Front Burner - Niger, and an era of mutiny in Africa’s Sahel region

Episode Date: August 15, 2023

Last month, the African nation of Niger became the seventh government in Western and Central Africa to suffer a military takeover in the last three years. And as of today, virtually every country in Africa’s Sahel region is governed by a current or former military officer. The Sahel is a part of the world that was dominated by France through the colonial period — and many leaders of military governments that have taken over, from Mali to Burkina Faso, have identified the unresolved legacies of colonialism as a source of their dissatisfaction. For decades, Niger, and countries in the Sahel more broadly, have received enormous investment from both France and the U.S. They have been called a “strategic partner” by both nations in the fight against islamic extremism in West Africa. Niger specifically was long touted as West Africa’s last bastion of democracy. So what happened? Today, BBC journalist Beverly Ochieng, whose reporting has long focused on the region, on what’s happening in Niger, and whether this era of insurrection in the Sahel is evidence of an anti-colonial renaissance, or something a little more complicated. For transcripts of this series, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Tamara Kandaker. This is General Abdurrahman Chiani. Last month, his forces led a coup in the West African nation of Niger, seizing power and naming him the country's new leader. The ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum, is still in military custody, and yesterday it was announced that he'd be prosecuted for high

treason and undermining national security. This coup is part of a broader trend across a region of Africa known as the Sahel, made up of countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan. A coup in a region already marked by political instability. Two countries bordering Niger have already seen their governments toppled in recent years. The whole belt south of the Sahara is becoming an extremely problematic area. Right now, most countries in the Sahel are governed by current or former military officers. And the seizure of power in Niger is the seventh military takeover in less than three years in Western and Central Africa. The backdrop is the ongoing fight against Islamist groups in the region, a fight that Western countries like France and the U.S.

have been involved in for a very long time. French Foreign Minister condemned, quote, all attempts to take power by force. The U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also denounced the situation. I spoke with President Bazoum earlier this morning and made clear that the United States resolutely supports him as the democratically elected president of Niger. Many observers are looking at what's happening in the region as a real turning point in African politics, a backlash to the West with a rise in anti-French sentiment across former colonies,

and charismatic leaders talking about African autonomy. We think that what is necessary today is to have a win-win partner, not a partner where it's only the West that profits. So today, we're going to unpack all of this with BBC senior journalist Beverly O'Chang, who's based in Nairobi. She's been reporting on this region for years. We'll talk about mutiny and the Sahel, whether this is an anti-colonial renaissance or something a little more complicated. Hi, Beverly. Hello. Hi, Beverly. Hello. Hi, Tamara.

Thanks so much for being here. So let's start with the current military leader in Niger, Abdurrahman Chiani. He is essentially a career soldier. He previously served as the chief of Nigerian presidential guard for more than a decade. But can you tell me a bit about him and how is it that he recently came to power? So Chiani has always been behind the scenes. He had been at the helm of the presidential guard since 2011, and he was appointed by the current president's predecessor, Isufu Muhammadu, and they seem to be close allies with him. Essentially, you would imagine that someone in the presidential guard is rather pampered. And ideally, the guard was set up as a buffer against military coups because Niger, since independence in 1960, has now experienced five military coups. Part of it is because of disgruntlement over representation in the top

echelons of the military, as well as in the political circles. And the more underlying issue and the more pressing issue at the moment is that Niger is an active conflict zone. It is experiencing violence from Islamic State and Al-Qaeda militants, particularly the group called Janim, and soldiers at the forefront of fighting against these militants. Now for a long time between when the insurgency started in 2015 up until about 2020, there had been higher levels of civilian and military deaths and that led to a lot of disgruntlement within the military. Now when President Bazum came into power, he actually started a number of initiatives. He was talking to militants, he was reaching out to international forces, but this wasn't enough for

the army itself. And Chiani comes from a group of the military that weren't satisfied with the solutions that were being given, whether it was joining forces with the French, the US and other international forces, whether it was talking to militants. They said when they seized power in that statement on TV, that it was the deteriorating security situation as well as long grievances over alleged corruption in the government that led them to seize power. We, the defense and security forces meeting within the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, have decided to put an end to the regime you know. This follows the continuing deterioration of the security situation and poor economic and social governance.

And obviously it can be kind of hard to get a sense during a time of transition like this, but do we know whether or not the military government has the support of the public? So at the very start, when it became evident that there was a coup that was underway, So at the very start, when it became evident that there was a coup that was underway, there were protests in support of President Bazum outside the presidential palace in the capital in near May. And immediately after this, the presidential guard went and shot at protesters and dispersed them. Now, in the days after it became evident that Bazoum had been deposed, there have been massive rallies. There was one in particular just when the deadline by West African leaders to restore Bazoum in power was elapsing. There was a huge rally in a stadium where about 30,000 to 50,000 people turned up in support of the junta.

We want the total liberation of Niger. We we're here for our country we're tired we're tired state tv if you're watching it every day yes you know state tv and you watch it every day it's pro-junta messages it's groups not just in the capital but in different areas in doso in zinda who are expressing massive support for the junta. There's also been a growth of certain groups, civil society movements, that express political support for the military rulers. And it's part of how they're packaging themselves as a locally legitimate force that represents the wants and the desires of the public. wants and the desires of the public.

We reject any interference in Niger's internal affairs, and we reject the claim by any party to punish the National Council for safeguarding the homeland and the people of Niger as an example. We therefore call on the people of Niger as a whole and in unity to defeat all those who wish to inflict untold suffering on our hardworking people and destabilize our country. And you mentioned this deadline by ECOWAS. That's this regional organization of African countries, including Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, a bunch of other countries. So ECOWAS and the U.S. State Department, they've been pretty clear in their condemnation of this coup and their support of the ousted leader, Mohamed Bazoum, who many people describe as the Sahel's last pro-Western leader. And I was wondering if you could unpack that for

me a little bit. Why do they want Bazoum reinstated and why is he seen as pro-West? So for a bit of context, since 2020, there has been a wave of military coups in West Africa. The very first one was in Mali, where they removed a democratically elected leader who had been pro-West. He had been backing the French military presence in the country for a long time. Then there was another coup in Mali because there was a pro-French interim government that was removed. Then there were two more coups in Burkina Faso. These are two countries that neighbour Niger immediately. And they removed Roch Kabore, who had been a pro-Western president, elected, even won a second term. And then the second time, a military junta leader was removed

because he seemed to have pro-French policies. Now, Niger seemed to be the very last base for where French and international forces could go because what Mali and Burkina Faso did is they expelled French forces they also ratcheted up relations with countries that were not seen as favorable for French and western presence and Niger opened its arms and said that these forces could be redeployed into the country Niger also went ahead to set itself as the headquarters of a force known as the G5 Sahel, which was a local force, but it was receiving a lot of Western support to operate. So it included Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, as well as Mauritania. Now, Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel because they had a spat,

because they felt that pro-Western leaders were being put at the helm of it. Mali says it no longer wants to be part of a losing force. Mali's government accuses because they had a spat, because they felt that pro-Western leaders were being put at the helm of it. Mali says it no longer wants to be part of a losing force. Mali's government accuses former colonial power France of excluding it. Once friends, now foes, the 5,000 French troops deployed almost 10 years ago to protect Mali's government from attacks are pulling out. Now Niger decided that they were going to host the French forces. They opened up to German training. They've had the U.S. base in the northern region of the Yagherdes. They've also

been sending their forces for training in different parts of the country and it's because of Bazoum's own goodwill. He saw these as being a means through which Niger could overcome its insurgency by increasing international partnerships and making sure that there was enough goodwill. He sought parliamentary approval even when there were protests, public protests against foreign military presence. So he seemed to be going by the book and he also seemed to make sure that the West would feel comfortable redeploying Tunisia. Germany wants to increase its military presence as part of the new EU-led military mission EUMPM. They will be training and supporting Niger's armed forces who face a growing threat from Islamist

violence. So ECOWAS had given the coup leaders a deadline to reinstate the president or face military intervention. That passed without incident. And more recently, they announced that they were going to deploy a standby force to restore constitutional order with troops from Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and Ivory Coast. But still, the coup leaders haven't flinched. And they actually announced that they're going to prosecute Bazoum for high treason. Why do you think they haven't caved? Well, because it will take ECOWAS quite a while to be able to get that force together. Niger is a bit tricky. You have militant violence.

You have widespread trafficking. You have unrest in neighboring countries. You have the fact that Mali and Burkina Faso have already said that there will not be a military intervention. Otherwise, that's a declaration of war. You have parliamentary processes. So Nigeria, which is south of Niger and is the one that is chairing ECOWAS, intervention otherwise that's a declaration of war you have parliamentary processes so nigeria which is south of niger and is the one that is chairing echo us they had the senate reject a

deployment which sort of makes it seem like a very divisive decision as you can see and then you only have about three countries out of a block of about 15 willing to deploy. And it's not a rapid thing. It will take a bit of time, which is why the junta, knowing that it will take time, sees itself as having the upper hand over ECOWAS. Yeah, interesting. And then the other thing I was thinking about is they've also appointed a civilian government, right? And it was a bit bigger than was expected. Does that have something to do with maybe the inaction on the part of ECOWAS? It's more of the junta wanting to consolidate power

and to show legitimacy. And it's interesting how all of these things have happened. So on the 6th of August, when the first deadline by ECOWAS lapsed, the junta shut its airspace as a way of just fending off any possible invasion. Faced with the threat of intervention that is becoming clearer through preparation from a neighboring country, Niger's airspace is closed, as of today, for all airports until further notice.

Any attempts to violate national airspace will be met with an energetic and instantaneous response. Then on the 10th of August, when ECOWAS was now having an emergency meeting, the junta unveiled a cabinet in which they put in a significant number of civilian members, which is very unlike what happened in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the military took most of the posts in the interim cabinet. It's one way of showing a bit of goodwill and demonstrating that they are willing to work with civilians and that they do want a transitional government. But it's also another way of saying, when you come to negotiate with us, it'll be on the terms of a transition, not on the terms of restoring the government or Bazum, who used to

be there. Because a lot of people are talking about reversing the coup, but increasingly it looks like there are very few odds of the Zoom being reinstated and perhaps even being seen legitimately. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here.

You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you. Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own household income? That's not a typo, 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this block of ECOWAS and the Western countries.

And then on the other side, you have some of Niger's neighbors and Mali and Burkina Faso. And they've vowed to form a block against any outside intervention. And I wonder if we could talk about those countries for a bit. So you mentioned these coups that have been happening over the last few years. Mali's seen three military takeover since 2020. Burkina Faso's had two just last year. And I think it's kind of easy to draw parallels given the proximity and the timing of these coups. But based on your reporting, how closely linked are all of these things? So I would say if you look at the region as a whole, So I would say, if you look at the region as a whole, the Sahel in itself, they are facing similar circumstances. So the jihadist violence began in Mali in 2012, when militants hijacked a separatist cause and decided to impose Sharia law in parts of northern Mali.

And then the French forces came in, they pushed them back, and there was an interim bit of success. And then afterwards, there was an expansion of how these groups are operating. And by 2017 they have slightly different political circumstances, by and large, Niger has been stable. And that democratic transition to resume taking power was one of the most well-recognized and well-lauded forms of democracy. Burkina Faso has had issues with internal rifts, social, political, as well as ethnic rifts. And militants have taken advantage of that to be able to bring in fissures within the community. So by and large, you have mistrust, you have a political breakdown, you have people not trusting the political processes such as elections. The coup in Mali in 2020 was initially triggered by disgruntlement over legislative elections because people felt it was not representative of what people wanted. It was held in a very highly insecure environment and the results were then

not legitimate. There were mass protests. ECOWAS did try to intervene but in the end there was a coup. In Niger, I feel a coup may have happened in 2020 or 2021 because this was the height of violence by militants. It's interesting that it has happened now, but it's still within the same context of people not being too happy with the government's efforts to end violence and seeing that as a reason to delegitimize it. So one of the defining features of the pro-coup demonstrations that we've seen has been a strong anti-French sentiment. The French embassy was attacked the day after the coup. There was footage of the flag being burned and people chanting down with France.

We came out to tell little Macron from France that Niger belongs to us. It's up to us to do what we want with Niger. Quite similar to what we've seen in Mali and Burkina Faso in recent years. And it's worth noting that all of these are former French colonies. So why are some people in Niger and in the Sahel more broadly so angry with France right now? I suppose it's that thing about, you know, when you get too close to someone and at some point it leads to resentment or bitterness. Of course, France has had a longstanding influence politically, socially, and now increasingly with security in the region. It is the language spoken

across. They were the former colonizers. They have been part and parcel of policy. Some of it has been exaggerated, of course. There are some activists who have rallied against the CFA franc, and there was even an instance where the Italian prime minister used it as a way of demonstrating, and I say this a lot in quotes, that France was holding these countries ransom through their currency. It's more complicated than that. Part of it is you have a growing generation of people who are coming to terms with their colonial histories.

They have anti-colonial sentiment. And that becomes sentiment that is very easy to co-opt, to be able to produce. You know, it could be, you know, posts on social media which are automatically anti-French and resonate with them. What we're asking for is for the French to take their business elsewhere and give us our country back. All the wealth of our country is with them, and they just do with us what they want. We won't agree anymore. Another one has been that sometimes France has often blundered in some of its policies. In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, it's more critical because of security.

France, for instance, opposed dialogue with militants. Malians felt strongly for a long time that they wanted to talk to militants because it was one way of trying to drive away the violence. Same thing in Burkina Faso. And then it became subverted into ideas that France wants terrorists to remain in the region as a way of controlling the region. So it's a very sticky issue. A lot of it is just misconstruing and misunderstandings, but part of it is also underpinned by France's own colonial legacy. The other player here is the United States. Like we mentioned, the U.S. has been vocal about their

support for Bazoom. And I'm curious why. What is at stake for the U.S. here? Well, the U.S. currently has a thousand forces who are based in Lugere. I think it's probably the second largest deployment because the other one is in Djibouti, which is in the far east of Africa. But they've also invested heavily. This is a multi-million dollar air base in the Agadez region, which has been used both for intelligence, it's been used for supporting training of forces, it's been used to just have a sense of the region to be able to support other military forces with operations, not just in the Sahel, but across the region. And given that they had this amount of goodwill in a very geostrategic country, it's important for them to preserve that. I think

there's also the fear that there may have been some lapse in how this coup happened, despite the fact that there was this presence of all of these international forces, including the US, and them losing this would be a loss of their standing security politically in the region. There's also the issue of how do they now, in the event that this coup is really allowed to stand, how do they now redeploy these forces? How do you draw down this huge operation that has been running for nearly half a decade now? How do you save face from that? If you think about what happened, it's not as extreme as Afghanistan, but it's almost comparable because the US presence there was very significant in supporting security operations. And without that, it feels as if

there'll just be a field of chaos left in the Sahel. Something interesting is that since 2008, at least 11 coups across West Africa have involved African soldiers that were trained by the United States. I wonder what you make of that. I mean, I think there's some points of analysis where people try to sort of point that out as a problem in itself. But the truth is, African forces are trained by various international actors. The US is a big actor, of course. The Flintlock exercise is one of the biggest exercises in West Africa. It has involved Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Mali in the past. And when you look at all of the coup leaders, even in the region, they have received some form of US or other external training. Another thing is the

issues that bedevil these countries internally. no amount of external training is going to take it away. If you have a country that you believe has a corrupt government, and if you're a deeply politicized military, as many of the Sahel and West African armies are, you will be inclined to intervene politically because you feel you have a stake in it. to intervene politically because you feel you have a stake in it. These are armies that are operating in the country. They're not defending it from some sort of external force. These are forces within the country. So they're very politically immersed in those decisions. So it is very likely that they will intervene, unlike many other parts of the world. I also wanted to get your take on the pro-Russia sentiment we've been seeing in Niger. Apparently, Russian flags have been in really high demand since Bazoum was ousted. And you can see tons of them at protests. You can hear Nigerians speaking in support of Russia. And why do you think the anti-French sentiment is being accompanied by this support for Russia at these demonstrations?

is being accompanied by this support for Russia at these demonstrations. So one of the reasons is that over time, people feeling despondent or people feeling that the French military operation has not been adequate is what has led to backlash against France and a feeling that perhaps France should actually leave and maybe the situation would improve. I went to the demonstrations and I was with a Russian flag. I like Russia because most African countries are with the Russians. I also think that they have a solution. It does feel slightly naive that the alternative partner would be Russia.

But Russia has spent some time in some ways building a deliberate reputation, based of course on its former standing when it was the USSR and it supported African governments, independent movements, with being able to build military, academic and political force that would come back home and support the new wave of leaders who are emerging. That's number one. And then there's the other more sinister way that this has sort of grown, and that's through the Wagner Group. Now, the Wagner Group is active in some African countries. Key among them is the Central African Republic, where they have really incubated media, security and economic operations.

The other one is in Mali, where even though the government doesn't say this, they have been carrying out operations for nearly two years. They have been carrying out operations for nearly two years. And it's not just about supporting the army, but it's also about how they're using this to angle expansion in the region and to demonstrate their military prowess. It took a while for that to grow in Mali and for it to sort of start and for people to feel that Wagner is the solution to the insurgency without really looking closely at the fact that Wagner group involvement in the Sahel and in the CAR has been devastating when it comes to violence against civilians or when it comes to undermining political freedoms and media freedoms and even security freedoms of the region. So obviously, part of this is this feeling that Russia can help with this insurgency problem. But you also mentioned this historical relationship that Africa had with the Soviet Union. And I wonder if you can elaborate just a little bit on that and how maybe it contributes to the way that people view Russia and Putin and his politics right now? Of course, the Ukraine war and even the annexation of Crimea was what really tested Russian influence

in the region. Russia came back, so to speak, to seek support after they annexed Crimea and they were experiencing a lot of international backlash. They signed security agreements with a number of countries across the continent over time. Of course, there had been longstanding defense agreements, but there was an increase in military purchases, in equipment and training. And over time with the Ukraine war, it feels as if Russia is sort of capitalizing on that footprint as a way of gaining political support and resonance, particularly in the UN, where there's been these crucial votes on whether to condemn or not Russia in the Security Council or in the UN General Assembly. And this has also played up in how

it's perceived in the region, particularly former French colonies. There's a colleague of mine and I who talk about how sometimes France has felt like a bit of an easy target, because some of the sentiment that you see pro-Russian, pro-Wagner groups riding on to be able to build Russian support in the region is not necessarily something that they have come up with. It's pre-existing, and they know how to use it. You will see it on diplomatic outlets. I remember during the Ukraine war, there was lots of stuff coming from the Russian embassy in South Africa, in Kenya, in Tanzania, in Swahili. They were talking about how, you know, Russia never colonized you, where here's your partner. And it's not a lie. It's, you know, it's true on the face of it, but it's a way of speaking back to so-called imperialism

and so winning public support. And in these countries like Mali, Bukina Faso, Niger now, it's played through local groups that then demonstrate to you that Russia is here for you as a friend to support you. But what's been the consequence of that, of course, we're still seeing because like in Mali, it's pushed out the UN forces, it's pushed out French military intervention. Of course, there's lots of other underlying factors, but the bigger picture is it's been somewhat disruptive to the policy as we knew it. And whether it's a force for good is a question which is on everyone's minds. From the outside looking in, I think regardless of the role that Russia is playing here, it feels obvious that people do want real change. And a lot of the rhetoric that you see on social media among young people, it's about agency and African autonomy, about freeing yourself from the

shackles of the West. And someone who really seems to represent that for some people is Burkina Faso's 35-year-old military president, Ibrahim Traore. Why do you think he's become this avatar of the anti-Western movement? So on his age, he is as young and just not too old for a lot of the young people who feel quite unhappy with the general leadership. A lot of people talk about how Africa is a very young continent, but the truth is it has a lot of people who have been well-established for a long time, for lack of a more polite term. well-established for a long time, for lack of a more polite term. Many leaders are in their 50s and their 60s, and they come from a different generation. And people want change faster than that. They want responsive leaders. They want jobs. They want opportunities. They want to see

themselves. And I think Chowarai has been able to capitalize on that to some extent. He has been making statements, although ironically, at the plateau of Russia, talking about how African countries should not beg. And this does resonate with people who feel that Africans do have their own volition and they should be seeking for themselves. But, you know, it doesn't help that it's coming from a country that's obviously facing the worst violence in recent years, that he is doing this in Russia, which has been seen as propping him up as a leader or sort of driving his legitimacy. But a lot of those points still resonate with many. It's not to discount them completely. Interesting. I mean, I've seen a lot being shared about him on social media. There's even one post I came across yesterday in Swahili, which was interpreting what he said at the Russia-Africa summit about Africans seeking support and not needing to beg people. So you can see that kind of resonance even across languages and across countries. I think these coup leaders, it may feel like a renaissance, but I think given the circumstances of many of these countries, it's still a worrying development because it's not clear when democracy will come.

It's not clear when elections will actually happen that will bring in leaders who are representative of what democracy means to these countries or whether we will see the security situation being meaningfully alleviated and tackled. So it's a bit tricky. On one side, these coups were met with a lot of euphoria because of that thing of you're seeing someone like yourself. But at the moment, they don't seem to be answering some of the crucial questions that were being posed at the time when protests were taking place, such as when will security be there? You know, the cost of living and other issues that, you know, bedevil people socially and politically. and other issues that, you know, begavel people socially and politically. Okay, Beverly, thank you so much. This was really, really interesting. Lots of layers and like a complicated context. So thanks for explaining all of this to us. I appreciate it. Thank you as well.

All right, that's all for today. I'm Tamara Kandaker. Thank you so much for listening, and I will talk to you tomorrow. Thank you.