Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Anu Hariharan – Lessons in Growth Investing - [Invest Like the Best, EP.198]

Episode Date: November 3, 2020

My guest this week is Anu Hariharan. Anu is a partner at Y-Combinator's Continuity Fund where she focuses on growth investing. Before YC, Anu was an Investment Partner at Andreesen Horowitz where she worked with portfolio companies Airbnb, Instacart, Medium and Udacity. In this conversation, we discuss growth stage businesses and their business models, how her background as an engineer impacts her investing style, the most interesting international markets for tech start-ups, and how much opportunity there still is for investing in tech and e-commerce startups. This conversation left me thinking about how much digital transformation there still is in front us and the exciting opportunities ahead. Enjoy this great conversation with Anu Hariharan.    This episode is brought to you by Koyfin, one of the fastest growing fintech startups. I discovered Koyfin earlier this year when I asked twitter for the best Bloomberg alternative, and the overwhelming winner was an intriguing new product called Koyfin.  Koyfin has tons of high-quality data, powerful functionality, and a nice clean interface. If you’re an individual investor, research analyst, portfolio manager, or financial advisor, you should definitely check them out. Sign up for free at koyfin.com    This episode of Invest Like The Best is also sponsored by Assure. Assure is changing the way investors manage private transactions.  With Assure, investors can eliminate nearly all the admin cost of private investment. On top of that, they handle all the backend, legal, taxes, accounting, and compliance. All of it, with a straightforward one-time fee. Learn more and try Assure for yourself at https://www.assure.co/patrick.   For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag   Show Notes (2:45) – (First question) – How she thinks about growth stage businesses through their business models (5:00) – Her views on the winner-take-all business goal (9:53) – How to prioritize the stakeholders when building a network business (12:19) – Priorities in growth stage businesses vs those seeking Series A funding (18:25) – Most interesting international markets (21:44) – Risks in investing in international tech startups (24:54) – Assessing a hardware-based tech company vs software business (30:22) – How her background as an engineer impacts her investing style (36:11) – Lessons from the various growth strategies she’s observed (40:05) – How valuation impacts the company and her decision to invest (45:45) – How far along are we into the global digital transformation and what opportunity is left (48:15) – Sectors that are still primed for more digital transformation (52:50) – How the tech investing landscape has changed during her career (57:45) – Kindest thing anyone has done for her   Learn More For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag  

This episode is brought to you by Coifin, one of the fastest growing fintech startups. I discovered Coifin earlier this year when I asked Twitter for the best Bloomberg alternative, and the overwhelming winner was an intriguing new product called Coifin. Coiffin is a web-based platform that lets you analyze stocks, ETFs, mutual funds, and other assets all in one place. I now use it daily to track what's going on in the market, and I think if you try it, you will too. Coifin has tons of high-quality data, powerful functionality, and a nice, clean interface. If you're an individual investor, research analyst, portfolio manager, or financial advisor, you should definitely check them out.

Sign up for free at coiffin.com. That's k-o-y-f-in.com. This episode of Invest like the Best is also sponsored by Assure. Assure is changing the way investors manage private transactions. When we recently launched our own venture fund, Positive Sum, I found out my biggest investor used to manage their investment. With Assure, investors can eliminate nearly all the admin cost of private investment. On top of that, they handle all the back end, legal, taxes, accounting, and compliance. When you outsource to assure your investor relationships and do more deals.

All of it with a straightforward one-time fee. Learn more and try Assure for yourself at assure.co slash Patrick. That's a s-s-s-U-R-E dot CO slash Patrick. Hello and welcome, everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Invest like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, methods, stories, and of strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. You can learn more and stay up to date at investorfieldguide.com.

Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of O'Shaughnessy Asset Management. All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of O'Shaunacy Asset Management. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of O'Shaunosate Asset Management may maintain positions and the securities discussed in this podcast. My guest this week is Anu Harihara.

Anu is a partner at Y Combinator's Continuity Fund where she focuses on growth investing. Before YC, Anu was an investment partner at Andresen Horowitz where she worked with the portfolio company's Airbnb, Instacart, Medium, and Udacity. In this conversation, we discussed growth stage businesses and their business models, how her background as an engineer impacts her investing style, the most interesting international markets for tech startups, and how much opportunity there still is for. investing in tech and e-commerce startups. This conversation left me thinking about how much digital transformation there still is in front of us and excited for the opportunities ahead. Please enjoy this

great conversation with Anu Hari Haran. So, Anu, thank you so much for doing this with me. I thought an interesting place to begin would be with your framework for how you think about growth stage businesses through their business model rather than through their industry and why that lens is appropriate for investing. First of all, thank you so much for having me, better. I'm a huge fan of the podcast. Specifically on business models, I in fact gave a presentation in YC for the YC batch a couple of years ago. And we focused primarily on business models because when you break down tech startups, even by industry, certain business models really overlap.

So let's start with what they are. So for example, if you're looking at marketplaces, whether you're a BDB marketplace or a consumer marketplace, at the highest level, you have gross merchandise volume, the dollar value of the transaction that's flowing through. You have a take rate that translates to net revenue. Then you have a bunch of costs associated with servicing that revenue, especially all variable costs, and then you deduct that to get to contribution margin,

and then you have a bit of margin. So the reason we focus on business models by function versus industry is that as tech is pervasive across industries and software is eating the world, you do see that whether it's a B2B or a B2C, if your business model is marketplace, your metrics are similar. If your business model is advertising, like LinkedIn has an advertising angle, but it's arguably on the B2B side.

Well, Facebook is on the consumer side of advertising. But advertising is a business model, you monetize in a similar way. When we broke it down, I think there are about 9 to 10 business models that really are the most common across tech businesses. At growth stage investing, especially at the stage we invest in, be it the B or the C, we're sort of, testing on, okay, if you have product market fit, which is say you have, if you're a consumer business, you hopefully have like a million plus users or at least a few hundred thousands,

but what truly is your business model at scale? What's going to drive your revenue? What are all the costs associated with the revenue? And what is the scale efficiency or the leverage that you're going to get as you scale? And is that underlying business model solid? So that's what we are looking for in a business model. You mentioned something before we hit, record that I found totally fascinating, especially at the stage that you're starting to look at at this sort of B or C kind of growth stage, which I take to mean they've got a product that's working. There's less product risk than you might take earlier on. You mentioned one area specifically, which is food delivery and DoorDash, where I know you've been involved. But you made a point,

which is interesting, which is the consensus is all of these markets are winner take all or most, and that there's effectively a pie to go win. And if you race to scale, which most growth companies are trying to do, you can have this outsized outcome. And I think you have a slightly different perspective on this winner take all or most idea. And I'd love you to explore that for us. Yeah. So especially in internet e-commerce businesses. And I think there was this very strong prevalent trend that most businesses would be winner-take most. So let's talk about food delivery in particular. So if you looked at food delivery a decade ago in the most narrow sense, you'd think of it as how many people are ordering for delivery today? And is that transitioning online?

online. That may have been a small market, maybe 10, 15 billion. But if you look at the takeout market, it was a 70 billion dollar market. Most of the takeout market was literally someone placing an order on the phone. Either you go pick up and that was the takeout market. And then there was this whole restaurant market, which is like hundreds of billions of dollars with majority of restaurants not doing any delivery. So Dorash. Dorash is a very fascinating company. It's a 2012 YC company. And one of the things that's very interesting being inside YC is we have this unique preview into knowing what the company and the founders insights were from day one because they have to apply. If you literally read DoorDash's application from 2012, you know, they were actually

called Palo Alto Delivery.com. I think they still own the domain. If you actually type the domain, it takes you to Dorash. And that's because all four founders were from Stanford. And their insight was, hey, I cannot order any food from any restaurant in Palo Alto. No one delivers. Well, there was so much talk about Grubhub. But Grubh and Seamless, even after their merger, more than 60% of their business came from two cities, Chicago and New York.

They literally built this delivery business in Palo Alto because there were students at Stanford and they wanted the restaurants in Palo Alto to deliver food to them when they were they ordered. And their insight was two things. They said most people are going to chase cities because they think that's where people eat out. but actually customers in suburban areas really want delivery and access to delivery, but no one's doing it.

So that was first insight, which was start with the suburbs because maybe the retention will be better because there's not many people focusing on the suburbs. The second thing related, they found out, was a lot of the delivery drivers that were driving for restaurants in these suburbs didn't have much work because the delivery volume was lower. Very few restaurants did it. And so they realized that we could recruit those delivery drivers and increase their average pay per hour, we could give them more deliveries or more others, we'll be able to retain and acquire drivers at a better rate than Uber could.

And those two insights alone is really what helped Doradge differentiate and scale. So in 2016, I remember this very vividly because that's when Uber Eats launched. And Uber is such a big right-sharing business. And I think most investors thought that food delivery is a zero-sum game. And Uber is going to be the market leader. in the US. Fast forward four years. Today, undoubtedly, DoDash is the market leader, and there's still room for two or three players. And so what was different? One, the insight they had, they started from the suburbs, the auto values and suburbs are higher. It's actually, they are way more cost-efficient

to acquire that driver, like 10 times better than what a right chatting company does in terms of acquisition of driver. And you see that in their retention cohorts too. And then the other thing they focused on was merchant strategy. I think from very early on, Tony's insight was selection is the most important. 70% of customers on DoorDash really stay on DoorDash for selection. They not only acquired a wide variety of merchants, but also provided them with workflow integration tools in terms of when you get orders, how do we queue up everybody, the ones that you get via DoorDash versus other tools or through phone calls, how do we help you with accounting, how do we help you with invoice processing. So that's the stickiness

of the integration workflow plus the core merchant focus. really help them spike on selection, and the approach from suburban and then to Siftees really help them tip. So fast forward today, I don't think there is any doubt that there's room for two or three players. But I think having that insight that Doddash did really helped. So you can see that there's room for multiple market players. It doesn't mean you can have 10, because there's still something called scale effects that you get and you have a fixed operating cost space to support significant scale. But there's definitely room for at least two to four per market.

market. Can you say a bit more about maybe this sticking with the DoorDash example? I'm always interested when there's sort of a marketplace-like dynamic. You're effectively connecting supply and demand. How you decide as you build out the business who to focus on. I find that, of course, customers matter here and of course the restaurants matter here. Any insights from watching a lot of marketplaces and maybe even DoorDash specifically about how they choose to prioritize their different stakeholders? I did this piece of work well at Andrews and Horowitz on Network Effects. And I remember I learned this from Chris Diction. He always said, in a marketplace, you've got to figure out which is the hard side.

And at different points of your company's evolution, one side is easy and another side might be hard, but it changes. The side might actually change. So the simplest way to explain this, the way I've thought about it is I lived in New York for five years before coming to the Bay Area. And if you look at New York bars, the dating scene was incredibly hard in New York. And some of the bars used to incentivize women at Happy Horror. There used to be discounts for women to come to the bar.

And that's because they said it was really easy to get the men into the bar, but it was really hard to get the women into the bar. So at different points of your marketplace evolution, you need to figure out which side is hard and do you need to subsidize. So let's look at Airbnb. You have the host and the guest. Initially, the guests were actually easier to get because when they targeted events. So their famous story is the Road Al-Aline design conference or there was a design conference

going on in San Francisco and all the hotels were sold out. So of course, it's on Craigslist. They're looking for a place to say. But it was really daunting for a host to put up their home to rent. So at that time, the subsidy was on the host side. In fact, they were incurring acquisition cost only on the host side. They were acquiring demand completely organically. They spent zero dollars for a long time to acquire demand. And then at some point it switches when your host, if you have a significant number of hosts in a certain city that's making a good revenue stream out of the business, you may have locked in supply and now maybe the harder side for the next layer of scale. So what I mean by that is say if you're going from 1 million to 4 million customers, maybe your demand side becomes harder. Then you've got to start offering subsidies on the demand side.

But at every stage of the marketplace, you have to always ask yourself, which is the harder side today? As you've explored the growth stage specifically, what are the key elements of diligence that happen for those companies that didn't happen or maybe were less important at, say, the Series A or seed earlier on in the business's life? I think the highest level three criteria is pretty much the same, which is number one team, number two, market opportunity for that business. And number three is performance to date. And this is where I think CDSA investor would say early signs of product market fit

because the company has been around for maybe 15 to 24 months, which is by the time we are investing, the company is usually three to four years old. And so we call it growth investors call it performance to date, which is how have you really executed in the last four years, both from a top line as well as from a cost perspective? So let me touch on each, number one team. Team, a CDSA investor would probably say, how strong, what is the founder market unique insight that you have? I use the analogy of the

YC application on the early stage. It's literally, they have nothing. They're usually never launched. I mean, more than 60% of our companies haven't launched on the early stage. But what we are looking for is what unique insight you as founders have about the problem you're solving and why you think that's a big opportunity. So that's what we are really trying to gather from the team. And second, the speed with which they move. From the time they had an idea, how far, have they been executing? Did they actually do an MVP in two months or is taking them six months to do an MVP and why?

So that's what you're looking at the series A. In growth, what we are looking for from team is clarity of thought. And I'll give an example for each. Clarity of thought, your ability to learn and scale. And third is your grit and determination. So clarity of thought. B or the CEO evaluation is roughly like $200, 400 million. And so at that point, it's not necessarily

the investor is looking for a 10x, but they really want to know what is your clarity of thought on whether this company is at least a $3 billion or a $5 billion or a $10 billion company. I usually refer to the Brex founders for this example. So the Brex founders went through YSene Winter 17 and second or third week into the badge. They have this idea of Brex, which is corporate credit card for startups, but they took an accounting class in Stanford. They were actually Stanford freshman. And I asked them, why are you doing this? accounting class. Enrique and Pedro, this was their second company, believe it or not, like they had built strike for Brazil and sold it when they were like 19. And they said, well,

we just want to really build a case for why will Brex be a billion dollar company at least. And we want to build a model that thoroughly reflects market share, how many customers we need to get, whether there's appetite for so many customers, what's the unit economics? So we just wanted to take the accounting class to really make sure that whatever case we built was relevant. And So I said, okay, but what's the point? And they're like, well, the stakes are high. We're going to quit Stanford if you're going to build this. And so we just want to know, is this worth, is this a big company?

Is that a big company to be built here? And that clarity of thought is rare. It honestly comes once in a decade. To this day, of course, they've deviated from plans and they've far exceeded plans in more cases. But like that product roadmap, even though they were starting with corporate startups and all the suite of products that thought through that they would build is still pretty much spot on.

That's right. That's something we're looking for for entrepreneurs. Do you have the clarity of thought on how big this business can get? The second example is your ability to learn and scale. So here, your first phase of the CEO is your do it yourself, CEO, which is you probably have a team of fighter 10 people. It's all about getting to product market fit. It's all about tweaking that product, really figuring out, are there 1,000 customers that love you? Can you get that to 10,000 and so on? But the moment you start hitting 30 people, you now have to become the company builder and chief. Most CEOs are the median age of YCCC is like 27 or 29. So for most of them, they've not managed more than 20 or 25 people. And for some of them, it's their first job. So they don't have people management skills. Their ability to learn and scale as a leader is something, I think YC, and we have an unfair advantage there because we've known them for four years. And fair, the company fair, the CEO, Max Road is an example. Like if you look his resume tremendous background. He was the GM of Caviar, launched square cash, and Ferris, like a marketplace that connects makers and retailers. So of course, he really knows the business

building, but he's never managed many people. And he got this feedback very early on in his company evolution that he openly admits his people were terrified of him. He realized that he wouldn't be able to successfully build a company if he doesn't improve on that lens. And so he went and hired an exec coach. He constantly sought feedback from everyone around the table, from his own leadership team. He's a phenomenal leader and scaling really well as a leader. People often look to Patrick and Johns from another YC company and saying they were one of the best founders that have built one of the best exec teams in the valley. And honestly, the entire company is great. I think fair is the next strike in the caliber

of people that they're going to build. That's the second thing we're testing. And the third is grit and determination, which is almost a given, but so hard to test. But once you're in existence for at least four years. There's surely been at least two or three near-death experiences in your company. And how have you survived that? DoorDash has gone to hell and back. And I would never bet against Tony. I'd say the same about Rappi, the Latin American company, which is in Stacartor-Dash. I mean, odds were against them. They don't even have a strong venture capital market in LADAM, and they're building a capital-intensive company. But my God, their grit and determination is unparalleled. And so you don't want to bet against those founders. So those are,

are really the three things that we are looking at from a team perspective, which is more proof points and a different lens from what a venture investor looks at when you look at a growth stage company. You mentioned Latam, and it makes me think of non-US markets for these kinds of global technology companies. What other markets do you think are the most interesting, maybe from a geographic standpoint right now? The world is increasingly becoming global. I mean, YC started a decade ago, and pretty much all the startups are U.S.-based. Today, out of the 2,500-plus startups we've funded, 27% of them have headquartered outside the U.S.

More recently in our batches, at least 40% of our startups are international. So I think if you play this a decade out, I think at least 50% of WIC startups are going to be headquartered outside the U.S. Innovation is just happening everywhere. Specifically, markets I'm excited about, of course, there's a lot being written about China.

China is probably further ahead than other markets. But emerging markets, I'd say, very bullish on India, Indonesia, and Latin America. What's going on in these three? India, I think the GDP of a capita has always been really low, like in the order of 2000 to $2,500, which is why the willingness to pay was not as high. And so you didn't see as many $30, $50 billion companies coming out of India. But that's going to change. this decade, 2020 to 2030, the GDP per capita is expected to go at least to $5,500,

which is what China had more than a decade before. And that's what really propelled a lot more multi-unicorn companies that were built in the region. And India has the talent. I mean, if you measure the number of computer science strads, India produces as many or more than the United States. It's soon supposed to surpass that. Therefore, I do think it has the talent and it has the venture capital ecosystem. The GDP per capita is the one ever.

solution we need, but it's happening this decade. So I'm very bullish there. Indonesia, GDP per capita is already really high. The population is far lower, but you're seeing a lot more Southeast Asian founders, even founders from other regions moving to Indonesia to build businesses. And there is a huge investor ecosystem like some of our companies, Zendit, which is a YC company, which is the stripe for Indonesia, is really pioneering payments in Indonesia. And you see a lot more new businesses starting in Indonesia, especially in the fintech space. So that's another. Third is Latin America. What's fascinating about Latin America, and I learned this something from RAPI,

actually working closely with RAPI, Latin America has 650 million people, 70% internet penetration. GDP per capita, same as China, $9,700. In fact, countries like Chile, Argentina, Uruguay is closer to $12,000 to $15,000. And 200 cities with high people density. what's the e-commerce penetration? 4%. And the e-commerce penetration of China is 22%

and maybe because of COVID is probably higher. But pre-COVID was 22% and pre-COVID in Latam was 4%. So you just do the math and I just think Latin America is going to be huge. It's geographic proximity to North America is going to help with the investor base and talent. It's really hard to build a company in India

and find execs that have scale experience. But Latam can at least get the people from the U.S. to move to Latam. I do think Latam is going to see a huge wave of multibillion dollar businesses in probably a region that doesn't get as much attention as India or other parts of Southeast Asia. What are both the reasons behind that and the risks associated with that sort of early investing? I mean, 4% is tiny. It seems like it'd be hard to not squint your eyes and look forward, say, 20 years. It'd be impossible to imagine that digital and internet and e-commerce is way more penetrated in Latin America.

on that sort of timeline. So the opportunity seems obvious. What's the catch? Like, what are the risks and the difficulties and the reason it's gone slower? Look, it is fragmented across multiple countries, right? It's not one country. And so the regulatory environment is actually quite complex for a young startup starting out of one country. So for example, if you look at the case of Rappi, they work with hundreds of thousands of delivery drivers and personal shoppers, but they have to navigate the Columbia landscape and the Brazil landscape and Mexico. And they present in nine countries in Argentina and Chile, the complexity really starts increasing. Second complexity is even in company building. They have probably more than 2,000 employees, but that are spread across

East. There was this whole mantra start in San Francisco. Keep most of your employees in San Francisco and you can also find all the other scale bags. That's simply not true there. And then you're also navigating with different time zones. But all of those are changing. And also investor interest before Rappi was very little. So Rappi went through, I mean, we're talking about Rappi as though it's established company. It's four years old. So it went through YC in summer of 2016. I was actually at Andreessen Horowitz at the time and we wrote the first seat check in RAPI. And it was fascinating because Andreessen Horowitz at the time did not do any investments outside the U.S. And literally our first investment was RAPI. And I think that's because we could see through the vision of the

founder's eyes how big that opportunity was. And we were already investors in Instacart at the time. people knew a lot about DoDash. And there was this company that's building essentially the Instacart plus Doordash of Latin America. So I think that there's more investor interest now, given there's a lot more startups in the ecosystem. And RAPI has sort of paved the way for generating that amount of investor interest. The second thing, people are realizing that in spite of that regulatory complexity and challenges, the market is very attractive. And it's not just from startups.

Look at Uber. I mean, for Uber in right sharing, Brazil and Mexico are some of the most important markets outside the developed markets. And there's a lot of money, right? The GDP per capita is really high. It's not that the auto values are low. So if you look at Rappi's auto value, that's something that's counterintuitive.

It's close to $20. And that's not the case in China or India. India is like far less than $20, maybe $5. And the food delivery players blended will be around 30, 35. So 20 is not that far from 30 or 35. But the difference is in cost of delivery. The cost of delivery is, less than 10% of the order value in Latam versus in the U.S., 50% of your gross fees goes on delivery.

It's unfortunate, but the socioeconomic status difference in Latam structurally helps support these companies because you have high order values. At the same time, your cost of delivery can be less than a dollar per order. And the minimum wage per hour is also a lot less than the U.S. One of the things that was really interesting to see in companies that you've been involved with is Boom Supersonic. I bring it up because I don't even know if hardware is the right term, physical technology, maybe it's such an interesting looking company. How do you assess a company like that relative to

a more traditional sort of software-heavy technology portfolio given the, I would assume, extreme capital intensity and extremely long lead times? What's different about that company and why do you find it interesting? Often at YCA, I often say, like it goes back to the prior insight that I told shared with you, which is I don't think any other invest. best of firm has that, which is we have this unique insight into how the founders are scaling and how big their vision or mission is. And Blake is that kind of a founder. So I think Blake, even if you talk to him five years ago, he was absolutely laser focused on building a supersonic jet. And if you look at his background, nothing screams of that. He worked at

Amazon and then was a Groupon and then background. How do you think of an Amazon group on person building a supersonic jet. But then when you spend time with him, you see how much time he has spent outside of his core work, learning about planes, and that's where he just perks up and he knows to fly and he knows about all the jets and he can tell you what the nuances of each jets are, what's the difference. His whole mission was, look, it's easy for me to build a software company. Everybody can. And there's lots of people starting. But people are not doing the hard things. And why is it that aviation has seen no innovation in like decades, not just one decade in two or three decades. I mean, we already hired the Concord for crying out loud. And like we didn't have any,

they shut it down. And then even though there has been advancement in manufacturing, advancement in laser technology, advancement in supersonic, no one's investing in it. The way from an investment perspective, we really look at these, what we call the hard tech bets is quite simple. We actually use a mental model. So which is you look at science risk, engineering risk, market slash commercialization risk, funding risk. That's it. You break them down into four buckets. So the science risk for boom was very low. The supersonic jet was already built. And so there's proven science, it flew. What most people don't realize, the reason they had to shut down Concord was it was not economically viable the way they built it. And the cost per seat and the number of

people in the plane didn't really support the cost to operate that plane. That inside that LACAD from day one was very powerful. Science risk, we were like, it's low. Okay, we get it. You can build a better jet with a new technology and maybe even a better max speed over time, but it's largely proven and there was a plane that launched. Engineering risk is the bet we are taking, which is you have all this advancement, but the advancement really matters only in the speed and pace with which you execute

and the less errors you can make. So one of the biggest milestones is that's actually the assembly of the jet itself. So it's like, okay, you run all these software simulations to figure out, is this how I need to design the part? What should be the specs of the part? But until you actually put it together, you don't know if those things work and like, okay, how fast can you iterate on the simulation and can you do the course correction so that your manufacturing is not delayed significantly. And that engineering risk, we were willing to take a bet on the boom team because that's their core strength. That's Blake's strength. His strength is in software and his ability to attract really

strong software folks to help build that. So that's the engineering risk. Market of commercialization risk, like I remember when he was going through the batch, one of our group partners told him, go prove to me. I know you were not going to build this, but go prove to me that you can get Richard Branson excited about this. And he did it. He didn't know Richard Benson at all. And he just went, hunted him down, pitched boom, and Richard was one of the first angel investors in boom. Over the course of two years, he had more than a dozen, two dozen contracts from commercial airlines. I mean, Japan Airlines is an investor in boom. But they all have contracts in place where they have an option to buy the first 10 jets when they produce.

So we're like, okay, he's proven market and commercial risk and funding risk. So when you look at funding risk for hot tech, you have to think different. We're not assuming that this is venture capital that's going to fund them forever and see them through. But if you actually spend a lot of time in aerospace, you realize that the pools of the capital that they can tap into are plenty. So you can start off with venture funds maybe, but then there are lots of suppliers that actually finance this program. So for example, for engine program, it's a known thing where like GE and others who manufacture engines actually can finance up to $500 million engine program for any model that you're working on. And then you also

have these huge raw material suppliers who finance the manufacturing of the plane. And so when we did the math, we said, okay, even if they need it, they probably need a billion dollars to build the overture, which they call the commercial jet. Okay, what are the different pools of capital that they can tap into? When we did all the risk assessment, it was literally market risk is low. If the thing flies, there will be enough appetite from airlines and consumers. Imagine if you could fly to around the world trip in a day. You don't need flat seats. You could fit more people in the plane and make it economical. And then there is funding risk is medium, but that depends on execution. there's lots of pools of capital. And engineering risk is high. So engineering risk and funding risk

also falls on the founder and that's where our conviction on the team comes. So that's what was our mental model on how we decided to lean in on boom. I know your background originally was in engineering working for Qualcomm. That's what you studied. We were talking about that before we hit record. I would love to hear how that background plays into your style as an investor. Typically, engineers are unsatisfied until they understand deeply how something works. I would just be curious. is to know if that translates over. And if so, what are some anecdotes or examples of how that happens? You asked me a decade ago, I don't think I would ever even thought of being an investor, not that I was ever fascinated by it, but just didn't know much about it. At Qualcomm, I was tasked

with deploying our 3G handsets with their video, telephony and video streaming solution. This was pre-Iphone. So there was nothing called an app ecosystem at the time all over Europe. over my first two years, people really knew me as an awesome debugger. That's really what's my title, even though my official title was senior software engineer. But there was a joke in the company that if there was a bug anywhere in any part of the world, like deploy, I know, because she's going to go find out what's the root cause. And that's just because I love, I actually thrive and know when there was the answer to a problem. And it just keeps me up.

And it's just something that I've always liked. And it's somewhat nerdy. They used to send me to Italy a lot at the time where we were deploying three G. all over with all the operators. And there was this weird bug at one of the cell zones during transition. And I had to keep driving with my form factors to, A, replicate the bug and then debug it and then fix the code. It was often done in like a time pressure setting. So fast forward, I often say that process of finding root cause is really what excites me about a diligence process. And so when I was at BCG post-business school, I actually spent five years in the private equity

practice. The private equity practice was doing due diligence for several private equity firms across several industries. My first case was in mortgages and it was literally to figure out a mortgage book and whether this fee firm needs to acquire that. I also looked at evaluating a diamond mine for one of the private equity firms. And so I knew nothing about diamond mining, for example. And I was like, okay, how do you replicate this process? Okay, we need to figure out whether we need to buy this mine. We need to just understand how the price of diamond evolves and what's the role this diamond mine will play in the supply scale and evolution because that influences. To build a supply curve of diamonds, I mean, believe it's so hard. You realize that it's such

an opaque industry. It's an oligopoly between Dibir's and Alrosa, but there's this long tail of diamond mines, maybe like thousand of them. And you have to estimate their supply production capabilities. And the only way to do that is like we were doing calls to Boswana. We even had somebody from BCG Africa like to visit the mines and talk to some of the workers that really understand what the supply production is. And we had to come up with this probabilistic curve. So the way I used the diligence skill or the debugging skill, if you will, was literally in private equity theory,

it was that diligence root cost process because private equity firms were all about downside risk protection. It's like, okay, I know what I can do with this mind, but tell me what my downside risk is. And so we would really unworth to the extent possible, like what's the true curve and what's the true impact from a downside that you will see as a firm. And then fast forward to Andreson Horowitz, which was such a different nature of investing.

I feel like you can be a great tech investor only if you're an optimist, not if you are a pessimist. One of the reasons why I feel like private equity worlds and venture worlds never overlap for a reason. When I was at Antries and Horowitz, I was hired for the diligence skillset, by the way. So they loved my diligence experience in the fact that I could go deep on any sector pretty much and figure out how to sort of build a investment case around it. but two months into my job, Mark Andreessen told me this. He said, your bias is going to be to say no, because you use your process on private equity to figure out downside risk.

He said, here's my challenge to you. You use the same process to figure out the upside potential. And the reason is he said, look, as venture investors, you will lose money, but you lose only one extra money. If you turn down a 10x investment, you lost an opportunity in a. a company that could potentially return the fund. And that's grand slam. And he was like, you have got to reduce the number of grand slam misses we have. It's a very simple insight and hindsight. That just

changed my way of thinking. So now when Grok State Diligence, like when I work with my team, I always tell them, look, don't spend 30% 60% of your time writing the bear case. Spend 70% of your time telling me what's your 20% upside probability case because that's what most investors are not going to get. The example I use here is strike. I mean, unbelievable funding. team, what they've accomplished is stellar. Like Patrick and John have done a phenomenal job of building the team and a payments processing business, which if you look at it, you can say easily as a C. C, CDSB, investor, like, what's your moat here? You don't have any network effects. You're just acquiring all these companies one by one. But if you talk to Patrick and John, you will see their

crystal clear clarity of thought on product roadmaps, the suite of products they plan. So when it came to upside potential, I remember this very vividly three or four years ago, a lot of investors under Stripe to maybe a $20 billion company because they could see it as a core payments processing company. But if you looked at their product roadmaps and even believed that, let's say, two of their products worked with a 5% at tax rate, what would that do to their upside case? Like what happens if Stripe did things right? You could start seeing them being a $500 billion company. And I think as growth investors, that should be your secret sauce. It's very easy to model a base case and a downside case. But where you're going to get wrong is the upside case.

And you turn down investments because you estimated the upside very low. That's fascinating. One of the descriptions I've seen in one of your various bios was this interest in network effects, which we've talked about, and also in what you call the growth programs. So I think that piggybacks off that last question quite cleanly, which is in the upside case, obviously there's going to be tremendous growth. And what I've learned certainly watching tons of companies and building one is that growth is a very careful painstaking process. It can be incredibly expensive. It can be very difficult, but properly thought through and set up. If a company gets the right flywheel going, it could be super powerful. Say a bit about everything

you've learned watching these companies and the different kinds of growth strategies they've employed. I think this is something that honestly YC is really good at. So people often say, why are you so focused on growth? But for a startup, growth is really an indicator of, everything that's going on, especially in the early stages, is there demand for your product. Growth is the only way you signal that. But it's important to make sure that this is organic growth, not paid growth. So that's the most important difference. We have stats there like, oh, if you're an early startup, like, is your week on week, growth at least 10%. And that's because it's going to start compounding a lot. And compounding is such a great factor. But if you're able to do that organically,

that means you've built something that people really want. So at the early stages, it's really organic growth. But even at the growth stage, we are looking for, hey, is more than 50% of your growth really organic? And often you'll see that the difference between the startups that really scale very well and the ones that struggle to scale is that organic-driven growth. So I'll give you the example of here, Monzo. Monzo is a Challenger Bank in the UK. Tom, Blomfield, the founder of Monzo, literally just built this for himself. He'll say that, hey, I just wanted something to be the operating center for my finances. Why is it that I have all my money in a banking account.

I have stocks maybe in an e-trade account. I then use Venmo and then I use Mint and I have all these ads. In today's world, my bank should be smart and my bank should be able to do anything I want. And that's literally what he built. The best way to describe Monzo, I often say, is like the Venmo plus Mint, but also does a lot of other things. They have 4.5 million customers. It still shocks people, shocks people, that it's completely product-driven growth. they have close to 8% of the UK market

and it's completely product driven growth and their NPS which they publicly report is greater than 70. Name one bank that has NPS greater than 70. It's a bank, one of the best global product engagement metrics. And so we often say when you're looking at growth,

that's what I'm looking for. I'm looking for as an investor, which is show me product to improve because that's the best kind of growth. And if you can show that, then there's nothing that stops you. you end up spending paid marketing towards the end, like it's going to benefit your organic growth a lot because people are already talking about you. So word of mouth is a mechanism of organic growth. So in Monzo's case,

a lot of people talk about Monzo. They have a very strong community. They also have the Venmo feature, which is peer-to-peer payments. And therefore, an average Monzo user has 16 friends on the Monzo app. And so there's lots of ways in product where you can drive product-driven growth. Another example of that would be fair. Fair is the B2B marketplace. that connects makers with retailers. It's very counterintuitive to think how will they have any sort of organic growth? Because we are talking about, think of brands, all birds, a glacié or the long tail of swell water bottle, all these brands that are trying to sell their products into local

independent retail so that there's products that are available at local retail as well. How does fair drive growth? Very simple. They have something called the Fair Elevate product. What they did is they essentially built order management system for these brands because no one caters to these small brands. So they went to the brands and said, hey, let me help you build an auto management system where you can receive orders and invoice retailers. And by the way, I know that retailers are doing bulk ordering because they're not just buying one water bottle, right? They're buying bulk water bottles for the store.

They're like, we'll help you offer the retailer free 30-day returns if they're ordering for the first time or net 60-day financing. can help them with the working capital for 60 days, depending on you have to be a good performing retailer. And brands loved it. Each brand on average is bringing five retailers to fare. Fair doesn't spend anything on retailers to acquire that. That's a great viral look. If you can find either product driven growth or some form of viral loop in a two-sided network where there's reference mechanism, that's gold. That really helps you set up for scale. And so that's what we are looking for when we are diligence in that distribution advantage. You mentioned earlier the kind of price range, typically that a growth stage company will raise equity at. I feel like a really under-discussed

item in the venture world is valuation. Obviously, the entry price is a huge determinant of the outcome, and there's no company that can't be ruined by a high enough price. I'm curious how you think through that and whether or not now that starts to bleed into your old private equity roots where you're underwriting a specific kind of range of outcomes, or if it remains at the growth stage more of a clearing price, that's just a reflection of supply and demand for the company shares. This was something I struggled with a lot when I first came to the valley because I'm such an analytically driven and a nerd engineer, and you come and suddenly feel like the whole

science behind valuation is art. The early stage was rough. But I think, look, at the earliest, but now that I've spent close to six years, I think I have a good understanding for how valuation methodology is done. So at the earliest stages, it's really art. It's not science. I think it comes down to if you're raising a series A, typically the lead investor is taking about 20 to 25 percent ownership. So if you say I'm raising 10 million, it's 10 divided by 0.05. That's your valuation. It's as simple as that. And the way you come up with that range of, do I have 120% ownership or 25 or sometimes 16 depends on how strong of a product market 50 you have.

is also a function of supply and demand, as you said, maybe how competitive that dealers and how it's getting marked up. And also the potential for that company, like I think at the end of the day, a CDC investor is still investing because they're hoping for a 10x. But if it's a grand slam, if it's going to return more than the fund,

well, it's okay if you owned only 15% at the start and even got valued at it to say 11. It's going to return more than the fund. I think as a CDSA investor, that's sort of your mental model. And C.D.B is also a little. little more art. So while the ownership is not 25%, people are looking for 10%, maybe 7 to 10% really hot consumer companies like Uber, Instacart, or DoDash, they probably would have been sub 10%

ownership for the Series B investor. But if it's B to B, it's usually at least 10%. That's the series A&B. It's literally what's the amount you're raising divided by the ownership percentage for the need ones. Series C and onwards, it's different. I don't think it's ownership driven. It's more, I think it's a growth investor. It's very important to focus on dollar or because you're not playing for 10xas now. But if you do believe, say you're investing like a $3 billion valuation and you think this company can be $30 billion

or even $20 billion or even $15 billion. So it's about, okay, if I'm putting $100 million at $3 billion and it's going to be at $15 billion, you're going to make $500 million dollars, little less than that because you'll have dilution. But it's about the dollar scale of return. So then you've got to compare to your growth fund,

but just like, okay, how big is my growth fund? And is this a meaningful check size? I like to use this analogy that I actually learned from the DST team, which I think they do a phenomenal job at this, the growth stage. Are you betting the house? Because if you're not betting the house, you're probably not, don't have that conviction.

If you're willing to write a $50 million check and say, let's say it's 10% or 15% of your fund, depending on the size of the fund, you are going all in on that investment. And you're saying that even if it's a 5x, look, I'm going to return $500 million. And so the dollar return becomes very important. So how do you then look at valuation?

So the valuation is a mix in the growth stage. We actually build a full-fledged model, full five-year model. We use certain valuation comps, not current valuation comps. We actually look at if this company was to go public. What would be the median comps of five or 10-year median multiple? And we look at different multiples. And what would this company be really valued at exit? And therefore, what's the enterprise we like now?

And we usually come up with a threshold of this is the max we're willing to go just to see, understand that dollar return math. But I don't think you ever turn down a company because this is the max valuation you want to go to because then that's your conviction. And this goes back to my upside case, which is like, hey, if you have a 10% probability that this upside case is going to materialize, you're turning this company down because of some strict math and your base case and you really don't have conviction on the upside case. I think we use the valuation methodology to make sure like we're not setting up the company for

failure down the line. What's most important is you don't want them, one, is that a too higher price to prepare them for a downround because it affects the moral of the company. It's not a public company and it really affects their hiring, all of that. And so you want to make sure you're pricing it somewhat appropriately and not too artifact. But the mental model is more, what's the true exit valuation for this company? What's the range of outcomes? And so therefore, what's my enterprise and how does that meet the typical dollar returns that I'm expecting? You mentioned earlier, a big part of this is obviously the overall opportunity for companies like this to become big businesses, not necessarily just the one that you're evaluating,

but just the ability for the market to withhold and build some of these huge outcomes to deliver the returns. That begs the question, like, how far into this technology deployment era are we? You mentioned the 4% penetration of e-commerce in Latin America, obviously super early, China much further ahead in the U.S. somewhere in between and accelerated because of COVID. What is your take on this critical, fundamental question of how far along we are in this transformation and how much more opportunity for digital transformation still exists? I actually think there's way more opportunity ahead of us. Let me comprehend with a little few numbers.

So pre-COVID, I looked at this rate. Total global market cap was $85 trillion. dollars, internet economy enabled businesses was less than 10% roughly $8 trillion. Even if you assume a 10% Kager and play this out, let's say in 2045, I think I'd seen estimates that if you assume the global market cap is going to be around 450 trillion, internet economy should surely be at least 15% of that, even if less, like $60 trillion economy. Guess what? From $8 trillion to $60 trillion, I'm willing to bet all day long that we are still very, very nascent, even in the most developed markets. Let me make it further specific and real for people.

Let's look at the U.S. economy. Pre-COVID, our internet penetration was up 20% in 2019, and I think April reports 27%. Lord has been written about consumer e-commerce penetration. Not much has been said about B2B wholesale e-commerce penetration. B2B wholesale in the U.S. is a $16 trillion market. Less than 8% of it is online. Less than 8%. 49% of B2B wholesale commerce transactions happen via phone facts. And Fair, which is one of the marketplaces that's working on,

it is still just attacking a small sliver of retail. The retail market that they serve is a $670 billion market. You have so many verticals here. Think of aerospace, chemicals, industrials. You're just going to see an explosion of vertical players in B2B wholesale commerce.

B2C consumer ecommerce itself is still sub 30%. So therefore, the internet economy is just still scratching the surface. We just have years to compound. And I think we're still in the early stages of the internet economy. I love the tiny, untapped B2B wholesale. That's such an interesting example. Everyone always talks about e-commerce because it's, I guess, the most obvious for the average person.

What other areas like that do you find especially interesting where digital and tech have maybe begun to make a difference but are still in the early days, if any? Yeah, I think second area is Fintech, obviously at YCVC, we see a lot of financial services startups. I mean, we ourselves have funded, Stripe, Brex, Monzo, lend up, to name a few, and then grow recently. But I think that are a few trends that are going on in Fintech. One, the payments landscape is exploring.

If you believe the internet economy is at least a $60 trillion economy, we've got a lot more work to do on payments and so there'll be more there, both on the consumer side. But you also, as I mentioned, B2B is a big side. Rex started as corporate current car for startup, but that's just scratching the surface. And they're well beyond startups now. They also launched Brex Cash last year. There were a whole suite of products that they're working on.

So B2B wholesale payments will also be a big area. The third area I'm saying is in digital and challenger banks. We saw the time recently. I just think that if you were to build a bank from today, it just won't look like your prior bank. Like, as I said, your phone should be your bank. and it is to be really smart in helping you manage money. Like, why do I need 10 apps? Make me really smart in managing my own money.

And I think you're going to see a whole suite of subscription challenger banks. They're also changing the business model, not just tech. They're saying, look, instead of me charging you fees for every single thing, let's just make it clear. Here's your subscription model. Here's a set of services you get. And that really excites millennials. They don't want to be charged for every transaction and they don't even know what to expect.

was as you just say, hey, here's what you get for $7 a month. Here's what you get for $15 a month. So they're changing business model too. And then the third lens in the financial services I'm seeing more in COVID is, look, savings yields are at an all time low globally. So you could have argued in all other recessions that each country came at a different lens, was now it's just across the board. And so a lot of the users got flat-footed. A lot of them are looking for other ways to invest. And that's why Robin Hood is doing extremely well. But Robin Hood is still, they're doubt really be a large player, but they're a small player in a large buy because it's the do-it-yourself market. So we're seeing Robin Hood everywhere globally. We are seeing Robin Hood for India. We made an investment in growth. We're seeing Robin Hood for Indonesia, Robin Hood for Latam. You'll also see this extent to active asset managers. We're seeing a lot of startups attacking that space. I think in the next decade, you're going to see at least three to five hundred billion dollar fintech companies, at least 10, I'm willing to bet maybe 10, 50 billion companies and two dozen, 10 billion dollar companies.

That's going to happen in fintech. And then the third area, I'd say, which has been fascinating, is ed tech. Historically, especially in the U.S., ed tech businesses have not been huge, therefore not a lot of investor appetite has gone behind ed tech, but there are two things that are changing. So one thing from the lens of Lambda school, I think there's a huge shortage of software developers. Just in the United States. I mean, there are different stats. Like I think OCTD reported recently that maybe there's a need for 200,000 developers, but I've seen

CodotRourDorRQ say we need 500,000 developers in the U.S. every year. And we have less than 50,000 computer science graduates. Less than 50,000 computer science graduates. And historically, we've tried to fill it through immigration and other means. And given the geopolitical climate, immigration is a question mark right now. We don't know how it gets impacted. But the short story is there's a huge shortfall. And if there's a shortfall, there comes Lambda School. They just through online resources and a nine-month intensive program are able to get you to the stage of starting a journey as a software developer. And for many people, it's increasing the salary from 15 to 25,000 to 25,000 a year. That's game-changing. That's one trend we're saying. Outschool is another

YC company that's done a phenomenal job, especially during COVID with all these Zoom classes, where public school, depending on state, city councils, you don't have enough budget to support teachers in certain areas. And here comes out school. They just have the marketplace of best teachers. And if you've gotten over the inertia to take a class online, outschool will play a role even post-COVID because after you attend public school, if your child has deep interest in science,

you can just sign up an out-school class with three other students and pick the teacher that you want and they can go deeper. So I think you're going to see interesting trends in ed tech, as well that's going to actually explode in the next 10 years. And it'll be fascinating to see what are some interesting business models that come out of that. Do you have any observations on the changing nature of the U.S. technology investing ecosystem? And I don't just mean growth equity. I mean any observation around from CED all the way through the biggest public equity managers that has changed across your career in technology investing specifically. Like,

what would be the most notable difference from day one to today? We often joke at VIC that we have more investors than we have companies. That's actually true. Our Demode gets close to 2,000 investors and per batch we have only 250 companies. It's a good problem to have, but I just think you're seeing the number of investors increasing across every stage. Having said that, I think the misconception people have is there's money everywhere and how are you going to differentiate.

I think at the growth stage, it's not true that there's that many. investors. So if you ask our founders, post-Series V or CDC when I spend time with founders, our founders a lot, they can't name more than 10 investors who can write a $100 million plus check. They can't. And so it's the same usual suspects. You could come up maybe with a list of 10 to 15 and you have to really scrape that list and they don't even know them, but it's the same. Yeah, the crossover funds

have started investing in startups. Yeah, more private equity funds have started investing in startups. But the thing is, unfortunately, most of them don't understand the pain of a startup. They don't. It's great when you get 14 terms sheets. How do you win? The company is not going to look up into the right every year. It just doesn't happen. I mean, YC has so much data on this. I mean, we funded 2,500 companies, less than 1% of our companies have greater than a billion dollar valuations. We have maybe 20 to 25 of them. And I can tell you pretty much every single one of them has had at least one or two really hard years in their growth stage. Really hard years. You often see that these investors that are new to the growth stage or working with startups

cannot comprehend that because your full-time job is really to focus. So if you're a public market investor, your full-time job is really to manage your portfolio and your day-to-day investments and the volatility associated with that. And then you sometimes maybe more afraid or chickened out by like, oh, the quarterly projection didn't really foot with this or the market landscape is changing or like the most common thing that I mentioned at the start of this session was you feel when a competitor or an incumbent especially launches something because you immediately think, oh, it's a zero-sum game. So I think founders are usually very attentive to who they are working with and which partner they want

to bring. And especially in this lens, they want someone who really understand startups. And I think you don't see a lot of growth stage investors who truly understand startups. And pattern recognition is a dangerous thing. Because when you use pattern recognition, on one hand, you may say it helps you, the zero-sum game always comes to hurt you because if you followed the software market and you followed Microsoft, you would think zero-sim game is real, but that didn't play out in the internet e-commerce world. I mean, even China, everyone thought Alibaba would be the only player. We have Alibaba, we have J-D, we have M-8-1, we have Pindu-O. I mean, look at the commerce market that's supporting China. I think there are far fewer investors on the growth stage that truly

understand startups, even though there might be a few more players that are willing to invest money. So that's one nuance that offer, which is probably different from what the people think, perception is outside. Second difference, I'd say aspects. There's a lot of talk about SPACs now. I think there have been aspects that have existed for years. It has happened in the past. But what's different about this time around is the underlying manager that's sponsoring the SPAC.

I paid attention when Reid Hoffman launched the SPAC and Mickey Malca launched the ESPIC. I mean, I work with both of them on two boards. I mean, Reed is on the Convoy board. and Mickey's on three of the boards actually we share with Mickey. And Thibboth are just phenomenal investors, incredible investor that a startup founder would love to have and they truly understand the pains of scaling a startup. So if you use from that lens,

you do see can SPAC really play a role. And I do think there are certain technology companies that could benefit from an SPAC. So this fintech companies are extremely in regulated spaces and they need a lot of regulatory capital and regulatory buffers, which I think people don't understand. And SPACs, depending on the underlying sponsor, could actually play a big difference for those companies. So I do think I can see the role of an aspect there.

And then the other argument I've heard from especially like Brad at Altimeter is most founders don't know who your Dave and traders are. And I think that's fascinating because if you ask a founder, they always want to know who your investors are because they want to know who are the true partners in your journey, who are believers in your company. They don't want someone who's just flipping after day one. That could be potentially a promise that attracts. But I think the question remains to be seen.

Can the next snowflake go on an aspect? And I think if that happens, there could be more aspects. I have to turn now to my traditional closing question for everybody, which is to ask you for the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you. Well, there are a lot of people that have really helped me. But I think the kindest thing that comes to mind is Dr. Jeffrey Reid. He was my research advisor at Virginia Tech. I was doing my master's in wireless communications.

This was in 2002, right after 9-11, and the funding that most state universities got from the government was completely slashed. Even private funding was at an all-time load. So I had come with the hope of getting a research fellowship. The university and the research group had no money to be able to fund me. I come from a tier three town in India. My parents were very middle class,

and my dad had pretty much taken an entire loan against all his assets and it could pay only for a year of my tuition. Come summer, and I was working in a good in Virginia Tech to cover all my living expenses, but as an international student, you can work only 20 hours, and you have to work in campus. You can't work outside.

So there's only so much I could do. And I remember very vividly, this was July, and my dad basically said, look, this is it, this is the last straw, finish whatever credits you can, you're going to come back in August. And I was like, yeah, I get it. And so I went to my advice that and said,

look, I really can't continue, and I need to find a way to graduate. So I should finish. whatever credits I can in the summer and maybe I could do remotely, would you be open to doing remotely? He asked me, how much money do you need? And I said, well, I haven't paid tuition this month. I need to pay $1,200. He took a check, but wrote a check and gave it to me without any questions. And I think if I look back in life, if he hadn't done that, my life would have turned out very different. I'm amazed by these little tiny things, obviously not tiny, significant things that people do

constantly all over the place. That's a very unique one. I haven't heard one quite like that yet. for doing more than 200 of these. So I love this story. And thank you so much for a really interesting hour and a half. I learned so much. Love learning about the gross stage where I've spent a lot less time and just really appreciate all your insight. Great. Well, thank you, Patrick. If you enjoyed this episode, you can sign up for a new email newsletter sent out each week called Inside the episode. Each week, I condensed that week's episode to my favorite big ideas, quotations, and more. I've been recommending books to members of this email list for years, and we'll keep doing so in this weekly email.

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