Front Burner - What do Israelis think about the war?

Episode Date: September 6, 2024

 Hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the street in Israel, demanding a return of all remaining hostages in the custody of Hamas. The demonstrations are the largest seen in the country since the start of the Israel-Gaza war. We take a closer look at the changing nature of public opinion currently driving these protests in Israel, and why calls for a ceasefire are complicated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu's war aims. Our guest Dahlia Scheindlin is a political analyst, pollster, author, and columnist for Haaretz and The Guardian based in Tel Aviv.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Ali Janes, in for Jamie Poisson. Hundreds of thousands of protesters have packed the streets across Israel this week, in the largest demonstrations since October 7th. They've been backed up by Israel's largest labor union,

which called a national strike on Monday that shut down many schools and government offices, as well as many private businesses. It was ended by a court order. Israel's international airport, Ben Gurion, also shut down for two hours on Monday in protest. These latest demonstrations erupted after the news that six hostages were found dead in a tunnel in Gaza over the weekend. The Israeli military says all six had been killed shortly before the forces trying to rescue them arrived on scene. Demonstrators are calling for a ceasefire deal that would bring the remaining Israeli hostages home. While they echo calls from many protests in the country since October 7th, observers say these ones feel different and that they may be heaping new levels of pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

to reach a deal with Hamas. Because every Israeli citizen was raised to believe that human lives are more important than everything else. And now we are explained that the Israeli government itself is more important than Israeli life. Today, we want to talk about how all of this is being viewed by people inside Israel. And for that, I'm with Dalia Shendlin. She's a pollster and political analyst based in Tel Aviv,

and a columnist for Haaretz, The Guardian, and others. She's also the author of the recent book, The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel, Promise Unfulfilled. Hi, Dahlia. Thank you so much for talking to us. Hi. Thank you for having me on the show. So let's start with the protests that are taking place inside Israel. What is it that has motivated hundreds of thousands of citizens to flood the streets? What is their central demand? Well, first, you have to remember

that protests have been taking place in Israel over these issues. And I say these issues because they're a couple of combined issues, but they've been going on for months and months, really all year. In fact, various kinds of demonstrations on behalf of hostage release began within a couple of months after the war began. And many people think that the pressure, public pressure, for the government to reach a deal for hostage release is part of what motivated the first hostage deal in late November. The relatives of the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza are hoping the deal to release them is real. And that 50 of the more than 200 people held captive by Hamas will be freed starting tomorrow. But the Israeli public has been extremely anguished and concerned that there has not been another deal to release hostages, which would mean a ceasefire. And there are serious implications for what that kind of a deal would mean for Israel.

But the people who are going out and demonstrating want to prioritize the release of the hostages, and particularly, of course, those who are still alive. And there have been double demonstrations every week. One is led by the hostage families or a group within the families of hostages. And it's very subdued, and they're just calling on the government

to prioritize the hostages. But there's a much bigger demonstration every week around the corner from the first, which is bigger and much more politically activist and aggressive in a way. But those protesters have been saying the government is responsible. There should be new elections. Get rid of Netanyahu and start with a hostage release deal. I'm here because I think this government should resign. Like they're not doing enough.

They're ruining the country. Like they're not doing enough. They're ruining the country. Like, they're ruining the economy. They're not bringing the hostages. And what we saw on Saturday evening was a level of desperation. It started on Saturday evening because the rumors about the six hostages who were executed by Hamas

were going around based on social media networks. And they were not yet confirmed, but people began feeling very agitated already at the regular Saturday evening demonstration. And so people were already very on edge, worried that these hostages were killed. And the names were going around as well. And some of them were names of hostages who had become practically household names in Israel, whose families were particularly active and had been talking about these hostages all year. And people felt like they knew them.

And on Sunday morning, when the army and the government confirmed that those six hostages were dead, I think that the anguish reached a level of desperation. People internalized that the government really is prepared for the hostages to die rather than reach a deal that would involve what the Israeli government considers concessions that are too big to make. It shocked me what happened on Sunday when they found all the six bodies who were actively murdered by Hamas and that Netanyahu let this happen by any chance. And the fact that Netanyahu has basically showed no remorse ever since is just despicable and it makes me ashamed. And so there's a serious dispute over whether Israel can make those concessions and still

achieve what the prime minister has described as the war aims. But the protesters, and they do represent a majority according to surveys, are absolutely unequivocal that the lives of the hostages come first and that they should be released no matter what the no matter what the kinds of concessions that would need to be made, even though some of them may have red lines. But for the most part, they just want the deal done. And that's why so many more came out the next day. On Sunday night, there were over 300,000 people in Tel Aviv alone. But there were protests all around the country. The next night, there were big protests in Jerusalem. But there were protests all around the country. The next night, there were big protests in Jerusalem.

And people were simply expressing desperation and the demand for the government to move ahead with that kind of hostage release deal. We're demanding from the government to stop putting anything that is in the way of having a deal. We don't want it in any other way, because in any other way, people are losing their lives. How have we seen Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other members of his government respond to these protests? Prime Minister Netanyahu has essentially dug in. He saw the protests. He's heard the calls from around the world and in Israel, of course, to get the hostages back. But he is very, very committed with an almost ironclad commitment to apparently to not getting a deal. Now, people are heavily, heavily disputing why he doesn't want to get to a deal. But what he did was call a press conference on Monday evening in which he really presented a very, very almost combative,

well, I would say confrontational position. And he explained in great detail why he would never give in on what has become rather recently the biggest sticking point in those negotiations, which is that Israel would either draw down and eventually give up its control over the line that separates Gaza from Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian territory. That's called the Philadelphia Corridor. So we set, as far as Gaza is concerned, three war goals. The first war goal was to destroy Hamas's military and governing capabilities. The second was to free our hostages. And the third was to ensure that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel.

And all three of those goals go through Israel's control of the Philadelphia corridor. And Netanyahu has kind of brought this into the negotiations at a fairly late stage, which caused lots of people to doubt that that's really the core concern. Negotiations have been going on pretty much since the last hostage deal in November, but this issue only became kind of front and center to Netanyahu's thinking in recent weeks, as it appeared that there was greater pressure from the U.S., possibly Hamas accepting the basic outlines of the deal that had been presented, and Netanyahu apparently looking for ways not to have to agree to that deal. Now, the heads of Israel's security establishment have said that Israel can accept the deal as it is developed now,

including the compromise that would be made over control of the Philadelphia corridor, which would happen in stages. And they have said that Israel can cope with this from a security perspective. And so a lot of Israelis are really questioning if Netanyahu isn't kind of conjuring a new excuse not to reach a deal because he's already decided that he is prepared to give up on the life of the hostages in order to continue the war. And of course, the deeper doubt in Israeli minds is that Netanyahu really only wants to perpetuate the war to satisfy his coalition partners who have threatened to topple the government if he goes ahead with that deal. Of course, the further right-wing coalition partners do not want the ceasefire deal because they don't want the ceasefire. They want to continue the war.

And a number of the ministers have been open, well, particularly the Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Security, who are from these ultra-nationalist parties. They have stated very clearly at points over the course of the year that they want to reconquer Gaza and establish Israeli settlements there. And so they don't want the war to end. And Israelis are increasingly believed that Netanyahu is doing this mainly to satisfy them and not for the good of the country. Let's talk more about Israeli public opinion. I mean, starting with the hostages, what is the majority opinion of the best way to get them back? Well, I don't think the question is really asked in terms of what is the best way to get them back. back? Well, I don't think the question is really asked in terms of what is the best way to get them back. Most of the time, polls have been asking, would you support or oppose a deal that

involves release of the hostages in return for a ceasefire and the release of Palestinian prisoners? Almost without regard to how the question is asked, you have a majority of Israelis, usually between 55 and 60 percent, who support the hostage release deal because they prioritize getting the hostages back even at the cost of the concessions that are on the table, whatever they may have been proposing in that particular survey. And that's been a very consistent finding. I don't think I've seen a single survey, not in my own run or in any of the other public surveys, that have shown more people who were opposed to a deal than those who support it, knowing that these contain significant concessions. You know, Netanyahu has been a polarizing figure for a long time now,

certainly long predating this war. Some might say that, you know, the war has kind of breathed new life into his political career. But how have we seen public opinion on his leadership shift over the past 11 months? What's interesting is that in most countries, when a war breaks out, there is a wave of support for the leadership and for the country and for the war. We call it in the polling world and oftentimes just in general media commentary, the rally round the flag effect. People feel very, very much unified, oftentimes on the defensive, no matter which side they're on in the war. And they support the war and they support their government. Many leaders get a major boost during the beginning of a war.

leaders get a major boost during the beginning of a war. For example, George W. Bush after September 11th, or Volodymyr Zelensky when the war broke out when Russia attacked Ukraine. In the case of Israel, we saw this rally around the flag effect for Israeli society in terms of widespread support for the war. But the first thing that happened politically was a plunge in support for Netanyahu. And that remained the case. Those general a plunge in support for Netanyahu. And that remained the case. Those general dynamics of like, you know, very low support for Netanyahu, for his party, which lost about half of its support at the worst point. And the government remained at this low point for the better part of the first six months. But what's interesting or what I started to notice is that around early April, around April and throughout April, what we saw is a little bit of recovery, sort of slow and very small and incremental at first.

And so, you know, in the beginning of April, I wasn't really sure and I thought it was a tentative finding. But over time, that recovery has continued. It's really interesting. I mean, Netanyahu continues to maintain the position that Israel's military campaign in Gaza and elsewhere will not end until Hamas is destroyed or eliminated. And how are people in the country right now responding to that proposition that this war continues until Hamas ceased to exist? until Hamas ceased to exist. Well, this is also worth putting into context. Many wars, when they go on for a long time, lose public support over time, because at first the public is all, you know, rallied again and fearful and feels the need to defend themselves by supporting the war. But when wars go on for too long, oftentimes you will see a drop-off of public support.

In Israel, we don't really have any indication that there is a drop-off in support, for example, for the justification for the war. We don't see much by way of soul searching about the level of destruction in Gaza. And I should specify that those last two points really characterize the Jewish Israeli population for everything related to Palestinian citizens of Israel. About 20 percent of the population, their attitudes towards the war are quite the opposite. They have not been supportive of this war. They think it has gone overboard from the beginning. They very much support a hostage release deal and a ceasefire. And they, of course, overwhelmingly support humanitarian aid, things that we don't see from the majority of Israeli Jews. And that trend hasn't

really changed over time. But what I do see changing over time is the level of confidence, including among Israeli Jews, that Israel can achieve those aims that Netanyahu has been talking about. Benjamin Netanyahu has been enumerating from the beginning the aims of the war as toppling Hamas's military and governing capacity, making sure that Gaza can never be a threat to Israel again, recovering the hostages. And eventually he added on safety in the northern region because there's also a brewing war between Israel and Hezbollah and Lebanon that has led to mass displacement from people in the north as well as the south. So he's added as one of the goals that people in the north should be able to return safely, which would mean that he has managed to de-escalate all fronts. But the other thing that he's taken criticism for is that he often, he usually, I would say most of the time,

begins by talking about the goal of destroying Hamas's governing and military capacities, rather than prioritizing the hostage release. And that has been grating on Israelis from the beginning. And then I think there is an increasing sense that Israelis don't know what it means to destroy Hamas completely. There's a lot of talk about how you cannot destroy an idea, how it would be impossible to physically kill every single person ever associated with Hamas, if that's what he means. But of course, he won't actually say what he means. There's plenty of evidence that Israel has killed a great deal, a great number of Hamas fighters. The government claims that 17 or 18,000 of them and that they have destroyed major battalions of Hamas. But the Israeli public has not been told what it would

mean, at which point we can say now Hamas has been incapacitated. The war is over. And as a result, we do see in surveys a declining sense of confidence about whether Israel can achieve those aims. And majority of Israelis still don't believe that he is making these decisions with purely, you know, the national interests in mind. They believe his decision making is tainted by his own personal political needs. And that affects their sense of whether they can trust things like his statements about victory being just a step away. In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization. Empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections.

Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here. You may have seen my money show on Netflix. I've been talking about money for 20 years. I've talked to millions of people and I have some startling numbers to share with you. Did you know that of the people I speak to, 50% of them do not know their own household income? That's not a typo. 50%. That's because money is confusing. In my new book and podcast, Money for Couples, I help you and your partner create a financial vision together. To listen to this podcast, just search for Money for Couples. I want to pick up on a couple threads from what you were just talking about, Dalia.

I mean, one of them is, talk to me more about how you've noticed people's opinions on Palestinian people change over these past 11 months. And, you know, maybe what kind of things now feel like acceptable to say or acceptable kind of in the discourse in Israel that a lot of people might have previously balked at? Well, I mean, I would say, you know, maybe I should also give some context here. I conduct regular polling that is what we call joint polling among Israelis and Palestinians. So my colleagues and I, my colleague, Dr. Fela Shikaki, and I for a number of years, for about six years now, seven years, have been doing polling where we ask the same questions of both sides, including mutual perceptions. And that joint survey research goes back way before my involvement, at least 20 years. And I can say that by December 2022,

the last time we had done one of those joint surveys, mutual perceptions were at an absolute low point. Israelis felt terribly about Palestinians. They thought the worst. They thought that Palestinians had the worst possible intentions. They thought you could not trust Palestinians. And it was a mirror image. Palestinians felt the exact same thing about Israelis. So the starting point was not good. And Israelis do not mince words. They talk about these things if they want to. The only difference was that before the war, many Israelis simply weren't thinking about Palestinians. And I can give you an example. In the massive demonstrations going on all year, claiming to advocate for preserving democracy in Israel, very, very few, only a handful of protesters

actually would openly criticize the occupation. All the rest basically took the attitude that why should we have to talk about that now? We're talking about democracy in Israel as if these things can be separated. They cannot be separated, of course. It's the same state and it's the same institutions and the same people making the policy for both the Israeli government and the occupation. But many Israelis did not make that just as the international media often doesn't truly pay attention to the issue until there's violence, Israelis didn't really think they had to resolve the conflict until, because it was, it was kind of on a back burner. And they had learned to live with a certain manageable level of violence for a long time. And they did not have any moral qualms or political qualms about essentially being an occupying force. Now, after October 7th, given the negative impressions each

had of the other side beforehand, it definitely didn't make them feel any better about Palestinians. And so what we saw is widespread justification of the war and widespread approval of the level of force being used. Many people even thought there wasn't enough force being used, but I should again qualify. Those attitudes really characterized the Jewish Israeli population. Palestinian citizens of Israel held the opposite attitude. They thought too much force was being used and there wasn't enough attention to humanitarian needs or preservation of civilian life. But the attitudes among Israeli Jews, from what we could

tell, not every survey asked these questions, but they were pretty consistent. And, you know, in a survey from January, for example, you had over 90% of Israelis who thought Israel should be using, is using the right amount of force or should use more. You had 87% who said, of Israeli Jews, who said the number of Palestinian casualties was justified. And I would say, you know, even though that's many months ago now, I don't have an indication from surveys that there has been a significant difference. I mean, it's a very tragic reality. I think Israelis are really shutting down their hearts to the absolute devastation of Gaza and civilian life there. Having said that, Israelis are simply all consumed. And this does carry over into the Arab or Palestinian citizens of Israel. They are consumed with their own grief and fear. You know, this is a population that is traumatized. At one point, over 200,000 were displaced. Many people, everybody seems to have some connection to somebody who was killed on October 7th or held hostage or, you know, suffered atrocities or terrible things. And so, of course, there's also fear of a regional war. The geographic spread of people who've been affected by this

ranges from north, center, and south, right? Even here in Tel Aviv, where we're not actually on the front lines of anything, there has been rocket fire throughout the year up until some months ago. So everybody is affected by this. And frankly, I think people are in a kind of survival mode. I mean, you've already touched on this, but I just want to drill down on something a little more. I mean, you know, obviously, we've been talking about these calls for a ceasefire as a means to get the hostages back. But obviously, as we've just been talking about, like, there has been incredible human suffering in Gaza over the past 11 months, I mean, an estimated 40,000 dead, now a polio outbreak. The IDF is also ramping up attacks in the West

Bank right now. So amid all that, I mean, tell me more about your sense of, you know, how Israelis are seeing this or how much people are even kind of talking about the details of what's happening on the ground to civilians in Gaza and in the West Bank? Remember that there's nobody, you know, it's very rare for anybody in Israeli society of serious political stature or influence to make the case that Israel could be, you know, waging the war to the extent necessary to secure its boundaries and its security and protect its citizens without doing this level of damage. Israelis are essentially being told day in, day out, or simply not being told anything else, that this is the only way to survive. And I think that that reflects, again, I don't want to let the

public off the hook. I think every human being has a moral imperative to know these things and to stand against them, frankly. But I don't dismiss that people are, again, living in a kind of survival mode, especially because, you know, what happened on October 7th was so terrible in itself, but also dredges up lots of the historic memory of persecution of the Jews in Israeli society. But I think more than anything else, it's a failure of leadership. in Israeli society. But I think more than anything else, it's a failure of leadership. And even the word failure is letting the Israeli political leadership off the hook too much. This is a cynical decision by the Israeli political leaders. And let's say even if they are right wing and deeply ideologically committed to doing this kind of damage, there are opposition parties. There are people who feel differently. They have recently started to say, well, it's really time to end this war and get a ceasefire and get the hostage deal done.

But none of them are talking about an alternate path by which Israel could have prosecuted some of the war aims while being much more targeted and careful to protect Palestinian civilian lives, you know, discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, proportionality, the kinds of things that are, you know, at the basis, at the heart of the accusations against Israel in international courts right now. And I don't expect, you know, I don't really expect the public to be international law scholars. I don't expect them to be political or military strategists. That's not their job. But that is the job of politicians.

And it certainly is the job of regular people to, you know, know what's being done in their name. And, you know, at the very least to, you know, pay attention and care about the fact that people right now kind of the way that the rest of the world is looking at Israel. And the way the nature of this military campaign in Gaza has shifted international public opinion about Israel. I mean, there have been obviously these huge protests around the world against this military campaign. Obviously, these huge protests around the world against this military campaign. There are also cases, you know, these cases at the International Court of Justice, possibly at the International Criminal Court. How are people inside the country looking at all of that right now? Well, there is a very kind of strong narrative that's taken hold that in the first days after October 7th, the entire world was on Israel's side.

Israel had a lot of sympathy. Everybody was, you know, revolted by what Hamas had done, attacking civilians, committing atrocities, etc., taking hostages. And that after a short time, the world turned against Israel. This is how Israelis constantly repeat the story of how the world thinks about it. But people who are on Netanyahu's side, and I think this really does break down politically. Believe that the world is just inherently and endemically anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. Now, that also, both of those attitudes fallen within a rubric of a much, much longer term perception across the Israel that the U.N. is virulently anti-Israel and that international courts are also anti-Israel. And, you know, this is something that is almost axiomatic in Israeli life, that these bodies exist in order to torment Israel and single Israel out for the kinds of things that every other country does and gets away with it. Now, that's a caricature, but I have to tell you that it is not far off from how, you know, most Israelis, including on the center and even in the mainstream left wing, you know, other than, let's say, you know, the more firm left. Many of these are very, very widespread attitudes. So, you know, on one level, there is a political critique of Netanyahu and how he's been running the war and has he strategically alienated Israel's international allies. Israel's international allies. But it does fall into, you know, a kind of longstanding presumption that is kind of across the board among Jewish Israeli life, that Israel is singled out for

bad treatment. By the way, I don't know if it's clear to your listeners, but it's really not true. In other words, there are reasons why Israel sometimes seems to have more, for example, UN resolutions condemning its behavior, but that's partly because the conflict has gone on for so long that it has garnered more international attention over all that length of time. And in terms of sanctions regimes, for example, there have been no significant sanctions on Israel for most of its history up until now. And even now, the sanctions that have been placed by the U.S. are limited and targeted to just a few people and a couple of organizations. These are attitudes in Israel that are so fixed in people's minds that they don't actually ever look at the international community and soberly assess what kinds of countries are doing things that are akin to what Israel is doing and what kinds of sanctions or punishments those countries have received, they persist in the absolute conviction that Israel is being targeted. And that is part of the context by which many Israelis say, well, even if Netanyahu didn't run this war well, even if I personally don't trust Netanyahu, ultimately the world would never be on our

side anyway. And it also completely ignores, of course, that Israel has overwhelming support of the world's most powerful country. Let's just finally land on that point. You know, the U.S. has been the key funder of this conflict and it's been Israel's most important partner, really, for most of the country's existence. So what are people in Israel thinking right now about Joe Biden and how he has handled the relationship during this war? grateful for Biden's support, his words of support, his visit. People remember how he said, don't, you know, threatening Israel's enemies, don't join in this attack. And they felt like he really gave that great big bear hug. They were grateful. It is regularly said that Joe Biden feels the passion and support for Israel in his kishkas, which is Yiddish for in his gut. Like, it's a truly authentic feeling. However, however, that had very limited cachet in Israeli life. In other words, the moment the moment the Biden administration even made any comments or, you know, barely suggested that Israel had been using too much force or not sufficiently supporting humanitarian aid in Gaza, or maybe should be moving towards a ceasefire, which some people think is good for Israel.

or maybe should be moving towards a ceasefire, which some people think is good for Israel. At that very moment, it becomes as if he is a big enemy of Israel. And I say that not because he is, but because much of the Israeli discourse judges. has continued to give overwhelming amounts of financial, military aid, and political coverage. America has protected Israel in the U.N. Security Council, vetoing various resolutions that Israel didn't want. Now, some people also are paying a little more, you know, closer attention. And, you know, the news commentators generally do report that Biden is also taking a lot of criticism and pressure, certainly from within his own party in the U.S. And, you know, some people will give him the

benefit of the doubt, so to speak, and say, well, he's being pressured by the progressive wing of his party. He himself would be a strong ally of Israel. But even that, of course, completely ignores the fact that he has continued all of this time, essentially doing nothing to constrain what Israel's done other than try to bring rhetorical pressure. And again, the sanctions that have been placed on just a very, very few people in Israeli life are noted, well noted in Israeli society,

but they don't actually have any impact on the fighting. Dahlia, this has all been so fascinating. Thank you so much for your time. I really appreciated talking to you. Thank you for having me. All right, that is all for today. FrontBurner was produced this week by Derek VanderWijk, Joythasen Gupta, Matt Mews, Matt Amha, and Elaine Chao. Sound design was by Mackenzie Thank you. For more CBC Podcasts, go to cbc.ca slash podcasts.