Front Burner - U.S.-Iran talks: Who’s got the upper hand?

Episode Date: April 10, 2026

After six weeks of war and a fragile ceasefire Iran is going into high-level talks with the U.S. battered but defiant. Whether any kind of real agreement can be reached remains to be seen. The U.S. and Iran are extremely far apart in their demands.Vali Nasr is a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University and the author of “Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History”. He joins us to talk about why Iran’s leadership remains steadfast and what the war has meant for its domestic and international standing. For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

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High-level delegations from the U.S. and Iran are set to meet in Islamabad, Pakistan this weekend, to talk about turning a ceasefire into a peace deal. One of the biggest threats to this process has been Israel's post-seasfire strikes on Lebanon, which have killed hundreds. On Thursday, Israel announced it would enter into separate talks with Lebanon, and Trump said the attacks will be, quote, scaling back. Whether any kind of real agreement can be reached, on both of these two tracks remains to be seen.

The U.S. and Iran are extremely far apart in their demands. When we had Vali Nasser on the show at the beginning of the war, he said that the Islamic Republic wouldn't back down easily because for them, this is an existential fight. Valley is a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and he is the author of Iran's grand strategy, a political history. He's back again to talk about why Iran remains steadfast on their demands about taxing passage through the Strait of Hormuz and a nuclear enrichment program despite the serious toll the war has taken.

Valley, thank you so much for coming back onto the show. It's great to have you. Thank you very much. Good to be back. So the situation has been rapidly changing. I'll just timestamp this conversation. I'm speaking with you at 1 p.m. Eastern on Thursday. As I mentioned in the intro, they're going into the U.S. talks in Islamabad, the U.S. ascending Vice President J.D. Vance, along with Middle East Special Envoy Steve Whitkoff and Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Iran's delegation is expected to be led by Iran's parliament speaker, Mohamed Baghar Kalibaf. Knowing what you know about these figures, what are you expecting or looking for out of Islamabad this weekend?

I think the level of participation in these talks is the highest that to Trump administration and Iran have had before. And Iran was looking to go above Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner because largely thought that they didn't have grasp of the issues. And in the last round of negotiations in Geneva, they perhaps misrepresented what had been achieved in Geneva at the White House. So I think we're seeing a higher level engaged, but both sides are speaking, if you would, for the principles, which is President Trump and Moshabakhamini in Iran. Iran. The core issues that they have to deal with is the nuclear issue, which still is left over from before the war. And then under what terms, would there be cessation of hostilities

between the two sides? Which party in your estimation has the upper hand or any strategic advantage going into these talks? I think Iran has a slight strategic advantage in the sense that it was very clear since two weeks ago that President Trump was getting desperate with this war. It had not unfolded the way he had anticipated. The war was not short, did not topple the Islamic Republic. There was no popular rebellion in Iran in support of regime change. And Iran had discovered the strategic advantage in closing the strait of hormones and putting pressure on the economies of the Gulf and on global energy markets in a way that caught the United States off guard. This is already the worst energy shock in the history of the oil market. The amount of oil that

we've lost to the Strait of Ramos is about 20 million barrels a day, which is about 20% of global supplies. We've just never seen anything even close to that. And President Trump found himself facing only two choices. One was to escalate vis-à-vis Iran, capture an island, threatened to send Iran back to the Stone Age, erases civilization, or to go to talks and try to resolve this war where it was diplomatically. And the Iranians obviously understood that it's the president who really is at this strategic dead end, the strategy that they had unfolded, which was to absorb the attacks, not collapse, stay in a longer war, and then use the advantage that they found in the trace of hormones

in a way that would actually create difficulties for the United States had worked. I mean, end of the day, the only reason that President Trump is entertaining these talks is because of the straight of hormones. He knows the war produced the strategic advantage for Iran that it didn't have before the war. So that has to be seen as a win because the end of the day, Iran was never going to defeat the United States militarily on the battlefield. The endgame for Iran always had to be a negotiated settlement that would change their circumstances drastically compared to before the war.

And now they have got the United States to the table. this war is ending in a way that President Trump didn't want, but in a way that Iran wants. And just in this 10-point proposal that's being circulated from Iran, the concessions on the U.S. as part, should they agree to them, are quite significant. An acceptance of Iran's nuclear enrichment program, the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, payment to Iran for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Are these demands realistic? Do you see them as some kind of starting point? I mean, they're definitely starting points, but it also tells you where Iran's head is.

Where Iran's head is that this war will not end with Iran being in the same box that it was before the war, under maximum pressure sanctions, open to Israeli and American attack at will whenever they want. and facing an angry population at home, essentially being in a straight jacket. So all the elements of this, if you condense it, suggests that Iran wants significant economic relief. In other words, the cordon of sanctions around it would end, that it would have a way to reconstruct and re-energize its economy, and that it would no longer be under the threat of attack by Israel and the United States. States. And also you could say that on the other hand, the U.S.'s 15-point demands were also very maximalist because they essentially were ideas that were conceived before the war when the U.S. thought Iran is really weak. The president's 15-point plan is Iran should surrender

absolutely everything and get nothing much for it in return. So it's really a surrender demand. And so they both are going to the table with their maximal positions. It will have to drop off a lot of things and try to find somewhere in the middle where at least there are some things they can agree with to. Now, the very fact that the president signaled to the Pakistanis, and I think privately said it much more explicitly, that he's willing to go to Islamabad with his own 15-point plan, but also accept Iran's 10-point plan as a starting point. It already is a massive concession to Iran. You know, I'm still thinking about that comment from Donald Trump. Trump from earlier this week when he was threatening Iran and he said a whole civilization

will die tonight. The use of such kind of plain spoken, frankly, genocidal language is a historical anomaly for a U.S. president in a country, certainly responsible for all kinds of violence around the world, but one whose leaders have just never been so plain, I guess, about the use of mass violence and killing. The invasion of Iraq was obviously incredibly violent and, and basically, based on a lie, but even George Bush, for example, said, quote, you are a good and gifted people, the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all humanity. And, you know, Iran is, is this millennia old civilization, more than 10 times older than the United States. Persia survived two invasions from Genghis Khan's Mongols, for example. These are people who, you know, I think,

take their history incredibly seriously. And what do you think that Trump, you know, fundamentally miscalculated about Iran? I mean, first of all, I mean, he miscalculated about Iran even before he arrived at this kind of hyperbolic language. He miscalculated the resilience of the Islamic Republic, its ability to survive. He miscalculated the patriotism of the Iranian population. He overestimated how much the population was actually organized against the Islamic Republic. We know that the population is extremely angry.

at the Islamic Republic and can erupt at any moment, but it's not actually organized into a political movement that could have taken advantage even of the war. And he also underestimated how prepared Iranians were for the war and underestimated the fact that the Iranians may actually have a strategy and they may have actually be capable of outflanking him strategically. So the miscalculations were very broad and were systematic. And I think when he arrived at a point of starting to either with the help of Israel or giving green light to Israel or on his own, attacking Iran's infrastructure, he already was signaling to the Iranians that he had failed.

In other words, they had moved from hoping that by killing Iran's leaders, the system would fall, that the people would rise up to actually going from attacking the system to attacking the state, attacking the country. And particularly when he started attacking the country and its infrastructure, the Iranians understood this to be basically an attempt to make Iran a failed state. There was no longer a pretense of wanting a stable Iran afterwards to be a responsible part of the international community. When he said that I'm going to send Iran back to the Stone Age, that's exactly what the Iranians understood. And therefore, he ended up mobilizing the Iranian population independent of the Islamic Republic into a psychology of defense. of the country, that this is our responsibility to defend it. So when Iranians began en masse, creating human chains around their refineries and their electrical grids, Iranian musicians showed

up in front of energy generation facilities playing music. I mean, this became essentially a form of a popular level defiance of a superpower that is that is declaring that he wants to destroy Iran. The rulers of the Islamic Republic were greatly angered by this. And first of all, they threatened that if the United States did this, that they would also destroy everybody else's infrastructure as well. And they had done something along those lines when Israel attacked Iran's gas field. Iran attacked Qatar's gas field. So the message to Trump was that if you go after our electrical grid, we go after everybody else's electrical grid. And then, you know, everybody's going to go dark, not just Iran.

And I think President Trump noticed that, or perhaps many leaders in the region, began calling him to saying that you're basically playing Russian roulette with our economies and our infrastructure as well. And then the threat to erase Iran as a civilization, that not only graded the Iranian public's feelings, many even thought that he intends to use nuclear weapons on Iran or what does that actually mean. but it also had impact on what he was intending to do. If he thought that he was going to intimidate Iran to the table, the opposite happened.

At that point, there was a channel of communication between Steve Witkoff and Iran's foreign minister. The Iranians immediately shut it down, saying we cannot talk to the United States under these circumstances. And then they went back to only exchanging notes with the Pakistanis over these issues. But in a way, by going to Islamabad, the president backed down from his own over-the-top rhetoric, that in the end he went back to the same conversation that was ongoing with the Pakistanis. He had said that Iran's offers was not good enough, but then they ended up being good enough for him to go to the table. And so every step of the way, you know, at least since three weeks ago, when it became very clear, to him that his initial expectations of the war were not being met, that he's acting in a

manner that shows that he's frustrated, he's lashing out, he's out of ideas, and his threatening, menacing language only tells the Iranians that they basically have caught his tail in the door. And as much as he's trying to wiggle his way free, he cannot do that. Hey Canada. Did you know you can help shape the future of our historic sites? The National Trust for Canada is excited to announce the Next Great Save competition is back with support from ecclesiastical insurance. Historic sites across the country are competing for $65,000 in prizes to renew for the future.

Sites like Aspire in Kingston, Ontario. Your vote decides the winner. Vote today at nextgreatsave.cave.ca. It's been said that being neighbors with America is like sleeping with an elephant. One gets affected by every twitch and grunt. Well, these days, there's a lot more than twitches and grunts in dealing with the U.S. I'm Paul Hunter. And I'm Katie Simpson.

We're reporters here in Washington, and every Wednesday will bring you a smart conversation to help you make sense of how American politics are affecting Canada. Our new podcast is called Two Blocks from the White House. follow now wherever you get your podcasts, including YouTube. Just to stick with some of the destruction in Iran just for a little bit longer, Iran is home to many UNESCO World Heritage sites and a handful of them have been damaged in U.S.-Israeli attacks, just to name a few Tehran's Golistan Palace dating to the 14th century and the 17th century Chehl, Sotune Palace, and Isfahan, the Phalek-Olluk-Aflat Castle,

in Loristan province, which dates back to the Sasanian period, sometime between the third and seventh centuries. The governor of Isfahan, where some of the worst damage has occurred, said the attacks happened after the coordinates of the sites had been shared with all parties. It's worth mentioning that historic cultural sites are protected under the 1954 Hague Convention. And, like, you know, how concerning is it to you that Iran's cultural history has been targeted in this war as well? Well, at least the claim that Israel and the United States made that was that they were not directly targeting these sites, but they were also not taking any care not to hit anything

close by to them that might damage them. And it obviously shows that, you know, to them, they're approaching this war in a manner, let's say, that Israel approached Gaza or is approaching Lebanon. In other words, total disregard, not just for the people, institutions, but also for history and what it means for the people. I would add to this that actually two more recent sites that were directly bombed and intentionally bombed were more significant as a symbol for the Iranians that Israel and the United States really intend to bring a Gaza future to Iran. So one was the Pastor Institute in Tehran. One of the oldest and most important medical research centers in Tehran has been hit by a U.S.-Israel bombings. Iran... And the other one was the Sharif University of Technology.

Which is known as Iran's MIT, one of the most, or perhaps I can say, the most important technical university of the country. I mean, I haven't seen this degree of reaction from across the political spectrum in Iran, as I saw in reaction to bombing of Sharif University. And yes, you have the similar kind of excuses that somehow these institutions were related to IRGC or were doing military kind of work. But to Iranians, that doesn't ring true. They know these institutions very well. They are symbols of Iran's modernization. They predate the Islamic Republic. And hitting them in this case actually directly really communicated that this is a war on the country.

It's not war on the regime. It's not about the nuclear issue. This is really going after some fundamental things. And some of the bombing, you know, it also raises questions. Like day before the ceasefire was announced, Israel bombed a synagogue in Tehran. And you have pictures of the Jewish community walking over the rubble trying to, you know, find and protect ancient pieces of the Torah and religious relics that were there. And so you begin to ask yourself, you know, what is basically in the mind of those who are conducting the bombing and it's become the way in which it has become wanton? Ultimately shows it shows the fact that the U.S. Israeli war has lost its way.

It's not reaching, arriving at any strategic objectives. It is destruction. And in a way, you know, again, you know, if you put it in the context of, of Iran is that this country has now paid a very, very huge price for this war, regardless of its origins and who's at fault. I mean, estimates are the, is that the damage to Iran goes up to several billion dollars. Important industries have been erased, steelworks, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals. You mentioned cultural sites, huge areas of refineries, railways, etc, et cetera, et cetera. And I think it's just created more resilience in the population and a

determination, I think, among the leaders of the Islamic Republic, that now that they have paid this price, they're going to get something out of it. In other words, just going back to a ceasefire is not good enough for them because of the damage that they have suffered. So that will play out in the course of these negotiations. And you mentioned Lebanon. I want to ask you specifically about Lebanon and Israel here. Iranian leadership and the Pakistani prime minister said that the ceasefire agreement meant an immediate cessation of fighting in Lebanon too. Israel has disagreed saying it's not part of the agreement. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance has said that he believes it would be, quote, dumb for Iran to let the ceasefire end over Israel's actions in Lebanon. And just how crucial is Lebanon to Iran's commitment to a ceasefire? I mean, at some level, Lebanon does matter to the revolutionary guards and to Iran's leadership because they know that Lebanon is paying a price because of them. And the Israeli bombing is not targeting only Hezbollah, is actually destroying the entire

social fabric of the Shia community. And that does have great impact on their thinking. But I think Lebanon matters to this ceasefire negotiations in two other ways. One is that Iran does believe, and it's now some reporting that that is the case, that Lebanon was part of the ceasefire. The Pakistani Prime Minister tweeted about it. New York Times is reporting that that tweet had been cleared by the White House. The Iranians believe that he was part of it. And ultimately, there is a sense that perhaps President Trump said yes to everything just to get the ceasefire talks going, not expecting that some of these issues he would have to do. defend or deal with afterwards. But first of all, to Iranians, it becomes a indication of whether the president is actually serious about what he promises. I mean, after all, this is a president

who came out of the nuclear deal that the United States had signed. Twice while he was negotiating with Iran, he bombed Iran. And so there is very little trust of him in Tehran. And if the Iranians feel that, okay, he said yes to Lebanon and immediately Israel dropped 160 bombs on Beirut in 10 minutes and killed so many people throughout the course of the day that maybe nothing that he agreed to on the prelude to coming to Islamabad actually matters. The second issue is that Lebanon is a test of whether President Trump can control Israel and can actually assert, if you would, America's position on Israel. That's going to be key in any deal that Iran makes with the United States, that Israel would be bound by the terms of a ceasefire.

It's not at the table, but it was America's partner in this war, and that ultimately the U.S. is really negotiating a ceasefire on behalf of both of them. And if the U.S. cannot basically control the actions of his partner, then that changes the entire dynamic of the conversation. So yes, Vice President Vance is correct in the sense that Iran would be done to make Lebanon a deal breaker, but he's wrong in the sense that Iranians won't look at what's happening in Lebanon as a sort of a bellwether of what to expect in negotiations with the U.S. So the U.S. has to first show that it can control Lebanon before it has credibility to say

that it can deliver on anything else at the negotiating table. You also mentioned before that Iran is going to really want to get something out of this. If the ceasefire does fall apart, does Iran have the kapes? to return to that level of fighting and sort of sustain it for much longer? Well, it doesn't have capacity to do so indefinitely. At some point, it's going to get exhausted and will not be able to sustain the same level. But its calculation is that its endurance is more than that of the endurance of the global economy and therefore the endurance of the United States. The United States is also gradually getting short of certain

ammunitions, it's also out of options. And if the closure of the strait of hormones and pressure on the oil and energy infrastructure and the economies of the Gulf continues, I think the damage to the global economy will be much, much longer lasting. And so the United States is also in a race of time against averting what could be the worst in terms of recession, inflation, across vast areas of the world. Already, if the trade of hormones was to open up tomorrow morning, there were still months of backlog before the flow of trade and energy would be back to normal. If the straits are closed another month, another six weeks,

the damage to the global economy would be much more. So already this war really, it's been sometime that this war is not about the munitions. This war has become about endurance. And ultimately, just because the United States is bigger and more powerful, it doesn't mean that necessarily it has greater endurance than a weaker party here. Before we go, I do want to get a sense of where you think the Islamic Republic's leadership finds itself currently. Of course, many of them have been assassinated, several political, clerical and military leaders,

including, of course, Ayatollah, Hamini. Now his son has taken over, Ayatollah Moshatabha, Khamini. How has the way the regime is led and governed changed, would you say? What we're right now witnessing is a wartime cabinet, if you would. So the decisions are all military decisions. The strategy that Iran is implementing was conceived before the war started by the previous set of Revolutionary Guard commanders and the previous Supreme Leader. but this new leadership is exercising it according to plan.

We're not seeing yet much about how they intend to rule over Iran. The indications are not positive. This leadership that is taken over is more hawkish. It has a history of suppression of political dissent in Iran during previous decades. Iran's economy is still bankrupt, has suffered gravely in the war. And we're not that far from January when the Islamic Republic killed thousands upon thousands of Iranians in order to suppress a massive level of protest across the country. So all of that is still there. But all that we are right now seeing is wartime management of a military campaign.

I think when the dust settles, then we will have a better understanding as to how this new leadership will be different. and in what ways from the previous leadership? And then the second question is, can they actually bring stability domestically to Iran? And that's a really open question, given the set of problems that I just mentioned, that they basically will be governing over Iran that is economically more broken, even if he can claim that it did well in the war. It's still militarily economically broken. It still has a deep gash of wound because of the January uprising and the suppression.

to deal with, it's still hugely disliked by a large swath of the Iranian population beyond this war. So the political fate of the Islamic Republic is far from certain going forward. Vali, thank you so much for this. Thanks for having me. Good speaking with you. All right. That is all for this week. Front burner was produced this week by Matthew Amha, Joytha Shangupta, Shannon Higgins, Kevin Sexton, McKenzie Cameron, and Dave Moff. Our YouTube producer is John Lee. Our music is by Joseph Shabbison. Our senior producers are Elaine Chow and Imigent Bertrand. Our executive producer is Nick McKay-Blocos, and I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you on Monday.

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