Front Burner - Ex-CSIS boss on China’s alleged election meddling

Episode Date: March 1, 2023

Recent reports by the Globe and Mail and Global News, relying on Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) documents and unnamed intelligence sources, have detailed different ways the Chinese government has allegedly interfered with Canadian elections. On this episode, Dick Fadden, a former director of CSIS and a former national security advisor to both Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, walks us through the way the spy agency operates on cases like this, and what should be done now to ensure Canadian elections are free of foreign meddling. For transcripts of this series, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jodi Martinson in for Jamie Poisson. Someone or some group of people with access to secret Canadian intelligence really wants people to know what's going on with alleged Chinese interference in Canadian elections. Whistleblowers have leaked information to more than one news agency, outlining serious allegations, including ones that could be understood as criminal,

about how the government of China tries to change election outcomes, influence politicians, and how that may have benefited the Liberal Party. Let me take you through it. The first big story broke in November by Global News. It was about the 2019 federal election. Unnamed sources tell Global that CSIS believed China's Toronto consulate sent money to 11 preferred federal election candidates and to their staffers who were operatives for Beijing.

The alleged interference network included members of both the Liberal and Conservative parties. The Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers, according to Global, had been briefed on it in January of last year, but we, the public, only found out about it a few months ago because of a whistleblower. Then this week, another leak. And this one starts to name names. Global sources say Han Dong, the two-time Liberal MP for the Toronto riding of Don Valley North, was a knowing affiliate of China to get himself elected.

Don Valley North, was a knowing affiliate of China to get himself elected. The story alleges Dong had the support of another politician, Michael Chan. It says Chan is a powerful fundraiser for the Liberal Party and had been monitored by CSIS for many years. It alleges that CSIS urged Trudeau's team to rescind Dong's candidacy and that the Liberals did not. Trudeau's team to rescind Dong's candidacy and that the Liberals did not. Han Dong won his riding and continues to sit as an MP in Parliament. He and Michael Chan both deny the allegations against them. Chan told Global News, quote, this sort of vague innuendo is impossible to respond to, and quote, to the extent you are suggesting I am not a true Canadian, you should be ashamed of yourself. Han Dong said in a

statement that his nomination and campaign teams have found no indications of irregularities or compliance issues regarding his candidacy or election. His statement reads, I have the utmost regard for the integrity of our democratic institutions and electoral processes. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau denies security officials told the Liberals to rescind Dong's candidacy, and that even if they did, it wouldn't have been appropriate. In a free democracy, it is not up to unelected security officials to dictate

to political parties who can or cannot run. Trudeau also connected the allegations about Dong to the rise in anti-Chinese racism during the pandemic. So all of that is about the 2019 election. Now let's talk about the 2021 election. Earlier this month, reporters from The Globe and Mail say they saw CSIS documents that show the Chinese government allegedly tried to influence the 2021 Canadian election as well. Beijing wanted a liberal minority government. Minority because Beijing said minority governments are less effective.

Liberals because Beijing sees them as friendlier to Chinese interests. The Globe reporting says donors were encouraged to send money to campaigns favored by China. For that, they would receive a tax credit from the Canadian government. Then someone within those political campaigns, quietly and illegally, according to the Globe, would allegedly return part of the money back to the donors. According to classified reports seen by the Globe, one former consul general in Vancouver boasted about helping to defeat two conservative MPs. So, two elections, two alleged interference campaigns by China, and now the latest leak.

Yesterday, The Globe and Mail reports China appears to have targeted Justin Trudeau himself after he became liberal leader in 2013. A national security source claims CSIS captured a conversation in 2014 where someone at one of China's consulates encouraged a billionaire and political advisor to the Beijing government to make a large donation to the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.

The Chinese government would reimburse the full amount. A $200,000 donation was made, plus $50,000 for a Pierre Elliott Trudeau statue. The Prime Minister's office said in a statement Justin Trudeau was unaware of the donation, and that when he became leader of the Liberal Party, he withdrew his involvement with the foundation. Two more important things for us to note. The CBC has not verified the reporting done by Global and The Globe, and Justin Trudeau has said that none of the alleged interference changed the outcome of the elections in question. So it leaves Canadians with really big questions before the next election is called.

What did CSIS, the RCMP, and the federal government know about the interference? And what did anyone do to stop it? Today, we're going to try to get behind the scenes into how Canada's spy agency, CSIS, handles threats to our democracy from foreign powers. Dick Fadden was director of CSIS from 2009 to 2013. He's a former national security advisor

to both Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau. He made headlines when he sounded the alarm over a decade ago about Chinese interference in Canadian democracy. Hi, Dick. Thank you so much for joining us today. Good to be with you. Okay, so we now know that CSIS says it has evidence of interference in two elections. And I think the really big question people have is how this whole process should work and why it seems like nothing was done with this information. So with your help, let's go through some of what we know here, okay?

Sounds good. So let's start with this reported by Global. CSIS allegedly found China's Toronto consulate sent money to 11 federal election candidates in the 2019 election, both liberals and conservatives, and to their staffers who were allegedly operatives for Beijing. In your experience, what would CSIS do if it had that information in hand? Well, I think the first thing they would do is they would really try and confirm it because it's so very sensitive. Then the people who collect it would pass it to the people in CSIS who do analysis. The idea is to separate collection from analysis so that the people who collect don't become overly enthusiastic about the value of their intelligence. So the analytical staff would provide an assessment, you know, a piece of paper that would be classified appropriately. It would work its way through an approval process within the service and then it would be distributed in town. There would be a standard distribution to all of the national security departments, you know, public safety, the Privy Council office,

Global Affairs Canada. And then depending upon the particular topic, that distribution list would be broadened to include other departments which may be interested. And these departments would then form a view as to whether or not a policy recommendation should be made to the government on the basis of the intelligence, because I think one thing that's very important to remember is that CSIS collects intelligence and conveys it to the government. It doesn't make policy recommendation. And with one small exception that's not relevant here, it does not act. What it does is collect, analyze, and provide to the government. So all of these departments would

look at the material and decide if anything's to be done. The lead department would probably decide to send it to their minister. Privy Council office might send it to the Prime Minister's office and the Prime Minister. Now, in the particular example that you're giving, if I can bring it back to that, if the facts that was outlined in the story, potentially a violation of the Canada Elections Act has occurred. As I said a moment ago, CSIS doesn't act, it's not an executive agency. So ideally, it would have passed that information to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and to the chief electoral officer who would decide, either together or separately, whether anything was to be done about it. Okay, so you're telling me CSIS collects the information,

a separate part of CSIS analyzes the information. If it meets a certain bar, it's up to CSIS to share it with people who can act. And that in this case might have included or ought to have included the RCMP because the allegation was that there had been a violation of the Elections Act. That is correct. Almost inevitably, because elections are very sensitive, I think the Privy Council office would have passed it on to the Prime Minister's office. Okay. Well, and so to that point, as far as we know from the reporting so far, this information was only shared with the prime minister and cabinet ministers in January of last year. We're talking about a 2019 election, and we've had another election since then. We've had the 2021 election.

Why would a delay like that occur? I'm afraid I don't have an answer for that. Part of the issue may have been that it didn't meet the bar, the standard that you just referred to. Part of it may have been that they were looking for collaboration to make sure they were absolutely certain. I don't really know. Ideally, when something like this occurs, you process it as quickly as you can and you pass it on to what I would call executive agencies, agencies that are able to take action. It does seem like a long time and nobody in my hearing anyway has been able to suggest why it took quite that long. And so let's go on to another allegation. We have this report, and this again by Global News, that in 2019, that same election, unnamed CSIS sources say liberal candidate Han Dong in the Toronto riding of Don Valley North is allegedly part of a Chinese foreign interference network.

He's a Whitting affiliate, as Global reports it. And so in this report, CSIS goes to the prime minister's office and warns staff about the situation. Why do you think they would warn about only Dong, the one candidate, and not the other potential 11 candidates in the 2019 campaign? Well, first of all, they may well have. And simply, the explanation would simply be that Global didn't have that information when they published their story. But again, I think it comes back to the issue is, you know, intelligence agencies, not just CSIS, but intelligence agencies

around the world collect a lot of intelligence. And a lot of it is not used because it doesn't reach the bar of being convincing enough, you know, from the perspective of those professional standards. So I don't think we can assume that it was only the one. What we can say is that the one seemingly was acted upon and sent to the PMO. won seemingly was acted upon and sent to the PMO. Okay. And it's reported that CSIS actually really urged the PMO to rescind Dong's candidacy. And that's one point that Trudeau has really been pushing back on this week, saying that CSIS doesn't determine who will run in the elections. To you, does that sound like something CSIS would do?

It is beyond my comprehension, my belief that CSIS would do that. It is so far outside of their legal mandate. I'm virtually certain they did not do that. They do not make policy recommendations generally, and they certainly wouldn't do a policy recommendation in an area involving the elections. It is it's inconceivable. So I think on this issue, the PM is entirely correct. Okay. And so how do you make sense of that in light of the rest of that reporting from Global? Well, I don't know. I don't know how they got that. I assume that the material reached PMO at some point. And if anybody was going to make a recommendation to the PM about, you know, supporting or not supporting a particular candidate, I think the PMO would be the primary candidate for that particular role. But possibly people became confused between CSIS providing the intelligence and the advice going forward if it did not to support Mr. Hahn.

Okay. And we should say that we know Dong remained the candidate and is today a sitting MP. He wrote in a media statement this week, I have the utmost regard for the integrity of our democratic institutions and electoral processes. Prime Minister Trudeau is also defending Dong. Han Dong is an outstanding member of our team.

And suggestions that he is somehow not loyal to Canada should not be entertained. Part of the allegations in the Han Dong story are that there were basically rumors spread about Dong's predecessor in the riding on WeChat. And that, of course, is a Chinese state-controlled messaging app. What are the options for CSIS if they believe that sort of influence is being applied during an election? Well, that, if I can use an old expression, is the $54,000 question. I don't think our legal system, generally speaking, has really caught up with how to deal with social media writ large. So I think the most that could have been done is for them to flag that this is happening, you know, to make a, to do an assessment and to report it. And for the chief electoral officer, another part of the government to sort of say this is happening.

But CSIS itself, I think, could not do anything. I mean, it's simply not within its mandate to action except to pass on the information. And then it behooves whomever has the lead to take the necessary steps. The Global Story also detailed alleged efforts to influence the party's domination race in that particular riding in the Don Valley North riding in Toronto. And that included busing in Chinese international students with fake addresses and coercing them to vote for Handong's nomination. Of course, all allegations. Again, what powers or options do CSIS agents have if they observe something like that happening? Generally speaking, they have the power to observe. I come back to when CSIS was

created, there was a very clear decision on the part of Parliament to isolate CSIS from any executive action capacity because it had very, very significant powers of intrusion. So the idea was you create an agency to which you gave a lot of powers to figure out what's going on, sometimes on their own, sometimes with a federal court warrant, but you didn't give them the power once they had all this information to act on it. We are very strict on this point. So if they saw something illegal, the first thing they should have done is call either the RCMP or the local police,

depending upon what the circumstances are. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization. Empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here. You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you.

Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own household income? That's not a typo. 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. So now let's turn to the other election that we've been talking about, the 2021 election. And here the Globe and Mail reports rely also on CSIS documents that have been leaked. And it reports that China's former consul general in Vancouver boasted about how she helped defeat two conservative MPs. So that sounds like a really clear example of foreign influence. If something like that

happened when you were at the helm of CSIS, which of course was from 2009 to 2013, what would you have done? Well, I would have caused a report to be prepared and had it circulated around town. And I probably would have called my colleagues in the Privy Council office and in Global Affairs Canada and pointed out that a foreign diplomat accredited to Canada appeared on the basis of the information that we had to be interfering in Canada's democratic process. And then the hope would have been that one or other of these two institutions would have taken some action. I mean, an easy thing to do if people are willing to expend the political capital in a case like that would be to declare the consul general person a non grata in other words you say that she's no longer welcome in

canada and she has to leave i don't know whether that was even considered but it would have been a fairly straightforward thing to do if the intelligence was a clear and unambiguous sure sure but those would But those would be political questions. Those aren't sort of CSIS determinations. They're not CSIS. But CSIS would have been asked about precedents and things like that. But they would have been policy and political questions. You're right. Okay. Okay. So you've done a great job, Dick, of really helping us understand the role of CSIS, which is to observe and gather intel and then share it with the people who can take action, the government and the police. In all of this reporting by the

Globe and Mail and Global, the National Police Force is barely even mentioned. Why do you think that is? Again, I don't know. You know, if I accept at face value everything that the Globe and Global have reported, it would be at least reasonable to assume that some breach of the laws occurred. I mean, it may not be true in every instance that they've reported. But if we look at all the instances that they have reported, clearly there are some cases that suggest a violation of the law. I don't know why they haven't looked at it. But we have some, we have these allegations that in some writings, at least, you know, China was allegedly saying to people, make a donation to the campaign, get the federal tax credit, and then we'll make you whole, like we'll give you the rest of the money back. I mean, if that's true and CSIS knew that,

that just seems like it reeks of criminality. I don't disagree with you. But then the question, I'm not an expert in the criminal law, so I'm a lapsed lawyer, so I'll have to be careful here. But, you know, CSIS may have collected this information through a source, you know, a human source, somebody who was working with these people. It may have been something they overheard. It may have been something that they heard about because they had a warrant from the federal court authorizing them to intercept communications. It is possible that in these three examples, it would not be enough to take to the police and a Crown attorney and say, let's investigate and prosecute. This is all based upon our charter rights and the rights in the criminal code to protect people from overly facile, overly easy investigation by the police. They need to have their standard met, not CISA's standard met. Okay. So now the Prime Minister is pointing to a House committee study as a means to get some answers on foreign interference. Do you think that will provide the accountability that Canadians need? No, I don't. And I think it's too bad that the answer

is in the negative, because I'm sure I don't have to tell you, you know, the House of Commons in Canada has become increasingly partisan over the years. It's becoming very, very partisan. It's difficult sometimes to, you know, have a debate, to listen to a debate, because all they do is lob, you know, political arguments against one another. arguments against one another. It is particularly difficult when you're dealing with electoral issues and whether one side or the other can get re-elected. So I almost think it's unfair to ask members of the House of Commons to look at this. There's a committee, they're going to look at it, they'll call witnesses, we'll see what comes of it. But there have been a number of other examples over the years where committees just haven't been able to move forward because they've been blocked because one party really didn't want anything out of it or the report is so diluted that you can't get much done. Quarry, what used to be called a Royal Commission by a judge or a former judge, something like Justice Rouleau, who just finished the review of the convoy and the blockade incidents in Ottawa and across the country. There seems to be a consensus that he did a fairly decent job.

So if he could do a difficult job or someone like him could do that kind of job, objective, beholding to nobody, with a set time frame and access to people and papers, I think we're more likely to get the kind of transparency that you were talking about in your question. Okay, so now, Dick, there is one more breaking part of this story. And that's, of course, coming from the Globe and Mail, who are citing CSIS sources saying that China attempted to influence Justin Trudeau through a $200,000 contribution to a charity that operates in his father's name and evidence gathered in 2014. Your time at CSIS ended in 2013. Was this an operation you were aware of?

Since I've retired, I've been very, very careful not to violate the Security of Information Act, so I'm going to decline to answer. Okay. Are the reports from what you've read accurate? I don't know if they're accurate, but it would not surprise me. One of the things that the Chinese do as part of their intelligence gathering and their influence in influencing activities around the world is identify people who are either very influential or who will become influential.

I think Mr. Trudeau at that point, whether he was just the leader of his party or was on his way to becoming prime minister, would certainly fall in that category. So I have no difficulty whatsoever in believing that he would have been targeted as a potential person to be influenced. Okay. And I can't really remember a time in CSIS's history where people inside its ranks are leaking information that is so damaging to the prime minister and to his party. What does that tell you about the relationship right now between the Liberals and CSIS? Well, let me start by saying nobody has found who has done the leaking. You'll remember that we talked earlier about the fact that whatever CSIS produces, it's always sent out in other departments. Those departments give them to their ministers and their ministers' offices. So it is conceivable, and I don't know, but it is conceivable that the leaks are occurring using CSIS material, but the material having been passed to another department.

So I just don't know. I'm just trying to suggest we need to be careful until the individual individuals are identified. If it is coming from CSIS, I am very, very disappointed because CSIS has a very good reputation of not leaking and of protecting national security secrets. And,

you know, as a former director there, I think this is a terrible thing. You don't, you know, you don't move files necessarily by leaking secret information. Having said that, now that we have the information, I profoundly believe we have to act on it, either through this committee of parliamentarians, the House committee, or a public inquiry. But if it is CSIS, and I really don't know, and I hope it's not, it will be quite shocking, because it will hurt their brand. I was reading an article from 2010, and that's kind of a remarkable year in your career, where you came on CBC television and you, kind of out of character for yourself, publicly flagged the threat of Chinese influence on Canadian politics and industrial espionage.

on Canadian politics and industrial espionage. Later, you went on to work for a while as Justin Trudeau's national security advisor. So you came into that job already concerned about Chinese influence. Did you warn Justin Trudeau about what the Chinese are allegedly up to? about what the Chinese are allegedly up to? You'll probably think this is a very strange rule, but there is a rule that public servants do not disclose what they tell ministers and prime ministers. And I worked for Mr. Harper, and I would have answered the same thing if you'd asked me about Mr. Harper.

No, I don't think it's a strange rule. I understand the rule. So I can't think it's a strange rule. I understand the rule. So I can't really answer. Okay. I would sure love to know the answer to that question, because it would suggest then that Justin Trudeau knew about these allegations for a lot longer than perhaps we might assume? Well, whether I talk to him about it or not is one issue. But by the time Mr. Trudeau became prime minister, it was generally accepted in Western countries that foreign interference was a problem. And in fact, I think he suggested the same himself one or two days ago when he said that he acknowledged it's a problem and that it has been a problem for some time. I couldn't put a date on the some time, but I think it would be, it's only fair to him to say that, you know, he would have been made aware in a general sense by somebody, if only by his political staff who read The Economist or The New York Times.

Sure. And so you made those public warnings in 2010, as you're saying, it was starting to be accepted as sort of common knowledge. Do you think Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has done enough to address alleged election interference by China? Well, I've got to say I'm a bit disappointed as a Canadian because it seemed, even if not every allegation by the Globe and Mail and by Global is true, even if, you know, there's even if there are some flaws in there, clearly we have a problem. Clearly our allies have a problem of a similar nature. And we don't seem to have done a great deal. I mean, I'm willing to accept that they may be doing something confidentially, but when you're dealing with the electoral system, I think you have to, to your

point, talk to the public about it. You know, a number of people over the years have suggested that we have a registry of foreign agents, you know, which would help, I think wouldn't solve the problem. I think just talking about it, which is what we're doing now, and what other people would talk about it. But I think we need somebody to look at the Canada Elections Act. We need to ask ourselves if the RCMP and if the Commissioner of Elections, the chief electoral officers, have a broad enough mandate to deal with this and whether they have the resources to do it. But so far, it seems to me that the government has repeated time and time again that, you know, they have the tools and they're taking all this seriously,

but nobody's really suggested anything concrete. And I think that's a bit of a shame because I don't think this is comforting people. I mean, you'll know better than I, but I don't think this is comforting when people always respond in generalities. I don't know what the solution is, but you know, maybe it's giving, putting a little bit more of a duty of care on political parties. Maybe it's changing the criminal law. Maybe it's the foreign registry. Maybe it's finding some way, going back to your question earlier, to monitor and report on social media better than we have. But we need somebody to sit down, I think, and look at this who's not actively involved in politics so we can avoid a conflict of interest.

Dick, taking us back to that moment in 2010 when you decided to speak publicly about your fears and your concerns about the threat China posed to our democracy, I suppose. Why did you decide to go public then? Well, CSIS directors over time, not just me, but any number of CSIS directors, have at one time or other taken an opportunity to comment on what they were worried about at a particular point in time. The current director has done that on a couple of issues. I think I did it on one or two issues. Part of it is sometimes it's the opportunity. Sometimes something happened that's specific that prompts more concern than might have been the case earlier. Sometimes you're encouraged

to do it by another country. There are any number of reasons. Sometimes do you want politicians to act? Well, yes, I do. But in my role as CSIS director, I was very careful never to tell them what to do. I didn't think that was my job. My job was to inform them. And I tried to do that.

CSIS tries to do that to the best of its ability. It's for people in other jobs to recommend action or inaction, legislative change, administrative change and whatnot. Okay, Dick, thank you so much for joining us and helping us try to understand

exactly what's going on with this story. Thank you. You're very welcome. Thank you. You're very welcome. Thank you. On Tuesday, the federal government released a redacted independent report assessing the work of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol. This group was established by Prime Minister Trudeau to monitor and alert the public to credible threats to Canada's elections. The report says attempts to interfere with the 2021 election did not affect the results.

It also says Ottawa should lower the bar so that Canadians are alerted even when there is only a potential impact of meddling. The report urges caution against stirring up backlash and marginalizing certain communities. That's all for today. I'm Jodi Martinson. Thank you for listening to FrontBurner. For more CBC Podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.