History That Doesn't Suck - 211: Pacific Theater Epilogue with Capt. Mac Caldwell

Episode Date: August 24, 2026

Professor Greg Jackson and co-host Riley Neubauer are joined by returning guest Captain Mac Caldwell, a Marine veteran, to dive deeper into the Pacific Theater of early World War II. The conversation reaps key wartime conferences, unpacks the strategic tensions between MacArthur and Nimitz, analyzes the evolution of amphibious warfare, and extolls the legacy of Carlon’s Marine Raiders. The episode also highlights the unique unity and sacrifice of Americans during WWII and answers listener questions about the Pacific campaign.Mac Caldwell served as an Infantry Officer in the USMC from 2016-2023. Though he's no longer on Active Duty, once a Marine, always a Marine. He currently lives in Atlanta with his wife and their three children where he works for a management consulting firm. Prior to moving to Atlanta, he used the GI Bill to get an MBA from the Darden School at the University of Virginia, where he got to walk in Thomas Jefferson's footsteps. Of particular relevance to today's episode, though, during his time in service, he was second in command of an Amphibious Company, specializing in amphibious landings from Navy ships and actually deploying to the Pacific to conduct a number of peacetime amphibious exercises with partner nations throughout the region.Connect with us on HTDSpodcast.com andgo deep into episode bibliographies and book recommendationsjoin discussions in our Facebook communityget news and discounts from The HTDS Gazette come see a live showget HTDS merchor become an HTDS premium member for bonus episodes and other perks.HTDS is part of Audacy media network.Interested in advertising on the History That Doesn't Suck? Contact Audacyinc.com

Hello, friends. Professor Jackson here. I want to introduce our newly launched show, Government That Doesn't Suck. I know across the aisle even, some, if not many of you, are already thinking, but our government does suck. I get it. And yet, if that's our mindset, how can we ever improve it? That question is exactly what drives our new show. Government that doesn't suck explores the ways our American system of government functions or fails to. Each episode, blends historical narrative with insightful conversations featuring experts. You can catch these new episodes during the off weeks of history that doesn't suck. Our upcoming schedule features topics like space exploration, the interstate and highway

safety, the development of the internet, and the national weather service. In other words, when you pull up the weather app via the internet before you set out to drive on a freeway, you're benefiting from at least a few aspects of our government that don't suck. This new podcast features its own dedicated feed. which is available on whichever platform you were currently using. To listen, simply search for and follow government that doesn't suck or go to htDSpodcast.com.

Welcome to History That Doesn't Suck. I'm your professor, Greg Jackson. And today, we're going to take a break from our narrative episodes to unpack some of the bigger themes and discuss stories that we couldn't fit into our recent Pacific-focused episodes. I'm joined by Riley Newbauer, my executive editor, as co-host. Together, we're welcoming back Captain Mee. Mac, also known as Mark Caldwell, a Marine veteran and favorite guest, returning three years after

our first conversation in episode 135 about Marines at Bella Wood in World War I. In this epilogue episode, we're diving deeper into the Pacific, answering listener questions, unpacking the strategy battles, we might say, between Douglas MacArthur and Chester Nimitz, analyzing the evolution of amphibious warfare, marveling at the Forrest Gump-like life of Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, and the story of his Marine Raiders. and reflecting on how World War II was an incredible moment of sacrifice and unity among Americans, from privileged elites and movie stars to everyday heroes. I love this conversation.

But first, let me share a few quick updates about everything we have going on at History That Doesn't Suck. If you haven't heard, we have a new series called Government That Doesn't Suck. New episodes of GTDS dropped during the off weeks of History That Doesn't Suck in its own feed. Just search for Government That Doesn't Suck to learn more about how our government's designed, and times when it's delivered on that constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. It's certainly not a love letter to government, but I think you'll find some moments of perspective that may help interpret the depressing everything is broken headlines today.

And on that topic, I also humbly recommend my book, Been There, Done That, How Our History Shows What We Can Overcome. It's available wherever you get your books and audiobooks. The audiobook is narrated by me, of course. Finally, we've just announced new tour dates for the Pacific Northwest. I've never been to that part of the country, and I can't wait to bring my live show there. More dates will be added for 2027, so be sure to go to htDSpodcast.com for the latest, as well as follow us on Facebook and Instagram. And now, let's go gunho island hopping through the Pacific Theater with my special guest.

Mack, I realize that you've moved on from the Marine Corps, and yet once a Marine, always a Marine, right? Indeed. So I'm going to stick with Captain. It's how both I and our listeners all know you. Right before we got rolling, you were telling me about an experience you had shortly after our Bella Wood chat. Shortly after we recorded our first episode on Bella Wood, Greg, back in 2023, I left active duty. Yeah, I know, right. I left Active Duty and I went to actually use the GI Bill to go back to school and get a master's degree.

and eventually I had an alumnus from my business school reach out to me and say, oh my gosh, I just heard you on history that doesn't suck. You're Matt Caldwell. Turns out this guy, I'll shout him out, his name is Mick Dinner. Mick was a captain himself in the Marine Corps. He went to business school a couple years ahead of me. We ended up becoming great friends. I worked an internship for him a couple years ago.

So you and your podcast have connected me to some great Marines and great legacy. Mick is one of those. He's an Afghanistan veteran. Mick, thanks for your service. And thanks to all the Marines who listened in on the Bella Wood episode. And yes, thank you to you and all of our service members across the branches. Well, Riley, you are our director today. Please lead us where are we starting? All right. So one of the things that we're planning to do differently with this epilogue episode is that we've asked all of you, our listeners, if you had any questions about the Pacific War. And so we'll do our best to answer as many. of those questions as possible as we have this more fluid conversation. But I'd like to kick us off with one from a Mrs. Kelly Jones who sent it in via Instagram. And she is asking why it's called a theater of war. So why do we refer to this as the Pacific Theater? And I think Captain Mack, you're probably the most poised to answer this one. Yeah, sure. I'm happy to take that. This is a great question because I think in this era of World War II, so much of what was broadcast to the American public came through the newsreel in the theater, right? So it's easy to associate those two things and think

that the theater of war was what people saw on a Saturday evening when they went downtown to watch a movie. But in reality, we were referring to theaters of war long, long before this conflict ever came up. Theater was derived from the Greek word Theatron and then the Latin Theatrum, both of which mean a place where things are observed. And that was first adapted to a military context by the French, French Marshal Vaubon and later Germini, who referred to it as their theater of operations. And that really became standardized in the Napoleonic era, which of course naturally tripled down to everyone who studied Napoleon, which was anyone worth their salt in military operations in the 19th and 20th century. So the term theater long predated the newsreel,

unfortunately, but that's kind of where we got the term theater of war from. Oh, I've got nothing out of that. That was just so crushed and, like, thank you. I think as we move into this conversation about the Pacific Theater, there might be some conferences that we should probably discuss and make sure we're all aware of how we have gotten to the Pacific Theater, to the planning, and to all of the action that we've been seeing in these past episodes. Absolutely. We have mentioned some of these conferences, singular conferences, multiple times across several episodes. We can think about the Atlantic Charter. And there are different priorities for the British. That's the Nazi threat that's just across the channel. And what I feel is often lost on 21st century America is that we really love World War II history.

But when we say World War II history, this is just my sense from the classroom, from conversations I've had throughout my career, what we really mean is D-Day into the liberation of Europe. And all of those earlier years and frankly, the whole Pacific is so often. and forgotten, and it gets lost on us, even as we know, we all know Pearl Harbor is what pulled America into the war. And yet somehow we just seem to forget Japan as a major enemy. There's this real fixation on the Nazi threat. And that's not to say it is an important, right? I'm not trying to downplay it. I'm just trying to remind us that when America entered the war, we were really thinking about Japan far more than we were Europe. And that's more of a

us today looking back, we've got this more European-leaning narrative than Americans did at the time of these conferences. I think a lot of that is attributable to pop culture, Greg. Yes. Because much of the way that certainly my generation and those before me digested World War II history was through films like Saving Private Ryan, for example, which so graphically depicted the D-Day invasion and amphibious assault, which I know we'll talk about later. but pop culture, I think, drove a lot of our understanding of World War II, and it wasn't really until later that we started to develop a pop culture appreciation for the Pacific Theater. So you're right. There's a lot of the war that happens on the other side of planet Earth that often I think gets overlooked because maybe it's not as glamorous on the top line, but it really is where a lot of hard-fought heroism took place on both sides of the war. All right, all that said, let's head to December, 1941, slash January, 1942. So we're looking at the first Washington conference, aka Arcadia, which happens post-Purl Harbor. And that's really where this Europe first policy gets solidified between the American and the British allies. It's where FDR and Churchill meet. How can we forget that this is the time that Winston Churchill is in the buff before FDR and proclaims that he has nothing to hide, bearing all before the president of the United States? Yeah, I'm really solidifying this close friendship.

That will solidify it. Yep. All right. So the next conference that's important for us is the second Washington conference, which is June of 1942. That's where we discuss the North African front. And that's where the Allies decide that the invasion across the English Channel is going to be postponed. Yes. And George E. Marshall is super frustrated because he wants to hit France. But Churchill sees Italy as the soft underbelly. And so he wants to start in North Africa. Then we have the Casablanca conference, which is January of 1943. That's really where this Italian campaign is planned. That's where a so-called cross-channel invasion of 1944 is planned. We will talk more about that in later HDDS episodes. And that's also where the Allies adopt a policy of unconditional surrender, kind of seeing forward to the end of the conflict. And Admiral King is chopping at the bit for more support in the Pacific.

as these decisions are being made. Then we have our third Washington conference. These same issues are continuing to be discussed. This is in May of 1943. That's where the second part of the Italian campaign is planned. The Allies are also focusing on increasing air attacks against Germany. And this is where the intense focus on the Pacific theater begins to expand. This is when the Americans really want to turn focus back towards the Pacific.

Yeah. So a little color on the third Washington conference in August of 1942, simultaneous to the Guadal Canal campaign occurring, right, Operation Watch Tower. Right. There was a largely failed attempt at an amphibious landing in northern France by a small French force and a large kingdom force predominantly consisting of Canadian infantry. It was a colossal failure. So they basically attempted at landing at a pier. And yet, it ended up resulting in very short-term seizure because they caught the Germans by surprise.

They were basically trying to show a proof of concept of, hey, if we're going to do a full-scale invasion of France at some point, can we do it this way? Totally backfired. I mean, the Germans responded in force. The Lefafo was flying without opposition in northern France and obliterated the Canadian invading force. So that was kind of the backdrop coming into the third Washington conference was, hey, we attempted this amphibious, landing in Dieppe, and it didn't work the way we tried it. So how can we find a proof of concept for some other method that we might be able to use to invade northern France? Where else can we try something that might work? Hence, the Pacific opportunities to work on our amphibious assaults, our ability to land on beaches. Precisely. This is simultaneous to all the war planning that's taking place in the Pacific as Nimitz and MacArthur are game plan.

how they're going to conduct this dual-axis approach to the Japanese islands. And so in no small way, the failure at Dieppe informs the decision to say, hey, let's use the Pacific as a proving grounds for how we can conduct successful amphibious assaults in the event that that's what we ultimately choose to do in France, which would go on to be Operation Overlord in 1944. Another story for another day, but we'll lead to it, I'm sure, throughout the episode now. Oh, I mean, that's what we're building toward. Now, I want to talk about the relationship between MacArthur and Nimitz, but there are two conferences I want to mention really quickly, and then I'm going to circle back to that.

The first is the Cairo Conference in November of 1943. That's where we end up with a Cairo Declaration, which is kind of an extension of the Atlantic Charter. This is all covered in our HES episodes. And then we also have the Tehran Conference in November, December, 1943. that's a huge moment. It's when the big three meet for the first time. So that's FDR, Churchill, and Stalin. And that's where this date for Operation Overlord, aka D-Day, what we're going to talk about in future HDDS episodes is set. So with that background, Captain Mack, I want to ask you more about this relationship between MacArthur and Nimitz as the United States in the Pacific focuses more on kind of joint attacks between air, sea, and land. Yeah, great question. At the very least, the relationship between these two very powerful, very political figures was tenuous. It's worthwhile to consider them both as politicians. You reach a certain point in military rank when you're dealing more with secretaries and senators than you are necessarily with the privates and lance corpals and your military rank structure. And that's a level of achievement that both of these men had obtained by the time the war began, similar to Eisenhower on the other side of the planet. But MacArthur and Nimitz had different backgrounds. MacArthur being an army man, having commanded in the Philippines, Nimitz being, of course, a Navy man and being an expert at naval warfare. So although they were both given adjacent responsibilities,

my perception is that they very much viewed it as a contest between the two of them, for who could clearly demonstrate to Congress, to the president, to the powers that be, and to the American people, if they wanted to run for office someday, which of them was more competent, which of them was going to be the real victor in the Pacific and the way that Eisenhower would become known as the victor in the Atlantic. And, Cap, and I'm just going to point out my gratitude to you texting with me.

And then I believe ultimately, I hop it on the phone. I don't remember which episode I was working on number-wise. But it was one of these as I was getting into their personalities. Yeah, I think it was 209 as he was starting to get into, this balance between leapfrogging, which is the term that MacArthur would use in his campaign along the Western side, the Western axis, if you will,

and island hopping, which is I think that what we use in our modern vernacular to describe all of the Pacific theater, but in a contemporaneous view, they were viewed very differently. Island hopping was essentially, if I had islands A through Z, then I would need to sequentially go through every letter of the alphabet in order to get to Z. that was Nimitz's approach, by and large, I'm making big broad brushstrokes here.

MacArthur, on the other hand, his theory, which he claimed, which was more so thrust upon him, but this was what he eventually claimed, was leapfrogging and saying, hey, if I need to get from A to Z, I think B and C might actually not be that important. Maybe I can skip straight to D and isolate or neutralize B and C by seizing D instead. And that's the wither on the vine, right? That's the phrase he used. wither on the vine. So we're cutting off Japanese strongholds. Rabal, of course, being the example, well, that we've hit on in these several episodes since that was the Target Operation Carwheel, but never actually hitting that stronghold of some 100,000 Japanese troops, instead just choke

off their supply lines until they're out of the fight anyway. Yeah. And it's actually a derivative of Erwin Rommel and the Lightning War, the Blitzkrieg that's been taking place across Europe and North Africa, Rommel's theory was, this blitzkrieg was maneuver warfare. Like you referred to in the last episode, a few episodes ago, hit the enemy, hit him where he ain't. Right. And that was Rommel's theory. It was exploiting an enemy's vulnerability. And rather than pitting your strengths against his strengths or your weakness against his

weakness, instead exploiting his weakness with your strength. And that's what MacArthur attempted to do, and I think pretty successfully, by avoiding the stronghold at Ravall. And rather than committing a large force to what would have been probably imminent death in Ravall, he instead said, let's isolate that and we can let it wither on the vine. I think that answers one of the questions in part that we got from Christopher from Iowa, who asked about with the information that we have today, if island hopping and these strategies were actually the best strategy, or if there was a better way to go about this campaign

with fewer American casualties. I don't know if you have anything you wanted to add or if you do think it was a successful strategy. No, it's a great question. I think historians today, military historians, largely look back on the idea of island hopping and say, what a waste. Because the reality is a lot of the intermediate targets that during Operation Cartwheel, for example, Baccio, the Terawa Atoll, highly strategically insignificant in the long run. The theory behind Basio Island, you know, again, this bird-shaped island that has a long airfield along the breast of the bird and a long seaport where the bird's feet might be. The idea was if we could seize that piece of key terrain, we could use the airfield and project air power and sea power to the next island, so on and so forth.

And it ended up being useless. Six months later, the Americans abandoned the airfield of Basio because it was too short even for B-25s, so we're not. which was our smallest bomber in the Pacific. So a lot of historians will look back and say, no, island hopping was not the right decision. Leaprogging as a form of maneuver warfare would have been much more efficient and the cost of golden blood that was expended for it.

But I do think it's worth noting. There were, in spite of the fact that Tarawa and Operation Cartwheel could be considered an unnecessary loss, it was an operational victory, but massive losses and a lot of young men that didn't come home, right? The counterfactual is that there were invaluable lessons learned from that amphibious landing at Tarawa that saved a lot of lives later on in the Second World War.

If we hadn't lost a lot of American lives at Tarawa and learned the lessons that we did about how to conduct amphibious operations, joint operations, which is combining, you know, Navy Army Marine Corps, Army Air Corps, put them all into one piece, that's a joint operation. Right. If we hadn't learned those lessons when we did at Tarawa, we would have learned them when the stakes were much higher, such as invading France, which would have been the wrong place to learn some of these tough lessons. And I think that in an odd way, the failures at Tarawa and what many view as avoidable

failures, they ended up saving a lot of lives later on in the war. You know, Cam, you say odd. I completely understand what you mean because my mind goes to film director Frank Capra, who we encountered in, well, in a few HTS episodes, but of course, as we were talking about film, propaganda in the United States, his role making films that would educate the American people that would put forth this argument that democracy is on the line, that there's genuine evil out there. And yeah, it merits the fight. this era is so interesting because it's one of the few eras in American history where we see

major characters in popular culture commit to a fight like this. And Frank Capra's one, but the most famous men of the era, Ted Williams, Clark Gable, Jimmy Dufittle, these men all, they went to war, all of them. And they left Hollywood. They left the Boston Red Sox for crying out loud, where Ted Williams was getting paid to swing a bat. And they went to war. I think few things like that make it clear how important this conflict was perceived to be by all parties. There were very, very, I mean, there's always some, but there were very few people on the American home front who didn't think that this was a fight worth fighting. Jimmy Stewart, talented, gifted people who clearly could have been pursuing their own lives and moving themselves

forward are on the front, are in service. They're contributing. And so our cartoon characters. Yes, that's right. I mean, you know, Daffy Duck understands. Exactly. Right. You can't waste those dollars. That's your support in Hitler. That's what the cartoon instructed everyone. Thinking about this theme of propaganda, we had an interesting question from John Draves on Instagram about how Bushito or the way of the warrior was intentionally used as propaganda to promote tactics like bonsai and kamikaze. And so we talked about this a little bit in episode 208 on the American side, how a warped version of Bushido was used to justify waging war, both in much of the propaganda and in a lot of the brutal fighting techniques that were deployed.

Interestingly, after the war, Americans went after these symbols of Japanese militarism and Bushido culture, because they believed it could perhaps still be dangerous, which I find really interesting. But then on the Japanese side, as we've talked about in our episodes, that Imperial Japan intentionally reinterpreted and warped the traditional idea of Bushido, right, of the way of the warrior, into a national ideology framed by obedience and nationalism with death for the emperor as the ultimate sacrifice. And so there's kind of competing ideologies being placed on this very traditional Japanese value. and it's been warped and changed for each country's national interest at the time. And so I think Captain Mack, you had an idea about how this shows up in Robert Lecky's helmet for my pillow, right?

Yeah, Alligator Creek and on the island of Guadalcanal. By the way, Helmet for My Pillow is an absolutely awesome book. Lecky's writing style is a little odd, but he tells great stories. And a lot of what I've drawn upon in my understanding of this era was helmet for my pillow. with the old breed by E.B. Sledge. And then another book called The Raider by Stephen Platt, which talks about the story of Evans Carlson, which I'll get into at some point.

But yes, not only was there this reinforcement on the home front of Bushido being bad and the Japanese are crazed over the emperor, they'll die for the emperor because of the Bishito code, that was actively reinforced by empirical evidence on the battlefield. I know that in episode 208, you referred to the Battle of Atu Island and the bonsai shards that took place there in the snow in Alaska. Well, we saw the same thing at Alligator Creek, Tenaru near Henderson Airfield on the island of Guadalcanal,

where the Japanese were literally with swords drawn flinging themselves at like a wall of flesh, essentially, flinging themselves in a last ditch effort against an American defense. That is a vivid image painted with words. Thank you. And that's, I mean, it's the same type of thing that John Vasilone and Mitchell Page, who maybe will get to speak about, both of whom received the Medal of Honor in October on Guadalcanal, they both experienced that as well. A bonside charge where the Japanese were flinging their soldiers with ruthless obedience and commitment to their mission straight into the teeth of an American machine gun. I mean, it really did demonstrate a level of, they didn't know whether it should be described as bravery, heroism, or insanity, but it existed somewhere on that spectrum. And reinforced to American.

Arguably, those are thin lines. I think they are very thin lines. And like we alluded to in Bella Wood, history is written by the victor. So we get to look back and say, hey, maybe they were just, you know, crazy influenced by the emperor by Hirohito and his aura is the son. God. Not foregoing the right way to conduct war, but being heroes. Yeah, it's two sides of that coin. It is. And I think it's worth mentioning that this wasn't just something seen by the young enlisted Marines and soldiers on the front lines. These stories made their way up, right? These stories made their way up the chain of command to the real decision makers in the American military complex. And by

1945, don't think for an instant that Harry Truman didn't consider the way that the Japanese might respond to an invasion of mainland Japan when considering whether or not to use the atom bomb. Because these stories that had perpetuated since 1942 in the Pacific of how the Japanese fought very much formed the opinion of what we thought might happen if the Americans conducted a full assault of the mainland Japan. We will take the time to get into all of that as we approach the end of this war. Would it be okay here, Riley, if I talked a little bit about amphibious warfare. Absolutely.

Please. Yeah, so let's maybe dig into this because we talked about this earlier, but what happened in the Pacific Theater really was quite novel. And amphibious warfare, think of that as basically getting ground troops from a body of water to a body of land. That's amphibious warfare. And it had been taking place for millennia, right? I mean, here at the time of recording, the Odyssey just came out.

That's right. Odysseus, right? He sailed all throughout Greece. The Persians, the Spartans, the Trojans, the way the big for. The OG Marines, right? Exactly. Yeah. That was the way of war.

It was projecting your power at sea, landing at a place of weakness, ideally on a non-hostile beach, and then bringing those troops ashore and fighting a land campaign. That was amphibious warfare for millennia and Virginia. So from the American Marine Corps' very roots, it was an amphibious force, an amphibious fighting force. But all the way up to the First World War, I mean, our last episode was Bella Wood. That was a land campaign. Right. The Marines, you know, if Ella Wood is their coming out party, their coming out party took place on land 100 miles inland.

Good point. They needed a coming of age. I don't know that. I really thought about that. That's the sort of thing that kind of hides in plain sight in the history. It does. It points to this theory that the Marine Corps was effectively a redundancy. The Marine Corps did things that the Army already could do. The Marine Corps, you know, why differentiate it from the Navy if the Navy's already at sea? What purpose does this service really serve? I mentioned this in our last episode, but it was Victor Cruak in 1957. He would go on to be a commandant of the Marine Corps. But General Kruak said that the United States does not need a Marine Corps, but Americans want a Marine Corps. I do remember that.

I think that hadn't yet crystallized after the First World War. Congress was still asking, okay, yeah, the Marines did great in Bellowood, but do we really need to front all this money for a standing Marine Corps that's separate from the Army? There was a very, I want to dig briefly into this character named Pete Ellis, who was a Marine officer who was very famous in Marine Corps lore. He started the Marine officer candidate school. He was responsible for a lot of. really important pillars in Marine Corps history, but he was a war planner. He had helped plan

the Samihel and Muzargon Offensives in the First World War, for which he was commended by General Pershing. And after the First World War, he identified, hey, the Marine Corps might not have a clear purpose. We've identified ourselves as a ground force, but the Army already does that. And if the Marine Corps is going to last, we need to carve out a specialty. Enter war plan orange. and I know that we haven't had a chance to talk about it before, and it's not mentioned in your podcast, but the United States military is always war gaming. War gaming is essentially contingency planning and saying, hey, if, you know, literally every country in the world, if something bad happened, how would we deal with it? Well, after the First World War, the Japanese who had been an ally during the

First World War, much like the British had and the French had mandates in Africa and the Middle East, the Japanese had a mandate too, a little forgotten part of history. And that included most of the second and third island chains in the South Pacific. And that Japanese mandate meant that they had extended their military reach all the way into the Marianas, the Gilbert, and the Solomon Islands. Now, War Plan Orange in the 1920s is when America said, okay, let's say hypothetically we had to fight the Japanese, how would we do it? So War Plan Orange was essentially the idea that naval power is what would win the day in the Pacific. And in order to win against the fight against the Japanese, Americans would have to win consecutive amphibious fights by landing troops

on these small islands that the Japanese controlled, island hopping, if you will, from point to point all the way from Australia, New Zealand area and the Philippines, assuming America retained the Philippines, which we did at the time, to the Japanese mainland. And Warplan Orange was largely influenced by Pete Ellis, who actually would go on to die under mysterious circumstances in Japanese-controlled Micronesia in 1923, where he was conducting an intelligence mission. That's another story. But the theory behind Warplan Orange was, hey, we are going to need to do amphibious warfare.

That's where Marine Corps war planners latched on and said, yes, we have a purpose. This is something that we do. Yes. And so in the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps started saying, hey, if we're going to differentiate ourselves as an amphibious force, we need to start preparing explicitly for that mission. So you start to see a difference in the way that Marines are trained in boot camp and the way that officers are trained and educated.

You begin to see the appearance of official naval amphibious policy that all is built upon using a Navy Marine Corps team to land troops on an island under War Plan Orange. And eventually, the Marine Corps says, well, hey, we need some technology to help us get ashore. Like these old rowboats that we used in the 18th century to invade NASA aren't quite as good. Right. So they go to a boat designer in New Orleans. And I'm sure we'll be a part of your story in this podcast later on. a Nebraska by the name of Andrew Higgins,

who has a boat company in New Orleans. And Higgins' boats are specially designed for the bayous of Louisiana. During Prohibition, he was selling his boats to the rum runners and to the Coast Guard, bidding himself against his own competition. It's ingenious, if you think about it. I mean, he forced...

Brilliant. Yeah, he forced himself to adapt and demonstrate ingenuity with his engineering. But in the 30s, he finally gets the eye of the United States Navy and they say, I'm interested in this craft. It's a flat bottom boat with a V-shaped hull with a very strong motor. And because of that design, it can operate in as little of a draft as about four feet of water, which is not, that means it can get really darn close to the beachhead. And as war planners are starting to think through the likelihood of an amphibious

assault, specifically in the Pacific, but later on in the Atlantic, they go to Andrew Higgins and say, I'd like you to produce a whole lot of these, please. And by 1943, nine out of ten boats in the United States Navy are Higgins boats. Full on 90% of their naval force is the wooden Higgins boats produced in New Orleans, Louisiana. And so that landing craft becomes known as the LCVP, landing craft, vehicle, and personnel. And that is the single piece of technology that is going to make the biggest difference in an amphibious campaign. You got to think about why it mattered to the Marines in the 30s. The last attempt at an amphibious landing in their context was the Gallipoli campaign in the First World War, which for those who aren't familiar with European World War history.

Confidence, if that's what you're looking to. Yes. The Gallipoli campaign was four months long. It was a completely failed amphibious operation. It was the first time that anyone in the modern era had attempted to land against a defended beach. and it resulted in a quarter million dead. Slaughter of the Anzaks. Absolute slaughter of the Anzaks.

It led to Anzac Day, and it was maybe the first time that Australians and Kiwis started to think of themselves as maybe not critics. Yes. And it nearly killed Winston Churchill's career. That's true. It did.

Yeah, because he was the board of the admiralty at the time. Yes. So that was the backdrop. We knew we needed to have a better landing craft. The Higgins boat was the answer. Now the Marine Corps needed approving grounds. The Marine Corps needed a place to demonstrate that this theory of theirs, that they could find a niche as an amphibious force would work.

And that opportunity came with Operation Watchtower in 1942. And so part of why, I know you alluded to this, but General Smith and others, part of the reason why they were fighting so hard for an invasion of Guadalcanal is because it could be the first time to really demonstrate whether or not this amphibious theory that the Navy and Marine Corps have been crafting for 20 years as part of Warclan Orange would actually work. Wow.

I think it's fascinating to see that connective tissue really between, well, between the Pacific and Europe, because we do think of them. I mean, we talk about them as different theaters. We conceive of them as very divided. It's one war, but almost two separate wars. And recognizing that the lessons on amphibious warfare, in one theater are going to translate to the other that we're using the same tactics in both theaters to some degree. It's essential to understanding the success of D-Day. It is. And in carrying out

that proof of concept, we needed to conduct an amphibious landing not only to test the theory, but also to test can the United States military function as a joint force. This is effectively the first time at scale that the Navy, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Army, the Army, Corps have all had to coordinate and do things together. And that may sound like, you know, as simple as a handshake and let's talk to each other. It's extremely complicated. You've got personalities. You've got politics, right? Yes. So the personalities and politics at the top. And at the bottom, it is, do the rounds that they're using fit into my weapon? Is their radio on the same frequency as my radio? Can I talk to them? When I shoot a red flare,

What does that mean to me and what does it mean when the Navy shoots a red flare? Do these mean the same things? A great example that comes to mind that our listeners will be familiar with, the Doolittle Raid, right? We had to have Air Force pilots to launch off these short flat tops, right, these aircraft carriers. And there's questions about whether or not a, well, I'm saying Air Force Air Corps. Plane is going to be able to make it off of such a short runway. But they need a plane with the ability to fly such a long distance and the Navy doesn't have them. But you can't just put a Navy pilot in an air core.

Yeah. It's super complicated. Yeah. And so I think the Doolittle Raid perfectly exemplifies your point, the value of the branch is working together and yet the difficulty of the branches working together. It is extremely challenging. And we just hadn't done it. We simply hadn't done it.

In the modern era here in 2026, we can look back and say, oh, yeah, of course they all work together. You know, special operations command. Everybody speaks the same language. But the point was this had never really been. practice. So Watchtower was the first time to practice that. The Navy puts the Marines ashore. End up kind of taking the Japanese by surprise. There was not much of a contested assault on the beach, so didn't get to prove that theory as well as they would have liked. But there's a huge

component of amphibious operations which follows the landing. And that's the logistics, right? Resupplying the forces on the surface with, or excuse me, on land, with surface assets, meaning naval assets. The reason why this failed, as you alluded to a couple episodes ago, is the Navy tucked tail and got out of Dodge when they put the Marines ashore. They did not want to stick around. There was a pretty substantial naval battle at Guadalcanal that didn't end particularly well for the Americans. We lost a lot of supplies at sea. I mean, Marines were essentially stranded ashore watching their ammunition chowl and water sink into the ocean, while Japanese troop supplies and troop transports were sailing by to go drop off the Japanese on the other side

of Guadal Canal and create this impending fight. It would take place over the preceding few months. Well, Guadal Canal ended up being a good proof of concept because we recognize where some of these friction points lay, where the Navy and the Marine Corps needed to be tighter knit, where the Navy, frankly, needed to hold up their end of the bargain and supply the Marines and soldiers that were ashore. But we do eventually see the Army come ashore in Guadalcanal. and conduct a relief in place with the Marine Corps. Very complicated maneuver. It was done effectively.

So lots of good learning that in Operation Cartwheel, a year later, ends up being absolutely invaluable as we continue to iterate and learn. The invasion of Basio Island, where we have tracked vehicles, we have LCVPs, the Higgins boats, and we have a very low tide, unfortunately, which means that Marines are having to disembark their Higgins boats in some cases 700 meters away from the beachhead and weighed through a half mile nearly of water and a direct machine gunfire from a well-entrenched concrete Japanese bunker before they can get ashore.

Extremely challenging, like we alluded to earlier, lots of lives lost and lots of lessons learned. But among the learnings at Tarawa in Operation Cartwheel was how to synchronize naval gunfire with an amphibious landing. This was going on at Gallipoli, and it was a huge failure because naval gun ships weren't providing adequate fire support to the troops headed ashore.

Well, we actually learned how to do it at Tarawa by the creation of this unit called the Jasko or what would later become the Anglico, the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. These were specialized units who could look at what the Marines were doing ashore, could contact the ships and the air fire assets

out at sea and carefully direct that gunfire to support the troops gradually echeloning their way into the beach until it became a small arms fight. Really crucial learnings, things that needed to happen in practice. You couldn't rehearse this and dry fire in Fiji. You had to actually do this live against a living, breathing enemy in order to see if it worked. And what we learned at Tarawa would end up becoming really, really valuable intelligence and learnings for D-Day. There's one character, Riley, you had mentioned maybe wanting to talk about this guy. Absolutely. So there's one character I want to make the reader privy of who's sort of the Forrest Gump of World War II.

I mean, this guy, his name is Evans Carlson. And he is at so many major junctures in world history. He joined the army before World War I. He ended up going from an enlisted soldier to an army officer, got out of the army after the first World War. a little bored. He was a traveling salesman. And he was like, you know, this isn't doing it for me. The army wasn't quite it. I want some more action. So he resigned his commission as an army officer and enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps. Like the lowest rank he can possibly come. What? He just wanted some action. He loved his crayons. What can I say?

Carlson enlisted the Marine Corps in 1921 and eventually becomes an officer again and placed some pretty critical role. He's in Nicaragua, where he earns a Navy Cross in 1930, and then very randomly, as a major, gets assigned to FDR's personal marine detail in Warm Springs, Georgia. And Evans Carlson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt become quite good friends. James Roosevelt, FDR's son and maybe his closest confidant, ends up becoming best buddies with Evans Carlson. Carlson and and James Roosevelt are like two peas in a pod. It's crazy that randomly these guys get connected. Yeah, I've definitely seen the Forrest Gump angle here.

Oh, yeah. That's a great comparison. Well, it gets better because you know how Forrest Gump goes to China to play ping pong, right? Yes. In 1937, Carlson gets orders to the Fourth Marine Brigade, or excuse me, the Fourth Marine Regiment, which are known as the China Marines. And the Fourth Marine Regiment are currently observing the Sino-Japanese War, where Chiang Kai Shek and Mao Zedong, you know, the communists and the Republicans in China have joined forces to fight against the Japanese invasion.

And Carlson tells FDR, sir, I've been given orders to go out to China. And FDR instructs Carlson to write privately to his personal secretary, everything that he's observing in China about the Japanese so that he can have a direct view of how the Japanese are behaving. So over the course of the next few years, Evans Carlson is FDR's eyes and ears on the ground to exactly how the Japanese are conducting warfare in the sign of Japanese war. That's even more baller than Forrest Gump, man. So the story gets better here. Evans Carlson goes to China. He ends up becoming friends with Chiang Kai Sheck and Mao Zedom. I mean, he's photographed with both of these men, you know, basically having a mirror.

So, yeah, the one man is the nexus between FDR, Mao, Chenkishik. But what he observes in China is, hey, the Japanese are a serious threat, and we need to be taking this very seriously. He's writing that back to FDR secretary who passes those handwritten letters along to FDR. James Roosevelt, FDR's son, who's, again, enamored with Evans Carlson, their best friends, James Roosevelt decides, you know what, I think that Evans and I should join forces. He actually joins the Marine Corps Reserve so that he can serve alongside Evans Carlson

at the onset of World War II. And Carlson uses those connections to reach up to FDR and say, hey, I learned some valuable things from watching these communist guerrillas in China. They had a very flat command structure. There was very little difference between their officers and enlisted. They learned how to live off of the land and everything they carried on their back. No real logistics chains. It would carry a sack of rice and cook it in their helmets,

and that's how they survive for months on end. He learned basically how to be a guerrilla fighter, and so Carlson went to FDR and said, I think you should allow the creation of a military, of U.S. military guerrilla force. So by pulling some strings, Carlson invents the first and second Marine Raider battalions. And he becomes the commanding officer of the first Marine Raider Battalion with James Roosevelt as his appointed executive officer, his second in command.

So the Marine Corps, the U.S. Marine Corps is very deeply and directly affected by the fact that this one gentleman was sent to China. Yes. And everything he learned, ironically, from the communist guerrillas in China, translated directly to his Marine Raiders, who actually, it's a great story, too much to go into too much detail. here, but they attempted simultaneous with Guadalcanal. They attempted an amphibious raid in Macon Island, which is in the Gilberts. It was actually the closest Japanese-held territory to Hawaii at the time. A horrible failure of a raid. He conducts this raid. I mean, they pop out of submarines on rubber boats.

They jet into this Japanese-held island. They're supposed to blow up all the ammunition and then get out of there. And the intent was to try and draw Japanese reinforcements away from Guadalcanal and up to the Gilbert Islands. It ended up being a colossal failure. They left nine Marines behind on Macon Atoll, all of whom were eventually beheaded on Quagelin. There was a surrender note written. I mean, think about it. They had the president's son on Japanese territory very nearly surrendered to the Japanese in 1942. That could have gone so bad. Yes. Well, by the skin of their teeth they get out. And he takes his raider battalion, Carlson does, down to Guadalcanal and avails

himself. They conduct what's known as the long raid. He and his Marines, they go into the woods, basically, they go into the jungle in Vietnam. And for 29 days, he in about 500 of his Marines, pursue an entire Japanese division and pick them off piece by piece and eventually force the surrender, or, excuse me, death or surrender of an extremely large Japanese force, for which he He's very well commended. James Roosevelt's very highly commended. They end up having a little bit of a happy ending in Guadalcanal for their performance there. But Evans Carlson, who would go on to die shortly after the war, he was someone who was

decried because of his affiliation with the Chinese communists and his desire to create this flat command structure in the Raiders. Well, what he created would go on to become special warfare. And the special operations that are the subject of all the movies we see. see in 2026 and all the things you read about in the news. Right. The roots of that are all traced back to Carlson's Raiders, the Macon Island Raid in 1942 and the Long Patrol at Guadalcanal.

And so, yeah, he's the Forrest Gump of this era. He played an extremely pivotal role in numerous theaters here. You know, we can't, it's the hardest thing about HDDS. Well, it's the hardest thing about being a historian. You can't tell every story, full stop. thank you that I am so glad, Captain, that you could bring, come in, bring Carlson's story into the HDDS world in brevity and with some power. And I am going to latch onto one other little tale here, if I may, right beyond all the importance of establishing the Raiders and leading to these special ops teams that will follow. You mentioning Roosevelt being there.

and it takes my mind to our cold open with PT109, with John F. Kennedy, being a young lieutenant in World War II. And the tale, right, or the thread, rather, that I find myself wanting to pull on here is that World War II is also a time where the average American sees the elites risking their lives as well. Right. They are, they're out there, whether it is the son of a president or it's the son of a extremely, wealthy, well-connected Bostonian, it's another signal that we are all in it together. Absolutely. I mean, from Jimmy Stewart to James Roosevelt with black paint all over his face, carrying a Tommy gun on a rubber boat, Americans were all rowing the same direction.

And it adds a little color, I think, to Eleanor Roosevelt's visit to the Pacific, knowing that her son was in combat there. Yeah. Right? And had had this, horrific near-death experience at Macon Island, which of course made its way back up the chain. But Eleanor Roosevelt wasn't just, you know, America's mother going to ask the questions that mothers wanted to ask. She was a literal mother of a Marine officer who was in combat in the Pacific. And she had a vested interest in what she saw. Yeah. Okay. Before we wrap up, I want to ask both of you if you could share your favorite World War II Pacific Theater movie or book, whichever you choose.

It's such a good question, and I'm going to cheat Riley because I have to give you two answers. So the first will be the film Hacksaw Ridge, which is about Desmond Doss, just an iconic figure in World War II history for his participation in the Battle of Okinawa. And an amazing story, but also special to me because he spent his later years in life on Lookout Mountain, Georgia, where I grew up. And Desmond Doss spoke to me as a, you know, a Cub Scout. He came and talked to my Scout troop about his Medal of Honor experience. And just an amazing man, an amazing film. Highly recommend it. And it's Andrew Garfield, so you know it's going to be good.

The second one is Steven Spielberg's series, The Pacific. It's an HBO mini series. It is not for young eyes or years. But it is based on Sledge's book, Robert Lecky's book, Robert Lecky's book, and the story of John Basilone, which I know, Greg, you guys brought up a couple episodes ago. Phenomenal storytelling really paints the full picture of the war from the most brutal, awful, horrible moments to the highest moments of elation that can sometimes come with warfare and

camaraderie and brotherhood. I think the Pacific is Spielberg's best. And I know that's saying a lot, but that would, those two would be my favorite. Yeah, this one's no contest. for me, I'm right there with the Capon. The Pacific is just brilliantly, brilliantly done. Storytelling at its finest. And, you know, it's rare when I watch a series,

and I think to myself, this was how an American conceived of this era of history. Typically, I watch, whether it's movies or series, and I'm definitely not the sort of historian who can't appreciate a little bit of liberty taken by a director. I recognize it, not making documentaries. I will make the accurate history. They're entertaining.

I get that that's their first priority. The Pacific is so well done and it draws you in in such a realistic way. Riley, what about you? I would have to agree with both of you, probably, that the Pacific is the number one on my list. I would also encourage listeners to then go read the books and the memoirs that the Pacific is based off of. I think they do a very beautiful, beautiful job with storytelling. not beautiful in terms of the content, but in terms of the language and the way that these authors are able to paint pictures of the war and to describe their experiences as realistically as they can

possibly conceive them, both during and after the war. And so if the Pacific speaks to you like it does for the rest of us, I really would encourage you to go read those books as well. And maybe just an honorable mention, if you like the story of Evans Carlson, go watch the movie Gung Ho. It is a somewhat elaborate adaptation of his story. If you heard the phrase, gung-ho, that's an Evans-Carlson thing. He brought that to America from what he learned from the Chinese, but that movie tells his story a little bit, and it's another good tale. Well, let me just say thanks, of course, to both of you, Riley, it's always a pleasure. And Captain, thanks for making a return three years later. And I love the thought that this isn't

the last either. Well, we'll just see what the future might hold, huh? Me too, Greg. I love doing that a few years ago. I was lucky to come and see your live show in Ashburn, Virginia a couple years back, which was lots of fun. And I highly recommend to every listener go find the nearest show and attend. And I absolutely look forward to being here again. I hope we can reconnect on future episodes. After recording, Riley, the captain and I, further discussed Carlson's raiders and their impact on amphibious operations. Their absence at Tarawa, combined with the several obstacles the landing force encountered, highlighted the necessity for a specialized force to conduct beach surveys and small amphibious raiders.

This need ultimately gave rise to the U.S. Navy underwater demolition teams, UDTs, the predecessor to today's Navy SEALs. Simply put, the Navy SEALs would not exist today without those gun-ho Marines. And if you want to hear an extra story about the formation of the Joint Assault Signal Company, JASCO, which the captain also mentioned, check out the HTDS membership program. Members receive ad-free episodes, bonus stories, and other perks. Details are at HTDS. podcast.com slash membership. You can also learn more by joining our free

HDDS Facebook group. There's a great thread going on there now about other World War II Pacific movies to add to my watch list. Join our Facebook group and add your recommendations to the list and connect with other history enthusiasts. History That Doesn't Suck is created and hosted

by me, Greg Jackson. This episode was researched and co-hosted by Riley Newbauer and produced by Dawson McCrall. Production by Airship. Audio editing by Muhammad. Chardet. Sound design by Molly Bach. The music composed by Greg Jackson. Arrangement and additional composition by Lindsay Grand Bairorship. For bibliography of all primary and secondary sources consulted in writing

this episode, visit htDSpodcast.com. H-TDS is supported by fans at htdspodcast.com slash membership. My gratitude to kind souls providing funding to help us keep going. Thank you. And it's special thanks to our patrons, who's gift puts them at producer status. Adam Goeran, Ahmad Chapman, Amy and Ross Hinson, Andrew Nissen, Andrew Sherwin, Anna M.

Hutta, Art Lang, Baby Nicknow, Bob Stinnett, Bonnie Brooks, Brian Gavigan, Brian Boyles, Brian Goodson, Bruce Hibbert, Caden, Charles Clendenin, Charles Starkey, Charlie Mages, Christopher Merchant, Christopher Lysel, Christopher Pullman, Christopher Young,

Cindy Rosenthal, Cody Brown, Pauline Martin, Colin Pennington, Connor Hogan, Craig Burrhost, Dan G, Daniel Beauchamp, Daniel Okamey, Darren Chambers, Darrell the Kid Lovell, David Rifkin, Dean Heiser, Durante Spencer, Donald Moore, Eli Edwards, Elizabeth Chris Janssen, Ellen Stewart, Ernesto Franco, Ernie Lomaster, Ethan Loring, Evan Thompson, G203 3. Jeffrey Nelson. George J. Sherwood. Gareth Griffin. Gina Johnson. Gordon Garwood. Henry Brunges. Holly Hamilton. Jake Gilbert. James Bloodso. James Blue. James Schlender. Jarrett. Jeffrey. Jennifer Mings.

Jeffrey Munchiem. Jennifer Roof. Jeremy Wells. Jessica Poppick. Joe Dobis. John Boogie. John Fugledugel. John Huber. John Huber. John Meshmer. John Rudevich. John Schaefer. Jonathan Schaeff. Jordan Corbitt. Joseph Joshua Steiner Julia Wright Justin May Justin Tolman Carl and Elizabeth Saline Carl Friedman Carl Hindle

Carl Romer Ken Culver Kim R Kristen Pratt Kyle Decker L Paul Gorge Gorringer Laura Norman

Lawrence Newbauer Linda Cunningham Mark Ellis Marsha Smith Mason Glenn Matt Siegel Michael Longest Michael Solvin

Nick Caffrell Owen W. Sedlach Peter Huginron Philip May Randy King Rich Ruckel Rick Brown Robert Drazovich, Robert Shelton, Rock Day, Sam Holtzman, Sarah Prescott, Sarah Traywick, Scott Hurst,

Shane Smith, Shannon Hoagland, Sharon Theiz, Sean Baines, Sean Collins, Stacey Steve Williams, The Creepy Girl, Thomas Churchill, Tom Bostofa, Walter N. Ames, Wesley McKeague, William Durham, and Zach Jackson. Join me in two weeks, I'd like to tell you the story.