In Our Time - The Tudor State

Episode Date: October 26, 2000

Melvyn Bragg and guests discusses the Tudor State. In 1485 Henry Tudor slew Richard III and routed his army at The Battle of Bosworth Field. It was a decisive victory which founded a bold new dynasty; and this date like 1789 and 1066 has been taken by historians to be one of the great ‘year zeros’ of history: Suddenly the muddled Medieval World with its robber barons, feudal barbarism and bloody Wars of the Roses was banished, and the modern age of centralised government and King’s Justice was ushered in. But were the Tudors as instrumental in reshaping the British state as historians have liked to make out, and did their reign throughout the 16th century really lay the political foundations of our own age? With John Guy, Professor of Modern History, University of St Andrews; Christopher Haigh, Tutor of Modern History at Christ Church College, Cambridge; Christine Carpenter, Fellow in History at New Hall, Cambridge.

This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK. Thanks for downloading the In Our Time podcast. For more details about In Our Time and for our terms of use, please go to BBC.co.com.uk forward slash radio four. I hope you enjoy the programme. Hello, in 485, Henry Tudor slew Richard III and routed his army at the Battle of Bosworth Field. It was a decisive victory which founded a bold new dynasty.

And this date, like 1789 and 1066, has been taken by historians to be one of the great year-zeroes of history. Suddenly, it seemed, the modelled medieval world with its robber barons, feudal barbarism and bloody wars of the roses was banished, and the modern age of centralised government in King's justice was ushered in. But were the Tudors really as instrumental in reshaping the British state as historians in the past have liked to make out? And did their reign throughout the 16th century really lay the political foundations of our own age?

To discuss the legacy of the Tudor era, I'm joined by the Tudor historians John Guy, Professor of Modern History at the University of St. Andrews, Christopher Hay, tutor of modern history at Christchurch, Cambridge, and also by the medieval historian Christine Carpenter, fellow in history at New Hall, Cambridge. A curiosity here never happened before on this programme, and highly unlikely ever to happen again, is that all three historians are former pupils of one man, the distinguished and influential Tudor historian, Geoffrey Elton.

John Guy, in 4885, Henry Tudor won the Battle of Bosworth Field. Now, can you tell us what broadly came as a result of the victory on that day? What happened at Bosworth was that Henry 7th usurp the throne. His claim was exceptionally weak. He was extremely lucky. The question of historians is what was the significance of this event. Really, for 400 years, the propaganda line, started by the Tudors, was that Henry started a new dynasty, he stabilised the monarchy, he refounded the monarchy.

But historians really in the last 15 to 20 years have questioned this. increasingly Henry's achievements are seen to be rather shallow and indeed Christine Carpenter has argued that in fact he was an incompetent monarch who didn't understand his job Oh well there you go Hamas brought up to think completely differently So we'll rearrange the past The idea was that after about a half century of turbulence

Just to peg on with the idea that most people have received Henry VIII was the efficient cunning, quietly effective Tudor who brought the Wars of the Roses to its final conclusion, although there'd been 20 years of peace-ish before the Battle of Bosworth Field, was that entirely, is that entirely mistaken? Well, I mean, the issue is that the Wars of the Roses were essentially a factional war

in which the nobility took sides really against a weak monarchy. I mean, the problem of the 15th century was essentially an under mighty king. Now, what Henry V. 7th distinctively did was to subordinate their ability to himself. And this is the big issue, because the argument of 15th century historians is that in the 15th century,

the king and the nobility worked together in partnership, and that was a partnership built on a common culture, a common view, if you like, of the kingdom, the state. And Henry V. 7th subverted that. He restored order, certainly, but he did it by subordinating the ability. Whereas in the 15th century service was regarded as an honorable occupation,

Henry turned service into subordination. The nobility were put very much under the Tudor's thumb. In that case, there was a change. So you're slightly back to where I started from when I was 40 years ago, even more reading this period, that there was a new form of government, that he did make a new attack, and whatever you can say about his weakness.

We might come to that in a minute. He left a wealthy exchequer and a powerful state comparatively to his son, Henry VIII. It was a step change. I mean, I think that, Edward the 4th had actually started many of the techniques that Henry used, but Henry did a step change. Fine. Christopher Haig, Henry the 7th expanded the King's coffers, as I alluded to.

He gets more tax. He takes advantage of an enfeebled aristocracy, as John Guy has again begun to point out. Was this new? Was this something that you can say more than a step change? Did this auger what could be called the sweeping changes through that, eventually culminating Elizabeth in the Tudor dynasty? Well, I'm not sure that much that Henry the 7th did actually lasted very much. I mean, he comes into a very fortunate situation

in which rivals of the throne have been killed or gone into exile. He inherits a massive concentration of land, such as no other English king had had before. He's hugely wealthy than the English kings have been before, by the accidents of inheritance. It's true that he goes in for a much more careful organized, involved government in which he's monitoring events, particularly monitoring finance, control of finance is taken into the royal court away from the exchequer.

He does deal very firmly with the nobles, putting them under bonds and promises, essentially promises to behave, spies on them, controls their military power. And he extends the role of provincial council. So it all looks new and controlled and centralized. But it hardly lasts. the massive land inheritance, not by Henry the Seventh himself, but later is dissipated. Most of it's spent by Henry VIII on wars. Crown, internal royal king's control of finance essentially is lost, certainly by 1554

when control of finance drifts back to the exchequer. No king can go on forever, hostile to the nobility, since they're essential to the control of the localities. But you're talking about the effects of what he did way after his death, if you're talking 1554. I'm just talking about only of the seventh to start with. Did he or did he not actually sort a lot of things out in terms of money, organisation of the state, organising of the aristocracy, the way he ran things. I mean, you three, you know, infinitely more than I do,

but this is a total blast against a received view by historian whom all of your respect, and I'm just seeing if there's anything left of what was the previous edifice. If there isn't, tell me, and we'll move under something else. Well, I think Elton's view is essentially about the 1530s rather than the 15. You're rushing. Elton's view is about the 1530s rather than the 1480s, 1490s. I don't think anyone for a long time has argued that Henry the 7th did anything quite so dramatic as to found a modern state. I mean, he has some certain initiatives which enable him to assert control, but they're not initiatives which last. Christine Carpenter, historians have said that after Henry the 7th, into Henry the 8 we have in his time,

and Henry the Eastside of the Star Chamber and the Chancery and so on and that one thing new was the national legal system and that was part of a new form of state. Would you dispute that? Well, this is something that I would very much dispute and I think all medievalists would dispute that the common law, i.e., the national royal legal system, came into existence in the second half of the 12th century

and it then developed hugely during the 13th century. and then further still in the 14th, that an indication of how important the law was already by the time of Magna Carta in 1215 to national consciousness is that Magna Carta is essentially about putting the king beneath his own legal system. He treated it as his own private property to give or to withhold. And Magna Carta, put it in very broad terms, says, no, the king cannot do this.

the ideology of the law and the notion that the king must be beneath his law and therefore must respect his subjects' property and the fruits of that property because that was primarily what the law existed to defend originally was property is just completely ingrained in the medieval mind from, I suppose you say, from about Magna Carta onwards, so that a king like Edward II or Richard II is deposed essentially in the end because they are both responsible for fundamental attacks on the law and attacks on the property defended by that law.

And one of the major problems with Henry VI reign is he is too feeble to make his law work, and that is one of the reasons why landowners get so worked up about this massive failure. There is a sense in which one can go back to first causes and we can go back to Adam, and you can't be really, or even I'm told beyond nowadays. but so to talk about the magnic artery

of the relation to Henry the 7th is obviously relevant but do you think that it is really relevant to discussing whether the Tudors, let's start with Henry the 7th and go to Henry the 8th or obviously there's a massive difference there whether the Tudors did bring anything at all new because what I've got from John and Christopher

is that there was a small step change a little bit here and a little bit there but nothing much that lasted after Henry the Sevens. Do you see a real connection between what you've been talking about, your 12th century, which you say is the most revolutionary of centuries, to the 15th century and the 16th century particularly? Well, for a start, it is the same system of law. For another thing, when Henry 7th was beginning to look rather worryingly

like John towards the end of his reign, people actually started muttering about Magna Carta, so clearly this is very much in people's minds. The interesting thing that happens under Henry the 7th I think we would probably all agree as a kind of privatisation of government that goes on. I mean, that's one of the very peculiar things that Geoffrey Alton

assumed that privatisation he saw in the later 15th century was essentially medieval, but it's not. It's a very, very odd response that grows out of the wards of the roses. And part of this privatisation, I think, is a much greater emphasis on the conciliate courts, the courts

of the council, non-common law courts, which are peculiarly associated with the Crown, particularly the counsel and chancery, on which John in fact has done a lot of work under Henry the 8th. And to that extent, I mean, that is certainly new, the intensification with which Henry the 7th was exploiting these courts to tighten his hold over the law. And that is part of a general centralisation that is certainly occurring in the late 15th century, but certainly doesn't begin with Henry the 7th.

Well, I think it could be summarised in a sentence, actually, that Henry the 7th, enforced the law, but he did so primarily by fiscal methods using conciliate courts. So this was like putting a sort of Damocles above the heads of the nobility and the political classes so that in fact if you push this too hard, you risk wrecking the system and not in fact supporting it. So you think you see him as very much part of a continuation of the late medieval period. You don't see it as a new turning happening with Henry of the time. I see him as a continuation

but with a sharp fiscal edge. Christopher Hayek? I agree. Would you concur with that? Yeah. Yeah. I mean, We can't, I think, think of kings or ministers having great long programs in this period. Henry 17 is in a very dangerous situation. He's got a tenuous claim to the throne. He's facing rebellions year after, and disorder year after year. He's got to take short-term measures which will guarantee his position.

Some of those measures are controlling the aristocracy. Some of them are raising cash. He's not thinking about how did bull a modern state. Do you think that there is more happening in that sense with Henry the 8 when he comes of age and with his advisers, John Guy? Oh, absolutely, because the point is that. The Reformation was also a re-foundation of the monarchy. When Henry broke with Rome, he claimed to be supreme head of the church, and this gave a new charismatic edge to the monarchy.

And in fact, the royal supremacy was in fact a restatement of theocratic kingship. Historians call it Kaiser Papalism. The king is almost pope, as it were, within his own kingdom. Now, it seems to me that, and Elizabeth thought that too. I mean, the fact that she took the title Supreme Governor of the Church was for a gender reason. She still maintained that her authority over the church under Christ was as strong as that of Henry VIII.

Now it seems to me that the point here isn't that theory in itself because, I mean, for intellectuals at the time, that was, if you like, a Mickey Mouse theory even in the 16th century. I mean, King John had claimed to be an emperor in his kingdom, meaning, you know, in the same sense, a Kaiser re-Papelist ruler.

The point is that the Royal Supremacy triggers responses, ideas that really do contribute to, if you like, the onward march of the state because in Henry VIII's reign, people in fact, as a counter-the thesis to the royal supremacy, come up with ideas of parliamentary sovereignty that really directly anticipate what happens in 1688-89, that in fact the king is, if it were, subsumed within the mixed monarchy in which Parliament is an important part. And Elizabeth's reign, it triggers quasi-Republican responses in which people start to say that there's an abstract and personal state which subsumes the monarchy,

and that in fact Protestant subjects, Protestant subjects are in fact citizens of a state. Christopher Haig, Henry VIII, needed a divorce. The Pope wouldn't give it to him, and that, as you say, very emphatically, is fundamentally what the Reformation is about. But Thomas Cromwell, as I'm a son, justified the breaker of Rome

by arguing that the modern state needed to take control of religion. Was this claim simply a fig leaf addressing? It's partly that they have to produce justifications of what is actually a pragmatic solution to an immediate problem, the divorce question. How do you justify going against the Pope? And they come up with the idea of empire, England as an independent sovereign nation state and the king as supreme head of state and church. It's a pragmatic response, but it's also a pragmatic response which acquires intellectual respectability. and is given intellectual respectability by the king's researchers and publicists.

It comes to matter. Above all, it comes to matter to the king, who dreams up earlier or has dreamt up for him the idea of a royal supremacy, but he grows to rather like it. He likes posing as the man responsible for his subjects, souls as well as responsible for their bodies. He likes being able to pose as the man who's cleaning up the abuses of old religion. He likes posing as the moral leader of the nation

and the spiritual leader of the nation. Roger Scruton in his recent book, England analogy, makes the point that he thought that this was more possible for England to do than any other country in Europe because of a special feeling that the English had about themselves. Do you think there's anything in that at all? I think that's, I think it's true and I think it's also true that the fact of reformation adds to that feeling.

The Tudors, Henry VIII, Thomas Cromwell, their representatives, presented the break with Rome as an example. essential part of making a proper state, an independent state, a sovereign state. But in some respects it had been there before. The argument of empire had been used in the 15th century and earlier, and of course it's not a feeling which was there in Spain and France. Other reneous ors monarchs thought they could run a perfectly decent state without declaring independence from Rome. But there is something about English exceptionalism, that England is different, which had been there before, it's been used as slogans, particularly in time of war. And the fact that England

has separated from Rome, and then in that sense separated from the continent, contributes to that continuing attitude through the Tudor period and after. Would you agree with that, Christine? I'm not sure that I'm entirely equipped to talk about something which is very much a matter for debate amongst Tudors. I'm not sure about this sense of English exceptionalism. I mean, it definitely grows during the period of the Hundred Years' War. I mean, for very obvious reasons, this notion that we are, the English nation. against the French, although it's also quite clear.

It's actually already there before the 100 years of war. There's plenty of evidence that's there in the later 13th century. And I think if there is a sense, I suspect a lot of it comes back to the fact that there was what you can only call an English state there, long before the tutors, there was a sense of the being under one law, again, the national, the common law,

very strong sense of the public authority of the king, which is perceived as the crown. So I think if there is a sense of this, then it probably owes a lot to that. But of course there's also the extreme complexity of the fact that England isn't, in a sense, England. You know, we're back with the issues that we're talking about today. There's Scotland, there's Ireland, there's Wales.

And of course, there's also very large chunks of France, which England owed a lot of the time. So I'm a little bit uncertain. One of the things that does tend to get overlooked is how difficult it must have been for most people in the country to think about their religion in terms of whether they would get to heaven this new way. How did Henry VIII cope with that, whether the sacraments would really work if they weren't Catholic, whether the baptism would be a proper baptism and so on? Christopher Hay.

And this is a really, really dangerous business. I mean, Henry is not just tinkering with the institutional organization of the church. I think we do have to distinguish between political reformation and constitutional reformation, taking over control of the church from Rome and religious reformation, changing, attempting to change services and religious ideas. But once he moves on to the second changing ideas, in part to justify the first the constitutional changes, then he's in really, really deep water, because the response from Rome is the threat of excommunication

and eventual excommunication of the king, the possibility, therefore, that England is not part of Christendom. And that's serious business, as you said in love it, and do the sacraments work? Is it true that England outside the Universal Church does not get its people to heaven? Does baptism work? Does marriage work? Our marriage is valid. Will prayers for the dead work? It does all the sacramental system, which is to get men to heaven operative within England.

And it's a very serious business. And concern about that issue does produce a lot of squabbling in parishes, a lot of unhappiness with religious change, a lot of disorder and rebellion. And the old view that we were all taught as students that the Reformation was easy, I think has now gone by the board, the Reformation in England, or as I prefer to call them Reformation because they're becoming a series. It's a very difficult business, very hard to achieve. And in some respects, this religious issue relates to our political theme,

because the fact that the Reformation goes through may make it look as if the Tudor say is extremely powerful. powerful. Here is this great massive shift in intellectual and religious consciousness which is being apparently enforced upon an unwilling people and the state gets away with it. How does it do it? This must mean, or it may seem to mean, therefore that

England has a very strong state. The Tudas have a strong state. I don't think it actually works out like that. I think it's the way in which rich change happens. And your direct question was how does Henry cope with the fact that the big ideas are being imposed and how do people respond?

Henry gets away with it, his successors get away with it, because it doesn't come all in one big go. The Reformation in England is not one big event. It's a series of piecemeal changes over 10, 20, 30, 40 years. They get away with it because it happens very slowly. Yes, and also, John Gar, there's the business of reading back and reading at the time, as I understand it, Henry was still thinking, well, he might slip back to Rome. It wasn't as if he did it and said, now forever more, we will be changed. He wavered and hovered and even 10, 12 years later, was thinking, well...

Well, he was watching his back, of course, in Europe because what he feared was an alliance between Francis I first and Charles V that would result in a Catholic crusade against England. But it seems to me actually that Henry really does believe... I mean, Christopher has made this point that Henry really does believe in this theory of the divine right of kings. I mean, he's probably one of only probably 20 people in the whole of England who actually really does believe in it. But, I mean, he's totally persuaded by this. You see, what we've lost is the sense of presence of majesty that a personal ruler could inculcate.

I mean, it was said that, you know, 50 years after Henry's death, when you walked into the privy chamber at Whitehall and saw the fresco of him on the wall, that people still trembled. And people like Stephen Gardner in Edward Drain could say that, well, you know, the royal supremacy was credible when you had a figure like Henry VIII, but it was completely incredible when you had a boy of nine years old, his son Edward the Sixth, succeeding him.

I mean, I think we've touched on something which I think we should bring back into the discussion that it's as much, if you like, the opposition to the Reformation and the break with Rome that actually reinforces the Tudor state because, I mean, Henry, there is opposition, quite considerable opposition. I mean, the Pilgrimage of Grace is the largest revolt faced by the Tudors, probably the largest revolt, you know, I mean, for 150 years. And it's important because it involves all sections of society from, you know, if you like, second rank peers, you know, down to the commons. I mean, this is dealt with extremely skillfully. And again, in 1569, Elizabeth's reign, I mean, the northern rising, which is relatively small scale, is used as really an opportunity to almost colonise the north.

I mean, villages are raised, 120 villages are raised. The regular laying ways to the north, which is a feature of English history of the last thousand years. Because what's happening here, partly as a result of the Reformation, partly as a result of the advance of Tudor State, is that, in fact, the English monarchy is colonising England, the north. Wales, the south-west. And making claims over Ireland. And of course Ireland. And of course Ireland is in a way the test case because there you really do have two civilisations,

if you like, the Anglo-English, the Anglo-Irish civilisation around the pale, which is only sort of 19 square miles around Dublin, and the rest of Ireland, which is Gaelic. Can you talk to us, Christine Karpner, about the way that this affected, the Reformation, affected Henry VIII, John's ludicode to it,

but if we could develop this, the idea of kingship, having challenged the Pope successfully, how did that leave the idea of kingship in Tudor England? Presuming you want me to talk about this from a medievalist perspective. I'm not at all sure about this, because the old idea that you can't have a proper king, that you can't have a proper state, if you've got alien interference coming from Rome.

It's a very 19th century concept, I think, particularly the notion, of course, that it comes from Rome, is peculiarly English 19th century. And yet the actual influence wielded by the church on England in the late Middle Ages and particularly the external influence is really not very considerable. I mean, they've actually managed to use it for their own purposes. I mean, there's a thing called the writ of prohibition that can prevent cases going to the church courts.

And you find people just using that writ entirely as they think fit, so you'll have clerics going for a writ of prohibition so that their case doesn't end up in the church courts because they'd like it to go into the king's courts or conversely you'll find lay people using the church courts for things like debt because it's quicker and it's cheaper. And in exactly the same way that papal influence is really exploited for purposes of those who want to use it.

And of course a prime example is here's Henry VIII, wants to get rid of the wife he doesn't want any longer, and who can't provide him with a male heir. What does he do? He goes to the Pope who usually will quite helpfully help out monarchs with this sort of thing. And unfortunately, on this occasion, it doesn't work. And so everything else follows from that.

So, I mean, clearly the fact that Parliament legislates about religion after the break from Rome, I mean, that is a huge difference and it would be idle to deny that it is a change. but I'm not convinced that simply excluding papal authority actually makes such an enormous difference and after all of course England goes on having church courts now run by the state which are if they are hated

as much as they were before the idea of politics though was there a change here I'm trying to look at any changes that came that come about here obviously and rather sort of bluntly but John Guy in your book, Tudor Monarchy, you write, I'm quoting, politics for renaissance councillors and men of business became the state of their art and the art of the state.

Now, can you expand on that and was that new? Yes, I mean, I think this is the big change in the 16th century. Of course, it's happening all over Europe, not just in England, is that the Reformation brings ideology into politics. I mean, in my view, politics in the 15th century or in the Middle Ages, and it was about boundaries, the boundaries between church and state, between the canon law and the common law. It was about the distribution of patronage,

who had what officers, who had what jobs, who had what lands, who had what pensions. But in the 16th century, I mean, people are arguing about, you know, different theories of faith and salvation. And that's closely linked into politics. And in the second half of the 16th century, of course, I mean, England is not cut off from the continent.

I mean, England is anti-Papel, but, of course, I mean, it's not anti-European, because, of course, I mean, England is heavily involved in the French wars of religion with troops and in the Dutch revolt. These are the cosmic ideological struggles of the second half of the 16th century. And it seems to me that

the idea that the English became xenophobic as a result of the Reformation is hocus pocus. The English were anti-Catholic, but I mean there was an international Protestant cause. Now, Elizabeth was not too keen on this, of course, because it involved very big commitments and commitments that she knew that England probably couldn't actually meet.

And wars that she wasn't very good at. And wars that she wasn't very good at. But there were many people in the Privy Council, not least William Cecil, Lord Burley, I mean, who were very much believed in a Protestant cause and were prepared to take quite radical steps, for example, in Scotland, in order to deal with that. Christopher Haag, do you come in behind this idea of a new sort of politics developing then? I think we have to distinguish between the things that look different but aren't very, and the things that really were different as a result of the political consequences of the Reformation.

I mean, we've talked about empire, and that's not very different from what had been there before. The control of the clergy. The assertion of state control of the clergy looked terribly new, the appointment of bishops and heavy taxation in the clergy. But that's only an extension of what had gone on before. The use of the church as a political weapon, praying for the king, preaching in support of Crown politics, policies. I mean, that looks different, but it isn't really. That had happened before. There are some things that are new. One is control of a cladustic legislation, in which the legislative legislation. in which the legislative independence of the church goes and thereafter either Regis Master legislated for by the Parliament or the Crown controls convocation.

The second thing that really is new is the confiscation of the ecclesiastical property. But even that had happened a bit before, but it's a huge confiscation of the endowments of the church and a shift into the coffers of the Crown. And the third thing that is new, and it links up with John's point about, ideology in politics is the

essentially crown roth and parliamentary control of doctrine. Once the king asserts control over what people shall believe, then the development of policy in that area brings ideological division within the council and within parliament. Tom, sorry you

Well, I said we mustn't lose sight of the dissolution because of course the lands were sold by Henry the 8th and of course, you know, if you like the landed aristocracy, the nobility gentry acquired these lands and thus had a stake in the Reformation and, you in the Tudor monarchy, even if you take, for example, the religious settlement of 1559, I mean, in that vote, a lot of people voted for the royal supremacy because it protected their property.

Because, of course, if there had been a reunion with Rome on a permanent basis, then in fact that property, there would have been pressure for that to go back to the church, so that someone like Lord Rich would vote for the act of supremacy because he protected his property. But actually, he voted against the act of uniformity, because he thought the mass protected his soul. What he wanted was comprehensive insurance. But, I mean, the nobility becomes a court nobility, and a court liability with a stake in the crown and the Reformation.

Christine, you want to comment on that? Which bit would you like me to comment on? I mean, the notion of the vested interest in the Reformation. Well, I mean, having done some work on the beliefs of late medieval landowners, the thing that absolutely astonishes me is that the Reformation took place at all. And this comes back to what we were talking about earlier on. that their wills, I mean, their donations, everything they do is just resolutely orthodox and conventional. And what's most significant is a very large part of this is designed to get them out of purgatory.

And what I find quite extraordinary is that these people could sit in Parliament eventually and vote away all these institutions that were apparently going to save their immortal souls. and, I mean, they knew what purgatory was supposed to be like and very unpleasant too. And that somehow they did this despite the fact that, as far as I know, they still believed in purgatory. Now, John's point at that stage, about the vested interest, I think then becomes extremely important that, yes, you are very worried about your own soul,

you're very worried about grannies and grandad's souls. But on the other hand, there is all this nice land that's coming into the system, first from the monster is, then from the chantry's. And I think that is undoubtedly a strong reason why they are prepared to vote this through and a bubble to keep to it afterwards. Christopher.

Property and Protestantism are not the same thing. People are perfectly willing to vote for the dissolution of monasteries and the suppression of chantries and then to buy their lands. It doesn't mean they're Protestants. The foreign ambassador, the Spanish ambassador was complaining

in the reign of Mary when Catholicism was restored. that two-thirds of the ex-eclisical land are in the hands of Catholics. And it did influence their votes when it comes to the future of the property. It doesn't necessarily influence their vote when it comes to the content of religion. As it were, they may have been Catholics, but they weren't fools. If they'd pay good money for ecclesiastical property, and it was sold at market rates, they're not going to just give it away and restore it to the church.

And it's perfectly possible, and it happens with large numbers of families, that they have ecclesiastical lands and Catholic commitment simultaneously. We've been talking very much, I'm going to go back to the idea of the shoes, but just to bring in, very briefly, John Gai, other things that were happening that century, the massive growth of London became the biggest city in Europe, the massive inflation, which resulted in a change, House of Commons and changed problems, that and other things. What influence briefly did they have?

Are we talking about them having an emphatic and direct influence? Yes, well, I mean, what happened was that the population doubled, this is probably the most important fact about the 16th century. And the population of England in 1520 is about 2.2 millions. And by 1600 it's about 4.5 millions. And the reverse is only in the end of Mary's reign. Between 1555, 1558, 9, there was an influenza epidemic and the population dropped by about half a million.

But otherwise, it's a pressure on land, on food resources. This pushes up prices. It encourages entrepreneurship, the market economy and food staffs. But of course, Henry's Wall, Henry VIII's wars are hugely destructive because to pay for his later wars he not only sells the ex-religious lands he debases the currency

and the currency is debased again in Edwards' reign this causes rampant inflation so what happens is that of course that the haves get richer the rich get richer the poor get poorer there's a polarisation of society and in fact I mean you could construct an argument that in 1500 the Society of Orders

was still relatively intact a very clear hierarchy but by 1600 you could argue that there's almost the beginning of a class system, the haves and the have-nots, those who have property and those who don't. And the striking thing in which this is represented is the decline in rebellions in the 16th century. By the 1590s there are isolated revolts, but they're about food, supplies in London, this sort of thing, there's a political revolt, Essex's revolt in 16-1, but you don't get the large popular protests that you get, say, in 1549, in East Anglia,

and in the southwest, and the reason for that is that now everybody who owns property will, as it were, side with the magistrates against the rabble. I know you're speaking around the point of view of medieval historian, Christine, but do you see in the 16th century new ideas, foreign as it were, or I know everything's rooted in the past, but more foreign than common to medieval times? Do you see a humanism coming in,

which is the most obvious thing in the 16th century that wasn't there in the 14th century? And if so, where did that lead us to? And I'm not trying to argue that everything, is always exactly the same. Everything happened in your stature. No, no, no, what I am arguing is that... We're talking about a territorial rights. I'm not arguing that everything stays the same.

I am arguing against the concept that suddenly everything changes in the 16th century and this is the period of change. This is the century that sees the beginnings of the birth of the modern age. But of course there are lots of new ideas in the 16th century. and of course the influence of Italian humanism is hugely important, but it's not something I should be talking about, it's something that my Tudor colleagues should be talking about. It is already there, as everybody knows, in the 15th century.

I mean, famously, Humphrey of Gloucester, whose collection of books went to found the Bodleian Library at Oxford eventually, was an avid collector of books about the new learning. There's the infamous John Tiptoft, who did very nasty things to people who've been captured in battles, but it was also a very learned man in the new learning. There's a whole group of people associated with William Worcester, a major figure in the past in letters,

who are clearly very interested in this. But, I mean, it is undoubtedly new. I mean, I'm arguing that the ideology of a public realm, a public wheel of things pertaining to the state, a lot of which is related to the law, but also related to the fiscal power of the state, that that is well in place before 1500, but I would not begin to argue

that there aren't extremely new ideas coming in the 60th century. We have in the 16th century, the printing press really taking off and pamphlets coming out, the most famous pamphlets, as it were, is Utopia and the Moesutopia and Machiavelle as the prince, and the Bible, vernacular Bible, these, again, outside, almost outside the monarchs, had a tremendous effect on ideas

and the shifting mood in that century. think this is really where everything comes together because, you know, what classical humanism and indeed the Reformation, you know, brought to England and to other European countries was the idea of building a state, you know, people like Martin Buse, you know, called building the kingdom of God in this world. But that meant dealing with the sort of economic problems that we've been talking about, you know, in fact, you know, doing something about poor relief. But building a state, you know, which in fact has an end in view. There's a sort of teleology here of building a Christian Commonwealth. I mean, at the same time, you know, the power of the state is marching on. You know, I mean, go to the public record office and look at the, you know, the state papers.

It's not just simply what's in them. It's the quantity. You know, I mean, for Henry the 7th is virtually nothing. You know, for Henry the 8th is really quite a lot. For Elizabeth, there is in proportion, you know, for each year two or three times as much as there is for Henry the 8th. By the 17th century, there's 10 times as much. The state is interfering in everything. Now, what's happening is that people are being politicised by the press, by what they read.

You know, those who go to sermons, you know, can hear things there. And the bureaucracy, of course, is increasing all the time. So we're talking, are we at Grys of a, hey, at the end of the 16th century, of a society, use the word state if you want to use it, which has moved on an awful lot since Pawsworth Field. It's moved on, but I'm not sure that I'd want to call it modern. I didn't call it modern. No, you didn't.

You didn't back on modern. And I'm not sure. Gordon begins about 1640. Christine thinks it begins about 11 or 60. I think 1867. Nothing happened in England between 1066 and 1867. But we have to teach our patch so we pretend it did. Well, I think quite a lot happened in 1688, 89, you see.

Exactly. And this is really well. Because in this 1689, I mean, a Catholic king was deposed. And a foreign king, William III, was brought in and made a king effectively by Parliament. Now, it seems to me that, you know, the story that you tell, as historians, partly depends on when you start the story and when you end it. But if you start the story in 1485 and you end it in 1688-89, then it seems to me that the Elizabethan succession crises, the reformation, this idea of a Protestant state with citizens, and of course

Catholics and non-conformists were not citizens in this polity, but also the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, which was, if you like, the counter-theist to divine right of kingship, is in fact exactly what is put in place in 1689. And someone like William Cecil in Elizabeth's reign, Elizabeth won't settle the throne, she won't marry, they want a Protestant succession, and he plans in his papers a contingency plan

that's almost identical to what happens in 1688-89. Well, so Christine sort of comes in before the Tudies, you nip over them, and Christopher also nips over them. Nevertheless, you have these monarchs of outstanding public, presence and recognition to this day. You have an age which produced our greatest writers, musicians, culture, painting, buildings.

You have something which has enormous power to fire people's imagination. And a lot of people who are obviously not as skilled as you three to start with still believe that this was a very special and very important period in our history. In the bigger picture, do you think that they're wrong? No, because it's an age of personality.

The tremendous personalities, Henry VIII, Elizabeth, and in fact, writers like Thomas Moore. But, of course, Moore was a man in a way out of place in the 16th century. He belonged in the 15th century. This was a man who was a writer who published, who printed books, but yet as Lord Chancellor, in fact, you know, prescribed, banned 120 books in less than two and a half years because, you know, in a way, you know, his world

couldn't cope with the technology of people actually reading things and forming their own opinions. Christopher Hay. I think John's right that it's an age of personality. I mean, our period is interesting because interesting things happen and because interesting people are there. That doesn't mean that this period

is any more important than any other period. John's kind of very sophisticated wick, he believes in tracing historical progress. I'm interested in historical accidents and the way things go backwards and forwards. I think things do go backwards and forwards in the 16th century. And was it Ranka who said that EJ.H is equidistant, from eternity. They're all equally important.

And to claim that our bit is more important than another bit, I mean, it may be kind of gets a few more students. I didn't say important, and I said resonance. But I think it's the personalities that give the residents, not because there are great structural shifts and major changes, which have long-term consequences. Would you agree

with that? I think so. I mean, I think there is a long period in which an enormous amount changes, but of what you might call steady development from the later 12th century up to the late 17th century. I think almost everybody would agree that there are

some major changes in the state in the late 17th century. And incidentally, can we not forget Jeffrey Chaucer if we're talking about our greatest English writers? They don't all belong in the 16th century. No, I didn't say they all belong. By including people, I didn't exclude other people. I'm up to Sir Robert. Finally, the man who, of whom you're all pupils,

Jeffrey Elton, thought that the modern state was invented by by Thomas Cromwell around that time and you've turned out wrong us through, haven't you? I mean, his views, you've all turned against that idea. Geoffrey studied the history of administration and I'm trying to study the history of politics and ideas. If we didn't have new ideas, we'd be out of a job. The tutor period is a period that has traditionally been full of bureaucrats

and administrators, the Middle Ages, full of aristocrats, but that's in many ways a trick of historiography in which Geoffrey actually played a very large part emphasizing the bureaucrats, which makes it looks more different than it actually is. Did you discuss your ideas oppositional to his with him at all, John Gai?

Yes, absolutely. Yes, many times. And how did he take it? Well. Very well. He always did. From his own students, actually, he was very, very ready

to accept straightforward contradictions of his ideas. And are you prepared for a new, you all and to rise up and attack the three of you? Happens every day. I'll call students. Next week I'll be discussing evolutionary psychology with Stephen Rose, Nicholas Humphrey

and Janet Radcliffe Richards. Meanwhile, thank you very much for listening. We hope you've enjoyed this Radio 4 podcast. You can find hundreds of other programmes about history, science and philosophy at BBC.com.com.uk forward slash radio 4.