Front Burner - Lessons from the Cuban missile crisis

Episode Date: October 31, 2022

Sixty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world the closest it’s ever been to a full-scale nuclear war. The story that’s often told about those 13 days is one of American might triumphing over the USSR — but that’s not what really happened. The true story of that crisis is actually about a relationship between two men who decided to secretly work together, to avert a global disaster. While we’re certainly not in another Cuban missile crisis today, experts believe this is the closest the U.S. and Russia have come to a nuclear conflict since that time. So today, we’re going to tell the story of those 13 days in 1962, and look at whether they may hold lessons for today. Our guest is Andrew Cohen, a professor at the University of Carleton’s school of Journalism and Communication, and the author of several books including Two Days in June: John F. Kennedy and the 48 Hours That Made History.

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson. On October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy broadcast a special message to the nation from his office in the White House. Here is President Kennedy as he delivered that message bearing on recent

events in Cuba. Good evening, my fellow citizens. This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Sixty years ago, from October 16th to October 28th, 1962, the world came the closest it has ever been to a full-scale nuclear war. In response to U.S. missiles stationed in Turkey, the Soviet Union had placed missiles

in Cuba, 140 kilometers from American shores. And during those tense days in October, people around the world waited anxiously to see how the U.S. would respond. The story that's often told about how that conflict ended is one of American might triumphing over the USSR. But that's not really what happened. The true story is actually about a relationship between two men who decided to secretly work together to avert a global disaster. We are, of course, not in the Cuban Missile Crisis today, but experts believe this is the closest the U.S. and Russia have come to a nuclear conflict since that time. So today we want to tell the story of those 13 days in 1962 and look at whether they may hold lessons for today. For that, I'm joined by Andrew Cohen.

He's a professor at the University of Carleton School of Journalism and Communication and the author of several books, including Two Days in June, John F. Kennedy and the 48 Hours That Made History. Hi, Andrew. Thank you so much for coming on to FrontBurner. Pleasure. So to start, I'm wondering what you remember about the Cuban Missile Crisis from your own childhood. Well, it's my first political memory. I was

seven years old. I was attending Roslyn School in the Roslyn School Board of Greater Montreal, where we did not practice duck and cover exercises, which my American friends did in their day because of the whole idea of civil defense. We must be ready every day, all the time, to do the right thing if the atomic bomb explodes. Duck and cover. That's the first thing to do. Duck and cover. And the first, you duck. But when the crisis began, I have a very strong memory of gathering around in my parents' bedroom, around a black table radio with a good tone, as my father would put it, and listening to an announcer say two things. And I remember it well. Go to a bomb shelter,

if you have one, or go to your basement. We did neither. We stayed. But it was the kind of thing that for both adults and children alike was absolutely unfathomable. For decades, there was a popular narrative about the Cuban Missile Crisis and what brought about its end that was told in movies and books, including by some of the people closest to the story. And what was that narrative? Well, John F. Kennedy dies in November of 1963, so about 11 months later. And there begins a certain deification of Kennedy, a certain sense of the heroic Kennedy. So the early emerging view of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the Soviets were foolish, the Americans stood up, the Soviets stood down, the world survived. And that was very much the narrative well into the 1960s and into the 1970s.

Largely, it had to do with the biographies of John F. Kennedy, President Kennedy, that were written by people like Arthur Schlesinger and Ted Sorensen, who were in the White House circle. Also, most significantly, Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, the brother of John F. Kennedy, and the man in Washington closest to the President. He writes a book called 13 Days, very much venerating the Kennedys. There was a film made about 13 Days. There was a film made about 13 days. There was a docudrama called The Missiles of October. Mr. President, we've received hard evidence that the Russians have placed offensive weapons in Cuba.

What kind of weapons? Nuclear missiles. All of them, all of them, they create a world in which, or a vision of which the Kennedy's heroic, it's a Cold War triumph, Nikita Khrushchev's humiliated, and a deal is found, or an agreement is found, but largely Americans come out looking the winners in what was the great confrontation of the Cold War. That later changes. And tell me about how that changes. I know there were materials declassified in the 90s. Well, that's the critical thing. So in the 1990s, the Cold War ends in 1989.

The Berlin Wall comes down. The Soviet archives are opened. And we learn a few new things. We didn't know how dangerous it really was because Soviet battlefield commanders had tactical nuclear weapons. It's a term we hear today, Jamie, tactical nuclear weapons, because President Putin is threatening their use in Ukraine, in which they would have been allowed to launch nuclear weapons against an invading American amphibious army. So had the Marines come ashore or had there been airstrikes, they would have been allowed to

do that. We didn't know that. But more than that, in 1997, I was the Washington correspondent for the Globe and Mail, so I remembered very well, the audio recordings that were made in the White House. And long before Richard Nixon taped meetings in the White House, in the Oval Office, in the Cabinet Room, other places, John F. Kennedy did. And there were some 22 hours of audio recordings of what went on in the missile crisis. And increasingly, the view became that John F. Kennedy was the person, as the president, with the confidence and the ability to resist what was, among his advisors, a very hawkish, aggressive, belligerent stance. And when we listen to those audio recordings, we hear particularly the military who were very hard on Kennedy.

And so, Jamie, Kennedy emerges today and over 25 years, it's really only grown as the conciliator, the peacekeeper, the person of restraint, the diplomat in all this. I was listening this morning to some of those recordings, notably Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff. There's one recording I was listening to where he is telling Kennedy he thinks a blockade and political talk would be considered weak. I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered weak. A lot of our friends in New York have made a pretty weak response to this. I'm sure a lot of our own citizens are feeling that way, too. So we're getting a pretty bad fix from the president. There's an enormous amount of pressure on the president.

Well, Curtis LeMay is the poster boy, so to speak, of what Kennedy called the brass hats. The admirals and the generals who he said were all too quick to send American soldiers and sailors and airmen into harm's way. The emerging view, at least among Kennedy and some advisors, is we have to try what became known as a blockade, naval blockade or quarantine, which was a form of diplomacy. It would give the Soviet premier time to formulate a response, and it wouldn't go to arms right away. Well, when Curtis LeMay heard this, he says to Kennedy, and it was quite actually impudent on his part, he said, this is Munich, referring to the storied surrender, so to speak, of Neville Chamberlain in 1938, which many people will call appeasement

and brings on the Second World War. So here's the head of the Air Force staff telling the president, Kennedy is livid, he leaves the room, and he's steaming. He knows all about the military. He was a decorated war hero in the Second World War in the South Pacific. And he knows what bloodshed looks like, and he's determined to avoid it, particularly on this scale. But he cannot believe, as he says later, the bad advice I got. What about Nikita Khrushchev in Russia? What do we know about the kinds of pressures that he was facing? Nikita Khrushchev was like Kennedy in the Second World War and too understood the costs of war. He miscalculates with Kennedy.

He has reason to believe Kennedy is weak, and there are reasons in 1961 for that. They begin with the Bay of Pigs in which John F. Kennedy authorizes an invasion that actually has been planned under Dwight Eisenhower, the previous administration, of Cuban exiles to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, as it was called in southwest Cuba. Cuban revolutionary troops such as these have invaded Castro's leftist island fortress. And overthrow Fidel Castro, who had become the revolutionary communist leader of Cuba and who was really a nuisance for the Kennedys. They just couldn't abide that there was this dictator, communist dictator, as they said, 90 miles from American shores.

I have emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator. While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies, we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way. when kennedy did not rescue those exiles who were cut up on the beach by the overwhelming superiority of castro's forces khrushchev thought he was weak and it was an impression khrushchev got in vienna when he meets kennedy in vienna in june of 1961 i went to vienna to meet the leader of the soviet union mr khrushchev for two days we met in sober intensive conversation. Khrushchev. For two days, we met in sober, intensive conversation. Mr. Khrushchev and I had a very full and frank exchange of views on the major issues that now divide our two countries. I wanted to present our views to him. And he threatens Kennedy and he said, we're going to move on West Berlin if you continue to act as you are, making these kinds of menacing gestures against Cuba. And the third thing that allowed Khrushchev to believe that his opponent, JFK, was weak was the Berlin Wall, which goes up in August of 1961.

He's surprised that the Americans don't move to protect West Berlin. 1961, he's surprised that the Americans don't move to protect West Berlin. East German troops swooped down on the border between Red Berlin and the Free City in the pre-dawn hours to close the 66 points where movement between the sectors has been relatively free. East Berliners who held coveted jobs in the West were told to stay home, and the elevated trains were halted. So by the time we get a year later, Khrushchev thinks he can install missiles, intermediate range missiles that can go all the way, as JFK says. Ranging as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru.

But more than that, they can hit Washington and American cities in a matter of minutes. Khrushchev thinks it's defensive and Kennedy will do nothing. So he underestimates Kennedy. And when things start ratcheting up, when they're in the midst of this crisis, and it's possible that America is actually going to do something here, what do we know about the kind of pressure that Khrushchev was facing? What do we know about the kind of pressure that Khrushchev was facing? Like Kennedy, Khrushchev was under enormous pressure from the hawks in the Kremlin. They think that this is, in the world of international politics and the Cold War, there was lots of strutting in the Kizmo. Who's got more nuclear weapons?

And Khrushchev knew he didn't have enough. Kennedy had run for office in 1960 as something of a cold warrior on something called the missile gap, believing that the Soviet Union had more missiles than the Americans did. The truth was the American nuclear arsenal was far greater than the Soviet. And Khrushchev was under pressure from his colleagues and others not to yield. And so in the early days, so the missiles are discovered on October 15th. The Americans have the big U-2 airplanes, which had a huge wingspan. They looked at a science fiction and they had cameras that were so precise they could read a newspaper headline at eight miles. On October 15th, when those U-2 planes pick, that there are missiles there and this is the American response. It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a

full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. Then between October 22nd and October 28th there is then a hard and fast and or not always fast negotiation between the Kremlin and Washington, Moscow and Washington, which goes back and forth and at some points gets very, very dangerous. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization. Empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections.

Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here. You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you. Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own household income? That's not a typo, 50%.

That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. These leaders, at some point, they open up back channel communications, right? And they start writing each other these letters, I guess, presumably in an attempt to turn down the heat. And can you tell me more about their correspondence?

Why do they do this? And what are they saying to each other? They're becoming a kind of nuclear pen pal or pen pals. And they write, they exchange 10 letters over the course of these 13 days. And they're heartfelt, some of them in which they begin to understand each other. And they begin to convey the pressure both are under from the hawks in their midst. Meanwhile, as you say, Jamie, there are back channels. The Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, is speaking to one of the diplomats in the Soviet embassy in Washington. And also, the Soviets approach a diplomatic correspondent from ABC News, and they begin to make offers and say, would you be interested in this?

And the back channels become very important. Kennedy is not shy about using them. He understands that official channels cannot necessarily solve this. And it's another form of diplomacy, which he believes in against many people who do not. And like you were saying, this is so different from the image and the communications that the public is getting, right? Like, which is very hawkish. Yes, I mean, I think that the public at a certain point knows it's before the United Nations. I'm prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I'm also prepared to present the evidence in this room.

And there, Adlai Stevenson is the American representative. He is another hero of the crisis because he is the one who actually suggests a trade of missiles early on. And when Kennedy's circle hears that, they said, you are a coward. You are an appeaser. You're a defeatist. So the Americans, the world is seeing some level of diplomacy. But there's a sense that there's nothing that is working here. So for several days, it's a stalemate.

And meanwhile, the United States has called up the reserves, has moved forces in place in Florida. The Americans have gone to DEFCON, I think it's three. I've gone to DEF CON, I think it's three. So there is a sense of real pressure that is growing on both sides. What was the deal in the end that Kennedy and Khrushchev came to that allowed the crisis to be resolved? The deal is that the Americans have nuclear-tipped missiles in Turkey, very close to the Soviet Union. They've had them there for some time. The deal, though, becomes, the public deal is that on the 28th of October, Khrushchev answers Kennedy's letter and says, we'll agree to withdraw our missiles in Cuba if you agree

not to invade Cuba. So that's the public deal, and it looks like a very good deal for the United States. What happens privately, though, is the Americans agree secretly to withdraw those missiles from Turkey. So it's a trade, Khrushchev's missiles in Cuba for Kennedy's missiles in Turkey. But the critical thing is, Kennedy says, you cannot talk about this. Khrushchev agrees. And Khrushchev, in some quarters, is humiliated, although it's very important to remember, Jamie, that Kennedy says, and this is, I think, the generosity of his personality or the depth of it, no declarations of victory, no triumphalism, allow him to save face, allow him to tell people that he

got a deal, and that was that we, the United States, will not invade Cuba. So allow your opponent to believe that he has won something too. And on Khrushchev's side, I mean, he also showed a tremendous amount of, I don't know if empathy is the right word or restraint, like there's this famous quote where he says to his foreign minister, we have to let Kennedy know that we want to help him, right? minister, we have to let Kennedy know that we want to help him, right? Yes, there is on both sides. It's so interesting. I was at a conference at the Kennedy Library just last weekend, in which they had a scholar from the School of Business at Harvard who's done an enormous study, a character study of Khrushchev and Kennedy. Both personalities understood that both were in some kind of trouble

and that there were people in their midst who were quite happy to go to war because that's what soldiers do. And Kennedy and Khrushchev were not going to do that. Both of them had the confidence to say no. And in Khrushchev's case, what was considered by some people in the Kremlin a humiliation would eventually cost him his job. He would be forced out of power in 1964. Reds say ill health prompted Khrushchev to step down. Observers say that his abortive feud with Red China that broke apart the front of monolithic communism was the real reason. But both of them, they both had a sense of understanding. And at the end of the day, they became, I don't know, friends is too strong a word, but they became partners.

They imagined by early 1963, they've established a back channel. They are talking about limiting nuclear testing, which has run amok in the early 60s. JFK goes to American University in Washington on June 10, 1963, and gives what is called the peace speech, the most important foreign policy address he gave, in which he humanizes the Russians. In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in holding the arms race. And proposes a limited test ban treaty. Khrushchev embraces that. First, Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister McMillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow,

looking towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history, but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind. And thereafter, in the summer of 1963, they talk about could they cooperate in space? Could we do something with the United Nations in pursuit of some kind of peace? And at this point, and it's important to know this, at this point, Kennedy is no longer interested in winning the Cold War. He just wants to end it. And in Khrushchev, he sees that he might have a partner. Of course, it doesn't happen. A flash from Dallas.

Two priests who were with President Kennedy say he is dead. A bullet wounds. This is the latest information we have from Dallas. I want to talk about today now. So obviously we're not in the Cuban Missile Crisis now. Let's just be clear about that. But plenty of people lately have been drawing comparisons to that time. And what parallels do you see between that period and what we're seeing now between the US and Russia?

Well, the parallels are imprecise and imperfect. But it is true to say that the kind of saber rattling that Vladimir Putin of Russia has been indulging in when he says, you know, that he said it now two or three times. I may give my commanders tactical nuclear weapons to use on a battlefield in Ukraine. And he said that he said, you know, the Americans shouldn't be very offended by this, because after all, it was the United States that established the nuclear doctrine by dropping two bombs on Japan to end the war in 1945. So then Joe Biden responds with thoughts or he mentions the word Armageddon. The president warning the risk of nuclear Armageddon has not been this high since the Cuban missile crisis amid the threats from Vladimir Putin. The president saying Putin is not joking as the Russians face serious setbacks in Ukraine. President Biden saying the threat of the use of nuclear weapons has not been this high since Kennedy and Cuba. President Biden also acknowledging the administration. So in the sense the climate in that sense is real. It is a different situation. Vladimir Putin could not be dissuaded from going

to war. The lessons again are imprecise because now we're rattling the nuclear saber but the belief in diplomacy is important here. The belief that you look for a way out, that you honor that, you recognize mistakes. Those lessons matter here. But we are down the road now. There is a constituency of people who think diplomacy is the only way out. The question is, there's a third party involved. It's not just between, you know, the United States and the Soviet Union. Cuba really didn't matter that much then in 1962. Today, Ukraine does matter. It's not just between, you know, the United States and the Soviet Union. Cuba really didn't matter that much then in 1962. Today, Ukraine does matter. It's spent blood and treasure and has lost much of its country to this invasion. And it's not going to just accept any agreement between Biden and Putin if such agreement were to be presented, like Castro had to accept the agreement that

Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to in 1962. And what about the environment that all three of these leaders are operating in? So, I mean, I'm just thinking about a very recent example. Members of the House Progressive Congressional Caucus sent this letter to the Biden administration where they made this pretty gentle plea for more diplomacy in the Russia-Ukraine war. And after this was reported on, there was so much backlash that they ended up walking it back, which seems like maybe a good comparison to the kind of hawkish environment in the U.S. at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis? That was an interesting intervention on the part of the House Progressive

Caucus, which they did walk back. If we see that as a plea for diplomacy, that's fine. The question is, what are the terms? Does the West allow Vladimir Putin to stay in Ukraine? Does he solidify or get to keep what he already had, which was the status quo ante? What do you give up? What are the wages or what's the bill that is presented to the West? is presented to the West. The idea that diplomacy has to be exhausted is real and true. The question is, what does it yield? Because the lessons are imperfect. There was a reason that the whole appeasement doctrine was so rejected and governed American foreign policy after the war and the whole anti-communism thing. And the reason was we didn't stand up to Hitler. Some people see Putin as Hitler. It was an expansionist regime. We didn't do it.

We tried to buy him off with diplomacy at Munich. Chamberlain did. It didn't work. So they say history repeats itself. I'm not so sure it's repeating here. They say it rhymes. Maybe it just resonates. And in here, there's great resonance, but the parallel, I would say, is imprecise. There are some comparisons

that work and some that don't. Andrew, thank you so much for this. It's been such a pleasure listening to you today. Thank you. All right, that is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC Podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.