In Our Time - Garibaldi and the Risorgimento

Episode Date: December 1, 2016

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Italian Risorgimento. According to the historian AJP Taylor, Garibaldi was the only wholly admirable figure in modern history. Born in Nice in 1807, one of Garibaldi's aims in life was the unification of Italy and, in large part thanks to him, Italy was indeed united substantially in 1861 and entirely in 1870. With his distinctive red shirt and poncho, he was a hero of Romantic revolutionaries around the world. His fame was secured when, with a thousand soldiers, he invaded Sicily and toppled the monarchy in the Italian south. The Risorgimento was soon almost complete.This topic is the one chosen from over 750 different ideas suggested by listeners in October, for our yearly Listener Week.WithLucy Riall Professor of Comparative History of Europe at the European University Institute and Professor of History at Birkbeck, University of LondonEugenio Biagini Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of CambridgeandDavid Laven Associate Professor of History at the University of NottinghamProducer: Simon Tillotson.

Thanks for downloading this episode of In Our Time. There's a reading list to go with it on our website, and you can get news about our programs if you follow us on Twitter at BBC In Our Time. I hope you enjoy the programs. Hello, Giuseppe Garibaldi, according to the historian AJP Taylor, was the only holy admirable figure in modern history. Born in Nice in 1807, his life's goal was the unification of Italy, and in large part thanks to him,

Italy was indeed united substantially in 1861 and entirely in 1870. With his distinctive red shirt and poncho, he was a hero of romantic revolutionaries around the world. His fame was secured, wearing with merely a thousand soldiers, he invaded Sicily and toppled the monarchy in the Italian south. The resurgimento was soon almost complete. We're discussing this now, as in October we ask you to suggest to today's topic. This one came from David Rowe, James Roles, John Raymond, Smalia Beres and Vinit Cannon.

My thanks go to them to all of you for sending in more than 750 good ideas. With me to discuss Garibaldi and the Zorgimento are Lucy Ryle, Professor of Comparative History of Europe at the European University Institute and Professor of History at Birkbeck University of London, Eugenie, Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Cambridge, and David Levin, Associate Professor of History

at the University of Nottingham. Lucy Ryle, can you tell us something about Garibaldi's early life? Yeah, well, as you said, he's born in Nice, and his father was a merchant shipment, So he spent much of his early life in the Mediterranean, sailing around the Mediterranean. You mean sailing around as a seaman, not turning around for fun? Yeah, sailing around as a seaman, exactly. You're doing work.

So by the time he was a very young man, he knew a great deal of the Mediterranean. And what else? It was also there that he became politicised. One of his jobs with his father was to carry a group of political exiles from France to North Africa, and he was converted to a form of socialism by then. And it was in the Black Sea, in the port called Taganrog, that he was converted to the cause of Italian nationalism by a Maxinian, one of a group of revolutionary young men

working for the unification of Italy. Can you place Matzini for us? Because he was not a father figure, only two years older, but he had some sort of control over Garibaldi, particularly in the early days. Yeah, I mean, Maxini, yes, he wasn't much older, but he was a father figure in a sense to all of them. Matzini was the man who made romantic nationalism, which hitherto had only really existed in literature

and in poetry, into a political movement. And he was also, I think perhaps the most important thing for us nowadays is that he had an extraordinary gift for publicity. So he was the man who really spread the word of Italian nationalism and the idea of a unified Italy throughout Europe. and particularly to Britain and made it as popular as it was. Because the media's coming up then, isn't it, very fast?

We have the big reporting on the Crimean War and the American Civil War and so on. So this is later on in our story, but still that's around and ready to go. It's starting in the 1830s, and Maxini perceives its importance almost immediately. It's a moment of revolution, both in reading, people are becoming more and more literate

and also in print. So there's more and more newspapers being printed with a wider and wider circulation. And he formed this group, the young Italians were they called, and we think that Garibaldi joined it? I think, yes, Garibaldi did join them in one way or another. And what did he do? What did he do?

He was essentially told by Maxini to, or by Maxinians, to join the Piedmontese Navy. And when the revolution broke out in, well, it was supposed to break out in 1833, he was supposed to lead a rebellion against the Piedmontese Navy. And, yeah, that was supposed to be a huge revolution in Piedmont, which actually never took place. But he was sent into it, he went into exile, he fled because he was,

can you tell us why Gary Bould, at quite a young age, left Italy and for a very long time, for 14 years? Well, he fled immediately to avoid arrest, and then later, because there was a sentence of death imposed upon him, because he was in fact a deserter from the Piedmontese Navy. He went first to Marseille, and then in 1834 went to South America, landing in Rio. So really the reason he went there, I think above all, was money. There was no money to be made in Marseille. There was a great deal of money to be made in South America.

But once he arrived in South America, he got caught up with, again, a lot of Maxenians who were already in exile, and this extraordinary generation of Argentinian exiles, who really kind of became also the founding fathers of modern Argentina. And I think he might have spent the rest of his life there, had it not been for... Can we just stay there for a moment? There was involved in a lot of fighting guerrilla warfare there,

and we're told that he learned a lot about guerrilla warfare, particularly there. He learned about guerrilla warfare there. He also learned how to ride a horse, which was extremely important. So, yes, South America was extremely significant for Gary Baldy, but I actually think more than just the fighting was actually the particular way he became politicised and the way he adopted in South America a very distinctive political style.

What was that? It was that of the gaucho or the South American cowboy. So the image that we have of Gary Baldy, the man with the poncho and the red shirt and the long flowing hair, that's really all developed in and borrowed from his politicisation in South America. David Luteman, was he thought of as a good leader of guerrilla warfare?

He gains an incredible reputation and one of the striking things is this is a time when Italian nationalism is beginning to kick off as a much wider movement within the different states of Italy because of course it's completely disunited and he gains his incredible reputation in his fighting in Latin America

and one of the interesting things about that is that Matt Zini begins to recognise that in Garibaldi there is a heroic military figure So it's not... At that distance from... 14 years and across the world of sea. Yep. Yep. And from 43 onwards, I think, Matzini, Lucy, that's right, 43.

Matzini begins to think of Garibaldi as a possible person who can be exploited by the patriotic revolutionary movement in Italy as this sort of heroic dashing figure, but also someone who has genuine military experience. Does he summon him back in 1848? Does Garibald himself want to come back to Italy in 1848? Garibaldi starts thinking about going back to Italy before. 1848, that when he's in Latin America and news is getting across the Atlantic, and it's quite

clear from 1846 onwards that there are changes afoot in Italy. In 1846, the key change is that a new Pope has been elected, past the 9th, who is mistakenly believed to be a Patriot Pope, who seems to be a performer, who seems to be someone who would like to see a greater degree of Italian unification. He picks up on the ideas of Piedmontese political thinker called Giberti, who says that Italy can be redeemed through papal leadership. Fuse that with an economic crisis, which is making people much more agitated. There are real problems, not just in Italy, but across Europe from 1845-46 onwards. And it's clear that there is the possibility of political change. When Garibaldi actually sets out from Latin America.

He's not quite sure what's going on in Italy. And actually, he arrives back in Italy a bit surprised to discover quite how dramatic and faster changes have been. It's remarkable, isn't it, though, that Massini should keep an eye on him for 14 years. He hadn't done a great deal before he went, and not only keeps an iron in,

but he's the man he wants to bring back. It isn't odd, but it is remarkable. Can you just say a bit more about that? But it's not just Matsini. I mean, it's interesting how this is percolating into the press. What's percolating? The actions of the so-called Italian Legion that's fighting in these fairly regular conflicts. Lucy, I think, is probably the expert on this.

I want to stay with you for a moment. But the Italian Legion is fighting in South America. Yeah. And so he comes back in 1848 and ready for action. Yeah. What role did he play in that action? What was the action? Well, the first thing he does is,

He'd said, I think, in 47, that he'd support anyone who'd bring Italian unification. He'd fight for the devil if the devil would bring Italian unification. And he offers himself, first of all, in a sense, to the devil, because it's Carlo Alberto of Piedmont, who has started fighting the Austrians. And Carlo Alberto basically says, we don't want him. And then he looks around, and he thinks of going to fight with the Venetian Republic against the Austrians. he ends up going to Milan,

organises the defence of Bergamo, a smallish-lombard town, ends up campaigning around Lake Maggiore. But the interesting thing about this is at that time, he is one of a number of volunteer leaders. Let's cut to Rome. When the siege of Rome was very important in the whole operation, what part did he play in that? Well, in November 1848,

Piers and Ninth Prime Minister, Pellegrino, Rossi is assassinated, at which point Pious flees Rome. And Rome becomes the centre of, essentially of the Italian revolutions. It becomes the centre of democratic revolutionary movements in Italy. A government is established early in 1849, which is the Roman Republic, with notionally under triumvirate, but really Matzini is the driving force. And very quickly, the French, with their new president, Lou Napoleon Bonaparte, who's the nephew of Napoleon in the first, send troops and to overthrow that republic.

And Gadiabaldi ends up as the person who's in charge of the defence of Rome. And he defends the Rome. The French are expected to walk in and take it over like tomorrow morning, and he holds them up for three months. During that three months, a lot of reporters and writers who are penned into Rome say what a heroic figure he is fighting for unification

and this gets around and enhances his reputation massively. Well, first of all, he is heroic. I'm just trying to get a move on. And secondly, he then retreats from Rome, and that's really where I think the great myth of Gadibaldi comes. Why is it a myth? Well, myth is probably the wrong word. Okay, the great legend of Gadibaldi is probably the best way of putting it.

Because on his retreat from Rome, he's trying to go and help the Venetians, and one of the great things that happens in that in terms of the reputation is that his pregnant Latin American wife Anita dies. And so he's not just a heroic warrior. he's also the grieving widower. Nevertheless, Eugenie, he loses Rome, as it were. He is still holding on. We put a hold on to this idea of trying to unify Italy at not all costs,

but almost all costs. He's now on one side and now on the other. There's now a monarchist, now a republican, it's now for the peasants, it's now for the gentry, anything. It seems, from a reading, that he'll go almost anywhere to get his main goal. What were his political aims after Rome? What did he do after he lost Rome, as it were?

Yes, it's a very good question because follows on from what David was saying. 1849 is the defeat of the liberal revolutions throughout Europe, from Hungary to Paris and everywhere else. But the remarkable thing is that Garibaldi was not captured or was not killed. So it is as if it becomes the hope, the revolutionary hope, or the democratic hope of Europe are surviving the odds. and of course simultaneously Matsini made was actually allowed to leave Rome undisturbed.

So the focus on these two leaders, and particularly Lungaribaldi, becomes increased by the general sense of defeat and despair. And it becomes, for the next generation, like the ongoing hope of anybody who had invested in the idea of liberal and democratic reforms around the world. He said earlier on he was prepared to,

for anybody who would be against the Austrians or for Italian independence. But in fact, from the beginning, it's closely associated with democracy. To begin with, of course, he is born under the French Empire and there is a long traditional revolutionary propaganda and debate in the area. Second, is politicised by Matsini, who is committed to ideas of democracy from the start. And third, of course, experience in Latin America. America is experience in a country within which democracy is taken for granted, while everybody, everywhere else in the world, except the United States and Switzerland,

democracy was a bad word. It was up to the 1870s, was just unacceptable, like communism or Bolshevism for a later generation. So basically, sorry. Sir. Sir. Massively popular in mind in America from early days. It's popular because of his association with this internationalist.

democratic campaign, which seems to know boundaries and seems to embody these different ideals of fraternity across national divides. And in a way, part of his success is that he believes in it, consistently fighting for it throughout his life. We have to... Matzini at this time is in London, isn't he? He's escaped and he's settled in London,

and he settles in it for a very long time, and he swings the British liberals behind the Italian unification course. Correct. It must be said that the British liberalists did not need much help to be swung behind the Italian unification. A previous generation of Charles James Fox had been indoctrinated, so to speak, by Hugo Foskolo, who was an Italian patriot and former Jacobin, who settled in London as well. And he basically gravitated in the circles of Holland House and the wigs,

who were at the time, before the 1830. to Reform Act, they were the focus of liberal political thinking. But Garibald, as you said, disappeared out of Rome and then he went into another exile, and we have four years of further what we could call exile, where he's seen here, there, and everyone could in Liverpool and Staten

Ireland, and then he works in the Pacific on a boat for two years. And then come, is that significant in his life? Well, it is significant because it's part of his life, but apart from anything else is significant. Yes, it is significant because it has a sense of global understanding to his career

and to his commitment to the struggle for democracy I was talking about. The vein of the Italians was at the time and perhaps since parochialism, campanilism, focused on narrow interests locally defined. Garibald is the opposite from the start. First of all, his emergency man in the Mediterranean,

then he espouses his idea of global democracy and third, during the second exile, is further exposed to wider influences. He seems to come back, Lucia Rale. He comes back at very significant times. First time he comes back and goes for Rome. And the second time he comes back in 1859 and the Second Italian War of Independence.

What brought him back then? Well, he was already back. He'd come back in the mid-1850s. But I think you're right, actually, to point that eye. I mean, I think there was a kind of idea about Garibardi that he's a bit of political, naive and politically innocent. I don't think he is at all. I mean, he stayed away.

He disappeared into the Pacific, partly to make money, but partly because he knew things had gone really wrong and he didn't want to have anything to do with it. He comes back because he knows that times are changing. And it is no, it's not luck that he finds himself in 1858, 59, ready there when things start changing again. So he's there, and he's backed by Matzini, who's in London. So what are the other leaders of the unification? thinking about this man coming in?

He's not entirely backed by Madsini by this stage. He's slightly broken with him and he's trying to make a deal with... The problem about this programme is about 17 states, countries trying to get in. But we will get through. It's complicated, absolutely. What he's trying to do is make a deal with the Prime Minister of Piedmont and the state of Piedmont to support Italian unification. And that's what he's really doing in 1859.

The problem in 1859 with this war that's breaking... out is that the Prime Minister of Pei Mont Cavour, who is an important figure to remember, thinks he can use Garibaldi to whip up nationalist support, and Garibaldi and the nationalists think they can use Caval. So the scene is already set in 1859 for a bit of a misunderstanding and political tension between them. The interesting thing once again is that he comes back after four years away. It's quite a long time, isn't it, in politics or anything? He's been in the Pacific, so he hasn't exactly been in radio contact any kind of. with what's going on, and immediately he's right at the front of it.

Yeah, because partly by being away, he has carefully added to his myth. I mean, I think that we have to remember that there's nothing spontaneous about the legend of Garibaldi. Its success is partly because it appears spontaneous, but it's actually quite carefully orchestrated by him and by others around him. How do you orchestrate something like that from the Pacific? Well, you can orchestrate it by not being there, by disappearing, by being backstage

and you can have friends in America and in Europe who are writing articles in the press. You said earlier about the press. The press is there absolutely, you know, frantic for news of Garibaldi. I see. David, David Lavin. So he comes back in, and then there's the great invasion of Sicily

with a thousand revolutionary troops. Now, he went there thinking is going to be a martyr because there was supposed to be 100,000 troops defending Sicily. He took his thousand there. Why did he go? Well, there are a number of reasons.

He'd already fought in 1859 alongside the Piedmontese. He's very upset because the Piedmonties hand over his birthplace and Savoy to the French in exchange for military support. And he initially thinks he's going to go and seize Nice, where he's actually just been elected MP. He's dissuaded from doing this. Here's about a revolution that's going on in Sicily and thinks he's going to hijack that. So he set sail with two commandeered boats to try and land on Sicily and take advantage of the fact that the Sicilians are. rebellion, which they do all the time against Neopolden rule. He's very lucky. I mean, this incredible, this incredible year in 1860 is in part based on

Gadibaldi's skill and is in part based on good luck. He could very well have been sunk by the European's... He could all be sunk on boats, but he wasn't and he got there. And how did he win? Well, he won in part because the Bourbon forces in Sicily were completely inept. I mean, it's not just Gadibaldi is a very able military leader. Sure, it's all in great odds. They've got to be very, very, very, very, very... Well, you've got a thousand men initially, you've got a thousand men initially against about 25,000, but he also whips up an existing Sicilian revolution against Neapolitan rule. Virginia, you want to come?

Yes, the reason why he wins, just to expand on what David was saying, is actually that the Neapolitan, the army or the king of the two Sicilis, feared the peasants more than they feared Garibaldi. So, for example, a calataphimini, which is the key initial bachel. where Garibaldi could have been destroyed. Only half of the available troops are deployed against Garibaldi. They have very good troops, and they fight very well. But the key decision which should have been taken by any general

to deploy the rest of the troops when the Garibaldians were in difficulty is not taken because they are guarding off the retreat of this army against the peasants who are surrounding the battlefield and sitting on the hills with their shotguns, ready to jump on them if there is a chance. To be a fear of a revolution is what paralyzes the Neapolitans. You had your hand up, Mr. Well, I think there are two other things, actually.

First of all, by May 1860 when Garibadi arrives, the Bourbon state in Sicily has collapsed. There is no communication across the island. All of the local governments have collapsed. So it's kind of become a failed state in Sicily by this stage. And the second reason, it's not just about him landing. That is, as David said, partly to do with luck. But there is an moment.

that he lands, there's an enormous groundswell of support. So volunteers are rushing in from all over Italy and actually from all over Europe by this state. So the army is swelling daily with people. And one of the fascinating things about that is that you do get, I mean, British, Hungarian volunteers fighting alongside these red shirts. And it's part, I think, of this sort of internationalisation that this is not just about creating United Italy. It's about the possibility to make a fundamental change in European politics. But I think one of the sad things is in a sense that Garibaldi's desire to create a united Italy

trumps the possibility to do something really interesting in the south of Italy. He makes himself dictator of Sicily, and he resists Kavar's attempts to take over that revolution. But at the same time, his eyes are on the bigger goal of Italian unity rather than using possibly introducing democracy in the South. Well, there are two things to be said, following from what David was saying. The first is that 1860 is the beginning of the undoing of 1849.

He said earlier on 1849 is the defeat to reform in Europe. From 1860 onwards, you have a series of decisive developments, first in Italy, then the American Civil War, which is the great turning point for democracy worldwide. Then, of course, there is a Reform Act in Britain, revolutions and reforms in the United States. the Russian Empire and so on and so forth. And it's not surprising that all these volunteers

see the Italian battlefield as the battlefield for this global idea of democracy or reform they have in mind. But the other thing to be said is that effectively the possibilities of the options open to Garibald in Sicily were limited by the social contesting which he operated. Social revolution was the one thing which would have destroyed

this new wave of Republican or liberal or democratic reforms and he couldn't afford it. Lucy, is there a sense in which at this stage he's moving there's an idea that we'll get unification and therefore democracy follows. Does he have to choose?

Look, I've got to go for unification even though democracy might follow. Well, that was the lesson of 1848-49 that they all learned, perhaps erroneously, that they couldn't actually have democracy if they didn't have unification because unification made them stronger.

And that made all the Democrats, but Garibaldi in particular, do this deal with liberal, monarchical Piedmont. And I think it was a, it was a grave error, fundamentally. On whose part? On Gary Valdi's part

and on those Democrats who were with him. Can you clarify? I didn't quite get it. It was the era to think that they could actually do a deal with Piedmont. With the King of Piedmont. With the King of Piedmont,

particularly with the Prime Minister of Piedmont, who was the real power. and then control him. But of course, once they've done a deal with someone like Kavur, Kavu basically controls them. Very briefly, as Alexandra Herzl, the Russian populist, pointed out, the lesson of 48 was that political division did not make for military abilities to survive. So survival on the battlefield standing up against the Austrians of the French was the key reason why all these people sacrificed democracy to unification.

We're on the battlefield, Lucy, and he's on the battlefield, Lucy, won this glorious war, however accidental, and not accidental, but however much of a pushover it might have seemed later and later. But then he went there, I sailed out, the world knew, because the press was, he was a hero, he was getting beyond any criticism, wasn't he? He was a living legend, that sort of thing. It then went, he took the kingdom of Naples, and so he's got the south, as it were. What stops him just marching north and taking the lot?

Well, that's a really big question that no one has quite understood. It, partly he's under enormous pressure within his own party, some of whom are actually working for Kavur to do a deal. Sorry, with Piedmont. Not everybody knows Piedmont. With Piedmont. And partly because he thinks that unification is the only thing that matters. So when the Piedmontese army marches south, he reckons that to come to agreement with them and actually unify Italy is more important. and that the following year

they'll actually finish off the unification of Italy and turn to democracy. They have this phrase, it was Danieli Manina, Venetian Democrat, who says, give us unity and we will get the rest. And they think they're going to get the rest after they've unified Italy.

But it's a mistake because at the moment that he's given his army over to the king of Piedmont, he's basically lost his force. I'd like that one step back, here with David, David Lavin. He's taken, he's got the south of Italy and he's

having, is his view of what he wants clear to them? Do they know what they've let themselves in for? I don't think it's clear and if you look at, as Lucy said, if you look at the camp of his supporters, they're incredibly divided too. I mean, within Sicily, there are people who want

Sicilian autonomy. They're not Italian nationalist. What they really want is they get rid of the rule of Naples, they might have rule from Turin, but basically they want autonomy. And they're largely centered in Palermo. There are people in the east of Sicily who so dislike the Palamitani that they're saying, actually we want a much stronger national state because that will limit the power of Palermo. So these little internal divisions, which Eugenio has mentioned, which bedevil Italian politics, are already surfacing while his dictator of Sicily.

There are ideological divisions between federalists and people who want a sort of Matsenian unified Republic and people who say let's do a deal with Piedmont. So I think there's a lot for Garibaldi, who is much more astute a politician than many people giving credit for. Yeah, Lucy's point to that out. But he's nevertheless faced with a remarkably

difficult situation to manage in the South. And I think what he really wants to do is fight the wars of unification. Can we talk about this non-battle because the Piedmontese thought the only way to stop him getting to Rome and taking everything over from his point of view, Gary Baldy.

which they was to send an army against him. Now, that battle didn't take place, but he met the heads of the penit and came to a deal. Can you just tell us about the deal he came to and what the implication of that was? Yes, you.

Well, the implication of the deal, which was basically the leader of democratic Italy as he was perceived at the time, and the leader of monarchist and aristocratic Italy, as the king was, met each of them on a horse, shook hands, then the two arms marched together, although observers noted how South and Garibaldi looked

afterwards. What did he give him up? He was giving up, effectively, the possibility of establishing a democratic system in the South. Why did he give it up? I mean, he had the momentum, didn't they? Going back to this point, but let us bear in mind at the time, democracy is really a very untested and tried political system. There are no democracies in the world, except the United States.

which is fighting a civil war. Switzerland is very small and nothing else. So the idea he could establish democracy was rather anachronistic. But I think we also need to recognize it was Gary Valdi's greatest defeat. He was simply outmaneuvered by the Pied Montees and by Kavour in particular.

He trusted Kavour and the king that they would actually... Yeah, he put his trust in the wrong people. What he did do thereafter was, however, quite remarkable is that he left on a ship from Naples back to his island home looking extraordinarily heroic

with only as a story goes a bag of potatoes for his garden so he leaves a kingdom with having gained nothing so what he does manage to do which is extremely important having suffered this serious defeat is leave with his reputation not only intact but entirely enhanced so the heroic myth of Garibaldia has this kind of honest gentleman farmer

that actually you started with AJP Taylor, you know, the only honest man. It actually comes after having suffered this terrible defeat, being able to leave the stage with dignity. Well, I don't leave the stage yet because there's an awful lot of stuff to get through. David, you're going to. And the point is that's a global reputation.

For example, when he visits England in 1864, the biggest crowds that have ever been seen are for Gadibaldi. He, both sides in the Americans for the War, ask if he'll be a general for them. So it's not just that reputation is existing within Italy, but it's global, and that is going to help the Italian cause a lot. So he seems to come in, do something extraordinary decisive, changes things, then goes away again.

Yeah, I think what people who were with him find incredibly frustrating is that he has absolutely no time for meetings and committees. He doesn't like that. He's not that kind of politician. He's one of those politicians who strikes a pose, you know, does something great and then goes away again. I'm interested in what you said about him looking very sad when he came away from that meeting,

which in fact was the handshake which led to the unification of Italy. In a sense, he's got what he wanted. Why is he looking sad? Because democracy was lost. But as I said earlier on, this was anachronistic at the time. Certainly in Italy were places. In fact, in America, civil wars was going to start right then. And the choice he said to be made,

whether the new state would survive or whether it would collapse into another civil war, which would have been devastating. The primacy of foreign policy is another dimension of his political acumen which must be borne in mind. He realized that the major powers were looking on and although Austria was temporarily defeated

and the Russians were sort of not involved, the situation could change any time. It was important to grasp the opportunity and settle down the new state before something happened. We must make it quite clear that Italy at this stage isn't entirely united and there's Rome still and there's the Pope. Now the Pope has been a difficulty all along. He hates Garibaldi and more importantly

he's got the following of Catholics and the Catholics are huge and also right across Europe are against Garibaldi because the Pope says they've got to be against Garibaldi. Now how do they nullify the Pope? Well, I think this is the key reason. If we think why the Piedmontese march south, it's not just to stop democracy. It's also to prevent Garibaldi possibly marching

on Rome. That would have alienated Catholic opinion across the whole of Europe, but more than that, there is still a garrison, a French garrison defending the Pope at that moment. So if Galeigh had marched on Rome, he'd have been attacking the army of Napoleon III, and then the French, who are not entirely comfortable about the creation of an Italian state, could very easily have marched into Italy. They'd have defeated the Italian army with no difficulty at all, and you would have actually had a French imposed territorial settlement in Italy. Just a little bit of background here. I mean, for the Madsenians and for Garibaldi, the God is fine. They all believe in God. What they don't believe in are priests. And of course, you know, the worst priest of all is the Pope. So the hierarchy of the Catholic Church is what they're so opposed to. But then the other problem is that, as you said, their great rival in Italy is the Catholic Church. And the Catholic Church is a global force. So it's not actually that the Pope hates Garibaldi. is actually that Gary Bardi hates the Pope because the Pope's really the enemy. And as time goes on, he increasingly argues that the real reason why Italy is not renewed,

it does not become democratic, does not become this new Italy that they'd all dreamed of, is because of the corrupting influence of the Catholic Church. So the church is absolutely fundamental to this story. Very briefly, just to follow on, we should be reminded that it does not necessarily hate priests. Lots of priests joined the Garibaldi expeditions and the army. The Catholic Church is not so monolithic as people may

believe at this point in time. There are Curé Rouge as they were in the French Revolution that is red priests or Republican priests. Throughout the period well until probably 1870 if not later. And of course as soon as this oppressive understanding that the Catholic Church is

incompatible with democracy is set aside, democracy within the Catholic Church can come to the forefront again. So it's not incompatibility in principle. He said the Pope has been caught up in international politics and he believes his survival is incompatible with Italian unification. You of course absolutely right, you genuinely, but in truth, the rhetoric, the propaganda is that it's the priests that are the problem.

So that's a straightforward of that. You just said the Pope was the problem. Well, the priests and the Pope at the top of the priest. It's the whole Catholic hierarchy. That's the problem. And what you have this, you rightly said, Italy is still not united. There's still Venice and Venetian and Friuli up in the north, which is still part of the Habsburg Empire,

and there is the rump of the papal states, with this French garrison protecting it. And I think the key thing with Garibaldi is that he's still thinking, what can I do to get those remaining bits? So there are conspiracies to try and attack the Hapsburg territories, and twice in 1862 and 1867, Garibaldi makes attempts to seize Rome. and 1862 is striking because yet again

the people who prevent him seizing Rome are the regular Italian army he's wounded and there is a clash I mean it's a tiny clash but the army comes in and prevents him 1867 his troops actually managed to get into the papal states and the result of that is that the French army which are briefly being pulled out

although they'd left people who were really French soldiers masquerading as volunteers for the Pope the French army is summoned back and the French are putting down a marker, you don't touch the Pope. So where are we now? 1867, I beg, I'm trying to think where to go now. But has he left now?

As he left the field? Is he off to his up to his... He spends... Put aside his... He's done a Cincinnati. He's... He's done a Cincinnati. He's...

He spends most of his time from 1860 other than this dramatic, these dramatic attempts to seize Rome in 1862 and 1867, and this extraordinary visit to London about which we could do a whole programme. Other than that, he's essentially on this little island off the north coast of Sardinia, tending his farm, which I think has two effects.

One, it adds to his myth as this gentleman farm as Cincinnati. But it also functions as a kind of backstage where he can see people, they can come and go as they please and they can hatch all of this. He builds a massive political alliance from that island. And of course what that shows is that in the more, modern world that's being created in the 1860s, you no longer have to be at the center of power, to be powerful. So Capreira, which is the name of this island, is actually really quite significant for him.

Now that Italy is united, and we're just about holding Venice, thank you David, and the Pope has come on, what's their place among the nations of Europe? Does it begin to exert itself as a national power? He does very rapidly. First of all, it must be bear in mind that when we speak of sovereignty, especially in these prexit, which never understand, which we should always understand it was never full sovereignty. For example, Italy was part of an international network of capitalist countries depended on international credit and so on and so forth. Having said so, it is much more assertive and able to decide its own future than ever before,

ever before for centuries, in fact. And it strikes very interesting international commercial treaties with various powers the political elite turns out to be quite sophisticated, for example, the 1863 free trade or commercial treaty with Britain, the Italian diplomat south manoeuvre of the British, which is quite extraordinary by any standard. I want to ask, I'll come to you in one moment there, because a particular question I want to ask you,

but how essential do you think, Lucy, was Gary Baudy to the unification of Italy? I think it's impossible to imagine that unification of Italy without Gary Valdi. I mean, the invasion of Sicily in 1860, the successful invasion was the key to changing dramatically the geography of the Italian peninsula. But I also think symbolically, so not just militarily, but also symbolically, he is really the one figure that comes to stand for, signify Italy for the whole world. and it's his remarkable capacity for political mobilisation through the use of his figure,

whether it's people rushing to join up and fight with him, whether it's journalists writing in favour of the Unification of Italy represented by Garibaldi, or whether it's actually people giving money because a great deal of money pours in, actually from England in particular, all of this kind of popularity, this idea that, idea that the unification of Italy is somehow

unstoppable, inevitable. That's in many ways unimaginable without Garivaldi. David, David, now, do you think that the unification, that what he did, turned out to be a good thing for Italy? No. And this is where I probably disagree with the other

two. If you just look at what the history of the Italian state in the 1860s, the first thing is that almost immediately in the south, you end up with a horrible civil war. They label it brigandage, but actually you have a broad coalition of Catholics,

of people who are loyal to the Bourbons. The Bourbons carry on fighting until March 1861. So there's a horrible civil war in the south, so that's no good. 100,000 troops. 1866, there's a war to try and get back Venetia where the massive investment in a new Italian fleet gets sunk by basically wooden boats commanded by the Austrian. So dreadnoughts are battle cruises, metal

cruisers, steel battles cruises are sunk by the Austrian fleet. humiliating, really humiliating. And while that war is being fought, what happens in Sicily, there's a rebellion against the new Italian state. So it doesn't work in the short term, in the longer term, though, briefly, because I think the other two are making to get in.

I think it's very striking that, for example, when the First World War breaks out, the Italians are probably the least patriotic nation in Europe. Lucy. I mean, I think, obviously, David has been looking forward to this for three quarters of an hour. he didn't think Italy was, United Italy was a good thing. I think it was neither a good thing or a bad thing.

I don't think it's really the role of historians to judge. It happened. It's our job to understand why it happened. But I would say about the civil war in the South that there was a civil war going on in the South before Italian unification. They just inherited it. So I think this, it was a very nasty war,

but it was one of the reasons why Italy was unified. It's one of the reasons why Gary Bardi was able to walk in there so very easily because there was already a civil war. Indeed, not only in Sicily but also in Latin, in southern Italy, the continental part of southern Italy. And furthermore, the remarkable thing is the resilience of the new country and the extent to which the separatist option was ruled out very rapidly. David was referring to a civil war. In fact, it is a social war because the elite abandoned the monarchies, the Bourbon cause almost immediately.

All along the line, the army officers, The Navy officers, where in the Italian Navy Alista, they are former Bourbon officers, and indeed the civil servants, only the peasants are left on their own, for reasons which have nothing to do with the Italian unification. It is about resistance to the draft, it's about taxation, and it's about disappointment with lack of democracy in Palermo, particularly. Sorry, David, there isn't even time for a full stop. I'm very sorry to that.

Thank you very much to you. David Levin to Lucy Royal. Virginia will be a genie. Next week, we'll be just talking about how I'm written Martinot, one of the most prolific and influential writers in the 19th century, and called by some of the mother of sociology, and thank you very much for listening. And the In Our Time podcast gets some extra time now with a few minutes of bonus material from Melvin and his guests. Would you like to hear something about the way the new state was organised?

Yeah, anything you want to say. Well, to begin with, it is a constitutional monarchy. it has a parliament consisting of two chambers, a Senate appointed by the King, and a chamber of deputies elected on a property qualification, which is quite restrictive, about 418,000 electors in 1861 out of 22 million people, which is, however, 8,000. 22 million, which is 8% of the adult male population, comparable to the electorate in Belgium or France at the same period.

below parliament there is a pyramid of representative government the main institutions are the provinces and the communes or municipalities each of them has its own council elected elected on property qualifications but interestingly on a lower qualification so you have only five lire per year as a tax requirement to be an elector for small community in context of 40 lilleera per year for the parliament. And the system

is basically the same ever since that is why it may be relevant in the run-up to the referendum at the weekend. We can say relevant on this. We don't like relevant on the main programme. Can I cut in there though? You've said about how the Italian elites immediately buy into

this new state. For 500 years, Italian elites have been buying into new states. They want to defend their own position. So what happens when there's a change in regime, when Napoleon arrives or when the Austrians arrive, the elites get on overwhelmingly with collaborating with those new states. And I think what we see with Italian unification is not that suddenly all these elites are converted to Italian unity. What they think is that's the new order of things. We get on with it. We're not going to kick against this because we'll have Pied Montes-Bersilli

Lieder kicking down the front door. We want to keep our lands. We want to keep our positions of authority, we want access to government power and patronage, and therefore we buy into the idea of Italy. The peasants are the people who remain who suffer invariably in these situations. And I think

the great tragedy about Gadi is what he did in 1960 was there was the chance, but even when he's in Sicily, his already jockeying, he's thinking I could play the peasant card, but actually the gentry are going to be more useful. for me and I think Garibaldi sells out.

I disagree with that. Not only the elite buy into it, but in fact the working class too, the next challenge of the state does not come from separatism from the socialist party. And that is where from then on the challenge to or the demand for social reform or justice

as proceeded from a unitary political organisation of the left which is now fragmented as it is in many other countries, but up to the 1990s who strongly dominated by national political parties, a socialist and economists. Can we actually go back to the point

about the peasants being sold out by Gary Valdia and actually about the elites because I think you both got it wrong. First of all, actually, it isn't that he sells out the peasants in 1860, it's that actually it's impossible in a way to integrate them in to the event. I mean, wherever, where do they do that

anywhere in Europe in this period? There's nowhere where they do this. The peasants are screwed, if I may say that, on the BBC throughout the 19th century. This is not quite dubious here. This is a podcast, so it's okay. I didn't use the word screwed. Can I finish, actually?

And, you know, what the lessons that they had learned from the 1820 and the 1848 revolutions is that if they actually allow the peasants to take part in social revolution, the elite abandon the revolution, and they're terrified of that. But Gary Valdi actually does try to introduce a really sweeping measure of land reform. It doesn't succeed because they actually don't have the bureaucracy

to implement it. but there is actually a willingness to benefit the peasantry and to integrate the peasantry into the southern army. So I think that's actually wrong. I think that's a kind of southernist myth that you're actually spouting there, David.

But the second thing I'd say actually about the elites, I think both of you have underestimated the difficulty of integrating the elites into the new system. Actually, one of the problems is, is that, you know, the Tuscan elite, the Neapolitan elite, the Palermo elite, the Umbrian elite.

They don't actually really want to have anything to do with the new Italy. And in order to integrate them into the new political system, they have to be bought off. Thereby you get corruption and clientilism, which in many ways is the pain still of Italian political life. This is very striking because in Venice, for example, which is the city I work on, the elites, after unification,

it's almost impossible to get anyone to stand for Parliament. They tolerate the new system. They do quite well, Anthony. system, but they won't buy into it. And it's not really until the 1880s, 1890s, that you get Venetians who are prepared to actually stay. Now, about the elite, it is interesting. Perhaps talk across purposes,

there is the development of a bureaucracy, which is national, consisting, for example, of school teachers, consisting of employees or clerks in local administrations, and consisting of police officers, and a totally new career pattern of social mobility opens up in this way. They are the elite which bring the country.

country together. And let us remember, in 1915 to 18, the country fought the First World War quite successfully without disintegrating. It disintegrated, paradoxical enough, after 20 years of fascist regime in 1943, for totally different reasons. Yes, I mean, I think that you're right, actually, Eugene, you to point out that the fact that despite all of this bad reputation, the Italian state survives and continues to survive, and that's actually very important. And also that there is this kind of negative narrative about Italy and United Italy, which is a very easy narrative. It's very, very easy to say what's wrong with Italy, and much more difficult to say what's right with Italy. But in this kind of rather shoddy world that emerges in 1860, there is one

person who continues to survive or emerge with his reputation intact, and it is Gary Baldy. And that's really one of the most remarkable things about him. And indeed, again to this day Garibaldi, it's very difficult to say anything bad about Garibaldi when I wrote this book trying to show how his reputation was artificially constructed. People were

extremely hostile. And of course, what you have in the 20th century, which is an incredible testament to his power, is you actually have two Garibaldives, at least two Garibaldi's emerging as a kind of myth in Italy. One is the fascist, monarchical, right-wing Gary Baldy, and the other one is the left-wing

sort of socialist Republican Garibaldi. It's not for nothing that the communist partisans call themselves the Garibaldi brigades. In the Second World War. In the Second World War. Well, I think we're Garibalded up. For this point, because it's all very much the second time. You're being offered you can't refuse here.

It's tea or coffee and we don't eat fiscuit. There are many more history and discussion programmes from Radio 4 to download for free. Find these on the website at BBC.co.com.uk. I'll.