Front Burner - Can Hamas’ handover restart Gaza’s peace plan?

Episode Date: July 15, 2026

The Gaza peace plan and ceasefire, announced last October, is in limbo.Israeli forces have continued their strikes and expanded control of the strip beyond the lines originally agreed upon in the plan. Humanitarian aid is trickling in but there are still concerns about how it’s being distributed. The U.S.-led Board of Peace, created to handle the resolution of violence and reconstruction in Gaza, has made little progress.But last week, Hamas announced that they are ready to hand over the authority of governing Gaza to a group of US-backed Palestinian technocrats. Is this the breakthrough needed to get things back on track?Hugh Lovatt is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He’s here to talk about where things stand in Gaza and what this latest announcement from Hamas means for the Palestinian people.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts 

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Find it on the CBC Listen app or wherever you get your podcasts. This is a CBC podcast. Hey everyone, I'm Jamie Poisson. After nearly two decades of governing the Gaza Strip, Hamas announced last week that it would dissolve its government and hand over power to a group of Palestinian technocrats. The move is part of a U.S. brokered peace plan that paved the way for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, a peace plan that's out of stalemate.

Since last October, when the ceasefire began, Israel has not only expanded its control of the strip, but also continued its military campaign there. According to the Gaza Health Ministry, over 1,000 people have been killed in the last nine months. Humanitarian aid is barely getting in. And the Board of Peace, the international body created and headed by the United States to handle the resolution of violence and reconstruction in Gaza has made little progress. Today, Hugh Leavitt is back on the show. He is the Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Hugh is here to talk about where things stand in Gaza,

what this latest announcement from Hamas could mean for the Palestinian people and why things haven't progressed more. Hugh, hi, it's really good to have you back on the show. Hi, Jamie. Thanks a lot for having me back. It's a real pleasure. So first, I just want to talk a bit about the situation on the ground in Gaza, Hamas and Israel reached a U.S.-backed ceasefire last October, and it is technically still in place. However, despite that, shelling and airstrikes by Israeli forces have continued, what is the state of the war in Gaza currently, and why is there still this level of violence? Well, despite us calling it a ceasefire, it is a ceasefire really only in name, or at the very at least a ceasefire only for one side.

So since it was formally implemented in October, certainly there has been a decrease in the levels of violence. Hamas and Palestinian armed groups have largely stopped their attacks on Israeli forces in Gaza. However, the IDF, the Israeli military, has been steadily re-increasing its airstrikes against Gaza, against the part of Gaza still under Hamas control. Now, Israeli forces have escalated their attacks on Gaza, killing at least 10 Palestinians in just the past 24 hours. Medical sources in Gaza say that at least 11 Palestinians, including women and children,

were killed in Israeli airstrikes in Gaza City early on Thursday. This is, at least in my reading, of the 20-point plan, that is the basis for the ceasefire. That is a violation of the ceasefire. In addition to which Israel having initially redeployed its forces in Gaza, is now once again re-expanding its control. That is another violation of the ceasefire. But let me finish on this point, which is that, you know, we can get into the specificities of what the ceasefire plan entails, but we should never, of course, lose sight of the human toll. And, you know, things are maybe a little bit better in Gaza, but that is starting from an extremely

disastrous baseline. Yes, there's a little bit of aid that's been allowed in. Yes, there's a little bit less violence, but Garza's continue to suffer. Gazans continue to face an absolutely atrocious humanitarian and security situation. And for them, there has been really very little meaningful change to their lives. I remember just last week, an aid worker that organized World Cup screenings in this trip was killed in a strike just before the Egypt-Argentina match, as well as two young boys who are also on their way to watch the game. in a very crowded neighborhood where thousands of displaced people were sheltering around the place where the strike took place and took the lives of this man who was all the time described

as a great hero by many of the people in Gaza who has been helping thousands of people. The Israeli military said they were going after Hamas militant but did say that they were aware that uninvolved citizens were harmed. And just is Israel being held accountable in any way for how they're choosing to engage militarily during the ceasefire, especially by the Board of Peace? Absolutely not in my reading. From a very big picture level, when you look at the atrocities that Israel has committed in Gaza over the past years, there's been very little accountability. We have had indictments issued by the International Criminal Court against several senior senior. Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, but little has covered that to date. We also have

ongoing case at the International Court of Justice, the ICJ, about potential genocide crimes in Gaza committed by Israel. That continues. But again, you know, at very little accountability, a number of European countries, the US, continue to sell weapons to Israel. But if we again, zoom in on the very specificities that we started off talking about in terms of what the ceasefire entails, Here too, there's been very little accountability of Israel's non-respect, non-implementation of its very specific obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire. And that is the obligations I mentioned in terms of stopping its fire against Gaza, withdrawing to a specific line within Gaza, allowing inhumanitarian aid. For example, Israel has not abided by that.

And the Board of Peace has largely ignored those violations by Israel. Israel. Why is Israel saying that they are increasing these strikes and expanding their territory in Gaza? And then what do you make of their position? Well, Israel will say first of all that it is doing that in response to what it says are violations of the ceasefire by Hamas. It says that Hamas's unwillingness to fully disarm is a violation of the ceasefire. And therefore, Israel has the right to do this. Israel will also say that it's, uh, systematic leveling of vast areas of Gaza still under Israeli control is actually also justified because that is Israel not leveling Palestinian homes as it is doing, but actually going after Hamas infrastructure. What I would add is the important caveat or important clarification when it comes to Hamas disarmament, which I'm sure we'll talk about shortly, is that the ceasefire plan is a three-phase plan. The question of Hamas disarmament is meant to be

discussed in the second phase. When we talk about Israel's violations of the ceasefire, those are violations under the first phase. And so Hamas, you know, and to be frank, perhaps not without reason, well, they will, how can you ask us to be implementing the second phase of the ceasefire deal disarming if Israel hasn't yet abided by its obligations under the previous phase? This expansion of territory that we're seeing, I know my colleagues here at CBC, were able to visually confirm that like that line of control that was demarcated with yellow cinder blocks had been moved ahead by Israeli forces. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, are moving many of these blocks far deeper into Gaza, and in some cases, demolishing almost everything along the way. Look at the satellite image from December 2025.

Trees, buildings, and orchards can be seen on the Palestinian side of the yellow line. And in these new images we obtained in June, it's all gone. How is it affecting how, like, aid groups have been operating? And what is it meant for the Palestinians there? Or even before we get to the specific question of demarcations in Gaza, we can zoom out and appreciate that. Israel has long hindered the activities of international humanitarian organizations in Gaza since the beginning of the conflict

and even actually before the conflict in other ways. And actually, Hinder is not even the right word because scores of aid workers have been killed in Israeli strikes and at times actually deliberate targeted strikes, including people working for the World Kitchen and, you know, very prominent international aid organizations. So that's already, you know, the context. Now, more specifically, despite the ceasefire plan

calling for the full and free distribution of aid to Gaza, Israel has not allowed that. Israel has continued to put in place very heavy bureaucratic and security restrictions that have heavily constrained the ability of these organizations to continue their activities or expand their activities in Gaza. And that's more difficult in the areas that are adjacent to Israeli lines of control. But there are nonetheless issues that aid organizations will face anywhere in Gaza, and again, not just bureaucratic, but really fundamental security issues. You know, they now control Israel now control 70% of the strip, as I understand it. And there was this press conference where a member of the audience go to Netanyahu to take all of Gaza,

and he said that he would aim for 70% as a start. What are Israel's plans for all this ground that they're gaining? I think that's very difficult to answer because there is no one answer. and it kind of depends on who you ask in the Israeli system and who you listen to. So there is a very narrow security answer, which is kind of the one I gave previously, which is this is about trying to erode and dismantle Hamas's military and political infrastructure. Remove Hamas there, enable the population to be free of Gaza and to pass it to civilian governance. That is not Hamas and not anyone advocating the destruction of Israel.

a more ideological argument, which we cannot dismiss because of the strong influence that the settler movement and the more sort of messianic right have within not just the Israeli's current Israeli government, but over a large part of Israeli politics itself, this messianic view is, you know, that the people of Israel need to go back to Gaza. And, you know, we often think of biblical, you know, Israel as being the West Bank, but parts of the settlement also claim Gaza. And there were Israeli settlements in Gaza, starting from the beginning of the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1967 until 2005 when Israel withdrew its settlements. And so that settlement movement has not forgotten and has long-harded ambitions to return to Gaza. And again, that cannot be

dismissed. Firstly, you know, obviously some Israeli politicians, senior leaders are talking about this, including the government, I believe, Defence Minister Katz, has raised this process. aspect again in the last few days. And this is not just about, you know, affectioneering. I think this does reflect a real ideological belief. And there's opportunity. Large areas of Gaza have been now flattened, which to be very crude or crass about it, you know, makes redevelopment very easy, makes settlement building very easily, because you no longer have Palestinian towns. But you also have the presence of the Israeli military. And what we know from the West Bank is that Israeli settlements arrive

off of the back of the Israeli military. So the Israeli military will go in, will create its own military outposts. And at some point, the Israeli military will withdraw from those outposts and the settlers will come in and create a civilian outpost. And that's the way that it has happened

historically over decades in the West Bank. And so I think that's exactly how it would play out. And that is exactly how Israeli leaders are describing it will play out in Gaza. Just before we move on to Hamas governments, I just do wonder if you could tell me a little bit more about what has been happening in these areas called by some as like a de facto kill zone near the demarcated line. So again, this idea of a kill zone has been, well, it's not

just an idea, it's a practice, has been present in Gaza since the beginning of the war in 2023. And we know this because, you know, we see statistics, we see Palestinian fatalities. We hear Palestinian witness statements, but also we get the witness statements from Israeli soldiers themselves, some of whom are now speaking out to Israeli human rights organizations and watch and whistleblowers. And so the Israeli military mindset is when they go into an area, they will give Palestinian civilians notification to leave that area. From the Israeli military's point of view, those who remain who chose not to heed Israeli instructions, should be considered enemies, military combatants.

And so anyone who's there is considered to be a legitimate target and shot and often killed. And again, we have plenty of cooperation from Israeli soldiers themselves who are speaking out about this and about how they have actually taken part on the killing of Palestinian civilians. So this is something that is documented and widespread in Gaza, and as part of the Israeli IDS rules of engagement doctrine. And now the way it plays out in Gaza is also in terms of areas of sort of demarcation between where the IDF is with the Israeli military is and where I'd say most of the Palestinian population is. And that sort of buffer zone between the Palestinian population and the IDF is a kill zone. Anyone approaching Israeli lines or demarcation lines, which are sometimes not obvious, will be considered to be posing a threat and will be engaged, shot and potentially killed.

I just have this in front of me between last October and early April, the UN Human Rights Office and the occupied Palestinian territory verified the deaths of 196 Palestinians killed in IDF attacks reported near that yellow line, including 18 women and 43 children. Hi, it's Thomas LeBlanc, host of Celine Understood. A deep dive into the cultural, political, and economic alchemy that created Celine Dion. And there are more seasons have understood. Follow our feed to learn more about other big stories in the news like the rise and fall of cryptoking Sam Bankman-Fried or the controversy behind another notable Quebec institution, Pornhub. And if you're already a follower, thanks. Please tell your friends about us.

Hugh, I want to move on now to the Hamas governance issues. Perhaps the biggest recent developments has been Hamas announcing that they will hand over governance of the strip to the National Committee for the administration of Gaza or NCG. They've dissolved their emergency committee, which has governed Gaza since they took control of the strip in 2007. And just how significant is this? I don't think it's that significant in terms of what's happening on the ground. Hamas still controls absolutely everything happening in the part of Gaza, about the 30% of Gaza still under its direct control. It still exercises security control over it, whether through the Hamas-run civil police force or through the Alka San Brigades, Hamas's own military wing. There is also a continuation of whatever is left of gas and governance.

This gas and governance structure that has been heavily targeted and destroyed and eroded. by Israeli attacks, whatever is left of it, is still continuing barely to do some administration, you know, in terms of service deliveries, electricity, water, etc. So on the ground, you know, I don't actually believe the Hamas statement, but it is a political signal above all. And I think that political signal should be taken much more seriously. And Hamas has long said it is ready to give up governance control. Now, we should not believe anything Hamas says, but I think we should understand that this is something that Hamas views as in its own interest, that even before this current war, Hamas was looking for opportunities to divest itself of what it saw as the

burden of having to govern and administer Gaza. So it wants to be done with that 100%. And I feel the problem is no one else really wants to do the governing role, apart from NCAG. The issue is Enkag is not being allowed into Gaza to. to do this. I actually think the blockage is not Hamas. The blockage is Israel, the US, and the Board of Peace. And I think, you know, they're basically one and the same at times in terms of the policies they advocate. And the current Board of Peace position is to condition the entry of NCG, a alternative civilian police force and indeed an international stabilization force, which would be an international monitoring and kind of peacekeeping force. The Board of Peace is conditioning all of these

things on Hamas, first of all, disarming. So in this weird situation where Hamas is saying, yes, absolutely come in, take away the governance from me. And the Board of Peace is saying, no, no, no, before we do that, we want you to fully disarm. Right. And of course, as you explained earlier, Hamas is refusing to disarm because they are saying that Israel is not complying with the first phase of the ceasefire agreement. NKag, just talk to me a little bit. more about this group, the committee of 13 Palestinian technocrats that Hamas has agreed to hand over governance to. Do they have public support in Gaza? Very little at this point in time, because they've done very little. Now, it's not to say that there is, I think, any real opposition

or animosity towards them. I think Gazans would accept almost anything that could provide them with governance and security. Within reason, of course, I say that because, you know, there's other plans that Israel's put forward, which I think would be truly rejected by Palestinians. I think The point is that Palestinians would readily accept a legitimate Palestinian-led administration that is seen to be administering Gaza for the good of Palestinians. I think that's the important point. The reason we have an NCAG is because, to begin with, because Israel did not and does not want the Palestinian Authority of President Mahmoud Abbas,

which runs some of the West Bank. It does not want the Palestinian Authority to come into Gaza, to run Gaza, because of the Israeli government, because of its ideological right-wing messianic zeal, as opposed to the Palestinian Authority as a political embodiment of Palestinian nationalism. So because of this essentially Israeli blockage, there was months of negotiations about finding an alternative. Israel did not want to govern or administer Gaza itself. Gaza certainly don't want that.

And so an Arab country did not want to take responsibility for it directly. ultimately it came down to this N-Kag, which was something that was ostensibly accepted both by Israel, Hamas, the PA, and the US. So it's sort of the least worst option. But again, the problem is, a, you know, let's be fair, it's an administrative, not a political body by design. So it can do the administration, but it should not be the body that actually, you know, governs or rules Gaza over the longer term.

it is only intended to be there as a transitional body pending the return of the Palestinian Authority in the future. At the moment, it's stuck in Cairo, as I said, because the Board of Peace in Israel will not allow it in. But ultimately, its legitimacy will be based on its ability to provide meaningful change in the daily lives of Palestinians. And to do that, it will need to be allowed to function both by Hamas but also by Israel. Can you talk to me a little bit more about the Board of Peace here? I remember when you came on the show in January, and we talked about the Board of Peace. You pointed out that its strategy was full of holes and didn't really have Gaza as its focus. One of its biggest challenges now, as I understand it, is financial.

Out of the $70 billion needed for reconstruction efforts, only $17 billion has been pledged also instead of the 20,000 peacekeeping troops, Trump had planned. for the International Stabilization Force in Gaza. They're deploying only 10 of 20. And I just, why are the resources so strange? Well, in terms of resources, there's always a difference between pledges and actually money delivered. And I think why there hasn't been more money? Well, firstly, there's a lot of concerns about the lack of financial transparency in the

Board of Peace. So if money does go, how will it be used? Will it be used in line with the objectives? And I think that's a basic requirement that a lot of donors have is to know their money will be used correctly. and the Board of Peace does not have that transparency. Secondly, when it comes to the bigger reconstruction objective, I think there's concerns about the sort of the reconstruction plan

and vision that the Board of Peace has itself promoted, but also quite clearly reconstruction cannot happen when you do not have adequate governance and security. Israel announced this week that they will be holding national elections on October 27. These would be the first elections, national elections, since the October 7th attacks

and war in Gaza. And I just, how is, among other things, Netanyahu's fight for political survival hindering the peace process, you think? Well, I think it has quite consistently harmed efforts to reach a ceasefire

and then to maintain and implement that ceasefire. I won't give you the whole sort of three-year history of attempts to reach ceasefire. fires. But quite often when there were, when negotiations were quite close to a ceasefire, Netanyahu would actually say something to derail it. So he would then, you know, publicly come out and say that Israel actually had no, no desire or no intention of respecting the ceasefire once Israeli hostages were released. And of course, then, you know, Hamas backed out. And the reason

that he did that was largely because every time he was pandering to the far right elements of his coalition who refused to make any compromises on the Gaza fire. And so largely, you know, this is continuing. He continues to play to the far right within the Israeli political spectrum. So, you know, it means that we hear all this rhetoric about reset in Gaza, which, as I said, you know, is rhetoric. But it's also, to a certain extent, being backed up with some action at the moment on the ground. And Israel would have to implement the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, which would mean a second further redeployment within Gaza.

It would also have to, you know, make some, it would have to agree, I think, ultimately, to some sort of more realistic approach to Hamas-Armement, one that would, the group would accept which should play out over the longer term. And finally, the government would probably have to at least pay lip service to the idea of a two-state solution in the future. But these are things that are politically toxic to a far-right government. So in essence, what this means is that not only is there no movement at the moment towards implementing the Gaza Sea Spire, but actually Israel or the Israeli government is actively

looking to undermine it to score political points at home. Hugh, I feel like you've gone through a lot of complex issues during this conversation. But I wonder if you could just as a parting thought try and pull. it altogether for me. Like, what does all of this mean right now for the Palestinian people in Gaza who have now been going through many, many years of war? Yeah, it's tough to find any ounce of hope in what is happening. But I think, you know, I think what the suffering in Gaza shows, indeed, you know, the suffering in Israel in the wake of September of October is, firstly, it is the inescapable necessity

of fully resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This means not just the Gaza peace process, but it will Israeli peace process. It means ultimately not just focusing on technicalities, but focusing on political objectives, which is the need for Palestinian self-determination,

the need for ending Israel's occupation, and at least within the current international diplomatic configuration, the need for a two-state solution. I think there are, despite everything, all the challenges that we've just talked about, there are real opportunities to move forward. I think there are, like Hamas has shown, I think, almost unprecedented openness to some discussions which were previously taboole in terms of decommissioning, in terms of accepting

a two-state solution in the future. So ultimately, you know, there are plenty of blame to go around on all sides. But ultimately, this is a question of, I think, Israeli political. political blockage. And I think if that political blockage can be resolved, maybe through elections or after elections, potentially also paired with this idea of, you know, Israeli regional integration, normalization in exchange for the implementation of two-state solution, if we have an Israeli government that's willing to engage in this discussion, then I think things can open up. Hugh, thank you so much. It's always great to talk to you. My pleasure.

All right, that is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC podcasts, go to CBC.ca slash podcasts.