In Our Time - The Jacobite Rebellion

Episode Date: May 8, 2003

Melvyn Bragg and guests discusses the Jacobite Rebellion. In the summer of 1745, a young man in a small French frigate landed on the West Coast of Scotland. It was Bonnie Prince Charlie who began his campaign to become king of Scotland and England. He had seven followers amongst his shipmates and took to the Highlands to raise an army from the Scottish clans: “The Highland clans with sword in hand Frae John o Groats tae AirlieHae tae a man declared to standOr fa wi Royal Charlie”.Or so the old Jacobite song goes. But why was the latest scion of the Stuart dynasty such a favourite with the Scottish Highlanders? And did Bonnie Prince Charlie ever have a real chance of gaining the throne of England? With Murray Pittock, Professor of English Literature at the University of Strathclyde; Stana Nenadic, Senior Lecturer in Social History at Edinburgh University; Allan Macinnes, Burnett-Fletcher Professor of History at Aberdeen University.

This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK. Thanks for downloading the In Our Time podcast. For more details about In Our Time and for our terms of use, please go to BBC.co.com.uk forward slash radio four. I hope you enjoy the programme. Hello, in the summer of 1745, a young man in a small French frigate landed on the west coast of Scotland. He had seven followers, some of them Irish, among his shipmates,

and took to the Highlands to raise an army from the Scottish clans. the Highland Clans with sword in hand for a John Ogrotster Ehrlich, had Tehrman declared to stand or four We're Royal Charlie, or so one of the old Jacobite songs goes. But why was the Lace's sign of the Stuart dynasty such a favourite with the Scottish Highlanders? Did Bonnie Prince Charlie ever have a real chance

of gaining the throne of England? Was the decision taken at Derby one of the most important in British history? And what were the consequences of the last invasion of England and the last battle on British soil? With me to discuss Charles Edward's Stuart and the Jacobite rising of 1745,

Alan McKinness, Professor of History at Aberdeen University, Murray Pittock, Professor of English Literature at the University of Strathclyde, and Starner Nenaditch, Senior Lecturer in Social History at Edinburgh University. Alan McKinness, there were five risings between 1689 and 1745, when Charles Edward Stewart launches his campaign. What were the other risings before 1745, and how close did they get? We start with the fact that in 1688, James of 1748, James of 1745, when he was. was sent him to exile after the glorious revolution.

He was a Stuart, and then what? Well, various campaigners fought on his behalf. When he was exiled in 1689, the campaigns were fought mainly in Ireland, but also in Scotland. In Ireland, we live with a legacy to the present day. In Scotland, the Jacobites relatively were undefeited, but then they didn't break out of the Highlands. In 1708 was the next small rising,

which was in the aftermath of Union. And that really was more a hiccough. up in a rising. 1715 was a major rising just after the Hanoverian succession, and that war is probably the largest Jacobite rising. The largest, can you give us some idea of the numbers?

In terms of numbers, well, I think at least 10,000 in the field. 1719 was a diversionary rising by Spain that ended up in the sort of wilds of the Western Ross. The final one was, of course, the rising that ended at Collodon in 1746.

Before we come to 1745, Was it simply getting a Stuart back on the throne that caused all these other rising? So did other complementary new factors emerge between 1689 and the end of the 1713? I think the most obvious factor was the union. That changed the nature of... In 1707?

I mean, Jacobitism in the 1690s was active but low-key. And particularly in Scotland, there's a huge revival in numbers. And so the Jacobite cause in Scotland can also be associated with ending the Union. And that is, I think, what gives a particular dimension to Scottish Jacobism as against English or Irish Jacobism. Why did the Union between England and Scotland, which you referred to in 1707, which seemed on the surface to be about to benefit Scotland, the great deal, open it up to the English markets and so on and so forth,

why did that inject such resentment? Well, there's various ways you can look at this. One is it also established Presbyterianism, when much of Scotland was not necessarily Presbyterian. Secondly, it led in the short term to economic recession. When you've equal competition between unequal powers, you're going to end up with recession. And I think there's also a certain amount of frustrated expectations.

Stana Nenidich, in exile, what kind of the stewards went into exile? But they took a court with them, didn't they? Could you give us some description of the court from, say, 1689 for the next 20 or 30 years? It is remarkable that they trudged around Europe with a fully-fledged court. I read that it was bigger than the court in London. Yes, in the first instance, of course, the court that went into exile was very much a European court, and the individuals that went with James

included many of his senior nobleman, British nobleman, who were disposed towards James, but also many musicians, artists, the sort of skilled workers that would be associated with the court. and they went for two reasons, partly because it was quite clear that the new establishment in Britain was not prepared to support an elaborate court. And one of the characteristics of court society, as it evolved under the Hanover's, is it was a fairly sort of low-key, cheap court. And what the Stuarts in exile hoped to maintain was a kind of alternative court. And they could do this to a certain extent whilst they were supported by other European powers.

And the relationship with other European powers is enormously important. But of course that relationship is a political one And it waxes and wanes And many of the individuals Associated with the court in exile Found it difficult to support themselves Finding financial support was always a problem And they spent a long time in France

But eventually gravitated towards Rome And a very much lower key court Was established in Rome Which of course is the court that Bonnie Prince Charlie was born into He called himself James second son called himself King James III. How did that play in, let's call it Europe? Well, again, it's a political issue. At certain points in time, there are major powers in

Europe who are prepared to exploit that, and the whole history of the Jacobite Risings in Great Britain are part and parcel of European politics, to what degree the French, or sometimes the Spanish, are prepared to lend help. At other points in time, the Stuarts were an embarrassment. At other points, they could be used to provoke the British. the Hanoverian state. So it really just depended. Certainly the papal state that largely supported the Stuarts latterly

gave all the honours to the stewards. It was in their interest to do so. And the people, well, it seems to mean that the eyes of most people back in this country, they were completely bound up with the Catholic cause, which was still a worrying cause for English government at that time. For British government as well,

and indeed for most. Scots. They were. I mean, the whole history of the later Stuarts is a complex one in religious terms. Prince Charles's brother, Henry, was a senior Catholic clergyman in his career, made a very successful Catholic career. Charles himself, I mean, at one point he was an Anglican, at other points he was Catholic. It's very hard to say precisely what their theological position was, but in most eyes they were a Catholic dynasty. settle in Rome and the young Bonnet Prince Charlie is brought up in papal society, in a court over the sea, I presume English, British persons, make Scottish, British person would come across and pay tribute and so on.

And this was fed, the idea that really he was, the throne was his by rights, if only he could go and get it, was fed into him from an early age. Oh, absolutely, yes. And he was very much raised as a European prince. And in some ways this was part of his problem back in Britain. personal style was not a very British style. It was very much a French, Italian, European, courtly style. Can you just do a bit more about that? What does that mean? What's the difference? Well, it means, I mean, the European aristocracy were a very military aristocracy. He was very much a sporting man. He was raised in the traditions of hunting, of fencing, of the kind of military skills. He was accomplished in music and these various things, which in many ways had been downplayed in Britain, because Britain as a Protestant, low-key court

was not providing that kind of patronage. And the British aristocracy were a less military aristocracy than was the case in Europe. His manner, his dress, his address was very European. And he was an enormously accomplished young man. There's no doubt about that in the European style. Finally, in his education, how did he learn, is it, with the arts of war? He had, yes.

He was skilled in the personal arts of war. He was not familiar with the battlefield, but certainly he was familiar with horsemanship, with fencing, and these kind of personal arts, which are so important for warfare at that point in time. Murray Piddock, Stan has suggested someone who, just colloquially, will seem very foreign when he turns up. How is his, how is his English?

I mean, did he speak an English or with a tongue that appealed to the people he was about to lead? It's very difficult to get actual direct evidence of Charles's accent. I mean, doubtless, he spoke English with rather a strange accent, but he wasn't necessarily an Italian one because his tutors from an early age had been Scots. And he had been raised in an expatriate enclave and also one which was the centre of a Scottish network,

not only in Italy but all the way back to Scotland too because many of the people were related to people who already lived in Scotland and for example one of the closest associates of the Jacobite court was in fact the brother of William Murray who subsequently became Lord Mansfield, the Lord Chancellor in fact the Lord Chancellor Mansfield himself

was accused of Jacobism as late as 1753 but there was only one witness and no corroboration So you have a network, and that network means that an expatriate community brings the prince up to express himself in a way which is certainly familiar, if slightly strange, to the people he goes to meet when he returns to Scotland and 745. It does seem remarkable, doesn't it, before we move on to the landing, which we're doing in a moment or two, we take 1688, 1689 to 1645, we're doing it around, 56 years, something like that, and this thing keeps going for 56. years, that there's still the possibility, they can come back, we're in the third generation now, you know, King James 2nd, then his son, and now his son. It's still going on. It is a remarkable sustaining, isn't it, of an idea that a comeback is possible? Well, there's, there are various different aspects to this, and yes, a comeback is possible. In Scotland, as Alan's mentioned,

there's continuing opposition to the Union, there's the fact also that there's an economic movement in Scotland from the East Coast to the West, imperial trade, the growth of Glasgow and so on, which is a patent by the mid-18th century. There's the fact that excise duties hit the East Coast ports and smuggling itself becomes a politicised industry in the East Coast. The whole range of economic and political circumstances within Scotland, in Ireland there are the continuing religious motivations, the fact that the Irish see the stewards alone among all British dynasties is actually rightful kings of

Ireland because of their roots in the high kings of Ireland. And in England Jacobism is a declining force, but it becomes stronger in the 1740s because of a sense of disappointment, anger and resentment at the way that Hanover, which is of course

overseas kingdom electorate, being ruled by George II, is being preferred to England in terms of foreign policy, expenditure and so on, because, of course, George II is effectively maintaining two courts, the court in London, the court in Hanover. And the interrelationship between Hanoverian history and English history at this stage

is often one which is still neglected. But, of course, to people at the time, they were very much symbiotic linked polities. So he became attractive and glamourized by contrast with the Hanoverians apart from anything else? Well, he was very glamorous personally. Can we come to the landing then? He lands at Moydart in Western Scotland and raises his standard at Glenn Finnan in summer of 1745 with 16 gunship, about seven companions,

a couple of whom are Irish. Why does he land there? What does he expect to find there? He lands on the West Coast, the Western approaches, because it's the route which is easiest, where he hopes it's easiest to avoid royal navy shipping, where in the West Highlands he expects some of the strongest support.

He doesn't initially get that support because the Highland chieftains are extremely wary of the fact he's come without any significant French aid. One of the paradoxes of Jacobism in 1745 is that actually the people who come out for Charles almost without any doubt are the people of the Central Eastern Lowellie. rather the West Highlands. The West Highlanders were supposed to be the most loyal,

in fact, are the most likely to want to either cut a deal or to play a double game. So how did he get them out? And why did they come at all? I mean, he turns up with five or six or seven people, you know, they haven't been around for a long time these people. He says, come on, we're going to attack London. I'm not being too colloquial of mine, that's what he says. And eventually, the Highland clans do give him the core, enough force to start to march on it. And about 2000 was it turned up. That's what I've read somewhere of the, in one of your sets of notes. about that number? Probably a bit less at Glenfinnan, but more than that or more than that

by the time the March of Edinburgh. So what really got them going is what I want to know? Why did they turn up at all? If there was leery and as wary as you say they were, and rightly I think, why did they come at all? Well, the key moment is really when Camel of Lochiel is persuaded to bring out the Camerons

by Charles Edward. And no one knows exactly what happened at that interview, but we presume that what happened was that Charles promised to recompense him for the loss of his estate in the event of defeat and to get him a senior commission in the French army, both of which subsequently happened. So the Cameron's brought about 700 or 800 men

to the rising at Glenfinnan, which was otherwise larger supported by the McDonald's of Kepech, who were themselves, as it were, a bandit clan of the fringes of Highland society. But it's thereafter that troops, start to come to him in significant numbers, partly as a result of the existing political and economic dissatisfaction in Scotland. Alan, by the time he gets to Edinburgh,

what are the significant numbers? And how Edinburgh we look at, even now, this castle on the rock, and how can they take that? But in fact, it just gives in, doesn't it, to these people, this army who turn up? How many are then? Why do they give in? Well, the castle didn't give in. This was the difficulty.

They didn't. No, the castle, they took over if it's Holyrood Palace, but not the castle, so they centred their... effective act of government in the Holywood Palace but they were able to accumulate fairly concerned. If it didn't give in, why didn't it hold out? Let me put it that way.

Well, it did hold out? Did it? So they didn't take the castle at all? No, they didn't take the castle at all? No, this was one of the... So they took Edinburgh but they didn't take the castle? Absolutely. There was no... I mean, the castle became a sort of sporting ground, but they commanded the effect of arms of government and that's what mattered.

The castle could eventually have been starved out. But it was less important these days to take castles, as to take the area. And they effectively, they... themselves as an army of provisional government. They did so also by attracting numbers, but the difficulty is, before they gave themselves full-time to consolidate in Scotland, they push on to England. So it's difficult to say, if you say, the 5,000 came in. We know from the local newspaper, the Caledonian Mercury, that people are coming in all the time.

So this is, it was actually a Jack, well, the editor was actually Jacobite Sympathor who ran some wonderful editorials in the course of this event, looking back to previous Jacobite history. So there is a rolling effect, and also there's an awareness. is in Scotland, there's a new government. There's between about 11 and 14,000 under arms eventually. But the difficulty is, is that there's all this pressure for them to march south, even while, as Alan says,

there isn't actually time to consolidate, there's still enormous pressure for them to move, and it's dealing with those competing pressures that is the crux of 45. It's partly to do with time, isn't it? You know, you don't want to be moving south in the winter, and this was largely taking place in the late summer

and the whole chronology of warfare in that period is enormously important. Do you think you would have been sensible then for them to have staying in Edinburgh, consolidated in Edinburgh, waited to get the French alliance, we haven't yet spoken about, get the French alliance properly on board, which was promised to some extent and never materialised at all. Is that an option that should have been considered any of you? I think that's been considered.

I think the other fighters, the Jacobites had a game plan that was established in 177, 78, by Nathaniel Hook, who was an Irishman working in French service. And that game plan was actually successful because it would be used by the Covenant movement in the previous century, which is you don't bother going initially for London, you go for Newcastle. You cut off the coal supplies, and this cuts the credit supplies in London, and you create a financial crisis.

Now, this is a very interesting strategy. It would have saved, shall we say, the Tourist Board of Cumberland, not a grief, Melvin, but basically, the actual attempt to, They didn't really go for Newcastle. I think that was the big mistake, was to decide not to consolidate in Scotland

in the one hand and take Newcastle. Newcastle was there for the taking. But Wade had 20,000 in. But the argument is that Wade was not necessarily on the ball. Absolutely. But people who don't know, instead of going to the Lake District, they took Carlisle from there they headed towards Derby.

They spent rather too long, everybody seems to think, in Carlisle having a good time. But they should have gone for Newcastle, you think? Well, I think that they probably should have gone for London, which is the route they took. The one thing is, I mean, Alan's case is certainly arguable.

It was Newcastle or London. They had an army of 20,000 men to face at Newcastle. It was badly led. It's a low morale, but at that point it out number them four to one. So they chose to go on the West Coast route to London. And they had to do one or the other. Staying in Edinburgh was not an option.

The power of the Royal Navy. and more important, the huge financial resources of the British state would destroy them the longer they stayed in one place. Because the rising was underfinanced from the beginning. I agree partly, but I think we overestimate the Royal Navy. In the northeast ports, you actually have 30 ships, I think 28 to 30 ships managed to come into the northeast port despite the Navy. And so I think the difficulty is where there's the real heartland is arguably the northeast. and the failure to consolidate it there. And also what we also have to remember, Melbourne,

is there's also Swedish backing taking place as well as French backing. So you can argue to hold on just a few more months in Scotland because there was no real reason. The campaign season was not the best time to go into England. The French would never have sailed unless there was a sign of a threat to London. And the great irony of the rising is that they were close to actually mounting an invasion when the Jacobites with Charles decided that, that he was lying and there was no chance

the French maritime invasion because there was no Jacobite intelligence and no connection between the two arms. The French causing trouble. They come to the French at Derb if you don't mind because it's clearer. The Jacobites won a battle at Preston Pans. Was that an important... That was always nice to win, but was it an important battle to win? It's an important psychological battle to win.

And of course Preston Pans was the Battle of Edinburgh. Alan is right. You can sit in the castle forever, but the castle does not defend the capital city of Scotland. It is, the castle and the city are quite detached. So the decisive psychological victory was Preston Pants which is just outside Edinburgh towards Musselbroke.

But thereafter, in a sense, the competing advice and the competing misinformation that this army was dealing with, it really was a set of options, none of which really was ideal.

The great thing is that everybody knows, he gets to Derby with the army. He's been an awful long way from Moydard, and London, by comparison, is not a long way off, and it's fairly flat land, and easy to get, comparatively. Dr Johnson walked, they did, from Litchfield,

nearabouts. So we add Derby. Now, where are the French? What are the options? And did he take the right options? Let's talk about the French, because Prince, Montevich Charlie, always said, I've got the French on side,

they're going to join in, they're going to come over, and he shuffled between raising people on the bank of the French and getting the French interested because he had the people in Britain on his side so these two who's playing these I presume against each other let's talk about Derby

where were the French when he got to Derby they were at Bologna mostly but the Jacobite army at Derby had hard that Lord John Drummond who commanded the Scots of the French service the Royal Scots

had landed at Montrose towards the end of November they had no proper intelligence and they much overestimated the force he brought with him which was about a thousand men they thought it might be four or five times that number. And where are the French here? I mean in terms of do they figure in the equation

when they're sitting down at Derby crucially to decide what to do? There is I think another issue of the strategy here. I'm not totally convinced that the French would have backed because the French knew that if the Jacobites has succeeded and taken London they're just replacing one major British power with another. So for the French, there's also an argument to say,

stay in Scotland, it's the back door, it's a source of trouble. And you're going to expand the campaign. So there are various arguments that could be used here. The Derby issue, I'm unconvinced that they should have gone as far as Darby. I would still suggest they should have stayed north. You wanted to stay in Scotland. And I think going to Derby, I think the other argument as well, is if you're going to mount a successful invasion from France,

it's very difficult to take up parts of England. Where are you going to land? I mean, the Norman Conquist, did it. William Avornis did it, but nothing in between. The plan is to land in Essex and to land and to land Irish and Scots in the French service, 10,000 men

to support an attack on London. But I think that there is an additional dimension which is the double-mindedness of France on these issues and that is that the same time they want to split up Britain into, they want to split

off Ireland and Scotland. That is a recurring theme throughout French policy in the 18th century. They see it as a way of preventing Great Britain becoming top nation, which it almost certainly was. But on the other hand, the move towards London was necessary to actually bring out sufficient French collateral. Because otherwise, all they would do was to drip feed troops into the East Coast ports. Just as 50 years later they drip fed troops into Ireland in 1798. The paradox was that if the armies stayed where they were in Ireland or Scotland, Scotland that the French were supporting. The French never set enough men. And if they actually

advanced towards the heart towards London, you know, to face other risks. The difference in all of this is that the French support, if you stayed in Scotland, consolidating in Scotland, it's a different argument. The towns that were not Jacobite, like Dumfries and Glasgow, were prepared to pay the taxes. They were prepared to pay, accept this army of government. Now, we've also got to bring in the Scandinavian side. I mean, the Swedes are prepared with French backing to send a fleet. So the fleet that's going to come from there it's going to be of no use in Essex, but it's going to be a considerable use in Scotland.

So there are various factors that apply here. Stana, what's your perception in whether French are? Because they're the great possibility, aren't they? They're the ghost at the feast. What effect did it have on the Council of Derby? The decision they made is to whether to go, whether or not to attack London? Well, I mean, the French situation is, of course,

always built around French foreign policy, and French foreign policy uses the Jacobite interest in very, variable ways through time. At that point in time, of course, the French were themselves involved in a major European war, as was Britain, so that this was merely one aspect of the very complex situation that they're dealing with. And when it comes to Derby, it is quite clear,

well, two things are quite clear, which shapes the Jacobite decision. Not only where are the French, but where are the French? English, and it is the English support or the absence of it. I mean the tangible English support, that is the critical issue, because the Scottish Jacobites had marched intending for London, expecting to gather tangible French support en route, but also expecting to gather up an English army, and that just didn't happen. There's one other fact, believe it or not, it comes into this,

both in the 15 but in the 45, there was a major outbreak of cattle disease in the south of England. and if you look at the local press, there's a conviction that this cattle disease can also spread to humans. Now, if you've also got a lot of Highlanders coming down there, their whole trade is based on cattle. So you reach Derby, it is just also the limits of the cattle disease, and you can find actually, seriously,

you can find in the whole areas in Essex. So the French could be bringing with the foot and mouth or something. So there's a cattle. Bonnie Prince Charlie and the foot and mouth. A new reading. A new weapon is right. There is this issue of, yeah, bio-weapons. There isn't this issue that comes in the press.

It's a serious issue of the cattle disease. It's affecting decisions. But there's where are the English in... Starner pointed out to where were the English? The English hadn't joined Bonny Pinit Charley in anything like the numbers anticipated, nor had the Welsh. But where are the other English, they must be presuming, where's the English army? Now, we know they're crossing Europe, fighting a war, but they're a very good army. And they're...

The Pornipancholny's advisers must think, well, they've heard about us. They're going to come back and have... tackle us quite soon. What was the level of communication? What was the level of intelligence going on at this time? Oh, I mean, intelligence systems and spy systems in the 18th century are astonishing. And of course, the very sophisticated misinformation being spread about. And one of the factors at Derby is quite deliberate misinformation about the where the British troops at home, the Hanoverian troops at home, because there were lots of Hanoverian troops based in Britain, as well as the ones fighting in the

war in Europe. And of course, British troops are not just English troops. They are enormously, it's a very, very complex army. What's the misinformation? I think people will be interested in that. The black propaganda, what are they putting out? Well, they are literally. And who is the day?

Who are we talking about? The British are putting out black. The English. I don't know where we are now. It is the British. It is the British state. They're all doing it. They're all doing it. Individuals are doing it.

individual spy masters, the British state, the individuals who are controlling the different regiments. And there are often regimental setups that were not necessarily in good communication with one another. And single individuals could be sent in to spread misinformation, even amongst just the ordinary truths. But, you know, the whole thing works on rumour and panic. I mean, there's this argument which may or may not be true

that a spy called Dudley Bradstreet came into the Jacobat Council at Derby and said that there was a third army between them and London. They knew that Cumberland had come back from the continent. They knew that Wade's army was in the north, but Bradstreet allegedly said that there was a third army between them and London,

which wasn't true. There were only about 1,500 to 2,000 troops actually guarding London and a significant portion of those with a black watch who were stationed in the south. of England throughout the campaign because they weren't trusted after they muted in 1743. So, I mean, that's the paradox of Derby is that the route to London lies open,

but a single piece of misinformation may have stopped that appearing to the case. Okay, decisively, each of you, and now we'll move on. Why did they turn back at Derby? Why did they not move on to London? Just briefly each. Alan, with you, your view. Quite clearly, Charles did not have English support, and particularly this Council of War,

led by Murray and supported mainly by the clan chief decided they'd gone as far as prepared to go. The argument was, why should they come into England to put somebody in an English throne when nothing was happening and they could consolidate in Scotland? So they turned back on the basis that there was no English support.

Murray, what's your view? Is that the same? Yes, but they also turned back because they knew that French troops had landed in Scotland and because in the event of failure of the rising and some were already, Murray included, beginning to believe that it would fail, they overestimated the extent this is very important to which they would be safe. Because in 1715 and in 1708, they had been safe.

When they got back to the country. Yeah, Scottish civil society had really refused to cooperate with meaningful strong action against Jacobite leadership in Scotland. And this was not to be the case after 1745, but they thought it would be, again, they thought if we lose, there isn't a price to pay. And that was a significant motivating factor. It must be said about the English support, though.

One of the peculiarities of these campaigns is that in 1651 on the March to Worcester, Charles II got hardly any more English support than his great-grandson managed on the route to Derby in 1745. You've got to gobbled as well. Well, the point is to the point is to estimate, To estimate support on the basis of who turns out is difficult in the case of England

where it's a very non-militarised society. But also interesting is the fact that Jacobites always overestimate how many they will get, even though in 1651, you'd have thought they'd have turned out quite a few. And you, Starner, why do you think they'd turn back in Dalai? To consolidate their position. I mean, Prince Charles was dismayed by this decision. This was not what he wanted to do.

But the Scottish Jacobite leaders knew that they had, go back. They had to go back for their supply lines, to re-equip their troops, to avoid having a campaign over the winter months, to really reposition themselves and then see what was possible. Now, Murray's made, I think, a very good point, sorry, silence, that after 715, when far more Scots had been in arising, and they went back to Scotland, Scottish Civic Society absorbed them, and the British army led from London, was not allowed to persecute them. Now this was going to change, they didn't know it was going to change.

They started to go back in Cumberland, obviously Hanoverian himself, the Duke of Cumberland, went after them. Did they get a whiff of the fact that they were really on the run then? They didn't settle at Edinburgh, as Alan would have loved them in Edinburgh to this day. But they didn't settle there. They kept going, didn't they? They were being pursued in a way that they hadn't anticipated. Is that right, Sonny? I mean, I think psychologically, as soon as you start,

to go back along the route you came, it is bound to have an effect, even though it may be a strategic retreat for the purposes of consolidation. I think they were quite dismayed when they got to Glasgow. They arrived at Glasgow and found that Glasgow is a very sort of Whig, Hanoverian sort of place, very much the sort of city that Murray has described, being involved in the Atlantic trades, a very modern kind of city, were just not interested in the Jacobites. I mean, they were pushed on very quickly. And then, of course, there's a battle with, which, Falcirk, Sterling, which in theory they won, but many of the Jacobites involved thought they had lost.

And at that point, a number of Jacobites vanished back home. It was a terrible muddle. I think the key with Falcirk is that after Falkirk, Murray wants to retreat, and in order to force retreat, Murray exaggerates the rate of desertion. And when they get to Kreef, they find out that far fewer have deserted than Murray as alleged. but at this time, this time comes the idea that Murray has betrayed the cause because he's decided basically to throw in the towel. He thinks that they can't move back on Edinburgh.

It's wooden trees at the moment. I just want to get to Collodon and then come back to Bonneville and Charlie. They retreat, they decide to turn and fight at Collodon. Why did they decide to fight at Collodon? Why did they feel they had to? I think that was very much Charles trying to reassertes position over Murray and the decision. I think it was a disastrous decision for the choice of the battleground.

It did not, I think, suit the terrain of the army. But one of the point to follow up from this, all the way out of England, there's also, in the press, you can begin to see this deliberate disinformation that the Jacobites are offering no quarter. There's a conditioning that's taking place that Cumberland is doing all the way through, particularly in the north of England, with the suggestions that the Jacobites are just killing people for the sake of it. So there's a preparation, there's a builder.

And the choice of Culloden really plays into Cumberland's hands. And I think it's, but this time also the command structure is in disarray. There's inadequate concern given to logistics. At least two-thirds of the army is not properly equipped or able to fight. They pursue a crazy night march and call it off. And so therefore, by the next day, it's a really unprepared army,

which chooses their own battle site. And this is, I think, where Charles Edward Stewart is its most indictable, is this actually Culloden. When they did that, the night before, they were going to do a night march on the billets where the Duke of Cumberland's troops were stayed. It seemed, in paper, and I read it, it seemed like a good idea, but then they pulled out of that.

Why did they pull out? One of the reasons they pulled out was that the marching rate of the regulars they had was slower than the marching rate of the Klansmen. And there's a gap started to open up between the Klansmen and the regulars, which was so large that the regulars could never have reached Cumberland's camp and time, and so the march was called off. It was march over rough ground. in the dark, there were different rates of...

There was also real problems that some of the troops are not been properly fed for several days and they were quite debilitated. Now, Collodon, as I understand it, it was a battle at last it for 40 minutes and appalling, dreadful tactics and comparatively very efficient British army led by Cumberland.

After 40 minutes, 2,000, as I read, of the 5,000 were killed and the rest turned and some fled and some actually, one or two regiments actually marched off the field in in good order and kept marching until they got back to base. What scale of, how would you describe the scale of this defeat, Stano?

Well, I mean, it is a significant defeat, though it's fair to say that some of the Jacobites and Prince Charles Orode himself hoped that they could regroup, and this is one of the reasons why he remained in Scotland, of course, many of the Jacobites exited very, very quickly from some of the East Coast ports. But in terms of numbers, one one thinks of some of the earlier great battles with which Scotland's been involved like Floddenfield.

I mean, nothing like the numbers of debt that one's seen in other battlefields. But, of course, for the Jacobites, it is decisive. How significant is it for Scotland and for the history of Britain as a battle then? It is the end of any armed and selectionary attempt within mainland Britain to break up the polity of Great Britain as it was constituted in 1707. It is the end of a long transition also in Scottish society between the Reformation of 1560 and 1746.

It's the end of religious wars, who shall be king, what the church shall be, and whether there shall be unity in Scotland and England. Is that decisive? I would agree. I mean, of hindsight, of course, that's absolutely clear. there was also at least a large force of Jacobites meeting at Ruthven just after Collodon, but they'd lost the will.

I think this is the really important thing. Collodon sapped the will of the Jacobites to continue, and that is what everything else falls into place from there. Now two things briefly to talk about. One is the retribution wrought by the Duke of Cumberland, who became known as Butcher Cumberland in some areas. Can we, first of all, Star an, can you give us some idea of what scale you think that was on? It was pretty nasty.

It was pretty nasty even for the day So that the title Butcher Cumberland Was one that was used in England as well? Because he thought of these people as being treasonable? As indeed they were, in terms of the standard Hanavarian legislation. I mean, it began with killing injured soldiers and people around the battlefield, execution squads on the battlefield, very swift pursuit and retribution against those who had given shelter or succour to Jacobites.

And, of course, it became far more system out. far more planned and spread throughout the whole of, particularly the Highlands of Scotland. I agree. I mean, I think there are two tactics that have to realise. It's not just killing people directly with Bainit and etc. There's also the deliberate tactic to starve out areas, to remove all livestock, to remove all support of life. And we know that from the present day and the Balkans, etc. The same tactics are used.

So we have this double policy. It is not fully effective for a variety of reasons, not least of which is some of the decency of some of the British officers who refused to comply, particularly the Earl of Loudon, who was the effective commander in Scotland before Cumberland came back. He did not comply, and we know from his letters. And increasingly there's letters from Cumberland to say, don't distinguish between Jacobites and their potential associates.

He did not comply with his orders. Murray. I think the crucial thing is that from the very start of the reprisals, certainly after the killing, Colodden. There's a separation between lowlanders and Gaelic-speaking Highlanders which wasn't present in the actual rising itself. So in 1746-7 you get Jacobite disturbances in Montrose and in Aberdeen, but these are treated far less severely than they are in the Gaelic-speaking areas of Scotland.

It's almost as if they are regarded as the core outsider and they are being stigmatised. The rest of Scots, many of whom did support the Jacobites, have been drawn into the British polity. It's only those who are most different in customs, manners, language, who are being blamed for the whole Jacobite escapade. One of the strangest things of all about this is two-barrel-dray. Bonnie Prince Charlie manages to drift around Scotland for five months after defeated Kolodon, protected from one of the ballots says by an entire people.

Well, you must have been protected by a great number of people. and eventually he dresses up as the maid of Flora McDonald and over the sea to sky and so on. And quickly becomes, even though in Europe he ends up very drunk and very debauched in many ways, Crippley becomes a great physiological hero. I've got a pile of ballads here written about him. We haven't time to sing them all, unfortunately. I wanted to hear an accent. And still to this day, and yet he led people to carnage.

So what are we doing that? The protection and then the mythologising. Alan. Well, the analogy would always be like the aftermath of the American Civil War. The Confederacy have the best songs. They've got the romanticism connected with it, so much the Jacobites. But the defeat of both, the defeat of both, was

essential for the emergence of the British and the American States. The reputation of Charles after Collodon has certainly suffered, and I think it was only in his latter years we can go all the way to say that he was a drunken bomb lying in the gutters of Rome. But that was put out. He also was actually seriously considered at one

point as the new king of America. The Americans at the time discussing the Constitution thought about bringing him back as a Stuart. So he was still, and my continental colleagues tell me that things like Freemasonry, which are greatly associated with Jacobitism, he retained a leading role in European society through this. So, you know, I'm sceptical of the British propaganda, particularly against him from the systematic of 1760s. And latterly, he ended fairly and gloriously. But I think we've tended to see the death often murdered for too soon. And are you surprised that the protection afforded him by?

the Scots in those five months. It's a long time. Because obviously I would guess Cumberland was after him, wasn't he? And Cumberland in his force, and you've talked to him. You've talked earlier about spies, intelligent networks and so forth. Lots of people were after him. But in a sense, those who protected him, lots of people did protect him, they were often quite equivocal about it. And there's an interesting story attributed to Flora MacDonald

that in her later experience, when she was in London as a prisoner, she also became a bit of a tourist attraction she attracted interest and the Prince of Wales Hanoverian Prince visited her and asked her how she could do what she did and she said I would do the same for you what else was she going to say it's going to get around a lot quicker she's a clever woman

but in a sense they didn't have much option because what were you going to do and the poor man and one has to be quite sorry for him was drifting around the Western islands and the islands waiting for a boat to meet up with him. There were a number of French boats trying to connect with him, but it took a while. So we begin and we end with a boat. Well, thank you all three very much indeed for Bonnie Prince Charlie. And next week we'll be

talking about the myth and reality of the search for the Holy Grail. So there we are. Thank you very much for listening. We hope you've enjoyed this Radio 4 podcast. You can find hundreds of other programs about history, science and philosophy at BBC. www.com.com.org forward slash radio 4.