Front Burner - A Hamas leader is assassinated in Iran

Episode Date: August 1, 2024

On Tuesday, the leader of Hamas’s political wing, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Iran. The killing is widely believed to have been an Israeli strike, although Israel has not claimed responsibility. News of Haniyeh’s death came just hours after Israel announced it had killed a top Hezbollah commander in Beirut, Lebanon, which it said was in retaliation for a deadly attack in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights a few days before.Now, the two attacks — coupled with Hamas and Hezbollah’s ties to the Iranian government — are stoking fears that a broader regional war could be closer than ever.Today we’re speaking about all of this with Khaled Elgindy, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, and the author of the book Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians, from Balfour to Trump.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson. On Wednesday morning, one of the most high-ranking members of Hamas was killed in Iran, in what is widely assumed to be an Israeli strike. Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas's political wing,

was in the country for the inauguration of Iran's new president. The killing came just hours after Israeli rockets targeted and killed the highest-ranking Hezbollah military commander in Beirut, Lebanon, which Israel says was in retaliation for a deadly attack in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights a few days ago. I know it's starting to sound a bit cliche at this point, but given the fact that these killings both happened in different countries, people are scared that this could easily spiral into a wider regional war. Today, we're going to talk about all of this with Khaled El-Ghindi. He's a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and the author of the book Blind Spot, America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump. And because this is moving quite fast, I just want to timestamp this conversation.

Khalid and I spoke at 2 p.m. Eastern time on Wednesday afternoon. Khalid, hi. Thank you very much for being here. Yeah, thanks for having me. So to start here, can you just explain to me who Ismail Haniyeh was and his significance to the operations of Hamas? Yeah, Ismail Haniyeh is one of Hamas's top political leaders. He was the head of the political bureau of Hamas and previously had served as the prime minister of the first Hamas-led government that was elected in 2006. The group won a parliamentary majority,

making Haniyeh prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. But his appointment angered the international community, who halted aid to the PA, placing the governing body under severe financial strain. And very briefly served as prime minister in the short-lived unity government between Fatah and Hamas in 2007. Since then, he played a very important role as a political leader in Hamas. He became the leader of Hamas in Gaza and then the sort of broader

leader of the political office for the movement and was based in Doha, outside of the country, though he himself is from Gaza and lived there most of his life. He joined Hamas when it was founded in 1987 and was arrested and jailed by Israel during the first intifada, the uprising against Israeli occupation. In fact, his sons and several of his grandchildren were killed in the war in Gaza in recent months. Ismail Haniyeh was in Qatar when he was told his sons were dead. Their blood, he said, was no more precious than that of any Palestinian,

and Hamas would not change its position on a ceasefire. So he's certainly someone who is familiar with the situation on the ground. And just what role was he playing in the ceasefire negotiations that are ongoing? Well, he was, as the sort of leader in exile, he was one of the main interlocutors in those ceasefire negotiations. And the fact that he is from Gaza, unlike some of the others in the leadership, gave him access to the leadership in Gaza, specifically Yahya Sinwar, who is, of course, both the military and political head of Hamas inside Gaza and is believed to be one of the architects of the October 7th attack. So he had access and some sway even with Sinoir inside Gaza.

So he was a very key interlocutor. And I think it's fair to say he was even a moderating force in terms of his role within Hamas. Just flesh that out for me a little bit more. What do you mean by that? Well, he was seen as a pragmatist within the movement. Like any political movement, Hamas has a spectrum of views and perspectives, even within the leadership. Some are more hardline. Certainly, Senwar fits into that category. The IDF tried to kill him in May 2021. Ten days later, he laid out his strategy.

He said, if the world doesn't take action to stop it, meaning Israel, there will be a religious war in the region. We will come to you with an endless number of rockets. We will come to you in a flood of soldiers without limit. Some are more pragmatic and moderate in terms of what their grand vision is vis-a-vis Israel and in terms of the day-to-day. The movement has provided a comprehensive perspective, starting by ending the aggression, opening the border, the prisoner swap deal, and ending with the revival of the political

and diplomatic movement towards the establishment of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital with a right of self-determination. However, Netanyahu and his gang are misleading his own people and providing false promises which cannot and will not be achieved. He was someone who, you know, ideologically in line with Hamas's worldview. But within that, he was someone who was a moderate, someone that could be counted on to deliver in things like the ceasefire negotiations because of his own views, but also because of his access to people inside Gaza. In a televised speech, Haniyeh said the group, which is widely designated a terrorist organization, was showing flexibility in negotiations with Israel. I know that there is no evidence that we know of that he played a role in the organization

of the October 7th attacks on Israel. But afterwards, he certainly did celebrate the attacks on October 7th. And as you mentioned, he is part of this organization and shares their goals, which are ultimately the destruction of Israel. So from an Israeli perspective, was he not a legitimate target? Well, I'm going to take issue with the framing of the question because I don't think it's accurate. It's kind of a trope. I don't think it's accurate to say that he shared Hamas's goal of destroying Israel. You know, Hamas is not in a position to destroy Israel. They have, you know, they have

for, they certainly don't accept Israel's legitimacy. And there are clearly Hamas leaders who would like to see Israel destroyed. But this is where the nuance matters a lot. And I don't think he is someone, again, he was not a firebrand ideologue calling for Israel's destruction. He was someone who was willing to negotiate, albeit indirectly, with the Israeli side. Many in the Hamas leadership have said that they would be willing to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, kind of de facto recognizing Israel's existence, you know, falling short of granting it more legitimacy, but accepting Israel's existence. Yeah, and just for clarity, do we know if Haneo is one of those people who accepted a two-state solution? Yeah, well, he accepted a two-state solution as a de facto reality. Insofar, he was

willing to live with a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem as its capital that was alongside Israel on the basis of a kind of indefinite long-term truce with Israel, but without recognizing Israel's right to exist. Haniya has been a staunch advocate of Hamas's position on Israel. We will never, never, never recognize Israel. His death, what does it do to Hamas now, you think? Well, it's a setback for sure. But also, on one hand, I think his assassination will raise the stature of Hamas. I think it will create more support among

Palestinians for Hamas. And it will also, I think, make the movement both more powerful, but also probably more hardline. When you assassinate the person you're negotiating with, that is something that obviously is bound to affect the whole diplomatic process. And so a lot of hardliners, I think, within Hamas will be emboldened and say, these are not people you can negotiate with. They will only understand the language of force. We have to hit them again and again. And if the goal was to radicalize us and to embolden hardliners, then I think this is the way to do it. Right. You're essentially saying this is a huge blow to a potential ceasefire. Oh, yeah, for sure. I think that's the real danger here is that this

effectively suspends, if not actually blows up the ceasefire negotiations process for the foreseeable future. It will take time to rebuild enough trust for the two sides, for all the sides to kind of come back, to even be able to talk again. So I think the ceasefire talks are for now dead. Let me put this argument to you. The other Israeli argument here is that the path to peace is not necessarily a negotiated one at all, but simply Hamas surrendering. And the argument, I guess, is that you knock out enough of their leadership, whether they be the most radical or some of the more pragmatic ones, you just knock out as many of them as you can. And you're basically, you're trying to bring about that moment of surrender quicker to end the war.

Yeah, that certainly seems to be the logic that Netanyahu and his far-right government are employing. My dear friends, the war in Gaza could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders, disarms, and returns all the hostages. But if they don't, Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas's military capabilities and its rule in Gaza and bring all our hostages home. But I would argue it's not a very rational one. The argument is actually one that speaks to the extremism of the Israeli government. The fact that they believe that they could destroy a political movement, I think, is a fantasy and one that I'm pretty sure the Israeli military establishment, at least in the

security and intelligence services, does not support because they understand that it's not feasible, that it's not achievable. Hamas is an idea. You can't simply pummel an entire population into submission as much as they may try. And when you do try, you end up where we are now, which is where Israel has killed at least 39,000 people and starved the population and left them with no real future. And even if it was possible to destroy Hamas, something like Hamas would emerge in its place because of the conditions that exist of occupation and Israeli control, denial of rights, and now the denial of basic life-sustaining food and medicine. That's what creates conflict. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection.

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That's not a typo. 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and some other events and broader concerns here. So, you know, hours before Haniya's death, before the strikes in Iran, Israel claimed responsibility for another strike. This one was in Beirut, Lebanon, and it killed Hezbollah's top commander, Fuad Shukur. Israel struck in Hezbollah's heartland, the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital, Beirut. The target, Fuad Shukur.

And I don't want to get too into the weeds here, but Israel says that this was in retaliation for a rocket attack a few days earlier in the town of Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. It killed 12 children and teenagers on a soccer field. Hezbollah distanced itself from the attack. The Lebanese group putting out a statement saying it categorically denies any involvement. But the U.S. says there's every indication that the Lebanese militant group is to blame. We're in conversations with the government of Israel. And again, I emphasize its right to defend its citizens. But we also don't want to see the conflict escalate. But people have worried about southern Lebanon and these tit-for-tats between Israel and Hezbollah igniting a much larger war.

Hezbollah is a way bigger, way better equipped organization than Hamas. So what have we heard from Hezbollah about how they might respond here? they might respond here? Well, I mean, this is the problem with every attack then demands a reprisal. That's how you get conflicts that go on, each side justifying its actions on the basis of what just happened. And that's why it's important to have level-headed, responsible third-party actors who can kind of see through the fog and convince the parties to stand down. Because very often what happens is each side thinks it's carrying out a limited reprisal, but it's not necessarily interpreted that way by the other side. And it could be seen as violating a new red line. And therefore, you know, each side says, well, I have to restore the deterrent by hitting them hard so that they never cross that line again. And then you end up with things spiraling out of control.

So, again, this is why you need responsible third party actors, of which there are very, very few at the moment. I think there are serious questions with regard to the United States' ability to constrain Israel. That's really the only role that it can play. It has no real influence with Hezbollah or with Hamas, very little influence with Iran. And so the one area where the U.S. can play a role is in trying to constrain Israel. Now, it's no secret that the administration's been extraordinarily frustrated with Netanyahu and Israel's conduct of this war, but they haven't been prepared to impose any consequences on Israel for all kinds of broken red lines, shattered promises, you know, the civilian toll, the humanitarian situation. And so the U.S.'s track record of

holding Israel to its commitments is not a very good one. I mean, what we haven't talked about directly yet is the fact that the Henia attack, even though Israel has not taken responsibility for it, it happened on Iranian soil. And Iran has vowed retaliation. With Iran announcing three days of mourning for Ismail Henia and vowing a harsh and painful response. God willing, with the efforts of the security forces, a report will be given to the people as soon as possible. My request is that necessary works be done so that those responsible don't feel like they can hurt us. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Wednesday morning...

First, this is something we were not aware of or involved in. It's very hard to speculate, and I've learned over many years never to speculate on the impact one event may have on something else. So I can't tell you what this means. I can tell you. What do you make of the fact that he said that? Yeah, it's pretty shocking, actually, because what does it say that he didn't know? What does it say about the nature of the special relationship between the United States and Israel? If such a major escalation that risks a huge regional explosion that could involve Iran and possibly even draw the United States into the conflict. If something like this isn't worthy of notifying the Americans, then I have to think that a lot of people inside the administration are having some tough conversation with their counterparts

in Israel, not least of which is CIA Director Bill Burns, who was in the midst of yet another round of ceasefire talks. And so to be caught off completely off guard is embarrassing for the United States. And I think should call into question the nature of the specialness of that relationship. This is not the first time that we have seen major escalations between Israel and Iran during the war in Gaza. So people will remember back in April, Israel struck the Iranian embassy in Syria. Iranian state media says a suspected Israeli strike has destroyed an Iranian embassy building in the Syrian capital, Damascus.

Among the dead pulled from the rubble, a high-ranking Iranian military leader. And Iran responded by launching more than 300 drones and missiles toward Israel. The vast majority of them were intercepted by Israel and other countries, and things kind of calmed down after that between the countries. But what do you think Iran could do here?

Is what happened on Iranian soil with Hania more embarrassing or worse for Iran? Would it precipitate a more serious response? Yeah, I think it is more serious.

I think it is more embarrassing. It is Hania was a guest of the regime, of the newly inaugurated president. This is very serious because it's on Iranian soil. And I think the response from Iran will be inevitable and will most likely be commensurate with the degree of humiliation that this attack involved. But, you know, obviously, everyone in the region has a lot to lose in a wider war here. And do you think Iran and even Hezbollah would really want to risk going to war with Israel? I don't think anybody wants that war.

But when you carry out an attack like this, a very clear assassination, a violent one, in the capital of a country, that you can expect that country to respond because to not respond would be a sort of surrender and you know an acknowledgement that we are too weak to respond and and essentially handing the other side of victory now the calculation that is likely going to be made is we're going to respond just hard enough to deter the other side from doing this again, to send a message that we won't tolerate this, but not so hard that things spiral out of control. But again, the problem is one side's calculations are not necessarily shared by the others. by the others. So, what Iran sees as a limited strike could be seen by Israel as crossing all lines and therefore demanding an even greater response. And then that's how things will spiral

out of control. And this takes us back to the question of mediation. We need responsible third parties to intervene. And, you know, the United States has been quite passive. for president. He has largely been commended, actually, for helping prevent a wider regional conflict up to this point, if you would agree with that. But what challenge does he face now in trying to stop this from erupting? Well, right now, we're closer to an all-out regional war than we have been since October 7th. And the ceasefire talks have been since October 7th. And the ceasefire talks have been completely sidelined, if not demolished. So, you know, this is a major challenge for the administration. Are they up to the challenge? Are they prepared to make hard choices, uncomfortable choices, all of which revolve around trying to constrain Israel and its very ambitious, desperate prime minister, who right now needs the war to continue and to

expand for him to stay in power. I think the stakes are higher than they've ever been. And ultimately, I think Biden's legacy will depend on whether they succeed in containing this from turning into a full-blown war, much less one that the U.S. gets dragged into. Okay. Khaled, thank you so much. Really appreciate this. Yeah. Thanks for having me. Thanks for having me. All right, that is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening.

Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC Podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.