Front Burner - After the airstrikes: Where do Iran and Israel go from here?

Episode Date: April 23, 2024

Today we are joined by Beirut-based journalist Kim Ghattas, author of the bestselling book Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East. She is also a contributing editor at the Financial Times.We’re speaking to Kim about the unprecedented, overt attacks exchanged this month between Israel and Iran — most recently an Israeli strike on Friday near the Iranian city of Isfahan. Where is this dangerous tit-for-tat headed next, and what’s at stake? What do Iran and Israel’s leaders actually want here? And what does it mean for the wider region?For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcriptsTranscripts of each episode will be made available by the next workday.

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson. My guest today is Kim Hottas. She's a journalist based in Beirut, the author of the best-selling book, Black Wave, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the 40-year rivalry that unraveled culture, religion, and collective memory in the Middle East.

She's also a contributing editor at the Financial Times. All of that is to say that Kim is someone with a very deep knowledge of the complex relationships and rivalries that define Middle Eastern politics. And that's why we wanted to have her on today, to discuss the unprecedented direct attacks we've seen this month between Israel and Iran. Most recently, there was a reported Israeli airstrike on the central Iranian city of Isfahan last Friday morning. The area is home to an airbase and several nuclear sites, as well as a missile factory. Iranian media said three small drones were involved. That happened less than a week after Iran fired more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel. Its first ever direct attack on the

country. U.S. officials confirming that Iran has launched drones and missiles toward Israel, the Iron Dome intercepting many of them. And that attack was in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iran's consulate in Syria, which killed more than a dozen people, including a top Iranian general. A U.K. war monitor says Israeli airstrikes killed 44 people early Friday. The war monitor says the casualties included Syrian soldiers and militants from the Iran-backed group Hezbollah. Human rights groups have called it the deadliest attack in Syria in years. So where is this dangerous tit-for-tat headed next? And what's at stake?

What do Iran and Israel's leaders actually want here? And is there anyone who can help turn down the heat on this conflict? Let's get into it. Hi, Kim. Thank you so much for coming on to FrontBurner. Hi, Jamie. Great to be with you. So according to U.S. officials, on Friday morning, Israel carried out an airstrike near the Iranian city of Isfahan. strike near the Iranian city of Isfahan. Although there's no official Israeli confirmation at this point, can you firstly just explain the importance of this city, Isfahan, to me and the region that surrounds it for Iran's military operations? So Isfahan is Iran's third largest city in the province of Isfahan. Of course, the word Isfahan also has connotations of, you know, history going back millennia and beautiful tourist site and

historical sites. But it is also home to a military airbase and a research facility, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which is Iran's largest nuclear research complex. U.S. officials say three missiles were fired from Israeli fighter jets just stationed right outside Iranian airspace. The target apparently was an air defense radar site that is located not far from an Iranian nuclear site. Iranian officials say none of the nuclear site was damaged. And that was perhaps a signal from Israel going for that site, among others, because the strikes also hit sites in Syria and Iraq. That was perhaps a signal from Israel that, A, they could reach this far, that they have these sites in their sights, sorry, no pun intended.

And also perhaps testing Iran's anti-missile defenses and radar systems. Does it seem fair to say that the attack was calculated to show Israelis or the world that Israel was responding without being so brash as to provoke an all-out war with Iran? I would say that is correct. Hunter strikes over the last 10 days from Saturday night, 13th until Friday, Saturday overnight last weekend, seemed to be very scary on the onset. It felt as though things could degenerate like we were close to Armageddon. How will Israel respond to an unprecedented attack by Iran on its own soil? World leaders meeting in an emergency session at the UN have warned that the Middle East is on the brink and that now is the time to de-escalate.

But it was also clearly very choreographed and telegraphed in advance. The Iranians telegraphed their intentions. They passed messages through the Saudis, the Turks and others. We understand there were also messages passed directly to the U.S. via Iron Dome, via coordination with Arab countries as well, and of course led by America and CENTCOM. involved more than 300 missiles and drones being launched at Israel. Israeli officials say that 99% of them, though, were blocked or brought down in part with the help of allies. The Israeli response came a week later and was not telegraphed in advance in the same way that the Iranians did, but was certainly a lot less than what some people had feared it could be, because the American administration, the Biden administration, had signaled very strongly

to Israel that although what had happened, the barrage of Iranian drones and missiles, was unprecedented, it had caused limited damage. And therefore, in the words of some American officials, Israel should just take the win and not escalate further. We're committed to Israel's security. We're also committed to de-escalating, to trying to bring this tension to a close. But the Israelis felt that they had to have the last word and conducted their counter-strike. I read in the New York Times, you know, they were quoting sources that Israel had initially planned a much larger attack, but essentially clawed it back after intense pressure from allies, particularly from US President Joe Biden, right? Yes, that would fit with the general analysis and the desire by the United States, but also actually by Iran, surprisingly to some people, not to escalate this further.

over the last six months in parallel with the war in Gaza. Iran and its proxies have been busy pushing back against America in the Middle East and signalling that they are still somehow the defenders of the Palestinian cause. Staying in the Middle East and the UK and US have launched another round of joint missile strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen in response to further attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea. But the Houthis targets in Yemen in response to further attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea. But the Houthis have vowed continued defiance, warning its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea will continue until Israel ends its assault on Gaza. But they don't want all-out war. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran felt that the Israeli strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus earlier this month, which killed several high-ranking military commanders by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards,

was a step too far. Smoke and flames billowing from an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus, debris scattered on the streets. Iran says the blast killed two generals and five officers from its Revolutionary Guard, and it's blaming Israel and vowing revenge. And that was a miscalculation by Israel, which has been used to getting away with strikes like these against Iranian assets in Syria and elsewhere in the region for many years now, and it barely ever makes a headline. So I think the Israelis felt they could get away with that as well. And they didn't realize that they had crossed a threshold. Not to ask too obvious of a question, but why does Iran not want full-out war? Does Iran not want full-out war?

Iran is very good at asymmetrical warfare using proxy militias like Shia militant group in Lebanon, Hezbollah, or their friends in Yemen, the Houthis, or other Shia militias in Iraq. And it uses that strategy as a forward defense mechanism, whereby it keeps what it considers the enemy, America, busy away from Iran's borders to try to avoid and deter from an attack, a frontal attack on Iran itself. The regime in Iran is always very worried about potential plans for regime change by countries like the United States against Tehran. And so they use that strategy. But this regime also wants to survive and ensure that it can perpetuate the Islamic Republic and the rule of the Ayatollah Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and his succession is coming up soon because he's elderly and will eventually pass away. So they can do this asymmetrical warfare quite well. I'm not going to say it's very low tech, but it's low tech compared to the Iron

Dome that Israel has. But Iran cannot engage in a full-fledged war with Israel and the US and expect to come out victorious. It can be the spoiler, but it cannot do a full-on conventional war against Israel in the United States and come out victorious. So it wants to preserve itself and its regime and its capabilities as much as possible and not be dragged into a conflict which it knows it cannot win. And what about Israel here? Like, what kind of pressures is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing within his own coalition government? Like, what have other members of that government been wanting to do? Well, one of his far right ministers said that Israel's response to Iran's strikes against the country had been meek and feeble. So he's under pressure from what is Israel's most far right,

most right wing government in its entire history. He's under pressure to continue the war in Gaza, continue the pressure on Palestinians, continue to fight back against what they describe as Iranian terror. And there were some expectation that, as you said also, that Israel would have a larger, more damaging counter-strike against Iran. That did not happen because of US pressure, but also 74% of the Israeli public does not want a large strike against Iran if it endangers Israel's security alliances, including notably with the United States. So these are the pressures that Benjamin Netanyahu is having to navigate. But the biggest pressure of all is how he stays in power and avoids being replaced in early elections. So for him, I think the key goal

is to stay in power. But that is coming at an increasing cost for the country itself, not to speak of the Palestinians, of course, who've been suffering under a devastating Israeli military campaign in Gaza. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization. Empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here.

You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you. Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own household income? That's not a typo, 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. So a lot of people are saying that this round of conflict between Israel and Iran is over for now, right? But what does that actually mean?

Because the deeper grievances have not been resolved here, obviously. You know, you just talked about how Netanyahu is under pressure to stay in power. Obviously, ongoing conflicts probably help him do that. So how much of a calm is this, really? It appears that the overt warfare between Iran and Israel, which we've never seen before, has gone back into the shadows. They've each had the last word. They've both tried to minimize what happened. It was very striking to see the Iranians minimize the Israeli strikes against Iran. After threatening a harsh and massive response to the smallest incursion,

Iran has downplayed this morning's strike. Its president didn't mention it once in his speech today. And this is the situation in Isfahan, as shown on Iranian TV. The message, nothing to see here. You've had the US administration trying to not talk about it too much because the more you talk about all of this, the more the different players will feel know, all of this, the more

the different players will feel that they have to go at it again. So that phase has now calmed down. But that doesn't mean that the region has calmed down. First of all, the war in Gaza continues, people are still dying, there are still Palestinians going hungry every day because aid is not going into Gaza as it should. And there is what I describe as a parallel war. There is the campaign that Israel is waging in Gaza, but there's a parallel war going on in the Middle East, which is the one led by Iran and its proxies. So we have now gone back to the proxy warfare. And indeed, yesterday, there were some attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, the likes of which we had seen at the end of last year up until February, when the U.S. struck back finally. The U.S. has started a series of military strikes against

Iranian-backed militias in both Syria and Iraq tonight. The bombing is in retaliation for an attack that killed three American soldiers and wounded dozens of others in Jordan. And that silenced Shia militias in Iraq for a while, but it looks like they feel they need to resume their attacks against U.S. forces. And that, if I may just add, And that, if I may just add, Jamie, that is part of Iran's effort, as I described earlier, to wage this asymmetrical warfare that is a way to defend itself from outside threats. But it's also an ideological drive against America in the region and American influence in the region. And Hezbollah, who you mentioned before, just a reminder again, for our listeners, this is the Lebanese militant group and political party, which receives huge financial and military backing from Iran. Where do they fit in here? So it's important to remind your listeners that the clashes between Hezbollah and Israel are ongoing since October 8th. It doesn't make many headlines, but there are 90,000 Lebanese citizens who are no longer in their homes in

southern Lebanon. And Israeli strikes are destroying infrastructure in the south of the country, civilian infrastructure, alongside whatever targets they're striking that belong to Hezbollah. But the damage to civilian life in southern Lebanon is quite dramatic. And of course, citizens in northern Israel have also not been able to go back to their homes since all of this kicked off on October 7th. but the devastation on the Lebanese side is quite visible and widespread. Hezbollah has also wanted to stay somewhat restrained and pragmatic, which has surprised a lot of people. So they have responded to Israeli strikes, but within limits in a very tit-for-tat way. And it's Israel that is increasingly striking deeper into Lebanon.

They struck Beirut, of course, in January. Israeli drone has assassinated Saleh El Arouri, a senior official from Hamas. At least four people died in the strike, which took place in the southern part of Lebanon's capital, Beirut. They struck deep into the Bekaa Valley, which is on the eastern flank of Lebanon. And Hezbollah's responding in a quite restrained way because Hezbollah is Iran's jewel in the crown. It is their best asset, their top proxy militia, and I would say almost an equal partner to the regime in Tehran. And it has the most training, the most capabilities and the most weapons. And the day that Iran really feels that it is under threat from the outside, either regime change or military strikes,

that's when it will deploy Hezbollah to strike against Israel or American targets. to strike against Israel or American targets. And so Iran wants to preserve Hezbollah for that theoretical day, if and when it comes. And that's why Hezbollah has been somewhat restrained, particularly during the last 10 days when we saw the Iranian strikes and Israeli counterstrikes. Hezbollah stayed aside from that. And that was quite interesting to watch. stayed aside from that. And that was quite interesting to watch. So you don't see that as something that is imminent right now? You see more of the status quo? I see more of the same, but there's always the potential for miscalculation the same way that Israel miscalculated when it struck the Iranian consulate in Damascus, it could miscalculate and,

and cross a threshold with its strikes in Lebanon. I know that the Biden administration is working very hard on trying to restrain Israel on that front as well. And they've done so since October 7th because Israel had plans or desires to conduct a large-scale military preemptive operation against Lebanon in the days following October 7th. And the Biden administration convinced Israel to desist from those plans. So we'll have to see how things unfold. But the diplomacy is in full swing as well to try to resolve this diplomatically between Lebanon, Hezbollah on one side and Israel on the other. Kim, I'm curious to hear your overall thoughts on how you think the US is doing here in terms of its ability to de-escalate things. Do you think that it's been successful? Well, clearly not, because six months into the war in Gaza, it's still war in Gaza.

And over 30,000 Palestinians are dead, thousands of children included in the death toll, thousands more of them who have lost one or both parents, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, of educational structure, hospitals, universities, that is clearly a sign that the Biden administration has not managed to properly advise and restrain its Israeli ally in terms of how to conduct this war with minimal civilian casualties. However, I would say that in the rest of the region, although the Biden administration gets a lot of criticism for not having managed this better, I actually think they've managed it better than they get credit for. Because first of all, as I said, the Biden administration has managed to restrain Israel from launching a full-on

assault against Lebanon. It has managed to maintain channels of communication, direct and indirect, with Iran. And it has encouraged Saudi Arabia to do the same. Iran. And it has encouraged Saudi Arabia to do the same. It led the effort, of course, to coordinate the response to the Iranian decision to launch missiles and drones against Israel. It's hard to describe a success that is not visible in the sense that we can only imagine how much worse it could have been if American diplomacy had failed completely. I shudder at the thought of what the region would be looking like if there were no channels of communication between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or if there was a breakdown in relationships between the Saudis and the Americans,

even because of what is happening in Gaza. The Saudis are deeply unhappy, but they want to also maintain their connections with the Americans. They're still talking about the potential of normalization with Israel, pending, you know, agreement on a future Palestinian state. So that kind of diplomacy helps avoid worst case scenarios. diplomacy helps avoid worst case scenarios. And that is difficult sometimes to give credit for to those who are trying to do this diplomacy. Right. Hard to prove a negative. Hard to prove a negative. Yes. Thank you for summarizing what I said with many sentences. Yours was much better. But just as a final question before we go, you know, with the ultimate goal being stability in the region and a real and lasting ceasefire in Gaza, what is it that you would like to see

happen next? You know, what are you going to be watching for next as signs that it might be moving towards de-escalation? I think it's very important to remember how this started. It started with the horrific events of October 7th, which, you know, unleashed violence and bloodshed inside Israel. It is part of a larger context of continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and control over Gaza's borders and de facto occupation there as well. And as we all get busy with talking about the geopolitics and Iran and Israel and strikes and counter strikes, it's important to bring our focus back to the human element of this, the hostages, the Israeli hostages who are still in Gaza, and the immense suffering by Palestinian civilians. And that's where the Biden administration, I think, is going to put its efforts now, again, to try to bring this to

not a conclusion, but to have a diplomatic push again, to try to solve many aspects of this larger puzzle. I made a reference earlier on to normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This was in the works before October 7th. And I know a lot of people feel that you have to suspend disbelief to begin to consider that this could be put back on the table. This is what the Biden administration would like to do. It would like to resume those conversations. They're talking to the Saudis about what the kingdom wants in terms of security guarantees for its safety in a region where Iran has the ability to strike and counter strike and deploy proxy militias. The Saudis are very worried about that, which is also why they decided to go ahead

with a rapprochement with Iran last year, a rapprochement that has withstood the shocks of the Gaza war. And that rapprochement, in essence, you could summarize it by saying that the Saudis, you know, think, you know, as is often said, hug your friends close and your enemies closer. So they're trying to get protection from potential targeting by the Iranians with this rapprochement. Saudis in that conversation, but the U.S. would like Saudis and Israelis to have normal relations. And the Saudis have made very clear that in order to be able to take that step, they need what they describe as credible, irreversible steps towards a Palestinian state. So the puzzle that this Biden administration now has to solve is how do you get the Israelis to agree to this, to this credible, irreversible path towards a Palestinian state so that you could get regional integration of Israel. And that's going to be a very tall order with Benjamin Netanyahu, who has staked his whole career on

making sure there will never be a Palestinian state. Kim, I want to thank you so much for this. It is such a pleasure to have you on. Your work has really helped me understand this conflict and the region a lot better. So thank you very much. Thank you very much for having me. Great to speak to you. All right, that is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson.

Thanks so much for listening, and we'll talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC Podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.