Front Burner - How did the Houthis become so powerful?

Episode Date: September 22, 2026

On Sunday it looked like the United States was about to wade back into its fight with Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, the Iran-backed group in Yemen that has grown into a surprisingly powerful military presence in the region.Saudi Arabia had been asking for support after a series of Houthi attacks and advancements, which brought a major global shipping and oil chokepoint - the Bab el-Mandeb strait - under Houthi control.Iona Craig has been reporting on Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula for over a decade and she joins us to track the group's rise from a group of rebels from the mountains of northwestern Yemen to a geopolitical force.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

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Saudi Arabia had been asking for support after a series of Houthi attacks and advancements, which brought a major global shipping and oil choke point, the Bob Al-Mandab Strait, under Houthi control. After rushing from Camp David to Washington and reviewing the situation, Trump decided not to carry out the strike on the Houthis. That remains the case as of Monday evening. The stakes are really high here for all the players. Iona Craig has been reporting on Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula for over a decade, and she joins us to track the Houthis rise. From a small group of rebels from the mountains of northwestern Yemen to a geopolitical force and what their recent advancements mean for the Iran war, and the world. Iona, thank you so much for coming on to the show.

It's really a pleasure to have you. My pleasure. Thanks for having me. So the Houthis have been fighting the Saudis for really over a decade now after a Saudi-led coalition entered the Yemeni-Civil War in March 2015. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched military operations in Yemen. The objective is to defend the legitimate government of President Hadi from the takeover attempts by the Houthi militias in Yemen. The broad expectation then was that it wouldn't last nearly this long, right?

So I want to understand how we got here. Firstly, can you briefly give us an overview of who the Houthis are and how they rose to power as one of the main factions in the Yemeni Civil War? Right, so going back a bit now, the Houthis hail from Yemen's most northern governorate in Sada up on the Saudi border. and they were formed in the late 1990s, firstly, as a kind of youth movement, but then in the early 2000, they fought their first war against the Yemeni government, and that became the first of what was six wars then,

against the government of the former president of Yemen, Aliad de Lassale, who was in power for 33 years. And then during my time in Yemen, when I was living there back in 2010, was kind of the wrapping up of the last of those six wars. But then, of course, the Arab Spring happened. A clear call for their country's leader to step down. Tens of thousands of people descending on the streets of the capital sunnah. The crowd made up of opposition members and youth activists.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced out of power. But then in 2014, the Houthis started pushing south and heading through all of the tribal areas in the highlands until they seized the capital Sunar when I was living there in 2014, but with relatively little fighting. The president's residence came under attack, followed by the nearby presidential palace, which was apparently looted by Houthi rebels.

Witnesses described the security forces as apparently giving up. And that transpired really because they aligned with Yemen's former president who they fought those six wars against. and his loyalists who remained in the army that they were able to take the capital. But then they didn't stop. And they kept pushing on down through the country. And then by early 2015, they'd put the new president, President Haddy under house arrest, who then managed to escape and fled to Saudi Arabia.

And that's when Saudi Arabia launched its bombing campaign against the Houthis in the spring of 2015. But like many countries, get involved in air wars, that sounds quite familiar. now, Saudi Arabia believed that they would bomb the Houthis back to Sada within a matter of weeks. That didn't happen. And the air war continued with support from other regional neighbours, most crucially the UAE, until a ceasefire was really agreed between the Saudis and the Houthis in 2022. And so the conflict had really been fairly dormant between 2022 and until the last few weeks, really, or crucially until July. But the Houthis had got to where they are today,

not just because of the help of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who they then turned on and killed in 2017. Sela switched sides in Yemen's civil war over the weekend, turning on his Iranian-backed Houthi allies, who reportedly attacked his house in Sanaa, pursuing him as he fled. But because of this ongoing support from Iran, that started really as political support,

and sort of summer camps and support from their other allies in Lebanon, Hezbollah. But it has kind of strengthened over the years, and certainly during the course of the conflict with weapons, training, particularly from military advisors on how to use much more advanced weapon systems. And to the point where the Houthis have now become able to manufacture their own weapons domestically at home. as well with components that are being smuggled in from China as well as Iran. So they've gone from this kind of stereotypical rag-tag militia that people like to portray them as to this very sophisticated now organization that has taken over the institutions and the infrastructure of the government that has existed before and have been in control of

that now for more than a decade with extensive military capabilities. that we have seen very well exercised in the last few days. For the first time, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have struck Saudi Arabia's capital. Massive plumes of black smoke were seen rising from fuel tanks near the city's airport. The rebels also hit energy sites with drones and ballistic missiles. Their slogan that the Sarka appears on banners written out in green and red letters against a white background and translated it says, God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse be upon the Jews' victory to Islam.

And just what more can you tell me about their ideological worldview and how it's attracted followers and allies in Yemen and across the region? Well, the Houthis rose really for several reasons, but also linked to America's invasion of Iraq and in a response to that. That particular slogan, the story goes, that came from the first leader of the Houthis when he saw a video from the Intipada in Palestine and his reaction to a man who was cradling, that became a very famous video, a man cradling his son in his arms that was shot dead. And so this visceral anti-Israel and in that slogan, obviously, as well, anti-Semitic slogan, came from, that ideological sense that really as well, of course, then aligned them with Iran's world perspective and really drew them, therefore, as a kind of natural ally into the axis of resistance.

But yes, it was from events around the region that really influenced that slogan being adopted. But, I mean, ideologically, the Houthis, they really see themselves as having a divine right to rule. They believe very much in the importance of being able to trace your lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed. And those families that can within Yemen are favoured in the Houthi networks. They are given positions of privilege and power. There's a religious aspect as well as a political one that feeds into that ideology of the Houthis. How does this help us understand their opposition to the same? Saudis.

Sort of back in the, back at the beginning of their history, their first sort of fighting centered around actually a religious school that was up in Sada in their homeland that was funded by Saudi Arabia. So you could take some of this back to almost a blowback from the funding of religious schools that spreads the Salafi Islam from Saudi Arabia into northern Yemen that didn't previously exist until the kind of 1980. So on an ideological and religious front, that is relevant because a lot of the fighters on the anti-Houthi side have come out of not just that school, but other schools that were connected to it that were funded across Yemen as well. And they're fighting very much for religious regions.

But more recently, the response to Saudi Arabia has always sort of been, as the Houthis have put them up as the external enemy now, you know, alongside. Israel, but has been down to Saudi's launching of this bombing campaign in 2015. And there was a peace deal or the political deal that was on the table between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis between 2022 and until this kind of summer. The Houthis were hoping or expecting to get a significant financial gain out of that deal that ran into the billions of dollars in the form of getting. government salaries and civil servant salaries paid in their territory. And that looked like, well, that was certainly looking like a possibility

sort of nine months ago or a bit longer. But now there's no question of that happening in the near future, I think. But that was what the Houthis were really wanting to get out to Saudi Arabia, was a kind of financial payout in order to keep them economic. economically sufficient, really, in their territory. According to the UN, around half of the population in government-controlled areas are living with acute food and security. And just what state is the general population of Yemen in after all these years of war? It was always in a fragile state. It was the poorest country in the Middle East.

But also crucially, Yemen imports between 18, 90 percent of its basic foods. And so there is very little capacity when those supply lines. are restricted for people to be able to cope. And certainly, you know, in the humanitarian crisis that we saw in the first round of this war in sort of 2016, 2017 and 2018. 17 million Yemenis do not know if or where they will get their next meal. Nearly seven million are facing the threat of famine.

And nearly 16 million lack access to water or sanitation. Ira was reporting from the ground then, and it wasn't necessarily about a lack of food in the markets. It was about the price of those goods because of the blockade being imposed by Saudi Arabia, because of the Houthis using siege tactics around villages, towns and cities. It meant that any food that was available was incredibly expensive. And now what we're seeing now is unfortunately a kind of flashback to that time because the current fighting has sort of led to a surge of displacement.

You know, sort of 100,000 people being displaced in around two weeks, which is just an extraordinary number. And that won't be people that are being displaced for the first time, the second time, or even the third time. People have been displaced multiple times now during this conflict because it's gone on for so long. Many have turned up over the Red Sea in Djibouti, but many of them are being displaced internally

and ending up in other cities and towns. At Athabaski University, we understand that work, family and education is a balancing act. With 24-7 online access, monthly start dates, and an adjustable course load, our flexible delivery options let you tailor your program

to fit your life's busy demands. Open your options with a more flexible online degree and choose an education that works for you, not the other way around. Find out how at Athabascau.com.com. You.com. Hi there. I'm Jamie Poisson, and my podcast, Front Burner, looks at the major news stories affecting Canada and the world.

There is no shortage of important international news right now, but that is not the only type of news that matters. So do local stories about your municipal elections across the GTA, your safety on the TTC, your affordable housing plans, which is why they deserve their very own pocket. This is Toronto is a weekly deep dive into the lives and issues that matter to Torontoians. Released every Wednesday and Friday and available wherever you get your podcasts. The surge in this conflict that we've seen some of the most intense fighting in years,

as we've been talking about significant territorial gains over the last couple of weeks, most crucially control of the Babal Mandab Strait. Could you just tell me more about what led to this recent escalation? in fighting? How did we get here? It was really triggered by an event in the middle of July. A Iranian passenger jet attempted to fly into Sunar. It was returning from Tehran, having taken a Houthi delegation to the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Hamanay.

And when it was attempting to return, the Saudis then came in and bombed Sire airport and bombed the runway. Those were the first airstrikes that the Saudis had carried out against the Houthi since 2022. The Saudi enemy through its reckless decision to launch what was an unjust attack on Sana International Airport bears full responsibility for this aggression, which serves the interests of the US-Israeli enemy and its grave consequences. The Houthis then responded to that, describing what the Saudis were imposing as a blockade on them, because there had been no commercial flights, passenger flights in or out of Sanaa since Israel destroyed passenger jets

on the runway at Sunar Airport back in the sort of spring of 2025. And so the Houthis responded then by targeting Saudi Arabia and said that they would impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea. And then quite quickly we saw that being reflected on the ground in Yemen with fighting, escalating between the Houthis and the very much Saudi-backed internationally recognized government forces on the ground. Then we saw tankers, Saudi tankers being attacked in the Red Sea and this what has been continuous tip-for-tat escalation that sort of culminated in the last few days with a drone strikes on Riyadh by the Houthis, an attack on their Western terminal, oil terminal at Yambu. We've seen attacks on the Saudi oil pipeline, but also this kind of this kind of lightning.

takeover by the Houthis of the Red Sea coast, the western Red Sea coast, and taking the islands that are in the middle of the Babel-Mendab, which is this very strategically important strait on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula, which of course then means you've got Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz and one of their strongest allies in control now of the Babel-Mendab, and that is both sides of the Arabian Peninsula. In insular, effectively in this kind of kinsa, a kind of control by Iran and its allies, which has this knock-on effect to the oil market and to the international economy. This jubilant Houthi militiamen said the rebels don't need missiles anymore.

They just need to position themselves in the right places around the waterway. This afternoon, the Houthis said that shipping through the waterway would be safe for everyone, apart from the Saudis. What do you think the Houthi's ultimate goal is here? It's partly to get that money out of Saudi Arabia, of course, and to give themselves a significant leverage in any upcoming deal or negotiations with them. But it's also to give themselves a kind of global strategic role, which they've done very successfully now.

And also, I think they would very much like to do what the Iranians have been talking about, which is monetizing the Babel Mendeb. Iran has talked about monetizing the Strait of Hormuz, and there's been a lot of talk about the potential of a toll being put on the Strait of Hormuz to start charging vessels going out of the Strait of Hormuz, much like vessels have to pay a tax to Egypt to go through the Seward Canal, but that the Houthis would like to do that through the Babel Mendab to equally earn an income out of the cargo shipping,

as well as oil tankers that have to go through the Babel-Mendab to reach Europe and from Saudi Arabia have to go south to reach the Asia market. So, yeah, there are a lot of things in there that the Houthis would like to gain out of this, but they certainly gained the global strategic role and position that they've always wanted to in the last few weeks. And what about the Saudis? Like, why did the Saudis choose to escalate things recently? What are the Saudis trying to do here? I think there's been a lot of miscalculation, as ever really, of the Houthis about their capabilities and their abilities to see so much territory so quickly. I think it was a miscalculation by the Saudis to have carried out those strikes on Sunar Airport back in July.

I think if they realized that this was going to be the consequences of it, that they perhaps would have thought again about, doing that. But now the Saudis have been backed into a corner really and given the attacks on Saudi Arabia directly, the casualties even that it's caused in Saudi Arabia, the damage to its infrastructure. Ballistic missiles and drones launched by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels striking Saudi Arabia's capital of Riyadh. Thick smoke seen rising near the airport. The Houthis targeting oil facilities in a key port along the coast, further disrupting Saudi oil production. It is in a position now where it has to escalate. It has to fight back. It cannot be seen be backing down in the fate of the Houthis, particularly now where we've seen some of these

strikes on the oil pipeline, Saudi Arabia's oil pipeline, coming from militias in Iraq, which the Houthis are also aligned to, and the Houthis even we know have a presence there as well, that now they've got the potential of strikes coming from the north, the south, and if things escalate over the Strait of Hormuz, potentially again from Iran, as they did do earlier along in that conflict. So the risks are very high right now for Saudi Arabia, and it doesn't have the same coalition that it had back in 2015 during the first round of fighting with the Houthis,

but crucially in the form of the UAE, who was very vital into providing support on the ground when Saudi Arabia was leading the air war, the UAE were really the most important element of the ground war down in the south. So the Saudis are now left with the anti-Houthi forces, which are deeply divided, which they've only had sort of command and control over since January, really. The way the Houthi swept into the Red Sea western coast in Yemen was quite clearly as much about the failure of those anti-Houthi fighting forces under the internationally

recognized government that are backed by Saudi Arabia. their lack of communication, their divisions that have been longstanding. Obviously, it was about the Houthis capabilities and their ability to be able to fight in Yemen's mountains, which they've had nearly 30 decades of experience doing. What about the United States here? Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, reportedly, according to the New York Times, has asked Trump to intervene here on behalf of Saudi Arabia. And Trump apparently was considering that over the last couple of days

and preparing for some kind of airstrikes, but demurred and has not struck as of Monday afternoon, Eastern time when you and I are talking. According to the Times, most of Trump's closest advisors were skeptical about potential strikes given the strains facing the U.S. military in the war in Iran. I just wonder what you think is going on there. Well, there's a lot in the balance, really, both for Saudi Arabia. and the US. I mean, there is a deal between the US and the Houthis that has been standing since the Trump administration launched its AIA campaign against the Houthis in the spring of 2025.

And after two months of bombing, the President Trump announced this deal with the Houthis, whereby the US would not strike them anymore if the Houthis didn't target any of their vessels in the Red Sea. And the Houthis have been very quick since this escalation started to say that the Saudi vessels are the only ones that will be targeted in the Red Sea and the Bablmendab. US vessels won't. And neither will others. Because the Houthis have received the wrath of President Trump before and do not want to repeat that now when they're already in a battle with Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is still trying to deal with the situation of the Strait of Hormuz, the potential of that escalating, and there's,

you know, an issue of potential overstretch. What, as well, it might do economically if the US does start bombing the Houthis again and they in response, then start targeting US-linked vessels in the Babel-Mendab and the Red Sea as well as Saudi vessels, there are economic repercussions for that, just as you're going into elections in the US. So yes, the US support that Saudi Arabia was obviously hoping for in the form of air strikes could have repercussions for the US economy itself if they did decide to support Saudi Arabia in this way. So it's a different scenario to 2015 now that the Babel-Mendab is in play and the Red Sea and because of what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz, because that gives

the Houthi so much more leverage now. than it ever would have done if they'd done this 10 years ago because of the war that's going on between the U.S. with Israel and on Iran. So there's a lot in the balance to consider whether you are President Trump or whether you are Mohammed bin Saman in Saudi Arabia. I think a lot will depend on the U.S.'s calculation over the Strait of Hormuz and what their plan is certainly is. if there is any plan for escalation with Iran. And say more about that for me, how you think the Houthi's recent gains fit into the calculus of the conflict in the greater region,

namely for Iran in their fight against the U.S. and Israel. Iran and the Houthis are, of course, very strong allies. The Houthis are not, however, a proxy of Iran. I think if Iran had its way, it would have wanted the Houthis to do this back at the beginning of the war in sort of March. But actually, timing-wise, it's probably worked out pretty well for Iran now, because just as the global economy is starting to feel the pinch, and we'll do even more so now, the northern hemisphere is heading into winter and the demand for fuel will be even greater for heating. The Houthis have now got involved at a kind of crucial pinch point when I think Iran believes that it can sit out this war economically better than Western countries.

can and Western governments can. And the Houthis are just adding to that pressure, having effectively put out of action, the Yambu port, which was exporting up to 4 million barrels of oil per day for Saudi Arabia, which is around 4% of the world's supplied for oil. This can effectively turn the screws on the global economy, which will, has a significant an impact on, you know, politicians and government leaders across Europe and, you know, and the US, as everybody is feeling the picture of that at the petrol pump in the form of diesel, gas, whatever. And I think the uncertainty in all of this calculation is for the US, if they're going to get

involved against the Houthis, if they did decide to carry out airstrikes, is what would the response be from Iran in the sense of if Iran then starts to escalate over the straight, of Hormuz, and the US is kind of distracted by bombing the Houthis, that it spreads them thinner across the region. You've now effectively got a new front in this war if the US starts targeting the Houthis in Yemen, whilst also trying to see off Iran over the strait of Hormuz. So that's the balance at the moment. I think for the US, to have its vessel still being able to travel safely through the Red Sea is perhaps a greater priority than it is looking after. to Saudi interests.

Iona, this was such a helpful explanation of what's been going on. I feel like I've left with so much more clarity than when we began this conversation. It is incredible to think about this relatively small force and the amount of outsides geopolitical influence that they have, hey? Yeah, I think what's really been really interesting, I think just watching the, you know, we're seeing so much more than we were 10 years ago in this conflict, you know, And now everybody's sort of videoing everything in the way that wasn't happening, certainly in Yemen anyway, 10 years ago. And everybody's trying to sort of grandstand with their drones that they're operating now.

Again, there's more drones than everywhere before. But obviously the stockpiles that the Houthis have built up. I mean, the mortars that are being fired in the last sort of 24 hours or 36 hours in Yemen, the number is just extraordinary. And they're dropping them from drones. And, you know, I suppose we've maybe got used to seeing the kind of level of ammunition or weapons in the form of drones being used in the Ukraine and Russia war. But, yeah, it's really extraordinary to see the stockpiles of the Houthis must have built up over the last few years. And certainly, obviously, since 2022 when the ceasefire happened in a preparation for an escalation in this conflict and they're now deploying them. So it's kind of extraordinary to see where the Houthis have come from in that terms of kind of their military industrial capabilities from where they started from back in the early 2000s.

It's kind of extraordinary. All right. That is all for today. I'm Jamie Plesson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.