Front Burner - Does a ‘peace deal’ fuel Middle Eastern war?

Episode Date: June 1, 2026

Negotiations for an end to the war in Iran took a baffling turn last Monday when U.S. President Donlad Trump declared via social media that he would be willing to end the war in exchange for a number of countries in the Middle East and South Asia joining the Abraham Accords.The Accords are a series of diplomatic agreements that normalized relations between Israel and some Arab states. They were originally touted as a Trump foreign policy victory, and a step towards a more peaceful Middle East. But six years on, the region has descended into widescale war.Today we’re speaking with Matt Duss. He is the Executive Vice President at the Center for International Policy. He was also a foreign policy advisor to Bernie Sanders from 2017-2022. He’s co-written a piece for Foreign Policy that argues that the Abraham Accords laid the groundwork for this new era of violence in the Middle East.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

Let's see if Toronto advisors know their group insurance providers. Oh, excuse me. Who has extensive expertise in both traditional group benefits and special risk solutions? Um, Beneva. That's right. Who offers adaptable plans that cater to businesses big or small? Beneva. Correct.

Who gives you access to the latest health trends and... I know it. Beniva. Looks like people are starting to know Beneva pretty well. I knew that too. You're stronger with the right partner, Beneva. This is a CBC podcast. Hey, everybody. I'm Jamie Poisson. So the Iran deal might be contingent on more countries joining.

I don't know. I don't want to say that. Negotiations for an end to the war in Iran took a baffling turn last week when U.S. President Donald Trump declared via social media that he would be willing to end the war in exchange for a slew of countries in the Middle East and South Asia joining the Abraham Accords. The Abraham Accords are a series of diplomatic agreements that normally, normalized relations between Israel and a number of Arab states. Trump's statement was met with confusion, in part due to the fact that half the countries he mentioned by name already have relations with Israel, while others like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have long held out normalizing diplomatic relations,

which is to say nothing of how these countries signing on would actually help bring an end to the war. The Abraham Accords were originally touted as a Trump foreign policy victory and a step towards a more peaceful Middle East. but six years on and the region has descended into wide-scale war. Matt Dust is the executive vice president at the Center for International Policy. He was also a foreign policy advisor to Bernie Sanders from 2017 to 2022. He's co-written a piece for foreign policy that actually argues that the Abraham Accords laid the groundwork for this new era of violence in the Middle East. Matt, it is really a pleasure to have you on Frontburner.

Thanks for making the time. Thank you very much. So can you take me back to 2020 and just remind us how the Abraham Accords actually came about and what they were supposed to do? Sure. In the summer of 2020, I mean, there was, I think a lot of people were surprised by this announcement by the Trump administration jointly with Israel and with the United Arab Emirates, that there was now going to be a normalization and peace agreement between Israel and the UAE. The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, and his finest, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates, will sign a Treaty of Peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization. Which, again, any kind of regional government, when Egypt normalizes relations with Israel,

around, you know, the Camp David Accords. Israel and Egypt have agreed to two. documents taking a giant step toward achieving peace in their troubled corner of the world. Israel has agreed to end its military government on the west bank of the Jordan River and to permit Palestinian self-rule there within five years and to withdraw from the Sinai and to establish normal relations with Egypt. That was obviously huge news when Jordan signed a peace treaty in the 90s with Israel also. But those were both Jordan and Egypt, both neighbors of Israel.

UAE was not a neighbor, it is over on the Gulf. But still, just any other regional government, especially one that had been playing such a prominent role in the leadership of the region as UAE had for the previous years was quite notable. Now, some people called it a peace agreement. Obviously, Donald Trump presented it as a peace agreement. The fact is, the UAE and Israel were never really at war. They said it couldn't be done, but President Trump did it.

The first Middle East peace agreement in decades, President Trump brought once bitter enemies, Israel, Bahrain and the UAE together to make peace. But still, again, the fact that, you know, a leading Arab government was signing this agreement was seen as significant. You know, what was happening at that time, there was the danger. I mean, I think the Israeli government had been moving forward pretty steadily, as it has since the 19th. to, to put settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, the West Bank, East Jerusalem. And there was a strong move inside Israel to make this formal, to announce a formal annexation of the occupied territory. So I think for the UAE's part, they were able to present this normalization of relations as a way to get Israel to agree not to make that formal announcement. I mean, the fact

is annexation is happening de facto. It was happening then. Before then, it's happening since then. It's actually been happening much faster over the over these past couple years, given the very, very right-wing nature of Benjamin Nanyahu's government. But the real prize for the UAE, I mean, there were a couple prizes. First of all, it was to kind of normalize relations to get greater access to Israeli tech. There had been relations kind of below the surface, between the UAE and Israel, as there have been between Israel and a number of other regional governments. But this was a way to make this relationship public, as I said, to give you aE access to Israeli tech, much of it surveillance tech, much of it used for repressive means. And to give Israeli tech firms access to new streams of capital in the UAE, which is, as many in the Gulf regimes are, you know, powered by energy resources.

But it was also for the UAE's part a way to get into Washington's good graces. I think we've seen a very, very aggressive effort by the UAE over the past decade to establish itself in Washington in terms of lobbying and advocacy in terms of relationship with different policy organizations and think tanks. But to normalize relationships with Israel was a way to kind of get on team Israel, so to speak. Israel obviously has a very formidable lobbying and advocacy network in Washington. And I think part of the attractiveness of the Abraham Accords, not just for the UAE, but for countries who subsequently signed up for it, was to give them access to this lobbying infrastructure to advance their own interests in Washington. You know, I know that Sudan and Morocco eventually follow, right? But Saudi Arabia doesn't. And just how significant is Saudi Arabia's absence from Saudi Arabia?

from the accords. It does matter. It does matter. And I think it's important to know why Saudi Arabia has been so hesitant. Again, Saudi Arabia long seen, you know, internationally and also they regard themselves as a very key voice of the region, a leading Arab government and also a leading Muslim government by virtue of the fact that they have, you know, two of the holiest sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina are in Saudi Arabia. So they have seen themselves as representing a much broader set of perspectives than just their own, although obviously the Saudi public has its own views. And the issue here was Palestinians. The Saudis have said and continue to say that they cannot move forward with normalization with Israel without some real movement toward Palestinian

liberation, an end to the occupation, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. So this is, again, why Donald Trump's announcement the other day, and we've seen other members of the administration and other members of the U.S. government in Congress like Senator Lindsey Graham, who've really been making a hard push on the Saudis to sign up. But the Saudis have been clear that they just can't and won't do it in the absence of any real movement by the Israeli government toward Palestinian liberation and statehood. And this Israeli government, it should be clear to everyone. It's simply not going to move in that direction. So in the absence of that, I don't think we're going to see any movement from the Saudis either. I'm not sure we should make the deal if they don't sign.

You want to know the truth. If they don't sign to join the Abraham, of course, I don't know that we, you know, we have countries in there already. UAE, great, great countries, bold countries. And it turned out to be so good, so effective. And so we're, you know, requesting strongly that they join. It'll be great. It'll be great for Saudi Arabia. It'll be great for guitar, Kuwait, the whole room.

Just to go back in time a little bit, I know in 2002 there was the Arab peace initiative, right, which was a proposal led by Saudi Arabia, endorsed by all 22 Arab League states. That's right. That would have recognized Israel and normalized relations in exchange for an independent Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. I hope the people of Israel who are interested in the security. and stability and future of their children will see to it that this peace initiative be responded to in kind and for Israel to gamble once. In 50 years they have gambled on force, on intimidation, on war, on violence. Let them gamble on peace once.

It had the support of U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair at the time, And why were they not able to succeed in this initiative? And then how do we end up getting this kind of more watered down and broken apart? If you think that's a fair characterization, Abraham, of course, nearly two decades later. Right. I do think it's fair. And I think it's good to understand how significant the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was. As you said, it was an offer led by Saudi Arabia, but one supported by the entire Arab League

and reiterated multiple times since then for complete normalization and peace with Israel and all the states in the region in exchange where it enter the occupation and the establishment of the Palestinian state on the 1967 lines, which is the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. And this is, it's not something that the Saudis just made up. I mean, these are, this is kind of the state of Palestine as it exists in international law in multiple UN Security Council resolutions. but again the Israeli government in 2002 didn't respond to it, which was strange at the time given that Israel had claimed that they would be willing to give up land for peace. I think it is worth, you know, just acknowledging, yes, Israel was facing the second Intifada at the time. There was a great deal of violence, but still this should have been a way to really end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But I think you also saw that you have elements in Israel, which are very much in the driver's seat in Israel now, but still very much existing back in 2002 for whom their goal has always been to take all of the land. They simply do not accept that the Palestinians are real people, certainly not a people deserving a self-determination, and certainly not deserving of giving up what they see as some very, very important parts of the historic state of Israel. So you saw the George W. Bush administration, while, you know, mouthing support for it, I think it's pretty clear that the George W. Bush was already quite distracted and preparing for the invasion of Iraq, which would come in early 2003, but they really didn't kind of get their diplomatic back into it,

so to speak, which in retrospect is extremely unfortunate, because I do think the Arab Peace Initiative was, and frankly still is, a model for how you could resolve this enduring conflict. And one last word here on the Abraham Accords, part of what was seen as so problematic by critics of the Accords, including myself, is that from the Israeli perspective and from many conservatives in the United States, the Abraham Accords, part of what was so significant is that was a way to simply sideline the Palestinian issue. For many years, you know, as I said, the Saudis, but not just the Saudi government, others in the region, and others who kind of understand the political realities of the Middle East have made the point that, listen, the issue, the plight

of the Palestinians is a real sticking point in the region and across the world, that they are understood as having been a people that has been dispossessed, expelled, their land taken, and there needs to be a just resolution of this situation to be able to move forward to a situation of real, you know, mutual safety and stability. And there's always been an element in Israel, including Benjamin Nanyahu, has always completely rejected that. His theory has been, we don't need to solve the Palestinian issue. We can just build relationships across the region without doing that and just keep taking the land however we want. And the Abraham Accords seemed to affirm that argument. Unfortunately, as we learned quite horrifically on October 7, that was false.

The Palestinian issue did, as it has often done, reasserted itself on the regional and global agenda. And my view is that it will continue to do that unless we are able to come to some kind of just resolution for the Palestinians. Right. And, you know, there was quite a bit of reporting after October 7th that the Abraham Accords were actually a motivating factor for Hamas leader Yahyazinwar and others to attack Israel to kind of like disrupt that process of normalization with other Arab countries. You know, after October 7th and then the devastating war on Gaza, widely considered a genocide by many experts in a UN inquiry, how did that, impact the viability of the accords. And I guess the chances, too, of getting more countries

to sign on. Well, I think it just, I mean, it's notable that no countries have withdrawn from the Accords in the face of the Gaza genocide. But I think it's also, you know, kind of underlined that it has raised the political cost, I would say, to new countries joining it. So I think we're just in kind of a status quo with the Abraham Accords. I think the countries that have signed on to it, particularly the UAE, Bahrain, some of the others you mentioned, are still getting what they want in terms of access to Israeli technology, still getting what they want in terms of access to American policymakers and influence in Washington. But the political cost of new countries, especially, but not only Saudi Arabia, to joining the accords, is now much, much higher,

especially when you have an Israeli government that is just absolutely dead sent on preventing a Palestinian state, on social. seizing control of all of the land in perpetuity. Let's see if Toronto advisors know their group insurance providers. Oh, excuse me. Who has extensive expertise in both traditional group benefits and special risk solutions? Beneva. That's right.

Who offers adaptable plans that cater to businesses big or small? Beneva. Correct. Who gives you access to the latest health trends in... I know it. Beniva. Looks like people are starting to know Beneva pretty well. I knew that too. You're stronger with the right partner, Beneva.

Viking. Committed to exploring the world in comfort. Journey through the heart of Europe on a Viking long ship with thoughtful service and cultural enrichment. On board and onshore. Learn more at Viking.com. Maybe worth pointing out that the Abraham Accords, they allowed the U.S. to move the coordination of military activities with Israel from U.S. European Central Command to one that's shared with Gulf states. And what has that move meant for the dynamics in the Gulf leading up to the Iran War?

Right. I think, well, part of, not necessarily as part of the Abraham Accords, but subsequently after the accords were signed. I mean, it was kind of understood when the Accords were announced in the summer of 2020 that not only was this about Israel and the UAE and the U.S. and sideline the Palestinian issue, it was always also about starting to build a kind of united front against Iran. And that became explicit over the course of the next couple years as legislation was passed in the United States Congress, encouraging and funding the kind of deeper integration of Israeli and region. governments in terms of missile and rocket and drone defense. As you said, we saw Israel being moved out of U-com, which is the kind of European command. The United States has a number of commands around the world and different regions. Israel had long been part of U-com. It was moved to CENTCOM, you know, in part to facilitate this greater defense integration. And we saw how this worked in practice a couple times in 24 and 2025, you know, with the response, you know,

Israel struck first, I believe it was April 24, a Iranian diplomatic facility in Syria, which saw for the first time Iran retaliate against Israel directly, launching missiles and rockets and drones, many of which, not all though, but many of which were taken down, destroyed by this integrated regional defense network that was, it's not just the Israel and the regional's age, it's also strongly backed and facilitated by the United States. We saw also the assassination of Hamas leader, Ismail Henea in Tehran, which saw a similar retaliation by Iran and a similar defense against that retaliation by this integrated defense network. And what my colleague Zuri Lenetsky and I argue in the piece that you've mentioned is that this integrated, you know, showing that this integrated defense network, you know, could work as well as it did, although we should note it didn't stop everything. There was still considerable damage in Israel.

I mean, I've seen this myself, you know, entire apartment blocks in Tel Aviv, just absolutely devastated. It still gave Netanyahu and his government enough confidence that they could go ahead and launch a war against Iran, always, of course, hoping and expecting that they would be backed up very quickly by the United States. But the argument that we make is that, you know, rather than, you know, contributing to greater peace and stability by lowering the perceived costs of a war on Iran, on. It has actually led to more war, more instability, more destruction, more suffering. And I think that's the analysis of the peace. You know, if the idea behind the Abraham Accords was to bring peace and stability to the region, but now we're seeing the opposite. I just want to ask you straight out, like, is that evidence to you of it being presented as one thing but meant to be another thing? I think that's quite right. And I do think this was pretty clear from early.

on. As I said, first of all, even presenting it as a peace agreement between two countries that were not actually technically at war was a red flag, that this was being sold as something that was much bigger and much more historic than it actually was. Something that could be genuinely historic would be to go back to the Arab Peace Initiative from 2002. But for the time being, we have the Abraham Accords, which are essentially a series of arms deals between Israel and the signatories between the United States. States and the signatories. I and others argued pretty much from the beginning, and I think it's very, very clear. Now, this is not the way to create a durable regional security architecture. This is a way

to prepare the region for more war, and that is exactly what we're seeing. The U.S. and Iran, of course, as you know, been deadlocked in this war, started by the U.S. and Israel at the end of February. And while they're attempting to hammer out this deal, Trump is now pushing for the remainder of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, to join the Abraham Accord, as part of an agreement to end the war. In fact, he said it should be, quote, mandatory. And I just like, what did you think of that as? I think that's a total fantasy. I think, you know, as people may have noticed, Donald Trump says and tweets things and puts things on social media that have no relation to reality. And I think that is a great example.

That's simply not going to happen. As you mentioned earlier in the conversation, a number of the countries he mentioned have already relations with Israel outside and pre, you know, before the Abraham Accords. I think what we have here is Donald Trump looking for something he can present as a win, looking for something that he can. present as, you know, look, this whole war was worth it. You thought things were going poorly. But here's what I got out of it. He clearly wants to end this war. It's been clear for weeks now that he realized he miscalculated. He really, and he's looking for a path, a path out. But I think he's, you know, given, you know, how he is personally, but also I think any leader would would be looking for some kind of off-ramp that they can present to their own country, to their own political

system to their own followers as look look i did it again i got something good um out of this this whole operation but the iranians for their part are very disinclined to give him that off ramp i mean from the iranian perspective they want to make sure that this hurts um in part because they want to make sure they want to feel at least confident that the united states or israel or anyone else will never try something like this again um and if donald trump is able to come out of this war you know claiming victory, claiming an achievement, I think from the Iranian perspective, that would undermine what they feel that they need. We've seen Israel push further into Lebanon in their war with Hezbollah this weekend. They captured a pretty key castle. We've also seen Israeli settlers make their way into Syria. The New York Times has reported that they built two secret military bases in Iraq.

And seeing all this, like, how do you think that the Gulf states are thinking about their relationship with Israel right now. I mean, also we've seen reporting that Israel was really instrumental in convincing Trump to join the war with Iran. Right. I mean, I think, you know, a lot of these, you know, states in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf, had hoped that they could build some kind of cooperation that would prevent or at least constrain Iran. They, you know, very legitimate concerns about Iranian policy in the region, Iran's support for, for militant proxies, Hezbollah and Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, militias in Iraq. However, I think there is greater concern now that they see an Israel that is acting without constraint, an Israel that is acting completely recklessly from their

view, not only the genocide in Gaza, but has been making war in Lebanon, has been making war in Yemen, has been making war in Syria, as you noted now launching war in Iran from secret bases in Iraq. And I would note there was one moment in particular, which was during the war, the U.S. and war last June against Iran when you saw an Israeli strike on Doha Qatar, the capital of Kantor, an attempt to strike negotiators. At noon today, I convened the heads of Israel's security organizations and authorized a surgical precision strike on the terrorist chiefs of Hamas. These are the same terrorists who planned, launched, and celebrated the horrific massacres of October 7th.

Qatar, a close U.S. ally, reacted sharply in a statement read on national television. This criminal attack constitutes a flagrant violation of all international laws and norms and a grave threat to the safety and security of Qataris and residents of the state of Qatar. That was a moment that really got the attention of regional governments, particularly in the Gulf, where they said, hold on, we did not sign up for this kind of bargain with, you know, Israel that now acts with complete impunity, with complete recklessness, and is now striking one of our own capitals. So I think what you've seen is greater concern about Israel instead of

just Iran. They do not want to live in a region where Israel is just the kind of unchallenged, unconstrained regional military hegemon with the backing of the United States. Yeah. I think that's also why I was so confused that Trump was floating this idea last week, because it just seems so implausible that they would all just all of a sudden jump on and be willing to sign the Abraham Accords. I just, yeah. Yeah, well, I mean, that's the kind of challenge with Trump is like you wanted to try and make sense. And sometimes you realize, you know, it just doesn't make any sense. It's just almost certainly someone got in his ear a few minutes before and was like, yeah, we can do this.

And so he just put out something on truth social, but it's just never going to happen. Yeah. It's complete fantasy. I just wouldn't mind kind of wrapping up this conversation by asking you how you think this is going to play out. So, you know, these teams have been negotiating. The New York Times has now reported that some kind of toughened up framework has been said back to the Iranians in their negotiations. There's reporting it has to do with like unfreezing some funds. And I just, what do you think?

think this reportedly imminent deal or this memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran is actually going to look like? Well, yeah, I mean, first of all, we've seen reports over the past weeks that a deal is imminent. You know, the administration leaks these things to cooperative reporters. I mean, it's clear that part of what has been going on here is that these leaks of an imminent deal are partly just an attempt to calm the financial markets, right? Trump is very, very, I mean, that's really one of the only things that he cares about. He's not so interested in the polls, not so interested in political criticism, but if the financial markets are going badly, he is, he's sensitive to that. So that's what I think some of these leaks are. Now, that's not

to say that we are not close to a deal, but I do think one of the key sticking points, and this is frankly, one of the sticking points that got us into this war in the first place is Trump's demand that Iran give up all uranium enrichment. Iran, believes with some, I think, legal basis that under the agreements they've signed, and particularly the non-proliferation treaty, that they have the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. And the acknowledgement of this right, let's remember going back to the Obama administration, when the Obama administration acknowledged this right that, okay, we would like to get an agreement that prevents you from getting a nuclear weapon, but we will acknowledge your

right to enrich at a lower level for peaceful uses. That was a breakthrough. that got to the JCPOA, that got to that nuclear agreement, which again was a very good agreement. It put Iran's nuclear program under heavy restriction, under heavy inspection. It kept Iran at least a year away from possibly obtaining a nuclear weapon. And Trump, of course, withdrew from that agreement in 2018 and reimposed a bunch of sanctions. Once Trump was convinced to make zero enrichment a demand, I think it was, we were very, we were already on the path to war, but I think that made war almost certain because that is not something that Iran is going to agree to, nor should they have to. As I think the JCPOA showed, there is an agreement to be had that allows Iran to enrich on its own soil, but keeps that program under lock and key,

under heavy inspection, under heavy restriction. So I do think one of the key questions now is whether Trump is going to be able to kind of walk back from that demand, allow Iran to enrich at a certain level, and still be able to present an agreement as some kind of accomplishment. So basically, you think they're going to get to a similar deal that Obama had under the JCPOA? I would say it's going to look something like that. I mean, if we get— That Trump pulled out of it. Very good Trump pulled out of it.

But listen, I mean, Donald Trump lies all the time. I'm sure Donald Trump would have no problem selling his new deal. I mean, literally could just scratch off Obama's name and write Trump on it and present it as his latest huge accomplishment that no other president could have ever done. You know, he can do that if he wants. But again, it's hard for me to imagine that we can get to any resolution without Trump acknowledging that right for the Iranians. And just to end this, I would be really curious to hear your thoughts on what you think the Democrats should be doing now and moving forward, especially as somebody who used to advise Bernie Sanders on foreign policy. The Biden administration tried to build off the Abraham Accords, right? But as you've argued throughout this conversation, this is, according to you, what kind of helped get us here to all of this violence.

And so what would you like to hear from the Democratic Party moving forward? I would like to see, obviously, a more strongly anti-war message. I do think we've had a number of members of Congress, a number of Democratic leaders who've been critical of this war from the very beginning, as they should have been. But I do think, you know, there's a real opportunity here for Democrats to kind of pick up the anti-war mantle, given how unpopular this war has been, given how unpopular decades of war have been, especially since 9-11, but even before that. So again, as we move toward the midterms in the U.S. and the 28 presidential election, I think that's just there's an enormous opportunity for Democrats to articulate a new, vision of how America operates in the world, one in which the military tool is not the one of a first resort, as it has been far too often. And just when it comes to peace in the Middle East, like, is it a return to the Arab Peace Initiative

and the pursuit of some kind of agreement or deal like that? I think the Arab Peace Initiative, again, remains very, very irrelevant. It's a significant offer by the entire region, by the entire Arab Peace. League. And I said, as I noted, it has been signed onto by a number of countries outside the region. But it really does come down to pressuring Israel to finally acknowledge and agree to Palestinian liberation, which is something successive Israeli governments have been unwilling to do. So I do think if we're going to get to a resolution of this conflict, which has endured far, far too long, we're going to see a greater willingness on the part of the United

States to put real pressure on the Israeli government. Okay. Matt, thank you so much for this. Really appreciate it. Very glad to. Thank you. All right. That's all for it today. I'm Jamie Plesson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC podcasts, go to cbc.ca.ca slash podcasts.