Guerrilla History - Korea War Games, Trump's Rhetoric on the DPRK, & More w/ Ju-Hyun Park of Nodutdol

Episode Date: February 28, 2025

In this episode of Guerrilla History, we bring back our comrade Ju-Hyun Park (whom you will remember from our recent episodes  A History of American Imperialism in Korea and  Korea Dispatch - Martial Law, Impeachment, and More) to discuss the upcoming US led war games taking place in the Peninsula, some interesting rhetoric coming from the Trump administration regarding the DPRK, Nodutdol's positions on each of these topics, and a brief rundown of the latest in the martial law and impeachment story that we covered last time with Ju-Hyun. For more information on these topics and more, be sure to follow the material posted on both UsoutofKorea.org and Nodutdol.org.  Also, check out some of Nodutdol's recent instagram posts here: Post 1 , Post 2   Ju-Hyun Park is a writer and activist with Nodutdol for Korean Community Development.  Their writing has appeared in a variety of outlets, and they can be followed on Twitter @hermit_hwarang. Help support the show by signing up to our patreon, where you also will get bonus content: https://www.patreon.com/guerrillahistory 

You don't remember Den Ben-Brew? No! The same thing happened in Algeria, in Africa. They didn't have anything but a rank. The French had all these highly mechanized instruments of warfare. But they put some guerrilla action on. Hello and welcome to Gorilla History, the podcast that acts as a reconnaissance report of global proletarian history and aims to use the lessons of history to analyze the present. I'm one of your co-hosts, Henry Huckermacki, joined as usual by my co-host, Professor Adnan Hussein, historian director of the School of Religion at Queen's University in Ontario, Canada.

Hello, Adnan. How are you doing today? I'm doing really well, Henry. It's great to be with you. Pleasure to see you as well, and as always. We have a terrific guest today in a really interesting conversation and a multi-time returning guest. But before I get to introducing the guest and the topic, I want to remind the listeners that they can help support the show by going to patreon.com forward slash guerrilla history. That's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-A history.

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So with that housekeeping out of the way, it's my pleasure to reintroduce a multi-time returning guest, Zhujan Park, who is a writer and activist for Nodotol for Korean Community Development. Listeners of guerrilla history, you most certainly will recognize Zhuryan's name because they have been on the show two or three times within the last couple of months, giving us updates on the goings on in the Korean Peninsula and we're very much going to be doing that again today. Zhuryan, it's nice to have you back on the program. How are you doing today? Henry, great to be here. Adnan. Good to finally have a chance to do a show together.

I'm excited to talk about everything that's happening. Absolutely. So as we had been mentioning before hitting record, we have a couple of different topics that we're going to be talking about in this conversation. We're going to be talking about war games that are going on within the Korean Peninsula. We're going to be talking about some of the rhetoric that's coming out from the Trump administration vis-a-vis the DPRK and how Nortato is viewing these developments with regard to, again, these rhetorical developments from the Trump administration. And then listeners who have been listening to the recent episodes that we have done with Jiuyan, no doubt, are familiar with the fact that we have been kind of tracking and following the updates regarding the martial law declaration that took place in just before the new year in December. and have been trying to follow along with that story, and we'll get a brief update on what has been going on with that

and how Nurtol is organizing themselves with regard to developments in that story as well. But we do want to start with the war games. So, Juryan, without much more introducing from me, why don't I just turn it over to you? And you can tell us a little bit about the war games that are going to be taking place. I know that in your first appearance on the show, we did talk about the previous war games that took place last year.

But can you remind the listeners a little bit about what these war games are, who is participating, what is the scope and scale of them, etc., whatever really you would like to say in terms of introduction here? Absolutely. So let's start with this term war games. That may be something that not all listeners are super familiar with. And it may even sound like a sort of paradoxical phrase. What is a war game? That's essentially a term that we're using to describe what the U.S. military calls its military exercises or military drills. So kind of in a manner similar to how a sports team will hold scrimand charges,

militaries also hold their own rehearsals or practices for different sorts of operations. And this can range from anything from seeing how effectively your troops are able to stage a landing in the case of invasion, to coordinating maneuvers between different branches of one military or even among the militaries of multiple countries in order to see how well they're able to operate in a wartime situation. Now, these war games are essentially happening in Korea every day at this point, just about. We've been tracking the statistics coming from independent studies and journalists in South Korea, and what they have been noting is a marked and very rapid increase.

in the number and the severity of war games that have been taking place over the last couple of years, especially, although these war games have gone on for decades in South Korea. In 2023, there were more than 200 days of war exercises that the U.S. military conducted in Korea alone. In 2024, that number rose to more than 275 days of war games. And what we know about what to expect in 2025 is that there will be yet another. 10% increase in the volume of military exercises that the U.S. will be conducting. Now, how exactly are these war games executed? The thing to know is that these are joint military exercises. So what that means is that the United States is not carrying out

these military exercises by itself, but rather with the South Korean military. But the South Korean military itself is really just an appendage of the U.S. military. The U.S. has something called operational wartime command over South Korea's armed forces. That means that in a situation of war, the orders don't come from Seoul. They come from the Pentagon. In addition to that, on a day-to-day basis, these militaries are very, very tightly integrated. Their command structures are fused together. Their troops regularly engage in all manner of drills side by side.

Their units are really designed to be compatible with one another. And really, it's that the South Korean military is designed to fit like a glove on the hand of the United States military. Now, in terms of what is about to happen, we are entering the month of March very soon. And March is when the United States and South Korea generally hold a series of exercises known as Freedom Shield. If that name sounds familiar, it's because it's almost exactly the same as their August wartime exercises, which are called Ulii Freedom Shield. Now, Freedom Shield, the war games that take place in the springtime are an especially provocative period and an especially dangerous period in Korea because so many of these war exercises are really just veiled threats against the DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea, better known to most as North Korea. And that is the official reason that the U.S. gives in terms of having these military exercises at all. They claim that these exercises are defensive, but they carry out things like practiced invasions

of the DPRK slash North Korea. Last summer, they rehearsed the first ever joint tabletop nuclear exercises, which is essentially activity in which the top senior officials of the South Korean and U.S. militaries discuss their plans for nuclear strikes on the peninsula in the event of war. So these are not actually defensive exercises at all. I think we need to do away with that frame entirely, and we need to understand that what these are is that these are intentional provocations against the DPRK. They are essentially rehearsals for war crimes against the Korean people, which is something

the United States has a long history of doing. And in the particular case of Freedom Shield happening this March, we have to be very mindful of how dangerous the situation is becoming. And one thing we are particularly looking to do is what happened last year during Freedom Shield in 2024. Because in that instance, Freedom Shield did not only include the militaries of the U.S. and South Korea. In fact, there were a total of 13 countries that participated in last year's Freedom Shield exercises. Those additional nations were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

So you have a bunch of NATO countries, a bunch of U.S. allies in Asia and the Pacific, that we're all converging on Korea to participate in these exercises. We don't know yet if there are going to be additional countries participating in Freedom Shield this year, although it is a possibility. And one thing we need to look out for is that in the past year, Japan has been participating in other war games in Korea as well, meaning they could return for Freedom Shield. Germany has joined the U.S. dominated United Nations Command in South Korea,

which means that they are now also militarily involved in the Korean Peninsula. So we're actually looking at a situation where many of the most aggressive and warlike states that we have today in the imperialist system could all be coming together on the Korean Peninsula to participate in these exercises, and that is based on very recent precedent. Another thing we need to watch out for is how unstable the situation is on the peninsula currently and how Freedom Shield is very likely to only inflame those tensions. We have a political crisis that is ongoing in South Korea at the moment. South Korea right now has an acting government, but it is unelected.

And yet in spite of that, this government is doing everything it needs to to appease the U.S. military agenda in Korea, which I think is a very clear. clear demonstration of whose interests the South Korean government serves at all times, regardless of who is in power. And then, of course, the situation with North Korea has only been deteriorating year after year, and we're now in a situation where relations between North and South Korea, between North Korea and the United States are at their lowest point in many, many years, and now we are having these extremely provocative exercises where tens of thousands of foreign

troops will swarm the peninsula. we could see the involvement of additional nations beyond the United States and South Korea's militaries. And on top of that, the war games themselves are going to be bigger than ever before. Last year, there were 10 combined firepower exercises that were conducted. This year, there are going to be 17. So we are entering a very uncertain period on the Korean Peninsula, and I think it just goes to demonstrate how unnecessary and dangerous these war games really are.

least if you have any kind of interest in the common well-being of humanity, and you're not thinking from the standpoint of imperialism, because even in the case of a misunderstanding in this sort of situation, you can very easily see how things could spiral into a war. And given many of the revelations that are coming out as well, in the hearings taking place regarding President Yunsookyod of South Korea's impeachment, there is always the possibility that military exercises can be used to mask essentially Black Ops military operations against the DPRK. So we should be looking at this as a very grave threat to world peace, to stability on the Korean Peninsula, and really a concern that extends far beyond just the Korean people, given

the size and scale and magnitude of the games themselves and the powers behind them. Yeah, that's a really interesting kind of set of analyses. about the significance of these war games and military exercises. There's so many threads that I think are important to pick up in that picture that you've drawn. But one thing I wanted to go back to is just to have a little bit more of a sense of what the consequences in effect and experience of these war games and these massive military exercises that have been taking place have been. What happens in them?

Are these within sight of, you know, how do the people on the peninsula experience these? Do these happen out of sight, or are they part of projecting not just in kind of military and strategic terms, but are they part of projecting kind of an intimidating U.S. presence militarily, you know, in the region? Like, how palpable is it to people? you mentioned that the vast majority of the year, there are certain kinds of war games or military exercises taking place. We're obviously focusing right now on the importance of large-scale coordinated ones taking place under this freedom shield, you know, twice a year, mainly. But it sounds like these are very extensive and constantly involved in, you know, violations

of North Korean, the DPR case, sovereignty, and that it must be palpable in some sense, even to just people, that they are facing a large-scale military threat. And is that, in fact, even part of the purpose to constantly put under pressure politically the sense of threat and intimidation? I think that's an excellent question. When it comes to the vast majority of war,

They do tend to take place away from population centers in, you know, kind of official military territory. However, I think that while for the majority of people in South Korea, we know we can say that, you know, they have not like personally witnessed a military drill being conducted unless it involved them as civilians, which is something I'm going to get to in a moment, there are a number of communities throughout South Korea that are in progress. proximity to very important bases or in some cases firing ranges. These are places where it's just sort of taken as a given that the United States and South Korea can practice the use of live ammunition. And keep in mind, we're talking about conventional capitalist militaries here, right? These are not like going down to the firing range with your uncle who's got like his, I don't really know guns, but you know, his bumpstock AR-15 or whatever it is. We're talking rocket launchers, we're talking tanks, we're talking about warships, we're talking about bombers.

I actually want to talk a little bit about a community called Mehangri. Meyangi was a place where from 1952 to 2004, the U.S. Air Force used two nearby small islands as the Kudni bombing range. And every day, the U.S. Air Force, and keep in mind, this is for 52 years, every single day, they would conduct more than 50 bombing runs. This is a small coastal village, and villagers would say that the planes flew so low, they could actually see the pilot's faces as they were passing by. And I just want everyone listening to this. I imagine many people have never heard a bomb go off before. But I want you to just imagine what that sounds like on its own. And I want you to imagine hearing that every day, 50 times a day.

And I want you to think about the youngest child you know and the oldest person you know. And I want you to think about them living in that kind of environment. Right. Like this is the actual cost and impact of these military exercises. And this is also what we mean when we say that these are near daily occurrences, right? because what we're tracking in terms of the 200 days, 275 days in 2023 and 2024, those are just the military exercises that get logged and have names, right?

We're not talking about the sort of daily operations of the U.S. military, which is an entirely different thing. Getting back to the story of Nehangli, you know, there are at least 12 deaths that are known from stray bombs or machine gun bullets. We know that 13 people were severely, injured over that 52 period at least. But we also know that there was an unusually high rate of depression and suicide in that village. Because if you can just imagine an entire lifetime

spent essentially in this nonstop war zone, I think you can pretty easily see why people would be kind of driven to that point. And one last incident I want to share from you, Yangdi, is in the year 2000 when a plane that was having engine trouble dropped six 500 pound bombs off the coast and in the process destroyed 200 houses so this is in peace a so-called peacetime right this is a US this is an ally the United States supposedly of the Korean people and they are bombing this village every single day for 52 years and then in the process they're driving people to suicide they They kill at least 12, they injure at least 13, and then they burn down 200 homes. This is in the 21st century, right?

Mayhengri is no longer the site of a live bombing range, but I want to share that as a historical example because there are new ranges being constructed all the time. There are bases being expanded all the time. There are people that are embroiled in fights that have been taking place for decades to defend land that really is their only place in the entire world. to go. And that's the real price at the U.S. military extracts from the Korean people. Now, in terms of the regional impact of these exercises, I think that's a very pertinent point to raise as well, because it's not just about Korea. What the United States does in Korea

is really about establishing and projecting its power around the entire region. If you were to take Northeast Asia, Japan, the northern half of China, the eastern half of China, the eastern side of Russia and you were to draw like a perfect circle, the Korean Peninsula would be in the almost exact center. And that's what makes this such a strategic position for the United States. And that's why any show of force that it makes against the DPRK is necessarily also a demonstration of its power when it comes to China and Russia as well. So there is certainly a lot of geostrategic thinking that goes into the frequency and the severity of these war games. it's a much bigger deal if the U.S. has like a massive exercise in like the Taiwan Strait, right?

But if it does it in Korea, it's not technically entering any kind of contested waters with these other great powers. And so it's able to more or less achieve the same fact without as much of the diplomatic cost. And finally, I want to just talk about the psychological effect beyond the communities that are, you know, really on the front lines of these military. exercises because something we saw in particular during the UN administration, something that had not really happened since the years of military dictatorship was the return of large-scale civilian evacuation exercises as part of Uriji Freedom Shield last summer. So these are in densely populated areas where you suddenly have large numbers of military and police that are deployed into the streets. They are rehearsing strategies of urban warfare that they would practice in the event

of needing to battle for control of the city. This is while residents are still there. In many cases, residents, particularly if they are federal workers or in public schools, they're being taken through these drills where they have to practice hiding from the enemy, so to speak, right? And of course, there's immense propaganda value in this, going into what we now know was supposed to be a war, right? The entire purpose of it is really to prime the population, to think in terms of war, to become accustomed to a process of much more direct occupation. So the military drills in themselves, you know, they play all these different types of roles. They terrorize and, you know, really enact the domination of the United States over the land and the people. They project its military power throughout the region and, you know, play a role in the conflict that is brewing between the United States and China in particular.

And it all comes at a deep, deep cost to Korean people. And I would argue that that is true whether someone is on the front line receiving the most direct impacts or, you know, even people who think that, you know, that that's all very far away from them. there are always reminders that, in fact, it is not. I think one final tidbit I'll share is that there are a number of high-rise apartments in the cities throughout South Korea that have anti-aircraft units stationed at the tops of them, and in many cases, residents don't know if their apartment has one or not. So I think that just is a demonstration of how thoroughly militarized the society truly is and the role that these war games play in that.

Before Adnan-Hopsin with his next question, I do have a very small follow-up. that might be apropos, you know, you mentioned that this is very much a projection of force and a projection of U.S. power, both to people within the Korean Peninsula, particularly the DPRK, but also regionally, this is the modus operandi of large imperial powers, right? When we're looking at the way that imperialists operate, if they are a small burgeoning imperialist power, they're not necessarily going to be the loudest and yappiest and taking the most explicit actions and in carrying out these war games perpetually right next door to people who are under the imperial umbrella. However, when the imperial power gets to a certain size, and particularly when

it's very established and has been for a while, part of the reason that they are maintaining their position within the world system is because they are so blatant with their show, of force, their show of their position within the world system, and their imperial ambitions. And the United States has been doing this for many decades since at least World War II. So it's very interesting to think about how the United States continues to demonstrate that it is an imperial power blatantly, but, you know, they would still disagree with you if you called them imperialists. If you told somebody in the, you know, administration, the current administration or any of the past administrations in the United States, that they were imperialists, they would say, of course not. We are ensuring that we are prepared to protect the safety of the people in South Korea or in Japan or in whatever other, you know, regional player that is allied with the United States. But the actions that they take just lay out their imperial ambitions and,

strategy very clearly. And I think that that's something that's just quite interesting to look at. It's not only in this context, obviously, but it's very explicit in this case, as you've been laying out to you, yeah, I think that's a really important thing to raise, even in terms of thinking through why are all these escalations happening in Korea specifically at this time, right? You know, so many people have received this narrative that the U.S. just has total preponderant power in all places, but especially in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea itself is often thought of as, oh, it's a backwater. You know, it has no real power or ability to threaten the United States, and yet the U.S. invest so much in demonizing North

Korea and threatening North Korea. And I think that's because the truth of the situation in the Korean Peninsula today is actually very different from the narrative we've received of just total capitalist supremacy in Korea. For starters, South Korea is in a very bad position these days. It's not just because of the political crisis that's taking place. There have been a lot of efforts by the United States to essentially kneecap South Korea's economy, particularly as a result of the new Cold War, all this anxiety about the control of high-tech supply chains.

We're seeing a similar process playing out with Taiwan, right? It's why you have these giants like Samsung, TSM, building these, you know, huge factories for semiconductors and other high-tech products in the U.S. now because the Biden administration essentially threatened them with tariffs if they did a transfer over part of their supply chains to the U.S. Trump is now accelerating that process with, you know, his various tariffs and threats of tariffs that are being made to multiple countries. And a big part of what's going on is that, you know, the big players in South Korea are being disincentivized from being able to continue and expand their commerce with China. And it's eating the economy alive, you know. It's especially coming at the expense of working people. All the processes that are happening throughout late stage capitalism, you know, this financialization, the creation of what really are not properly real economies, you know, the dominant. nation of global north monopolies over supply chains and production at very deep levels in the global south.

This is all happening in South Korea too. And simultaneously, North Korea is now in a position where U.S. sanctions are not as effective as they were, even just a few years ago. We're actually seeing very considerable growth of the North Korean economy, and we're seeing a lot of technological advancement. We're seeing a lot of advancement in their ability to provide a high quality of life for their people. This is supposed to be the year that 50,000 free apartments are completed in Pyongyang. And, you know, of course, conducive with all of that is also military advancement.

So the U.S. is really throwing its tantrum in Korea because there are very clear signs that the basis of its hold is actually slipping. So it needs to resort to more military threats than before. And it's very interesting, you know, you say that. there is evidence that sanctions are working less and less that's very related to the context that, of course, I live in as listeners are where I live in Russia. And I can see firsthand how, yes, of course, sanctions have had a detrimental effect on various, you know, things that we see here within Russian society going to the grocery stores and whatnot. You'll see some products that are unavailable, various products have increased in prices. But overall, the Russian economy

is still growing at a fairly rapid rate. even though we have seen pretty substantial inflation in the last year and a half, to be honest with you, real wages are still growing relative to that. The average salaries in my republic when increased 9% in terms of real wages compared to inflation within the last year even when, of course, the sanctions were supposed to be as crippling as possible. I just mentioned that because, of course, we're seeing increased integration and planning and diplomatic ties between the DPRK and Russia these days, really since the special military operation began and since the sanctions regime really started to ramp up on Russia. The DPRK has been suffering under sanctions

for many, many decades, which we have outlined in our sanctions as war series, and we've also discussed with you, Chuyang. It's very interesting that the DPRK has been grappling with these sanctions for decades. And when Russia then had pretty extensive sanctions packages put upon it, that this integration between the two nations took place at that precise moment to an unprecedented level, really something that we haven't seen in decades at this point between the DPRK and previously the Soviet Union, now Russia. And we are seeing actually pretty high-level collaborations between the two nations with regard to how to circumvent sanctions, how to survive sanctions. And, you know, as we've said, there are definitely still

severe impacts as a result of the sanctions, but I think it's pretty obvious that the sanctions haven't had their intended impacts here in Russia. And as you've just laid out in your last point, Chu Yan, they're not really having the desired impact or quite the same extent. extent of impact within the DPRK that they had previously either within the last couple of years. So interesting to see how those dynamics play out. But I want to turn to Adnan. Now, Adnan, I know that you have a couple things that you want to bring up at this point. Well, you know, it's just such a fascinating subject.

And you've had so much interesting information to impart. And I just had to say, I think, your description of the experience of the village, you know, undergoing 50 bombs daily. I mean, it was a very vivid and compelling way to encourage our audience and listeners to really understand the continuous effect of this extreme militarization that they're experiencing. And it just reminded me so much of the relief that I remember hearing Abu Bakr Abed, a Gazan journalist who appears and as a contributor to the electronic intifada, talking about how difficult and, you know, it was to sleep under the terrifying conditions of bombardment, of hearing drones over flights constantly. It just was

such a level of anxiety that made everyone exhausted, prevented them from sleeping, and how much relief, you know, despite all of the problems that the Gaza ceasefire at least had allowed, you know, some sense that you're not constantly having overflight and bombardment, which is just terrifying to hear. So that was a very vivid account. And I think one could, you know, even elaborate a little bit more and talk about all the environmental effects, the social consequences of all of these military bases and soldiers stationed and undergoing all these exercises. So it's really just a huge impact to underscore what you've been describing about the incessant and intensified character of these war games. But one thing I did want to pick up and just ask you finally about that you started

to talk a little bit more when you were discussing the regional picture is thinking a little bit more about these military alliances. And it also anticipates a little bit my kind of interest, your recent answer, your interest, my interest in your discussion about the economic costs, you know, of this on even the Republic of Korea's economy, as well as, of course, sanctions on the people's, the DPRK as well. But how there seems to be a kind of closing noose that's happening with these kind of military alliances. I mean, we've heard about Aoukos, you know, U.S.'s kind of coordinated plan with Australia as an anti-Chinese measure. And everything that you've been describing seems to suggest targeting very much China as well.

The U.S. Japan and Republic of Korea, Jakhuz, as another war alliance. I'm just wondering if you could talk a little bit more about this. it seems that it's related to the interoperability that you see with NATO. It's, you know, kind of rehearsing and practicing and requiring in some ways the coordination of militaries. It means that they have to use more U.S. technologies, war technologies, also U.S. expertise, and so on. It's a way of subordinating more nations to participate, you know, in a kind of U.S. military projection. but I guess what I found very fascinating in your point is that it's something that reminds me of Kissinger's supposed to have said something about like being an enemy of the United States is terrible, you know, it's very dangerous for you, but being a friend or an ally of the United States is like utter disaster. And that seemed to be in some sense what you're describing with the suffocation of South Korea, you know, Republic of Korea. And so I was just wondering if You know, you might talk a little bit more about this way in which these military alliances, the way in which this kind of economic policy are moving towards where, okay, I mean, DPRK is under these horrific sanctions, but at least they're developing some kind of self-sustaining, you know, mode of trying to evade sanctions and have development.

Whereas the dependency and the constraint and strictures militarily, politically, economically on the Republic of Korea really have to be, you know, kind of assessed in this term. I'm just wondering if you have any thoughts or comments in response to that. Yeah, absolutely. I think the thing to be understood is that what is happening in the Asia-Pacific region currently is essentially the formation of what A lot of critics refer to as Asian NATO, which is a phrase that the United States does not like, because it reveals exactly what they're doing and they don't like it when that happens, right? They prefer to have their liberal narrative kind of be the icing on, I guess, their poison cake that they're trying to feed people. Don't know if that metaphor is too forced, if it is apologized. Anyway, what it is Asia-Nado and what exactly are we talking about?

how is it different from before? What are the effects that it's happening in the region? Now, the thing to understand is that the U.S. has been the dominant military power in the Pacific since at least the end of World War II. And something I like to just impress on people as a history nerd is that the U.S. has had military operations in the Pacific going back to the very beginning of the 19th century. So this is actually a very old imperial theater for the United States, which is, I think, something that is not always understood very fully, because we tend to think of it in terms of, like, the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii at the end of the 1800s.

Anyway, since World War II, the U.S. had this constellation of bilateral military alliances. So they have a standalone military alliance with Japan, a standalone alliance with the Philippines, with South Korea, with Australia, et cetera. What has been happening in the last five years or so is the increasing formation of new sorts of clusters of alliances. You have Ocus, you have five eyes, which has now grown far beyond just five. I forget the most recent number. You had the quad where they were attempting to bring India in on the situation alongside Japan and Australia. And the strategy that they've been pivoting towards is the creation,

of more of these sorts of trilateral alliances. Ocas was kind of the first one, the first instance of that, but a very important one that has also emerged is Jackus, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. There is also a recent one that was formed between Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. And essentially, these are the building blocks for forming a much more tightly integrated U.S. dominated military block in the Pacific, where the militaries of all these countries can be mobilized for the purpose of U.S. war. And, you know, when it comes to actually getting militaries to fight alongside the U.S., it's not just a matter of political commitments, right?

Those militaries have to use the same or similar equipment. You have to have officers that are able to communicate with each other in one language, et cetera, et cetera. So the purpose of these military exercises around the Pacific, these new alliances that are being formed, are to facilitate this process, to integrate those militaries more with the U.S., but also with one another, so that you're able to have multiple U.S. vassal states coordinated in a single fight. Now, this is not necessarily a very new thing that the U.S. is doing. It's really a variation on an old theme.

The way that President Nixon described his approach to Vietnam was Asian boys fighting Asian voice. And this is essentially the same sort of approach to warfare in the Pacific today. Now, in terms of the effects that it's having in Korea and in the region, there was a very important speech that General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Jong-un gave on February 9th, and he was discussing the formation of these new alliances. And the analysis he gave was that it is causing military imbalance and a new conflicting structure on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. So I want you to imagine that there are these sorts of blocks forming and that these blocks

are grading against one another on the Korean Peninsula because that is the only place in the region where you have of competing blocks that share a land border, right? And I think the thing to be clarified is that although North Korea has its strategic agreements with, you know, Russia and China, that is actually not nearly as tightly integrated of a block as the U.S. has with South Korea, Japan, with the Philippines, with Ocas, right? Because those militaries, China, Russia, North Korea, they don't have this extensive history of collaboration, right? They also don't have any kind of agreement that joins them together into a specific alliance, unlike Jackus, which is probably going to reach the point of a formal

military alliance either this year or next year. And, you know, it really is affecting the calculus of countries that are targeted by imperialism in the region because it has to, right? If you are North Korea and the U.S. already has an alliance with South Korea that it uses against you, and it has an alliance with Japan that it uses against you, and then suddenly it is starting to process of fusing these alliances together, integrating all the military forces among the three countries to essentially form a much more powerful kind of block that can be wielded as a weapon, that forces you to increase the kinds of deterrence that you have because the military threat that you now face is much greater. And keep in mind, these are all things that the U.S. has pursued,

saying that it upholds freedom, it upholds democracy, peace in the region. But what is mean for people and communities like Mayhung-di, the village where the United States had 50 daily bombings for 52 years, right? What does it mean for the people in North Korea who are constantly under siege militarily, economically, and we say that this is the freedom and the peace that the United States is delivering to the people of Korea and to the region as well? I think, you know, when you look on the ground, the situation and the reality of the matter being as much clearer and the impressions and the thing that you walk away understanding is that there can be war without formal declaration of war, right? When you live around these actual military communities

and when the cost of their daily operations comes down on your head, then that is really in many ways indistinguishable from a more conventional hot war, as we might think of it. And so I think we need to understand that the U.S. enacts and is always reestablishing this structure of warfare, this reality of daily warfare in the region. And these moves to form these new alliances, this new big block that we can call Asian NATO, is really pushing us as an entire region towards a place of all-out confrontation, which of course only means the expansion of a war that is already taking place and grinding away at the left.

As of so many people to include millions and possibly billions of others. Yeah, I just was wondering, that's just so important. I really appreciate that analysis. And so I wanted to also ask about, you know, what Notetol is doing in its strategy against all of this and to have our listeners learn more about the activities that are planned

by your group. Absolutely. So I've previously come on to talk about the U.S. Out of Korea campaign, which is a campaign that we launched last summer, it's pretty straightforward we want the U.S. out of Korea. If you go to U.S. out of Korea.org,

we have a campaign platform that lists out our demands in more detail, but just to give people a top line. We want U.S. troops and weapons systems out of Korea. We want an end to the U.S. South Korea alliance. We want an end to all U.S. hostility and aggression against North Korea. And we want an end to the U.S. war economy, right? The U.S. is spending something like $1.5 trillion on war, persons policing, when you add it all up. And in the meantime, I mean, we have a lot of the U.

smoldering ruins in Los Angeles. We have people in Appalachia that are still intense or getting kicked out of the hotels that FEMA set them up in after Hurricane Helene. That was months ago. We have 20% of adults who are functionally illiterate. We have millions of children that are dealing with hunger. We have rapidly growing rate of homelessness, right? To us, that's the war economy, right? It's taking the goods produce. by our social labor, and instead of putting it towards our collective wealth, it's putting it towards private wealth and ultimately our collective destruction. And that's a process we want to reverse. Now, when it comes to the Freedom Shield war games, which are likely to take place

between March 10th and 19th, although we are still waiting on final confirmation of those dates, we are going to be mobilizing in New York, Los Angeles, and in Oakland on March 1st. The reason why we're choosing March 1st is twofold. One, it's the anniversary of a very important moment in the development of the Korean independence or national liberation struggle, known as Hamiljol or Samin Undong, which just means like the movement of March 1st, right? Koreans like to refer to things by the days that they happened. And what happened on that day was under colonialism, there was a mass mobilization across Korea. of more than 2 million people.

So what happened on March 1st was that more than 2 million people across Korea mobilized for independence. It was actually one of the world's first large-scale attempts at non-violence struggle, and it ended up having a deep influence on other similar movements across Asia, including the May 4th movement in China.

The independence struggle in India was even somewhat influenced by this. But within Korea, itself, you know, this was a very important moment in that it reawakened the national consciousness and the national liberation movement. There was, of course, a very violent crackdown, and as a result of this, people had to go into exile, people had to go underground, but the movement itself did not die. And the independent struggle that would grow out of it and then reach the phase of armed struggle really required the March 1st movement.

an important historical episode to pass through. So we are marking this moment because it is a date that is well known among most Korean people and because we feel that in doing so, we can draw the parallels between the struggle against Japanese colonialism in the past and U.S. imperialists and kind of to that spirit of the national liberation struggle as something that we need to be building on and carrying forward. So if you're in these cities, we really encourage you to join us for the various actions and events that we have planned for that day. In addition to that, if you're part of an organization, you should go to us out ofcarea.org, you should submit your organizational endorsement. You should sign up for our email list. That will be the most effective

way to get updates on further ways that you can participate. I think the thing that is really important right now is for us to be building consistency as an anti-war movement and as an anti-imperialist movement. And what I mean by consistency is just that. It's straightforward. It's the consistent participation of as many people as possible in political activity that is mass in character and that allows for many people to operate through a collective activity. That's something that you know, really needs to be developed as almost like muscle memory, something that we just do as a movement. Not because an individual protest is going to stop the United States or stop imperialism, but because we need that consistency and we need this practice as a collective movement of engaging in collective struggle

in order to advance to higher phases of struggle in order to bring more and more masses of people onto our side, and in order to really make our movement a political factor that is a part of how events are shaped and not just something that responds to events that are determined elsewhere or even worse than that is just a spectator to these things. And I say this because I know that a lot of people feel this kind of wariness around protest. And while I very much understand what that's coming from. I think what I'm trying to say is that this is a really essential part of the process of building movements for transformation. It is a protracted process. It takes time. And it also takes this level of commitment where we continue to show up no matter what

and we continue to be a presence in the streets because that's what allows us to grow that process further until we reach points where we are able to take it beyond the tactics and the appearance of how things have been going so far. I want to move topics now because we've been going for a fair amount of time on these war games. And of course, there is much more to say, but there is also a lot that we have to cover still without getting too bogged down. So moving topics, we have seen some interesting rhetoric, interesting for several reasons, coming out from the current U.S. administration. Now, of course, course, the United States has always been the most bellicose of nations when it comes to the

DPRK. And so the rhetoric vis-a-vis the DPRK has always been pretty much homogenous, regardless of whether it was a Democratic or Republican administration. Yeah, you know, how bellicose they were might vary to some degree, but by and large, the rhetoric has remained the same for many, many, many decades. There have been some very interesting things that have been said recently by Trump and other members of this administration vis-a-vis the DPRK. So I'm wondering if you can take us up to date with some of the things that have been said by Trump and other members of his administration and how you are viewing these rhetorical devices that are being used vis-a-vis the DPRK, because even within individual members of the administration, there is a lot of contradiction with regard to the

rhetoric that is coming out. Sometimes you have words coming out that look like, almost like they would be pushing for some sort of mild detente to other things that are, again, extremely bellicose, which is what we have come to expect over the decades. So how are you viewing some of these statements that are coming out? And can you tell us a little bit about the statements that have been coming out? Yes, absolutely. So I think by now, everyone is pretty familiar with this media myth of a Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un bromance. That's me directly quoting media, not because I find that term particularly appropriate or even a thing I'd say in real life, but that's the narrative we've been sold on, right?

For some reason, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un love each other, they're holding hands and skipping across the DMZ. They get along so well. If you're a Trump supporter, it's a sign of, you know, what an amazing diplomat he is and just how macho he is that he can get a country like North Korea to be afraid. If you are, I guess, a Democrat or a liberal, then, you know, this is a sign of Trump's authoritarianism, right? Look who he hangs out with. He hangs out with the wrong people. He's just like them, right? He's not an American home. grown threat. He is some kind of oriental brainwashed

Manchurian candidate, right? My kid, but well, not really because that is what the narrative is. But in any case, that's the story that we've been sold, right? And I think the thing to understand is that Donald Trump is very good

with media. So he has taken this narrative and he's run with it. He did it all throughout his campaign. He's done since coming into office, right? He continued used to play up the fact that he and Kim Jong-un have this supposedly personal relationship, right? That only he can reach Kim Jong-un and North Korea in the way that he can. No other U.S. President could do it, right? But I think the reality of the situation shows that that is

actually not the case. And it is also increasingly demonstrating the limits of Trump's vision and also really that his policy so far is no different from Joe Biden's. So I want to start with how the DPRK has responded to Trump leaning into these claims of a more personal relationship between them. Back during the election over the summer, there was a moment at the Republican National Convention where Trump claimed to have been endorsed by Kim Jong-un, and the DPRK felt it was necessary to give an official response to that. So back during the summer of 2024 during the election, Donald Trump at some point made a claim that Kim Jong-un had actually endorsed him in his presidential run, and the DPRK felt that this warranted an official response. And I'm going to read verbatim from the response that was actually given. They said, no matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate does not change, and accordingly, we do not care about this. So I'm going to reiterate that we do not care about this. That is the view of the DPRK or North Korea when it comes to the U.S. political system,

and that is because they see the U.S. as a fundamentally hostile entity, and they don't think that any changes in administration are going to result in a better relationship that is lasting between the two states. They also further clarified that, you know, the matter of U.S. DPRK. relations is not a a matter of personal relations, but a matter of state-to-state relations. So that's, you know, neither confirming or denying the Kim Jong and Donald Trump romance, supposedly, but it is also very firmly saying that ultimately this is a government-to-government relationship, not a relationship between two people, right? And so I think that's a very important thing to bring up, because it really just dispels all this mystique that the media and Trump have kind of

constructed around himself when it comes to North Korea. Now, with that being said, since coming into office, Donald Trump has said that restarting dialogue with North Korea is something he wants to do. And there was a little bit of excitement in the first week when he was in office from, you know, various people who I guess you've been kind of described as career watchers, because Trump, Hegeseth, and Rubio all referred to North Korea as a quote-unquote nuclear power. Now, the reason why that's significant may not immediately land with people, because if you just say, like, well, North Korea is a nuclear power. That just sort of feels like a factual statement, right? But the thing you have to understand is that the reason why the U.S. has never done that

before is because they use these international systems of nuclear governments, like the nonproliferation treaty, like the IAEA, in order to criminalize North Korea and say that, you know, you are outside the bounds of international law. And they use that as the basis for things like the sanctions that have been imposed through the UN Security Council. So for the U.S. government to say that North Korea is nuclear power is essentially them kind of stepping back from the use of these international instruments of lawfare. Now, that's only in theory. I think that when we look at how the relationship is actually playing out, we're starting

to see a different story. Now, shortly after, you know, referring to North Korea's nuclear power, the Trump White House did clarify that they are seeking the total denuclearization of North Korea. This is the same goal that they were pursuing in the first round of talks in the first Trump administration, it's also been the goal of the United States for as long as it has believed that North Korea has a nuclear program. And it is also a goal that the United States has never been able to reach and fundamentally is not able to reach. Because even in the past, the U.S. did not have sufficient leverage to force North Korea to voluntarily surrender its nuclear

weapons, especially given that those nuclear weapons are the main deterrence that North Korea is able to, you know, put up in resistance against the United States. Over the course of close to about 40 years of on and off diplomacy starting in the late 1980s, the U.S. has only diminished in terms of its global power. It's only diminished in terms of its relative leverage over North Korea. And it's now at a point where it simply has no capacity to even be making this demand. And there's no realistic possibility of dialogue even starting if these are the conditions that it has to be based on. And, you know, that is based on very clear statements that North Korea has made since the first Trump administration. They've declared that their nuclear arsenal

is not up for negotiation with any foreign power. And they have also declared multiple times that negotiations with the United States are pointless and they will not be pursuing them. And in spite of that, Trump is putting up the same sort of like failed approach. And I think what we have to take away from that is that the purpose of these negotiations is not to achieve any kind of lasting peace, but really to find a way to achieve through non-military means what the U.S. cannot do militarily, which is weak in North Korea. That is, you know, without committing themselves to any kind of conflict that would have immense consequences for the United States as well.

And so after, you know, Trump clarified that, you know, the purpose of this is denuclearization of North Korea. The next day, Kim Jong-un visited a uranium enrichment facility, published the photos along with statements calling for an expansion to the nuclear arsenal, right, which is, I think, a pretty clear message that's being sent. And so since then, there's been lots of other back and forth. Marco Rubio at one point referred to North Korea as a rogue state to which the foreign ministry of North Korea responded by saying, quote, the most depraved country in the world is not entitled to take issue with other countries, unquote. And there have been a number of other developments as well. I think one of the most significant is something that happened

last, or two Fridays ago, February 9th, when Japan's prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, visited the White House. And what's significant about this is that Ishiba was the second foreign head of state to meet with Trump after Netanyahu, which I think tells you a lot about Japan's importance to U.S. imperialism, which is something that most people are not very familiar with. But in this meeting, Ishiba and Trump essentially reaffirmed Biden's approach to the new Cold War, at least when it comes to the Asia Pacific. They agreed to continue inciting against China, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea. They agreed to continue to advance and build upon the Jackus Trilateral Alliance with South Korea

and to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. And I think this is very significant in revealing the role that Japan plays as kind of the head vassal state in the region, right? There's no representative of the government from Taiwan or the Philippines there. There's no representative of the government of South Korea there. And yet these two heads of state are making pronouncements about what their shared policy over these countries is going to be, right? And, you know, shortly afterward, we began to see the same kind of approach that had been taken under the Biden administration.

The USS Los Angeles, a nuclear submarine, was deployed to Busan on February 10th. On that same day, we saw very large live fire, live fire meaning the use of live ammunition joint military drill between the U.S. and South Korea at the Rodriguez firing complex, which is about, I believe, 20 kilometers from the DMZ. And, you know, we have also seen a number of other military exercises announced in February, including the upcoming Freedom Shield in March, but also through other means as well. I think one of the most interesting is a multi-month military exercise that was announced between the space forces of South Korea and the United States. It's supposed to take place from February well into the summer, actually. And so while Trump is saying publicly, you know, I want dialogue. I'm going to make peace. Only I can do it. When you look at the substance of what is being communicated to North Korea officially, in terms of what the conditions of the conversation are, when you look at how the U.S. falls back on its strategy of building up the military block through Jackus, of asserting increasing military pressure on the DPRK, this is just exactly the same thing.

the Biden administration was up to. So there's actually not really been a change in policy. It's really just a change in the salesperson. And we have a salesperson who, I guess, can at least stay awake through a press conference this time. So it just looks a little different than before. This is a fascinating case where, of course, further proof or demonstration of the continuity of U.S. geopolitical policy and empire, there may be variations. in some of the modes of expression and so far as so on, but it's definitely a case of long continuity that we see also in other theaters and similar kinds of hijinks of absurd and outrageous and aggressive,

bullying kinds of statements that, you know, maybe theatrical, you know, expressed by the Trump administration, say, for example, this plan to transfer the population of Gaza out for its rebuilding, you know, these kinds of things, but it's clear that the real policies are in continuity. So this was very helpful analysis, and it was really useful to hear also a lot about the DPRK's response. And the whole nuclear question and proliferation does remind me very much also, again, of the U.S. using this as the means and mechanism for trying to expand its aggressive and hostile relations and put, you know, nations that are attempting to build their

own, you know, political and economic sovereignty under threat and under pressure. But yet it is also a tool of great resistance and deterrence. And so I just think a little bit about that. I've just recently had a conversation with a colleague about Iran. And it just makes me, you know, think that these are two different paths, you know, pathways in terms of facing similar kinds of problems of U.S. pressure and interference. So this was very interesting to hear about. But before we end, and you've been so generous,

with your time, I wondered if maybe you might just give us a quick sort of roundup on what's been happening in South Korea since the last time you had a conversation with Henry early, Well, at the end of last year, there may have been some important developments that you want to highlight, you know, especially in the context of the fact that there is a new U.S. administration. And perhaps there will be some variation that's worth mentioning or discussing. But perhaps you could just give us a little bit of a quick roundtable, you know, basically January and February, what's been happening, you know, in South Korea's political situation. Absolutely. Before we get into that, Ednaud, I'm really glad you brought in the Iran and Gaza comparisons, actually, because I think there is a lot to learn from that.

I think with Iran, we are seeing a very similar strategy where the U.S. is using saber-rattling on one hand and on the other saying, you know, we're open to making deals with you. You know, it's just the only deal we'll ever accept is one where you totally unconditionally surrender. And I think it just kind of goes to show that, you know, like we're just in an era where there are no agreement. with the United States that are worth the paper that they're printed on, right? And I think that many states are waking up to that, and Iran and North Korea have similar responses because they're responding to a shared reality. And I think, you know, with Trump's so-called plan to turn Gaza into Miami Beach or something,

I think that also just kind of goes to show, like, how this administration is really perpetuating the grand American tradition of imperialist delusion where, you know, they put forward these pie in the sky objectives that are totally unachievable, but then the purpose of it is to force everyone to respond to it and kind of use that to set the terms of engagement and, you know, what the stakes are, right? Even though I think increasingly the U.S. just can't achieve the things it says that, you know, it wants. And so, you know, that does actually shape the reality of how things play out. And I think we should always keep that in mind, particularly given that, you know, we have this specific administration which can be very bellicose and very theatrical.

And, you know, I think the purpose of that is psychological. It's to wear us down. It's to make us feel like, you know, we never really know what's going to happen next. But I think if we take a more sober look at the reality, it actually helps us to understand that they are also an actor that is limited in what they can achieve. Now, pivoting to South Korea. So the last time I was here, it had been a couple of weeks since the martial law coup attempt on December 3rd, and there were a number of details coming to left. One important thing was that the impeachment vote had finally cleared the National Assembly, which opened up a trial process for the South Korean president, which is, you know, what's needed in order to remove him through the Constitutional

Court. And in addition to that, there were a number of National Assembly inquiries that were surfacing allegations and evidence that there were plans in part of this coup to commit atrocities against members of the media, against politicians, and against civilians. There were plans to possibly use the martial law coup as a kind of smokescreen to instigate some kind of conflict with North Korea, preferably involving the United States. And there were also allegations and details coming to light of an episode that occurred in October of 2024 when the DPRK and North Korea told the world that they had discovered down South Korean military drones that had flown over the airspace in Pyongyang, the capital, and dropped a number of propaganda leaflets. This is, of course, you know, straight up act of war. It's a violation of international law.

It's a violation of the sovereign airspace of North Korea. and it's also something that, you know, there's no way that the U.S. and South Korean militaries didn't know about because the skies over the Korean Peninsula are some of the most surveilled in the world, right? So at the time, the South Korean Ministry of Defense simply said they could not confirm the allegation, which is a very interesting choice of words. And around the time that I came on last time, there was more and more evidence mounting that this had actually been ordered from the highest levels of government. Fast forwarding us to the present, a lot of these allegations have now only built up more evidence. We now know that it was the Minister of Defense who ordered those military joint incursions into North Korea. We know that there were purchase orders made to uniform manufacturers to create copycat uniforms of the DPRK military for use in the coup attempt on December 3rd. There's also been a lot of crisis occurring within the government.

And so I think even as these allegations are coming out, they're being reported on by progressive South Korean media and even mainstream South Korean media, it's not necessarily top of mind for everyone because there is just so much happening in terms of uncertainty as to how this impeachment process will go through. I mentioned before that, you know, after the impeachment vote, there needs to be a trial in the constitutional court. For a couple of weeks, there was uncertainty if that would even happen at all because the first acting president who stepped up after President Yun basically said that he would not appoint further judges since the court was critically lacking a full bench. And as a result of that, he was also impeached. And so now we are on the second acting president who has, you know, committed to filling the constitutional court, which has happened. There are now eight out of nine judges on that bench, and the impeachment trial has been underway for a while, but it also

keeps being drawn out and keeps being extended. I believe we are on something like the 10th hearing that is about to take place. At this point, it's reaching a level where progressive voices in South Korea are more or less accusing those leading the process of intentionally drawing it out as a way to delay. And, you know, the actual proceedings of the trial are bewildering, shocking, at times comical as a result of these things. President Yun has been on the witness stand attempting to make puns to describe his martial law coup, kind of as an attempt to downplay what he did. He said things like, well, it doesn't matter because in the end nothing happened. And in the meantime, you know, there are just

more, there's just more evidence being surfaced of the extent of the plans that were in place. We now know that there were several hundred people who were essentially marked for disappearance on the night of December 3rd, who were supposed to be taken to a military bunker. We know that there were troops that were going to be deployed to the National Election Commission, that they were carrying things with them like baseball bats, which only has one purpose in this sort of scenario. It's to beat people and torture people, right? We have discovered written plans by, you know, members of the intelligence community that were deeply involved in the coup planning that essentially called for the massacre of up to hundreds of people,

if necessary, on the night of December 3rd. So all of this is being uncovered, and there is still a battle taking place in the streets. There's still a battle taking place in the courts to determine in the political future of the country. So I think we're actually in a place where the direction is not super certain. And part of that is because while President Yun's space of support is very small, they are at this point

the most hardcore and extreme fringes of the far right who are willing to take things to a level that other forces in the society may not quite be ready for. And they are also very organized. The earliest signs of this that we saw, around January 10th, when there was kind of like a January 6th-style storming of the court

that issued the insurrection charges against President Union. Of course, you know, that was very quickly put down, but then in the weeks after that, we also saw right-wing mobilizations to impede and, at least on one occasion, successfully stop the attempt to arrest President Yun. And since then, you know, we have only seen these four of the far right, continuing to build their momentum, continuing to build their organization, and really contest for power with the mass movement in the streets. This is at this point happening almost every day, and you even have some of the most extreme, explicitly fascist

sort of factions within this pro-yuan base of support who are saying things like they'll start a civil war if he's removed from office. So we are actually in a very, delicate and dangerous point in South Korea. And I think it's something that, you know, is continuing to sort of escape the attention of international media, but something that people need to be very aware of. And it does tie into why this particular set of war games, Freedom Shield, occurring in March, is so destabilizing because we are already in a place in South Korea where there essentially is not an elected government.

It's a caretaker government, right? And there is so much political disorder that is occurring in a very fluid situation. And, you know, adding these military exercises into the mix on top of all the other ones that have already taken place is just a very, very bad recipe in terms of South Korea's political future. Chiuyan, you've been very generous with your time. And as Adnan said, that was very much going to be a run-through of the recent events, because there is a lot happening in this. there's a lot more that's being reported on in South Korean media and are being helped spread to those of us who are not regularly reading the South Korean media by journalists and writers like yourself. So in closing, Juyan, could you tell the listeners where they can follow,

you find more of your work, and keep up to date with what Nurtol is doing in terms of actions and the material that they're putting together, which also helps clarify a lot of what is going on, especially for listeners who want a little bit more of a deep dive into what is going on than we have time for in this conversation. Yeah, absolutely. I think for starters, if you're not following Lodotol on social media, I highly encourage you to do so. That's at N-O-D-U-T-D-O-L.

I'll spell that one more time. N-O-D-O-L. You can find us on Twitter. You can find us on Instagram. We also have a website. Notable.org. Also highly recommend visiting the U.S. Out of Korea campaign website once again. That's us out of Korea.org. Sign up for our emails, you know, follow our posts. We are regularly talking about the current situation in Korea, sharing information about Korean history. We also have,

you know, interviews like this one and, you know, different webinars or events that will host either online or in person throughout the year that, you know, we really want as many people to participate in as possible. So please, you know, give those accounts to follow and we're very excited to continue to be in touch with all of you. Absolutely. I also want to thank you for reaching out to me to propose having this conversation, something that was on my mind, of course, you know, you and I talk back and forth about some of the ongoing events and things along those lines. So when you propose this conversation to me, as you may have noticed with how quickly I responded with an enthusiastic. Yes, of course we should have this conversation. It was very much appreciated that

you reached out with regard to having this conversation. So again, listeners, our guest was Julian Park, and we will have all of the information that Julian mentioned in the show notes. Adnan, can you tell the listeners how they can find you and more of your work, and especially now that your other program now has a new name, which listeners who listen to a recent episode of guerrilla history, which was a re-publication from your kind of revamped, retitled show will be familiar

with, but let the listeners know where they can find that and what to expect there. Yeah, thanks. But first, of course, also thanks to our wonderful guests. That was absolutely excellent analysis. I'm so glad I could have been part of the conversation this time and learned directly. It was so great. Thank you, Chiu Yun.

And, yeah, you can follow me on Twitter as usual at Adnan A. H-U-S-A-I-N. But instead of going to the Mudgellis, if you are a Mudgeless listener, I hope you will migrate over to a new channel on YouTube as well as on the audio podcast platforms, the very uncreatively titled The Adnan Hussein Show. I couldn't come up with a name. Truly, it's not about narcissism. I hope people understand that. I just hope that you'll support the channel and we have discussions that are about the Middle East Islamic world, Muslim diaspras, but we're expanding a little bit to other areas of history culture and even religion, comparative religion. You might be interested in some of the things we're doing on thinking

about, you know, Muslim liberation theology and, you know, things about Islamic tradition that you might find helpful listeners. So do check it out. It's Adnan Hussein 786 on YouTube and the Adnan Hussein show on other platforms and subscribe, support, like the new show. Thanks so much. Yeah, absolutely. Highly recommend that. I naturally have already learned things from Adnan's conversations on his other show. And it is worth mentioning that Adnan is not leaving guerrilla history. He's not flying the coop in order to reach new pastures. This is very much a sister show of this program. And if you haven't already heard the episodes of the Adnan Hussein show, which have already come out, you will see that while the content of the Adnan Hussein show isn't exactly the same as what we do on guerrilla history.

There is a fair amount of overlap. And if you do appreciate this show, which obviously you do if you're still listening at this point in the interview, then you certainly will also enjoy the Adnan Hussein show. So just my, you know, deepest recommendations that you also check that show out on YouTube or on various other platforms. As for me, listeners, you can find me on Twitter at Huck, 1995, H-U-C-K-1-995. I am not very active online these days because I have far too much going on. And my in-person work and organizing takes precedence over doing Twitter. But nevertheless, you can't follow me there and tell me that I'm doing a bad job or whatever you want.

As for guerrilla history, you can help support this show and allow us to continue making episodes like this. And I will mention our ongoing and very labor intensive but very exciting African revolutions and decolonization series, which is dropping every other week. So if you're just tuning in for this episode, last week was an episode in that series. and next week will be an episode in that series as well and the episode before this one will be on the Mau Mau Uprising so if you haven't heard that go back and check it out you can help support us by going to patreon.com

forward slash guerrilla history that's G-U-E-R-R-I-L-A history two R's and guerr and you can keep up to date with everything that we're doing by following us on social media gorilla underscore pod on Twitter gorilla underscore history on Instagram and gorillahistory.substack.com to get our newsletter to your inbox for free.

And just be sure that you're spelling gorilla with two R's. So on that note then, listeners, and until next time, solidarity. Thank you. Thank you.