Front Burner - Israel’s open nuclear secret

Episode Date: May 21, 2026

Earlier this month, 30 Democratic lawmakers sent a letter to the Trump administration with a remarkable request: to publicly acknowledge that Israel has nuclear weapons. Israel is widely believed to be the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East. But unlike other nuclear powers, Israel has never officially acknowledged its arsenal.That nuclear policy is known, in Hebrew, as “amimut” or opacity. And for decades the United States has largely gone along with it. Today, historian Avner Cohen, author of ‘Israel and the Bomb’, joins us to explain how Israel built its nuclear program in secret, and why that silence still matters today.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

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Earlier this month, 30 Democratic lawmakers sent a letter to the Trump administration with a remarkable request. And that is to publicly acknowledge that Israel has nuclear weapons, which is widely understood to be true. For more than a half century, Israeli and U.S. leaders have refused to officially say whether or not the country has nukes. In Israel, this policy has a name, amimuth, or opacity. The story of how that policy came to exist is one of espionage, deception, secrecy, and underground facilities. So today, we're talking to Avner Cohen. He's a professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and an authority on the history of Israel and Nukes. His book, Israel and the bomb is one of the definitive texts on the subject.

Avner, thank you so much for coming on to Frumperner. It's really great to have you. I have pleasure to be with you. So before we get into how Israel built the bomb, can you explain the policy of nuclear opacity or Emmy Moon in Hebrew? And why Israel came to develop this policy of non-acknowledgement as it relates to nuclear weapons, despite much of the world, frankly, not believing them. The policy has to do with the fact that Israel has not wishing to be openly a nuclear power. Israel did not want to initiate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, did not want to introduce and to open the Middle East to nuclear weapons. And it became a nuclear weapon state in a very unique way, in a very special way, and somewhat ambivalently and definitely against the desire, on desire, to make the region a nuclear region.

the decision was to blur what is the definition of nuclear weapons. Israel is a very unique case. And in some practical sense, yes, obviously Israel is a nuclear weapon state. In some other sense, Israel is not like any other nuclear weapon state. It's not just wording. It's not just talking. It's not just diplomacy. It's not just a wink and a nod. A yes, no question for you. Does Israel have... nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons? Yes or no? We've always said that we won't be the first to introduce it, so we haven't introduced it. But that's not an answer to the question. Do you have them or do you not?

It's as good an answer as you're going to get, but I'll tell you one thing, Chris. But Israel organized its nuclear capability in such a way that it's difficult to say, and it depends on the definition, what it's like to have nuclear weapon, and whether What she has, you call it nuclear weapons or not. And it was also part of the understanding with the United States. Long, long, long time ago, at the time of the Nixon administration, 1969, 1970, when Israel told the United States, look, we're not going to test, we're not going to declare, we're not going to see ourselves as nuclear weapon states,

we have what we have, essentially you know already what we have, it's very, very close to nuclear weapons. Maybe micronuclear men is minus a few hours, but we are good in that. And for the sake of the general peace in the Middle East, for the general atmosphere in the Middle East, it's better for you, for us, for everybody, not to be precise about what we have.

What you do know is that we're not going to declare, we're not going to test. So this is the situation, and the United States was reasonably okay with that? Yeah, can you say more about that? Like, what you think Israel ultimately has? What does their nuclear arsenal actually look like? The unique thing about the way that Israel organized its nuclear capabilities, in some sense, nuclear weapons do not exist as a fully assembled thing.

It could be put together very, very quickly, as everybody understand that. The U.S. called it in the late 60s, screwdriver away from the bomb. And they were comfortable about it. They couldn't do much to stop it. And it was by default the kind of situation that everybody was reasonably happy about it because any other alternative would be worse. When people say that Israel has as many as 90 nuclear warheads, do you understand that to be true? Well, it's not my number. I know this number is commonly circulated. I don't have a number of my own. And I tend to believe that most likely to use some sense of that. One way to understand it, Israel has 90 or whatever number you'll use, 120, whatever number you'll use. But it's not under the custodian ship of the Israeli army. Israeli army does not have those kind of weapons. It is under the custodian chief of, so to speak, the agency which belongs to the primary. Mr. the atomic energy agency, and only when there is a very unique situation, those things

put together and becoming a nuclear weapons. So how would you call it? They have or they don't have? It's interesting that the country chose to be on the line, not to cross the line, maybe inch before the line, as a permanent position. And the public policy is we don't talk about it. We don't say a word about it. Can you talk to me about Israel's early logic and justification around the creation of this project, why they wanted to do this in the first place? You've written, quote, they see the nuclear project as a commitment to ensure the country's future,

a never again pledged shaped by memory of the Holocaust. Indeed, indeed. I mean, the project was an obsession essentially of one man and the man is Israel by the founder, David Nguyen. Israel. On Friday, the 14th of May, 1948, in the city of Tel Aviv, David Ben-Gurion stood behind the microphone and solemnly proclaimed the establishment of a state

for the Jewish people in Eritz, Israel, the land of Israel. Who immediately after the births of the country thought that the conflict is long-term, not easily to be resolved. Israel is tiny. In February at the time, less than a million. people, 1949, 1950, and the independence were about 650,000 people. A big Arab world hostile, that hostility is not going to be removed. He found the only thing that Israel could compensate and could get some kind of long-term

deterrence rather than getting into another cycle of violence. Another cycle of violence is to create a stable deterrence. Perhaps it would ultimately lead to peace by. having the nuclear option. In what circumstances would you, or could you imagine, using it as a deterrent? For the time being, I don't think under any conditions. But if they will get nuclear bombs from Russia or from China, then you will have to try also to get somebody else.

You mentioned earlier that the U.S. accepted this program, right? and accepted the opacity around it. But was that always the case? Tell me about that. No, no, no. There was, John Kennedy was trying too hard to struggle, to stop, to put limits, to inspect, to verify. Ultimately, he failed. And ultimately, Nixon is the one who made a deal with Golden here that don't ask, don't tell.

essentially we know. To this day, we do not know exactly what was said between the two of them. Most likely it was even walking outside the Rose Garden and the White House, certain understanding were made and essentially were confirmed and confirmed by every president, Israeli prime minister. And let's home in on Demona, which was at the center, as I understand it, of Israel's clandestine nuclear weapons program. The Demona reactor, which began its life in 1963,

is one of Israel's most closely guarded secret installations. It's thought to have produced hundreds of kilograms of plutonium in that time, more than enough for the scores of warheads Israel is believed to possess but doesn't declare under its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Shrouded in secrecy, this facility is closed to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that's because Israel has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. and was initially described to U.S. officials as a textile plant when they were trying to hide this.

And can you talk to me a bit about Demona and how Israel was able to deceive? Well, the story of the no textile plant, which indeed is a full myth, was never planted. In fact, only a few years ago, I was able to get the guy who was the founder of that story of the textile. and like everything in life, everything major in life, it was born out of accident, out of circumstance, out of proposition.

So that guy was the senior treasury official in Israel. He flew with American official ambassador on a helicopter to move some development sites. They came back over Dimona and the Saudis excavation. This was, I believe,

September 1960, before Dimona was openly known. The U.S. Embassy knew a little, bit about rumors about that, they asked him, what about that? He knew a little bit about that. He knew that he's not supposed to say. So he improvised. He had a relative who was architect, who was building something in the mind that had to do with textile. So that's what he improvised on the helicopter because he had to say something to the American ambassador with him. And that's how the big thing of the textile plant came into being an improvisation on a helicopter of Israel.

official, we didn't know what to say, so he had to make up something. That's so interesting. Another of the more remarkable chapters in this story, and one which I think also captures the sort of clandestine and subversive nature of so much of this, is a story of the Newmec or Apollo affair. And can you talk to me about the Newmec affair and what we know about it all these years later and how central it is to our conversation today? The story was that a certain amount of highly rich uranium was diverted to Israel.

In the mid-60s, the CIA collected some samples of soil from the area of the Mona, and it is believed that it was found that there was some traces that resembled or identical with the kind of traces of highly rich uranium that was produced in, that could be taken from NUME, that was producing. planned in Portsmouth, Ohio. The CIA lived in that. John Haddon, the agent who became a friend of mine, he was the CIA station.

He lived in that. If it's true or not, the fact is that by that time, Israel was able to produce already on plutonium. And so whether if the United States, Israel was the divert or not, it's intriguing. It's interesting. But to the big picture,

I don't think it adds much because obviously the bulk of what Israel has is on its own, what was produced in the Mona itself. What's that noise? I don't know. I get that checked.

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Explore online graduate programs at uab.ca slash step up. I want to ask you about what it took to enforce the secrecy around this program because it wasn't just about diplomacy, right? it was also enforced by severe punishment. Israelis who reveal details about the weapons program can face lengthy prison terms. And this is exactly what happened to a former Israeli nuclear technician. The story of Mordecai Vanunu,

the insider who had the guts to reveal the truth. What I call in English whistleblower to inform the world about Israel nuclear secret because no one speak or no one report exactly what is going there. In 1986, Vanunu juped Israel's vaunted security apparatus and smuggled a camera into the secret de Mona plant. His photographs exposed the world's greatest nuclear cover.

Now, when the Sunday Times Exposé finally ran, Vanuio was found guilty of treason and espionage and served 18 years in prison. I think the unique thing about it, it's not because it's imposed, but because the people who were involved, and they were involved, even in the formative years, thousands of people,

and tens of them, maybe hundreds of their imposition of knowledge, position of leadership, it was self-imposed, it was a sense of we are part of something which is much larger than what, something larger than we are. It's a project to provide foundations for the existence of Israel, to prevent another holocaust,

and the people, that generation of, people, most of them generation of my parents, were part of that sense of mission, commitment, and the secrecy was very much part of that. It was not just, they felt the secrecy is essential. It's kind of amazing that over the years, even though thousands, most likely by now, tens of thousand people were involving one or another, only one person came out, you refer to Moldech Vanunu, who openly talked about it to the world. Anunu fled Israel and set out across the world with his super secret on two roles of unexposed film in his backpack. He traveled through Europe and Asia and ended up in Australia, where he converted to Christianity in a King's Cross church.

Then, together with a friend, he touted his story. Yes, from time to time, I think there was also low-in-forcement who were involved, people who were reminded about the penalty involved talking. But by and large, I think it was very much a bond of secrecy. It's kind of giving a sort of sharing something that we are privileged group, that we have been engaged in something that created Israel's short, the issue of Israel existence for longer. That's the way the ethos of that project and the people were involved in. And I met tens of them. What about you?

You've been reporting on this issue for, what, over two decades now? Almost four decades. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Has the Israeli government ever targeted you? There was a decade when I work on Israel in the bomb that there was a strong pressure on me not to publish. There was threats. It was being stopped at the airport and being questioned. And when the book out, there was anger and there was investigation.

And I couldn't be sure that the Israeli government would not have mistaken and would arrest me and would decide to put me to trial. I mean, they could have, and I took the risk and I faced it. And ultimately, they were wise enough not to continue with that. So I was indeed interrogated for some 50 days, not continuously, of course. And I should add with somewhat the gloves of silk as opposed to others. Why is this an issue that you're so seized with? Why do you want to talk publicly about Israel's nuclear capacity? There is nothing more faithful.

nuclear weapons. This was a matter of foundations of the world during the Cold War, but it remains so even now. When there is one issue, which is by tacit agreement, by the citizenry of the country, agreed to be outside the public discussion. And essentially, it has a unique status off limits. Nobody talks about it. Obviously, it serves the bureaucracy. It's created a certain kind of privilege to that topic and it deprive the discussion. The truth is that most Israeli accept those rules of the games. And by now, a great deal can be told within the rules of the games, even though there is no formal acknowledgement that Israel has nuclear weapons, but the discussion in

Israel and outside has a certain rituals, people say, according to foreign sources, kind of smiling or having a nod. And much can be said, but with no factual reference. And I believe that time has come to look for ways to incorporate this issue into a way that the country find a way to acknowledge it. I understand the difficulties, especially given the situation right now with Iran. It's already quite a few years. And it's not a trivial thing, how to bring it to the open. And especially given the fact that the Israeli posture on this issue is so,

complex is built on ambiguity is so unusual. So the aminuque is very inherent to a situation that it has some positive elements. It has eased, reduced, not provided completely nuclear arms raised in the Middle East. It helped to many Arab countries, maybe all of them by now, to tolerate the Israeli capability of the Israeli bomb and to know that it's only political that it's not truly a weapon, that Israel would never use it under virtually any circumstances unless Israel very existence would be in peril, which is unthinkable today's context. But how to untangle it is not a true thing. Most policymakers, including prime ministers, do not fully understand the complexities

and the multi-layers, and it's so easy to live with that kind of area. It is a sensitive area. It's all secret. It's all off-limits. We don't talk about it. And the fact that the public, the citizen-free as its whole, likes it. They feel comfortable with it. So I think fundamentally it manifests a profound Israeli ambivalence about nuclear weapons.

And Amimut, opacity, is a way to reflect it. And it goes historically from the very big decision. when he wanted to have the capability, he wanted to have the technological resolve, but it was also element of caution. And the compromise between caution and resolve led to this very unusual, very remarkable, very exceptional and exceptional list position of Israel in itself, in the region, and even within the regime, the non-transperish regime as a whole. In the region, how has the fact that? How has the fact? act of Israel's dukes been understood historically in the Middle East more broadly. What is the

historical position on this been in Egypt, or say Turkey, for example? Well, it's a long history. But when Israel was discovered to have the demona and it was the allegation that Dorian said it's peaceful, there was immediate rumors. It must be about weapons. Over the years, even though Egypt made from time to time noises about it and did not like to explain to. accept that kind of situation. We wanted to have Dimona under safeguards. It has never been under safeguard. But I think over time, Arabs in Egypt, including Egypt and others, Saudis, have realized

that the Israeli nuclear capability, nuclear program, is about political strength. It's about political symbolism. It's about being unique in the region. but Israel does not treat it as military weapons, and they realize that Israel is extremely cautious, indeed more than, in a sense, more than any other nuclear weapon states in the world today, and there are nine of them,

and I think they tolerate it. So opacity, part of the virtuous opacity, it was a way for others to tolerate and to accept it, and in most cases, not to make a big deal out of them. And I think that's by and large our response. Do you think that this current government is thinking about nuclear weapons in the same cautious way that previous governments, Israeli governments have? I think so and I hope so. You know, personally, I detest this present government in any possible way.

And I think the head of this government, Prime Minister of Israel today, is the worst leader, whether Israel ever had, especially in his last few years in office. However, on the nuclear issue so far, I believe that they, at least in terms of running and conducting that system, they have taken the same, they had adhered to the same measures of responsibility. It was so embedded in the system. It's so in frame. So I cannot see any specific prime minister to change. But Amimu is so engraved into the foundations of Israeli thinking about it. It would be extremely difficult for any prime minister to change it.

So that's one thing. I do think, however, that this government allows various members in its periphery, including ministers, to talk loosely about this issue in a way that I believe previous government would not allow those loose talk. And in that respect, it allows it to go into the Israeli discourse in a way that I found quite negative and not very healthy. Looking at the region right now, Iran has long framed its need for nuclear weapons as an existential matter for national security. Do you see an ironic resemblance between Israel's logic in the 1960s and Iran's logic today? Iran always talks about his right to enrich, which is a symbol of proximity to the bomb.

A few people would say it about semi- unofficially, but Iran officially never asked to be nuclear weapons. And there was a fat one by the previous by the disease, but the one who has killed a supreme leader against production of nuclear weapons. However, and I'm kind of anticipating what you were about to ask, I do believe that Iran has mimicked Israel very, very much so, wanted to have a similar opacity, wanted to have the proximity of the bomb and the kind of exceptionalist position that Israel had. And part of their frustration is that what they would be doing 30, 40 years after Israel, the world does not tolerate, Israel does not tolerate, and they're treated in a very, very different way, and rightly so. You know, for Israel, it's a great deal of responsibility to find that kind of way. But I think that Iran has

trying to mimic and to imitate Israel way towards opacity. As we mentioned in the intro earlier, earlier this month, 30 Democratic lawmakers called on the Trump administration to publicly acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal for the first time. Why, after all of this time, do you think that this is becoming a political issue at the moment? They raise it because, in my opinion, it's a very much. testimony, how much, this was a taboo, not to raise for Americans, because in many ways, America is part of that opacity.

America by now is a, for years, for decades, is a partner for opacity. Opassi could not have been survived internationally vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime without a strong support of the United States. Israel, Elon could not have kept Apatis in international posture, and they know, and they should know it. It's a testimony for the political decline of the Israeli status in the United States, for the standing of this Israeli government, for the standing of this Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu. This was kind of hocking finger into Israel, and essentially it was a testimony of how much the very status of Israel in the United States has been in decline.

question that would never be openly raised and now being asked, even though the answer is the same. Israel is responsible. There is no any danger of use of Israeli nuclear weapons. And everybody knows that. Just as a final kind of question for you, do you not see the Israeli example as weakening the global non-proliferation argument, given the fact that the U.S. is both like reifying Israel's nuclear ambiguity,

while waging a war to impart enforce transparency from Iran. So what would you say to that argument? No doubt about it. When you have an exceptional case and you do not even I did it with you right now, we're trying to do it right now, to give reasons

why he's exceptionalist case and why there are grounds and reasons to keep it at least for the time being. But once there is a refusal to do so, you obviously open yourself to double standards to all these allegations that why Israel is allowed and why Iran is not, and people feel

uncomfortable to give an answer for that, because that would be acknowledged that there is something unique in Israel and to acknowledge Israeli responsibility. So it is a problem. It is a problem for the regime as a whole, even for the Middle East, even for people who care about rule-based principles. Israel is an exceptionalist case, and people even refuse to talk about to recognize this exceptionalism. But I think at the context of today, it's a by default situation

that nobody sees something better than that. So it's become the interest of everybody. The region, Israel itself, even outside powers, such as European powers, Russia, and others, not to make a fast of the Israeli nuclear case.

Because what could it do? I mean, obviously, Israel is not going to have safeguard. Israel is going to keep what it has. It's critical in the Israeli image and self-image and sense of security. And it's not a threat to anybody. So why to make something which is so complex, so subtle, so few people want to talk about it, why to let it go? And so people really understand it. Why to try to open it? I wonder this was really fascinating. Thank you so much for this. This is great. And we're just hardly able to touch it. Scratch the surface, for sure. It's been a pleasure.

All right, that's all for it today. I'm Jamie Pousson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC podcasts, go to cbc.ca.ca.