Front Burner - Scathing report slams RCMP over Portapique mass shooting

Episode Date: April 4, 2023

Poor communication, a victim treated as a suspect and a police force that was unprepared — these are some conclusions about the RCMP’s handling of Canada’s deadliest mass shooting. Today’s guest, Angela MacIvor, an investigative journalist with CBC Nova Scotia, talks about how more than half of the commission's 130 recommendations focus on the RCMP, and asks whether the force will be forced to implement real change. For transcripts of this series, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson. After two and a half years and nearly $50 million, the inquiry looking into what went wrong during Canada's deadliest mass shooting has wrapped,

late last week, and just a few weeks shy of the third anniversary of the deadly rampage that started in Portapique, Nova Scotia, and left 22 people dead. The report is a scathing indictment of the RCMP, of its failures to respond, to communicate, of its preparedness to handle an emergency like this in the first place, and big missteps that could have prevented the whole thing. Out of 130 recommendations, more than half are directed at the RCMP. So today, that is exactly what we're going to talk about. My colleague Angela McIver is back with me. She's been following this inquiry from the onset, and we're going to dig into what the commission concluded, what happens now, and whether're going to dig into what the commission concluded, what

happens now, and whether this brings the families who lost loved ones any comfort or closure. Hi, Angela. Thanks so much for being here. Hi, Jamie. So big picture, reading this report, the RCMP comes out looking very ill-prepared, an organizational mess, frankly. The conclusion is something, of course, many people have been saying for a long time, but basically that the police response was a failure, hey? Yeah, I mean, Jamie, the words failure and mistake are used many times in the final report.

And the language is shockingly strong. I mean, we were surprised how strong the commission came out against the RCMP, especially when it comes to the RCMP's response to the crisis on really almost every level. That's really interesting to me to hear that you, someone who's been following this so closely, was also shocked here. And so let's go through why that might be, right? I know the report's 3,000 pages, so we can't get into all of it today. But I wonder if maybe the best way to do it is to kind of look at like some buckets of failure here. I know we've talked about much of this before, but it's really quite something to see this all laid out. And let's start with like the bucket of preparedness, specifically with the commission's conclusion that the RCMP in Nova Scotia simply

lacked an operational plan to respond to this kind of emergency. And what could a plan have provided here? We know now that the responding detachment in Bible Hill, Nova Scotia, they didn't have an emergency operational plan despite national guidelines following the Parliament Hill shooting in 2014 that every detachment was supposed to have this document. We also know that the critical incident commanders were also unaware of even the existence of this plan. And so it was not used during the mass casualty. And a plan could have really outlined the roles and responsibilities of the command structure in particular and what they were supposed to do. But had they really been up to speed on the procedures, then they would have known things, you know, about how to stop the thorough ways so that they could contain the threat. Right. Because didn't he escape down like a dirt road, right? And I guess is the argument that a plan would have, you know, shown exits and entry points, and it would have been clear, like, what might need to have

been blocked off to kind of contain the scene, right? And what kind of procedures would they, like, a checklist of what exactly should they be doing to ensure that they've gone through every possible scenario and they have obtained all of the information? So, yes, honing in on what the possible exit routes were and just following that procedure so assumptions weren't being made. When you say assumptions, what do you mean? What do you mean? So, well, they thought, first of all, that he was still in Portapique, that he had never left the area. And there were, you know, several fires and explosions that were going on, which officers thought were gunshots. And at one point they actually thought that he had killed himself in the woods.

So those are the things. They just never imagined that he escaped Portapique. They thought they had the area contained, even though we know that, you know, there was a community member who told one of the RCMP members on scene, hey, you should know that there's a back road out of Portapique through a blueberry field. And that information wasn't passed along. So it's things like ensuring that

all of the available tips are inputted so that the command knows what's being said on the ground. Yeah. On that note, tell me more about what the report found when it came to how information did or didn't get passed within the force. Yeah, the report was really critical about the fact that they did not listen to community members who were telling them important details. And so, like I said, the person who told the RCMP officer about the Blueberry Field Road. And we also know that there were multiple people who called 911 and told them information. And there was another eyewitness who explicitly said the gunman's name and that he was driving what looked like an RCMP vehicle.

It was around 6 a.m. on the second day of the massacre that the person in charge of communications for the RCMP became aware something was happening in Portapique. A couple of hours later an officer sent her a photo of the gunman's mock police cruiser. And if you had it by 8 10 why wasn't it sent out by 8 15? Because I'm waiting on the operational direction to send the photo out. But testimony illustrated that approval process was unclear to basically all involved. I thought it was a done deal when I gave the information that it was going out. And so that was key information. And we heard throughout the inquiry that these were key details that were never passed along. Like one officer might have

had that information, but the rest of the command did not have that information. And so they weren't able to properly evaluate and investigate. Another pretty shocking issue the report touched on was the equipment the force had to go when this all started in Portapique, right? And there was some stuff that could have helped, I gather, from reading the report. And tell me more about that. Yeah, so number one would have been air support. And so that was called upon immediately, and it was down for maintenance, which we heard through the inquiry that that was pretty typical, actually. And so they didn't have a backup plan for that. So that was one thing. Another thing was that they had key people in the Bible Hill detachment who couldn't access the mapping software that the RCMP used. They couldn't find the right computer with the software.

There was only one person who actually knew how to use it, and he wasn't based at that detachment. So it was just mad panic. They didn't end up using the software, and they relied on Google Maps. Tim Mills, the now-retired corporal, led the Nova Scotia RCMP Emergency Response Team, or ERT. That night, ERT rushed from its Dartmouth headquarters to the scene. They didn't have laptops with mapping software, and the GPS apps on their phones weren't functioning. And it's pitch black, no street lights, no street signs.

The team's second in command testified about what it added up to. We're basically blind as far as situational awareness went and mapping on the ground. Also, the officers on the ground did not have night vision goggles. And so that was something that was identified as being an issue. It's something that has since been resolved. The RCMP has distributed more night vision goggles, but those were the key examples of equipment that could have been used that night for sure. Yeah. I remember when it came out during the inquiry that those officers were just kind of fumbling around on their phones using Google Maps. It's like just

as shocking now to hear it as it was back then. Also probably worth noting here, the report found the Bible Hill RCMP, which covers Portapique, was chronically understaffed. There's another failure bucket we have discussed a lot on the show and in part with you. One of the main critiques from the very beginning was how police notified the public. So for example, their decision to tweet warnings, they tweeted one the night of the spree saying the RCMP was dealing with a firearms complaint, and then an updated tweet that there was an active shooter situation the next morning. Instead of sending like a more widespread alert alert there are lots of other examples too and what did the inquiry make of the police's communications you know not not internally but

like outwardly to the public the the report says that that was a failure uh point blank um that every step of the way that this was communicated could have been done better. And that initial tweet, which was sent out at 11.32 p.m. on the night of April 18th, it was too generic. It said that there was a firearms complaint in the area. And, I mean, I can just say, Jamie, as a reporter, I woke up in the middle of the night and I was seeing on social media there were homes on fire in Portapique and there was all of this stuff happening. People were being told to evacuate or hide in their

basements. And so when I called RCMP at three o'clock in the morning and said, okay, I see that you sent this tweet, but what's the update? They didn't have an update. They had nothing more to say. I had to press them for information to confirm that there was an active shooter in the area. And so the commission's final report did come out to say that that was too generic and that they really put the public in danger by not being more specific about what was actually happening. And of course, the time delay in between that 11.32 tweet and when they finally did update the public the next morning. The gravity of the situation was much higher than what they were

communicating and so that was frustrating for me as a journalist trying to get the information out to the public as well and the commission did come down on that you know and said the RCMP needs to be more effective in using the local media to get the message out because we do have a role to play as well. And we can help with that by putting it on our newscasts and putting it online. And they failed to do that. And then something that we've talked about a lot, much has been made about the communication in the morning and the fact that the shooter was wearing RCMP gear during the attacks and driving what looked like an RCMP car, but that was not communicated to the public. And we know that the police did know about this. And some of the victims' families have said that their loved ones who were killed the next morning might have survived if they knew who to look out for, what to look out for. And so does the report back up that claim? Yeah, the report's really strong on that fact. So we know that there was a period of three hours

between when the RCMP knew that he was driving a replica RCMP cruiser and when they finally did notify the public. And so the report, one of their main findings is that it says the RCMP's failure to publicly share accurate and timely information, including information about the perpetrator's replica RCMP cruiser and disguise, deprived community members of the opportunity to evaluate risks to their safety and to take measures to better protect themselves. And we know this to be true for two people in particular. That was Kristen Beaton and Heather O'Brien. They're both employees of VON, which are nurses, and they were traveling around the area. And the report does say that the RCMP really especially put their lives in danger because they didn't know and their employer didn't know, and their employer wasn't able to evaluate the danger that they were in that day. And so that was very explicit in the report. I know this is something that their families have been saying for a long time, but to actually see it in writing in the report.

Kristen was pregnant at the time. Am I remembering that correctly? That's right. We just assumed it was over. We thought he was taken care of. If I had known he was taken care of if i had known he was on the loose i would have not let my wife leave the house that day rcmp were tweeting i don't know i don't use twitter and i don't know anyone that does use twitter he was driving that

night at portapique an rcmp cruiser dressed as an rcmp officer This is confirmed by people that have seen it. They didn't warn us then. I didn't know until after my wife's life was taken that he was in a cruiser. They can use the alert to warn us about COVID and separate, and I believe that's important. But what's more important, there was like 19 lives lost. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization. Empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections.

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Together, to listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Cops. Let's do another bucket of failure. This one focused on prevention. Might be fair to categorize it as that. The last time that you were on, we talked about Gabriel Wertmann's, the shooter's, history of violence and abuse of his common law wife, Lisa Banfield. And the report actually devotes a whole chapter and 17 recommendations to address gender-based violence. And how does the commission connect Wartman's abuse of his partner to his violent spree in his community? This was a really big area of the report. The commission, you know, explicitly said that Lisa Banfield

was clearly a victim that night. She was not only a survivor, but she was a victim of the event. And so, you know, we know that Lisa Banfield on that night, Gabriel Wartman started, you know, they had a fight. He attacked her. He dragged her out of bed. He set their home on fire, and he pulled her through the woods, and she was kicking and screaming. He was shooting at her, missed her. And then he threw her in the replica police cruiser, and she managed to escape as he was going to load up on some more weapons

and she hid in the woods all night. And if I didn't get that car, I often think, what if those people had died? So that's something that haunts me all the time. And so there has been, you know, controversy and speculation about whether she, you know, her role that night and if she was actually a victim. And people here in Nova Scotia still to this day, I mean, I even heard comments over the weekend, oh, you know, wondering about her role in all of this. And the final report,

the commissioners clearly state, you know, the abuse that she has suffered and the criticisms need to stop because Lisa Banfield was a victim. And so that was very clear. Before Gabriel Wartman killed 22 people in Nova Scotia in 2020, the Mass Casualty Commission report says he controlled and abused the women around him for years, including his longtime partner, Lisa Banfield. The inquiry says that connection can't be ignored. Those who perpetrate mass casualties often have an unaddressed history of gender-based intimate partner or family violence. The report takes issue with how the RCMP treated Banfield too during their investigation. Yeah, so there's a few things. So the report was critical about, you know,

how police addressed complaints to the police prior to the event. There was a neighbor who reported that Gabriel Wartman was abusive to Lisa Banfield in 2013, and the commission found that that was not properly investigated investigated and then when you fast forward to the aftermath of the shooting um the commission you know is pretty explicit on the fact that the rcmp mistreated her um they did not debrief her properly they didn't um treat her as a witness and a victim of crime. They treated her as a suspect and her lawyer's words were that they manipulated her because what they did is that she turned into a suspect for them. They later charged her for supplying ammunition, but they never told her that she was under investigation. And so the commission's final report does explicitly say

that the way that the RCMP handled that was not trauma-informed, you know, and that this is an issue that needs to be looked at going forward for how police handle these extremely complex cases and that they need to do better. Angela, like this report goes through a lot of flaws in how the RCMP operates. I mean, we have not, we don't have the time to touch on all of them today, from training gaps to chain of command to procedures. And I know in the immediate aftermath of the report being released, there was controversy because the new interim head of the RCMP, Michael Duhem, who recently took over from Brenda Luckey after her retirement, said that he hadn't been able to read the report or familiarize himself with the recommendations late last week, even though the RCMP had the report a day in advance. I, like I said, I haven't seen any of the recommendations. My team, I'm not quite sure

exactly what time we got one of the versions, and I'm not quite sure if it's the full version or just the executive summary, but I'd be happy to come back to that. I haven't seen it and I haven't gone through it. Can I ask you why you haven't seen it? I just haven't gone through the recommendations just yet. It doesn't minimize the impact of what took place. I just haven't had time to go through the recommendations.

And I imagine that this did not go well with community members and families who lost loved ones. Is that fair for me to say? I think so. So I couch that with the fact that when I talked to family members last Thursday, it was before the RCMP appeared in Truro. But I did talk to one of the lawyers who represents most of the families and he was shocked like his jaw was on the floor that the RCMP actually showed up to speak to the media and publicly said that they had not read the report. And he was insulted because he had, you know, stayed up the entire night, did not sleep a wink. He read all of the reports so that he could properly inform his clients. And this was something that was important to him. You know, he's been living and breathing this inquiry and he felt passionate about it and he just could not understand for the RCMP, you know, to be the main

player, the main subject really in this report that the commissioners didn't read even the executive summary with the recommendations. And now we do know that, of course, people within the RCMP have read the report, but for them to come out publicly and say that they hadn't read it and they didn't know what the recommendations were was a slap in the face. What, if anything, did the new interim head do him say about next steps? I remember Brenda Luckey, before her retirement, you know, made these really personal promises that she was going to make changes in the wake of Portapique. I have a commitment to you. I have a commitment to the families. We will look into this. I can't undo the past, but I surely can change the future. She was criticized after she announced her retirement,

but did you hear him say anything? He just basically kept saying over and over again that they will read the recommendations and they're committed to following them through. I don't know what all the recommendations entail, but our commitment is to go through every single one of them and see if they're under my authority, our mandate. We will look at them, we will review them and determine a way forward. If it's not under authority, we'll be working with provincial or federal representatives to make sure that we address the recommendations that were look like. I think that basically the play there was to not make is like pretty, a really critical condemnation. The commissioners of the report take aim at the RCMP top leadership and they say, quote, more than two years after the event, RCMP leadership has done very little to systematically evaluate its critical response to the deadliest mass shooting in Canada's history. It's a move that the commission writes serves no one. You

know, of course, as we've talked about today, much of this stuff is not new, right? Like this came out during the commission and there's been, you know, much said about it. Are family members, are community members optimistic that this report will result in any meaningful change. So before we went into this final report release last week, I would have said no, because that was the answer time and time again. They had lost hope in the process. They didn't feel like they were being heard. But last week, you know, multiple people, members of families of the victims told me they were pleasantly surprised by what was in the report. And I spoke with Darcy Dobson, who lost her mother, Heather O'Brien, on April 19th of 2020. And she said that she just couldn't believe it when she opened up the report and how strongly it was worded.

We didn't feel very listened to throughout the process. Strongly, it was worded. We didn't feel very listened to throughout the process. So we were surprised when opening the report and reading what they had to say about policing, just because a lot of the questions we had to ask went unanswered. So it left this kind of looming, we had very low expectations for this report, and we were pleasantly surprised, which is a good thing. That's such an interesting perspective to hear. And I guess kind of loops back to what you said at the beginning that you and your colleagues were kind of shocked by the fact that this report seems to have given family members something to feel optimistic about.

I imagine that there are some people listening right now who are remembering, you know, previous very scathing reports directed at the RCMP that we have seen. This is a force facing criticism over racism and sexual harassment. Other jurisdictions in the country are looking to take back control of the RCMP. And, you know, I think a criticism that we've heard in recent days is that we haven't really seen any very meaningful structural changes here. Yeah, I mean, the track record for implementing recommendations is not great, right? I don't think that there is a single report that I can cite off the top of my head right now where every recommendation has been followed through. It's just, it's been widely known, and I think everyone involved in this report knows, that really implementing all of these recommendations is a tough battle ahead. There are some grand sweeping recommendations here.

I'm thinking like reform the RCMP. Government after government has been trying to do this for the last decade. It hasn't happened yet. And it's something that needs to happen at really every level right across this country. And then you look at gender violence and the commission's recommendation that this needs to be treated as an epidemic and there needs to be resources thrown at it just like COVID-19. I mean, how realistic is that? What's it going to take for that to happen? And I think these are some really big, thoughtful recommendations. But when you look at budgets, how realistic is it? So we'll all be kind of keeping that in mind as we pursue the accountability going forward. Angela, thank you so much for this. Thank you.

You're welcome. All right, that is allbc.ca slash podcasts.