Front Burner - 'Flying coffins': Boeing CEO faces grilling over 737 Max
Episode Date: October 31, 2019Two devastating crashes, five months apart, left 346 people dead. Both Ethiopian Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 went down shortly after take off. The victims' families are still looking for answer...s. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg testified in front of two committees in Washington this week about the 737 Max. Today on Front Burner, CBC correspondent Susan Ormiston tells us what he said, and how the families responded.
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Hello, I'm Jamie Poisson.
It's been one year now since Lion Air Flight 610 took off from Jakarta, Indonesia.
The pilots noticed a problem right away.
And within 12 minutes, the plane crashed into the Java Sea, killing everyone, all 189 people on board.
The flight went missing soon after takeoff from Indonesia's capital, Jakarta, early Monday morning local time. It was on its way to Penang.
As the investigation continued, so did the flights.
And in March, an early morning flight out of the airport in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, slammed into the ground shortly after takeoff. 157 people died, including 18
Canadians. After insisting the Boeing 737 MAX 8s were safe, both Canada and the U.S. have now
grounded the planes and banned them from their airspace.
The Boeing 737 MAX 8 fleet has been grounded ever since.
This week, Boeing CEO Dennis Mullenberg was called to Capitol Hill to explain what his company is doing to fix the plane and find out what went wrong.
The CBC's Susan Ormiston went to Ethiopia when the second plane crashed
and has kept in touch with the families of some of the victims.
She also watched the hearings this week.
This is FrontBurner.
Hi, Susan.
Hi there, Jamie.
Thanks for being here today.
No problem.
So this was the lawmakers doing the questioning over the last couple of days. But, you know, I know they weren't permitted to speak, but the families were also there. And in a sense, it felt like they were facing off against the CEO of this huge American company. And as someone who was there in the room, how did their presence affect what went on in those hearings?
How did their presence affect what went on in those hearings?
Hugely. I mean, yes, they couldn't ask questions, but boy, did they have a presence.
You know, they've been waiting for this since March, most of them family members from the Ethiopian crash.
And they've been waiting to see the man who led the company which failed them.
And there's no question about that.
So at the very beginning on Tuesday, they pulled up big placards with their families' loved ones on them, photos of them.
They held them aloft and walked in a slow procession into the large committee hearing room on Capitol Hill. They took up a whole row and a half and sat right directly behind the CEO of Boeing.
Thank you.
Most important to the relatives who have lost loved ones, if you could please stand so we could thank you all.
Thank you for being here, if you could just stand.
I was going to ask that you hold up those photographs because I understand that for security purposes you can't during the hearing, but just for this short period of time.
When he came in, he came in through a back door behind the legislators and he walked very purposefully past them, didn't look at them.
As he was walking in, it would have been nice to actually, I think, walk in.
But he sat down and immediately one of the first things he said was, I'm sorry. I am truly, deeply sorry.
We haven't really had him apologize to us at all directly, indirectly indirectly, same sort, and that's all.
And how did they react to that?
There was a lot of emotion.
I saw several of the families crying.
One man had his arm around his wife.
She was slumped over.
They've been waiting for this apology for a long time, but it only goes part way to
making them feel differently about this crash, but it
was necessary. He didn't turn and speak to them though. And at the end of that day, one of the
women called him out when he was leaving and said, Mr. Mullenberg, when you apologize to people,
you should look at them. I want to come back to the families in a few minutes. I know you've kept
in touch with several of the Canadian families.
I'm really grateful that we've been able to follow this story through with you. But let's focus on
these hearings first. I know that they were ostensibly about what went wrong, what caused
these planes to crash and whether either one of these crashes was preventable? And how much do we learn about those questions?
Interestingly, I think in the way that Boeing characterized the fixes, the reforms they're making, you learned a lot about what went wrong. So rather than, you know, press on what went wrong,
which you wouldn't do as a company, he talked about reform. So let's take MCAS, the flight
operating system, which we've heard so much about.
Right. And while investigations are still underway, we know both accidents involved the repeated
activation of a flight control software system called MCAS, which we've already talked about.
That system responded to erroneous signals from angle of attack sensor. No question now that it was partially responsible for both crashes,
that it was improperly tested,
and that it was functioning in a way that made it difficult
for these pilots to override.
So, for example, Mullenberg said there's three or four fixes to MCAS.
It will now compare data from two sensors, not one. So clearly a problem. It will only
activate once, whereas in Ethiopia, those pilots, it kept activating, they kept turning it off,
and it kept coming back on. So it will only activate once. It'll never have any more data
than pilots can manage, and they will be able to override it. So clearly, as he said, we learned lessons from these crashes. We made
mistakes. We own it. We're fixing them. I know there was suggestions in the aftermath of both
crashes that this could have been pilot error. And did you hear any of that over the last couple of
days? Yeah, it came up several times, and particularly in a tense sort of exchange with
the CEO and one of the senators the first day. And he said, you know, how can you say that you're
accountable and that you stand by your product when shortly after the crash, I had Boeing in my
office saying it was pilot error. He said, it wasn't pilot error. Those pilots were flying coffins. There was no way that
they could have changed this. Those pilots never had a chance. These loved ones never had a chance.
They were in flying coffins as a result of Boeing deciding that it was going to conceal MCAS from the pilots.
Another really interesting detail that came up was the company made an assumption, which is industry-wide,
that in crises, pilots take about four seconds to respond.
Something goes wrong, they're sort of on it within four seconds.
But if it takes longer, if it takes in Lion Air, apparently eight
seconds, or in Ethiopia, maybe 10 seconds, what we learned is that company memo said that MCAS
was, quote, catastrophic if it took longer than 10 seconds to get on it. Wow, just 10 seconds.
Yeah, so clearly the pilots who didn't know about MCAS because it wasn't in the operating manual and there was a lot of discussion about that,
if they didn't know what the problem was and couldn't figure out how to solve it, within 10 seconds, according to Boeing's own memos, this could be catastrophic.
Wow. Speaking about these memos, I know that this was something that the lawmakers spent some time on, recently released emails and messages that suggest that people
inside Boeing knew there was something wrong with the MCAS system well before both crashes. And
how did Molenberg explain this? Well, you know, that was one of the key things. What did Boeing
know and when? And I don't think that was one of the key things. What did Boeing know and
when? And I don't think that was fully unveiled in the last two days. I think that will take
more investigation. The Ethiopian investigation still hasn't produced a report. But what you're
referring to is Mark Forkner, who was the chief testing engineer. And back in 2016,
they revealed text messages before these hearings.
And in them, he said, oh, shocker alert, MCAS is running rampant in the simulator,
trimming itself like crazy.
And he says, you know, I suck at flying.
He was joking.
But even this is, quote, egregious.
So the senators pressed the CEO on that, that 346 people died
because of what a chief test pilot described at that time
as egregious. And what do we know about what happened? Did Mark Forkner tell anybody else
at Boeing about this? We don't know the full story, in part because he has left the company
and he has hired a lawyer and he is not talking to Boeing nor publicly at this point. So Mullenberg
was able to say, I don't know what Mark Forkner
was referring to. I don't know what was in his mind when he was making these text messages and
that it was during a simulated training so that he said it was the simulator that was
misfunctioning at that time, not the MCAS software system. But we didn't learn a great deal more about when he saw these other than
recently the actual text of the remarks. And how did the senators and congresspeople there react
to that? Well, they don't believe it in part. I was made aware of the existence of this kind
of document, this issue, as part of that discovery process in the investigation
early in the year, as you pointed out.
And —
Did you read this exchange?
Look, I was made aware documents were being produced, that is, passive voice and disclaiming
responsibility.
You're the CEO.
The buck stops with you.
At one point, one of the senators said that this was a systemic pattern of the summer of 2018. So just
a couple of months before the Lion Air crash. And this was from a senior manager on an assembly line.
And he wrote to Muhlenberg directly and said that after 30 years of aviation safety experience,
he had grave concerns about the assembly line, that people were frustrated and exhausted,
line, that people were frustrated and exhausted, that they were being pushed too fast to get through a high rate of assembly, and that for the first time in his life, he was reluctant
to put his own family on a Boeing aircraft.
Now, Muhlenberg said, I received that letter.
We looked into his concerns.
But when pressed about, did you reduce the rate, the high rate line to fewer aircraft being produced in a month, he said no. evidence that people raised concerns about this or were concerned about this and that nothing
was done? And also accusations that people at the company were feeling overworked. I know you
mentioned some things were done there, but what do we know about consequences here? For example,
is anybody going to be charged? Not at the moment. There are no charges.
The Justice Department is looking into this.
These sessions on Capitol Hill, of course, were not a criminal investigation.
There are loads of lawsuits from families and other people, pilots,
and several lawsuits going on, which are going to take years.
But so far, no criminality.
There was also much made in these hearings of Mullenberg's salary and bonus, right?
Yeah, that came up about accountability. So Mullenberg, to his credit, did not try to evade
the issue of whether he was accountable. He took full responsibility. He said it many,
many times over and over, these crashes happened on my watch. I
am responsible. My company is responsible. We are accountable. But then when it came up the question
of, okay, if you're accountable, then what's happened to you? You've been stripped of your
chairmanship from the board, but you're still CEO. And he said, I'm staying to fix the problem. It's my responsibility. I was raised on a farm as a farm boy in Iowa.
My dad told me never to run away from challenges, and that's what I'm doing.
But this led to aggressive questioning by some Congress members on Wednesday saying,
OK, but in the year of the lion crash, you got a bonus of $15 million after that crash.
So how does that square with accountability?
I'm not sure what accountability means.
If accountability means, Mr. Molenberg, you received a $15 million bonus after these planes crashed.
I'm not sure who's been held accountable here for this.
Now, fair enough to say that this year, 2019, in which Ethiopia crashed,
there will be no bonuses paid to Boeing executives, as they say.
However, he's still a highly paid executive, as was pointed out.
He's not a farm boy from Iowa anymore.
He's running the world's largest aircraft company,
and two crashes within five months killed more than 340 people.
The other question I have is whether these planes will ever fly again.
What did Mullenberg say about that?
Well, clearly, they're trying to get recertification.
They've done hundreds of tests, so they are aggressively trying to get that aircraft, popular, popular aircraft, with hundreds of back orders.
They're trying to get it back in the air by the end of the fourth quarter of this year.
So that's end of December.
But even so, he made it a point to say that the world's regulators, so each country, can look at the certification themselves,
do their own analysis, and make their own decision about whether
MAX 8 planes should fly in their country. Okay, Canada among them, since we did make the decision
to ground these planes. I know that part of the concern for many people has been this
seeming cooperation between Boeing and the supposedly independent government regulator,
the Federal Aviation Administration, right? That was pressed on many times. Is there enough of a firewall between FAA and large corporations
like Boeing? Or are Boeing engineers too closely associated with the testing and certifying of
aircraft? Complicated by the fact that the MAX 8 was not a brand new aircraft. So as I understand it, I'm not an aviation expert,
it was not required to have exactly the same certification process
as a brand new aircraft.
It was a 737 series, which have been flying for decades,
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I'd like to go back to the families for a moment.
Were they able to say anything to Dennis Mullenberg or interact with him in any way? Yes. Tuesday, after the first day of testimony, he met them privately for
at least an hour or more. They all went into a room no one else was allowed in.
He listened to the stories of the people they lost. He was clearly moved by them,
and it was the first time that the CEO of Boeing had met the families,
and he actually said in the hearing the next day
that he regretted he hadn't reached out to the families earlier.
I've had the opportunity to talk with some of you and hear your stories,
and we are deeply, deeply sorry. And we'll never forget. And I want you to know that.
And we're committed to making the improvements that we need to make. We're committed.
And the second day when he was testifying, he made a point of often looking at them,
often including them by looking over his shoulder in his testimony when he was talking about the impact of his company's actions on people.
However, a very unfortunate event at the very end of the second day, at the end of over eight and a half hours of testimony by the CEO,
he and his chief engineer were being quizzed about some test, about something that happened last March.
And the congressperson asked them,
well, was that before or after the Ethiopian crash?
What was the date of that crash?
There were some similar tests down in Miami around that time, yes.
And what date did the Ethiopian Airlines crash take place?
It was in March of 2019, before the simulator
tests. And at that point, Paul Njerogi, who lost his whole family, the Moors of Scarborough, who
lost Danielle, 24, both started sobbing. Because for them, March 10th stopped their world.
I'll always live knowing that the decisions that they made
before and after the first crash
cost the lives of my family.
And many times it's sad.
And that date is seared on their brain.
And for whatever reason, maybe from fatigue, maybe whatever,
it was a cruel and unfortunate ending to this long inquiry.
That must have been so difficult for them.
Can I ask you, I know we've talked about the Moore family who lost their daughter Danielle,
and Paul and Jeroge who lost this whole family in this crash. I thought about my wife and my children on that morning on March 10th. They knew that they were just about one and a half hours
and I think about them in that aircraft which became an equipment of death and left them in that aircraft, which became an equipment of death and left them in pieces.
That, that's something that never leaves me. I think about them often. How are they doing?
I think about them almost every day, to be quite honest, Jamie. And seeing them again, they are,
they are ambassadors now for the families they lost.
All of them there were.
There must have been 20 or more family members.
They're there for justice.
But sadly, what they really want, Boeing can't give them.
No one can.
Their loved one's back.
And I think that one of the things that still haunts the Moors, for example, and several of the families, Paul, is what happened
between Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines? Why did Boeing fail to acknowledge or realize the extreme
nature of this failure in their aircraft? Why did they decide to fix a software problem,
give it a longer timeline,
now in hindsight realizing they were taking a risk that it would happen again, which it did?
And is it fair for me to say that they did not get those answers this week?
They didn't.
That's still, I think, from listening and following this story for almost nine months now,
that is a missing part is what happened between those
two crashes? Why wasn't the first one dealt with in a different way? And I'll say that the CEO of
Boeing also shares that concern. He said, I ask myself that question every day. I've asked,
and my company has gone over that decision time and time again. We've learned from the second
crash and if we knew then what we knew now we would have made a different decision. And if we
knew back then what we know now we would have grounded right after the first accident. If we
could have saved one life we would have done it. That's pretty hard for the families to hear.
if we would have done it.
That's pretty hard for the families to hear.
Do you think that there's a scenario in which they will be able to get more information about the decision-making
that went on between those two crashes?
I know, as you mentioned, they're in the midst of a lawsuit right now.
The lawsuit, if it goes to trial, it will be years.
But the company may be forced through the legal procedures
to reveal more information.
But there's also various investigations going on still, various attempts to get more documents
from Boeing. And I might say that observing, I was about a meter away from Mullenberg today on
the second day, and watching him, there's a reason why he's the CEO of Boeing.
He's extremely calm, steely, well prepared and coached. He was harangued several times as
senators and congressmen, you know, are grandstanding to some degree in these hearings.
And he kept his cool, but he never strayed from his talking points.
And I think the fourth time he said that he was a farm boy from Iowa, there were gasps in the
family's corner. Well, you talked about Iowa just like one too many times, and the whole group said,
go back to the farm. Go back to Iowa. Do that. And it's because Like, okay, come on. You can't rely on that. We understand
your values, but this was a serious problem.
They want answers. Susan, thank you so much. You're welcome.
Okay, so on Tuesday's show, we took a look at how Facebook is handling a series of really big problems.
Problems for the company and society at large.
One of the things centered around truth and political advertising.
Facebook has said it would continue to allow paid ads from politicians that contain false information.
Well, yesterday, Twitter took a much different approach.
The company decided to ban old political ads on its platform worldwide.
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey said, quote,
We believe political message reach should be earned, not bought.
That's all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson.
Thanks for listening to FrontBurner and see you all tomorrow.