Guerrilla History - History of Palestinian Communism w/ Patrick Higgins

Episode Date: March 15, 2024

In this absolutely fascinating and important episode of Guerrilla History, we are joined once again by Patrick Higgins to discuss the history of Palestinian communism. Patrick serves up an masterclass here, and honestly this one is worth listening to and then re-listening to while taking notes despite its 2 hour length.  You certainly don't want to miss this one!  Also be sure to share this with comrades, this episode is sure to benefit many! If you didn't catch Patrick's last appearance on the show, you should check out our episode Palestinian Resistance vs. The Zionist Project w/ Max Ajl & Patrick Higgins, where he and comrade Max Ajl provided biting and vital analysis immediately after October 7.  A wonderful (and extremely popular) episode of Guerrilla History in its own right! Patrick Higgins is a researcher and writer, holding a PhD in Arab History.  Patrick recently completed his dissertation titled "Palestinian Revolution and World Imperialism in the 'American Century': 1945-1972".  While Patrick doesn't use social media, he is going to be co-presenting a class on April 13 on the topic History of Palestinian Revolution, which is hosted by the excellent journal Middle East Critique as part of their Ramadan Course on Palestine and Imperialism.  The whole course is free, so sign up! Help support the show by signing up to our patreon, where you also will get bonus content: https://www.patreon.com/guerrillahistory                               

You don't remember Den Ben-Boo? No! The same thing happened in Algeria, in Africa. They didn't have anything but a rank. The French had all these highly mechanized instruments of warfare, but they put some guerrilla action on. Hello, and welcome to Grosvenor. Guerrilla History, the podcast that acts as a reconnaissance report of global proletarian history

and aims to use the lessons of history to analyze the present. I'm one of your co-hosts, Henry Hukimaki, joined by my other usual co-host, Professor Adnan Hussein, historian director of the School of Religion at Queen's University in Ontario, Canada. Hello, Adnan. How are you doing today? I'm doing great, Henry. It's wonderful to be with you. Absolutely. Always a pleasure to see you. and we have an excellent returning guest today and a really fascinating topic. But before we get to that topic, I want to remind the listeners that they can help support the show, allow us to continue making episodes like this by going to patreon.com forward slash guerrilla history.

That's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-A history. And you can keep up to date with everything that we're putting out individually and collectively by following us on Twitter at Gorilla underscore pod. That's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-L-A. underscore pod. So as I mentioned, we have a returning guest from actually a very popular episode that we put out not that long ago. We're rejoined by Patrick Higgins, who you may remember was with Max Isle when we talked about

Palestine at the beginning of the events that began after October 7th, and then contextualizing that historically. To remind you, Patrick is a PhD in Arab history, and he recently finished his dissertation, Palestinian Revolution and World Imperialism in the American century, 1945 to 1972. Hello, Patrick. It's nice to have you back on the show. Hey, how you doing, Henry?

Adnan, thank you both very much for having me. It's a pleasure. It was a great time that we had last time with you and Max, and I have been looking forward to this conversation ever since then. I'm pretty sure I emailed you like 10 minutes after the conversation wrap last time to tell you that we needed you back on to talk about the history of Palestinian communism, which is the conversation that we're going to be having today. As opposed to usually when I ask the intro question, I'm going to pass it off to Adnan for this one to get us

underway. Sure. Well, I just want to thank you for coming back on. Patrick, I'm really looking forward to what you have to say about this important topic. As you know, as a historian of the Middle East, the Palestinian, sometimes when we do history, we break everything down into particular or national or, you know, other political subgroupings. But of course, the whole Middle East during the period we're talking about had very vibrant and important communist party, socialist movements, and so on. So it's useful perhaps before getting into the particulars of the history to have some sense of the overall stages, you might say, or periods that are very important in the history of the region and in particularly for communist party movements.

So how might you give us a sense of the Palestinian communist parties or communist movements kind of basic framework? You know, like what are the kind of key periods? And that might help us then kind of bring to light, you know, what are some of the ways in which it's connected to the wider history of left movements and communist parties? in the wider region, and what specific, distinctive and unique to the trajectories of, you know, Palestinian history of communism? Thank you for that question. And then I'll just add a few caveats before I start speaking today.

The first one, of course, is that I found when dealing with Palestinian history, first of all, that my impressions would change somewhat when I got access to primary documents versus secondary literature. And I changed my mind often in the course of my research, which was driven by a sense of solidarity and, of course, this overriding desire to know that perhaps those of us acting in solidarity in the United States need to become better acquainted with this history in order to understand the questions faced by Palestinian revolutionaries on their own terms. And so that history is a very collective process, of course, because Palestinian history has been for such a long time systematically under attack. The sources are, some of them have been destroyed, oftentimes they're scattered across many different locations. And I think that this needs to be born in mind that, you know, some of the conclusions or ideas or analyses that I provide here, I might feel a different, very different about that in five years. So we just need to keep in mind. that the process of having a honest conversation or a sympathetic conversation about Palestinian history,

relatively speaking, especially when it comes to revolutionaries, is still very early, I think, in the United States where I'm located. For a long time, it was just court-owned off by quote-unquote security studies, terrorism studies, and other sort of junk like that. So just having that out of the way, when I provide a rough periodization, I am providing just a tool, a tool that I think is useful for thinking it through. Of course, it's not the only way to periodize this history. But I would say, I would, I'll speak today in three broad periods. the first deals with the early communist formations in Palestine in the 1910s, 1920s, up through the 1947 because the questions faced by revolutionaries in Palestine at that time was, there were some

commonalities, but major differences. And obviously the major authority there would have been British mandate, British colonialism, But this meant that because the Zionist movement was still emerging, still growing, still establishing its dual authority in Palestine, that some of the guiding poles of theory did not have a developed theory of how to understand Zionism. I'm referring explicitly there to the Soviet Union. And then after 1947, after the partition period, I think we can speak. of a middle period, which is really the height of what is referred to as the Palestinian revolution. I periodized this as such because of the radicalizing effects of the Nakhba in 1948 on Palestinian society that what was the revolutionary base in the 1930s,

the peasantry, has now been displaced in refugee camps and a new political culture, therefore emerges. And so even that period itself, we could deal with the 1950s where the main political task of the day was Arab unification of the, say, the Balkanized Arab region, Balkanized under the 1916 Sykes Bicot Agreement. And there were certain set of organizations dedicated to that task. And I would say in the Levant organizational backbone was formed. formed by Palestinian refugees.

And then after that, in the 1960s, we move into the emergence of the Fidei movement or the Commando Movement and its relationship to the Palestine Liberation Organization. And then we can speak of a late period or a current period, the overthrow of the Soviet Union in 1991 proves to be watered, an important event, and also the destruction of the PLO as a political entity in Lebanon, 1982, which preceded that. And after both of those things, there's no coincidence that shortly after the overthrow of the Soviet Union, you get the Oslo Accords in 1993. And I would describe this for the Palestinian left as an era of ideological and material. reconstitution and yeah so and I would I really think that we're seeing that process still

underway today yeah terrific and apropos of nothing before I get to my next question I'm always glad that you mention the overthrow of the Soviet Union rather than the more popularly conceived fall of the Soviet Union because it certainly was an overthrow of the Soviet Union in many ways which I'm not going to enumerate now because it's not the point of this conversation, but I am just going to throw it out there that I'm glad that you conceptualize it in that way as well. But turning back towards kind of the origin period of Palestinian communism to get this episode underway in terms of following that history. When I was doing my background research on this, most of the analyses were starting in the

early 1900s, early around 1910. And what they were looking at was how ideologically and politically, the influences were coming in from essentially two directions. One was from influences from the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks, and the other was from incoming left-wing Zionists. And this was also influenced, of course, by sociopolitical realities on the ground within the Palestinian community. So this combination of material conditions, as well as these ideological influences coming in from these two different routes. Patrick, if you can, talk a little bit about whether or not you would agree with this kind of conception that I have been seeing when I was doing my background research on this. And then if so, can you speak to

how each of these influences played into this kind of origin of Palestinian communism as well as what the material conditions were like at that period of time and how that may have also influenced those early stages of Palestinian communism? Yeah, I think that, okay, so I agree, first of all, that this is what's been reflected in the literature and both English and Arabic that I've looked at. And there's a beginning of

oftentimes the beginning of Palestinian communism as such is attributed or traced back rather to the 1910s. And very much so, there are two currents that you described. There's the left quote Zionist current

and the Zionist labor current and there is a Soviet-influenced current. And there was early on two formations, starting after around 1919, one being the Palestine Communist Party, the other Communist Party of Palestine. There was a split actually over this issue of Zionism. The split away from left Zionism was led by somebody named Joseph Berger,

who was himself, he went to Palestine as a Zionist settler. And he had been, his life trajectory, if you look at it on a long-term basis, he really moves from an early position of Zionism to Bolshevik anti-Zionism. And at the end of his life, after he had falling out with the Soviet Union, he moved somewhat back towards a position of Zionism. I believe that he ended his life in Israel, if I'm remembering correctly. And his position was influenced by really the Leninist position on Zionism. Lenin theorized Zionism as a bourgeois nationalist deviation and did not find it not only not persuasive to as a solution.

to anti-Semitism, but actually part and parcel of the problem of anti-Semitism. So the Leninist position was that in Eastern Europe, the Jewish population would be emancipated through communist revolution. And so Joseph Berger leads a split in the 1920s. And I think that one thing he can be credited with recognizing is that there were serious divides between the Zionist settlers, including those claiming to be socialist, and the Arab peasant population. So in the early 1920s, his wing made an attempt to actively to organize Arab peasants against

the British mandate, but it was something that was consistent in the 1920s and 1930s as well, is that the Communist Party did not really have much success in developing deep membership, deep Arab membership within the party.

There were different ways to try to deal with this. And increasingly, the Soviet Union, eventually through the Communist International, gets involved directly. And these cadres, led by Burj, were being educated by a certain form of anti-imperialism in Moscow in 1920s through the University of the Toilers of the East.

So this was a major resource that existed. But we see a major turning point for the Berger's Palestine, his Communist Party, in 1929 with the Baroque. uprising. So this was a major Palestinian uprising against both the British mandate authorities and Zionist settlers, okay? And Zionist settlements. This, I think, made more pronounced the issues faced by the Communist Party of Palestine in terms of the relationship between the settlers

and the peasant population, the Arab peasant population, it becomes a question that also the Soviet Union tries to deal with because at the time that this uprising is occurring, there was a representative from the Czech Communist Party who was visiting Palestine at the time. And the language with which he read the situation was that it was reminiscent of programs in Eastern Europe. So he's reading it through this lens with which he's familiar.

And I think this shows the extent to which the Soviet Union and the Communist Party did not really have a proper theoretical sense to understand the growing Zionist movement because there was, as I mentioned at the beginning of show, a growing dual authority in the country, right? And so he has, this representative from the Czech Communist Party has some critical remarks, but actually in collaboration with the commenter, the communist international, which I think was very important for articulating anti-colonial positions early on in the existence of the Soviet Union, they work with Berger to come up with a novel reading of, what happened, and their understanding is, even though there's some criticisms made by the common turn of what they call the quote-of-quote reactionary Arab leadership, which they

describe more or less as futile, even though those criticisms exist, they actually put out a statement saying that this uprising in 1929 was on the whole an anti-colonial uprising against the British mandate authorities. So that's a turning point because I think, the reason I think they arrive at that position in my reading is, again, this split that exists between the central committee of the Communist Party of Palestine, which was overwhelmingly Jewish and made up of settlers to Palestine, and the Arab peasantry, which they read recognized was actually the backbone of anti-colonial revolt.

In other words, the lever of revolution in Palestine cannot move without them. And Berger makes some ideological attempts, as I understand it, to convince Jewish workers to abandon Zionism. All right. So this shows that, theoretically, there is a pass available to those members of the party to say, you can become part of the Palestinian liberation struggle if you give up loyalties to the Zionist project. And so in this sense, there's this possibility that's left out where the term settler becomes actually a political term of one's relationship to the question of, the question of revolution of Palestine, to the questions faced by the peasantry in Palestine, we're facing already land loss to the Zionist movement. But of course, as we know from the long history

of struggle in Palestine, that this is a path that is pursued by borderline, very few, you'd probably count on one hand how many Israelis after the state of Israel has established in 1948 actually are willing to join the Palestinian Revolution or the Palestinian Liberation Group. And I think a famous case of that is Yuri Davis, who ends up joining Feta. So this tells us that this is a possibility, but it's not a possibility pursuit, right? And the Palestine Communist Party at the time, I think they are slow, just like the Soviet Union, to grapple with the reason that this path is not being pursued is for material.

reasons is because of the divergent relationship of the settler community versus that of the native peasant community to the land. Okay. So after that, we see, another thing I want to add about the communist international's position of why they describe this 1929 uprising as an anti-colonial revolt, I think it was also informed by the emergence of the third period. The third period that really sees in the 1930s and predicts that the world is going to go into a period of economic crisis, which would create social dislocation and therefore for ripe grounds for revolution. And anti-colonial revolts would be essential to the success of world revolution. So they take up a fairly hardline position and support

of Palestinian Arab peasant-based uprising. And this leads to a policy in the early 1930s of quote-Arabization. This idea that the central task of the majority Jewish Central Committee is to train Arab Padres and promote Arab leadership. And there are some important figures who end up some some arab cadres end up you know developing strong position in the party in the early 1930s but in the long term i think that this project of arabization fails and comes to an end with the onset of the second world war which causes the soviet union first to abandon

its position this third period position and analysis of the world eventually, as the war continues in favor of the popular front, which therefore jettisons some of the resources that went specifically in to theorizing and supporting anti-colonial struggle, and that culminates with the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, which becomes really a fatal blow to the policy of arabization. Now, when I'm setting up here talking about this transition from the third period to the popular front, and of course we have to understand, it goes without saying that the Soviet Union is confronting an existential threat in the form of Nazi fascism that compels some of these developments. But we need to, of course, understand this holistically.

So I'm setting up, I think, the conditions that lead to USSR's support. ultimately for the partition resolution after the Second World War in 1947. So that would include those conditions would include, first of all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1938, which as the Soviet Union absorbs new territories in Eastern Europe, it ends up also absorbing Zionist organizations. start to lobby the Soviet Union and Moscow very intensely using quote-unquote leftist language. And then also you have figures like David Ben-Gorvian, the Jewish agency organizations like that also start to lobby the Soviet Union using leftist language.

So all of these elements, I think, are important to understand the position the Soviet Union ends up taking in 1947, which is not, it actually comes as a surprise to all of the Arab Communist parties in the region. Because the Palestine Communist Party through the 1930s, 1940s has a strong relationship with the Lebanese Communist Party to the Syrian Communist Party. And this was helping them to sharpen the Palestine Communist Party on the question of Arabization because they're connected to anti-colonial revolts that are going on in these other countries. Major one, for example, would be the 1925 Syrian revolt against the French mandate authorities. So there is, there are some connections that are made on a pan-Arab basis,

and the USSR support for the partition resolution ultimately comes as a shock to the leadership of Palestine Communist Party and Arab Communist parties in general, who find that officially according to policy they have to support Moscow's decision this puts them in an impossible position I think actually between

1947 and 1949 the Lebanese Communist Party loses about two-thirds of its membership and the Syrian Communist Party about half of its membership so it is

even though there are some afterlives especially in Iraq to Arab Communist parties as such. After this resolution, it is really I think a mortal blow to their credibility among Arab

populations in the region. So I think that gives that I think lays out some of the overview, hopefully of why in this early period the communist parties were unable to ever develop a deep base

among the Arab peasantry. or at least in Palestine and I think it has to do ultimately with the fact that the Soviet Union before we start talking about processes and events and positions and analyses

like third period, second world war popular front and so on and so forth they never actually did have a very clear analysis of Zionism of how to understand Zionism and its relation to world imperialism and world revolution, and in fact, even when they are promoting a policy of Arabization that they drop in the late 1930s, even when they are

promoting that policy, they never really take a resolute position against the project of Zionism. They maintain this kind of vain hope that there can be quote unquote Arab and Jewish worker solidarity. I say quote-unquote because Arab and Jewish as mutually distinct categories as creation of Zionist ideology in itself. But they maintain this sort of vain hope that they can join together as workers against the British mandate. So they did not properly theorize the material and ideological links between the British mandate and the Zionist project in my analysis. Yeah, and just hop in quickly before Adnan goes in. with the next question. You mentioned about this marginalization of the Arab Palestinian population in the formation

of the communist parties in Palestine. When I was reading through this, it was really interesting. And it was kind of the first five years of the Palestinian communist parties were very murky and hard to sort through because they changed names and split and reformed. But really the first, you know, organizations in terms of parties were starting to form in about 1919. They split several times. They came together. In 1921, they became the Jewish Communist Party. In 22, this party splits into, as you mentioned, the Palestinian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Palestine.

And then there was a reunification. That's the word. In 1923 of the PCP after that, split to multiple camps, as you mentioned earlier. Mostly around the question of Zionism versus anti-Zionism and other, you know, related questions like this, but through that whole first five-year period of creating these communist parties or socialist parties within Palestine, it took until 1924 for there to be a single, and again, quote unquote, because as you mentioned, this is a construction of Zionism, really, but the first quote-unquote Arab-Palestinian member of any of these communist organizations. Whereas in that first five years, the entirety of the parties were

made up of Zionist settlers for the most part, as well as other Jews that were still in the area at the time. But there was not a single Arab-Palestinian that was invited into the party until 1924. And even the first few years after that, they were still in the single digits in terms of membership of the party, which I think speaks to how the foundation of this party was was based on, as you mentioned, left-wing Zionism and a marginalization of the actual Palestinian Arab community, which as we'll talk about as we go on, is going to perpetuate itself throughout that early period.

Adnan, feel free to hop in. Yeah, sure. Thank you for that, Patrick. It was very illuminating. And I think it highlights, or at least crystallizes a question for me, which is that it has been, it seems historically the case that left Zionism has proven to be something confounding certain left communities, right? Certain other left movements. In this case, you were mentioning, you know,

the Soviet Union under, you know, its Aegis sort of, but we see that, you know, that it was, it seemed somehow successful in adopting kind of left language to explain the process. To me, it's still a bit mysterious. And so I wanted to think about and wonder whether there were ways to clarify this by looking at maybe what might be considered analogous situations where, for example, like the French Communist Party in settler colonial Algeria still supported the settler colonial project, which ended up having a pretty substantial, you know, and consequential effect on the character and direction of Algerian national resistance. And, you know, I wondered if this is a bigger issue here that it wasn't always clear how to parse the issue that capitalism

you know, as Marx himself says, is this extremely progressive force in history. And so when it is brought to the global South, some leftists can make the case when it's imposed in this way, you know, under colonialism, some can, you know, kind of fit into these civilizational, developmental, or however we want to think of it,

models that suggest that perhaps this is going to lead to a better outcome in the future. Whereas, you know, global South theorists come down pretty firmly, very few of them tend to think that it's great that, you know, that they be subject to colonialism and capitalist exploitation because this is going to end up leading to, you know, a better liberated society in the future. And they feel that, you know, national liberation is a key necessary demand and that colonialism, imperialism has to be defeated before you can. So I'm wondering, since that's problem, that's something that comes to be a key issue and question for the subsequent periods as well. I just wondered your thoughts about that, how one might think through how, oh, and why these decisions are being made. Why Zionism comes to be acceptable to the Soviet Union, does it have anything to do with how French communists, for example, thought that, well, we still have to support. support, you know, this settler colonial regime in, in, you know, in Algeria, for example.

Yeah, I think that there's been a massive corrective for the global left broadly conceived that's been made through and born of the direct experience of the colonized. And Palestinian is one, Palestine is one such case. Algeria is another. And there are other situations where we see similar dynamics. I mean, if you look at the north of Ireland, for example, there were various attempts and many splits over the question of how to orient towards the loyalist or pro-Aulster community in that area. And repeatedly, those attempts to say, okay, worker solidarity, cross these lines failed. Now, it doesn't mean that we're not individuals from the old

the pro-Alster community who end up joining the Republican or nationalist movement to happen. But it also is something you can really count on two hands, the amount of instances where it actually happens. So, you know, there has to be a clear understanding of the material relationship. And you can't fall into an over-emphasis on ideology or rhetoric. So, okay, so somebody speaks the right Marxist language or spouses the right theory, the theory you're familiar with as a trained communist, and then you take that and think that you can explain the entirety of a situation based on that. I believe to a certain extent, the Soviet Union did make this mistake. I mean, they're, I mean, if we, in the interest of providing a kind of holistic analysis of its role in those early decades before the NACPA, and I appreciate, Henry, you're adding those clarifying points about the various splits that occurred. And there are more that happen leading around the time of the NACPA.

there is a organization that comes out of the Palestine Communist Party called the National Liberation League in Palestine. And this organization, I think, even though after the Nakba, the Communist Party as an official organization is discredited, they do, I think, inject into Palestinian political culture through publications. newspapers, especially through the NLP, a use of these theoretical tools that they brought from Moscow in the common term previously to begin to propose the beginnings of a theory for the relationship between Zionism and colonialism and the NLP's documents, official statements, as well as Communist Party's newspapers, start to talk about how there exists in the world, this force of Anglo-American imperialism because the world was in this transitional stage between the Second World War, the transition from this British-led system to the U.S.-led system, and how Zionism was dependent on that. So even though the Communist Party itself as an organization has a limited shelf life in terms of its actual popular legitimacy because of this, we do see a reuse locally of these tools to provide a new theory that is starting to be attempted at that time.

But the Soviet Union itself, it seems that they did place an over emphasis on the rhetoric coming out of left Zionists. and Zionist labor movements and saying, well, this is where, through this, we will have an actual stronghold for Zionist or for rather communist power in West Asia. And I think that that error, even for Soviet Union's self-interest, rears its head very quickly after the partition resolution. But I would actually, if we want to understand, I think the problem of the overemphasis on the subjective factors and under emphasis on the objective factors

that is the relationship of these two communities to the land, it's useful. One formulation I think of sometimes comes from Domenico Lucerta in liberalism, a counter history. I recall a formulation he makes distinguishing what he calls political radicalism from political socialism. And this doesn't mean that you necessarily give up socialism, but political radicalism is this ability to recognize a fundamental inequality that might not always take the form of the worker capitalist relationship. In this case, you have the, there's contradictions between proletarians and, you know, somewhat a peasantry, but even more fundamental between settler and native in these situations. So I think that the influence of Palestinian liberation movement, Algerian revolution, and each of these arena, and coming out of the north of Ireland as well, examples like this, what they have done,

in the long run is force the organized left in countries like the United States or throughout Western Europe to become to become more generous. That is, you know, there's this tendency that's existed in the past where you might see a Palestinian commando reading Mao on the one hand, but also reading the Quran on the other hand, is, okay, the Quran, is that something that is a communist principle subjectively, and then extrapolating that to assume that this reactionary or something like this is a remarkably shallow way to think. Because, of course, theory falls into the hands of the masses

and is interpreted through the tools that people have available to them. And actually, we should be embracing this diversity of world revolution. And actually, at its best, I think, the USSR and the, the communist international was able to do this. I mean, Stalin gave a speech at the University of the Toilers of the East where he spoke of internationalism as the intersection of many nationalisms

rather than this thing that just magically immediately dissolves people's national subjective understandings through this abstraction of worker solidarity, right? You have to, that is the, you have to take the path towards through struggle towards that horizon, and you can't just impose such a horizon from above and automatically. Well, I'm happy that you brought up Lucerto as well, as somebody who has translated one of his books into English. I'm always happy to hear Lucerto mentioned on the show. But one of the things

that I want to bring up here, which is not, it's related temporally, but not related conceptually to what you were saying, which is that we have this tendency, as those of us on the far, the fringes of the far left, as I like to say, to think about how the Soviet Union was relating to these sorts of questions and these movements and these other organizations and various parts of the world. But we also have to consider that there's various other relationships that we have to examine. You talked about how Britain was relating, but we have to think about what the United States is role. It was in this early period, both in terms of the government, well as in terms of left-wing organizations within the United States.

We also have to think about various other left-wing formations throughout the world, particularly in the global north. That's actually quite interesting to think about how global north, quote-unquote, left formations relate to the burgeoning communist movement in Palestine, as well as time goes on, the kind of consubstantial relationship with Palestinian liberation, in addition to the communist movement within Palestine. So if you can take any of those things,

if you want to add in any points in terms of relationships between the U.S. and Palestinian communist movement and Palestine more generally in this kind of origin period, which we're still talking about at the moment, and left-wing formations in the global north and how they were relating to these questions at this period of time as well. I'll use that to say that, I'll use that question, Henry, to say that Israel's foundation on the ruins of Palestinian society, 1948, and the growth of the yeshuv in historic Palestine that led to that or enabled them to create the militia necessary to ethnically cleanse large parts of the countryside. A lot of, that required a lot of technical expertise, a lot of contributions internationally and from the West. And I think that the social support coming from the United States on a long-term basis, as well as the institutional support, has changed in different ways over time.

So the United States, at the time of the partition, or even leading up to it with the 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which was really the United States' formal entry into this relationship with Britain for decision-making over the future of Palestine, that had a lot of support in the U.S. at the time institutionally from the heads of universities, which were oftentimes at prestigious universities, you had ideological Zionists, and you had also in terms of a layer of social support, the labor movement. Now, there's a lot of good stuff that's written about the U.S. labor movement and its collaboration, at least at the level of the AFL, CIO and so on, is collaboration with imperialism historically. A lot of which has come out of dissidents within these actual unions, and the United States has done this fantastic work. And I think that because historically, the mainstream of the labor movement has been aggressively pro-Zionist and aggressively pro-Israel, that if, yes, if we're going to be critical

of the role the Soviet Union plays, especially me as somebody based in the United States, it's even more essential to be critical of the role of these labor unions, because a lot of that support, even though the basis of support of Israel has grown in the highest rungs of the Department of Defense, the Pentagon, the CIA is all unanimous and so on and so forth. But with the labor movement, you have, even still today, organization, let me just give an example, the American Federation of Teachers, the major union within the AFL-C-I-L, in the late 1970s, they put forth a resolution, I don't know, it might not still be binding, but this resolution exists for anybody who wants to look it up, offering

feverish support for the state of Israel. And that is a problem of history that still applies today. The American Federation of Teachers is led by a woman Randy Weingarten who recently did a major story with Harrett's newspaper

where really what she was attempting to do, I think, was to balance the difference between these different forces within AFT. There are forces who are critical of the genocidal campaign being waged.

by the Zionist entity in Gaza right now. But she was trying to square various circles with her own very loud, very vocal support for Israel. I mean, only belatedly, almost five months later, was there anything the word ceasefire even put out there by AFT? And we could go through a number of organizations, the AFL-CIO, who, you know, their support for Israel is not strictly this problem

of offering ideological saying there's an ideological affinity within the labor union there's many forces at play including the role of the intelligence agencies historically in trying to capture the leadership of the AFL CIA

and use it in the Cold War as an instrument for instance so there's more than just simple opportunism I think that's involved there but it is something that we find is even though there are cracks in the overall labor movement coming from below is still persistent. And of course, what AFT does when Randy Weingarten goes on her

official visits to the state of Israel is she visits unions there and emphasizes the kinship of labor as reason and justification for her own position. Of course, she's going to throw some words out about peace and getting Palestinian Arab communities together and and Israelis and so on and so forth. But we still, I'm bringing all of this up to say, in the United States today, this is still a major social political force that we have to contend with. And it does date back to this era where there was a relationship between left Zionism, Zionist labor, and U.S. labor unions, British labor unions, and so on. Yeah. So I was looking in liberalism.

as you were speaking for a specific quote on Zionism, and I eventually found it. I'm just going to read out this particular quote because I think it speaks to something that you were talking about a bit earlier, Pat, and then I'll turn it over to Adnan. Lesotho says, hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused.

Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria. Like democracy, this is quote democracy. Socialism, again in quotes, can be envisaged restrictively for the master race and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin.

At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism but without crossing it. With reference to Zionism, a rent drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a particular a peculiar tendency. It was characterized on the one hand by support for chauvinist objectives and on the other by commitment to pursuing

collectivist experiments and a rigorous realization of social justice within its own community. Thus crystallized, a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach in revolutionary social reforms domestically with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy

and in the field of relations with colonial peoples. In other words, master race democracy can also go further and take the form of master race socialism, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as master race. Exactly the excerpt I was referring to. I knew it. I knew I could. I knew I would be able to find it. That's great. Well, so maybe it's time to turn towards. that second major stage or period that you adambrated after this origins, but through the Nakhaba post-Nakaba and this period, which in some ways, I don't know how you would characterize it, but sometimes seems like the high points of, you know, Palestinian left organization as well as

because of the, you know, period after the 67 war of active military struggle against the occupation. So what do you think are the kind of key features or themes in this historical period of Palestinian communism and its kind of relations with other formations within, you know, Palestine? Right. It is definitely, it can be described this period. let's say between 1948 and 1949 and if we want to extend it in a long-term basis

1982 as the high points of the Palestinian revolution. Of course there's a danger in that politically in terms of becoming nostalgic. I'm somebody who believes liberation is to come for Palestine. So you know, and I feel this

way about the 60s and 70s in general is that we don't want to fall into the habit of thinking about that as some sort of quote-unquote golden era because despite the subjective forces being strong in that era, they ultimately did not succeed in the goal of world revolution that was set forth as the lofty task. So the struggle continues, in other words. But it is a remarkable period and no less remarkable for anything I just put forth. And I would begin by saying that after the Nakbah in 1940, really, if we can extend that periodization,

Nakba exists between 1947-1949 with full-on ethnic cleansing, right? Even though there was a resistance attempt that was made by volunteer-based Arab Liberation Army to prevent this, there is a defeat in large parts of historic Palestine are ethnically cleansed of its native population. And then we see the creation of these refugee camps. And the existence of the refugee camps have a radicalizing effect on Palestinian political culture. To go back to my earlier schema, there's 1950s where the main task is Arab unity.

And then there's the 1960s where a specific Palestinian revolution begins to emerge. So I'll take those in turn. Dealing with the 1950s, a lot of the secondary literature I would look at would take an approach wherein, at, at least some of this literature, would talk about the goal of Arab unity as if it were just a form of, of blood and soil nationalism or something, sort of passing reference to that period. But I think that it's important to note that the Pan-Arab Unity Project

was compelled by actual practical and logistical concerns. It was not strictly, even though language and art and culture and so on as an important component of any nationalist project That's not strictly what it's about. It's that the Nakhba in Palestine was a continuation of an earlier colonial crime that led to colonial theft in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. That is, you begin with balkanization of the region. So you have this state of Iraq, you have the state of Syria, you have the state of Palestine, you have the state of Palestine. and so on and so forth.

And you have trade ties, familial ties that are all of a sudden cut and sliced by borders. And you also have a built-in mechanism for the containment of the Arab military capacity within these separate regions. So that creates a practical problem for development because once you're balkanized, you are more likely to be, dependence on outside powers for in forms of liquidity, investment, and then development, right? And another major problem created by those borders, those psychs be co-bordered, was just the issue of resources, is Arab, the project of Arab unity, which ultimately becomes led by Nasser in Egypt, was trying to figure out some sort of, uh,

central organization, some sort of central planning for regional resources for Arab states. Now, the creation of Israel, which went hand in hand with the destruction of Palestine, adds to that dilemma because you have a new entity in the form of Israel that requires resource support. So let's take a basic example, the example of why. Water. Regional water resources, if the Arab region, the Arab states, are not able to claim substantive sovereignty over that water resources, decide where it's going to go. And if they don't have the tools to do that, let's say they're going to outside powers. In this case, in the early 1950s is the United States through Ambassador Eric Johnston, who leads with this kind of Johnston Plan initiative. That creates a problem because they say our development of, let's say, irrigation systems in countries like Syria, Jordan, so on and so forth, we're going to require as a condition of that co-development with Israel. So certain water resources would be directed towards the settler entity and therefore would also develop the very military capacity that displaced Palestinians in the first place, okay? And so to look at this water issue, Pan-Arab Unities develops as this practical answer to this problem to say,

okay, we need some sort, if we're going to have a self-reliant model of development, we need, say, Syria and Jordan to work together on their common resources so that our irrigation lands for our farmers, or sorry, our agricultural lands for our farmers is not losing water. to the developments of the Israeli military. If one of those states ends up defecting, of course, it further weakens everything else within the capacities of the rest of those states, within Syria, within Egypt.

Ultimately, by the way, that did happen, that there was a proposal made Syria and Egypt, say, we have to go a separate direction. This is where they start conceiving of the idea of a unified Arab state in this region, and they turned down the United States' planned for this type of irrigation. but then Jordan surreptitiously ends up enlisting itself to the plan later on nonetheless.

So you have a divided front in the Arab camp. So I just wanted to put that out there to understand why Nasser and other Arab nationalist organizations were taking up this question as fundamentally linked with the issue of Palestine. And the Palestinian refugees who were getting involved in Arab nationalist organizations felt the same way. Because they knew, taking the Johnson plan again as an example, this came as an offshoot actually initially of UNRWA, okay? The aid organization, which Palestinians didn't like because it put them and it made them dependent, like they're beggars with no power over their actual political destiny. So if there was this major project that was going to be undertaken, led by U.S. capital, U.S. corporations, and they were actually going to use Palestinian labor for this project to settle to take out two birds with one stone. They say, okay, there's no more right of return because we've resettled them, and we've resettled them building our irrigation projects for Israel.

So this leads. Palestinians see very clearly as displaced peasants and refugees the role that is being prescribed to them by the United States. So they see also the practical need for a United Arab Front to confront Israel and U.S. Capitol, which is very powerful. So that leads to, I would say, the emergence of three major Arab nationalist organizations. 1950s. After 1952, you have the Nasser front, which, you know, he carries out a nationalist coup against the monarchy in the early 1950s. And he becomes the leader of these ambitions because of the popularity of the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal in Egypt, which shows that it is possible to nationalize the whole. holdings that were being kept by, in that case, it was Britain, also France, and it is possible also to repel the counterattack that occurs after the tripartite attempted invasion of France, Britain, that was really led by Israel as the attack dog in, or with rather Israel being sent as the head attack dog for that attack in 1956. Right. Right. This is the best illustration you could have of the process you were talking about, about the need for Arab unity because, you know, the Zionist state of Israel is essentially operating on behalf of colonial imperial goals in the region. So that's a very direct example of that problem. Yeah.

Any time you attempt, exactly, anytime you attempt this alternative to passive development, which goes hand in hand with empowering Palestinian refugees and giving them political agency, you have, there is a. possibility of attack. So any type of development that occurs has to be defensive development. And so that explains the, I think, prominent role of the Nassarists in the 1950s. But you also have the Bathis, liberty, socialism, unity being their slogan. They begin to organize very heavily in the 1950s, including among Palestinian refugees. There's a Palestinian branch that was based in what's now the West Bank, in Ramallah, and they were publishing newspapers at the time, because this was under Jordanian control, that were really anti-monarchy in nature.

They were Republican messaging that was attracting Palestinians. And actually, the head of that branch, Abdullah Ramawi, ends up becoming an important figure and a major uprising, a major revolutionary period in the late 1950s. 1957, 1958 in Jordan. There's a nationalist Republican front inspired by Nasser with involvement from Baathis

and other organizations in Jordan that it absorbs the Palestinian leadership of the Ba'ath party from the prior periods. So the Ba'athis of the second poll that I would draw attention to. And the third is the movement of Arab nationalists.

And the movement of Arab nationalists was started by actually Arabs from several different countries at the American University of Beirut. And one of the principal founders, George Hadash, ultimately ends up going in the direction, becomes a communist. But that was not the case during this period of Arab nationalist struggle. because of the role the Soviet Union played in the partition of Palestine. The reputation was bad. So this gave, and using Habesh as an example, I mean, there were Iraqis and there were Kuwaitis and others who were involved in the founding of this organization.

And they wanted to create a cell structure throughout the region for regional revolution. But using Habash and zeroing in on him because he becomes the leader of the Palestinian elements of this organization. He was himself a victim of ethnic cleansing in the Nakhba. He ends up becoming a medical student at AUB. And he's involved in a few organizations before the movement of Arab Nationalists. But ultimately, when he does get involved in this organization, it represents for him an evolution for both him. And actually another Palestinian, the Haddad, who both of these guys become the principal leaders of the PFLP after that's founded in the late 60s. Their approach early on after the Nakhba is really about seeking revenge.

There's an interest in assassinating the Arab leaders who were deemed complicit in the Nakhba. But they realized very quickly that some sort of organizational capacity needs to be developed. So they begin to organize in the refugee camps on campus at AUB in Lebanon, later in Jordan, to pitch their message to the refugee camps. They published newspapers. And ZNA are actually looking at during that period. Their influences are, first of all, local Arab nationalists, and they had a mentor named Constantine Zare, who was,

interested in thought he articulated all these problems we're talking about in a book he wrote called the meaning of the Nakpa that okay the division was a major reason for why the Nakpa was able to happen in the first place there were other Arab nationalists they were taking views from from earlier periods like Satya al-Hustri and then figures like this but then when they actually moved their scope beyond the Arab region their examples their historical examples looking to were in Italy and Germany, those reunification efforts because they thought this was similar to their problem. And it's only later on in the 1960s when there is membership that had come in contact with left-wing formations, including the Iraqi Communist Party, which was a party that was

sort of a communist party whose blow was not necessarily mortal in 1948. There were cadres who were coming into contact with them discussing theory. Nayas Hawattsma, who later becomes the leader of the DFLP, was one of the main figures who leads this theoretical change. And so they start to bring these ideas to the movement of Arab nationalists. The growth of Marxist ideology in that organization is gradual and is really something that change, a shift that's forced by the circumstances including the loss of the prestige of Arab nationalism

or the Pan-Arab Unity Project in 1967. But before we move on, I just want to make a couple quick points about Arab Nationalist Project and this project of Arab Unity. First of all, those revolutions, those uprising, let's say, that occurred in, first of all, Jordan and then Lebanon, in 1957, 1957, 1958. You look at the records, because there was major mobilization from the people,

and much of that mobilization was driven by Palestinians, who, again, were the rank and file of the Nassiris, the Baathis, and so on, and the movement of Arab nationals. These uprisings, even though they are, they don't succeed in full in their aims, they fundamentally change those societies to set up the next period of struggle. If you go look at what many of the protesters as far as the documentary record we have of what they're saying

in Jordan for instance, they wanted a unity merger with Syria. They were even raising Syrian flags on Jordanian territory to proclaim this a Syrian territory and they wanted a common market, they wanted a common currency. They were thinking about these practical problems of development, okay? And that's met with a very harsh response. The United States

behind the scenes really takes a strong position in compelling King Hussein to crack down with martial law. And they go so far as to start to enter cafes and rip down portraits of Nasser because he was such a popular figure at this time. But they have to, that, let's say that spirit of rebellion. They have to try to keep that in the bottle after they impose martial law. And they're able to keep some period of relative quiet for some time. But when you get to 1970 later on, there's this major now with the PLO and the Sedein, there's this major revolutionary effort against the king where a lot of the cadres who were involved in that Arab unity effort, they essentially return in the form of the Palestinian revolution.

So it was essential experience. The second point I would make is, you know, depending on what you're reading, you might look at this transition from the Arab Unity project to the Palestinian Revolution as this was a progressive step, a one-dimensionally progressive step because of the self-reliance, the spirit ethos of self-reliance that emerge among the Palestinians in organizations, first of all, like FETA, but later on in the PLP, the DFLP. But I do think that there were problems and challenges as well as benefits to both of these periods because the Arab unity period with a radical Egypt, with a radical Syria, which becomes

even more radical, that is really, in my opinion, the storm center. of revolutionary activity of the 1960s, because of the resources they're able to provide in terms of, let's say, if they want to analyze water development in the region and how this affects Palestinian refugees, they would bring in and convene experts in Damascus, to figure out how that problem applies.

Or they would provide a land base, very simply for military activity. And, you know, movement of Arab nationalists, They gained their initial military training and experience in Syria and then also fighting on behalf of the Nassarist project in Jordan, 1957, and then Lebanon, 1958, which causes the Marines to have to invade the country to stop it. So what I'm saying is that the Arab dimension of that 1950s period, who is very important as a necessary condition for allowing. providing the opening of the Palestinian revolution in the 1960s. So that was an incredible answer, Patrick. So kudos to you on laying so many threads out there that it's almost hard to think of where to go from there.

But I'll do my best. Before I do get into the next question, which is going to kind of narrow that the scope down a little bit. I do want to mention, you mentioned the Iraqi Communist Party. We do have an episode that may end. interest the listeners if you want to know a little bit more about the Iraqi Communist Party, which is our episode on the paranoid style of American diplomacy with our friend Brandon Wolfe Honeycutt, which covers, you know, the late 1940s, 1950s, 1960s in Iraq primarily and does talk a bit about the Iraqi Communist Party. That comes up in that conversation. And so go back and

check out that conversation if you haven't already heard it. It's actually one of our most popular conversations that we've had and we have we've had branded on a couple of times since then and we have plans to bring him on again in the near future listeners but now to narrow the scope down a little bit you've mentioned some of these political formations that were springing up in the mid to late 60s and then in the early 70s you mentioned the PFLP DFLP FETA the PLO all of these different groups if you would be able to in as we're talking about this period of the late 60s, early 70s, can you talk a little bit about the changing formations of groups in the kind of communist movement within Palestine, as well as how tactics changed,

because tactics, as you touched on a little bit in your last answer, the tactics within the communist movement in Palestine were changing quite dramatically within the late 60s and early 70s. And so if you can talk about who were some of these players at that period of time, as we kind of left off in this last answer, and what were the tactics? that were being employed by these various formations at that time, that would be excellent. Yes. But first, I will deal just because I was talking about movement of Arab nationalists when they emerge into what becomes the PFLP and the DFLP, I'll deal with them first.

So their relationship, their idea, their ambition, 1950s revolved quite a bit around Nasser, okay? And Nasser, there were actually contradictions. So let's say there are regional contradictions between the Arab Nationalist Republican Front in the 1950s and the reactionary monarchy front, okay, led essentially by Saudi Arabia. Within that Arab Nationalist Republican Front, there were also contradictions, okay? And I think, so that would include Nasser. He has his tensions with Abdu Qarim Qasim Qasem in Iraq and also with increasingly the Ba'ath Party in Syria in the late 50s, early 60s. The movement of Arab Nationalists, I think, for some time to find itself in relationship to the Nassarist project. At first, when Nasser came along and was claiming to herald a new era in the region without reaction in colonialism,

I think that the movement of Arab nationalist leadership was somewhat skeptical because they felt that they'd seen figures like him before. I think the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal changed that. and they really start to form really pro-Nasser militias in these arenas that I was talking about. But there are two major crises for the project of Arab Unity that cause them to re-conceptualize or to change course. And in some ways, what they end up finding out is that the Arab Unity Project is a riddle. a conundrum. It's both the question and the answer, because the step, the more you take steps to begin to unify Arab states under a broad federation, the more you find that the question of centralization creates problems. And Nasser found this in the United Arab Republic

project, this merger between Egypt, the southern, what they call, the southern region in Syria, the northern region, between 1958 and 1961. Movement of Arab nationalists put a lot of faith in that project, that it was the first step to a growing unity project that would then become capable of confronting Israel and the West militarily and economically. It ends up being very short-lit.

there is this coup in 1961 there's a lot of resentment that grew among certain rank actually among multiple forces in Syria over the project there was the bourgeoisie

element that did not like the direction of socialism and nationalization and there was also there were Bathist cadres who did not like this decision

that Nasser undertook to dissolve political parties. So then there's more to that. There was there was disputes over the direction to take in support of Palestine. So at first, the movement of Arab nationalist's response to that 1961 coup, rather, was very, they were against who they took part in demonstrations against what they were referring to as the secessionist coup. But they realized it created this, this major dilemma for the feasibility of this project. And there were very stark disagreements within the organization

that started to say, we don't have a theoretical language to understand this failure. And there was an opening there led by, I mentioned, Hawatma, but also Mohsen Ibrahim was a communist, increasingly regarding himself as a communist from South Lebanon. And so there was one argument that takes place there. and the faith in Arab nationalism as being the be-all, end-all begins to disintegrate a bit amid these divisions. And then in 1966, this organization has another conference where there is a fallout about the strategy specifically for Palestine. The conclusion they had reached, or many had reached, by 1966, was that, there was no plan from Nasser that was capable or at least even prioritizing the liberation specifically of Palestine.

So out of that 1966 conference, you see the creation of movement of Arab nationalists, Palestine, regional command. And then you get various formations, one of them is heroes of return. short-lived kind of Faddi organizations. Heroes of Return is one of them. And that forms the basis for the creation of the PFLP in 1967, which does not coincidentally happen in the aftermath of the Six-Day War because there were already questions emerging about how serious Nasser was in prioritizing Palestine. Because we have to remember. that his, Nasr's field of concerns were much different because Egypt had a major role in the Congo, for instance, in the 1960s. To think of regionally in terms of the Arab dimension, also thinking

of the African dimension. There's a lot going on. And so they begin to say that we have to take matters increasingly into our own hands. There was already this left-winning Marxist challenge that was really influenced by a lot of things, including the beginning of the Chinese cultural revolution. And the fact that even in Syria, there was this, in 1966, there was this radical coup that happened, led by a figure named Salah Jadid,

who they were taking their cues by studying people's war and studying Mao. So this was entering in to the movement of Arab nationalists. They end up founding that organization as a merger of several different smaller factions that, and a few of those factions had come out of the movements of Arab Nationalists. George Havash, who becomes the general secretary, he was already at that time somewhat, his evolution towards Marxism happened gradually, and in his own telling, I believe that when he was. jailed in Syria in 1968, he said that he had time to read figures like Mao, figures like Ho Chi Minh. And he felt inspired. This was somewhat the answer, the missing link that he was looking for. They needed to combine that project of Arab nationalism to this class project. They didn't have a strong class analysis before this. So, but you know, you'll note that

He comes to this realization in 1968, so it's somewhat belated compared to the younger generation that was putting a lot of pressure on him. So a lot of the creation of that organization, the turn towards the class-based analysis, had to do with the criticism, the critique that was hard won of the Nassarist project at its limits in the 1960s. Then there was Feta, and I'll be briefer with Feta, but their founding cadres led by, of course, Arrafat, but you also had Abu Jihad and Abu Yad. A lot of their founding cadres, actually, this is relevant to today, because they come out of Gaza. They were, that's where they developed their initial experience not only militarily because there were a lot of early rudimentary forms of fedat operations being carried out from that location in 1950s, including a direct confrontation with the Zionist entity in 1956, but also developing political experience in organizations like Gups, the General Union of Palestinian students in Egypt, and also the Muslim Brotherhood. It represented various tendencies coming together, saying that we have to stop waiting for the perfect circumstances and the perfect conditions to take action in a specifically Palestinian capacity. And self-reliance, inspired largely by the Algerian model,

Arrafat had studied very closely became the calling card or the clarion call for that organization initially founded in Kuwait in 1959 and they launched their first military operation December 31st, January 1st, 1965, which notably targets an Israeli water carrier. So it shows you that these resources, that the knowledge from the pan-Arab period had, had, had, had sunk in and that the theft of resources like water was a foremost concern of an organization like Feta. So Feta, the form this movement of Fadain capable of roving across the Sykes-Picot borders and defying them, which becomes their great advantage that the Arab Nationalist Republics themselves did not have. And that gives away to the Palestinian Revolutionary Period, including by 1969, the Sedein had their organizations, led by Feta, had taken over the infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization that had previously been founded by Nostr in 1964 as an attempt to kind of show, I am taking the Palestine situation seriously. But of course, by 1969, these organizations made of refugees had taken these matters into their own hands.

Yeah, well, there's so much that we could talk about, about this era and these organizations. And so I'm sure maybe you will find some way to incorporate. And there's also some key figures that would just be wonderful to hear how you situate them. And there are kind of importance and significant people like Rassan, Kanafani, you know, and others. but we should probably also think about pointing towards that 1982 kind of, you know, a turning point or at least a consequential moment with is, you know, the Lebanese, you know, intervention and invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel and how that affects the left. But so how do we get from this kind of period where you have these new movements that have turned towards a more avowedly Marxist orientation like the PFLP and DFLP, you know, towards, you know, kind of this situation here in 1982 and all of its aftermath and consequences? So I'll try to, let's say, I want to situate what happens to the PLO in a couple of contexts. So there was a regional context.

There was a specifically Palestinian context. And then there was an international context. And each of these have quite a bit to do with each other. and they, of course, interrelate. So what ends up happening to the PLO, I think that we need to remember that in advance of 1982, there were political contradictions

between left and right within the PLO that applied to the organization itself, okay? And just for listeners, the PLO was really meant to be, the government in exile of the Palestinian people. So it had an executive branch, it had a legislative branch, and people from the factions that would include these organizations I was just talking about, like Feta and DFLP, PFLP,

could, of course, play a role in the PLO. But in the 1970s, the divisions within the PLO became quite stark. Some of it had to do with the left-right orientation because there were, even within each of these organizations, within FETA, within PFLP, so and so forth, there was a left and right, and how they would orientate towards, let's say, this or that Arab government, or towards either China or the USSR, so that main international contradiction at the time was the Sino-Soviet split, which how that relates to the Palestinian Revolution is a a whole subject that's interesting in itself for how those, because I think in the Sino-Soviet split, if we look at it holistically, both the USSR and China alliance with one or the other, provided both problems or disadvantages and advantages, okay? So with all of that happening, though, instead of simply looking at it, these divisions as revolving around a left-right split, I would say that the biggest division was over the issue of recognition of Israel.

And in 1974, there was this conference where the leadership of Fetach and Arafat comes out, comes forward, and enumerates this conference in Rabat, a 10-point. program that some organizations, including the PFLP, which turns away from the PLO at this time, recognized as an implicit recognition of Israel. And that becomes the basis for disagreements that weaken the PLO internally throughout the decades. And the reasons for that recognition is a few things. The way it's articulated first of all by Feta is that we should try to create a Palestinian entity on the territory that we've actually been able to liberate. Okay. But there are other reasons for this. A major one is that by this time in 1974, the United States had successfully flipped Egypt, okay, to the U.S. camp. in the, as far as the international contradiction between USSR and the U.S. So in that case, that creates a weakening, first of all, on the regional front of Feta's position.

And also the USSR's, because they recognize that they've been weakened by SEDA essentially defecting to the United States, start to become more willing for a long time. for instance, the USSR had been looking at the Fedellin as left adventurists or organizations that did not properly ingratiate themselves in their respective populations. I have a lot of disagreements with that, but that nonetheless was their line for a while. You get to 1974, and they're willing to open up certain pathways, but they still maintain this idea that there needed to be a political solution, not a military solution. So that also plays a role in this turn.

But you see there the emergence of a rejectionist front opposing any idea of negotiations. Another thing I forgot to mention was the U.S. pressure internally. The U.S. was reaching out to contacts within the PLO to create a pathway to a political solution down the line. So the rejectionist front, which is led by the PFLP, ends up becoming, that begins a period of divisions within the PLO that I think is the political weakening that ultimately culminates in a military destruction in 1982. And after that happens, of course, Israel had carried out these brutal. invasions of Lebanon first in 1978. They'd gone up to about the Latani River. And then in 1982, this is the occasion where they go even further into Beirut.

And I think once the deal gets negotiated where the leadership of Arafat then relocates from Lebanon to Tunis, that is where you see other populations in Lebanon, in particular the Shia and South of Lebanon. Um, form their own separate kind of resistance, uh, organizations that ultimately become Hezbollah in order to, uh, resist the Israeli occupation because the, the Zionist occupation there is a problem for the, the, the, the Lebanese people as a whole. And of course, there are, there are other factors that we could bring into it, like the 1979, um, Iranian revolution would be a huge one. Yeah. So picking up from here, I'm wondering, you know, what I think of, when I think about, you know, Palestinian resistance in the 80s is the intifada. You know, so I'm wondering if maybe you have a particular analysis that you might bring to, you know, how this kind of popular youth resistance movement emerges outside or with.

in or, you know, maybe you can tell us what the relationships are to this background that you've been covering of these more formal organized resistance movements, right, that have been contesting Israeli occupation in various ways and in different contexts. But as you point out in 82, there's a kind of dramatic withdrawal, you know, as the PLO moves to Tunisia. And in fact, actually, the national resistance, you know, takes on a sort of orientation with different kinds of leadership and sources, but perhaps there are some intersections and connections that we should be paying attention here that have to do with some of the kind of left traditions or left organizations on the ground in West Bank and so forth.

And also, of course, how that leads to, you know, exactly what the PFLP was attention. attempting to resist was tacit and then even more than tacit formal recognition of Israel, which, of course, as you had pointed out already in this analysis, was a key kind of question or problem within the resistance, the national resistance movement. Yeah. So the intifada of 1987, and historically, we've been talking in 1950s, 1960s, where situations where in the storm center of revolution and liberation movement was in the surroundings of historic Palestine, where, you know, Fetat gets its first military training in Syria, and that's where they launch commando operations from that base and then subsequently Jordan. and then after there's an attempt to overthrow the king in Jordan in 1970

and there's a brutal, let's say, reimposition of martial law by King Hussein. Then we see the relocation to Lebanon. And then by the early 1980s, this destruction that we're talking about a PLO as an institution in Lebanon. So in each of these cases, and I think that there's some connections we can draw, to the present moment as far as how a war of liberation could be fought by a people spread among many different states and displaced. So in that period of struggle, we saw in each of these arenas, say Jordan 1970, some attempt to study, let's say, the Vietnamese experience, or how.

a successful asymmetric war could be fought against a very powerful military foe. In Jordan in 1970, this is People's War and People's War is not just War of the Whole People, but it actually involves intense organization on the social

levels before anybody even picks up a gun. So this is something that was attempted and did not succeed in that case in overthrowing the King and replacing him with a republic. So this was really how liberation was attempted throughout these periods, and you did have regular uprisings within historic Palestine itself.

But I think in 1987 with that first intifada is where you see the storm center of Palestinian organization, revolt and revolution. moves within this occupied, the directly occupied territories. And so in that sense, it is a period of reconstitution and reorganization. But also, I want to say that it's not a total rupture that I remember a mentor of mine. He was saying that the first communique that was put out for the intifada used the language of the revolution, so that it was actually continuing the revolution. evolution that we're in the PLO was the senator of gravity from that earlier period.

So they did not look at it as a complete rupture. So we see after that the challenges or maybe even relative advantages that come from attempting liberation from within historic Palestine. And I would say actually looking at Gaza today, I mean, we had a conversation in October. about the state of the resistance forces that are led by Hamas, but not by no means limited to Hamas. We were having that conversation and we had a discussion. We did a little bit of an analysis of the capabilities, that is, the military capabilities of those brigades in Gaza. and we were talking about how clearly the operation on October 7th had demonstrated very skillful, sophisticated development on that front. And so if we're thinking about comparing the condition of that situation to these historic examples,

you can see that at one time the ability to rove across borders and carry out operations opened up new possibilities, but ultimately, again, that old problem of the borders, the divisions of the Arab states, became a major issue and their ability to consolidate in base areas because they had host countries to deal with. And what we see from the Intifada onwards, and that includes, of course, everything in between the second Intifada, and then getting to now, is that within these attempts at re cruel confinement and concentration, tending even towards a concentration camp in Gaza that there has been a way to consolidate among the resistance factions today, which includes organizations from the era we're talking about like the PFLP and DFLP that are core resistance forces in Gaza, the ability to learn the lessons of that history, but also reapply it to this context where they have concentrated the population, but they find new tools such as the tunnels and creating new areas where

the Zionist entity can't reach to reach, in my opinion, military successes that were not historically seen by the forces we've been talking about. So there's been accruing historical lessons here. And I would not say there was any major rupture between the tradition of the revolution and the infatheas, but also there are continuities even from the experience of people's war historically in the 60s, 70s, 80s, and organization like Hamas, Palestine, Islamic jihad, and how they're fighting today. That has also to do with international context and how lessons are transmitted from one generation to another. For instance, they have, you know, The EPRK has had a very, referring here to Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

has had very robust relationship with Arab and Palestinian organizations historically. And that includes the transmission of military wisdom of how, for instance, a people's worst thought. And these are lessons that organizations like Hezbollah and how, Mas have internalized whatever their actual ideological superstructural views. Yeah. So, Agnan, I know you have to leave. So it'll be, you know, just me and Patrick for the last question or two here as we wrap up the conversation.

But I appreciated that you were able to be here with us for this part of it. Patrick, the next question that I have is related to kind of where you were leaving off in your last answer. And I'll keep the question brief because, of course, there's going to be a lot to say, regardless of how brief the question is asked. So the question can be formulated as such, from Oslo to today or at least until October, because I think that there's a pretty dramatic shift in October, or maybe not a shift, but there has been other wrinkles that have been thrown into this equation. But from Oslo until October 2023, is it possible to talk? about what happened to the communist movement in Palestine, in that period. And then also how kind of the leading edge of resistance, Palestinian resistance shifted from these socialist and communist groups like the PFLP, DFLP, to in the last several, a couple decades, actually, have really shifted dramatically towards religious organizations like Hamas and Islamic jihad.

So what happened in that period? And I know, again, it's a big question, but we don't want to hold you forever. We will bring you back in the future, I'm sure, to dive into other things that are related inevitably. But from Oslo to kind of more or less the contemporary period, what happened to the communist movement in Palestine, what was the state, what were some of the things that were changing within Palestine that caused these shifts? And how did those shifts result in groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad kind of taking the fore of actual resistance to Zionist imperialism? Yeah, that is a very big question. So I'll deal with it in very brief terms. I think that the most significant shift was the global, I think, disastrous consequences of the over.

overthrow of the Soviet Union in 1991. It ends. I think that that created a crisis, an ideological crisis all over the world, including in Palestine, to say nothing of the actual base

of support. Because for all the criticisms we might make of the Soviet Union in terms of its ideological orientations or its analysis of the Palestine problem, At the end of the day, there's another important element, which is the umbrella it provided for resources, for political education,

there was a coherent political project attached to it. From the toilers of the University of the East in the 1930s, 1960s, the Patrice Lumumba University was a very important meeting place. For many people around the world to actually learn about the Palestinian cause for the first time, and to do so on a communist basis. Okay. So with all of that vaporized, and, you know, militarily as well, the USSR, even when it was making its worst judgments,

I think I read somewhere that between 1966 and 1974, 52% of USSR's military aid globally was going towards this West Asia Arab region, and that is because this was this, you know, a revolutionary storm center against the U.S.-led system. So it, along with this, this says nothing about even within the eastern block. You have GDR in eastern Germany. I was actually reading an article recently by an aggressively Zionist historian, but nonetheless, despite his ideological convictions and actually outright lies did go through some sources from East Germany

that showed that the military support that was being provided to Palestinian resistance groups did include militia on the front line. El Saipa would be a big example. So it was hard to calculate because today we're talking about this or that subjective whim of the USSR, but it was really incalculable the total influence that the USSR as a system, an alternative to U.S.-led capitalism, actually provided for the sustenance of an organized communist movement and communist resistance in Palestine. I will, I guess, close by just adding something about what I think is relevant about this history to anybody

professing to be a communist today. When I was first starting to take an interest in these issues and trying to do sincerely committed research to the best of my ability to understand this history, I would find, let's say, the early 2010s, when I wrote about it, the reception I would receive from the mainstream of the U.S. left would often range from hostile to coal.

You know, there are exceptions here and there. But I think that the determination for the U.S. left at the time, I want to make it clear why I bring this up is because we can ask these questions about the state of the Palestinian left and so on and so forth. But I think what this history we've been discussing shows us is that a more pertinent question is, what is the left offering to Palestine? So in that spirit, let me just return to what I was saying about the U.S. left, their reception of a serious exploration of these issues. The hostility I would encounter would often caricature theoretical interest in even the strains of Marxism with which the Palestinian left. was engaged. The Palestinian left was not reading Michael Harrington in the United States. The Palestinian left was looking at the collective historical experiences of, say, the North

of Korea or Vietnam. Actually, the PFLP, if you want to talk about what they looked, they looked at Vietnam as a model or People's War for victory over U.S.-led imperialism, their same enemy. And they looked at the DPRK actually as a project for how to sustain national defense for socialist development after the national revolution has been won. Now, of course, in the ideological context I'm describing in the United States, the DPRK is a punchline oftentimes. But it was not this way to the PFLP. They viewed the, um, ability to repel U.S.-led imperialism at its most violent with technocratic theory falling from the sky on civilian centers, exactly what Gaza is dealing with right now.

The ability to overcome that and still construct a socialist project after that, they looked at that as a very serious accomplishment because, again, that technochemical theory from the sky is what they encounter. It's not necessarily as simple as exploitation in the workplace. So if you're studying this history, you're looking at different historical models, you're looking at a different set of theory. And if you were to look at people's war, for example, oftentimes this would be looked at, okay, you're a, to get really specific about it, you're a first world white boy, you're larping. And that is the condescending attitude that would be taken. Or there'd be comparisons to these things.

this caricatured version of the weather underground in the United States or guilt politics and so on and so forth. I think that recent events show us that the struggle for land, as exists in Palestine right now, can very much serve as the foremost, is at the forefront of a challenge to the U.S.-led global system in its entirety. And if you live in a suburban, or urban context in the United States, the question of the land, sometimes if you look

outside, it might just seem like it's a settled matter. And I know there were writers at Jacobin, for instance, who are saying, oh, this is, the land question has been already resolved in the United States in favor of capitalism. But actually, it was studying the situation in Palestine that made me confront more, in a more forthright manner, the same questions in my very own social location. Okay. First of all, okay, what's going on with the border right now? We have, how is the question of a population refugees coming northward deemed by the custodians of the global capitalist system to be quote unquote surplus populations going to be dealt with? The genocidal campaign in Gaza is a frightening precedent because I think it's an attempt by the U.S. leadership

where the real architects of the policy say to see what they can get away with in terms of sheer depopulation and extermination. That implicates us very gravely. The move directly to the question of the land, actually we look at history in this country, struggles for the land remain paramount. I was looking recently in what happened on Pine Ridge Reservation in the 1970s, is you had nothing short of an armed rebellion against the sovereign, quote, unquote, authority of the United States in that territory to liberate land.

And then you had the Pentagon actually carry out a field testing of a counterinsurgency operation, the form of Operation Garden Plot. and after that a long period over the course of multiple years of actual death squads led by Dick Wilson who had received funding from a federal bureau the Bureau of Indian Affairs something like $62,000 to start up a policing or military force so that's a connection between the federal government and an armed organization that was killing or attacking systematically for multiple years, supporters of the American Indian movement or members of the American Indian movement

for the struggle to liberate land. Of course, if you look further into the background there, you see that there were major mining development interests on those reservation lands. All of this is to say, not only not a settled manner, but anybody politically serious, not only about the future of Palestine or the world system,

but actually for the future, of what happens in North America takes the questions the Palestinian left had to deal with as well as their theoretical models for addressing those questions very, very seriously. Yeah, all excellent points

and one of the things that, you know, as you're talking about, thinking today and thinking about how things are not only within Palestine, but also how relations between the left and Palestine and other people,

places in the world are, it brings up the last question that Adnan and I both had planned on asking, and since Adon had to leave, I will ask it on his behalf, which is that if we're thinking today, obviously we're looking at this from the, again, the perspectives of the fringes of the far left, and of course we are in full support of the Palestinian resistance to Zionist imperialism. But with that being said, obviously we would be much happier if the resistance was being led by communist organizations like PFLP or DFLP rather than Hamas and Islamic Jihad. I mean, that's just a simple fact. That's not to say that we don't support Hamas and Islamic Jihad in their struggle against Zionist imperialism, but ideologically speaking, there are other

groups that we align with much more closely. So the question of what are the prospects for a revival of these left groups within resistance as well as in the future after liberation of Palestine, what are the prospects of these groups coming back and reemerging to the fore of that resistance and hopefully to a liberated Palestine at the forefront of the people? I think that they're quite strong because there is an importance to the theoretical framework of how to deal with questions, national liberation. Every national liberation struggle ultimately comes to a place where the colonial authority attempts to negotiate some sort of deal, limited basis of sovereignty, whether we're talking about South Africa, whether we're talking about the struggle in North of Ireland, and Palestine itself, where, and you can hear it now, like, okay, what is post-Gaza situation going to look like? and I think as a way of

dealing with the reality of the Palestinian people that has been asserted by the Palestinian resistance you see certain governments starting to make noises about now is time for actual two-state solution all right there comes to this point of two-state solution then the one's view of the capitalist system

becomes increasingly relevant because if you're given some form of formal national sovereignty in order to maintain substantive all its forms, you're going to have to deal with the question of

markets. And we've seen different developmental paths taken by, say, Zimbabwe as compared to South Africa. And in the quest, when there's, is a failure to deal with the question of capitalism and the question of imperialist markets,

which can be another form of subjugation, the inequalities of the inequalities of the colonial era can persist in the quote unquote post-colonial era. And I think that the communist forces have the theory and the program to actually follow through revolution past a national stage to a social stage. So for that reason, the Palestinian left remains highly relevant. For those situated outside of Palestine, I think the short-term task is somewhat simple. I mean, I'm in the United States. There needs to be a campaign dedicated. to challenging the anti-terror laws or these lists of quote-quote FTOs, foreign terror organizations

that disallow many forms of communication, co-learning, and any form of co-organizing between those working in solidarity and the organized Palestinian left in Palestine. because it's only through those relationships that we can actually collectively answer these questions. It's only through a process of struggle. Those laws exist to subvert or outright obstruct that common struggle. And there are organizations like Semmudun. I would suggest that people get involved with who put confronting such laws and Zionist lawfare in general at the forefront. fronts of their political organizing.

Yeah, brilliant. Patrick, this has been a tour of tour de force. And I can't thank you enough for coming on to the show and at such length and with such erudition explaining this in many ways very complicated, but also in many ways very uplifting history of Palestinian communism. Again, listeners, our guest was Patrick. Patrick Higgins, returning guests, PhD in Arab history, expert in Palestine. And now you are going to officially be labeled a friend of the show, Patrick.

So can you let the listeners have any other parting words that you would like to have and tell them if there's anywhere that you would like direct them to to find your work or any other organizations that you would recommend them to keep track of? I know we did this last time with you as well, but here we are. I'll reiterate much the same is please all the work can get involved with the Palestinian youth movement Samudun, whom I just mentioned within our lifetime

USBCN organizations like this and also I hope that first of all I want to thank you Henry as well as Adnan for having me on I hope the again I don't claim that

what I'm saying on any of this is the capital T truth of the matter. This is what I've come across as an engaged researcher trying to do my part. And I hope that people find it useful. And I just also want to offer my appreciation to the audience in the spirit of common struggle. Well, of course, there is no capital T common truth. And anyone who claims that there is is probably trying to pull the wool over your eyes. That's what the bourgeois technocrats often say is that this is the true. So I'm glad that you say that, you know, this is not the capital T truth, but your experience and your findings in years and years of study. So I do appreciate that. And of course, I agree with the sentiment entirely. So listeners, just to shout out Adnan, you can follow Adnan on Twitter at Adnan A-Husain. That's H-U-S-A-N-Husain. You should follow Ignan's other show, the M-A-J-L-I-S, not the one that's hosted by Radio Free Central Asia, which, of course, is Radio Free Central CIA.

Don't follow that one. Follow the one by the MSGPQ-EU, Muslim Society Global Perspectives Project at Queen's University. It's great stuff. They recently put out an episode on the history of the Ood, one of my favorite instruments, another episode that was a collaboration with our sister. our spin-off show, Gorilla Radio, on the campus front, organizing on campus in solidarity with Palestine. And I know Adnan is recording another episode this upcoming week, so there will inevitably be another new episode of the Mudgellus coming soon.

So make sure to subscribe to that wherever you get your podcasts. As for me, listeners, you can find me on Twitter at UQ-1995, H-U-C-K-1-995. You can pick up, I'm going to advertise Stalin history and critique of a black legend, we mentioned, Lacerdo in the conversation, you can download the PDF for free or buy a low-cost paperback or hardcover edition of it from IskraBooks.org, or usually it's in my pinned tweet.

So if you follow me, you can just find a link to it there to either download it or pick it up. I've got another book coming out from Iskra soon. Adnan, Brett and I co-wrote a forward on a upcoming historic documents of the PLO text that's coming out from Iskra. books. So if you're keeping up to date with what Isker is putting out, you will see our forward on one of those texts soon. You can help support the show by following us on

Patreon at patreon.com forward slash gorilla history. That's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-A history. And follow the show on Twitter to keep up with everything that we do at Gorilla underscore Pod. That's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-A underscore pod. And until next time, listeners, Solidarity. I'm going to be able to be. Thank you.