in Iran to take over their institutions. This is a ruthless regime, and one of the things very different about this particular Iranian regime compared to the monarchy, which collapsed and, 1979 is that the political and military elite of Iran's monarchy, many of them had studied in America in Europe. In some cases, they probably had foreign passports and they spoke foreign languages. And so when things got difficult, they could remake their lives in Los Angeles or London.

But the political and military elite of the Islamic Republic have oftentimes provincial backgrounds. They weren't educated abroad. They don't speak foreign languages. They don't have foreign passports, and they have nowhere else to go. And again, for that reason, for many of them, it's killer be killed. In the meantime, a lot of Iranians are fleeing bombs, they're inhaling smoke and being the victims of black rain because of all the oil that has been bombed. So, I mean, and, you know, the consequences of toxic smoke and black rain, that can last a lifetime. That can to cancer and kill you? Absolutely.

And again, this is, war is hell. It's not just a cliche. I think people are experiencing that inside Iran. And for many people, they're probably thinking about the lesser of evils. I've heard some people say, listen, we fear this war. You know, we're fearing for our lives under bombardment. But we fear for our children's lives. if this regime manages to stay in power and further retrenches itself.

So I think there are a wide mix of emotions among 90 million Iranians inside the country and within the diaspora. And unfortunately, there are no quick fixes or quick solutions to this terrible predicament. Do you know if there were any leaders in the protest movement that could have emerged? and, you know, if the regime truly was toppled, that could have been a leading contender as the leader of a new Iran. The one thing that the Islamic Republic of Iran does effectively is repression. It's a government built to stay in power, and they've been practicing the arts and science of repression for five decades. And so they are skilled in crushing protests and also identifying individuals who are capable of potentially playing leadership positions. I remember a European ambassador in Tehran years ago said to me,

the Iranian Vasslav Havel is either dead or in Los Angeles. You know, they either kill people or exile people. And for that reason, a lot of the opponents of the regime have turned outside. of Iran and looking at the person of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former crown prince of Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah, who Rezapalavi has lived in exile the last 47 years. And for many Iranians, certainly not all, but for many who oppose the regime, he's kind of become an inspirational leader for the opposition. There's a wonderful book by a guy called Jack Goldstone on revolutions, and he says,

that every revolution needs two kinds of leadership, organizational leadership and inspirational leadership. The organizational leadership is lacking, but for many people, Reza Pahlavi has become the inspirational leader. Yeah, that's really hard for me to understand because the Shah westernized Iran, and, you know, there was a lot of education and Western values and modernization. However, his secret police, the Savak, they were severe. They tortured people. rounded up and disappeared people? You know, Terry, this is a population inside Iran now,

around three quarters of whom were born after the 1979 revolution. And so when they think of the era of the Shah, what they think about are social freedoms, which they see the photos of that era, economic dignity, a time when Iran as a nation had a positive, a place in the world. The Iranian passport could get you places. And they compare that to the life they've experienced under the Islamic Republic that has not only been far more brutal than

the Shah's government, but it's been socially and economically authoritarian as well. And so I think there's been a lot of revisionism in the last decade or so among, especially the younger generation of Iranians who see documentary. films and movies and read about what was like life was like under the Shah. And it's kind of the ultimate middle finger to the Islamic Republic to say, you know, long live Pahalavi, we want to return to Pahalavi because this is a regime,

the Islamic Republic, which has spent, you know, from the time children are small in Iran propagandizing against the Shah's government. And And in my view, it's kind of like a forward-looking nostalgia that people have. They want Iran to once again be a nation with a prosperous economy and social freedoms and an upstanding place in the world. And the idea or the example, which is perhaps most palpable for many people, is how things once were.

All right. So we need to take another break here. If you're just joining us, my guest is Karim Sajapur of Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and formerly an analyst with the International Crisis Group and during those four years who was based in Tehran as well as Washington. We'll continue the conversation after a break. This is fresh air. What, to you, would be the best case scenario for ending the war?

I always try to distinguish between best viable case scenario and best case scenario. Best case scenario obviously would be we have a different government that comes to power in Iran in which it's either, you know, Iran transitions to a democracy or a government whose organizing principle is the national interests of Iran, long-lived Iran rather than death to America. I don't think that that is a short-term prospect. So in the near term, I think best-case outcome is that we, liberate the Strait of Hormuz from Iranian interference, and you reestablish the safe passage of trade and ships through the Strait of Hormuz. And obviously, Iran has ceased all of its

attacks on its neighbors and on Israel. That would require the United States and Israel to also cease those attacks. But even then, we're going to be leaving. There's a lot of going to be some outstanding things which we can't afford to ignore, which is what happens with that highly enriched uranium inside Iran. How is that going to be accounted for? What about Iran's ballistic missile and drones? That's been proven to be a real menace to regional security. How are we going to address that? What if Iran starts to rebuild and refinance its regional proxies? That's a challenge we have to address.

And then finally, as I emphasized before, the whole reason that this conflict has begun, which was the Iranian regime's brutality toward its own people, that's something that I fear that this regime is so deeply unpopular that the only way that they'll continue to manage to stay in power is by being even more brutal than before. Do we have a strategy for addressing that? And this is not, you know, this, I think the president was hoping for something quick and easy, something seemingly quick and easy like Venezuela appeared to be for him, but this is anything but.

But even securing the safety of the Strait of Hormuz, how hard would that be? I don't want to pretend like I'm a military expert. When I speak to experience folks who've served in the Navy, I think most people would, say that it's doable, but it's not going to be easy and it's not going to be quick. How are you and how are the people who you know in Iran? Your family is from Iran. You grew up in the U.S., but you've spent a lot of time in Iran. So how are your loved ones? How are your friends? How are your resources? Well, I appreciate you asking that, Terry. For me personally, I've been doing this long enough

that I can kind of separate as best as I can, emotions and personal feelings and analysis. But for my family members and loved ones, both inside and outside Iran, it's obviously a very

harrowing time. People were really either directly or indirectly traumatized by the massacres of last January. I think obviously everyone knew how brutal this regime was, but they didn't fully appreciate the scale of it. And I think many people were hoping that this conflict could be a quick way to help the people in Iran get rid of this regime.

And I still hear from people inside Iran that, you know, perhaps they are still holding out hope for that, such as their level of desperation, where, as I said earlier, I think others have now buyer's remorse or a real second thoughts about this intervention. But I think there's a bottom line which I feel I know most people

and the U.S. and European governments feel and tens of millions of Iranians feel which this is a country which isn't where it should be. This is one of the world's oldest civilizations. It

has enormous human capital. It has enormous natural resources, this rich history, it should be a G20 nation. You know, there was a time in 1978 where Iran and South Korea had the same GDP levels. And you look at those countries now and where Iran is. And so modern day Iran is really a tragedy. And it's a tragedy above all for Iranians, both inside Iran and in the diaspora, but it's also been a tragedy for the United States. Because in my view, America, and Iran actually should be natural partners, and instead, Iran is one of our worst adversaries. And unfortunately, I don't see that dynamic changing in the near future.

Why do you see the U.S. and Iran as natural partner? You know, I always quote Henry Kissinger here. He said there are few nations in the world with whom the United States has more common interests and less reason to quarrel than Iran. But Iran has to decide whether it's a nation or a cause. for Iran, the national interests of the country should be that which advances the prosperity and security of its people. And before 1979, Iran and America enjoyed a fantastic partnership. And America actually was an ally for Iran against Soviet and Russian encroachment vis-à-vis Iran.

And so I think this modern period is an historic anomaly whereby Iran is allied with Russia against the United States. It really should be the opposite. And I think most people inside Iran understand that so long as the organizing principle of its government is death to America and death to Israel, the country will never fulfill its enormous potential as a nation. The organizing principle needs to be the national interests of Iranians, and that requires a fundamentally different relationship with the United States. Karim Sadrapoor, thank you so much for your time and for sharing some of your knowledge with us. I really appreciate it. It was my honor, Terry. Thank you so much for having me. Karim Sadatpur is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a contributing writer at the Atlantic.

Tomorrow on Fresh Air. How to get ahead in business when you're a young woman in sexist World War II London, trying to survive the Blitz, navigating romance, and fighting time-travelling fascists. That's the premise of the new novel,

None Such. Our guest will be the author Francis Buffard. His earlier novel, Cahokia Jazz, made our book critic Marine Corrigan's Best Books of 2024 list. I hope you'll join us

to keep up with what's on the show and get highlights of our interviews, follow us on Instagram at NPR Fresh Air. Fresh Air's executive producer is Sam Brigger. Our technical director and engineer is Orgy Bentham. Our interviews and reviews are produced and edited by Phyllis Myers, Anne-Marie Boldinato, Lauren Crenzel, Teresa Madden,

Monique Nazareth, Thea Chaloner, Susan Yikundi, Anna Bauman, and Nico Gonzalez-Wistler. Our digital media producer is Molly C.V. Nesper. Roberta Shorock directs the show. Our co-host is Tanya Mosley. I'm Terry Gross.