Front Burner - The US and Israel’s ‘special relationship’ - Part 1

Episode Date: July 25, 2024

On Wednesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave a long-awaited and contentious speech to a special joint session of U.S. Congress. He had been invited by all four top congressional leaders — Democrat and Republican — to speak. But not everyone was happy about it. More than 80 Democratic lawmakers skipped the speech, and thousands of people protested outside the Capitol. Netanyahu’s visit comes at a moment when the US’s relationship with Israel, and support for the war in Gaza, are facing unprecedented scrutiny. So today we’ve got the first of a two-part series looking at the past, present and future of the ties that bind Israel and the United States.In part one, the history that built this relationship into what it is today.For transcripts of this series, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Allie Janes. Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received a long-standing ovation as he entered the chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives. as he entered the chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives.

He had been invited by all four top congressional leaders, Republican and Democrat, to speak. America and Israel must stand together, something very simple happens. We win, they lose. But not everyone was cheering. More than 80 House and Senate Democrats skipped the speech. They included former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, one of the most respected members of the Democratic establishment, who said that extending the invitation was wrong. I feel very sad that he has been invited.

Senator Bernie Sanders called Netanyahu a war criminal. In bringing Prime Minister Netanyahu to address a joint meeting of Congress, it will be the first time in American history that a war criminal has been given that honor. Vice President Kamala Harris, the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, also didn't attend, saying that a long scheduled trip would keep her away. But she's supposed to meet with him in a more private setting on Thursday. on Thursday. On Tuesday night, protesters demonstrated outside the Watergate Hotel, where Netanyahu is staying, and projected an image of his face with the words wanted and arrest Netanyahu on the side of the building. A spokesperson for the Watergate also confirmed to Politico that maggots, mealworms, and crickets

were released at the hotel on Tuesday, apparently by activists. And during Netanyahu's speech on Wednesday, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the capital. So why, some may ask, at a moment when there's a huge backlash in the U.S. against Israel's military operations in Gaza, which according to Gaza's health ministry have killed 39,000 people? When the International Criminal Court may soon issue arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his defense minister? When Netanyahu remains on trial at home for corruption? When tens of thousands have taken to the streets of Israel to protest his government? Why, in light of all of that, would both parties still invite him to speak? There are, of course, a ton of really complex reasons.

But they can ultimately be boiled down to two words. Special relationship. A special relationship with Israel and Israel only. There is a special connection between America and Israel. We have a unique relationship with Israel, a relationship of trust, friendship, and shared ideals. One of the things that binds the American people to Israel is our shared respect for human rights. The incredible partnership between the United States and Israel.

We must be crystal clear. We stand with Israel. We can say crystal clear. We stand with Israel. We can say today that America is Israel's oldest and best friend in the world. That relationship is facing unprecedented levels of scrutiny right now. So today, and in the second episode tomorrow, we're going to take a look at its past, present, and future. So first, when people say the U.S.-Israel special relationship, what do they mean? Here's how Fayez Hamad, a lecturer in political sciences at the University of Southern California, frames it. Well, obviously, it could mean different things to different people.

But in a nutshell, it means that the United States has Israel's back and that it will do its outmost to help Israel in the needs that Israel identifies. that Israel identifies. Since 1948, the United States has always sort of been Israel's leading champion on the international stage. This is Ben Samuels, the U.S. correspondent for Israel's Haaretz newspaper. Not only has that meant in terms of defending Israel in international forum, but it also means, you know, just sort of ensuring that Israel has what it needs to defend itself, whether that. People often describe this as a relationship based on shared values and similar worldviews. Here's Jonathan Schanzer.

He's the senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Well, what they're referring to is the close bond that exists between the people of the United States and the people of Israel. This is enshrined in the democratic sort of alignment between these two countries. But also, there are a lot of people in the United States, whether they be Jews or evangelical Christians, that have a very strong connection to the Holy Land. And Ben Samuels from Haaretz again. It's important to note that at the very core of it is sort of this emotional component. And, you know, Israel was founded right after the Holocaust.

The United States has always insisted that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people and that that plays a major role in its calculus towards its approach. Beyond that, though, Israel plays a very... Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign aid in the world. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. has given Israel a total of $310 billion, adjusted for inflation, of course, in economic and military assistance.

The U.S. has also been a staunch diplomatic ally to Israel. Since 1972, it has vetoed some 50 resolutions that were critical of Israel at the U.N. Security Council. Last month, the U.S. House of Representatives also voted to sanction the International Criminal Court after the ICC's chief prosecutor sought an arrest warrant for Netanyahu. For proponents of the relationship, this isn't just a good deal for Israel. It has big strategic benefits for the U.S. too. Jonathan Shanzer wants more. The kind of development of cyber tools and weapons

and the sheer number of Nobel Prize winners that come out of Israel and the technology that Israel produces, the fact that Israelis have incredible love for the United States. It's a pro-American country that fights for pro-American values and that fights more often than not against American enemies. Ben Samuels from Haaretz. Israel plays a very important geopolitical strategic role in terms of the U.S. approach to both the Middle East and the world at large. It is sort of a bulwark against all of these other forces throughout the world that are against U.S. interests. So when you talk about the United States and Israel, it is very much a sort

of relationship that is just as much an American interest as it is an Israeli interest in many ways. For decades, a majority of Americans have agreed with that idea. But right now, particularly in the wake of the war in Gaza following the Hamas attacks on October 7th, public opinion is shifting, especially among younger Americans. A recent poll from Pew found that only 16% of adults under 30 favor the U.S. providing military aid to Israel for use in the war in Gaza, compared to 56% of those 65 and over. Polls have also found that strong majorities of Democrats and slight majorities of Republicans favor a ceasefire. And of course, there have also been huge pro-Palestinian protest movements, in the streets and on campuses. From California to Michigan and along the East Coast, college campuses erupting in protest.

Thousands of members of Jewish Voice for Peace New York City and their allies shut down the main terminal of Grand Central Station during rush hour. Pro-Palestinian protesters blocked traffic calling for an end to military action in Gaza. They shut down the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco and stopped vehicles from getting to O'Hare. Pro-Palestinian protesters are blocking the entrances to Lockheed Martin's research campus in the South Bay. Violence at the University of Virginia. Police in Rayakir spraying protesters. At least 25 people arrested as officers cleared that encampment. Columbia, where police have arrested nearly 50 protesters who had refused to leave campus. Columbia asking the NYPD to stay.

Many analysts believe that all of this could actually impact the November election. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never really been an issue when it comes to voters and presidential elections. It's always considered sort of a niche issue. This is the first election ever where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could very well sway the election one way or another. So in this election, some of the key swing states have larger Arab and Muslim populations and younger voters and progressive voters than other states.

So some of these states like Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Georgia, they really could capture a large number of voters who have become really disillusioned with Biden's policy toward the Israel-Gaza war. There's also an unprecedented wave of pushback coming from within the Democratic Party. I think we are kind of in uncharted waters here. You know, you're not going to be able to put the toothpaste back in the tub after this war. You know, I remember three, four years ago, like 20 Democrats signed a letter to Biden being critical of Israel's conduct in the war, and that was unprecedented. You know, now you're seeing dozens and dozens and dozens of lawmakers being critical in ways of Israel that was previously unimaginable. And you're seeing lawmakers make calls for

complete frozen military aid to Israel and a complete pause in offensive weaponry. to Israel and a complete pause in offensive weaponry. And the center within the debate is really shifting in a way that was really unimaginable in years past, but it was also unimaginable in the aftermath of October 7th. The way that Israel has conducted this war has alienated and frankly horrified a lot of Democrats. And this has sort of given people an opportunity to really take a microscope to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way that hasn't really been done before. And that is causing a lot of people

to be reflective of policy of years past and what policy should look like in years to come. But criticism isn't just coming from the left. It's also coming from some prominent America First voices on the right, like media heavyweight Tucker Carlson. If you wake up in the morning and decide that your Christian faith requires you to support a foreign government blowing up churches and killing Christians,

I think you've lost the thread. So look, before we talk any more about where this may all be leading, we need to understand how we got here. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here. You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you. Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own

household income? That's not a typo, 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. Let's start on May 14, 1948. The city of Haifa and its harbor become the center of bitter conflict as a new Jewish state is born in the tense atmosphere of civil war. U.S. President Harry Truman became the first world leader to recognize the new state of Israel, just 11 minutes after it declared its independence. The U.S. then announced their support at the U.N. Palestine's case is before the world parliament as Arab delegates look on stonily.

In a tense atmosphere, the assembly hears a statement of momentous importance read by United States Delegate Jessup. of momentous importance read by United States Delegate Jessup. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel. With United States recognition, the new Jewish state is launched. But for the first couple decades of the state's existence, the relationship wasn't what you'd call particularly special, really. People have this image that the U.S. has always been Israel's best friend, but it didn't really start that way. This is David Makofsky. He's director at the Caret Project on Arab-Israel

Relations at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He's also the host of the podcast Decision Points about Israel's past and present. People have a certain romance about the relationship, but it didn't start, it was not a romance, I would say, in the early years. And Eisenhower totally saw it as an impediment. In the first 20 years of the Cold War, In the first 20 years of the Cold War, Israel was seen more of kind of a liability in a fundamental sense. It complicated the United States position in the Arab world. That's Fayez Hamad again from the University of Southern California.

Hamad and Makovsky both say that at the time, the U.S., especially under Dwight Eisenhower in the 50s, was mainly worried about Soviet influence in the surrounding Arab states. And under the Eisenhower administration, he wanted to maintain neutrality on the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in the context of the Cold War and containment and so forth. in the context of the Cold War and containment and so forth. So it was, the Arab-Israeli conflict was sort of, you know, in the back burner, or was in the icebox, as it was referred to it. That all changed in 1967, after the Six-Day War, which, to put it in the simplest terms possible,

was a war that Israel fought with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. For the third time since its birth as an independent state, Israel is embroiled in a war with the Arab nations that surround it. The crux of the whole argument is Egypt's closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's oil supply route to the Red Sea. With relatively little outside military help, Israel ended up capturing the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria,

and Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, Palestinian territories that it still occupies today. So far, the big powers have stood back in a state of virtual neutrality, but the same big powers have been providing Israel and the Arab countries with all the machinery of war. After that war, the U.S. started to look at Israel in a whole new light. David McCoskey. There's no doubt that 67 is a seminal moment in the U.S.-Israel relationship because it was an understanding now that ultimately Israel is a serious partner for a security relationship with the United States. Yeah, I think 1967 is when Israel shows not only that it can hold its own,

but it establishes itself as a kind of regional superpower. That's Khaled El-Gindi. He's a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and the author of the book Blindspot, America and the Palestinians from Balfour to Trump. The fact that they were able to defeat three Arab states' militaries in six days, they destroyed the Egyptian Air Force while it was still on the ground. It was an enormous humiliation for the Arab world. an enormous humiliation for the Arab world. And it really established Israel as the regional superpower and something more than just, you know, a country with which people had a border dispute

or issues related to the Palestinians. Experts say that particularly as the U.S. was fighting a losing war in Vietnam, Israel suddenly started to look like a horse that they wanted to bet on. One that could be a serious partner in countering Soviet influence in the region. I'm just going to quickly note here that the Six-Day War also gave rise to a critical U.N. resolution, 242, which is better known as the Land for Peace formula. It's been the underpinning of all of the Israeli peace processes. And basically, the idea was that Israel would withdraw from the territories that it occupied in 1967 in exchange for peace and recognition from its Arab neighbors. We're not going to get

into it right now, but just remember that for later. Anyway, the relationship grew even stronger in the 70s under President Richard Nixon. Nixon, and especially his chief foreign policy national security person, Henry Kissinger, who began as national security advisor and then became Secretary of State, he was very much a cold warrior. And he viewed the world exclusively through the lens of the U.S.-Soviet competition. And so that was an even greater incentive for

the U.S. to back Israel militarily, that Cold War mindset. Things really ramped up on that front in the aftermath of another war. In 1973, on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. It is an all-out war. That's how Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan describes an invasion of the Golan Heights and the east bank of the Suez by Syria and Egypt. This eventually led to the Soviets supplying weapons

to the Egyptian and Syrian forces and the Americans supplying weapons to the Israelis. Basically, putting these two superpowers in a proxy battle at a time when Kissinger was trying to cool things down with the Soviets. And it took an American airlift and a whole lot of diplomacy to eventually get a ceasefire with the Egyptians and with the Syrians. And in the process, there was a realization, at least in Washington, that we need a broader diplomatic process.

We need to resolve these issues. Makovsky says that Kissinger saw a real opportunity here to expand American influence. Egypt's the most, you know, the biggest Arab state. And if Egypt is willing to flip from the Soviet kind of orbit to the American orbit, we want that. If we're going to wean Egypt away from the Soviet Union, then we have to offer them something. And the only thing they could offer them was a process that would lead to regaining Egyptian territory. Kissinger ended up negotiating crucial agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria,

which eventually paved the way for major, lasting peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and cemented the U.S. as the key player in peace negotiations. We must now demonstrate the advantages of peace. demonstrate the advantages of peace. Let there be no more wars or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis. This is also the period when the U.S. began to majorly ramp up military aid to Israel and to Egypt too.

Makovsky said that the U.S. saw it as a way to encourage both parties to feel secure enough to want to engage in a peace process. The U.S. wants to use the aid as an incentive to oil this machinery of peace between Egypt and Israel. And this was a huge deal. And that tradition has continued to this day. But I think the idea is how do you minimize the risks of peacemaking? And the U.S. has seen military assistance as that way to minimize the risk. And by the way, it's a model. Khaled El-Gindi says that in a lot of ways, the special relationship has been crucial to those diplomatic and peace processes. The calculation made in the Arab world was only the United States can deliver Israel.

And it was because the United States was the only party that Israel could trust fully to look after its security interests. trust fully to look after its security interests. And so it sort of worked because there was really no one else who could convince the Israelis to take certain steps other than the United States. But El-Gindi believes that when it comes to the Palestinians, Israel's special relationship with the U.S. has also been an impediment. You know, the West Bank, we're talking about areas that are not just geographically closer to Israel, but ideologically, historically, from a religious standpoint, are also front and center in the kind of Zionist ethos and Jewish history, right?

So there are things that Israel just doesn't want to do. We'll never give up Jerusalem. We'll never divide Jerusalem. We will never allow any refugees to return. So this is the flaw in a U.S.-led process. If the U.S. is only going to go as far as the Israeli leadership is already willing to go, well, then what is its value as a mediator, right? If the Israelis say dividing Jerusalem is a non-starter and Palestinians say, well, a state without Jerusalem is a non-starter, so then where are you? If the U.S. has to choose between those two mutually exclusive positions, they're going to choose the Israeli side and say, well, Palestinians, you're just going to have to give in on that point because it's a non-starter for the Israelis. And this is where the U.S. putting its thumb on the scale for Israel.

El-Gindi also believes that another part of the special relationship presents a paradox. El-Gindi also believes that another part of the special relationship presents a paradox. As we were just talking about, part of the rationale for the U.S. supplying military aid to Israel is this idea that if Israelis feel secure, they'll be more willing to risk engaging in a peace deal and give up the occupied Palestinian territories. But El-Gindi and others argue that by strengthening Israel's military capacities so much through a cumulative $230 billion in military aid, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, Israel arguably has enough security that they don't necessarily need peace, which these analysts believe removes the incentive to give that land back.

In order to move toward diplomacy, you actually have to feel a little bit insecure, right? Everyone is feeling a little bit insecure. Therefore, they have a common interest in reaching a diplomatic resolution where everybody gets a little bit of something, right? But as long as one side feels total absolute military supremacy, and we keep deepening that power asymmetry between Israel and anyone else, that's how you create instability. That's how you create and fuel conflict, not just for a few years, but possibly for generations. Of course, this security is not absolute, given the nearly 1,200 people who were killed and roughly 250 hostages that were taken in the October 7th attacks by Hamas.

But I asked David Makovsky about this idea, that by ensuring Israel's military superiority, U.S. aid might be removing the need for Israel to make concessions, to want to trade that land for peace. Makovsky, who was on the State Department's Middle East peace negotiating team during the Obama administration, said he respectfully disagrees. Because ultimately, no country is going to give up land if they feel it makes them more vulnerable. So it's just reality. the Israeli right in the center, and certainly since the collapse of the peace process with the second Intifada in 2000 and 2004, that would argue, look, it's just not safe to give up this land. You don't know what's going to be. Look, Hamas in 2007 has now taken over Gaza. So you can't afford this. It's just too risky. Now we're seeing that with October the 7th that Israelis don't even want to hear people saying the word Palestinian state.

For them, it's like all you do-gooders, you were proven wrong. Israel pulled out of Gaza and they got massacred, 1,200 people. people. And the idea of land for peace is a joke because you got out of Gaza and you got all this, you know, this terrorism. And so if you didn't like the book, you're going to hate the movie and the West Bank. And that's a real argument. I think the military aid is at least something that gives, you know, centrists a leg to stand on to say, no, you know, that it might be short-sighted. It's, you know, we are militarily the stronger party and we can take some risks for peace. At any rate, these building blocks of the U.S.-Israel relationship—military and economic aid, peace brokering, diplomatic support—continued to deepen over the decades.

But that doesn't mean that there haven't been moments when American presidents pushed back on Israel. One famous example is a phone call in 1982 between Ronald Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. It was during the war in Lebanon, when Israeli forces were heavily bombing Beirut. Reagan wrote in his diary, quote, I was angry. I told him it had to stop or our entire future relationship was endangered. He also told Begin that, quote, the symbol of his war was becoming a picture of a seven-month-old baby with its arms blown off. Twenty minutes later, Begin writes, Begin, quote, called to tell me he'd ordered an end to the barrage and pled for our continued friendship. In 1991, George H.W. Bush conditioned aid to Israel. He refused to approve $10 billion in loan guarantees

unless Israel froze expansion of its settlements. Some analysts point to these as moments where they believe the U.S. was really in the driver's seat in this relationship, something, they argue, that doesn't seem to be the case today. There must be no daylight between Israel's position on anything in the United States. That's the special relationship. The United States will stand with Israel, and Israel will stand with the United States when it feels like it. I mean, it's a, yes, it's very special in that regard.

It's sort of like a one-sided affair. This is M.J. Rosenberg. He's a commentator who worked for many years on Capitol Hill, and before that for the lobbying group AIPAC, who he's now a vocal critic of. We'll hear more from him and about AIPAC in the next episode. There is no other country that could get away with defying the United States the way Israel does.

And I include Canada, I include the UK. I mean, you know, America's best friends. As an example, analysts point to the Biden administration, saying that if Israel invaded Rafah, a city in southern Gaza where nearly half the population had moved to try to escape the war, it would be a red line. But in late May, when Israel ramped up attacks on the city, the U.S. said that the actions didn't constitute a major ground operation

and therefore didn't cross their red lines. How does this not violate the red line that the president laid out? As I said, we don't want to see a major ground operation. We haven't seen that at this point. Here's Khaled El-Gindi. The moment the president decides to pick up the phone and tell Netanyahu what Reagan told Begin in 1982, this has to stop.

It will stop. But they choose not to do that. The president chooses to not do that at every stage. Instead, it's as if he's asked his national security team, what can I do to end this war short of using any kind of sticks at all? And they've run out of carrots. They've run out of finger wagging and rhetoric. Critics also point out how openly Netanyahu has defied the Biden administration. He's rebuffed calls for restraint in the war in Gaza.

He's repeatedly rejected the possibility of a future two-state solution, which is official U.S. policy. solution, which is official U.S. policy. And in June, he forcefully criticized the Biden administration in a video where he said that the U.S. had been withholding weapons to Israel. I said it's inconceivable that in the past few months, the administration has been withholding weapons and ammunitions to Israel. Israel, America's closest ally, fighting for its life, fighting against Iran and our other common enemies. The White House said that they had just paused a single shipment of munitions in May, and that, quote, we genuinely do not know what he's talking about. I asked Ben Samuels, the Haaretz journalist, about this criticism of Biden,

that some say it doesn't feel like he's in the driver's seat here. Biden, who has known Netanyahu for decades, he has really believed that the way to approach Netanyahu is to keep him close and to give him public support and to use that as leverage for private criticism and pressure. That worked to an extent in the last war between Israel and Hamas in 2021. That really hasn't paid off during this most recent war. And that strategy has sort of ebbed and flowed to varying degrees. But what you're really seeing is that the administration in America is really having a hard time putting the appropriate amount of pressure on Israel to get the policies that it wants to see and to really sort of pull the levers in the way that it does have the capability of. You know, America provides Israel with over $3 billion in military assistance every year.

They just passed a supplemental bill that includes $14 billion in emergency military assistance. If the United States wanted to, it could very much leverage some of this military assistance to say, okay, you're not getting these offensive weapons unless there is a dramatic surge in humanitarian aid entering Gaza per day, or unless we see a much stronger commitment on the Israeli military's part to take more care into avoiding civilian casualties. The United States says this rhetorically, and they, you know, offer all of the public comments that they deem sufficient. But at the end of the day, it hasn't sort of put on the full pressure that many of the critics of US policy toward Israel believe that it can and should

put forward. Why do you think that they're not doing that? A few reasons. I mean, one, it could just be Biden's personal view and his personal approach and what he believes needs to be done to further push this conflict toward its end and putting it on path toward negotiating a final status agreement toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and getting this on the path of reconstructing Gaza and bringing all the appropriate Arab allies into the mix. Another reason could be political. A few months ago, he froze a shipment, a single shipment of heavy payload bombs, because he didn't want it to be used in a potential military invasion of Rafah and being used in dense population centers, like Israel used heavy payload bombs and other previous

dense population centers at the beginning of the war. There was such an intense political blowback to that, that it probably dissuaded the United States and the White House from really putting on further pressure. You know, I can't overstate how little of a change in policy this was, you know, it was one single shipment that was paused amid billions and billions of dollars of continued sales. You know, this wasn't a change in policy. This was just sort of like a, hey, let's slow things down here a little bit.

The reaction to that, both within Congress and the Republican Party, among pro-Israel allies of Biden's, within the Israeli government, it was so disconnected with the reality of what Biden was actually doing that, you know, it probably dissuaded the White House from really putting further pressure on toward Israel. Political backlash, political consequences. It's a theme we're going to explore tomorrow in part two, the groups,

forces, and consequences that underpin the special relationship, and how it can affect the lives of Americans in some surprising ways. We cover barbecue. We cover state government. We cover Medicaid expansion. We don't write about the Middle East. We don't write about Israel. We don't write about Ukraine. We write about Arkansas. so this is totally irrelevant to anything that we're doing it is really remarkable that even as israel finds itself on its back foot in this overall battle for hearts and minds it is being accused of chilling criticism it feels like i'm living in bizarro world here look i'm fond of saying you may not care about Israel or Palestine, but Israel or Palestine cares about you, and it's coming for your rights as an American.

That's all for today. I'm Allie Janes. This is FrontBurner, part two, coming tomorrow.