Front Burner - Are Israel and America at odds over Gaza?

Episode Date: December 7, 2023

As fighting in Gaza resumed, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued strong words of caution for Israel to obey international humanitarian law and to minimize civilian casualties. It was a significant shift in tone compared to the total support Blinken had delivered earlier in the war. And it’s a message that’s been echoed by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Are the long-time allies at odds over Gaza? What does strain in that relationship mean for the future of the war – and for the civilians caught in the middle? Gregg Carlstrom, Middle East Correspondent for The Economist, explains. For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts Transcripts of each episode will be made available by the next workday.

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Damon Fairless. The way Israel defends itself matters. It's imperative that Israel act in accordance with international humanitarian law and the laws of war. That's U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last week with strong words of caution for Israel.

It's a significant shift in tone compared to the total support Blinken had delivered earlier in the war. But with the temporary ceasefire over, Israeli forces have begun a brutal second phase of operations, expanding into southern Gaza set on Khan Yunus, where the IDF say Hamas leaders are hiding out. Meanwhile, people in Gaza say there's nowhere left that's safe. Many have already fled from the north, and the UN says more than 80% of the population has been displaced. With international scrutiny over the rising Palestinian death toll, which is 16,000, according to Palestinian health authorities,

there are growing questions about the state of Israel-US relations. A noticeable rift has emerged between the United States and Israel, marking unprecedented tension between the two longtime allies. Today, we're asking whether the allies are at odds over Gaza and what the growing strain in that relationship means for the future and for the civilians caught in the middle. Here to explain is Greg Karlstrom. He's the Middle East correspondent for The Economist. Hey Greg, thanks for coming on the show. Thanks for having me. So, Greg, let's begin today with a reminder of where the U.S. and Israel were at the beginning of the war. How strongly did the U.S. respond after the October 7th Hamas attack? The American response in some ways was really unprecedented.

really unprecedented. It wasn't just that we heard strong American support for Israel's war in Gaza, for its right to self-defense. In this moment of tragedy, I want to say to them and to the world and to terrorists everywhere that the United States stands with Israel. We will not ever fail to have their back. That's something that happens every time there's been a conflict in Gaza over the past decade and a half, or not just the fact either that America has sent a sort of ongoing airlift of munitions and other military equipment to Israel. First shipments of U.S. military support have already arrived in Israel, and more is on the way. As Israel's defense needs evolve, we will work with Congress to make sure

that they're met. Again, that's not unusual, but going so far as to send two aircraft carrier groups to the Middle East, sending air defense batteries across the region, sending thousands of troops to the Middle East, that is something that we haven't seen before, that level of military support. We saw an American destroyer in the Red Sea shot down missiles and drones that are thought to have been fired from Yemen in the direction of Israel. We cannot say for certain what these missiles and drones were targeting, but they were launched from Yemen heading north along the Red Sea, potentially towards targets in Israel. So beyond the usual political and diplomatic support, really an unprecedented level of military backing for Israel over the past two months. Yeah, so we've also heard early on from Antony Blinken

basically saying that America was going to stand by Israel no matter what. To any adversary, state or non-state, thinking of taking advantage of the current crisis to attack Israel, don't. The United States has Israel's back. Right. And for the Americans, of course, a lot of this has been not just about the immediate conflict between Israel and Hamas and Gaza, but also these fears of a regional configuration that Hezbollah in Lebanon might get involved in a bigger way, the Houthis in Yemen, other Iranian-backed groups across the region. So the Americans have tried to not just in word, but also in deed, make it very clear that they are supporting Israel and they're trying to deter these other Iranian back groups from joining the war in a significant way.

So that said, you know, given the strong rhetoric and the strong support, we have started to see recently some cracks in this unified front, I guess. How would you characterize the state of U.S.-Israel relations right now? It's become certainly a bit more tense over the past two months. past two months. If you go back to the days after the October 7th massacre, America wasn't raising any questions about the Israeli response. It was full-throated support for the war in Gaza and whatever it was that Israel planned to do. More and more in recent weeks, we've heard from Vice President Kamala Harris. The United States is unequivocal. International humanitarian law must be respected. Too many innocent Palestinians have been killed. Secretary Blinken.

Before Israel resumes major military operations, it must put in place humanitarian civilian protection plans that minimize further casualties of innocent Palestinians. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. So we will continue to press Israel to protect civilians minimize further casualties of innocent Palestinians. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. So we will continue to press Israel to protect civilians and to ensure the robust flow of humanitarian aid. All of them have begun to raise concerns about, I think, two things. One of them is the tactics that Israel is using in Gaza, the atrocious civilian death toll that we've seen, the increasingly dire humanitarian conditions there. And then the second issue is this question of the day after, of when the war ends, whenever that is going to be, what does the situation on the

ground look like in Gaza? Who is in control of that territory? Is it Israel? Is it the Palestinian Authority? Is it somewhere else? And the Americans are not getting the sorts of answers to those questions that they want from the Israelis. And so they have in their public messaging, but then much more so in their private remarks to Israeli officials, they have become more and more critical of this war effort. So actually, I want to talk about each of those things in a little more detail. So there have been some direct signals that the Biden administration is shifting its position a bit on the war. On Tuesday, the U.S. announced it will impose visa bans against individuals involved in undermining peace, security, stability in the occupied West Bank. Allies of Israel condemned a sharp rise in attacks on Palestinian civilians by Jews who are armed and who've

settled in the West Bank. Now the U.S. is imposing travel bans on a few dozen of those responsible, possibly including their family members as well. But let's go through each of these major divisions between Israel and the United States right now, starting with something you've already mentioned, the scale of Israel's renewed military assault on South Gaza. So the U.S. has drawn a bit of a line here, right? Can you kind of walk me through that? Right. Since the end of the week-long truce last Friday, the Israelis, before the end of the truce, they signaled that they were planning to expand their offensive beyond North Gaza to Southern Gaza. expand their offensive beyond North Gaza to southern Gaza.

And the Americans made it very clear that if Israel did that, they didn't want to see Israel use the same tactics in the north that it used in the south. But Israel has the most sophisticated, one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world. It is capable of neutralizing the threat posed by Hamas while minimizing harm to innocent men, women, and children. And it has an obligation to do so. What we saw in the north was weeks of ferocious aerial bombardment followed by a very heavy ground offensive with, you know, armored columns of tanks going neighborhood by neighborhood through north Gaza,

which is still ongoing now in bits of the north. That was, to some extent, enabled by the fact that Israel told civilians to flee the north, and most of the population of north Gaza has now fled to the south. As Israel geared up to launch a southern part of this offensive, those civilians now have nowhere to go, right? They are stuck in southern Gaza. They can't go back to the north. It's controlled by the Israeli army. It's largely in ruins, and they can't leave Gaza. So they are stuck there. And the Americans said very clearly, you can't use the same tactics in the south. It can't be the same ferocity of fighting because the civilian death toll, which was appalling in the north in the first month and a

half of the war, is likely to be even worse in the south. That is what the Americans wanted. That is what they told the Israelis. Judging by what has happened over the past few days since the truce ended and fighting resumed, it doesn't seem like that message was really received or acted on. What we've seen in Khan Yunus, which is the first major city south of the evacuation line that the Israelis demarcated in Gaza, what we've seen there has been very similar to the north, it seems. It's very heavy aerial bombardment. It's reports of Israeli tanks going through parts of the city and very heavy ground fighting there and civilians who you talk to in Gaza saying they don't feel they have anywhere

safe to go. So what America wanted, an entirely different set of tactics in the south, it doesn't seem like Israel has really done that so far. So it sounds like the U.S. felt like it had to spell out that reduction in civilian casualty. And yet there, you know, Netanyahu has not seemed to follow that. What's he said in terms of the response to that line that the U.S. has been laying down? in terms of the response to that line that the US has been laying down? I mean, the Israeli government and the Israeli army, they have paid lip service to that American demand. I think the best example of that was over the weekend, the Israeli army released a map of Gaza that had divided Gaza into about 600 numbered zones. And the idea of this map was that the Israeli army said, on a rolling basis, day by day, we will tell Palestinians, these are the areas where there

is fighting today. And these are the areas where you should flee to because those areas will be safe. In theory, that was meant to try and alleviate some of these concerns about civilian casualties. In practice, when you talk to Palestinians in Gaza, they say the map isn't clear. First of all, they're not entirely sure where these zones begin and end. And in some cases, they've been told to leave one area and go to another area. But the route that they are told to take to get there takes them through other active zones of fighting. And then also add to that the fact that there are huge issues in Gaza right now

around electricity, internet connectivity, just getting in touch with people to even get that message to them. So on the surface, yes, this is a bit of an effort by the Israelis to take heed of America's concerns. But in practice, it doesn't seem like it's amounted to much. So US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has publicly called out Israel's military strategy. Can you go into what he said on Saturday? What he said, I think the crux of it was that if there is a truly appalling, not just civilian death toll, but humanitarian conditions in Gaza during and after the war, then Israel risks turning a tactical victory in Gaza into a strategic defeat. So I have repeatedly made clear to Israel's

leaders that protecting Palestinian civilians in Gaza is both a moral responsibility and a strategic imperative. That is certainly something the Americans, after decades of counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere, have some familiarity with. And so trying to put that not just in humanitarian terms or moral idealistic terms, but trying to say very clearly to the Israelis that whatever it is you think you're trying to achieve with this military campaign in Gaza, the idea is to remove Hamas from power, prevent it from ever being a threat to Israel again. But Lloyd Austin's argument was that if you do that in such a way that creates widespread civilian suffering, you're going to end up whether it's allowing Hamas to survive or

giving rise to some sort of group very much like Hamas in the days and years to come. And so but the Israeli army hasn't seemed to heed that, though. I mean, I'm just thinking of the past few days, we've seen some of the heaviest bombardment of the entire war, according to the UN. We have and that is what both that is how both Israelis and Palestinians describe it as well. I think for the Israeli for the government and the army, there is a feeling that there's a ticking clock right now. The Americans have yet to call for a ceasefire. Joe Biden has been very clear that he does not support one right now.

But again, the messaging is getting tougher. And then add to that that much of the world wants to see a ceasefire, including even some of Israel's other allies in the West. And so from the army's perspective, they have a certain window in which they can continue this campaign in Gaza. That window is closing and they want to do as much as they can in whatever time is available to them. And so rather than doing what the Americans wanted them to do and going in quite slowly in a piecemeal fashion into southern Gaza, they seem to be moving quickly because they feel like there is a ticking clock. I'm going to go. and industry connections. That's not a typo. 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast,

Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. Another point here is something else you mentioned earlier. What happens to the Palestinians in Gaza after the war? What has America said they don't want to see? Secretary Blinken has set out what he calls his five no's for the Gaza war and for what comes after the Gaza war. And on that list are things like no reduction in the territory of Gaza and no forcible displacement of the population of Gaza outside of the territory. That is America's position. What we've seen from Israel over the past few weeks often flies in the face of that. The Israeli government has said and has told America, has told Arab states that it plans to expand the buffer zone between Gaza and Israel. So in other

words, expanding the amount of territory in Gaza on which Palestinians are not allowed to live, work, etc. That is de facto a reduction in the territory of Gaza. In terms of displacement, that hasn't happened yet. The Egyptian government has adamantly refused to allow Palestinians from Gaza to enter Egypt, with the exception of a small number of dual nationals and people who are severely injured being taken for medical treatment in Egypt. But there has been talk in the Israeli government over the past two months about trying to do exactly that, trying to push a large chunk of Gaza's population outside of the enclave, at least temporarily during the war. So these are America's demands. Israel's positions often fly in the face

of American demands. And not only on that, but on questions like who will govern afterwards. America would like to see the Palestinian Authority come back to Gaza. It controlled Gaza until 2007 when Hamas threw it out. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said multiple times now that he doesn't want to see the PA come back to Gaza. Israeli state broadcaster Khan broke the story of a closed-door meeting between Netanyahu and members of the Knesset, where the prime minister reportedly said, not only will there not be a renewed Palestinian Authority in Gaza after the war, there will also be no Palestinian authority in Gaza at all. America has talked about some sort of an Arab peacekeeping force to operate in Gaza after

the war. Netanyahu has said he doesn't support that idea either. He de facto at this point is pursuing what looks like it will be a prolonged occupation of Gaza, which was also on Secretary Blinken's list of no's. So there are real divergences in how these two sides see the post-war order. And so these divergences, you know, this is really, these are questions of how the war is being fought, not necessarily whether the war should be fought. Let's talk for a moment, if we could, about some of the things that the U.S. and Israel fundamentally agree on about this war. I think the biggest one is for Israel in the wake of October 7th, their entire view of Hamas has changed. They thought that this was a manageable threat on

their borders. They don't see it that way anymore. After 1,200 Israelis killed and hundreds more abducted, they see this now as an intolerable threat that they have to get rid of. And on that, America is in full agreement. And that is why Joe Biden, when he publicly swats away calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, he keeps coming back to that idea that Hamas, if there were a ceasefire now, it would be allowed to survive and would remain a threat to Israel. And then that also ties into, for Biden, what he would like to see as sort of a post-war hopeful, optimistic outcome of this leading to a renewed peace process, a renewed effort at a two-state solution. Hamas has been a spoiler for the peace process since the early

1990s, since the Oslo Accords began. And that is another reason why he supports getting rid of it. That is not something that the Netanyahu government supports, but that is something that some people in the center and on the left, politically in Israel also agree with. Okay, so we've been talking about the increasing strain here between the U.S. and Israel, but I think it's worth maybe taking a minute to talk about, for people who maybe don't have the background, to talk about why this strain is so significant. So from a historical standpoint, what do people need to know about the longstanding relationship, the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel?

How tied are the two countries? the U.S. and Israel? How tied are the two countries? If you want to talk about Israel's diplomatic relationships, they don't get much older than the relationship with America. The United States recognized Israel moments after it was established as a state in 1948. In a tense atmosphere, the assembly hears a statement of momentous importance read by United States Delegate Jessup. The United States recognizes the provisional government For the first couple of decades, though, there were some frictions in the relationship, and it wasn't actually the closest relationship. During the Suez crisis in the 1950s, for example, the America is by far Israel's closest ally, provides it with several billion dollars a year in military aid, provides it with a reliable veto at the United Nations Security Council. Anything that either America or Israel deem an anti-Israeli resolution by and large is vetoed by the United States at the UN. And it's one of the few foreign relationships that

for decades now has been a bipartisan issue in America. Both Republicans and Democrats historically, up until quite recently, were united in their political support for Israel. We stand with Israel. I love Israel. I love Israel. The bond between our two countries is unbreakable. The eternal friendship. Relationship is very important. We are you and you are us. Have we seen this level of strain before? We have. I mean, there have been tensions in the relationship,

but more recently, the strains tend to involve Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been prime minister, of course, for more than half of the past 30 years and has routinely butted heads with Democratic presidents back in the late 1990s when Bill Clinton was in the White House. He's really pissed. All pussycats here. Let me first of all say I'm delighted to have the prime minister here. I look forward to having a chance to have this conversation. He often clashed with Netanyahu over efforts to try and push forward the peace process

between Israelis and Palestinians. Barack Obama famously at odds with Netanyahu about a number of things, but the biggest of those was Netanyahu's efforts to sabotage the nuclear deal with Iran, which was Barack Obama's signature foreign policy initiative. Prime Minister Netanyahu has not offered any kind of viable alternative that would achieve the same verifiable mechanism to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Something that Netanyahu fought tooth and nail to the point where he flew to Washington and delivered a speech to Congress denouncing Obama's diplomatic efforts.

We've been told that no deal is better than a bad deal. Well, this is a bad deal. We're better off without it. Had a better relationship with Donald Trump for the four years that he was in office. He's always gotten along much better with Republicans, but then also had a very frosty time with Joe Biden up until October 7th. For most of this year, his relationship with the Biden administration was terrible. The president refused to invite Netanyahu to the White House, in large part because of Netanyahu's efforts to hobble the Israeli Supreme Court and overhaul the country's judicial system. Biden was often very, the U.S. is still supporting Israel with significant amounts of military aid.

Is the U.S. leveraging this influence to the fullest extent? Is it showing any signs of pulling back at all? I don't think it's leveraging it as much as it could. I'm also not sure that given the realities of American politics, a president heading into an election year would be willing to use that sort of influence. You know, I think a good example, as you mentioned before, this idea of visa bans on violent settlers, something that the State Department announced earlier this week. And the idea there is that we have seen a big uptick in settler violence in the occupied West Bank, settlers attacking Palestinians and their property.

The videos are everywhere. Daily evidence of Palestinians being violently attacked by Israeli settlers, often armed, and in some some cases murdering Palestinians. Burning homes, businesses and cars. Something that was widespread even before October 7th, but has become an even bigger problem over the past two months. And so the State Department said that it was going to start imposing visa bans on some of these violent settlers. two months. And so the State Department said that it was going to start imposing visa bans on

some of these violent settlers. I think two issues with that as a policy. One is that the sorts of settlers who are involved in violence against Palestinians, they're deeply ideological. I don't think they're going to be deterred from burning down Palestinian olive groves or attacking Palestinian farmers because they can't take their kids to Disney World. They can't get a visa to the United States. I don't think that's a real deterrent. But then the bigger issue is, you know, you have to look at settler violence, not just as an individual phenomenon, but something that exists in the context of a half century plus occupation of the West Bank. For America to treat this as just a problem of

individuals, I think shows you that it wants to do something symbolic, but it doesn't want to go further and say, threaten sanctions on the Israeli army, if it doesn't start fulfilling its responsibility to protect Palestinians. The Biden administration doesn't want to do that. Arguably, it can't do that going into an election year because it could be politically damaging for a president who's already facing big questions about his re-election, but they're settling for symbolism rather than doing something more substantive. You talk to some people in Washington who will tell you that they think the Biden administration is almost a dinosaur in the sense that you have this president who, not just in terms of policy, but his own ideology, the way President Biden talks about Israel, he is deeply personally

committed to the state of Israel in a way that many younger Democrats are not. And it's entirely possible that whoever is the next Democratic president after Joe Biden will not feel the same sort of reflexive ironclad support for Israel that the current president does. All right, Greg, thanks so much. It's been great talking to you. Thank you. That's all for today. Before we say goodbye, I want to leave you with an update from a guest we spoke with a while back. Dr. Mohamed Abou Mugaisib is the deputy medical coordinator for MSF in Gaza. We wanted to know how he was doing this week, so we reached out.

And here's part of the voice note he sent us. What I can say, I mean, the situation is really getting worse and worse. I mean, after asking the population to move to the south, and the majority moved to the south, and now they are attacking the south and doing ground operation in the south area. South, north, I mean, Gaza City, all are the same. Bombings, striking, I mean, maybe you can hear the drones.

That doesn't stop at all. That make you crazy. Situation is becoming, I mean mean hospitals are almost not functioning and there is no more hospital functioning in the north now we can say that Gaza is I mean it says no living zone for human beings people are getting I mean we are in the starvation era. There is no more food in the market. There is no AIDS enough entering. People really, they look like zombies.

I mean, they look really like zombies here, the people now, because there is no food. I mean, it's horrible. It's really horrible. I don't know what more to say about the situation. There's no words, I mean. It's the catastrophe of the century. I mean, when we are...

All right, I'm Damon Fairless. Brent Byrne is back tomorrow. I'll talk to you then. Thanks for listening.