Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal of Acquired - Lessons on Early Stage Investing and Getting Acquired - [Invest Like the Best, EP.196]
Episode Date: October 20, 2020My guests today are Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal. Ben and David are investors but also the duo behind the Acquired podcast, which is one of my favorite podcasts that dives deep into business histor...y and famous acquisitions. I recommend you check it out. In this conversation, we review of some of the greatest corporate acquisitions of all time and also discuss investing lessons Ben and David have learned across their careers. I hope you enjoy my conversation with Ben and David. This episode is brought to you by Koyfin, one of the fastest growing fintech startups. I discovered Koyfin earlier this year when I asked twitter for the best Bloomberg alternative, and the overwhelming winner was an intriguing new product called Koyfin. Koyfin has tons of high-quality data, powerful functionality, and a nice clean interface. If you’re an individual investor, research analyst, portfolio manager, or financial advisor, you should definitely check them out. Sign up for free at koyfin.com This episode of Invest Like The Best is also sponsored by Assure. Assure is changing the way investors manage private transactions. With Assure, investors can eliminate nearly all the admin cost of private investment. On top of that, they handle all the backend, legal, taxes, accounting, and compliance. All of it, with a straightforward one-time fee. Learn more and try Assure for yourself at https://www.assure.co/patrick. For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag Show Notes (2:29) – (First question) – What they look for in new founders based on more experienced managers they’ve worked with (5:07) – Difference between emerging vs legacy market (9:17) – Research steps to determine if a market can get big enough to invest in (12:08) – Working with other firms for doing an initial investment round (15:42) – Recent trends in the supply of capital and number of founders in the VC space (18:56) – Lessons they have learned studying corporate transactions (24:13) – How do startups transform once they are acquired to increase their multiples so much (28:10) – What they learned from deliberations that take place within the acquiring company (30:39) – Most interesting deal for them to unpack (32:44) – What are features of a business that is difficult for others to replicate (35:52) – Any company that are intimidated to go up against (37:37) – Who would they follow (38:52) – Blake Robbins Podcast Episode (39:09) – Missing pieces in their skill set (41:43) – Early green shoots (44:40) – Lessons from Alaska Airlines acquisition and the value of scarcity (47:07) – Kindest thing anyone has done for them Learn More For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag
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This episode is brought to you by Coifin, one of the fastest growing fintech startups.
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Patrick. Hello and welcome, everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Invest like the Best.
This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, methods, stories, and of strategy.
that will help you better invest both your time and your money.
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Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of O'Shaughnessy Asset Management.
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discussed in this podcast.
My guest today are Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal.
Ben and David are investors, but also the duo behind the Acquired podcast, which is one of
my favorite shows that dives deep into business history and famous acquisitions.
I highly recommend you check it out.
In this conversation, we review some of the greatest corporate acquisitions of all time
and also discuss investing lessons Ben and David have learned across their careers.
I hope you enjoy my conversation with Ben and David.
So, guys, I have so many different areas that I want to cover with you today.
you guys run, I think, the most interesting of all podcasts out there, but you're also both investors
in a similar space, but also in different ways. What are some of the things that you see?
I love this idea of this long game that companies have to play or just the long story that they
endure to get where they are and have us all talking about them. What about those later years
of a company and how a management team or a team is operating help you filter the potential
skill set of a very young team?
What are you looking for in a young set of, or a new set, I should say, of founders or a founding team that is impacted by all your exploration of these much longer stories?
Yeah, this is a fantastic question.
And I think one, I ask myself a lot.
My primary job, despite having the podcast is I'm the co-founder of a thing called Pioneer Square Labs, where a startup studio and an early stage venture fund in the Seattle area.
And the way that I see this manifest is I often ask.
myself the first question than the flow chart, which is, is this business in an emerging market
or trying to transform a legacy market? And if it's the legacy, there's a whole different set of
questions than the new and emerging. And you look at things like Tam and you look at things like
how will they compete against incumbents. And if it's an emerging market, you look so much more
at what is the secret that this founder knows, kind of in that Peter Thiel parlance. The thing that I
think is very counterintuitive is if it's an emerging market, you really don't need to pay attention
to is this founder an experienced manager? Are they someone that's going to do really well,
organization building? Are they someone that's going to be really polished? Because that's not
the scarce commodity in the business when something is sort of brand new in the world is shaping
around a company or a movement. The rare commodity is, is this person amazing at understanding the
needs of this newly developing thing and building a product such that a movement will form and
galvanize around them rather than other players in the industry. And I think that's a completely
different thing than someone that's going to try and tackle something, say, like title insurance
or like account reconciliation or any of these sort of super deep vertical companies that we incubate
and spin out of our studio, that those are really much more about kind of the business plan
and much less about the founder being this kind of thrashy visionary that you can ignore a lot of
flaws in because they will figure it out along the way.
It begs the question what the markers are of the difference between a legacy and emerging
market.
I think legacy maybe is a bit more obvious, but how do you know when you're exploring what
you would characterize as emerging or new market?
That seems hard to do.
Well, I definitely know it when I'm making a pitch deck where as soon as I get to Tam,
if it's less than a billion, then it sure is heck better be an emerging market. Otherwise, it's just
not an investable one. And so then you ask yourself the question of do the growth rates and do the
societal trends and do the obsession among the core users indicate that there's a future here.
And that's when you have to, not that any investor has a crystal ball, but that's where you
sort of have to have an opinion on where the world is going and trust your spidey senses a little
bit more of, can I see this thing that only a few people are obsessed with now becoming huge?
And I use few there.
It could be in the hundreds of thousands or millions, but it's not a universally accepted idea that this is the way the world will be in the future.
Are there a few examples of markets that you've seen that would certainly fall in that emerging category just to put some examples around it?
Sure.
Yeah.
I think it's helpful to talk about a few that are sort of successful and not successful.
David, you were one of the first people who introduced me to VR, I think, in 20, gosh, 13, 14.
and that was one that absolutely was an emerging category and sort of has plateaued, as we all
sort of know and talk about a lot. For now, maybe it's at the middle part of the S-curve,
but I guess it's not the inverted S-curve. Another one that I think people talked about as being,
and I actually started a company in this area called Taunt, talked about as being an emerging market
that was poised to explode was e-sports. And I think there was a mistake made by all of us who
were analyzing the industry and looking at the rise of streaming.
and projecting that that would accrue to competitive, organized esports in a league format in the same way of all the traditional sports leagues.
And ultimately, so far, at least, it has accrued to the publisher and the broadcaster, but there has not been a new ecosystem for new startups to thrive in this trend.
So I think those are sort of two that I would look at that David and I respectively both look heavily at and participated in and invested in and operated in that ended up not actually exploding in the way that if we go back and look at,
digital wallets with Square and Venmo or Square Cash and Venmo short form video. Anything we look at
today that we sort of can laugh about because it's so mainstream, it's whole is hard to remember
that these things were emerging markets and secrets and kind of jokes recently.
So it's funny. I at least recently, partly through our own work it acquired, partly through
a lot of your guests, Patrick, on your show. I'm coming to a little different perspective on this,
particularly around early stage investing. The question often and the big unknown,
with early stage companies is Tam.
I've got a lot of guests talk about this on the show.
How do you measure Tam?
Is it worth measuring Tam?
What I've come to think about is you can't, people have said this,
you cannot model Tam expansion for the big, big winners and the big world-changing companies.
You just simply can't fathom how big it's going to get.
And I think the nuance of that is you can't model Tam expansion that is going to come in a space,
whether it's emerging or legacy.
This Tam expansion very much happens in legacy.
got some examples here that comes from just the founders giving a damn about it. If there's a space
where nobody has given a dam before, by give a damn, I mean build the right product with love
and care and something that customers are really going to want. I think that's on our show where
we've really seen things be game-changer. So look at like electric cars before Tesla. No analyst
was going to model the Tam expansion of electric cars to what Tesla became or rockets in SpaceX.
photo sharing was dead before Instagram.
Instagram and Kevin Sistram, and even though that was a pivot, they gave a damn.
Or like Oprah and Daytime TV, comic book movies and the Marvel Cinematic Universe.
And here's the best example, web video conferencing.
How crappy was web video conferencing?
Legacy market, old, done.
Well, then along comes Eric and Zoom.
I think the common thread for all of those founders was they just like really gave a damn.
I'm really curious when you do have.
that question of whether or not a market can get big, what the literal research steps are for you
decide yes or no. I'm doing this with four or five companies right now. And so I don't know the
answer to this question, but I'm dying to know the ways that you found to be effective, even though
obviously you probably don't know yet if you're right and if the tools are the right ones.
But what are the things that you consider when, let's say just in binary terms saying,
yes, this will become big enough to justify a venture investment versus those that are just going to remain
sort of a hobby corner of the internet. My favorite way to do this is to basically make a tree
of contributing factors that ultimately add up to a large number. So an example of this would be
you look at something that you hope in the future has a $5 billion tam. And you look at the unit
economics of this particular business. And you say, well, it's a SaaS business. So it makes
80% gross margin. And they price it around this amount. And big customers look like this,
medium-sized customers look like this and small customers look like this. And you kind of can keep
branching down the tree of for every one of those numbers that you end up having to multiply together
to get to that $5 billion, how fine grain can you get on each one of those assumptions to basically
give yourself enough granularity where you don't have false precision? You don't get too granular and
have to model in what percentage that contract with that customer is going to expand every year or
something like that, but you can get enough granularity to understand what your core assumptions are,
so you can at least ask yourself, what would have to be true for the world to look like this?
Is it possible that there could be a million buyers of this software at some point in the future?
And at least then you get to that core question of the real question you'd have to ask yourself
with something like Shopify is, what would have to be true in order for there to be a million
e-commerce merchants.
And to be clear, this is
certainly easier to do in more
enterprise-y-type businesses.
Like on the spectrum, every business is somewhere
on the spectrum from pure B-2B to pure B-to-C.
As you move across from B-2B,
B-to-B, you just go ask the customers,
hey, have you heard of this thing?
Do you like it if it exists?
Or if it doesn't exist yet, do you have this problem?
As you move towards consumer, that's harder.
And I think, again, to come back,
we've learned so much on the acquired journey from Sequoia
and many other venture firms, but Sequoia, too. The biggest question they ask themselves
an investment is why now? But I think the important thing there is that you move from the quantitative
to the qualitative, where you're just trying to give yourself enough granularity on all the
numbers that get multiplied together to at least then go ask the questions of, all right,
time to start talking to people and figuring out if what are the circumstances that could
lead to this one number that seems way, way, way too big to ever be believable. Why could
that possibly happen? What's your experience in, especially one of these emerging markets?
and putting together an investment round with other firms because I've never seen any interesting
breakdown of how rounds get composed, even though when you see new financing, it's often
two, three, four, five participants. Sometimes that's just a single new lead and a lot of old
investors, but sometimes it's group. As soon as you get a group, I start to wonder about consensus
and consensus around the emerging market is an interesting idea. So how do you think of when you've made
investments in the past, either involving or not involving other venture investors in the thinking
about the market and even participation in the investment round. This would be an LP show topic.
Well, I think there's two answers to that question, and they're kind of by nature on opposite sides
of the table. There's how founders should think about this, and then there's how investors should think
about this. And there's different natures, of course, to both. But at the end of the day, the venture market
just like any other market is a market driven by supply and demand.
And so from the founder perspective, certainly, it's always amazing to me how often founders,
even very experienced founders, they just don't raise money that often.
It's not a high frequency event.
And so it can become very easy, especially with how much branding there is around capital
out there these days.
Just forget that fact that it's a market for the equity for your company when you are
raising around.
and if you want to raise the price, you want to have low supply and high demand.
And so I think oftentimes when you see a lot of these rounds, especially now, I think this is
happening more and more where you see multiple firms coming into a round, you might see two,
three firms as co-leads or major investors in a round.
That probably means there were five to eight term sheets that came in.
And probably most of those venture firms wanted to lead the round and were willing to do it
solo, but the entrepreneurs chose to have multiple of them. And in the process, round size floated up
in commensurately valuation, perhaps valuation even more than round size. Yeah, the last thing
that I'll add to that is on the founder side, no investor is going to seem more valuable to you
than the moment after you have a term sheet until the moment that definitive docs are signed.
It always feels incredibly compelling to let that one more investor into the round because of all
the things that they say they're going to do. And this isn't because of a personality flaw or because
anybody has malice. It is the incentives at play for a follow-on investor to sort of sell that they want
to participate in this round. And I don't think it's always the case, but most of the time,
the right thing to do for that founder is to have fewer people around the table who care more.
And the worst thing you can do is get yourself into a position where the founders are the only
people who have real career risk on the line with the company, and no investors do. And no investors are
thinking about this as, wow, I am all freaking in on this thing. And of course, that's been the knock on
sort of party rounds forever. But the question I always sort of ask when putting together these
sort of syndicates, and with PSL, we're really a co-founder. And so often we're on the side of the
table of we're a founder in this thing trying to find the ideal investor syndicate for it,
is really, other than the lead, what is the specific value to this?
company that this investor will uniquely bring, and can you, if not quantify it, then at least
specifically articulate it? Most investors, in my experience, in public markets and in the later
stage of private equity, are often valuing companies in very traditional ways, using comps,
using multiples, using DCF, et cetera. I think one of the dirty realities you realize very quickly
in the venture space is that venture valuations are a clearing price and just a function of supply
and demand. And I would love you guys to riff a bit on what you see as recent trends in both supply
and demand. By a supply, I mean the supply of capital from venture firms and demand, I mean
founders that want that capital. Can you talk about what those dynamics are and sort of how
those dynamics have impacted the nature of valuations and what I would call fairly founder-friendly
period of time here? Absolutely. It's been the past, we're recording this in September 2020,
the past six months in the coronavirus era, I've been completely blown my mind and expectations on this front.
I was just part of a group of other investors.
We chat once a month, and there's folks from big firms, small firms, mostly in the U.S., but some in Europe, too.
We're on this call, and it was so interesting to hear how this dynamic has played out very differently in Europe and in the U.S.
the past six months in the U.S., there has been an incredible, unforeseen flight to deploying capital
into companies, particularly quote-unquote quality companies, this flight to quality that's happened,
but it's, if anything, it feels like the level of capital deployment has stepped up.
And commensurately, I've seen prices and number of term sheets and round sizes at the C to A, B stage going up meaningfully.
In Europe, actually, it seems to be the opposite.
that because there are fewer venture firms there, there's less competition for raising LP
dollars and deploying those dollars as fast, things seem to have taken a pause. And the few firms
over there are more sitting back. And so valuations have been falling. And it's just kind of
crazy, the delta that we were talking about that we're seeing. Yeah, I think it's interestingly
parallel to the public markets where the top, I'm going to make up a percentage, but call it the
top 10% of companies that are hitting their milestones and growing meaningfully month over month
are attracting basically all of the investor dollars and less people are willing to take risk
on the meat of the curve, which are really great companies. We're not talking about the bottom
30% that sort of won't raise their next round, but there has definitely been more capital
trying to flood into the sort of highest performing companies price be damned. And I think
it's an interesting concept of in times of uncertainty, herd mentality increases, and therefore
prices go up among a smaller set of assets. Just on that note, one example of a growth round
that I've heard about for a recent SaaS company at an insanely high price by any multiple
to the current performance of the company, then investors justify by saying, well, we apply a Zoom
multiple, a Zoom revenue multiple to this. It's like, Zoom is a once in a generation company,
but that's being applied across every high-quality growth company right now.
We've gone a long way without talking about one of my absolute favorite things that you guys do,
which is literally the name of the original show acquired,
which is to tell a deep story about a company that is ultimately bought
by some other company or some sort of story similar to that.
You sort of grade it and analyze it.
And a huge component of that literally on your list of all-time 10 best acquisitions is Instagram.
And I think a huge part of that is the price that was paid relative to the price that probably Instagram would trade at today as an independent company, which is who knows what that multiple is, but it's an outrageous one of my favorite topics on all things acquired, which is what lessons you guys have learned studying so many of these big corporate transactions through time.
We could even isolate it into you published a top 10, which is filled with really different.
kinds of businesses. It's not just a bunch of tech businesses. Marvel's in there. Google Maps is one
that I remember being in there. And then, of course, there are the PayPal's and the Instagram, which I
mentioned as huge and important acquisitions. Let's talk about the lessons that you've learned that
pervade your deep study of each of these crazy transactions. And whether or not you think they're
portable, like I'm always interested in how idiosyncratic something is versus a playbook that's being
rolled out or a repeatable insight that you see across these companies. Oh, man. Well, I was just listening
to our top 10 episode to kind of prep for this. My biggest takeaway from it was we really tried not
to just focus on tech companies and we really tried not to just focus on today. But our yardstick for
ultimately ranking these acquisitions was in the absolute dollar value return to the acquirer.
Instagram's bought for a billion dollars, and then we would do our best based on revenue to figure out
how much of the market cap of the acquirer can be attributable to that acquisition that they made
way back when and then figure out that absolute dollar return. And if you look at them,
they're basically all tech and media businesses. And partially it was because we weren't willing to
consider these sort of partial acquisitions or investments. They had to be wholesale purchases of
companies, but the driving force of the massive amount of value creation on basically every single
one were network effects on the internet, the fact that these companies in large part had zero
marginal costs, and also in large part had zero distribution costs. And the tech businesses are
toward the top and the media businesses are toward the bottom and the other business models
don't make the list. And the way that that sort of shakes out to me is that tech businesses are just
media businesses from the sort of 70s and 80s, but with one more steroid injection to their
business model, that is, you don't need to keep creating media, that the media of software,
the code that software engineers write that then gets executed and becomes a product that
people can use delivers that ongoing value over time without needing to create that next great
podcast episode. Or in the case of social media, I think YouTube was number three by our ranking
and Instagram was number one, it is media, but it's other people are making the media for free,
for you.
Yeah.
In YouTube's case, they pay out half of their revenue to those creators.
In Instagram's case, they don't need to pay anything to their creators.
It's just absolutely free.
So, Patrick, I think that was the biggest takeaway for me was you sort of already had the
greatest business media of all time with media, and then software added even one more
layer of benefit to it.
Yeah, it's funny.
That top 10 episode sent me down a path that we had touched.
on Will Thorndyke in the book The Outsiders a little bit before in Acquired History when we
covered ESPN, which I think was number nine on our list, maybe, of top 10 acquisitions
of all time. But then going back and rereading the book, Will has eight case studies of
kind of the Hall of Fame of Value Creation, Value Creative CEOs in history, and it's all
kind of pre the tech era. But if you look at those case studies, four of them are media
companies, Washington Post, General Cinema, Capital Cities, of course, which ESPN was a
huge part, TCI, John Malone and what would become Liberty Media. And I think the two interesting things
I kind of took away from the episode of reading that is that when you have businesses with lower
zero marginal costs, obviously that creates the opportunity for a better margin structure.
But it also allows you to scale bigger and faster because as you're making stuff,
you're not making stuff, you know, it replicates. And just to frame some numbers around this for
anyone who's thinking, oh, come on. Like, there has to be some traditional business that
created as much value of any of these. Our number one with Instagram, the absolute dollar
return was over $150 billion. Double-click was over $120 billion. YouTube was $85 billion.
And so it really is just mind-boggling when you look at really how the market caps of these
acquirers today, which is meaningfully larger, 50% in some cases larger than it was even six
months ago when we did this episode and you look at the contribution by that acquired property
is just a staggering amount of dollars of our publicly traded equities.
These numbers are staggering.
Someone finally ran the number because I had an idea that the best investment ever
was Apple's buyback program.
And indeed it was on a dollar basis, which was if you do the dollar return, average price
paid for the shares compared against today's price.
It was a $752 billion dollar return investment, which is a $1,000.
silly. It's actually the same theme as Thorndyke's book, right? That most of those companies,
I think, all but Warren Buffett were religiously buying back their stock when it was cheap.
And so obviously a big reason a lot of this value can get created is that the entry price,
I'm scrolling through and looking at the purchase prices, and there are 70 million,
188 million, 1.5 billion, 135 million, 429 million. Most of these are below or at about a
billion dollars in terms of their acquisition, which begs the question, what is the transformation
that's happening from purchase to deployment inside of a bigger parent company that is able to
create these sorts of multipliers. Double-click or you pick your examples. What is the unlocking
mechanism that's happening in the buy-the-parent company post-acquisition that usually creates this
kind of value? One thing I'll say as a precursor to that is we may never see a company come into the top
five ever again. This may capture a moment in time where there was an underdeveloped venture capital
market and companies, the big five tech companies just starting to hit their inflection point in
terms of people really starting to increase their multiples in the public markets where they had
the ability to come in and pay these at the time seemingly crazy prices where we didn't have the
soft bank vision funds of the world. We didn't have a lot of these super late stage, stay private,
longer billion dollar growth rounds into companies. I don't know in the future if the company that's
growing the fastest and seems to be where the future is headed, which everyone sort of knew with
Instagram at the time being snapped up for the low, low price of a billion dollars to be able to
grow most of its value inside the acquirer. It's going to take a very, very talented executive
to be able to make an acquisition like that with as developed and competitive of a private
capital market that we have today.
So that's the precursor. David, I saw you were ready to jump in on what contributes to the transformation.
That was also just struck me, how much the private funding world has evolved, even since
Instagram was acquired for a billion dollars in 2012. It was an eternity ago, and that felt like
such a landmark huge deal at the time. It was hard to imagine companies getting financed at
valuations in that realm. And now that happens every day. So there's that. But in terms of the
transformational aspect. I think there's for all three, what was there, I forget what number four was,
but top three were Instagram, double click, and YouTube. Four was Android, which is going to buck the
trend of where you go here. Perfect. Google and Facebook had developed for good or bad, better or
worse, these money printing machines. And that is their ability to sell at scale advertising to advertisers
and when you plug in a new source of inventory like YouTube, like Instagram and like double
click in its own way into that machine that's already humming, it's going to be able to just
monetize it at such an incredible rate. And that's really for those top companies, that's
the transformation that happened. Again, also, I don't think we'll ever see that again for regulatory
reasons if none other. Yeah. Point to make on top of that is most of these
top 10 were revenue upside, not cost savings. Even the greatest of sort of cost savings
acquisitions or synergy seeking, it doesn't have the same sort of asymmetric upside that these
acquisitions in order to unlock net new revenue have. When you think about the parent companies
involved in each of these, how much research did you do on their deliberation process in and
around the acquisition? I'm thinking back to the start of our conversation where you're
Googling stuff to try to understand what it felt like at the time versus hindsight bias creates a
very different kind of lens to view these things with. But at the time, a billion dollars for
Instagram. It was a very different scenario and a different calculus for the acquiring company.
What have you learned about those deliberations at what ends up being the parent or acquirer?
Man, I think there is an inverse relationship between the purchase price and the amount of
diligence that is done. I don't say that in any sort of disrespect or
fault to anyone. I say that because a deal heat. The Instagram deal went entirely around anybody in
Corp Dev and was done over the weekend in Mark Zuckerberg's backyard. And they notified everyone via
email that, hey, we're going to announce this on Monday. Including the board. Yeah. My take on this is
a version of one of the other big lessons from our Sequoia episodes, which was especially part one,
Don Valentine had this amazing way with words. And he would say, when he started Sequoia, which was
really the first, along with Kleinner 2 in its own way, but the first modern venture capital
firm, he's like, I had an advantage. I knew the future. And I think in each of these cases,
the CEOs slash founders, leaders, Google was the triumvirate of Eric Schmidt and Larry and Sergey
during these years, they had a competitive advantage when it came to deals like this, which was
that they knew the future. Tencent has this now, both in China and in many ways around the world,
what they have with WeChat, Facebook was able to see that the impact that Instagram was having
on Facebook. For Zuckerberg, he just knew at a deeper level than anybody else, any venture
capitalist was going to be able to tell about the potential value of Instagram because he was seeing
it in the impact on his business. Yeah, so maybe I should revise and say, it's not as much that
they did little diligence, it's that they did little process because they had the data to enable them
to do that, so it's sort of conviction faster.
It's the same information, analytical, behavioral edge that people talk about in public markets.
This is just an information edge.
I think that's a really key and interesting insight is that tech firms uniquely have had,
that they've got crazy data to understand something in an unfair way.
I think that's really neat.
What of the top 10 acquisitions was the most interesting for you guys to explore?
Curious for what each of you have to say.
Android was the most interesting deal to unpack,
because of the reason that they did it. And it was something that I previously had heard about,
but didn't understand the incredible extent of. And that is traffic acquisition costs.
So the real reason, and of course, Google now generates a lot of revenue from the Play Store,
which wouldn't have been possible without creating Android. But there's an incredible amount of money
that they don't have to pay someone else by owning their own mobile operating system.
And if Android did not exist and the iPhone had a monopoly, Google would have to pay dozens, literally
dozens of billions of dollars to Apple every single year in order to keep Google as the default
surge engine on iOS. And Android, the reason why it was important for them to have a credible
competitor against Apple is to basically just reduce this incredible cost burden.
These are toward the bottom of the list. But again, studying these media companies has been really
eye-opening for me just in how they really pioneered so much of the tech business models and how
much history repeats itself. ESPN is so important in the history of the media business and
the cable business, which was the precursor to the technology business and the communications
business. This was the first time where you had consumers indirectly through the cable distribution
companies but paying for content directly. So you could monetize content with a dual revenue stream,
not just advertising, but advertising and subscription.
And it was also the first time really where you had this remixing of content.
Sports Center, the very first ESPN broadcast in 1979 started with SportsCenter.
You were able to take these sports, which Americans and people around the world love,
chop them up into highlights and have it be just as if not more compelling.
Now you can resell the same content multiple times.
And then you just look at everything that's happened with social media since
and draw the line.
You guys have both explored and adopted this seven powers framework from Hamilton
Helmer in a lot of your thinking and as a device in each exploration of a company to sort of
understand where its competitive strengths come from.
Another way I like to think about this is what is hardest to replicate in a given business.
And as you've explored, not just these 10 companies, but all the companies that you've
explored, what pops to mind with that idea of a feature of a business?
And this could be something really young. Like I've loved some of the very early stage founders that you've hosted.
What features jump out to you of a business that just seem incredibly hard for others to copy?
The very first thing that comes to mind here is that Hamilton-Helmer basically has caution tape all over his book that says that understanding the powers are not the ticket that you need in order to have them.
And what he really underscores there, because that's, of course, in my own words, is that creativity is the
necessary precondition in order to develop any of these powers. And if you try too hard at the very
beginning to think, what power am I going to be able to accomplish? That is not the way to be able
to get there. And it's almost like there's a great Elon Musk quote. Or it might be Justine Musk about
Elon that if you want to become like Elon Musk, the very first thing you have to understand about
him is he didn't spend his youth trying to figure out how he can be like someone like Elon Musk.
And I think that that is something that has shown up over and over, especially in these early stage founders that we've interviewed on the LP show, they had these critical insights and then they applied creativity and then they sort of felt along the way, where are we building defensibility in our business? And how can we lean into that? You don't deserve any customers at all without first having an insight, iterating on that insight over and over and over again, and then developing something that somebody
loves. And then you can try and figure out what power applies to you. I've got a fun in some
way's toy example, but I think illustrative of this and fun because it involves both us and
acquired and Hamilton himself. Earlier in the summer, we did an episode on Oprah, another incredible
media company, media entrepreneur and her empire and how she built it. And one of the major parts
of the Oprah empire is the book club, or was the book club. We did that. We were kind of inspired and
me like, we should have an acquired book club. That would be really cool. We weren't thinking about
it is anything more than this would be a fun, creative thing to do. And so we emailed Hamilton
and said, hey, of course, the natural first book we have to have in the book club is the seven
powers and would you do it with us? And Hamilton's response was creativity. All power starts with
invention. I love it. I'm in. And of course, he was the first. And we're still early in the
book club journey. But I think for us in our own business acquired, that's going to be a powerful
source of power for us is we have our community. We have our book club. We do these Zoom
discussions with the authors. That's a very special.
thing where you've got these great authors like Hamilton. We've had Will, Will Thorndyke from
the outsiders. We're going to have Emily Chang and Beretopia. And our audience gets to participate
in that in a live discussion. And so you have this kind of network effect that's developed.
And like we weren't thinking about that. But Hamilton, creativity.
One of the cool kindred things I think we share in common is a joint interest in very big public
companies and the earliest private companies. What company would you be most afraid for a portfolio
company of yours to be up against.
Public or private?
Anyone.
I mean, at the risk of being too tropey, like Amazon, yeah, I would never want to compete
with Amazon.
In fact, I regularly look at Amazon stock and think, why does anyone invest in startups?
Why not just invest in a trillion and a half dollar public company that's growing faster
than any of them?
I mean, Shemath called this years ago.
Yeah.
Even just looking at the big five tech companies, you look at their growth rates, Amazon's
growing at 40% none of the others are even close. I think what's amazing about Amazon is they're so
decentralized and are working on so many different things. And they are, I don't know, you could almost
argue that as a organization as a whole, one of their guiding principles is just rationality.
They will do what makes sense. And if things don't make sense, they'll kill it. So a really
interesting thing in our top 10 acquisitions, and really most of the acquisitions we've covered
on the show, you very rarely see Amazon. They don't pay up for anything. They paid a billion
dollars for Twitch, got a steal with that. Well, Whole Foods, they paid $16 billion for it. That's a
little bit of a different scenario. But they're not at all afraid to go compete head to head with
the company. They did it with diapers.com, which they ended up acquiring after competing with
same with Zappos. If they decide to enter your space, they will do it with all the scale advantages
that they have and they will not let up. If you had a secret inside database of when every VC
in the world was very interested in a company before they invested, whose feed would you
subscribe to first? Mine is the benchmark partnership 15 years ago. I don't know if we can
have historical folks in this one, but they just didn't miss. Maybe another lesser well-known
one, but also from the same time period, is Steve Anderson at baseline back in the day,
right when these inflection points, many of the flexion points we've talked about on this
episode, we're starting to change in 2010, 2011, 2012, who's the first investor in Instagram?
And I think of many ways, Maples and Flaggate, same deal.
Like, that generation of very early seed investors saw both the changing dynamics for company
building, but also for investing, too, that Ced was going to professionalize was going to be a real
asset class and that you could take a really important role in company building with these
companies at that stage. If we could go back in time to them and see some of those teams they were
meeting at that moment in time, that would be amazing. And I think David and I both just gave mild
cop-out answers. So I want to just go out on a limb a little bit and say, one of your former
guest is someone I really look up to Blake Robbins. And I'm particularly calling him out to bring it
back to a question you asked earlier, I think entrepreneurs in many emerging markets, including
sort of gaming and streaming and influencers, but emerging consumer categories look up to Blake.
And I think that if I could get insight into a credible view of what could be big five years
from now, I think Blake is at least having to come across his desk.
One of Blake and my's mutual good friends who introduced the two of us, when he introduced me
said, please meet Blake, I haven't found a bottom yet when talking to
which in my experience has been true. And this is a quality shared of great investors in general
that you run out of questions before they run out of answers, which just tells you that they
have obsessively explored every nook and cranny of an area or an idea, which is a cool thing.
It's hard to find people like that, but I would agree that he's one of them. So you've explored
lots of businesses. You're years into this. You've sort of started developing this muscle, I guess,
for running this research process on young and old companies. What are the big open questions that
you guys still have? I often ask people, what do you not understand well that you wish you did?
And this is kind of my version of that question for you. As you think about what to tackle next,
what companies to tackle next, what guides that decision? What are the big missing pieces that you
want to fill? I'll tell you a big missing piece that I want to fill that is both in the show and in my
investing career and in the work we do starting companies, I was so fortunate to be right on the edge
of the app store's launch in 2008. And when I created my first iPhone app in college, that Apple was
kind enough not to have reminders on the iPhone. And so I got to go get sort of millions of downloads
just as like a college could make an app. And that was such an unbelievable transformative wave.
I am desperately trying to get better at figuring out what the next app store is. What is the
wave that we are right on the edge of that's going to start the next five-year run of
unbelievable creativity, a free-for-all of people starting stuff, the classic unsettled frontier
before people start building the modes around their business where you kind of can't miss.
And I sort of remember what it was like being someone making an app in that moment.
And I haven't really felt that about any of the, you can call it Frontier Tech recently.
And I modestly got in on the crypto wave, just buying currencies.
I was not a big participant and people talk about defy now and people talk about a lot of the things
that could be this next wave. I don't have conviction in any of them. And I'm trying to figure out,
is there another app store boom? Is there another dot com boom? When's it going to get here?
What's the technology going to be? And I would say I'm on academic quest to try and understand how one
can be better at spotting that. Are there any early green shoots of one of those things that you think
I'm not asking to say that this is the next platform change or whatever or platform unlock,
but anything that's at least of note or of interest in that exploration?
I think GPT3 is a potential one. It's so hard to know how that will evolve,
but it's so powerful and so amorphous that it's got a shot.
Can you just describe what that is?
Yeah, absolutely. So OpenAI released the third iteration of their language model.
well, first of all, it's trained on a big chunk of the internet. And so it's a machine learning model that has sucked up Wikipedia and tremendous slice of the internet. So it understands things in a lot of contexts. And one of the things that it indexed is public GitHub. So it sort of understands what a variety of programming languages look like. And you can feed it input. So that input can be text. It can be code. It can be there's even early experiments of bits that represent an image and then ask it to,
help you make the rest of it or summarize it or hey pick up from here or i once asked it the most
amazing business model is or hey this is the most interesting business i've seen in the last decade i
love it because and then i asked it to write 200 characters after that sometimes it misses
horrifically but with sort of incredibly compelling language that makes you sort of falsely believe
that it has the answers, but there's just so many different things that people can do with it.
I think the important thing to take away is it is a very powerful, generative machine learning
model that may be capable of things that we haven't seen with any other model before this.
It's so hard because so many of the reasons why businesses that you wouldn't expect to be technology
or media actually have a flavor of that in them, which makes them interesting.
We just did our episode on the NBA where we spent three hours really diving deep on the whole history of the league and evolving into the business model that has today. And obviously it's a media business. And I think we might just be too attracted to those.
We have one coming up our season finale this year that's going to be along those lines. That'll be really fun.
We did the Alaska Airlines acquisition of Virgin America. Yep. That was a fun one because I'm like a little bit of an av geek. I would say like I dip my toe in it.
And it's kind of the same way that I dip my toe in being a space geek.
And so doing the SpaceX episode, obviously a technology company.
But I don't think I've ever done any more research for any episode than SpaceX just because I felt so compelled to nail it.
I felt like I'd be letting myself down if I didn't understand every corner of that company.
And let's say, I think SpaceX is probably the answer because it doesn't share any of the technology characteristics that we've talked about on the rest of this episode.
But obviously is a tech company loosely defined.
What did you learn from the Alaska Airlines investigation? It's all about real estate.
There are a very fixed number of gates, and no one's building new airports, and rarely are they building new terminals.
And so the prices are high because it's beachfront property. And the thing that constrains those businesses is the margin profile.
And so you have basically a war of who can be a better sort of manager of their financial statements and make sure to keep their balance sheet in a healthy place such that they can go and compete.
for these constrained number of gates, but not with a business that has massive upside. So it's this
really interesting sort of fight over a pie rather than the venture world that we're used to
expanding where everyone just assumes that the future is going to be 1,000x what it currently is
today. Every business falls somewhere in every market industry on the spectrum between real
estate and Zoom, right? Tech business. That's a fascinating concept of just scarcity value and
scarcity driving business outcomes. I've never had that thought. There's not a lot of new airline
gates that get created. So it creates this weird fixed pie dynamic. And one interesting note on that,
it's not like there was other people, there weren't that many potential acquirers, because there's
been so much consolidation in the industry, and it's effectively a pure commodity at this point.
Obviously, there's loyalty programs and little differences here or there, but anybody that's
tried to create a differentiated airline for a different experience has basically failed.
So you've got a pretty small set of people competing to buy Virgin America.
And ultimately, the other people just couldn't do it because they were in so much debt.
These businesses have been mismanaged is probably the wrong word, but have just not kept themselves as healthy as a lot of the other businesses that we look at.
And so Alaska was almost the de facto winner because they were the only one who could kind of get it done with their financial profile.
Well, guys, I've probably learned more from you about the history of business and dynamics within
business than just about anybody just because you've done the work. I love my friend Eugene
Way's phrase compressed to impress. I think that's a phrase to live by. And that is how I describe
what you guys do to people is that you suck in, God knows how many hours of research and
information and distill it down to not just the best of it, but also into a narrative form,
which makes it easy to remember. So first, I'm just deeply appreciative of the work you guys do.
encourage everyone listening to just go sign up for the show immediately and learn along with the rest of us.
And I have to turn now, before we do a little fun extra that we'll reveal at a later date,
I have to turn to my traditional closing question, which is to ask you each for the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you.
Oh, man. Well, I was thinking about this, and there is an answer I could absolutely give you about my parents,
because how could anyone ever do anything kinder than sacrifice years and years and years of
their life in order to enable you to have a great one. But as much as I love my parents, I want to give
a more sort of fun answer than a less cliche answer than I'm sure many a guests before it has.
So I want to tell a fun story of my girlfriend and I going to Disneyland when that was still a thing.
Before we couldn't do that anymore. It was her birthday and we really, really, really wanted to go to do
the new Rise of the Resistance ride, which is for anyone who's never done it, which very few people
have done it because it launched shortly before the shutdown. It is by far away the coolest
Disney experience ever. And it is, obviously, you kind of feel like you're in Star Wars. So for any
Star Wars geek out there, it is a absolute must-do thing. Did not win the luck of the draw on
random sort of Wheel of Fortune thing that happens when the gates open to figure out if you're going to get in
that day. And we were going to get to do it maybe a half hour before our flight, if you were lucky.
And through the incredible generosity of a guy who I won't say in case there's someone at Disneyland
and he did something wrong that gets him to trouble. So I won't name him. But there was a guy working
there, and despite the fact that there was a couple breakdowns during the day, we were not going to be
able to get on it, and we're going to have to get our flight. We basically made our case to him,
explained that it was her birthday. He moved mountains for us, got around an incredible amount of red tape,
because they don't want people doing this to get us onto that ride immediately before having to run to
the airport. And I will tell you, Patrick, when you were on our show, I talked about the thrill that
comes from learning, the thrill that comes from that moment in my physics class when I discovered
that orbit and me not being able to throw a baseball very far were related. I had like a similar
high getting to go and do this Star Wars experience with my girlfriend when we thought we weren't
going to and he put personal risk on the line to make this thing happen for us. It is the tiniest,
strangest little example, but it's a fairly recent one and it totally stuck with me. I just loved,
he truly had no personal gain in doing that. And many kind things that.
people do. There's some amount of personal gain. This one had actually none. I love that one. It's small
and simple and makes the point well. David, over to you to close this out. I'll be quick, but I was thinking
the same thing. So many of your guests on the show have such amazing stories and so many of them.
The theme you always comment on is people giving them a chance when they hadn't done anything to prove
they deserve it. I've had so many of those in my life too many to talk about. On the kindest theme,
I was thinking about what's really kind and it seemed to have been that, you know, I've had some
moments in my life and career that have felt like big failures to me and anybody who's had
that to be around long enough, you'll have it. And it can shake you. And when those happen,
I had three people who I really trust and respect, mentors of mine, Matt McElwain at Medrona,
Ben's partner, Greg Goddustman at PSL, and Craig Sherman at Meritech, I'll just kind of sit me down
each individually, take me out to lunch, go for a walk and just feel like, David, look,
like, things are going to be okay. Not only going to be okay, you're going to be okay, you're going
be great. And you were going to do great things and I believe in you. They weren't getting
anything out of that. They weren't trying to recruit me for anything. They had nothing to gain,
but just to tell me they believed in me that I was going to do great things just meant so much.
So I'll never forget it. And I'm so thankful to them.
Guys, this has been so much fun. I think maybe this might become an annual tradition to do a home
and home together. This was jam-packed with lessons and a cool way to distill even more what you guys
have explored for the last several years. So thank you both so much for your time.
Thank you. Thanks so much for having us.
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