Front Burner - Why Russia has Europe on edge

Episode Date: September 23, 2026

Earlier this week, Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party won a record number of seats in the country's parliamentary elections. Putin is expected to frame the result as an endorsement of his war with Ukraine. And, according to Ukrainian intelligence, he may mobilize hundreds of thousands more Russian troops before the end of the year. All of this has Europe on edge. Because Russia hasn't just been targeting Ukraine – but Ukraine’s allies too. In the last few weeks, a Russian ship fired flares at a Danish military helicopter, NATO jets shot down a drone over Lithuania, and Germany thwarted a suspected Russian drone attack at one of their airports. Many observers think Russia is intentionally trying to provoke NATO. But why? And what happens if NATO decides to fight back? Victor Jack, POLITICO’s NATO reporter, joins us from NATO’s headquarters in Brussels.For transcripts of Front Burner, please visit: https://www.cbc.ca/radio/frontburner/transcripts

The following is paid content for Desjardin. Lately, it feels like everyone has a take on Gen Z. There's a misconception that everybody in our generation wants things handed to them, which is so unfair. A lot of the circumstances that other generations got to have, we simply do not have. So when Dejordan asked me to go out and hear directly from young people, I was all in. Because between Sky High Rent, $10 Lottes, and the AI Revolution,

got a lot to unpack. We went out to see what Gen Z's reality actually looks like, and we made a web series out of it. It'll be on CBC Gem. It's called Countess In, and honestly, I think you guys are going to love it. This is a CBC podcast. Hi everyone. I'm Jamie Poisson. Earlier this week, Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party won a record number of seats in Russia's parliamentary elections. The election was widely criticized as illegitimate. Most real opposition candidates weren't even allowed to run.

But Putin is expected to frame the result as an endorsement of his war with Ukraine. And according to Ukrainian intelligence, he may mobilize hundreds of thousands more Russian troops before the end of the year. All of this has Europe on edge because in recent months, Russia hasn't just been targeting Ukraine, but Ukraine's allies too. In the last few weeks, a Russian ship fired flares at a Danish military helicopter, NATO jets shot down a drone over Lithuania, and Germany thwarted a suspected Russian drone attack at one of their airports. Many observers think Russia is intentionally trying to provoke NATO. But why? And what happens if NATO decides to fight back. Victor Jack is Politico's NATO reporter and he joins me now from NATO's headquarters in

Brussels. Victor, hey, it's great to have you. Hi, thanks for having me. Thank you for making the time. I know this is a really busy week for you. Let's start with the parliamentary election that just happened in Russia election in air quotes. I don't think anyone was surprised by the result, obviously, but could it still be consequential? Yeah, I mean, it's a good question to start off. with. I mean, you know, these elections in Russia, you know, where, you know, there have been various kind of allegations and evidence of, you know, ballot stuffing, of payments, of kind of pressure for people to vote. I'd say less about, you know, having an election or about the outcome or about the result. I mean, they just tell you something about, you know, the state of the government and of the

regime in Russia. United Russia. Now, that's a party backed by President Vladimir Putin is leading the parliamentary election count there. It has won more than 57 percent of the government. of the vote. The party is said to control nearly 80% of the 450-seat parliament, which is an all-time high. It's really more about legitimizing Putin's rule amid little fragments of information that escape the regime, which show that there's some disquiet potentially both among the general population and among Russian elites as well. And in really enforcing Putin's rule, particularly also in the four regions that Russia has designated, in Ukraine as part of Russia, which obviously isn't recognized by the international community and really enforcing the people there, you are now part of Russia. So I think it's really more

about that potentially than about the outcome itself, which, you know, it always records unusually higher results for the ruling party. It was just a couple of days ago on Sunday that Ukraine hit Moscow with what Moscow's mayor said were the largest drone strikes the city has ever seen. It is a war of attrition and it's growing ever more violent. An oil refinery near Moscow set alight by several drones in this Ukrainian attack. This is the dramatic moment when a drone flies towards and then strikes a warehouse. In the midst of Ukraine's drone strikes apartment buildings were also damaged throughout Moscow. They reportedly hit another major oil refinery on Monday night. The Kremlin has vowed to intensify its strikes on Keefe and

response. How do you see this playing out over the next few weeks? You know, I think you have to see Ukraine's strategy here. I mean, it's driven by kind of three objectives, I'd say, these kind of deep strikes into Russia, into the refineries and more broadly. The first thing is to kind of bring the war closer to the Russian people and to prove. Putin. Ultimately, I think the social contracts that Putin has kind of engaged his elites and his population with since the start of the war and before is, you know, this is a foreign war. It's a small conflict, you know, ultimately, it's something that's under control. The more that, you know, Ukraine is able to disrupt ordinary life and even cause casualties, the more that

social contracts is threatening, the more a potential risk to the Putin regime. I think the second point is it obviously gives leverage for negotiations as well for Ukraine with Russia, especially heading into this winter period, right? Because in winter, Russia always gains the upper hand because it bombards Ukraine's energy infrastructure and puts it in a weaker position for talks. And also obviously the third and most obvious reason is to kind of hurt Russia's war machine. I mean, Ukraine claims that he took out a big Russian refinery here. And, you know, in the past month or two, we've even seen incidents and times of where, And Russia has actually been importing diesel and oil products, you know, for the first time as a major exporter.

I think that's obviously damaging for Russia's, you know, own narrative about how it sees the war as well. I wanted to ask you, Russia's Federal Security Service, the FSB, has imposed temporary movement restrictions and curfews in two districts across the border from Estonia. And an Estonian border official said this was not routine, but neither is it anything particularly extorting. in Estonia's interior minister didn't rule out the possibility that that could signal the mobilization of Russian troops. So when we're talking about what we could expect here, like, how do you interpret those curfews in these latest moves? Yeah, so I think the Estonians have been very cautious here, right? I mean, because, you know, I think this is the delicate balance that all the frontline states who Russia want to have, right? I mean, on the one hand, they want to convince NATO and other

NATO allies that have been skeptical of the Russian threat, that, you know, Russia is a real threat to the alliance and to Europe. But obviously, they don't want to go too far and, you know, seem as if there's an imminent invasion as well, which will, you know, potentially so anxiety and make Russia seem like it's, you know, more powerful than it potentially is. So I think you have to see that in this context. I mean, Estonians have said that effectively these restrictions were around the Russian election. So, you know, it might be to kind of restrict any kind of, interference with those elections as a sensitive time for Russia, despite, you know, the result being, you know, a kind of preordained outcome, you know, some experts might say. So I think it's

kind of about that. Russia claimed a plethora of reasons why this was the case, including protecting their aquatic biological resources in the area, which I'm not sure is particularly convincing to observers, but definitely another motivation, I think, for Russia here is, you know, to sow kind of fear in populations as well, because not only does that make them seem strong, but I think it also pushes European publics into thinking, okay, well, we need to just tie up this war with Ukraine under any possible circumstances, because ultimately, you know, Russia is a massive threat and it's, you know, we have to just sort this out in any case. So it's a really delicate balance, I think, for both sides here.

Just to pick up on that point here, there are concerns about a full-scale invasion, but more of the focus is on these so-called hybrid attacks, right? Throughout the war, Russia has been provoking Ukraine's allies with what are known as hybrid attacks. And just what are hybrid attacks? So yeah, so hybrid attacks are kind of anything that's below the fresh. of a conventional military attack. And so it's kind of a vast range of possible things that fall under that. I mean, everything from sabotage attempts, which, you know, as you mentioned, we saw in the Leipzig airport in Germany recently, it could be cyber attacks, it could be, you know, stray missiles or

drones, which, you know, might cross into NATO territory and might be either an accident or played off as an accident. And so you have this vast kind of array of possible things. And that's also, I think, the difficulty as well. And I think there's a lot of talk around rejecting this notion of hybrid threats because, you know, ultimately characterizing a sabotage attempt that could potentially kill people is far more than, you know, a small cyber attack or a stray drone, right? And I think there's a lot of discussion inside NATO about whether, you know, we need to be dispensing of this term altogether. Is it really useful anymore? And does it help Russia more than it helps NATO? Last week, the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, said that Russia is planning strikes

with drones or rockets on Ukraine's allies, including Poland. Lithuanian, France, the Netherlands have all made similar warnings now. Germany is reportedly preparing its hospitals for conflict. Just what exactly, tell me more about what exactly Europe is bracing for here. Yeah, again, it's a difficult one. I mean, if maybe, you know, zooming in on Tusk specifically, right? So he made these comments kind of alleging more or less that Poland have got new intelligence that Russia was planning.

an incursion in the coming months potentially into a NATO country. Then you had France's Emmanuel Macron and you had the Netherlands's Robbieten, Prime Minister, both kind of defend those comments as well, as well as the Lithuanian foreign minister. But what the foreign minister said is we have the same intelligence as Tusk and we got this intelligence he suggested in July. So to me that indicates that ultimately this is the same intelligence that was, you know, the US were sharing around.

around in July, August and that was leaked around a potential incursion in the coming months for the coming years. And I think that, you know, Tuss' comment caused a bit of confusion here because as far as, you know, lots of NATO diplomats that I talk to here are aware, there hasn't been any new intelligence assessment that they've been briefed on. And NATO's threat assessment of a Russian attack hasn't really increased. So I think part of it is, you know, Tusk trying to, again, and raise the kind of alert levels and the population raised that kind of threat assessment across NATO. Ultimately, I think there's also some internal politicking going on because, you know, he's jostling for influence on who can see the strongest on Russia with President Karol Nadvotsky,

who's from a different party and the Polish elections are coming up. I think, you know, there's a bit of internal politicking going on here as well. The following is paid content for Desjardin. Lately, it feels like everyone has a take on Gen Z. There's a misconception that everybody in our generation wants things handed to them, which is so unfair. A lot of the circumstances that other generations got to have, we simply do not have. So when Dejordan asked me to go out and hear directly from young people,

I was all in. Because between Sky High Rent, $10 Laties, and the AI Revolution, got a lot to unpack. We went out to see what Gen Z's reality actually looks like, and we made a web series out of it. It'll be on CBC Gem. It's called Count Us In, and honestly, I think you guys are going to love it. Mr. President, my company formed me of the explosion on our rig.

On October 2nd. Causing massive water displacement and triggering the tsunami. They all heap to blame on me. Tom Cruise is. Digger got us into this mess. And Digger's gonna dig us out. From the director of Birdman and the Revenant. What would happen if I stop doing?

You starve. You freeze to death. That's what? With great power comes great deniability. I'm not the earth, Danny. Digger. See the trail online. Only views October 2nd. Tell me more about what Russia's strategy is here.

So according to a July report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as many as 450,000 Russians have already died in this war. And just given those staggering losses, why would they want to antagonize NATO like this? I think it's kind of three broad reasons driving this from this kind of pattern from Russia. the first is to weaken support for Ukraine. So the more they can kind of push this. And some of the hybrid attacks, the Russian narrative has been, oh, well, actually this is a Ukrainian drone,

even though, you know, evidence points in a different direction. So I think it's about weakening, you know, military aids and financial support to Ukraine to make things easier for Russia, right, on the battlefield. I think the second factor is, you know, it's around testing NATO resolve. They're trying to really test the boundaries here and see, you know, to what extent can we push NATO into such a situation? situation that there just won't be any sort of collective approach or unity on this. And so that's them kind of testing the limits there. And then the third factor is, you know, what we mentioned

before, which is effectively make themselves seem so powerful and so threatening that people panic into thinking, okay, well, let's just get a Ukraine deal across the line on any terms possible. Is that strategy working at all? Is it having that effect in Europe? Yeah, it's difficult to say, really. I think at the political level, the line is still holding. I think most mainstream politicians and most governments in Europe are very much maintaining this line. We're not going to be deterred. We're going to continue support for Ukraine and we're going to stay united. The strike on a peasantry train in Ukraine yesterday shows how desperate Putin has become. He thinks that he can stop us from supporting Ukraine and that he can undermine our unity.

He is wrong. Our answer is to increase support to Ukraine, so it has what it needs, to defend itself. I think behind the scenes there's a bit of anxiety around this and perhaps some splits kind of starting to emerge, but ultimately I think the line is holding. When you look at the European public and the population, people are thinking, well, actually maybe Russia isn't so much of a threat. Our economic problems are more important. So that's maybe a potential first sign or symptom there.

But otherwise, I think for now, the line is holding and the elections next year will be kind of really the critical test, right, of this. When you say that there are some splits emerging behind the scenes, I mean, just tell me more about that. Where might those be? I think the splits kind of inside NATO, you know, as they always are really kind of fairly regional in terms of, you know, to what extent should we confront Russia or to what extent should we escalate. So I think that obviously the frontline states think that we need to maintain a really tough line on Russia. You know, there's even discussion in some quarters here at NATO that, you know, some delegations want to discuss, you know, where the Article 5 clause would actually apply for a hybrid attack. So that's the mutual defense provision, you know, that's foundational to NATO. But others say that's an absolute non-starter.

We're not going to escalate to military confrontation. So I think that's a kind of perennial discussion that's existed, but it's really. really kind of sharpened, let's say, in recent weeks and months. Has it ultimately resulted in an inability to deal with these hybrid attacks? I mean, I asked this because between January and August, there were 100 officially recognized incidents, but a senior NATO official told you the real number was easily 200 plus, right? And it does seem like the response from Europe has been quite subdued. Yeah, no, absolutely.

I mean, I think, you know, the NATO take on this, the official line is, you know, and you've seen Secretary General Mar Grutter say this repeatedly, we are doing things, but this is happening behind the scenes and ultimately you'll never know. Partly that's fair and true. I think, you know, NATO as an institution isn't really designed and doesn't have the tools to kind of deal with hybrid attacks below this conventional military kind of threshold, right? And it's more national intelligence agencies which will surreptitiously, you know, carry out offensive cyber operations, for example, against Russia, but never publicly say anything about it. So to some extent, that's fair. I think on the other hand, ultimately, in terms of, you know, the strategic communications issue with NATO is that simply just doesn't cut the mustard, right? I mean, you can't say as NATO, we're doing things, we're really strong, we're confronting Russia, we're deterring them, but you'll just have to take our word for it. I mean, I think in the public's eye, that's a bit of a strange argument to me. make, just take our word about something so serious that involves so much defense spending,

so much taxpayer money. So I think this is, you know, NATO is in a real bind here, at least in its communications around this. You talked about Article 5, which says that an attack on one NATO country is an attack on all. Do you see a scenario in which one of these hybrid attacks would cause Article 5? have to be invoked? Like what could that scenario be? Yeah, no, it's a good question. It's kind of a million dollar question here in a moment. Look, I think these discussions around restarting, you know, a debate around what meets Article 5 legally, etc. in a way or a bit of a distraction, right? I mean, Article 5, yes, is a legal thing, but ultimately NATO is a political organization and whether or not

we trigger Article 5 is ultimately a political decision, right? So I think it just really does. depends at the point at which the kind of pain threshold that allies reach and whether there's kind of consensus and solidarity around that. So it's really hard to envisage exactly what that means. I mean, and NATO allies agreed that, you know, hybrid attacks, including mass cyber attacks, could count as an Article 5 scenario. So that's kind of already on the books. The question is now much more of a political one, really. If Article 5 was invoked, what would be the most likely scenario that would lead to that? That would lead to that. Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, I think, you know, when we're coming to hybrid attacks and sabotage attempts, I think it would

really have to be something with mass casualties at this point. I think, unfortunately, I'm not sure whether they would be consensus around triggering Article 5 if, you know, there were even 50 or 100 casualties, you know, after a particular attack, simply because NATO, again, has a limited set of tools. if the response is, you know, a missile strike into Russia or kind of battalions which are sent into Russia, then immediately, you know, we sort of escalate into a huge kind of military conflict. So I think that ultimately, you know, this is really the number one question here that's really difficult to answer. But, you know, my guess would be, you know, some incident that really, really has significant amounts of casualties and can very, very clearly be attributed to Russia.

But, you know, I think at this point, anything under that is unlikely to be honest. I mean, just because we've seen some examples of this recently, what if like a Russian drone makes its way into Poland and ends up killing Polish citizens? What do you think would likely happen then? Yeah, I mean, I think under that scenario, absolutely there would be Article 4, which is NATO legalese for basically triggering urgent consultations. So we saw this happen a few times last year with similar characteristics. of incursions and stray drones and that sort of thing. So at least that would show an element

of solidarity. So that would perhaps neutralize this argument from Russia that NATO is weak, NATO is divided over us. However, I'm not sure necessarily, you know, again, if it's sort of, there were a few casualties, whether it would lead to Article 5 purely because, you know, the risk of escalation into a wider regional or even global conflict are just very high. and I think that's something that's very present on people's minds here. And by the way, kind of, you know, the NATO line, and, you know, I don't necessarily subscribe to it. But the NATO line here is that military deterrence has held. And that is why Russia is kind of doing so much in the hybrid domain.

Not sure that that necessarily will be the case given, you know, the potential risk for miscalculation. And, you know, you never know what's happening internally in the politics of Russia. But ultimately, that's, you know, the argument here. I imagine the other factor impacting this decision is whether the United States would join, right? You spoke to an Eastern European diplomat who said, we have considered calling for Article 5, but it could backfire, as it could show Putin that Trump is not ready to help. We're working very closely with the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, and we will get that one done. It's going to happen, I think, more quickly than people understand they've had it.

What do we know about how Trump might respond in the event that a NATO country is attacked by Russia, including if one of these hybrid attacks, there's a real miscalculation during one of them? No, absolutely. And I think, you know, since we've seen Donald Trump return to power, that's kind of been the number one question which has kind of plagued the alliance and the health of the alliance, let's say, given, you know, the various feuds that we've seen both over Greenland and over the Iran war in the past year here at NATO. So, you know, I think that the narrative here has been, you know, whatever Trump believes or doesn't personally believe in the moment, there's so many different kind of structural barriers built in and checks and balances built into the U.S. system, be it Congress, be it the Senate, be it, you know, the generals around Trump that ultimately, you know, the U.S. would step into help an ally. But ultimately, you know, the president is the commander in chief. it is his decision ultimately whether or not to send in the troops. So I think there's just an

unpredictability within the administration and with Trump himself, given also, you know, his kind of guttural, warm relationship with Putin personally that makes things a little bit unclear, especially, you know, with the midterms coming up as well and how that could also influence, I guess, his thinking and his views on foreign policy, depending on, you know, how that goes as well. Trump did just sign a piece of legislation, the Lindsay O'Gram sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 26, that gives him pretty sweeping powers to impose sanctions on Russia and their allies. Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky also called Trump this week and said they had an important conversation and that they have diplomatic momentum. The two leaders, I believe, will be meeting today in New York, where the UN is meeting this week. You and I are talking around 1.30, Eastern time.

It's very supportive. I hope that we will end this war and President Trump will help us to end this war. Well, I think they're going to make a deal, and I don't want to say what the deal is. We talk about it a lot, including with President Putin. And I think something's going to happen. What do you think all this means for potential U.S. involvement in this conflict? Are you buoyed by any of this? I think I've learned to take a bit of a way and see approach, right? what comes to this administration and its kind of policy towards Russia. I mean, again, you know,

in recent weeks, we've had slightly mixed signals on its Russia policy. On the one hand, you had CIA director John Radcliffe go to Moscow, reportedly to personally deliver a very rare message saying, do not mobilize, do not launch an incursion into a NATO country, which was read as obviously positive. But then you have obviously two negotiators, Kushner and Ritkoff that returned back to Moscow. And, you know, again, there were stories of, you know, a potential business deal with Russia as well. So it's very hot exactly where Trump himself and where the administration stands on Russia. And I'm not sure there is a clear line that's kind of, you know, communal to the administration, let's say, on this. On the sanctions bill,

I think that it's widely seen as positive in Europe that it's passed. However, it does still give Trump a great degree of responsibility, right? That's, that's, that's, the thing. I mean, as far as I understand, there's automatic, you know, sanctions of Putin, his ministers, officials, etc. But ultimately, only determined within 30 days. And Trump can also ask for a waiver on certain aspects of the bill as well, you know, including on this idea of secondary sanctions on countries, you know, China, India, others that buy significant amounts of energy from Russia. I've seen a lot of rhetoric sort of describing this moment as the possible rank of World War III.

Do you see any truth to that? Or do you think that kind of narrative is actually playing into Putin's hands? Again, I think it really comes down to this kind of defense communications dilemma that we were talking about before, right? I do think that, you know, the only thing I can say is obviously there's anxiety around, you know, these mounting hybrid attacks that are proliferating across Europe. here at NATO, I don't really see fears of a full-fledged conflict. And I've kind of repeatedly be asking people in the building, I mean, do you see this as imminent? You know, should we be scared of this? I mean, if you log on to X or Twitter these days, you know, you'd think we're going to war in about four times. But I think that here the senses, you know, military deterrence

is holding for now and there's a lot of noise around this. But it's impossible to tell. You know, I mean, you know, NATO allies, some of them were denying intelligence around the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 right up until it happens. So we have to fare with both as journalists and as officials, both the U.S.'s unpredictability and Russia's unpredictability. Victor, this was great. It was really nice to talk to you. Thank you so much for this. Thanks for having me. All right. That is all for today. I'm Jamie Poisson. Thanks so much for. listening. Talk to you tomorrow. For more CBC podcasts, go to cBC.ca.ca slash podcasts.