Hidden True Crime - Could the Holdout Controversy Stop a Second Trial? | Lindsay Clancy

Episode Date: October 4, 2026

The Lindsay Clancy case is far from over after a mistrial and an 11–1 jury split. Hidden True Crime’s Lauren Matthias breaks down the post-trial hearing, Judge Sullivan’s denial of the defense��s request for a finding of not guilty, and Kevin Reddington’s surprising argument questioning whether prosecutors proved Clancy killed her three children, Cora, Dawson and Callan. We also examine the separate double-jeopardy motion seeking to block a retrial, the fight over sealed juror notes, and holdout juror Michael Desronvil’s public statements as his attorney announces plans for a bar complaint against Reddington. What does the judge’s ruling mean, and could Lindsay Clancy’s defense still prevent a second trial? Sponsor: Ethos- Protect your family with life insurance from Ethos. Get up to $3 million in coverage in as little as 10 minutes at https://ethos.com/HIDDEN. Application times may vary. Rates may vary. Trustpilot rating as of 8/1/2026. About Hidden True Crime What started as a simple conversation at their dinner table became a captivating podcast. Join the dynamic duo of Dr. John Matthias, a criminal psychologist, and Lauren Matthias, an investigative journalist, as they delve into the psychological facets of unthinkable crimes every week. Their unique perspectives and in-depth analysis offer a fresh take on true crime storytelling. Thank you for your support through sponsorships, subscribing, listening, and becoming a Patreon member at⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon.com/HiddenTrueCrime⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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This past Tuesday, Lindsay was back in front of Judge Sullivan for a status hearing after a mistrial was declared just weeks ago. 11 jurors agreed on a verdict, but ultimately, there was one juror holdout. And after more than 30 hours of deliberations and multiple notes being sent to Judge Sullivan, a mistrial was declared. And since then, motions have seemed to be filed left and right by both sides. Multiple jurors have spoken out, including the lone juror himself, who is now lawyered up. Hi, my name is Michael Peggy Des Ronville, also known as the lone juror. I know the whole focus has been on me, but we want to reel everything back and put the focus on the

angels that are at hand. The ones that can't speak for themselves, the ones that can't defend themselves, and the one that can't fight the battles. And those are Cora Dawson and Callan. A little bit about me. I want to thank God for my Catholic faith. I want to thank God for bless me with the ability to love my daughter. And I'm foremost, I would like to thank everyone every individual that have support me throughout this difficult situation. And that's left the public with one very big question. What is next? Well, on Tuesday morning, we got a bit of a glimpse of what could be coming.

We're going to go through it all today. The filings, the hearings, the loan jurors, new statements, and everything in between. My name is Lauren Matthias, and this is hidden true crime. Court started a bit late on Tuesday morning, but when it started, Judge Sullivan jumped right into the motions. He didn't waste any time. These motions were filed in the last week, and he began with a motion for required finding. This motion was filed by Kevin Redington, Lindsay's attorney shortly after the trial asking for the court to enter a finding of not guilty on all counts. The prosecution obviously objected to finding Lindsay not guilty. The motion was

essentially asking Judge Sullivan to end the criminal case right here without putting Lindsay through a second trial. More specifically, he asked the judge to enter what Massachusetts calls a required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility on all six charges, three counts of murder and three counts of stringulation. But to understand exactly what he's asking the judge to do, we need to separate this motion from what happened with the jury. Because as we know, the jury deliberated seven days, 30 hours before ultimately telling the judge they could not reach a unanimous decision. According to the jury four-person, 11 jurors were prepared to find Lindsay not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility. One juror was not. The four-person also claimed

that this remaining juror actually acknowledged having doubt, but was refusing to apply that doubt the way the other jurors believed the law required. We talked extensively about this in our last video. I will link it below. Reddington tried to get that issue addressed before the mistrial was even declared, even taking it to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. But that attempt was unsuccessful, and Sullivan ultimately declared that mistrial. Normally, a hung juror means the prosecution can just try the defendant again. There was no acquittal. There was no conviction. So legally, the case is completely unresolved. But Reddington says there is another issue here that exists completely separate from that 11-to-one jury split. Was the prosecution's evidence actually legally sufficient

to prove that Lindsay was criminally responsible in the first place, that's what this motion is about. So under Massachusetts law, when a judge considers this type of motion, the evidence has to be viewed in the light most favorable to the state or to the prosecution. So the question isn't, which side had the better experts, which witnesses were more convincing, and what conclusion the judge personally would have reached as a juror. The question is essentially, giving the Commonwealth with every reasonable benefit from the evidence it presented, could a rational juror still find the necessary elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt? And Reddington argues that the answer is no.

There is no dispute that Lindsay killed her three children. Well, at least I thought there wasn't. Just wait, we'll get there. But the main issue at trial was her mental state and whether she was legally, criminally responsible when she did it. Under Massachusetts law, once criminal responsibility is properly raised, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, what's criminally responsible? It can do that one in two ways.

It can prove that the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the time, or even if the defendant did have a mental disease or defect, it can prove that she still had the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of what she was doing or to conform her behavior to the requirements of the law. And according to Reddington, that first option was essentially taken off the table by the Commonwealth's own evidence. He pointed out that all six forensic mental health experts who testified, three called by each side, agreed that Lindsay was suffering from a serious mental illness on January 24, 2023. They didn't necessarily agree on exactly what was wrong with her and there were different diagnoses and very

different interpretations of her symptoms. The Commonwealth also presented treating clinicians who had seen Lindsay before the killings and testified that she presented with postpartum depression and anxiety, but that they did not observe psychosis. But Reddington's point is that nobody, nobody was saying that Lindsay was mentally well. So according to this motion that left the Commonwealth with the second option, it had to prove that despite her mental illness, Lindsay had the capacity to understand that killing her children was wrong or to control her behavior and follow the law. And this is where Reddington says the prosecution's case just like falls apart. He argues that the Commonwealth experts blight heavily on several things that Lindsay was capable

of doing around the time of the killings. She could drive. She could call the pediatrician. She could communicate with her husband and send him out to run errands. The killings themselves involved a series of actions occurring over roughly 18 to 20 minutes. And in the weeks beforehand, Lindsay had conducted internet searches involving medications, psychosis, and other related subjects. The prosecution's experts also pointed to inconsistencies in Lindsay's later descriptions of hearing a voice. But Redington argues that even if you accept every one of those facts, they still don't answer the actual legal question.

Being capable of driving a car, making a phone call, using a computer or completing familiar tasks does not necessarily prove that someone experiencing severe mental illness can appreciate the wrongfulness of a completely different act or stop themselves from committing it. He specifically points to testimony from defense expert Dr. Zaisal, who said that a person experiencing psychosis can still perform familiar practical activities and that hallucinations. and that hallucinations can be intermittent rather than occurring every second of the day. Reddington even turned part of the Commonwealth's own expert testimony against it. He pointed to Dr. Highbrun's characterization of what happened is essentially a suicidal mother,

killing her children out of a distorted belief that they would suffer without her. Reddington argued that this doesn't demonstrate rational thinking or preserved criminal responsibility. In his view, believing that your children need to die because they will suffer with you sounds more like delusional reasoning than evidence that Lindsay retained the mental capacity required by law. The motion then pointed to what happened immediately after the killings. Lindsay cut her wrists and neck and threw herself from a second story window in an attempt, a parent attempt to kill herself, and she suffered injuries that ultimately left her paralyzed from the waist down. And Reddington argued that this wasn't someone who had shown absolutely no

signs of psychiatric trouble before that night. In the weeks leading up to January 24th, Lindsay had sought help from multiple providers contacted a suicide hotline, gone to the ER, and voluntarily admitted herself to a psychiatric hospital. According to the motion, all of that has to be considered alongside the fact that all six forensic experts agreed that Lindsay was suffering from serious mental illness. Now, Reddington does mention that 11 to one jury's He's making it clear that 11 jurors believing that Lindsay lacked criminal responsibility does not automatically entitle her to an acquittal. A hung jury is still a hung jury. And ordinarily, the Commonwealth has every right to retry the case. Instead, Reddington asked the judge to independently

review the evidence and decide whether the Commonwealth presented enough for a rational juror to find criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. His argument was that the Commonwealth presented evidence that Lindsay could function in certain ways despite being mentally ill, but functioning is not the legal standard. The prosecution needed evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that despite her mental illness, Lindsay retained the substantial capacity to appreciate that what she was doing was wrong or to conform her conduct to the law. Reddington says that evidence just wasn't there, and he acknowledged that judges granting this type of motion on criminal responsibility grounds is extremely rare. In fact, one of the Massachusetts

cases cited in the motion specifically describes this as something that should happen only in a rare case. But Reddington's position is that this is that rare case. And the stakes of this motion are huge. If the judge leaves the mistrial in place, the Commonwealth can prosecute Lindsay again. but if the judge agrees with Reddington that the Commonwealth's evidence was legally insufficient and enters the required finding he is requesting, that functions as an acquittal and bars a retrial on these charges. So Reddington argued that even when the evidence is viewed as favorably to the Commonwealth, they still failed to present enough evidence for a rational juror to find Lindsay criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. And because

of that, Reddington argued the case should end here rather than putting Lindsay Clancy through a second trial. So with the motion itself out of the way, let's get into what actually happened when everyone got back into court. John and I have had to have those very adult conversations that nobody particularly enjoys having, which is if something happens to one of us, is everything actually in order? Would the other person know what to do? They're not fun conversations. to have, but having a family makes you realize that planning for things you hope never happen is part of taking care of the people you love. And that is why I appreciate how straightforward ethos makes looking into life insurance. The process is 100% online. You can get a quote in seconds,

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Assistant District Attorney Sprague and Buckingham were there for the Commonwealth. And before they even got into the main argument, there was quite a bit of housekeeping because this case now has several different motions pending, right? There's a motion seeking to preserve juror records, obtain the juror questionnaire, and related records, and allow a limited inquiry into that holdout juror. An attorney named Heather O'Connor appeared in court on his behalf. That issue, though, was continued until November 2nd. So we'll be listening to. on November 2nd to that. There's also a request from the jurors attorney for access to certain records that have been impounded or kept from public access.

I know that was filed just yesterday. Hey, what's your honor? Um, Thomas, I didn't get the memorandum and it wasn't clear what exactly the relief was, what it was that you wanted access to. So I don't know if you want to supplement that. And I can take a look at it. If we have to, can deal with it on the second I can supplement I think part of the issue is there's a number of documents that have been impounded in the case that I can't even see to actually request what they are so we're essentially looking for anything that

has been impounded that would address that issue so that we can prepare fully well is the memory is there a memorandum filed there was a motion filed an affidavit all right but I think the motion actually referred to a memorandum that's what I was looking for oh I apologize well so Is it your intention to file memorandum? We can file something. No, because they, you know, I kind of need to know what it is that you're looking for. Sure.

So why don't you file that? If I can, I'll take a look at it. If we can't resolve it on the papers, then we can deal with it on the second. I believe that is also assented to you. Yeah, I know, but that, you know, it's something I have to look at. Sure. All right, because I impounded it for certain reasons, not just councils, everybody else, there's a lot of, this bigger picture in a lot of these issues that I need to,

trust so I understand that's a set to do but I need to know exactly what it is that you want so I can evaluate it and make a decision. My only concern and I'm suggesting maybe an interim date because I believe that in order for counsel to argue her motion on the second she may need some of those materials. Okay I gave an interim. That's the earliest day we have. I've been trying to get an interim date.

I understand. I'm not I'm not jump around you. I understand. I'm just trying to prevent a continuance of the motion. Right. I'm trying to move this as fast as we can. If I'm able to supplement the memorandum, are you able to design the papers? I'll take a look at it if I can, depends on what's in the papers.

Sure. All right. So why don't we keep that date? If after looking at it, I feel that we need an interim date, I could reach out. Maybe we could, even if it's done, let's worry about that if we have to worry about that. And then there's the defense. much larger motion to dismiss the case entirely based on double jeopardy, essentially arguing that there was no manifest necessity, manifest necessity to declare the mistrial and because Lindsay

had a constitutional right to have her case decided by that original jury, the Commonwealth should not now get a second chance to prosecute her. Reddington was ready to argue that motion immediately, but the Commonwealth was not. I know I related to Madam Clerk, but we are objecting to proceeding on that motion today. The reason for that is that we received the motion last Monday. It was our understanding that today was scheduled for possible trial assignment and the Rule 25 motion. We learned on Friday when defense counsel or someone working with him sends an email to the clerk that they would like to argue the motion today. We were not aware that that was going to happen, and so we've really had a very limited.

time in which to delve into this 34 page memorandum that was submitted by defense counsel and prepare for this motion today. So we are asking for more time on that than what we've had up to this point. Reddington countered that they had already had eight days to and emphasize just how important this motion is if the judge agrees with the defense. There's no second trial. The case is over. But the judge ultimately agreed that the Commonwealth should have additional time to prepare that motion will be argued November 2nd, with prosecutors expected to file their written opposition at least a week beforehand. And then there was another interesting motion filed by the Commonwealth asking the court to restrict prejudicial statements being made outside the courtroom. Both sides

were apparently prepared to argue that one, but the judge wasn't. He had only seen it around five o'clock that morning and said it raises significant constitutional questions. So that was also pushed to November 2nd as well. And with all that out of the way, they finally got to the motion we just talked about, Lindsay Clancy's renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty. Reddington began by explaining the procedural history. He first asked for a required finding after the Commonwealth arrested its case. The judge denied it. He renewed it after the defense arrested, denied again. Then the Commonwealth presents a rebuttal evidence, and when the entire case was finished, he renewed it one more time. Now he was asking the judge to reconsider, and Reddington really divided his argument

into the same two questions the jury have been asked to consider. The issue is really two. You've got, as it goes back to the motion for bifurcation, you may recall, I know you do, that I had filed the motion requesting that the court bifurcate the trial itself, arguing the Massachusetts Constitution, the difference in the language between the mass constitution and the federal constitution as it relates to presenting evidence against oneself, whether or not it's an impingement on a defendant's rights for due process, as well as their Fifth Amendment, in 14th Amendment due process rights,

to require a person who is asserting a defense of lack of criminal responsibility to have to have both issues tried. In other words, whether the person committed the offense and whether or not the person at the time of the commission of the offense lacked criminal responsibility. Two separate issues. But the way our present statute and law is set up, and as Your Honor denied that motion,

in your memorandum, you indicated obviously that, we have to go forward on one trial, whether or not it's because of money, that it would cost a lot of money to try two cases for anybody asserting a defense of lack of criminal responsibility or whether or not it's logistics. I don't know, but I suggest to the court that it's readily apparent that you are put in a conundrum where you have to, in effect, admit culpability, if you will, to raise the issue of lack of criminal responsibility. Now, many, many lay people who have difficulty understanding the concept of the bifurcation and say, well, you know, she admitted that she did it. So she's guilty. And therefore, she's just guilty. And then they go off on a tangent about all of these horrific allegations, you know,

that she's a demon and she's possessed and she should be executed. And this is coming from politicians, you know, from President Trump all the way down. So we end up trying the case. I tried to raise the issue as best I could on the issue of probable cause. The jury was instructed by you that they did have the obligation to make a determination as to whether or not the government has presented evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this young woman was actually guilty of this offense. Your Honor then proceeded to indicate appropriately that in the event that the jury determined that there was evidence that in fact she had indeed committed the offense, they would then proceed to the issue of whether or not the government sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact she was not suffering from a mental disease or defect such as which would have an effect on her being either unable to appreciate her. the criminality of the conduct alleged

or in the disjunctive conform to conduct to the requirements of the law which is our black letter law definition of lack of criminal responsibility. So I'd like to kind of bifurcate this argument this morning in the same way. And what I would

do is address first the issue of the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And it's not riding the horse two ends against the middle and trying to play games with the system or gamesmanship or anything. This is a constitutional due process obligation that the government, when the government,

charges a person with a criminal offense, they have that burden of proof on each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt. You're on the nose from your review and recollection of the evidence that was presented. I submit to the court that a motion for required finding of not guilty should have have been entered on the total and complete lack of evidence

to indicate to a rational juror, which is consistent with the Latimore standard, consistent with Jackson versus Virginia, 443 US 307, where the courts note that to sustain the denial of a directed verdict, they call it directed verdict, we call it required finding, it is not enough for the court to find that there was some record evidence, which is always what the government always argues.

There's some record evidence here. There was an evidence on this, evidence on that element. Dr. Satoff testified to something, and there's enough for a jury. It's a question of fact. No, that's not the standard. The standard is whether or not that there is evidence that a court is able to determine that there's record evidence to support each essential element of the offense.

It must find that there is evidence that there is evidence that there is record evidence to support each essential element of the offense. It must find that there is enough evidence that could have satisfied a rational trier of fact of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. We consider the directed verdict standard required by Jackson v. Virginia to be comparable to that heretofore applied in Commonwealth v. Cooper and that's in Latimore. Jackson case further indicates that the evidence must not just be some record evidence. has to be reliable and it has to be sufficient that would allow a rational juror to make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt not just that there's some record evidence that touches on

each element of the offense so i asked the court to hearken back to the evidence that was presented and ask yourself where's the evidence that she did this where is the evidence that she did this You have a situation where Patrick comes home. Your Honor recalls the evidence that he indicates that when he came home, that he enters the house, he puts the food down on the table, comes back from the restaurant, it's quiet, eerily quiet, as the government indicates in their motion. That he then indicates that he goes upstairs into the bedroom.

After yelling downstairs to the basement, there's no response. He goes upstairs. and when he goes upstairs, he goes into the bedroom, and Your Honor will recall that the evidence is that he's able to make an observation, that the window is open, it's cold in the room, he sees blood. My memory is that it appeared as though it was sprayed on the walls.

In fact, Your Honor, we'll recall it was not sprayed on the walls. It was a lot of, I would say, copious blood drops on the floor and on the mirror. When you consider the evidence that the government has, you have the exercise bans, you have the woefully deficient DNA, you have the woefully deficient fingerprinting, you have the horrific, ridiculous investigation, using the term loosely by the police.

There was no investigation. It was not even a horrendous investigation. There was no investigation. And then you ask yourself some questions that we always do, as defense attorneys, prosecutors, investigators. So when he goes into the bedroom, there's a lock on the knob. There's blood.

He's able to use some type of a little key in spite of the lock, jaw lock, that was on the doorknob. Opens the door, goes into the room, goes into the room. Now, the evidence is that she cut her wrists, cut her throat, standing in front of the mirror, blood drops, then went over to the window and propelled herself, out of the window. Your Honor heard evidence that she indicated that the screen was cut. Your Honor also heard evidence that, in fact, the screen was not cut. Your Honor could infer, obviously, as a rational jury, could infer that in fact this is a false memory that she had because she believes that the screen was cut. And it wasn't. But in any event, she propels herself out the window

and sustains the injuries that Your Honor is well aware that she sustained. She then is on the ground, she has no shoes on. Why does she not have shoes on? It's 30-something degrees outside. There's snow. It's the winter. She has no shoes. She's wearing black socks. Where's the blood on the black socks? Where's the blood on the shoes? When did the shoes get taken off and why? Euronora recalls looking at the blood spatter evidence and the drops on the floor. Where are the smears from a person who has just cut their wrists, cut their throat is in a state of psychosis that throws themselves out of window, where are the smears from that person walking across the blood up to the window and then propelling themselves out the window? Where is the evidence

that the cup that was on the nightstand contained crushed up, not just medication, crushed up medication. Where is the evidence of that? Where does that come from? Did the police even seize that cup? No. Did they examine the residue, the white residue? No.

Patrick said that in fact it was medication. Patrick said that in fact it was crushed up medication. Where is the crusher? Where's the pill crusher? Where are the two spoons to use to crush it? Where's the residue? Why is it not on the table? Why is it not on the floor?

Why is it not on the bed? Why is there no blood in the bed with the copious bleeding? They don't seize that. They don't test the substance. She ends up in the hospital. Your Honor recalls the evidence of the removal of the bans from the children's necks, the horrific experience and testimony that was presented as far as removal of the bans. The government's demonstration with Dr. Lappasata that, in fact, the bans exploded wide open.

They were not tied. Your Honor heard the testimony that, in fact, they were tied. entire case is based on speculation. Where is the admission? Where does she say that she did this? And what's most chilling is the fact that when she comes out of this obvious coma that she is in, that when she comes out of it, Your Honor heard the testimony from the psychiatrist and from the doctors of Brigham and Women's Hospital, she was told what happened. She had no memory of what happened. Why does she recall cutting the screen?

Why does she recall killing the children where she's told what happened and had no memory? There's no evidence that she admitted that she did this. So you have no evidence from the defendant. In Massachusetts, an uncorroborated statement of a defendant obviously is not evidence. You have to have corroboration. I submit to the court there is no evidence. She made any statements as far as the actual killing of the children, which forms the basis of the indictments.

Reddington also went after the timeline. He argued that the window of time between Patrick leaving the house and returning was inconsistent with everything the prosecution says occurred, and he raised Lindsay's extremely low body temperature as another piece of evidence that he believes does not fit the Commonwealth timeline. Someone's been watching TikTok, I think. His position was that when all of those gaps are put together, the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence for a rational fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsay was the person who killed her children. The time frame does not match. Even the government in their own closing indicated to the jury that she did not have enough time to do this. The timeline is ridiculous

as far as him leaving the house, sending off the 524 email, whether it was from his laptop, whether it was from his cell phone, driving the CVS, driving down to the restaurant to pick up the food. You've got videos from both of those places. He's coming back. He's got shoes. He takes his boots off is what he says. You want to see in the photographs as far as the sneakers are concerned.

Whatever he takes off, he takes it off. The time frame does not match. The core body temperature. If you talk to a profusionist, a profusionist would indicate that it would take at least two hours for a human being to get down the core body temperature of 82 degrees. They would have to warm the blood, which they did in the hospital, to bring that person to the level where they're not ready to expire. And in fact, Your Honor knows that she did obviously expire. She died in the hospital. Massive transfusions.

And it just goes on and on and on. There is, there was, and there cannot be evidence under the Latimore standard that this woman killed those children.

As lawyers, as judges, we look to the evidence. And when the government charges somebody with a criminal offense, they have the burden of proof. not the defendant. And I submit to the court that when you consider all of the standards, all of the, I mean, I argued under Bowden for you to give a Bowden instruction. I've had many, many cases obviously in this courtroom, many courtrooms all over the state. If ever a case

called out for a Bowden instruction, it was this one. And Bowden is you know, Judge, and I'm sure you argued it before you were a judge. A jury can draw an inference or can determine that there is reasonable doubt based upon the lack of an adequate investigation. In this case, there was no investigation. They just immediately assumed that this woman was guilty. But Reddington said, even if the judge rejected that argument, there was still a second question, and that is, again, criminal responsibility. He argued that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsay was criminally responsible at the time of the killings. He heavily criticized the prosecution's rebuttal experts, Dr. Mack, Dr. Heilbrun, and Dr. Sathoff,

and argued that none of them were sufficiently qualified to tell this jury what Lindsay's mental state would have been specifically in the context of postpartum illness and psychosis. After you get over that hurdle, assuming you get over that hurdle, the government then has the obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact, She was not suffering from a disease or defect, as I indicated under the McCool standard. Your Honor would hearken back to the evidence. And this is where we have the law in the situation, as Your Honor instructed the jury, that any statements made by a defendant pursuant to the government's motion or defendants' motions

to have the person evaluated by a physician, a psychiatrist, is not an admission that carries independent weight. So what are we left with as far as the disease or defect? We have the government's rebuttal witnesses. Dr. Mack, Dr. Heilbrun, Dr. Satoff, I suggest first of all, goes to credibility. Not one of those rebuttal doctors were qualified to get on that witness stand until that jury, their opinion of her mental state as a result of a psychosis because of postpartum depression, postpartum psychosis. I'll leave it at that because I know your memory is strong as to cross-examination of each one of these individuals. He contrasted them with the defense experts, particularly Dr. Philip Resnick, who Reddington described as exceptionally qualified in cases involving parents killing their children.

According to Redington, the defense evidence showed that Lindsay was suffering from psychosis at the time of these events. And he pushed back on one of the prosecution's themes from trial, that Lindsay's ability to function normally was evidence against psychosis. She could text people. She could speak with friends and family. She could care for her children. She could build a snowman. she could carry out ordinary tasks. Reddington's response was essentially none of that means she couldn't also be psychotic.

Defendant presented testimony from, I suggest, to the court, qualified experts that indicated, I mean, Dr. Philip Resnick, you can't get any more qualified than that doctor who had a significant impact on the jury. And we're sitting there listening to this evidence. And Dr. Resnick clearly and unequivocally indicated in his extensive involvement dealing with filicide, dealing with evidence that we presented to the jury that shows it at the time of this incident in the event, the jury determined that she did it. She was suffering from post-patterned. She was suffering from psychosis.

He indicated that was his opinion based on his evaluation of the evidence, based on his evaluation of her statements, and based on his continued. evaluation of her. Dr. Zaisel, same thing, indicated as I indicate in the memoranda. Clearly and unequivocally, that when a person is in a psychosis, they are capable and able to perform normal everyday activities and be in a full bloom of psychosis. The government spent a lot of time minimizing the whole concept. Originally, the government comes into this courtroom and says that the reason that she killed these kids is because she was sick of being a mother. She wanted to move on with her life, apparently.

Well, they backed off on that like a Pluto on the linole floor. Once the case got to the jury on a closing argument, now all of a sudden, oh yeah, well, she did try to kill herself. We spent a week trying to show that in fact it was a legitimate suicide. They say that it was not a suicide. It was just a fake attempt. Then they agree that it was a real suicide. Then they go on with their argument, well, maybe she was sick. Maybe she did suffer from a disease or defect, but she knew what she was doing. And then you can hearken back to the government evidence and the government doctors and the guy looking up at the ceiling and talking about taking five minutes to answer a question. You even had to tell him, look, just, you know,

answer the question. The government's theory that she was not in a psychosis, they would sprinkle throughout their argument. Is there any evidence that she's seeing a purple unicorn in the corner of the room? Was she able to talk to her friends? Was she able to walk and breathe at the same time? Was she able to take care of the kids and build a snowman? Was she able to send a message on a text? Was she able to talk to her husband?

Was she able to talk to her friends and her family? Yes. Argument being, she was fine. Why? Why? Forget about them. law, forget about emotions, forget about everything. Talk by human beings. Why would this woman, who the evidence shows clearly and unequivocally, was a nurse, a mother, a friend, did nothing

wrong in her life? Why would she kill those three children? All for the first, five of the doctors, six of the doctors, indicate that she was suffering from a mental disease or defect. Not just a mental disease or defect. She was suffering from a serious mental disease or defect. Maybe a little difference under the DSM as to what the cookbook would say, well, she's suffering from this, but she's suffering from that. Basically, it's a severe mental disease and defect. The evidence shows clearly and unequivocally that she was

in a state of psychosis. The government did not present evidence under Jackson and Virginia, under Latimore, if you get out from underneath the usual argument that, well, there's enough evidence because we hit on all the elements. No, that's not the standard.

The standard is whether or not it is reliable, whether or not it is evidence that a rational jury of fact finder would be able, to apply to the facts that they find and determined that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. And as this woman sits in front of you today, I suggest to the court they did not prove probable cause, and they certainly did not prove that she was not acting at the time of a psychosis and should be found not guilty. The Commonwealth obviously saw the evidence very differently. attorney Buckingham first addressed Reddington's new emphasis on whether Lindsay committed the killings at all.

She pointed out that throughout the trial, the defense had repeatedly offered to stipulate that Lindsay committed the acts because their case was centered on criminal responsibility. And now, after the mistrial, the defense was arguing there wasn't enough evidence to establish that she did it. Buckingham called that argument laughable. She reminded the judge that Lindsay was alone inside the home with the three. children. Patrick testified that Lindsay sent him out to CVS to pick up food and phone records corroborated those calls. Surveillance video, then placed Patrick at those locations during the relevant period. He returned home and found the children and Lindsay. Buckingham also pointed to Lindsay's DNA on the ends of the exercise bans used to strangle the children. Specifically, the portions, prosecutors argued she would have pulled as well as statements she made after waking.

in the hospital. According to the Commonwealth, Lindsay spoke to a chaplain about hallucinations telling her she had to kill the children and said she was glad they were safer now. So from the prosecution's perspective, there was more than enough circumstantial and physical evidence for a rational fact finder to conclude that Lindsay killed them. What we heard throughout the course of trial over and over from counsel was that there was objections to the presentation of Commonwealth's evidence on the underlying murders. because the defendant admits, the defendant stipulates, whether the common oath agreed to the stipulation or not. And now, for the first time, the defendant is arguing that there's no evidence that she did this.

I suggest to you that the entire record is voluminous as to the information supporting the fact that she did this. We have she's the only one in the home with three young children. We have that her husband testified under oath that he left the house, that she sent him out on those errands, that he went to the exact places where she directed him to go. Not only did she direct him to go based on his testimony, but we confirm that with her own cell phone data that says that she made the call to the restaurant, that she made the call to CVS, that he then went there. He's on video surveillance at those locations during the time period in which these murders occurred.

He comes home and he finds the children in the manner that they were in, and he finds the defendant where she was. We have all that information. We have, there was DNA on those exercise bands that was attributable to this defendant, And it was on the ends of those bands, the ends of those bands that she had a pull in order to strangle each and every one of those children. We had that she woke up in the hospital and spoke to a chaplain within days of organic consciousness where she talks about the fact that she had these hallucinations telling her what she had to do, that she had to kill the kids, and that she was glad that the kids were safer now. So there's plenty of information to support the essential elements of the charges of murder. there's information that or facts that support deliberate premeditation, there's facts that support

extreme atrocity or cruelty, much of them which I would more focus on and discuss with criminal responsibility, but I ask Your Honor to consider a lot of these facts in both contexts. So the first point that there isn't enough evidence to prove that she did it, I would suggest as a laughable argument, and based on what Your Honor sat through several weeks of the trial, that the Commonwealth met its burden as it applies to that. As far as the motion for required finding as to the lack of criminal responsibility, I did try to outline in the Commonwealth's response the law as it pertains to this issue because it is a little different, I would suggest then what we traditionally see with

motions for required findings. When it comes to a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, Your Honor is aware that that's something that comes into effect only when raised by the defense and when it it's adequately raised, then the burden switches to the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not lack criminal responsibility, that they were criminally responsible. And the case law is specific when it comes to required findings that when that is the case, again, for required finding, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the commonwealth. And that the court, unless they find defense case proves that the commonwealth cases,

conclusively incorrect that the court doesn't necessarily rely on the defendant's case in order to address whether the commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence so i i bring that up just as a kind of procedural issue with arguments that council made about defendants experts and defendants evidence but what i would um point to your honor when determining the sufficiency of the evidence as opposed to criminal responsibility is we've talked a lot about the fact that there are are two prongs to criminal responsibility and that the commonwealth can prove the defendant criminal responsible by either proving one that the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect or by the second prong where we're talking about substantial capacity as it applies to the defendant's

arguments that we haven't proved that she did not suffer from a mental disease or defect I'd remind the court that mental disease or defect is in fact a legal term that there is no clear definition that is a complicated topic and there was sufficient evidence presented in the commonwealth case in chief, or substantial evidence, I should say, that the defendant was having signs and symptoms of mental illness in the months prior to the murder. There was no dispute about that. Again, confining Your Honor's rulings to what you heard as far as trial evidence in this courtroom, not what was said in pretrial arguments, not what was said in press conferences or what was said in arguments at other points of time, what the jury heard, what Your Honor heard as trial

evidence in this case is that she was displaying signs and symptoms of mental illness. She was seeing several medical providers, she was getting treatment, she was on medication, she went to the hospitals, she went to the inpatient at McLean. That is all clear in evidence, but the Commonwealth doesn't have to rely on that in order to say that she is in fact criminal responsible. The next part of the analysis comes into play, and I'd suggest that that's where the focus of the evidence is. It's on the defendant's substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct into control or conduct or confine or conduct to the requirements of the law. And the case law is clear that not every defendant with a mental illness lacks criminal responsibility.

That's Commonwealth versus Virginia. That's Commonwealth versus Rezac or Rezac. A defendant who has mental illness can commit crimes and can be criminally responsible. That's why the court, SJC, has repeatedly addressed this issue and identified various ways in which the Commonwealth can prove. that a person does have criminal responsibility despite suffering from a mental disease or defect or mental illness. I caution that those terms should not be used interchangeably, although I understand that we tend to do so. But in the context of what the court might look at or what a jury might look at in order to find a person was criminally responsible, the SGC has given us clear guidance on the types of facts or the types of evidence.

The Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility through inferences arising from circumstances of the offense or admissible evidence of defendant's words, conduct, before, during, and after the offense. That's Commonwealth v. Cullen from 1985. Again, reiterated in Commonwealth v. Lawson in 2016, I believe. The Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility by showing intention, goal-directed conduct, evidence of rational motive, a fact finder may enforce sanity from evidence and inferences the defense. defendant was oriented to time, place, in person, that's commonwealth versus coal. The fact that counsel wants to argue, defense counsel wants to argue, that she was psychotic is an argument, and he can make it. But that doesn't mean that the commonwealth hasn't proved otherwise, with evidence of the defendant's conduct, with evidence of people's

observations of her, with evidence of how she interacted with medical professionals, even on the day before this incident occurred, that she was not displaying any signs of psychosis. The court considered that. A fact finder can consider that. And you should consider it in determining that the Commonwealth has met its burden in this case. Defense counsel refers to why she would do this in motive. Your Honor is well aware that motive is not an essential element of either the underlying offenses of murder or of criminal responsibility. But I would suggest to your honor and I argue in the motion that the Commonwealth did in fact present and argued to the jury that there was a motive here. Whether the court finds it to be rational,

whether a fact finder found it to be rational. It's a question of fact, but the commonwealth presented evidence, not that the defendant was a bad mother or unhappy with being a mother and trying to start a new life. It was the fact that she was in a point in her life where she felt that she was never going to be the same, she was never going to be the person that she was before. She was frustrated with the system that she had been dealing with,

she was frustrated with the results that she was getting, and she had succumbed to the idea that she didn't want to be here anymore and that she was going to commit suicide and that she was going to take those kids with her because no one could care for them like she could she didn't want them to suffer those are all based on statements that she is made not in the context of a forensic interview but at various points to different people including people at the bergam and women hospital after this incident occurred so the idea that this was altruistic philicide as the commonwealth expert talked about is in fact a motive. And it is, in fact, rational based on everything that we know about the

situation with the defendant during that time period. So to say that we haven't shown why it's just a misrepresentation of the evidence I'd suggest. So the Commonwealth's bottom line was that there was sufficient evidence on both questions, sufficient evidence that Lindsay killed the children, and sufficient evidence from which a rational fact finder could conclude that despite her mental illness, she was still legally, criminally responsible. The judge did not decide the motion from the bench. He actually took it under advisement, meaning he would review the arguments and issue his ruling later, but that wasn't the end of the hearing, because then things went back to the jury controversy, the juror, the one lone juror, and what the public should be allowed to see about what

happened during those final days of deliberations. Attorney Weinberg asked the judge to unseal, certain juror notes and sidebar discussions that were impounded. This is important because those records directly relate to their motion to dismiss the entire case on double jeopardy grounds. The defense's argument is essentially that in order to decide whether a second trial is constitutional, the court has to determine whether declaring the first trial a mistrial was truly necessary. And according to Weinberg, some of the most important information for answering that question is contained in a juror note and in conversations that happened at sidebar outside the public's hearing. Judge, this motion involves the constitutional right to a public trial. We've cited to the

SJC's decision in Commonwealth v. Cohen, but the Cohen case relies on a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that talk about the centrality of a public trial, particularly in criminal cases. and they make clear that part of the right to a criminal trial to a public trial of a criminal trial is for judicial documents, documents that would provide the predicate for the court's decision-making to be public. It's not an absolute right. There are exceptions, but the exceptions need to be as narrow as possible. They need to be supported by particularized need. They need to be the least restrictive, and they need to be accompanied by judicial findings.

In this case, we've particularly asked for two categories of documents to be provided to us so that we can rely on them publicly in support of the motion for double jeopardy. Motion to dismiss. One being the jury notes. One of the two notes that are central to the determination. whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial, which converts to whether or not there would have been a predicate for a discharge of a juror and for the continuation of jury deliberations rather than a mistrial was cited in public on September 4 when the arguments were made

out here in public. But the first of the two critical notes from the juror that was essentially providing notice which we contend required of voir dire remains under seal because it was discussed at sidebar. With counsel. With counsel, but with counsel objecting to the sidebar debate about the implications of that note and about what remedies the court might apply. The fact that there are sidebars, of course, are not illegal. lawyers sent to it, Mr. Reddington did not, at least as the transcripts of September 3 and

September 4 reflect. So I'm making the argument to Your Honor that, you know, we have filed a redacted motion to dismiss. It has, you know, blanked out and redacted for the public and for the media the content of juror note 2, which was the note on September 3. the first of the two notes. And we've redacted the transcript to the extent it was at the sidebar. But there is no particularized need for it. You know, we believe that a juror, that redactions still remained possible, that if the Commonwealth or the court believes that a redaction of the transcript

is required to protect some important value that outweighs the public right to a public trial and to review any documents that might be the predicate for important decisions that the court made, the decisions being to deny the defendant's motion to voir dire the juror, to deny the motion to voir dire the foreperson, and to deny the defendant's objection to the mistrial, there needs to be some weight that outweighs the public right to access. When I read that there simply is no particularized need that I can identify, Judge, other than the need to redact the name of the juror consistent with Your Honor's impoundment orders. Likewise, for the juror notes, you know, they've been discussed in general in open court. One of them

has been quoted in open court. There is no particularized need to preclude the other note, the note that was discussed alone at Sidebar earlier on September 3 from becoming part of the public record. And so we've made this motion essentially to facilitate Your Honor's consideration of what is the real cornerstone motion in this case that remains to be resolved following the Rule 25 motion, that being whether or not the Commonwealth gets to re-prosecute Ms. Clancy, whether or not the Declaration, of a mistrial was supported by manifest necessity, whether or not the alternative of or ordering a juror or jurors that could potentially have supported the court's assumption that the juror remained as a juror following the law, but not necessarily, whether or not a voir dire could have led to answers that would have been inconsistent with that juror's

statement in answer to the one question the court asked. And so I ask you really to, in order to facilitate important litigation about a federal and state constitutional issue, whether or not through the end of deliberations, Ms. Clancy had a jury composed of 12 impartial jurors, all of whom were following Your Honor's instructions, all of whom were obeying both their oath and their duty of jurors. That's a Sixth Amendment right, a Declaration. under the 12th Amendment, the 12th clause of the state constitution, and then the corollary of that, whether or not the double jeopardy clause would be violated by subjecting Ms. Clancy to the anxiety,

the burdens, the perils of re-prosecution. And so for those reasons, we've asked the court to make this limited ruling to unseal the bench conferences from September 2, 3, and 4. and to provide the jury questioner, the jury notes, with the redaction of the name of the jury. So your position would still be, as put out in the motion, that the defendant would have sent to the redaction of any juror names or other identifying information reflected in the notes? Absolutely, Judge. There is a particularized need.

We don't contest that there is none, but that would be the limits of the redaction that I think would be consistent with the constitutional public trust. all right all right thank you your honor we would object to this motion in in defense council's motion they cite that the the courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of a public trial overcome only by overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and i suggest that what the higher value here in this case is the sanctity of our system our judicial system and more specifically our jury system. What has been happening with this case outside of this courtroom in press conferences

has had a chilling effect on whether a juror would even want to serve on a case in this Commonwealth. And then if we go further to make public notes sent by the jury regarding specific individuals that would have an even further chilling effect on whether if we get a jury, will that jury feel comfortable in sending a note to the court knowing it might become public? And then further those conversations that the parties have about that note and the opinions that they have, it just all would pile on to have this repeated chilling effect that would harm irreparably our judicial system. And I think that if you look at it from a different perspective, where here we have a lone holdout juror allegedly looking for a guilty verdict versus those looking for a not guilty verdict by lack of criminal responsibility.

If you flip that and to defendant facing a jury where 11 people are voting guilty and one is the holdout looking for not guilty. And the chilling effect it would have on that person to know that the public will know their position. The public will be able to see notes about them, we'll hear discussions about them, will know that they were the one who didn't hold that person responsible. That would be a travesty. And so it shouldn't be allowed because it, this juror might have favored the defendant if that's how it worked out. So I would suggest to you that there is an extremely high value here to protect our system, protect our jury system. And the court has found previously in the Globe v. the Commonwealth 407 Mass 879 that the public has no presumptive right of access to lobby conferences or side by our discussions. And so I think here we need to protect our system and deny the law.

this motion. I think that matter under a five-up. Then the Boston Globe and WBZ entered the discussion. Their attorney, John Albano, argued that their motion wasn't about eliminating sidebar conferences altogether. Courts obviously sometimes need to discuss sensitive matters privately. The concern was what happens when major legal arguments, arguments that actually determine what happens to a criminal defendant, occur so frequently outside public hearing that

watching the supposedly public proceeding becomes, as he put it almost like watching a silent movie, right, without captions. His argument was that public access serves a purpose beyond just curiosity, allowing people to hear the lawyer's arguments and the judge's questions helps the public understand why decisions are being made and, in turn, helps maintain confidence in the judicial process. The Commonwealth, again, emphasized that anything involving private information about an individual juror should remain protected. The only thing to my argument earlier is that any motion regarding the individual juror information about that person should be held at sidebar and should be protected because

the Commonwealth believes that a juror's right to privacy, a jury's right to come to a verdict without any type of fanfare or unwanted attention or persecution, It should be sacrosanct. And so we would object to any type of public hearing where information, private information about that juror would be discussed. Can I be heard? Sure. Thank you very much. I am so tired of hearing persecution, attacking.

I am doing all these terrible things to this juror. I filed one motion and said nothing. every comment I have made has been in reaction to people from Donald Trump on down to Nancy Mace down to Cruz not the DA but the politician calling for her execution I have responded to these outlandish comments including the guy from Houston I just wanted to say that judge we're talking about this motion for access to arguments we're at inside our conferences anything else you want to add to that on edge On the issue that we've just been talking about, the Gloves motion.

No, I've just tired of hearing about me to persecute people. I never said anything else. No, listen. We'll talk about this motion, all right. I'm going to take it under advisement. I think I understand everybody's position. So that matter will be under advisement. Thank you, Good.

So the judge then took the Globes, Boston Globes request under advisement as well. Finally, they talked about what happens next. including the possibility of a second trial. And Judge Sullivan was very careful about this. He said that discussing another trial date should not be interpreted as a hint about how he intends to rule on any of these motions. If he grants the defense's motion to dismiss, obviously there won't be another trial. The same goes for other rulings that could fundamentally change the posture of the case. But his concern was that if another trial does become necessary, he doesn't want everyone to wait another month or two just to begin looking for a date. Interestingly, neither side

was particularly eager to schedule one yet. The Commonwealth argued that the judge first needs to rule on these motions and that either side may have appellate rights afterward, which could take substantial time. And for once, Reddington said he agreed with the prosecution. Commonwealth, what's the status in regards to the trial dates at this point? Your Honor, I think we need to obviously argue these motions, have rulings, there are appellate rights to those rulings, and so once all of that's complete, I think we could select a trial date once we know what those rulings are, and appellate rights could take some time. So I think if we select a trial date now, that might not actually be a real trial date depending on how this case proceeds and what happens with any appellate rights from either side. Well, let me hear from the defense. Believe it or not, I agree with it.

So we'll stand together and say, we'd rather defer until you make your rulings and then any appellate arguments are presented rather than pick a trial date. Why don't we just pick a trout thing? And that we'll get this case moving. The discussion three weeks ago was let's try this thing in a week. Right?

And now no one wants to pick a trial date. Commonwealth's position. So I think that when you you factor in that this could take some real time to go through these issues and then exercise any rights. I'm just concerned that any trial date we pick might not be realistic. I agree with it. Then the parties can move to continue one. Why don't we do this? November 2nd be prepared to talk about picking a trial date. Yes, Your Honor. All right? And I'll leave it at that. All right.

This is a matter when I'm hearing about how important this is to get this resolved, to deal with this for all the parties. That's what I'm trying to do, all right? And I'm not saying, I'm not blaming counsel for that. But that's my goal in this thing, is to get this thing tried. Assume it's proper without sacrificing. Anyone's rights, anyone's position. But I don't want this thing to then just start to kind of get kicked down the road,

punted and go forward. It's not going to get punted, but I'll tell you right now, I can't do a trial before June. I'll just let you know that right now. It's not a matter of punting or kicking or anything. I was to talk about that on November 2nd. They're making the take look at their schedules. All right.

So anything else? So we've got November 2nd, they'll be here 9 o'clock. So we will be in recess at this time. So that's where everything stood when the hearing ended. The judge did not rule on Lindsay. Clancy's request for a required finding of not guilty. He took it under advisement. He also did not decide whether the disputed juror notes and sidebar discussions will become public. We still don't know. Those issues were taken under advisement as well. And the biggest unresolved issue of all,

whether Lindsay Clancy can constitutionally be tried a second time after the mistrial. That wasn't argued at this hearing. But we didn't have to wait until November 2nd for more information, because just a few days later, we do have answers to at least one of those questions. So it was October 1st, Judge Sullivan issued his decision on the motion for required finding. He started by explaining that the legal standard he had to use, and this is important because he was not being asked to decide whether he personally believed Lindsay was guilty or even which side presented the more convincing case. The question at this stage was if there was enough evidence presented at trial

that a rational fact finder could find the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Remember, Reddington's argument had two parts. First, he argued there wasn't sufficient evidence proving Lindsay was actually the person who killed the children. And second, even if there was, he argued the Commonwealth failed to prove that Lindsay was criminally responsible at the time. Judge Sullivan rejected both arguments, first on the question of who killed Cora, Dawson, and Sullivan found that the Commonwealth presented enough physical and circumstantial evidence for a rational fact-binder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lindsay committed the killings. He pointed to the timeline. Lindsay ordered takeout that night and asked Patrick

to leave the house to pick up the food and medication for their daughter. While Patrick was gone, Lindsay was alone in the home with the three children. And the Commonwealth didn't have to rely solely on Patrick's words about where he was, surveillance video showed him at CVS and the restaurants at times consistent with Patrick's testimony. When Patrick returned home, the house was quiet. He eventually went upstairs, found blood in the bedroom, and saw that window was open. He went outside and found Lindsay injured on the ground below that window. Patrick asked her what happened, and Lindsay told him she had tried to kill herself. When he asked where the children were, she told him they were in the basement. Patrick ultimately found all three children there with exercise bans around

their necks, all recorded on a 911 call that I will never forget. His screams. The medical examiners determined that the children died from asphyxia or complications from mechanical asphyxia. Sullivan also noted that the jury had received a much broader collection of evidence, including phone records, computer records, and crime scene photographs. So while Reddington had emphasize everything the investigation didn't establish, the untested cup, questions about blood evidence, the window screen, the timeline, and other gaps, Sullivan's ruling basically says those arguments do not make the Commonwealth's evidence legally insufficient. And more importantly, the prosecution did not need an eyewitness or a direct confession.

The case can be proven largely or even entirely through circumstantial evidence. When Sullivan viewed that evidence the way the law required him to, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, he found there was enough for a rational fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsay killed her own children. And then he turned to a much more contested issue, right? Criminal responsibility. And here Sullivan acknowledged something significant. Both sides presented expert testimony indicating that Lindsay was suffering from some form of serious mental illness at the time of the killings. But as Sullivan explained, having a serious mental illness does not by itself mean someone is legally, not criminally responsible.

That's the distinction that was at the center of this entire trial. Once Lindsay's defense sufficiently raised the issue of criminal responsibility, the burden was on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was criminally responsible. The prosecution theory was essentially that whatever mental illness Lindsay was experiencing, it did not deprive her of the substantial capacity to understand the criminality or wrongfulness of what she was doing. And it did not deprive her of the substantial capacity to control her conduct according to the law. And Sullivan found there was enough evidence supporting that position to put the question to a fact finder. He specifically pointed to evidence about the nature and method of the killings, along with Lindsay's behavior

and demeanor around the time they occurred. But probably, most importantly, the Commonwealth presented three expert witnesses who testified that. In their opinions, Lindsay did not lack those capacities when the children were killed. And of course, the defense had experts who reached the opposite conclusion. Redington had argued that his experts, particularly doctors with substantial experience in psychosis and thilicide, were far more persuasive. But Sullivan explained that deciding which experts to believe isn't something the judge can simply take away from the fact finder. Expert testimony isn't automatically conclusive just because an expert says something. And when qualified experts disagree with each other, weighing their credibility and deciding how

much weight to give their opinions is the job of the fact finder. So Sullivan was not finding that the Commonwealth's experts were right and the defense experts were wrong. He was finding that the Commonwealth presented enough evidence that a rational fact finder could believe its experts and could therefore conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsay, was criminally responsible. And because Sullivan found sufficient evidence on both disputed questions that Lindsay committed the killings and that she was criminally responsible when she did it, he denied the motion for a required finding of not guilty. So this ruling, it does not mean that Judge Sullivan has now found Lindsay guilty. It also doesn't resolve the question the first jury

couldn't resolve. What it means is that Sullivan rejected Reddington's argument that the Commonwealth's evidence was so legally insufficient that the case should be taken away from a fact finder altogether. And in the judge's view, there was enough evidence for those questions to be decided by a jury. So that takes one potential path to ending this case off the table. But it does not resolve the other major motion we talked about, the defense's motion, to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. That is an entirely different argument. There, the question isn't whether the Commonwealth presented enough evidence against Lindsay.

It's whether the first trial was properly declared a mistrial in the first place, and whether the Constitution allows the Commonwealth to put her through a second trial after the way those deliberations ended. So even though Lindsay lost this motion, the much bigger question of whether there can legally be a second trial at all, it's still unresolved. But now let's turn to the holdout juror, the man who, depending on who you ask, is either a hero who refused to abandon his convictions under pressure or the juror responsible for this entire mistrial mess. His name is Michael Disfrumville. We can now say it. And he is standing

by his decision. After initially speaking through other people, Michael eventually appeared on camera in a video statement aired on Fox News Hannity. But he said he didn't want the conversation to be centered on him. Hi, my name is Michael Peggy Des Ronville, also known as the long juror. I know the whole focus has been on me, but we want to reel everything back and put the focus on the three angels that are hand. The ones that can't speak for themselves, the ones that can't defend themselves, and the one that can't fight the battles. And those are Cora, Dawson, and Callan. A little bit about me.

I want to thank God for my Catholic faith. I want to thank God for bless me with the ability to love my daughter. And foremost, I would like to thank everyone, every individual that have supported me throughout this difficult situation. Your prayers, your emotional support, your psychological support is a tremendous to my heart that I, feel that I sense that I know. I do want to thank you from the bottom of my heart. Thank you. He has also gotten financial support as well with one article saying that a fundraiser established

to help with his security, legal expenses, and lost wages had raised more than $400,000. Michael has also hired an attorney, Edward Paltzik, who has been anything but quiet about what he believes has happened to his client. And let's go back to when we first learned about him when the jury four person in the Lindsay Clancy case brought a note that said that Michael, he was not named at that time, refused to follow reasonable doubt law. Did Michael ever have reasonable doubt? Michael had zero doubt. He had zero doubt. No doubt. No doubt. And he had evidence to back up his position. A lot of evidence. A mountain of evidence. A mountain of evidence. Well, I want to play Kevin Reddington, Lindsay Clancy's attorney. Here's what he said about Michael in court. We have a person who, under their oath, stood in front of you yesterday when you did the individual voir dire, and according to this information, under oath, looked you in the eye and lied. I would go so far as to reluctantly say that the individual has made a false statement under oath to this court.

Reddington essentially said he committed a crime. Your response to that? That is the most outrageous thing I have ever heard in almost 20 years of practicing law. It is categorically false. Accusing a juror of committing a crime? Accusing a juror of committing a crime, Kevin Reddington is clearly attacking the Sixth Amendment. He's clearly attacking the right to trial by jury. He is off the rails. Well, he also said this in court.

And I want to explain some context. We did not know in the jury note, or at least publicly, the identity of the juror. We also didn't know the gender. I want to play this moment where Kevin Reddington refers to Michael as a he four times. Listen to this. That juror told you that he would be able to apply the law to the facts as you asked him. He is, as the law states, he is not being honest with you at the sidebar. Kevin was asked why he referred to your client to Michael as a he. He said, quote, it was revealed during the course of the SJC, presumably referring to the Supreme Judicial Court. I have personally searched transcripts. I can find no record of he being used. Neither can the Fox News brain room, neither can legal experts who are at the trial who I have spoken to. How did Michael feel when an attorney used the word he, essentially bringing the holdout juror from a pool of 12 to a pool of three and putting media attention directly on those three.

It was astonishing. It was horrifying. It was beyond the pale. And Kevin Reddington did not do that for any legitimate purpose. Just like what he said on the courthouse steps afterwards, the purpose all along was to out Michael. You believe Reddington was trying to dox Michael? I believe that Kevin Reddington, ever since the moment he learned that Michael was not going to side with him. I believe that Kevin Reddington lost his mind. I also want to play this moment. This was on September 4th, the day of mistrial was declared. Kevin brought forth a last-ditch effort to file an emergency motion. Here's what he said. I further raised the issue of the American with Disabilities Act. I believe that this is a situation where there is a clear and present danger that this individual, for some reason, what it is, we don't know, but is taking a position

that's intractable regardless of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ed, I have Kevin's motion here, and he says in that motion he filed that day that the jurors' reasoning reflects a bias against those who suffer from debilitating mental illness. Your response? Kevin Reddington's motion, first of all, is frivolous. Secondly, Kevin Reddington's motion is a direct attack on the United States Constitution. Everything that Kevin Reddington is saying is false. It's completely false.

It's completely outrageous. And Kevin Reddington is just upset that he lost out on his legacy moment. He was one vote away from winning a trial that would have been the capstone of his career, and he didn't get it. And he lost his mind because of it. I find it richly ironic that after Kevin Reddington outed Michael and stood on the courthouse steps and said, Michael has an agenda. Michael robbed the other jurors. I find it richly ironic that now all of a sudden he's calling him John Doe after the damage was already done. And the question now is, do we want to have a Constitution? Do we want to have a Sixth Amendment? Do we want to

jurors to feel safe when they show up to perform their civic duty. Because we're not going to have a criminal justice system if jurors are afraid of reprisals. And what Kevin Reddington is doing here, he is setting a nightmarish precedent. And what would happen next time if it's the district attorney that didn't get his way because of a holdout juror? What are we going to have now? The prosecution doing this? Because the tables always turn. Things always change.

It's the principle that matters here. And we're consistent about that. Kevin Reddington isn't. Kevin Reddington is absolutely furious that Michael did the right thing. Do you intend to file a bar complaint? 100%. So you'll be filing a bar complaint. Will there be defamation lawsuits against any party that you can speak about at this moment?

It's a bit early to talk about lawsuits, but I can say this. Kevin Redington's conduct is not consistent with the standards of professionalism that we expect from members of the bar. It is inconsistent with what we expect from members of the bar. And I'll expand on that. If you're an officer of the court and you have taken an oath to uphold the United States Constitution, you've sworn to defend the Constitution, and then you get out there right after a trial, and you attack a juror. But then you don't stop. You continue to attack the juror.

You're attacking the juror outside the courtroom, inside the courtroom, everywhere. Kevin Reddington is not behaving rationally anymore. This is nuts. Those motions should be denied because 11 to 1 is not 12 to 0. Kevin Reddington doesn't know how to do math. Also, you can't investigate a juror because the juror followed the law and the evidence and came to a different conclusion than the one that you wanted, Kevin Reddington. Kevin Reddington wanted this for his legacy.

He wanted so desperately to win this trial. And in his mind, he's thinking, I had the perfect jury. I had everything set up for me. I won this trial. But the problem for him is he didn't win this trial. We can't talk about what ifs. The reality is that it was 11 to 1,

because one courageous, heroic man, heroic man stood up and said, this is wrong. And I want to talk to you about that courageous heroic man in one moment, but last moment about the trial and Kevin Redington, there were some remarks he made to Michael Ruiz at Fox Digital. I want to play those. Listen to this about you and about Michael. I think Ed ought to learn how to go into the courtroom and articulate his position rather than be a histrionic individual which is just milking off for the media.

I think the biggest misconception is that this individual is referred to as the holdout juror. He, in fact, is the obstructionist juror. He attacked you. He called Michael an obstructionist. That is one of the most shocking things I've ever heard. But I appreciate the fact that Kevin Reddington says the quiet part out loud. That's the one thing I'm going to thank him for. He tells you exactly what he's thinking.

And what he's thinking is unacceptable. It has no place in the law, and it's the exact reason why he needs to be disciplined. We will follow that. I do want some time to talk about Michael here. You said to me that we cannot get into the jury deliberations, and you do not want to address jurors directly. That is fair. I respect that. I'm wondering if you can broadly characterize for me what it was like for Michael to be a holdout juror for 30 hours. It was an intense experience, and the pressure was unimaginable. imaginable and no person of ordinary firmness could have resisted. Most people would have folded. They would have caved and they would have buckled.

Michael did not because he is an uncommon man. He's an extraordinary man. And what he did was extraordinary. He is a brave man. He's a courageous man. He's a kind man. He's a decent man. man. But he's also a man who cares about the law. He does care about the evidence. And he rigidly applied the reasonable doubt standard. So to his supporters, Michael did exactly what we asked jurors to do. He listened to weeks of evidence, reached his own conclusion, and refused to change his vote simply because 11 other people disagreed with him. If he genuinely believed the Commonwealth proved Lindsay was criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt, then holding firm wasn't

misconduct. It was his duty. But to his critics, there are still unanswered questions about what happened inside the jury room, whether Michael properly participated in deliberations, and whether the concerns that surfaced toward the end should have been investigated much more thoroughly before Judge Sullivan declared a mistrial. We will wait to see. There is still so much a stake, and we still don't know. Will there be a trial? An upcoming trial for Lindsay Clancy. The judge has made it clear. He doesn't want this lingering. And I agree, even the clansies should have some closure, right? We can't leave this

lingering for years and years and years. But it is important, as Judge Sullivan says, to make sure everything is lawful and legal, and I think he's doing an excellent job. And there are precedents to be set with this case, especially with the jury. I agree. I am concerned about what happens when public jurors, specifically, even just being called, are identified online before they even choose to go public themselves. There are a lot of questions here. We'll continue covering, continue bringing you every update, every hearing. November 2nd will be there.

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