Global News Podcast - Russia-Ukraine: On the brink of war?

Episode Date: January 28, 2022

Our experts in Moscow, Kyiv and London answer your questions about the crisis.

Hello, this is the Global News Podcast from the BBC World Service, with reports and analysis from across the world. The latest news seven days a week. BBC World Service podcasts are supported by advertising. If you're hearing this, you're probably already listening to BBC's award-winning news podcasts. But did you know that you can listen to them without ads? Get current affairs podcasts like Thank you. Amazon Music with a Prime membership. Spend less time on ads and more time with BBC podcasts. As tensions increase over Russia and Ukraine, is a full-scale invasion imminent? I'm Jackie Leonard, and in this special edition

of the BBC World Service Global News podcast, recorded on Friday 28th January, we're putting your questions to some of our experts. In Moscow, Steve Rosenberg, formerly in Moscow, now in Kiev, Sarah Rainsford, and here in London, our international affairs correspondent, Paul Adams. As we record this podcast, around 100,000 Russian troops are in place along Ukraine's border, taking up positions to the north, south and east. The US President Joe Biden has warned there is a distinct possibility that Russia might invade in February.

And Russia says it sees little ground for optimism in resolving the crisis after the US rejected Russia's main demand. It wants a guarantee that neither Ukraine nor Georgia should be allowed to join NATO. That's the international group of 30 countries who have agreed to support each other politically and militarily if they are attacked. Moscow also wants a withdrawal of any NATO presence from Eastern Europe. In this podcast, we will be putting your questions to our expert correspondents about how we got here, what Russia wants from this situation, the broader view of world reaction and world alliances, and what might happen next. Before any of that, though, let's hear a little bit from some of the people in Ukraine who are currently living with this hanging over them. Finally, some drills have started so our kids know what to do in case of war. Of course, it makes no sense for a great war with Ukraine.

But Mr. Putin, I'm afraid he's delirious. He's far from logic. For me, it's not surprising to see that a lot of people, women and men, will be ready to protect Ukraine in the case it would be necessary. I want to be prepared to any scenario. So I know that probability of a hard war is not that high, but it still might happen. So if it happens, I'm already prepared. I'm asking it's time to start preparing to flee or protect their homes. So how did we get here?

Paul Adams is our international affairs correspondent who helpfully has also reported over many years from Washington and Eastern Europe. So, Paul, this didn't just come from nowhere. A brief timeline, please. Well, I won't go back a thousand years into history. A brief one. When he wrote about this last summer. But I think it's worth just quickly sketching perhaps, you know, the situation over the last hundred years, if you'll forgive me. So we had the Russian Revolution, 1917.

Communist Russia then dominated an empire from the Baltic to the Pacific. That was the old Soviet Union. That, of course, came to an end with the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s. And when it collapsed, around 15 countries, including Ukraine, achieved independence. That was 1991. For the next 20 years or so, Ukraine, like some of the other former Soviet states, wrestled with its political and economic identity, whether to look to the West and NATO, the European Union, or to Russia for support and

protection and alliances and so forth. There were two moments of high tension. There was the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004, which pitted pro-Western and pro-Russian politicians against each other. And then the protests known as Euromaidan 10 years later. Now, those were triggered when Ukraine's then president, Viktor Yanukovych, decided rather abruptly to scrap an association agreement with the European Union that had been in the works for some time and move instead to a closer relationship with Russia. That triggered enormous street protests in Kiev in November of 2013. In February, after some pretty deadly clashes in the city, Mr. Yanukovych actually fled and a new

pro-European leadership took over. Moscow, not surprisingly, was furious. They've always called this a coup. And within days, we remember Russian troops took control of the Crimean Peninsula down on the Black Sea. Crimea, by the way, had been arbitrarily handed over to Ukraine from Russia back in the 1950s. And there were plenty of very pro-Russian people down there. And Russia supported armed men in two other southeastern areas of Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, where pro-Russian sentiment was also fairly strong. This led to a war, which flared in 2014 and 15, and has continued ever since at a pretty low level, but has killed around 14,000 people so far. Paul, thank you for that. And welcome to Steve Rosenberg in Moscow, and Sarah Rainsford, who is in Kiev at the moment. Welcome to you all. Let's hear from

our listeners. First of all, this from Ariane in Brussels. I would be interested to hear more in depth report on the geopolitical interest of Ukraine to Russia. This mainly from a geographical natural resources, as well as historical perspective. And a couple more. Hi, it's Victoria from New York. Why does Ukraine joining NATO pose such a threat to Russia? And that's echoed by Alexandre in France. I'd like to know if you can summarise for us what NATO represents, to give us some context of why Russia seems to care so much about who joins the organisation. So Steve Rosenberg in Moscow, let's start with you.

Oh, good questions there. I mean, as far as Russia's interest in Ukraine goes, I mean, Russia's interest is multifaceted, isn't it? It's historical, it's imperial, it's emotional, it's geopolitical. Russia wants Ukraine to be in its orbit and its sphere of influence for many reasons. I mean, these two countries, we've heard from Paul, but these two countries go back a long way, right? A thousand years, all the way back to Kiev and Rus'. And of course, Ukraine was part of the Tsarist Empire, then the USSR. There's an emotional bond between the peoples. But you also get the feeling that Russia's leadership, current leadership, believes that without Ukraine in Russia's orbit, somehow Russia would cease to be a great power. It can't seem to accept that a country with so much shared history could drift away from Moscow forever. And there's another aspect to this, because I think the last thing

that Vladimir Putin wants is a thriving Western-style democracy in Ukraine right on Russia's doorstep. And Sarah, what about people in Kiev, in Ukraine right on Russia's doorstep. And Sarah, what about people in Kiev, in Ukraine? What are they saying about NATO? Well, I think, yeah, the interesting question there was what does NATO represent? And Steve sort of describing what it represents, certainly for Russia's political leadership. But here in Ukraine, if you talk about people on the street, then I think it represents security.

And it also just represents a basic choice that people here believe they've made, which is for a life that is separate from Russia's so-called sphere of influence, you know, a decision to step away from that, that sphere of influence and to set their own path. So I think, you know, if Ukraine believes that its future is with the West in that sense, politically, geopolitically, then NATO represents the security, giving it the security to be able to make that choice and to do that. I think, you know, nobody here really thinks that Ukraine is about to join NATO anytime soon. Of course, there isn't even the first formal step on that path that hasn't been made. But it's about an ambition and aspiration, but it's more, I think, about a choice of direction

that Ukraine believes it's made and wants the right to be able to make. And just looking at the current situation, we've talked about troops massed on the border. What does that actually look like? What's there? Is it fields and trees, barricades? What is actually there? Well, in terms of troops on the ground, first of all, you've got the 100,000 Russian soldiers close to the border with Ukraine, right? You've got other Russian troops nearby, military exercises going on. As far as the

conflict in the Donbass, in eastern Ukraine, which basically erupted as a war back in 2014 and 15, you have a very tense situation, but something that's gone on for the last eight years, really almost a frozen conflict or a low intensity conflict that's gone on for several years now. And as you say, there is a long history between Russia and Ukraine. How do Russians and Ukrainians feel about each other? And what's going on? You first, Sarah. Well, I think on a sort of human level, then there is very little antipathy. I mean, certainly Ukrainians would say they're not one nation with Russians, but there are strong bonds, cultural, historical, linguistic even, that go back many, many, many years.

And I don't think those bonds have been broken by the conflict that began in 2014, but they've certainly been strained by it. I would make the point, though, that people have family members, of course. So you've got Ukrainians with lots of family in Russia, Russians with lots of relatives here in Ukraine. So, you know, the ties are strong. But, of course, if Vladimir Putin believes that there's a very strong pro-Russian sentiment here in Ukraine that he could tap into, that he'd be met with flowers, for example, if his tanks were to roll across the border,

then I think, you know, plenty of Ukrainians would contradict that pretty firmly. So yes, the Russian people and the Ukrainian people are pretty closely tied and fairly friendly. But in terms of the politics, well, that's ugly. That's, you know, there is no love lost now between the two countries at all. Russia is seen as the aggressor. Vladimir Putin very much seen as a hostile force, if you like, in Russia. And Steve, how does that look from Moscow? Well, it's interesting. I mean, the last couple of days I've been out on the streets chatting to people here about what they think about whether people believe there could be a big war between Russia and Ukraine. And most of the people that I've spoken to simply can't believe or they don't want to believe that that is possible because so many people have said to me, look, Russians are Slavs, Ukrainians are Slavs, we're brothers.

How can this possibly happen? And, you know, there's one metro station in Moscow, a very elaborate one called Kievskaya, Kiev, that was basically built to celebrate Ukraine as part of the Soviet Union. And at the end of the station, there's a big mural mosaic of Vladimir Lenin, the Russian revolutionary and the words, the bonds between Russia and Ukraine are unbreakable. And that is why I think people, despite everything that's happened right in the last few years, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Russia fermenting conflict in eastern Ukraine, fueling and funding this separatist war in eastern Ukraine. Still, most Russians simply don't want to accept that a large-scale, full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine is possible. Let's get back to one of our listeners.

This is Norman from Ontario in Canada, and he's concerned about how much people know or think they know. Over the last five years or so, I've developed friendships with people in Russia and in Ukraine. My Russian friends are very kind and intelligent people, and they are notably wary of state news outlets. However, when you've been reading crafted propaganda for 20 years or more, you end up believing some of it. So my question is, how do I respectfully deal with what I know to be outright lies that they may believe? So how significant an issue is that? Steve, first.

It's a really interesting question, and it's a very difficult issue to address. I mean we talk about the messages coming out of out of the state media. I've noticed actually that people some people that I've known here in Russia for many years have started to repeat almost word for word the the messages or the anti-western rhetoric that they hear on talk shows or in news programmes on Russian state television. So the messages being put out by the media are powerful. They work, and this is why governments do it, right? They control the media to get their messages across.

And Sarah, what about media, social media messages in Ukraine? Well, I was just going to mention that, of course, it was the propaganda in 2014 that, of course, it was the, you know, the propaganda in 2014, that plays such a massive role in actually what happened in the east of the country. So the Russian state media stories, which are exposed as complete lies that peddled the story that there was a fascist coup in Ukraine, and that, you know, the fascists were coming to the east. And so that the sort of Russian-speaking part of Ukraine was under direct threat, that played an absolutely fundamental role in what

happened in the east and in the fighting there. So it really frames the narrative to such a fundamental degree. I saw it before my own eyes, you know, people, families were split, you know, families who pro-Russian families, if you like, and pro-Kiev families then kind of torn apart by the conflict, which in a huge degree was fabricated by propaganda. So here's the big question. Hello, I am Mizuki from Japan. This might be basic, but what is Russia trying to accomplish? My name is Maria. I'm from New Orleans, Louisiana. My question is, why is Putin escalating tensions and possibly increasing Russia's already present invasion in Ukraine? What does Russia gain beyond more territory with a larger invasion? So what is at the nub of all of this? Paul, what does Russia hope to get out of this? It's a question that almost everybody asks every

day. And frankly, without reaching any very satisfactory conclusion, it is clearly about more than just Ukraine. And some would argue it's not really about Ukraine in the sense that some people doubt that President Putin, despite the enormous numbers of troops massed around Ukraine's borders, intends to invade at all. He has maintained pressure on Ukraine for the last eight years. It has worked to a certain extent, although it's worth pointing out that with each passing day, Ukraine is slipping further and

further out of his reach as it becomes a more westward looking, democratic place where the rule of law applies and so forth. But clearly, he has a bigger agenda. And in one sense, he's already succeeded because he has managed to grab the attention of the international community and specifically of Washington. And that is his principal obsession here to listen to a set of demands which have been boiling away in his mind for the last 20 or 30 years about the way in which the Cold War ended and the settlement in Europe after the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The fact that in those years after 1990, NATO rolled forward into Eastern Europe, into those countries that had been part of the old Warsaw Pact, the old sort of Russian empire, as it were, unchecked to the point where NATO members were actually on Russia's borders. That has always rankled, particularly with Vladimir Putin and the people around him. And he wants in some way

to roll that back. And Mr. Putin's agenda is sort of a difficult thing to pin down, isn't it? This question came from Norway. Hi, I'm Paul from Oslo, Norway. So I expect Putin to be a very smart strategist, and that NATO would completely reject Russia's demands, show more unity and resolve. Sweden and Finland would become more pro-NATO and possibly more sanctions. That should be completely predictable. So assuming that Putin is also predicting this, he's actually after something else than what's on the list of demands. But what is that? What is he actually aiming to achieve? Well, Steve Rosenberg, you're in Moscow. What's the answer to that? Well, that's a difficult question, isn't it? I mean,

I wish I could see into President Putin's mind and understand what he's thinking and what he's planning. I suspect the answer to this basic question of what he's doing, why is he escalating tensions, depends on the answers to a whole lot of other key questions, right? Has Putin decided that it is within his power now to forcibly change what Paul referred to, the European Security Order, to his benefit, to push the West back, push NATO back and re-carve for Russia a sphere of influence? Does he believe, has he concluded that the West will roll over,

that all this sort of dangerous brinkmanship will deliver him what he wants? Is that what the intelligence he's getting is telling him? And what calculations has he made? Has he calculated that the potential gains, geopolitical gains, as he may see them from all of this, outweigh the potential economic hardship. But it's also still possible that all of this is sort of coercive diplomacy, right? Very coercive. And that Vladimir Putin is hoping that by forcing the West, the Americans, NATO to the negotiating table, he won't get all his demands. He won't get everything that he wants. America's not going to say, no, Ukraine can't join NATO. But he could get some deals on arms control and military transparency and things like that. We simply don't know. And Sarah, we heard a sort of potted history of

Ukraine. But tell us a little bit about the makeup of Ukraine right now, the tensions, some people wanting to move closer to Europe and NATO and others very definitely not. Well, I think it's partly geographical and it's partly linguistic. It's partly generational as well. I was just speaking to a journalist here who was saying, you know, there's still this kind of post-Soviet man or post-Soviet woman. And that's the person who still looks East, he would say, and doesn't really have a problem with the idea of close-ish ties with Russia. One thing I would say is that

I think the history of the past, what is it now, eight, 10 years or so, has slightly shifted the balance. So whilst there is still, I would say, a significant portion of the population here who looks West somewhat, but is also still quite happy with close ties with Russia, there is, I think, a more obvious pro-Western orientation now here in Ukraine, precisely because of the conflict that's been fought in the east for the past eight years. So I think, you know, the fact that 14,000 people have died in that conflict has very much focused minds. So there is this idea that, you know, they shouldn't have died for nothing. You know, that conflict in the east of Ukraine, in the Donbass region, and the loss of Crimea, that

can't have been for nothing. you know, that this was a conflict about Ukraine's choice of direction in the future. And if that choice was for the West, then that is the path that Ukraine must continue along. And for all three of you, whatever Moscow's ultimate aims with tough diplomacy or beyond that, Russia has a lot of leverage at the moment, doesn't it? Not least the fuel that so many countries depend on. And is that making for tensions between allied nations about how to handle this? I think to go to Paul first. Well, yes. I mean, Europe is not in a good place when it comes to energy security, particularly not at the moment when, you know, we've had these massive rises in the cost of natural gas, for example.

And so this couldn't come at a worse time in that respect. Of course, one of the big questions that the allies, the Americans and the Western Europeans are wrestling with at the moment, is the extent of sanctions that could be put in place on Russia in the event of some kind of incursion into Ukraine. And a lot of attention has been given to what's called Nord Stream 2. That is a pipeline which delivers natural gas from Russia to Germany. It's complete, but it's not yet functioning.

And pretty much all of Germany's Western allies want Germany to include Nord Stream in a package of sanctions. And up to now, the Germans have resisted that. They argue that diplomacy and dialogue should be pursued and that this could have very damaging consequences for energy use in Europe. And indeed it would. And this is why we're seeing an effort led by the Americans and others to try and find other sources of natural gas. But it is absolutely central to the question of the kind of sanctions that could be imposed on Russia. And it is an issue which is causing division. Of course, this is something that Vladimir Putin will welcome, the sign of Europe's most important country, Germany, somewhat digging in its heels on a key aspect of all of this.

And what international pressure might look like is very much on the minds of our listeners. Let's start with Nicholas in Colorado. Why have the US and other countries explicitly excluded the use of force while threatening sanctions on Russia as opposed to keeping their possible responses ambiguous and private? And leading on from that, do sanctions work? What's the track record on different types of sanctions compared to what's being proposed just now for Russia and Putin? Hi, this is Mason in Richmond, Virginia. I would be interested to hear more about the potential economic impact of the specific sanctions being considered against Russia on the economy of Russia, the economies of EU and NATO

countries. My name is Sophia calling in from Montreal, Canada. If an attack on Ukraine occurs, what further repercussions could its Western allies put against Russia? Are more sanctions always the answer? So sanctions, let's start with Steve in Moscow. Is Russia worried? Well, you know, Russia's been under Western sanctions for eight years now. And the position here, you often hear Russian officials that are saying, well, you know, sticks and stones will break our bones, but sanctions will never hurt us. They've managed to survive the current rounds of sanctions. But of course, what Western governments are threatening now, in the event of a further Russian invasion of Ukraine, are much tougher sanctions, things like possibly cutting Russia off from the swift global payment system,

possibly even sanctions against Vladimir Putin personally himself, a different level of sanctions. And that is causing concern here. But we have talked about energy and whether Russia could hit back by reducing energy shipments. It's a very important question. Moscow insists that it is a reliable supply of energy, of oil and gas, and always has been, even going back to Soviet times. But of course, this is a concern that Moscow could use energy as a political weapon. It's been accused of doing so by governments in the West before. And Sarah, what sort of international pressure would Ukraine ideally like to see its allies put on Moscow? I think from the people I've been speaking to

here, the more pressure, the better on every front. I mean, with Nord Stream 2, for example, Ukraine is no fan of that pipeline because it denies Ukraine a whole lot of money in transit fees that it gets for the gas that's currently flowing via pipes across Ukraine. So sanctions that would prevent the turn on of Nord Stream 2, Ukraine would be fine with that. But I was asking, for example, not about sanctions, but about military pressure and escalation and what have you here. For example, a lot of people have been saying, OK, the West is giving Ukraine weapons, it's arming the Ukrainian military, it's helping Ukraine to be able to physically fight back were Russian troops to enter en masse, you know, an all out war here in Ukraine. But some people have been saying, is that moral? Is that ethically right? When the West is then saying, but we won't send any troops, because let's face it, the Russian military is a

bigger and more powerful force than the Ukrainians, even though the Ukrainians have been much strengthened by over the past few years by military assistance from NATO countries. And the answer I'm getting is, you know what, we're happy for the support we're getting. We're very grateful that we're getting lethal force now weaponry from the US in particular, but from the West more generally. We want the force essentially to hold Vladimir Putin at bay. We want every single lever of pressure possible used to ensure that Vladimir Putin cannot make the calculation that it's in his interests to send his troops openly into Ukraine. We did actually hear President Biden talking about a response to an incursion rather than an invasion, which caused some consternation, it's fair to say. There are options short of a full land operation that could still have a massive impact, aren't there? Let's go to you,

Steve. Yes, I mean, anything is possible. I mean, we talk about possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, but there could be a more limited military operation. There's talk about possible cyber attacks. Anything is possible. And I think there would be differences amongst Western governments about how to react depending on what Russia did. One thing that the Kremlin is masterful at, it is identifying differences and disunity amongst Western governments and Western leaders and trying to exploit that. And I think you'd see the Russians trying to do that, depending on what actually happens and develops. In the Russian press in recent days, there's been a lot of articles about alleging differences and arguments amongst Western leaders, between America and various European governments, about what to do, how to react to Russia. And, you know, we've seen in recent years, Vladimir Putin being quite successful at this, at developing relations with certain countries, driving wedges between various members of NATO. And I think the Russians will continue

to do that. Only this week, we had Vladimir Putin meeting over video link with some Italian businessmen, very controversial at a time when the West is trying to put a unified position, talk about possible sanctions against Russia. And he was speaking to Italian businessmen. So the government paper here published a letter by 40 German ex diplomats and politicians and military men in support of Russia and calling on the West to have a more constructive relationship with Russia. So I think we're going to see the Kremlin continuing to do this, to try to pick away at Western unity and create disunity. As you say, anything is possible. As we record this podcast, we are poised at a very delicate

point. The US warning an invasion could happen in February. Ukraine somewhat trying to play that down. So how likely is it really? This listener thinks not. Jamie from Hungerford in Berkshire. Surely nobody, including NATO, Kiev and Moscow, thinks that Putin is going to invade Ukraine. It will be committing his military to something far worse than the 20 years that coalition forces spent in Afghanistan, with no end except the total devastation of Putin's political position in Russia. If he invades, then our principal worry should be that he's gone completely mad.

Steve? invasion of Ukraine. But I would also say that eight years ago, I would never have believed that Russia would have annexed Crimea or intervened militarily in eastern Ukraine. I was completely taken by surprise by that. So anything is possible. And, you know, when you have so many forces down there, concentrated down there in that area, even if an invasion war is not in the planning, there's always the room, the danger of some miscalculation, some accident, some spark that sparks a conflict that would be difficult to stop. Sarah? First and foremost, let's bear in mind that part of Ukraine is already, Ukrainians would say, invaded. You know, there have been Russian troops, although Russia has denied it always. There were Russian troops in eastern Ukraine.

So what we're talking about is how far would Vladimir Putin think he could go this time? I'd say from here in Kiev, the general feeling is it's unlikely that people here in the capital would be threatened by some kind of all-out war, some kind of massive incursion into the country. But the likelihood or the possibility of a serious escalation and an open involvement of Russian troops in the east of the country, in the Donbass region,

well, people definitely aren't ruling that out. I would say it's kind of similar to what Steve was saying. Generally speaking, people here say it wouldn't be rational, it wouldn't be logical for Vladimir Putin to go for all-out war in Ukraine and to think he could occupy a country which believes it's made a choice to turn away from him and away from Russia. You know, people I've spoken to here are pretty firm that they would resist. Kiev doesn't feel like a city on edge. It's not a nervous place. But talking to people, an increasing number of them are beginning to prepare these emergency bags, as they call them, kind of grab and go kits with the absolute essential stuff in it that, you know, if something bad happens, if they need to run to safety, they can just grab those bags, get in their cars and get out of town, go west.

And Paul, finally. Yeah, I was just going to echo what Steve said. I mean, I don't think many people believe that an all out invasion is likely. They also don't think, frankly, that there's nearly enough men and material ranged around Ukraine's borders to actually do that at the moment. But they do look at a number of options. One would be a kind of formal takeover of those breakaway areas in the southeast, in the Donbass region. That could be fairly easily achieved. Ukraine wouldn't necessarily put up all that much resistance if that were to happen.

But there is a question about whether or not that would be of any real utility to Vladimir Putin. Those are pretty poor parts of the world that have been devastated by eight years of war, and it's hard to see what he would really gain by formally taking them over. Another possibility is a land corridor from those areas to the other part of Ukraine that is currently controlled by Russia, and that, of course, is Crimea. That would be a major, major military operation right along the coastline of the Sea of Azov to create this land bridge to Crimea, which the Russians would really like, not least because Crimeans are short of water, which comes from the mainland, and that would be one way of sorting that out. But that would be a pretty substantial operation

and, again, fraught with all sorts of risks. One last thing, though, on the kind of military options. Of course, one of the things we've seen in the last week or so is the movement of Russian troops and equipment into Belarus, which, of course, is a significant development, moving Russian troops outside of Russia's borders into a neighbouring country where they will be much closer to the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, in the event of some kind of much, much larger operation. I don't think, again, people

think that that's all that likely. But a lot of people do note that the presence of Russian troops in Belarus now is in itself a substantial achievement for Vladimir Putin. And they wonder how long they're going to stay there. And we will end where we began with a reminder, this isn't just geopolitics and power, military might and finance. It's about ordinary people living their lives. Two people sharing the same hope, one from Kiev, one from Moscow.

I'm just living my best life right now and hoping that everything will be okay. I don't know, somebody can pray, somebody can meditate for a, a peaceful resolution. And I think we need to urge our governments to do the same, not necessarily pray, but to resolve all of this peacefully, because nobody in their right minds wants war. Voices from Kiev and Moscow. All that remains is to say thank you to Paul Adams in London, Sarah Rainsford in Kiev, Steve Rosenberg in Moscow, and you, listeners around the world, for your questions.

Apologies if we didn't have time to get to yours. Normal global news podcast service will be resumed later. Our email address remains globalpodcast at bbc.co.uk. Not just for your comments on this edition, but also if you have any questions about other big world issues you would like us to tackle next. You will also find us on Twitter at Global News Pod. Today's edition was mixed by Holly Palmer. The producer was Theopis Galatos. Our editor is Karen Martin. I'm Jackie Leonard. And until next time, goodbye. But did you know that you can listen to them without ads? Get current affairs podcasts like Global News,

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