How I Invest with David Weisburd - E241: How Spirits Became a $1 Trillion Alternative Asset Class
Episode Date: November 13, 2025How do you turn whiskey barrels into an institutional asset class? In this episode, I sit down with Giuseppe Infusino, Chief Investment Officer and Managing Partner at InvestBev Group, to explore how... a real asset like aged whiskey is quietly becoming one of the most uncorrelated and profitable investments in alternative markets. From his early years at RVK advising multi-billion-dollar allocators to managing institutional portfolios in a niche category few understand, Giuseppe shares how InvestBev has built an entirely new asset class from the ground up. We discuss the economics of whiskey aging, how barrel pricing creates asymmetric returns, and why alcohol performs differently across economic cycles. This conversation breaks down incentives, alpha generation, and how to educate LPs on emerging strategies long before they go mainstream.
Transcript
Discussion (0)
So you're the CIO of Invest. We'll get into that in a bit. But you started your career as an OCIO at RVK. Tell me about your experience working at RVK.
Yeah, that was a great experience. I worked with some really intelligent people who taught me a lot about investing.
It always set the foundation for kind of how I thought about things as an investor. And one of the things that I thought RVK and did a really good job of, especially the folks that I worked with, was thinking about things a little bit differently than the broader sort of institutional.
investment community, especially from the consultant's side where there was a lot of pressure
to invest in big names. Pension plans want to align with what other pension plans have done
simply because it didn't really put their neck out on the line. If you follow people's incentives,
you'll see kind of what they do, right? And the consulting community oftentimes isn't incentivized
to really search for the best and the best and brightest. It's oftentimes reversing to the
mean of the lowest common denominator of what others are going to do. And RBK was very different
in that regard. Our team really wanted to differentiate ourselves by finding unique strategies
that together created the diversification that maybe a go anywhere, do anything allocator fund
could do, but with more precision. And typically what we saw with experts and a specific focus
is that you're sourcing better deals. You're adding more value throughout the deal and you're
exiting better. And that was a really important lesson that I thought was unique to the firm
and the team that I was working with. And you hear a lot of people saying that consultants or even
larger allocators are not incentivized to find these best and brightest. They're incentivized
to go after the large brands. Can you double click, like really granularly? Why is that
incentive there? And maybe walk through that incentive structure from an individual at the
consultant or an individual at a large asset allocated. For the consultant, you're proposing
investment opportunities to typically an investment staff who then has to propose those
to a board. And if you as a consultant, which are paid on a flat fee-based arrangement, if you
propose something new, unique, and different, if it performs well, you get no compensation
for that. And if it performs poorly, you're oftentimes, could be considered the scapegoat
there to the investment staff, who the investment staff, if they kind of get the line and
believe the story that's being sold from the consultant, then they are responsible ultimately
to the board as well. And so if they are recommending something to the board that is kind of out
there a bit and it doesn't work out, that's putting their neck on the line. And they're often
times not compensated. And there are structures that some groups have implemented to kind of avoid
this a bit, but they're oftentimes not compensated for overperformance. But if you do have
something that's a bit of a slip up, then you're going to be judged against that. And all of these
institutional groups are judging their performance relative to their peer set, relative to
benchmarks. And so as long as you're meeting or exceeding the benchmark, really you just don't
want to be below the benchmark, right? And that's going to put you at risk for your role and
for the individual who's making those recommendations. There's not a lot of incentive for either
the consultant or the investment staff to take those risks. And you see that bear out in terms
of the portfolios that you see a lot of money going to these big allocators that over time are
just hard for them to really outperform.
If I was debt set to raising from consultants and let's say I was on a fund three or four, I wasn't KKR Fund 17, what would I be looking for as a counterparty from a consultant, maybe individual or firm that would signal to me that they are looking for the best and brightest and that they are willing to take a risk on an emerging manager, maybe a manager that just became an established manager, but still early on their life cycle.
What would be those one or two characteristics?
One of them is that you could look at the track record of what they've already recommended, right?
that would certainly be something that was a kind of telltale sign to the market for us that,
hey, we were doing some more unique things. But I think that manager needs to think about
how can I be a good partner here? How do I differentiate myself? And if you see a consultant that
is open and interested in those things as a way of creating a customized relationship,
whether that be fee reductions for first time closings or co-investment rights,
like that investor that's trying, that consultant that's trying to find
value add pieces above and beyond the contract of the strategy, they're thinking a little bit
more about how to add value to their underlying investor. Because not only are you trying to be a good
partner for this manager, but you're also trying to be a good partner for your underlying
constituents, staff and the board by lowering the fee load and finding these additional
opportunities to do co-investment. So those are just some simple ones. They're just thinking a little
bit differently about about allocations versus I know that pension plan ABC is in you we're
already in this fund in a prior vintage that seems pretty good nothing has really changed let's
move forward with it with another allocation which which you know happens quite a bit what percentage
of the funds did did you and your team source directly out in the market and how many were
referred to you by LPs that were basically sourcing them and and sending them over to you for
diligence a good question I mean I would say 90 plus
percent were self-sourced by us. We really turned over the stones to find the new and
interesting differentiated teams so much in fact that we would even think about going as far as
finding a great group of people who are at a larger firm. And we talked about this at times,
do we see to spin out ourselves to create, you know, we are the C capital for this new firm,
which would really incentivize that manager obviously to perform at their first time fund
with us as the main LP source. And so we never went that far, but that was,
We even, that was something that was bad at about.
So you went from working out at OCIO to investing in bourbon, quite the career arc.
So tell me about that.
And how did that come about?
So my partner and the founder of Investbev, a guy named Brian Rosen, he and I have known each other for a long time.
And we were out with our wives, who are our good friends, out one night.
And he started talking about his industry, which was alcohol.
His family had been in the industry for nearly 100 years.
It's a really fun story.
They were actually the first liquor license in Chicago coming out of Prohibition.
So his family has been in this space for a really long time.
And under his stewardship, after running the business for a long time, he had exited the business to private equity with his own personal and friends and family capital.
He started investing in the Athol space again.
And he came to me at that dinner and said, look, Giuseppe, I'm seeing dealful.
I'm very ingrained in this space.
I think there's some great opportunities to invest.
I think, you know, my own capital can only go so far.
I'm thinking about raising a fund.
And I said, well, Brian, you know, I know this world a little bit.
I'm happy to help any way I can and kind of in a funny way.
He said, well, why do you think I'm telling you about this?
You know, I want to do this together.
And so that's really how it started.
And so the next step was, okay, alcohol as a category, we all know it as a consumer.
Let's talk about what you're actually doing.
What's the strategy within the category?
And you really lean into this concept of whiskey aging.
And I kept kind of leaning in further and further on this because as I heard about it,
this aligns to some of the real assets kind of investing that I did at RBK, right,
about real estate and infrastructure and all those things, timber as well.
These barrels are this tangible real asset that really had a lot of the same attributes
that some of those other real assets had,
but they had a really distinct advantage relative to those other things where the good itself
was actually getting better over time, right?
We all can go to a liquor store and see, you know, 15-year-old McCallon is more expensive
than 12-year-old and so on, right?
Those types of things are kind of universally known that the maturation of whiskey, you get
a better product as time goes on.
So that really got me thinking that there's some attributes about this category that
were really compelling.
I spent a good half an hour going back and forth with chat GPT.
I even Googled, which is not something I do very often these days.
I couldn't find the returns on bourbon.
What are the historical returns on bourbon?
The market by, some would say by design is a bit opaque.
But if you transact as much as we do, we have both our investment equity side and a credit side, which provides a lot of insights.
You get a deep understanding of where pricing a barrel should be finger on the pulse.
And in our years of doing this nearly over 10 years now, we've had transactions and you've seen high times in the 40s percent IRAs.
you've seen some really, really outlandishly good returns when you think about it is a tangible asset.
If you compare it to the timbers of the world, which are typically like a single digit type of a return, it's just no comparison.
Now, I'd be remiss if I didn't mention that there are also times like in recent years where COVID has had a impact on the art industry and so forth.
And so returns have come down.
The price of barrels have, that appreciation curve has come down slightly.
And so returns in some of our vintages are going to be in the 20s.
potentially even in the high teens.
And so, you know, that's really the range that you can think about from a realistic outcome.
What is the correlation to the market?
And how do you look at it?
Is it also somehow correlated to equities?
Does it have a beta?
And how do you go about kind of ascertaining these numbers?
We actually worked with the Kalaas School of Management here in Chicago and just had them do a kind of a third-party correlation analysis.
It kind of, it certainly mirrored what we might anecdotally say is that people drink in good times and bad, right?
It's a non-correlated category, and the data bore that out.
There was almost no correlation whatsoever with the S&P 500.
There was no correlation with 30-year treasury, unemployment, housing starts across the board.
In addition to that, alcohol sales had a dramatically less volatility.
Standard deviation was half in many instances and even less than others relative to these other categories.
And so when you think about a category with an appreciating asset, tangible asset,
limited volatility and limited correlation relative to the other things in your portfolio,
that really became compelling to me and I thought would be compelling to the investment
community because that's one of the reasons why you invest in alternatives, right?
At the end of the day, is you want something that behaves differently and complementary.
It doesn't all zig when everything is zinging.
You want it to, at the very least, not zig and potentially zag, but the alcohol industry
just being so steady is a really compelling piece of this to me and to our investors.
There's this whole, there's this whole asset allocation of diversifiers, typically it's hedge funds that are uncorrelated to market. And typically these have lower returns, but add diversification to the portfolio because they are uncorrelated. Is this the bucket that it would fit in to endowment or a pension fund? Or where exactly, from first principles, where exactly should investors fit something like bourbon or alcohol in their portfolio?
The one thing we talk about a lot with investors when we work at the institutional level is,
those that have really rigid buckets they need to fill across their allocation struggle
with where do I put this, right? And I would argue that it does fit in a real asset bucket.
That's certainly one opportunity or one way you can go if you have that. Some folks have
just an opportunistic bucket. I don't know if the risk profile of what we're doing is as high
as what was typically in an opportunistic bucket, but we almost have to meet the investor where they
are and say, what does your investment profile and portfolio look like? And how can we think
about what we're doing and where it might fit. And honestly, it doesn't fit for a lot of folks,
but those that are more nimble in their asset allocation and can be a little more open-minded
because you don't start the day with an allocation to whiskey in your portfolio. We have to,
convince you that this is a category that is interesting and that it does fit as opposed to
finding where it was already preordained to fit. You know, there's only a handful, probably
half a dozen funds that invest in this entire space. So a big part of your job is
educating the market. How do you educate the LPs in a process? And how do you get that second
and third meeting? Like, what's the art to that? You start with what is the category, right,
that we're talking about? If it was real estate, right, they already have an allocation to real estate.
But you might have to be more specific in a particular category. So you need to get into the
details of multifamily, right? You need to sell the category in and of itself. What are the
underlying dynamics and characteristics of the category that make it make it compelling.
And that's where we start with alcohol.
We'll talk about the size of the category, you know, a trillion dollar category.
You talk about the correlation to other categories.
We start with that to say, okay, this is big enough to really think about.
This is compelling enough to dive a little bit deeper.
And then the next step is kind of what is the strategy, right, with which you're capitalizing
on the opportunity.
First you've got to sell them on the opportunity of the category.
And then you have to sell, how do you capitalize on it?
And so that's when we get into the whiskey barrel specific characteristics, et cetera.
And then from there, once they get a good grasp of this whiskey aging component,
then you have to talk about why us, why we the ones to do it, right?
So it's a three-part journey in my mind.
And to be honest, the first of those is honestly the most difficult.
Once you get to now you bought into this, I'm even open to the concept,
the strategy on the bourbon barrels is really compelling.
And then you talk about us as a firm.
To your point, there's very few people who do this aside from us,
But our whole team, aside from me, comes from the beverage industry, right?
Aside from my partner, who I mentioned, we have folks from Bacardi, Moulson Coors, et cetera.
And that really differentiates us from a relationship basis to buy and sell barrels differently.
And to the point I made earlier about sourcing better, adding value, and then exiting better,
if you have deep industry relationships in our category, which we do, that really sets us apart from,
no offense from anybody who lives in New York, you know, flying in from New York and just doing this as part of a larger
hedge fund strategy, whatever the case may be, it's very different. And that's how we think about it.
A lot of people, for whatever reason, don't think of asset managers as traditional businesses.
I like to think of them as businesses. And the way I kind of think about it is you have to pick your hard.
So it's very hard to be in a hyper-competitive market. And it's also very hard to educate a market, to go through all that.
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It's two funds that come to mind.
Arcto started the first sports fund in 2020.
I believe there today at about that $9.9 billion as of January 2025.
Blue Owl, which was named Doll at the time, starred GP Stakes for the first few years.
It was incredibly difficult for them today.
Today they're a part of Blue Owl, which is roughly 280.
billion. So it's the some of these businesses, it's the education, the first mover advantage,
although it's very difficult. That's what leads to these like unique asset class. The same could
be said in venture. Andrews and Horowitz had to popularize this idea of founder friendly. We're going
to give feedback to founders. We're not going to treat founders poorly. And it took a while to kind
of scale up for them. I think their first fund, if I'm not mistaken, was roughly two to three hundred
million dollars. So I think you pick your heart and there's different dynamics. But there is no
free lunch. Same to your execution sourcing. Like that
is your alpha. The reason that's sustainable alpha over several vintages is because you can't just
come in. It's not just financial trade. Everybody wants that financial trade, but they don't want
to capture a beta. They want to capture alpha. So I think you have to think about alpha not only as
today, but how do you sustain that alpha over several vintages? That's an incredible way of
thinking about, right? Pick your heart there. And I certainly, we've experienced that over
time. There's certain people that immediately get it. And there's certain that just, you know,
a lot of convincing. And some you'll ever convince, right, to do something different until they
see, you know, decades of experience and then, and then, I'll say it'll be too late, but
you'll certainly be behind the curve of getting exposure to categories that really could
generate, you know, returns that you're not getting in other places with managers that
you want to be aligned with, right? Adreason Horowitz, for instance, right? If you passed on that
years ago and you said, okay, now I'm not bought in. I'd love to have an allocation there.
Well, good luck, right? It's one of those things is that, uh, that they're only working with
existing investors typically. And so, um, you know, you don't want to say folks are going to miss
the boat, but there's, you will certainly from a return perspective and you may just,
you know, not be able to get access to that manager. You see that with others in Venture,
Sequoia and so forth. Like, it just becomes, becomes difficult and very saw after one once everyone's
bought in. Going back to that point, we talked about earlier, right? Once there's, there's
comfort in the masses, uh, from, from others investing, you start getting a snowball of,
of commitments. Do you find that the early adopters, the Clay Christensen, an innovator's
dilemma, the early adopters and going back to the laggers and the conservative
investor. Do you find that that's on organizational level when it comes to LPs or in an individual
level or is it some combination of both? And if both, then how would you allocate kind of
100 points across the individual versus organization? Ultimately find at the end of the day that
the individuals who think that way gravitate to the organizations that think that way, right?
Because if you were, if you were that, have that entrepreneurial mindset and want to do
things that are new and different, you're going to get stifled over time at an
organization that doesn't think that way and you're going to either go start your own thing
or you're going to find an organization that that does accept that mentality. So it's certainly
driven by the individual at the end of the day, but I think the individual drives the organization
and they have to ultimately be aligned for anything to get done. Tell me about the economics of
alcohol production. What does that look like? We'll use spirits here, right? Because it's different
across different categories in alcohol, anything about beer and wine and so forth. And I'm going to
use rough numbers here just in terms of these costs and they vary. But if you think about a whiskey,
right, a barrel, the wood itself is going to cost roughly 250 bucks. And then you think about the grain
and the labor and all those things, another $200. $200. So then you have a roughly $450 cost basis as a
distillery. If we as a firm buy that barrel for 750 bucks and we bought barrels for more
expensive or less expensive than that, less expensive today, which is great. But that's roughly a 40%
margin, right? So now we're talking about a margin of 40%. We hold it for four years,
let's just say on average, and we sell it to a brand for $2,000. And again, we've sold
four-year-old barrels for more than that and at times even less than that. But if you think
about those numbers, if you bought it for $750 and sell it for $2,000 in a few years, it's a 27%
return, which is kind of in line with what our fund is projecting. So now you have a $2,000 barrel
of whiskey, and you're going to get anywhere from $250 to 300 bottles.
out of that barrel.
And so now you're talking about $7 a bottle.
So then you take $7 a bottle
and you add that into,
you add in the bottle itself,
the label and all those things.
Call it $10 for cost of goods to the brand.
That brand is going to sell it to the distributor
for, let's call it, $25.
So they're getting their margin.
Then that distributor is going to have to sell it
to the retailer and they're getting their margin.
And then that retailer has to sell it to you
as the consumer, and they're getting their margin. And so all in that, that liquid that cost
$7 a bottle is probably ending up on the shelf for $50, all in when you, when you layer in all
those pieces of the ecosystem in the alcohol industry. So that's a lot of, a lot of middleman.
A lot of middlemen. And the whole three-tiered system, and we can, we could have a whole conversation
around that. It came out of prohibition. But there's pros and cons for that. But for those who
can navigate it well, it creates advantages to, for scale. And for those that can't, it creates
hindrances and really blocks the ability to grow brand. And so the fact that we have a team that
knows that space very, very well and, you know, decades of experience there is incredibly
helpful for us as a group. You started your first fund in 2015. You're on your fifth fund.
What have been some of the lessons that you've learned over the last decade on how to start
and scale a fund manager? People are important in every business. And having the right people
on our team has, or in the early days, just not having as many people or the,
it was just really my partner in the early days,
I think that can limit your ability to
execute and to scale.
And so if we had a crystal ball
and kind of knew where the world would go
and knew how investors would
how this would resonate with investors,
I think we would have invested even more upfront.
We would have built a bigger team.
We would have built bigger, more resources,
and we would raise more money earlier.
Would probably be one of the lessons
that I see because
one thing that we,
that we really found ourselves thinking about is our first institutional fund was our fund too.
The first fund was really friends and family capital that predated that.
When we came in the market in the middle of COVID in 2020, we didn't know how the market
would react to a alcohol-specific fund, et cetera.
And so we came out with a pretty small fund and we ended up being oversubscribed, which was great,
right, for the fund.
But then you find yourself in that dilemma of now I have to go sell my second fund.
And I think about my consulting hat, putting that back on, you don't want to see a fund
to make too big a jump between Fund One and Fund Two, Fund Two and Fund Three.
So now we're sort of anchored to this smaller fund size that we've been building on over the years.
And now we're to our Fund Five, which still relatively small comparatively to some of the names we've talked about.
But now we're big enough to really be on the radar of, you know, some of the larger.
Let's assume that a Fund 1 is $100 million.
What's an acceptable fund two, Fund 3?
and what's tolerable, for lack of better word, by institutional investors,
and what do they like to see in terms of fund size of retirement?
How much is that impacted by the strategy itself?
We've been doubling that.
That's palatable to folks, even though it's a bit of a, not a bit of a, not a stretch,
I mean, a slight stretch.
You don't want to see this dramatic increase, but a doubling has been what we've done
from fund two each time.
So we're at about a 250 million target here for our fund five.
So still on the really small end of the spectrum.
But now you think about from the institutional perspective, there's a couple of things that have historically been limiting factors for the very large institutions to be to look at us and really have we've gotten passed now, which is great, is that if you're writing a very large check, now we're to the point where in the most recent fund, we have an anchor that's a $100 million check, which is great.
And we have a couple of others that are $15, $20 million checks.
And so that snowball is starting to really roll, which is great.
Going back and putting on your RVK hat, I've heard of this kind of doubling is an acceptable.
kind of speed limit, but you do see some people that triple or even quadruple. What are some leading
indicators of a fund that's allowed by their institutional investors to grow faster? What's necessary?
If you can prove that you're not having scope creep in terms of what you're doing and doing it
differently and to say that maybe there were deals before that you had to syndicate and now you can
take more of that deal, I think that that's really compelling as the story to say, we're just going
to take more of any individual deal, which gives us more pricing power as being the sole capital or more
the capital. If you add to the team and you have more capabilities, right? I think that's also
something that can be pretty compelling from a investment community perspective. And then if you
then if you just have great returns, right, if you have great returns doing what you're doing and
you say, look, we've had to turn down a lot of deals. And this is what we've done historically
to turn down tons of deals. But we're going to keep doing exactly what we're doing.
We're going to do more of it. That's believable versus I was buying investing in oranges before
and now I'm investing in Cadillacs. It's a hard time for me as the investor to look at you with
the straight face. And I say, I believe you can execute on this totally kind of diverse strategy
from what you've been doing. Even better than that would be having co-invest. So let's say you had
a $100 million fund, $200 million co-invest. How do you know that you could have a $300 million
fund? Well, if I had done the co-mess in the fund, then I'd have $300 million. It sounds kind of
oversimplified. But that is a way to almost empirically prove the investable universe.
A lot of GPs as they grow, private equity funds want to at some point start a private credit
franchise. When does
institutional investor market
allow that? When do they want it?
And what's your right to start a credit fund? How do you know
that you might be approaching that?
I think credit is very different, right, than
traditional, maybe it's in private equity or
venture or something like that. I mean,
private equity specifically, right, it's just very different
than private credit. So in my mind, you need
to have poured it over a whole team from someplace to lead
that strategy. I don't think you could say this
group can necessarily do something different. Now,
in the example of InvestPev, the thing that is a little bit unique is that what we do on the
barrel side is essentially inventory financing, right? Because a brand who doesn't want to
buy the barrel today is waiting until it's aged and buying it from us. And the reason they don't
want to do that is because they don't want this inventory being on their balance sheet for
four or five years. So they're waiting to buy it from us when it's older. We're essentially
doing inventory financing. So for us, we are working with the same parties. We're solving the same
problem, and we're just doing it in a slightly different way if we bring our private credit solution
to the market, which we have, and we put a decent amount of money to work on that side of what we do
because a brand could either wait until the barrel, the liquided inside the barrel is fully aged
and just buy it at that point, or they might want to take some chips off the table,
have some risk appetite to have the barrels slightly earlier in the aging process. And if they do
that, instead of doing it with 100% equity, they can do that with 40% equity and 60% debt.
and why we are very well positioned to do that
is because if we were to take those barrels back,
we have a whole side of the business that does that on a day-to-day basis,
so we know what to do with the inventory.
So we know how to underwrite that collateral.
We know how to sell that collateral
if we actually had to liquidate and again, solving the same problem.
So our story, we think, is a little, much more kind of the jump
feels less of a jump and more of a step, right, for us.
But I think in the broader community,
you really have to have a compelling story
as to why you have a right to win on the credit side.
We obviously do, but, you know, it is a hard story to sell.
I want to double-click on something that you said that was very interesting,
which if you had known the demand for the asset and for your fund,
you would have invested more money upfront.
What are those some low-hanging fruits that you could have invested money in
that would have helped you accelerate your franchise?
We would have put more on the operation side on our team,
just buy and selling actual assets is there is some operational intensity there that
if you have those resources internally, you just remove a lot of the friction of those
processes, just kind of explaining it in kind of mundane detail, right?
But like if you are buying a barrel from me, I have to get a sample set to you.
You have to agree that you like the sample.
Then we have to send you sale agreements, invoices, all these different things.
Then we work with the storage facility and a transfer over from my,
my account to your account. There's a lot of steps in the process that can just really slow things
down. If you don't have dedicated resources focused on that, that just kind of gets you stuck in the
muck a little bit. And we saw a lot of great buying opportunities. So if we had more capital and the
team to kind of execute operationally in the early years, we could have bought barrels at prices
that were attractive in the 2020 timeframe. And that would have set us up or even earlier.
that would have set up to have larger funds that had more barrels at better cost
basis for those funds.
What are some higher investments in technologies or things that you wish you would
have done fund one or fund two that now are painfully obvious and just accelerated your
franchise?
So behind the scenes, a lot of what we do from a valuation perspective and where we see
an intrinsic value of a barrel today and where that barrel is going to be valued in the future
is based on other factors that are going on around just the barrel itself, the inventory
that exists at that time, demand at that time, all these different things.
And had we brought the rigor in the very, very early days to identify how all those factors
interact, to get more precise on pricing, I think we could have been even more aggressive than
we ultimately were. So I think that would have been great. I think if we, then you build this
model that tells, gives you, gives you insights, but all models, right, across AI to Bourbon,
it's all about the input, right? What goes into the model? And so,
if we had spent more time working with some of our peers in the industry gathering data, too,
that would have fed the model and to be even more precise in the earlier days,
that would have been really interesting.
We have gobs of data now, right, over 10 years of operating,
but I think there could have been some interesting collaboration efforts with, you know,
there are tons of other players out there, but other players.
And that both of those things would have been something that if you had to do it over again,
I would have spent more time focusing on in those days.
What's the single best piece of advice or feedback that an LP has ever given you?
No one, no investors ever upset about returning, you returning their capital.
That was one of our investors.
I had a conversation with a family office that I've known for a really long time all the way back to my RBK days.
And I said, look, you know, we bought some of these barrels a year ago and we're getting offers to sell them and we get a nice IRA.
But, you know, I'm thinking about this from a multiple perspective.
and want to deliver on that side of it.
And the response was, you know, I understand what you're saying.
I think investors really do want multiples, right?
They want real dollars.
But if you see a good trade and you can return money to investors,
no one is going to look at you cross-sight for that.
No one is going to be upset about getting money back.
Now, I will say in the institutional world,
that it does become a problem sometimes, right?
Because you make an allocation, you go through a whole process to get approvals,
et cetera, and then all of a sudden the money comes back quicker
than you anticipated in a pacing study.
or what have you, then you have to go through and make a new allocation.
So it doesn't be a little bit balanced.
I think there's like an asterisk on that point.
I would even put it to the extreme.
I invested in a company seven, eight years ago.
It's not doing well to be nice.
And I found a way of secondary to get my investors back their money.
And I was very apologetic.
And I add multiple, especially the most,
the most institutional and most experienced LPs were like really cutting me on the back.
They're like, look, you don't get any economics here.
I really appreciate all the work that you did here.
So even when you return 1X over 7.
and eight years, especially in venture. And certainly that's not what you underwrite the investment
to. Even that itself could be a positive to your LPs. Yeah, 100%. And I was just at a conference earlier
this week. And this has been a theme in many of the conferences over the last, and just in the broader
kind of investment community about the tie of capital across investors in private equity and venture
and so forth. And that being a linchpin in the in the ecosystem here of we need that capital
to free up, to make new investments, to kind of keep the kind of machine running, and it's tied
up. So, you know, just getting that capital back can really be a good thing, even if you're not
maximizing returns to your point. There's something to be said for money back in your pocket.
I went to karaoke last night with 20 LPs, and without outing the LP, one of the LPs made a wrap
about DPI. So I think that's a good sign of where the LTE market is today. That's a, that's a
hidden town right there. It was a great, I'll keep them anonymous. It was a great, is a great,
a great wrap. How are you using AI today? One thing we're using it for is just broadening our reach
in terms of research on who our potential customers are on the barrel side, who our potential
counterparties are. You can do, you know, each barrel has what's called a mashville, which is
just essentially the recipe of proportions of grains, corn, wheat, rye, malted barley. And you can,
we've used, you know, AI to say, which brands are using this type of, of, of,
of liquid, right, of this type of bourbon. So you, we know many of these brands. We have
relationships with lots of them, but just there's, there's thousands of brands in the
U.S. United States, it's like 4,500 brands. And we don't have that reach, right? And you use those
tools to define that information and broaden that kind of outreach, looking at it from a trend
perspective to think about kind of how can we be thinking about what's coming next from a, from
the alcohol industry, right? If, if we would have been able to have been thinking about
this 10 years ago or maybe a little longer, somehow predicting hard sultures, right? Now we have
hard teas, all these different things. We continue to spend time talking about and toying with
AI to try to help us unearth some of those trends. Yeah, we're still trying to figure out how to best
incorporate AI. One thought experiment that we look at it as kind of a third person in the room.
You literally could turn on chat GPT while you're having a conversation, have chat GPT chime in
at the appropriate time, almost as a third partner as somebody that
that could provide more context. So it's still evolving every day. And as
AI gets better, I think that's going to evolve as well. So taking that step further,
using it as a contrarian kind of counterpoint. So kind of to do the third person point that
you're mentioning, but really, you know, when me, we haven't talked much about the other side of our
business on the brand side. But, you know, if we're making a business case that it's worth
making an investment in a particular brand, you can use AI to kind of poke holes, what aren't
me thinking about, what contradict or contest some of the points that we're making in, in our
assumptions here or in our business case.
So take it a little bit less personally when it's AI, person, individual.
Yeah, exactly.
Yes.
That's true, right?
You do get some group things sometimes as a team and people don't want to necessarily
always fight against someone who's super passionate about something.
And so you get an inanimate being, kind of being the one that says you guys are missing
something pretty glaring here.
That can be really useful.
Goes full circle to the incentives we talked about in the beginning of the interview.
Well, just I'm looking forward to continuing this conversation live.
And thanks for doing a full breakdown on the alcohol space and how you're going about investing.
Yeah, no, really enjoyed the time, Dave. Appreciate it. Thank you.
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