Front Burner - Will tanks end or escalate the war in Ukraine?

Episode Date: January 31, 2023

Last week, after months of requests, Germany agreed to send German-built tanks called Leopard 2s to Ukraine, to help in their fight against Russia. That decision opened the door for other countries to send their Leopard 2s, including Canada – which will send four. The US also jumped in, agreeing to send 31 of its M1 Abrams tanks. All in, over 300 tanks are being sent to the country. Now, Ukraine is asking for more weapons – including long range guided missiles – faster. But this begs the question: how will an influx of heavy weaponry change the situation on the ground? Could this mean an end to the war? Or could it mark the start of a new, increasingly violent and dangerous impasse? Rajan Menon is the Director of The Grand Strategy program at The Defence Priorities think tank. He’s also a senior research scholar at Columbia. He gives his take on how this next phase of the war could play out.

In the Dragon's Den, a simple pitch can lead to a life-changing connection. Watch new episodes of Dragon's Den free on CBC Gem. Brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections. This is a CBC Podcast. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson. It's the flagship of the German army, the Leopard 2, a heavily armed battle tank with superior firepower. So last week, after months of requests, Germany finally acquiesced to giving Ukraine these German-built tanks called Leopard IIs to help in the fight against Russia. Weighing close to 60 tons, it can hit targets at a distance of up to five kilometers and protect itself and other vehicles from all kinds of threats.

The decision opened the door for other countries to send their Leopard IIs as well, including Canada, which will send four. We begin with what could be a game changer on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. This is huge news, right? And very welcome news for Vladimir Zelensky and all of Ukraine. This is a major step for allies' support for Ukraine. And it's that continuing high level of support that's so critical to keep the Ukrainian resistance going. The U.S. jumped in too, agreeing to send 31 of its M1 Abrams tanks. All in, over 300 tanks are being sent to the country. Now Ukraine is asking for more weapons faster, including long-range guided missiles.

During his nightly address on Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized the importance of keeping up his country's offensive momentum. Russia hopes to drag out the war and exhaust our forces. So we have to make time our weapon. We have to accelerate developments. We have to speed up the supply and launch of new necessary military options for Ukraine. So today, we're going to talk about how an influx of heavy weaponry could change the situation on the ground and whether it will help to end or just escalate the war. Raja Menon is the director of the Grand Strategy Program at the Defense Priorities Think Tank. He is also a senior research scholar at Columbia.

Hi, Rajen. Thank you so much for coming on to FrontBurner. Thank you. Let's start with the tanks, which have been described as a game changer. And why are these tanks so important right now for Ukraine? Ukraine has been asking for these for a long time, because if they decide to launch an offensive, whenever that will be, you need to move over open terrain rapidly to seize territory. And so tanks, along with infantry fighting vehicles,

are very important because it's the fastest way to cross open terrain, sheltering yourself from enemy fire while deploying substantial offensive power of your own. And so why was Germany so reluctant to send them to Ukraine and had essentially stopped other countries from sending these Leopard 2 tanks as well? Right. There have been lots of theories about this. Obviously, nobody knows what the deliberations were inside the German government. But let me give you some of the standard explanations. One is the legacy of World War II and Germany's feeling that when it comes to military matters, it should tread lightly and only be involved in wars of national self-defense or collective defense, which

it would be obligated to do under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. So that's one. The second is the Russia question, because as you know, in World War II, Hitler's armies penetrated deep into the Soviet Union, and many millions of people were killed. Now, present-day Germany is a far cry from Nazi Germany, but nevertheless, that legacy hangs heavy, and the Russians have done their bit to remind the Germans of this legacy and to drive that home. The other reason, the third, is that the German government is a coalition government. You have Chancellor Scholz's party, the SPD, the Social Democratic Party, which has different wings, but some wings that are either almost inclining toward a kind of pacifism or have a belief that a dust-up with Russia

should be avoided. So we need to unify that party. Questions were raised whether we shouldn't send Western tanks. And what's the next? Western airplanes? And someday we talk about Western troops? I don't know. So I don't think that this is the right thing to do. We not only have the military dimension of working together, but we also have political and diplomatic, economic dimension. And most of importance, we act together. And that's what's happening. Then you have the Green Party.

The foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, is from that party. It started off many years ago as an environmentalist left-wing party, but on Ukraine, it has been very hard line taking the position that Germany should do all it can to support Russia. President Putin wants to drag Europe back in a path dominated by power politics, where states can trample on individual rights in the pursuit of imperial glory. That is why in the face of Russia's war, neutrality was not an option. And the third component of the coalition is the Free Democrats. And their views sort of align, at least on assisting Ukraine, with that of the Greens. So there needed to be a census worked out. And then finally, Germany, because of all the

reasons that I just mentioned, didn't want to make the first move and said, well, the United States should also send tanks. Biden surprised him or gave him the cover to do so by announcing that he would send M1 Abrams tanks. We're also closely coordinated this announcement with our allies. I'm grateful to Chancellor Schulz for providing German Leopard 2 tanks and will lead an effort to organize a European contribution of two tank battalions for Ukraine. I want to thank the Chancellor for his leadership and his steadfast commitment to our collective efforts to support Ukraine. Germany has really stepped up. And so that led the way for Germany to say two things, that Germany itself would provide tanks

and that other countries that have German-made leopards would be free to provide those tanks to Ukraine. So the announcement last week by Joe Biden to send in these M1 Abrams tanks, what you're saying is that you think that it was done to provide some cover for Schultz? It certainly had that effect. And I would surmise that there are good reasons to believe that the administration understood that without that, the whole delivery of tanks from European countries, of the leopards, would just be hamstrung.

What do you think, cover aside, why do you think Scholz ultimately made the decision to send the tanks? What does he want to try and accomplish here? It was becoming increasingly isolated in NATO and the countries on the eastern flank, that is to say Poland and the three Baltic countries, as well as Finland, which has not yet entered NATO, it has an application pending, they were all putting a lot of pressure on him. I think he did not want to be seen as the one person standing in the way of Ukraine's self-defense. So all of those things rolled together, I think,

provide the explanation for why Germany did a long song and dance, but ultimately joined the party or led the party. And just looping back to the United States for a second, you know, I do get the point that these Abrams tanks aren't necessarily ideal for the terrain in Ukraine and that they're actually not coming for a while, right? Like they're months out. But the U.S., yeah, I understand, was also reluctant to send them at some point. So why the shift from the U.S. as well? Or would you even define it as a shift? Well, it is a shift because initially the administration said they had no plans to do, so it didn't rule it out.

And I think it took that position for a number of reasons. First of all, you know, the United States has been, along with Britain, the leader in providing military assistance to Ukraine. It's provided about $27 billion to date. That is the overwhelming majority of all Western arms provided to Ukraine. So nobody could rightly accuse the U.S. of not having done enough. Then there was the question of whether the Abrams, which uses jet fuel, which requires really complicated maintenance, which was not insufficient quantity on site, which would reduce American inventories, whether that was necessarily the best tank. And the feeling was the Leopard, because it could be easily delivered, serviced,

repaired, there could be training in a nearby country, that that was the tank to go for. I guess the question I think I'm trying to ultimately understand here is what is the strategy here from the U.S. and Germany now? And is it the same strategy that Ukraine has? So there's a public position that the US and many NATO countries, including the head of the Secretary General of NATO has taken, which is to say that the terms under which the war ends will be up to Ukraine to decide. Our main responsibility, the urgent task is to support Ukraine to defend themselves and to create the conditions for a negotiated solution that ensures that Ukraine prevails as an independent sovereign nation in Ukraine.

And the formula is nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. That is, we won't do any kind of deal under the table and not tell the Ukrainians about it. Of course, the Ukrainians' maximum goal is to retake all the territories seized since 2014. That would include Crimea and the so-called republics that the Russians helped create in 2014 in the Donbass. A fallback position would be everything except Crimea, because either the Ukrainians would be able to take it, or because the West would say, you know, that's a bridge too far, that's risking a confrontation with Putin, escalation and whatnot. The third possibility is some more significant territorial compromises by Ukraine, such as allowing Russia to keep the land corridor it's created between its territory and Crimea,

which it never had before this war. So all of those outcomes are possible. Now, the strategy for the moment is to get Ukraine enough firepower, protection, and mobility to stymie a Russian offensive. My own concern is, and there's nothing to be done about this, because you can't suddenly dump a lot of tanks into Ukraine and expect them to start driving them around, is that the Russians, of course, know these pieces of equipment are along on the way, that is tanks, but also infantry fighting vehicles, which are very important, and we should talk about them. So they have a window of opportunity, and they might seize it to launch a major offensive, and that is entirely likely. So you're saying that it's possible that even the announcement of these tanks,

it might provoke an offensive by Russia. It's like, isn't this what people were worried about when they talked about the West sending massive amounts of weapons to Ukraine, like a Russian response? Yes, that's true. On the other hand, the Russians would launch an offensive, whether they're tanks or no tanks. The question is, are they in a position to mobilize enough people and launch an offensive? And I say, are they in a position because one of the problems that they have had is with logistics, that is supplying troops with everything from food to parts, water and so on. The logistical performance of the Russian army has not been good. And then the question is how quickly Russia can carry out an offensive. And depending on what expert you

talk to, some will tell you they're going to do it quickly and others will tell you they won't be able to do it in the spring. The fact is we don't really have a good idea about what their timeline is. But if you were Putin and you saw the West declaring that it is now going to send not just tanks and armored personnel carriers of infantry fighting vehicles, but a lot of other things like artillery and so on, wouldn't you want to get the jump and do an offensive at a time that best suits you. And that time would be before all of this equipment flows in and the Ukrainians are trained up and ready to use them. If I could just push back a little bit on your point that the offensive was going to happen no matter what.

Like, how do we know that the offensive would happen no matter what, considering that their military is in such rough shape? Like, by sending all these weapons, could you make the argument that it's forcing him to do something? Well, some have made that point. The counterpoint is that the whole war began when Putin crossed Ukraine's territory and invaded it, right? So one could say, well, that was the escalation that we really have to talk about first. But your point is a good one. I mean, are we, in a sense, by giving Ukraine more

and more weaponry, forcing Putin to act sooner rather than later? And how do we know he'll launch an offensive? Now, I can't tell you your hypothesis is wrong. What I can say is a Russian offensive is coming because from September onward, they've been on the defensive. They've lost a lot of territory. So the Ukrainian army took back all of Kharkiv province to the north and east, and then in the south part of Kherson province. So they're definitely going to launch an offensive. Your point, though, is a good one. Are they going to do it sooner rather than later because of this package of arms, to which I can only say, I don't know the answer. It all depends on what their level of readiness is. Hi, it's Ramit Sethi here. Gem, brought to you in part by National Angel Capital Organization, empowering Canada's entrepreneurs through angel investment and industry connections.

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Do you have the sense that NATO wants Ukraine to retake Crimea? I think that if, imagine a situation where the Ukrainians are wildly successful and they're in a position to take it all and Crimea is the last piece. And this is purely a hypothesis. I don't know how it's going to play out, but let's assume that that's what happens. I could see a situation where NATO is divided on this. I could see Germany and France and perhaps the United States taking the view that, look, taking back everything except Crimea is a wild success for you. You've basically brought a superpower to its knees. But if you go into Crimea, there is a risk of an escalation because Putin will be back in the corner.

We urge you to rethink this. Now, I'm not saying this is going to play out. I'm saying I could see a circumstance in which that could happen. And when you say that that really puts Putin in a corner, like what are we really worried about here, about what he could do? So before I answer that question, let me just add a caveat. If you see me saying, I can envisage, I'm not sure. I'm saying that because a lot of what many people believed about this war, including me, has not panned out the way it did. So when we talk about this war, those of us who study it have to have the humility just to put conditionals and say, there are some things that

we don't know. Now, what do we mean by backing him into a corner? So this war is Vladimir Putin's war. There is no evidence that his inner circle was clamoring for it. This is a political system in which one man is pretty well all-powerful. There was this famous tape recording before the war in which he assembled his main cabinet of national security people. He was sitting in a desk far away, and he called each one of them up to come and speak in favor of the war. It was almost like a Saddam his national security team one by one press him to invade Ukraine. They went up there and dutifully said what the master wanted them to say. He has a lot riding on this. And I would say, since becoming president, he's never been in a

more vulnerable position. So if he loses the war, he stands to lose a lot, perhaps even his presidency in extremists, perhaps even in his life. I'm not predicting that. But he understands that this is a war that he cannot lose and go back to Russia holding nothing in his hand. And I would say this, even if all he manages to salvage is Crimea, it would still be a defeat because it would mean that after February 24th, 2022, he has not gained any territory from Ukraine as a result of this war. Considering the stakes are so high for him here, are we talking about a real risk of him deploying nuclear weapons in Crimea?

So in the United States, and I suspect in Canada, there's a debate that goes as follows. And you have, to simplify things, a bifurcation. Some who say you're dealing with a country that is a nuclear superpower and a leader that has staked a lot on winning this war. You're dealing with a war that is far away from the United States and also Canada. You want to be careful how you tread because the escalation could come in two forms. Horizontal, the war spreading to NATO terrain, or vertical, that is nuclear weapons. Either way, it would be a very, very bad thing. So you want to keep that in mind and tread lightly. The other side, which believes in more or less the unconditional support of Ukraine, says the Russians have been talking about escalation and breathing fire ever since this war

began. They initially said if you supply weapons, we'll take out the supply routes. They haven't. To succumb to Putin's pressure tactics would be to cave to an aggressor, and he ultimately won't do it. Now, the truth of the matter is that unless you live inside President Putin's head, nobody really knows what his calculation is. He may not have even told his closest advisors, and even what he thinks now may shift if the situation changes and he feels that he is in a corner. So the problem with the escalation debate is that it never ends because you have two sides that have diametrically opposed points of view, but they don't have the necessary evidence to persuade the other side that they are correct. Right. Although it seems to me, and I'm not saying one side is, obviously,

we don't know if one side is right, the other side is wrong. But it seems to me that the don't cave side over the last several months is winning the public relations war, I guess. And so do you have concerns about that? Right. I remember when this war started and in the spring of last year, there were lots of concerns being talked about, like, you know, that these weapons could end up on the black market, that they could fall into the hands of paramilitary groups, that everybody needed to be careful because they didn't want to risk escalation with Russia. And it feels like those concerns have been somewhat drowned out. I don't know if you would agree with me on that and whether or not that concerns you.

No, I think that's a fair observation. And I think that is so for a number of reasons, but I'll give you two off the top of my head. So the more time that elapses and various threats are not delivered upon, people become comfortable and lapse into a, well, ultimately, this is just bluff and intimidation. The other thing is that since September, Ukraine has been very successful. Ukraine has taken back close to 50% of the territory lost after the war began. So those two things put together have made the following argument very strong, that we shouldn't buckle under Putin's pressure, and support to Ukraine has paid off. And if we stop now because of the fear of escalation, all of that will be undone.

President Biden, by the way, I think has walked a fairly balanced line between providing support and not providing things that he thinks might be going too far. So for example, the Ukrainians have called for the supply of the army's tactical missile system, it's called Atakums, and it has a much bigger range than anything the Ukrainians have now. And that hasn't been provided for fear that that is a weapon that could give the Ukrainians the capacity to strike Russian territory. Now, they may not do it if the USS don't do it, but there's certain weapons that haven't. We will see now when, what happens now that the Ukrainians have put on the table, at least kind of indirectly, the request for fighter jets,

F-16s, F-18s, and so on. Will those be provided? I see the argument that the confidence has grown because we've seen it play out on the ground. But are you concerned the players involved in this might get too confident at some point or that they're getting too confident? Well, sure. I mean, the two camps that I discussed just now, the people who say escalation won't happen because Putin is bluffing, the others that say we don't know, we need to be treading very carefully. Agree on one thing at least, that escalation, should it happen, would be a very, very bad thing, right? So it's absolutely something to think very, very hard about. And I'm sure that in the back of the minds of every Western leader involved in supporting Ukraine, that concern is there. I think the degree to which it's shared varies. The further east you go in NATO, I think the less shared it is because you

are much more liable to encounter the opinion, say in Poland, that we cannot succumb to Putin's intimidation because the lesson he will take from that is that he can next time go even further. Is there a point where you think that NATO and the West stop funneling weapons into Ukraine? What does it look like at that point? If the Ukrainians are doing poorly, let's say in the spring, hypothetically, again, i don't know how it's going to play out ukrainians start suffering reverses there will be pressure on nato to not allow that to continue by providing more support conversely if the ukrainians start doing really well there will be pressure on nato not to take its foot off the gas pedal now and allow Ukraine to finish the job as it were. So the West is in a paradoxical sort of situation. We are fated in this war where NATO and other

countries are supporting Ukraine to move forward and take decisions without knowing really what the escalation risks are. There's just a huge magnitude of uncertainty. Anyone who comes on your show and tells you, I know that escalation will occur or won't occur, you shouldn't really listen to them because they have no evidence to back up that claim. Yeah, yeah. Which is why I'm not making it. No, which is fair. And I appreciate that.

And also, thank you for this discussion. It was really helpful to have today something I've been thinking about a lot lately. So thank you so much, Rajen, for wading through it with me. My pleasure. Thank you for your very good questions. All right. So just a quick note before we go. Rajan mentioned that Ukraine had recently indirectly requested F-16 fighter jets from the U.S. President Biden was asked by the media yesterday if he would heed that call and answered with one word. No. All right. That is all for today.

Thanks for listening. And we'll talk to you tomorrow. Thank you.