Fresh Air - Reflecting On 2 Critical Conflict Zones: Ukraine And Gaza

Episode Date: August 22, 2024

Georgetown professor and foreign policy analyst Daniel Byman discusses Ukraine's daring offensive into Russian territory. And he reflects on the future of Gaza, after Israel's military operation ends.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

Support for this podcast and the following message come from the NPR Wine Club, which has generated over $1.75 million to support NPR programming. Whether buying a few bottles or joining the club, you can learn more at nprwineclub.org slash podcast. Must be 21 or older to purchase. This is Fresh Air. I'm Dave Davies. Today we're going to consider the state and future course of two bloody conflicts occupying the world's attention with veteran foreign policy analyst Daniel Byman. He recently returned from Ukraine, which has been at war with Russia since Moscow invaded the country more than two years ago. Russian forces have made gains in eastern Ukraine, but earlier this month the Ukrainian army launched a daring offensive into Russia itself, seizing territory the Russian army has so far been unable to retake.

We'll also look at the future of Gaza, where Israeli forces have waged a fierce retaliatory campaign against Hamas following the brutal October 7th assault in southern Israel. The Israeli campaign has resulted in tens of thousands of civilian casualties as efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and the return of Israeli hostages by Hamas are ongoing. Baiman recently wrote an article for Foreign Affairs magazine exploring options for the governance of Gaza when the conflict subsides. Daniel Baiman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He's also a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign

Service. He's the author of nine books and more than 200 academic and policy articles. Well, Daniel Byman, welcome back to Fresh Air. Thanks for having me. You recently took a trip to Ukraine. I got back, I guess, a couple of weeks ago. Give us a sense of who you spoke to, what you saw. So our trip was primarily involving meetings with political leaders and leaders of industry and also individuals who were different parts of the civilian sector. And that could include first responders, people in apartment buildings that had been bombed, and so pretty wide range. And we were initially in Odessa, and then we went to Kiev.

To be clear, I was not near the front lines. But it was a broad range of military, political, and business leaders. And they gave us a pretty good sense of their feelings about how the conflict was going. Right. So we're talking about a population that has now been at war for more than well, well over two years. Tell us some of what you heard. How are people feeling? So what you got was a tremendous sense of both pride and weariness. Ukrainians we talked to were understandably and I think appropriately very proud of the resistance that the entire country has shown in the face of Russian aggression and also

their sacrifice, the many losses they've taken, yet they're still willing to keep fighting. But of course, these losses are really taking their toll on society. You see that in the constant vigils for those who have died. You see that in Ukrainian concerns about sustaining the war. And of course, there are a lot of Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure, on hospitals, on power plants, and other attempts to undermine that civilian morale. So I would say that people remain defiant, but there is definitely a sense that this war is dragging down Ukraine as a whole, and people are getting very tired. What is daily life like for these folks, and how has it been affected by this war? So daily life in Ukraine very much depends on where you are. There are communities and, of course, fighters on the front lines that are enduring tremendous suffering, constant shelling, risk of constant attacks. You have many people who have

been displaced from their homes. Go a little farther back where I was, you have major cities that have some degree of a normal day-to-day life with bars and coffee shops open, but then it's interrupted by rockets and missiles raining down. So it's a somewhat back and forth between normal life and the horrors of war. And then as you get farther and farther away from the front lines towards the west of the country, you have more of a normal existence. But even then, you have many people who have been called up to the front. You still have the occasional airstrike farther into the country. So it really is something that is affecting the country as a whole. But there's a lot of variation.

You know, now after two years, the war took this dramatic turn a couple of weeks ago when the Ukrainian army launched this incursion into Russian territory. They said they've taken control of about 400 square miles. Certainly several towns, we've seen hundreds of Russian prisoners. The Russian army has been unable to retake those areas. What is your sense of the purpose of this operation? So that's a big question. And let me lay out both several military purposes and broader political goals. So for immediate military purposes, probably the most important is to offset some of the Russian pressure that we're seeing right now in the Donbass region. So there in eastern Ukraine, Russia has made steady, very costly, but very steady advances in recent months and has captured, by now abandoned,

but nevertheless, various towns and is really chewing up the Ukrainians. And part of the goal of this operation was to force Russia to transfer troops from that area into Russia itself to defend its own territory. In addition, there are benefits in terms of destroying military infrastructure in the Kursk area. That's been an area where Russia has been supplying its forces in Ukraine. There are airfields where Russian assets are taking off. And by disrupting those, Ukraine eases some of the pressure on itself. But I also want to highlight a few political factors that are tremendously important. One is Ukrainian morale. 2024, before the last few weeks, has not been a good year for Ukraine.

There is a sense of civilian suffering. There's a sense of military loss. Yet here is Ukraine punching back, a daring operation. And for many Ukrainians, the sense that now ordinary Russians have a sense of what life is like in Ukraine is very uplifting. It's a sense that is giving them much more support for their government and much more support for the war because they feel it is going better, at least temporarily. In addition, there's a cost to Russian morale. Putin has portrayed this war as entirely successful, has portrayed it as steady progress, and has talked about Russia's ability to withstand Ukraine's military.

And here you have a clear Ukrainian, really short-term success. You have it on Russian soil, the first time Russian soil has been taken since World War II. Many of those involved in the Kursk operation on the Russian side are conscripts. And Putin had promised that it would be volunteers and mercenaries who'd be fighting in Ukraine, not conscripts. So it brings in a whole new population of Russian soldiers.

And it's embarrassing. And the last thing is the possible exchange of prisoners. Ukraine has taken hundreds of conscripts and others as captives in its operation, and these can be exchanged for the many Ukrainians that Russia has captured. And again, this is a source of uplift for popular morale. I wonder how much Russian citizens actually know about what's happening in Kursk, this area that the Ukrainians invaded? Is that clear? So there's a lot of information on social media that indicates Russia is having significant problems. People like me tend to focus on particular military bloggers who provide information. And that is at least somewhat available in Russia. There has been some coverage on this in Russian media, but it actually is portrayed almost more like a flood or humanitarian crisis where you see support for the

Russian citizens who have been displaced from the conflict rather than discussions of the military operations. So I would say there's at least some knowledge, but it's, of course, skewed by the Russian government to favor its narrative. The caveat is that in authoritarian states, it's always very hard to know what people believe and what they don't. Sometimes there's a lot of very bad information that seems to be widely believed, but at the same time, people often are very skeptical of official news sources. So, as an outsider trying to get a sense of what many Russians believe about this operation, it's very difficult. Yeah, I was surprised to read in an Associated

Press story, it said that Putin appeared uneasy at an August 12th televised meeting of his security staff. And when Kursk came up, he cut off an acting regional governor who started listing the settlements taken by Ukraine. This kind of thing is televised? I mean, kind of surprising to me. Russia has often been sloppy in its information operations. And there is, of course, an attempt to present a narrative of Russian triumph and Russian resistance. But yes, at times you see officials and government officials or certain voices in what seems to be pro-regime media talking about quite real problems. So there certainly is an attempt at spin or more than spin at censorship and repression and pushing the news in certain directions.

But at the same time, you have voices that at times get at least part of the truth out there. You know, I didn't realize until I started preparing for our interview that this region of Kursk, which was the, you know, the site of this Ukrainian incursion, was actually also the site of a celebrated victory by Soviet forces in 1943 to repel the Nazi invasion of their country. And in fact, Putin was in Kursk a year ago commemorating the anniversary. It seems kind of like it would be a real embarrassment for Putin, is it? There's no question this is embarrassing for Putin. As you said, this was one of the key battles in World War II. Many people believe it was the largest tank battle in world history, among other notable facts about it. And Russia has made a

point of celebrating its defiance of the Nazis at Kursk. So yes, this is symbolic ground for Russia. But then just more broadly, this was an unexpected attack. Ukraine was supposed to have been defeated. It was supposed to be on the run. So Ukraine punching back effectively is an embarrassment for Putin. You know, it's interesting that the Ukrainians launched this offensive. And there has been reporting that this year, the Zelensky government has put out feelers towards negotiations. I saw one report that there was talk of negotiations this summer to potentially reach an agreement with Russia to not attack each other's energy infrastructure. Is this true? And what exactly is going on here? There certainly are reports that there were, if you will, certain rules that were being

established within the war and energy infrastructure being one of the top elements of that. Attacks on energy infrastructure have been devastating for Ukraine, and we know less about the impact on the Russian side, but my guess is also quite consequential for Russia. This Kursk attack probably puts even limited negotiations on the back burner. It's very hard for Russia to be seen as making concessions in the face of Ukrainian victories. Again, going back to Putin's self-image, but the image he projects as a strongman, that he cannot be seen as bowing in the face of foreign pressure.

So, limited negotiations have occurred on other areas. It's occurred, for example, on the flow of grain out of Ukraine in the past. So, like many wars, there are often limits to it or ways to reduce some of the war this year that he sent his foreign minister to China to perhaps lobby for some help there in working something out with Russia. It would seem odd that if he was putting out peace feelers that he would then take this bold military move. Are they connected, do you think? Peter Robinson So this is a genuine question mark. And a lot of what I'm saying is, you know, people like me are reading in motives where we don't actually have strong evidence either way. But one way to improve your negotiating position is able to hold it, Ukraine could say, look, we'll trade what we've taken in Kursk for some of what Russia has taken in Ukraine. But even beyond that, even if Ukraine does retreat from the territory it's taken, by having hit Russia hard, it makes Zelensky stronger politically.

And that makes him better able to make concessions, that he can say, look, we've hurt Russia, we've stood up for ourselves, but this war is incredibly costly. We're losing really a generation of young men on the fighting lines. Our civilians are suffering. We need to make sacrifices, however horrible they are. So We have seen, if you look at many past attempts at negotiations and conflicts around the world, at times success has actually proceeded not by reduced military activity but by increased military activity. To be clear, this could backfire. By embarrassing Putin, it may make him less likely to want to negotiate.

He may want to have the perceived upper hand going into negotiations. So I think Ukraine rolled the dice, both in a military sense and in a political sense. And it's still a bit too early to tell if this was a success or not. Trevor Burrus You know, throughout the war, there have been stories about Russia meeting its manpower needs with convicts, with recruits from foreign countries, and that they're often sent to the front lines with little training. Do you have a sense if that's how this Ukrainian invasion is being met? So the Ukrainian invasion so far seems to have been met primarily with conscript forces, which are kind of a different category than what Russia has been

fighting with in Ukraine. What we've seen in Ukraine primarily is a mix of very experienced professional soldiers who are reasonably well-trained with a lot of individuals who are hastily recruited, whether from prisons or with large signing bonuses, and really thrown into the fight with minimal training. And they take really staggering casualties. In addition to all this, though, Russia has conscription. And it's called up large numbers of young men. And they have not been deployed in Ukraine for the most part. Most of them have been deployed elsewhere in Russia, such as on border duty.

And these individuals are not particularly well-armed, not that well-led, not that well-trained. And that's part of why Ukraine has had such success, at least initially, in Kursk. But now Russia is reinforcing Kursk, not just with more conscripts, but also seems to be pulling at least some experienced units off less critical parts of the frontline Ukraine. So I think in the coming weeks, we're going to see a very different fight going on in Kursk than we've seen in the first few weeks. Yeah. The reports I saw said that the Ukrainians had knocked out three bridges over a river, which would have the effect of isolating the Russian troops that are there and making it much harder for relief to come. Is this a decisive move or a potentially important one?

It's certainly an important one. It's a way of greatly complexifying Russian military operations. They have to use improvised pontoon bridges to move stuff back and forth, which have a lot less capacity. In general, their forces crossing rivers will be very vulnerable, while the ones that are trapped on the wrong side of the river are vulnerable both to military pressure, but also simply running out of food and ammunition. So this is a very smart move. It's a way of solidifying Ukraine's gains. But in the end, it is a tactical move. Russia can overcome it with enough resources, but it will be very costly for Russia. You know, a lot of the audience may remember the Russian oligarch, Evgeny Prigozhin, who had his own mercenary army, the Wagner Group, which fought in many conflicts for Putin. He was closely allied to Putin. But then, you know, a year ago, in June 23, he launched this mutiny, which was essentially an invasion of a column of his military forces, which got, you know, kind of moved unimpeded

to, I guess, about 60 miles from Moscow. I wonder if that made Ukrainian military leaders to think, you know, there's something we can learn here. File that under, you know, one of the many, in my view, unexpected and somewhat crazy things we've seen in the last two and a half years. And certainly there is a brittleness to Russia. What we've seen again and again in their military operations is that they're better when they have plenty of time to prepare and they can move forward steadily and kind of grind through conflict. But when they're surprised, when they

have to improvise, they've had far more problems. And so I do believe that Ukraine identified weak spots within Russia in advance with excellent intelligence and exploited that. And whether they looked at what happened with Brygozhin or simply their own assessment of the weaknesses of Russian conscripts, I don't think we know yet. But we do. I think it's perfectly reasonable to believe that Ukraine thought, here's a vulnerability that we can exploit, and it will either provide some short-term benefits or maybe even some long-term ones if we can hold on and sustain operations there. It seems that the posture of the United States sort of began with cautious use of ammunition, arms, equipment, and has steadily been more generous in terms of allowing Ukraine both more sophisticated weapons and their use, right? The Biden administration has been concerned, and I think reasonably, that this conflict

could escalate further. Russia, of course, is a major power. It has a massive nuclear arsenal. Putin has, in his rhetoric, mentioned nuclear weapons. So there was a lot of concern that things could get dramatically worse. And so the United States was trying to help Ukraine without pushing Russia into escalation. But it was unclear where Russia's red lines were. And as time has gone on, what the United States saw as possible red lines, such as providing certain types of weapon systems,

such as the very best U.S. tanks, such as using U.S.-provided weapons to do limit attacks into Russia. And now, of course, U.S.-provided weapons as part of invasion of Russia. All these red lines have been crossed without Russian escalation. So there is a view in Ukraine that U.S. limits in general are completely unnecessary. But of course, the Biden administration has to worry not just about Ukraine, but about Russian behavior around the world, and is trying to balance that with support for a country that's become a very important ally. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

We recorded our conversation yesterday. We'll hear more after this short break. I'm Dave Davies. This is Fresh Air. This message comes from WISE, the app for doing things in other currencies. Send, spend, or receive money internationally and always get the real-time mid-market exchange rate

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Stories from across the world. Knowing how to forage and to live with the land is integral to a nice culture. And down your block. From CPR News, this is Colorado Matters. And you can find all of that and more in your pocket. Download the NPR app today. What about the argument that Putin has a case that the West has provoked Russia by expanding the NATO alliance, you know,

giving signals that Ukraine might get in by admitting Finland, which has this long border with Russia? I mean, there's, you know, you can make the argument that Russia wants security and that the West has made it harder. That's certainly what he's been saying, right? He's not fighting Zelensky. He's fighting the West. Is there any room for adjustments there which might give him more of a sense of security and make him more willing to temper his activities in Ukraine? I'm highly skeptical of the argument that NATO expansion and talk of it somehow led to this war. This goes back to the 2008-2009 period when there was some rhetoric about this,

but we really didn't see much progress on this. And then, you know, five years later in 2014, we see Russian aggression, and then, of course, in 2022. So I don't see a direct line in terms of timing. The more direct line to me is Ukraine wanted to join the West, if you will, politically. We saw Ukrainians demonstrate and kick out kind of a corrupt Russian-backed government in favor of one that wanted to be integrated into Europe, that wanted more democracy, that wanted more openness. And I guess we could say that provoked Russia. But to me, that is much more a people that were aspiring for freedom and for a better life. And we've seen Russia look at the sort of popular revolutions

in areas on its border with great alarm, seeing them as backed by the United States, when in fact, the U.S. role in all this is pretty limited. And that, to me, is much more of a threat to Russia, which is its own people with the idea of freedom and democracy. You know, Russia and China have become closer as this war has developed. And, in fact, Ukraine's made some efforts to try to influence Russia through China. How important is this Russia-China connection in terms of Russia's ability to maintain the war?

The Russia-China connection is tremendously important, although there are a few risks of overstating it. So China has not provided the most advanced military systems it has to Russia, but it's provided a huge number of components and other forms of support that have enabled Russia's industrial base to maintain a high level of production, even in the face of Western sanctions. China has also provided a market for Russian oil. So the economic ties are not just important, they're really vital for Russia. And when I was in Ukraine, Ukraine was being hit by drones that were an Iranian system that were being manufactured in Russia with Chinese components. So we're really seeing a

number of countries rally behind Russia to do the war. The caveat I'd want to introduce to all of this is that the China-Russia relationship is not something like the U.S.-Canada or U.S.-NATO relations of an exceptionally close set of allies that have integrated operations. These are countries that have, at times, quite different interests, and they're cooperating due to a set of short-term incentives. But it has been something that's had a huge impact on the war and is something that U.S. defense planners need to consider as they explore risks around the world, whether that's in the Middle East or especially in Asia. Are they doing joint military exercises? They have done very limited joint military exercises, including one that was off the coast of Alaska, which was obviously designed to provoke the United States.

Again, these are limited in scale, but because we haven't seen them being done in recent years, this is obviously something that should be a significant concern for the United States. Trevor Burrus You know, I'm wondering, people like you who try and look down the road, what are the realistic scenarios for this war ending? You know, Zelensky, you know, you've mentioned he, you know, when he invades Russia, that might give him more leverage and more capacity to tell his citizens, look, we're in a stronger position, we can afford to give up some things if we need to. But he's also been very firm about maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine as it was. Is there a course for ending this that you see?

Let me say two possibilities which frankly contradict. So we've seen largely a military stalemate in the last, you know, really year and a half, where at times Ukraine seemed to be pushing Russia back. In recent months, Russia has pushed Ukraine back. But the amount of territory changing hands is relatively limited. And both sides, but especially Russia, but really both sides have taken huge numbers of casualties while doing so. So it doesn't look like if we kind of play this movie forward a year, that the front lines are going to change that dramatically. And that creates an incentive to negotiate, right? Why keep fighting a grinding war where everyone is suffering if

you're not going to see dramatic military change? But the opposite view is that this is a war of attrition, and that at some point, one side's will is going to break. And the question is not just the day-to-day of combat, but can you sustain support for the war? Can you sustain military production? Can you keep young men of fighting age going into this meat grinder? And we've seen in past wars of attrition that they grind, they grind, and then sometimes one side collapses. So there are two different theories of victory. But right now, at least, the progress on negotiation seems, I'm going to say limited, but that's probably even overstating it. So we may have to ask this question again in three

months or six months. So let's talk about the crisis in Gaza. You know, the United States has been trying to arrange a ceasefire agreement which would get Israeli hostages released. These have been going on in Qatar, right? What do we know about what this proposal actually provides? Peter Robinson So the U.S. proposal involves a ceasefire that the idea is it would build over time. And within that, there would be Israeli troop withdrawals, there are disagreements as to how much and where,

and Hamas hostage releases. And again, disagreements on the number, as well as Israeli releases of Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails. Again, disagreements as to which ones and how many. But that's sort of back and forth where you have hostages, troop withdrawals, and cessations of military operations. The idea is that you would start with a certain significant number and then build over time, ideally from a U.S. point of view, leading to a more permanent ceasefire. I mean, this is a particularly sensitive time, I suppose, because Israel has been expecting retaliation by Iran for its killing of a senior Hamas leader in Tehran. And then there was, of course, another attack in Lebanon on a Hezbollah leader. Is the fact that the Iranians have not yet launched a significant reprisal suggest, is that a sign that they want a deal

and will help get one? The Iranian lack of response is something we're all watching very closely. And part of it may be that it's a fragile political time. But I actually think the bigger problem for Iran is it doesn't have good retaliation options. It tried in April when there was an Israeli assassination of several Iranian military leaders in Syria, it tried a massive attack on Israel that was almost a complete failure through U.S. support, Israel's own air defenses, and the actions of several U.S. allies and now Israeli allies, Jordan and the Gulf States, the Iranian attack was shut down. And so there's a genuine question of, yes, Iran may want to

respond, but what's it going to do? It could launch another massive salvo at Israel, but that might fail. It might try international terrorism. But Iran doesn't have great military or other options. So it may simply be looking for an opportunity and biding its time until that happens. An explanation I had heard for the failure of the Iranian air attack on Israel was that they meant it to be ineffective. And so they gave plenty of advance warning so that it could easily be deflected and shot down. I would say that Iran, there's no question they telegraphed the punch they were going to take. They definitely provided warning was happening. They sent a message to the United States saying

we're not attacking U.S. facilities or otherwise trying to involve the United States. But given the scale of the attack, I think the Iranians were probably surprised that almost everything was shot down and what little made it through failed. I think they hoped for partial success where they could say, you know, look, Israel hit us, but we hit back. Yet not so much success that it caused a new round of escalation. But instead, it was really a failure. And no country wants to do, you know, a highly public of escalation. But instead, it was really a failure. And no country wants to do, you know, a highly publicized military failure. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Our conversation was recorded yesterday.

We'll hear more in just a moment. This is Fresh Air. Hey there, this is Felix Contreras, one of the co-hosts of All Latino, the podcast from NPR Music where we discuss Latinx culture, music, and heritage with the artists that create it. Listen now to the Alt Latino podcast from NPR. One thing that might be much more harmful to Israel would be an all-out attack from Hezbollah, which is rooted in Lebanon and has far more potent military force than Hamas. There have been exchanges of fire between Israel and Lebanon, but neither of them have, you know, launched an all-out attack. Do you think there's a serious risk of that and would Iran encourage it? Unfortunately, there is a serious risk of a massive expansion of the Israel-Hezbollah war.

Hezbollah is far more formidable than Hamas militarily. It has a massive rocket and missile arsenal. It has so many it could overwhelm Israeli air defenses. It has the range to put all of Israel in jeopardy. So you would see attacks on Tel Aviv, on airports, on Jerusalem, really everywhere. Hezbollah also has large numbers of skilled fighters who have been hardened in battle in Syria and have been highly trained by Iran. So this war would be a much more devastating war. And on the Israeli side, Israel would do massive bombing in Lebanon. There would be parts of the country that would look like Gaza, and it would be devastating both for Hezbollah and for ordinary Lebanese. And

Israel has been planning for the war really since its poor performance in a 2006 war with Hezbollah that has led Israel to redouble its intelligence and military efforts. Having said all that, there are reasons that both sides don't want this war to escalate. This has been going on really since the October 7th attack when Hezbollah has done limited solidarity attacks in the name of helping Hamas, but it has not used the vast majority of its arsenal and it has limited its attacks. And Israel too has done, certainly done attacks on Hezbollah, has killed a lot of key personnel, but has also put limits. And I don't think right now either side wants a big war. I think for Hezbollah, a big war would hurt its support in Lebanon. The country has a massive economic crisis and the last thing it needs is a significant conflict with Israel.

Israel, of course, has to worry that a war with Hezbollah could be a disaster for Israel itself, could lead to significant casualties, and it's fighting an increasingly unpopular war in Gaza. And adding a second war to this right now would not make sense from a military point of view. So my hope is that the limits on both sides will prevent significant escalation. But when you have bombs going back and forth every day, there's always a chance things are going to spin out of control. And of course, Hezbollah does want revenge for the loss of its senior leader at the end of July. It'srus It's unfair to ask you to predict the future, but given where we are with the Gaza war, do you think we're near a deal to return the hostages and bring a ceasefire?

Peter Robinson Unfortunately, I don't think we're near a deal. I think that from Hamas's point of view, their goal is to survive, and they see holding at least some hostages as key to that. And Israel, of course, wants its own hostages back, but the Netanyahu government has prioritized destroying Hamas over hostage release. And add to this politics. Netanyahu's coalition depends on a number of far-right parties that have said, we want Hamas destroyed, even at the expense of a hostage release. And so for Netanyahu, making a deal puts his political survival in jeopardy. And there's a

question for Israel on, you know, is it in Israel's interest to allow Hamas to survive, even in a weakened form? And so I think these strategic questions and political questions make it hard for Israel to make a deal. And flipping to the Hamas side, I think there's going to be limits on the concessions they're willing to make. And Sinwar as a leader is a very ideological leader. He's very anti-Israel. He has said that he believes Israel is in a tough position because of the tremendous international criticism it faces. So I think the incentives on both sides are mixed, and that makes the deal very difficult. You recently wrote a piece in the journal Foreign Affairs titled Can Anyone Govern Gaza,

in which you examine the options for governing the territory when the shooting stops. So just to remind us, Israel occupied Gaza from 1967 when it took it in the war to 1994 when the Palestinian Authority took formal control. That's when the negotiations, the Oslo process hopes for a two-state solution, although Israel did have some settlements in Gaza for a while. 2006, Hamas wins legislative elections. The following year kind of expels its rivals by force and has controlled Gaza since then. So somebody's going to govern the place, but it's hard to see exactly what. That's what you did in your article. You looked at this. One option, you say, would be for Israel to fully reoccupy the territory. I mean, they've had experience with this. What would it look like?

So, if Israel reoccupied Gaza, it would be responsible for the day-to-day governance of Gaza and responsible for economic activity. So, Israel would have to put in a lot of money or rely on international support to restore power, to restore schools, to otherwise rebuild the country. But far more difficult is Israel administering Gaza. You would have Hamas that is defeated in a sense of it's no longer governing Gaza, but certainly has thousands of fighters who remain. And they would wage a low-level insurgency in Gaza that, in my view, wouldn't necessarily result in massive deaths of Israelis on a regular basis, but there would be a steady drip of casualties. And it would be very hard to have any stable government in place,

including an Israeli stable government, in the face of this. So you would still see regular Israeli military operations as well as a lot of expense. And, of course, Israel would be criticized for occupying more Palestinian territory. This is already going on and expanding on the West Bank. And now it would be a major increase in territory and Palestinians under its rule in Gaza. So this would be something very difficult for Israel as well as very unpopular. Trevor Burrus So the other thought is that the Palestinian Authority, which is the governing party in the West Bank, would again take the helm in Gaza,

which you say is probably the Biden administration's preferred option. What are the pros and cons there? The Biden administration would like to see the Palestinian Authority take over Gaza for several reasons. First of all, it's a Palestinian actor. So it's one that has at least some degree of legitimacy among Palestinians more than an outsider. In addition, the Palestinian Authority, which now governs the West Bank, has worked well with Israel in security terms. The Palestinian Authority has also worked well with the United States. And so there's a sense that this could be a partner in maintaining order, and it could be at least somewhat acceptable to ordinary Palestinians.

There are a huge number of problems with this, though, in practice. One is that the Palestinian Authority's record in the West Bank is very mixed. There is a high degree of corruption. Many Palestinians there see it really as a handmaiden of the Israeli occupation. And as a result, the Palestinian Authority is deeply unpopular. Polls will show it having about a 10% degree of support among many Palestinians. The leader of the Palestinian Authority is deeply unpopular. Polls will show it having about a 10% degree of support among many Palestinians. The leader of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Bass, is 88 years old. He's a chain smoker. There's a real question on whether he'll be around in the next few years. And so this is an entity that really needs new leadership. There's also a question of what Hamas would do.

It sees the Palestinian Authority as a bitter rival, and it would not welcome the Palestinian Authority truly running Gaza, that if it were really trying to impose its will on Hamas, Hamas would fight back. And the last thing is Israel. From an Israeli point of view, there are two problems. One is there is a broad sense among the Israeli public that Palestinians in general should not gain from October 7th. And having the Palestinian Authority take over Gaza, some of the Biden administration have said, you know, this could be really a prelude to having Palestinian unity and thus hope for a two-state solution because the Palestinians could better negotiate. And many Israelis reject the idea that there should be any political benefit to

Palestinians from October 7th. The other, which is much more narrow, is that the far right in Israeli politics really is hostile to the Palestinian Authority. They see them as supporting terrorism in a rhetorical basis, as having an education system that supports extremism. And as a result, they don't want the Palestinian Authority to grow in strength in the West Bank, let alone Gaza. So there's a lot of opposition to this, and it comes from lots of different quarters. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. We recorded our interview yesterday. We'll hear more after a short break. This is Fresh Air. Truth, independence, fairness, transparency, respect, excellence. This is NPR. Support for NPR and the following message come from Carnegie Corporation of New York,

working to reduce political polarization through philanthropic support for education, democracy, and peace. More information at carnegie.org. Apparently, some Israeli leaders have suggested some coalition of unaffiliated Palestinian leaders or technocrats, clan leaders, whatever, some kind of decentralized arrangement might work with Israelis controlling some zones. Is this a feasible approach? For the most part, the idea of finding the perfect outsider is not feasible. The vast majority of political figures in the Palestinian space are tied to either the PA or to Hamas or to some other existing group. And there certainly are many skilled Palestinian technocrats, but it's very hard for them to insulate themselves from

politics, to simply say, we're just going to fix the water system and have nothing to do with politics one way or another. Especially if they were backed by Israeli tanks, they would quickly be seen as simply Israeli occupation by another name. So we're left with a failed state. What does that look like? You know, having gone through the different options and saying, well, this one's not going to work for this reason, and this one's a political non-starter, what do you end up with? And you end up with no government. And so what we see is really a variation, hopefully a less bloody one, of what we're seeing today, which is that you see Gaza as not having any government. In some parts, Israel is doing regular raids to attack Hamas or other groups of fighters.

In other parts, you might have a local leader, whether a technocrat or a clan leader or a warlord who has a little control in a little area, and that person at times works with Hamas or at times works with Israel to maintain a very uneasy peace. But it's very slippery, and sometimes it slips into conflict. And it's very difficult to deliver aid in such an environment because you have to worry about not just the lack of infrastructure, but the security for the aid where people might steal or rob it. And the aid workers themselves have to worry about constant military operations. Trevor Burrus You note in this article that you wrote

about this that the Palestinian citizens of Gaza don't have a vote here. Do we know what they would prefer if they did? Peter Robinson So we don't know which option the Palestinians in Gaza would prefer. And part of it, of course, is they're not really being presented with an option list. But, of course, the most important thing they want is for the fighting to end. And then they want day-to-day survival for themselves and their families. And then the next step is not exactly prosperity. I think that's a long-term goal. But really going from day-to-day

subsistence to some degree of confidence that they and their families will be able to, you know, eat, have medical care, be educated, and otherwise live more normal lives. And that requires a degree of stability. And there are a number of options that could provide that, but they're all very politically difficult. So I think they would certainly have their preferences in terms of an independent Palestinian government that has a high degree of respect. But of the bad options available, there's a question on which they would prefer. But I think anything that involves more Palestinian rule and less Israeli or foreign rule would be more welcome.

Trevor Burrus In decades, do you see this getting better? This is a tough question. So I am a somewhat optimistic person. And I do believe that for both Palestinians and Israelis, that the really only solution is a two-state solution, that for both of them to preserve the identities they want, to have the societies they want, they need their own state, but the state needs to be separate from each other. The problem, of course, is that right now, support for a two-state solution is

incredibly low among both Israelis and Palestinians. October 7th, not only the day-to-day military operations and the death and destruction, that's part of the problem. But for both sides, the actions of the other are seen as proof of bad faith. The Moss attack for Israelis is proof that Palestinians are not serious about peace, that they hate Israel, and if given the chance, they will attack. And the very, very tough Israeli response is proving to Palestinians that Israel itself doesn't care about Palestinian life. So I do believe in the logic of a two-state solution. I have hope that at some point governments on both sides will be more amenable to it. But in the short term and probably the coming years, we're not going to see any progress.

Well, Daniel Byman, thank you so much for speaking with us again. My pleasure. Daniel Byman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. We recorded our interview yesterday. If you'd like to catch up on interviews you've missed, like our conversation with actress Anjanue Ellis-Taylor, check out our podcast. You'll find lots of Fresh Air interviews.

And to find out what's happening behind the scenes on our show and get our producers' recommendations for what to watch, read, and listen to, subscribe to our free newsletter at whyy.org slash freshair. Our interviews and reviews are produced and edited by Phyllis Myers, Roberta Shorrock, Anne-Marie Baldonado, Sam Brigger, Lauren Krenzel, Teresa Madden, Monique Nazareth, and Joel Wolfram. Our digital media producers are Molly C.V. Nesper and Sabrina Siewert. Susan Yakundi directed today's show. For Terry Gross and Tanya Mosley, I'm Dave Davies.

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