Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Etched - Building AI Hardware to Make Inference Faster and Cheaper - [Invest Like the Best, EP.480]
Episode Date: June 30, 2026My guests today are Gavin Uberti and Rob Wachen, the founders of Etched. A few years ago, when they set out to build a better AI chip than the largest companies in the world, almost everyone I call...ed told me it could not be done. They have since done it, taping out a working chip on their first attempt and becoming the first hardware company founded after ChatGPT to do so. They already have more than a billion dollars of customer demand for their first product, and have raised eight hundred million dollars to build it. Etched builds chips and systems designed to run AI models faster and at lower cost. They started the company in 2023, and that product is a complete rack for inference, the chip along with the boards, the power delivery, the interconnects, and the manufacturing to produce it all. We talk about the technical bets behind their architecture, how they hired industry legends and paired them with elite 22 year-olds, and why they believe inference will become one of the largest markets in the world. I think you will find the story of what they have built hard to forget. Please enjoy my conversation with Gavin and Rob. For the full show notes, transcript, and links to mentioned content, check out the episode page here. ----- Become a Colossus member to get our quarterly print magazine and private audio experience, including exclusive profiles and early access to select episodes. Subscribe at colossus.com/subscribe. ----- Ramp’s mission is to help companies manage their spend in a way that reduces expenses and frees up time for teams to work on more valuable projects. Go to ramp.com/invest to sign up for free and get a $250 welcome bonus. ----- Trusted by thousands of businesses, Vanta continuously monitors your security posture and streamlines audits so you can win enterprise deals and build customer trust without the traditional overhead. Invest Like the Best listeners get a special offer of $1,000 off Vanta when you go to vanta.com/invest. ----- WorkOS is the infrastructure B2B and AI-native companies use to sell to enterprise. It covers everything enterprise security requires: SSO, SCIM, RBAC, Audit Logs, AI governance, and more. Trusted by 2,000+ fast-growing companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, and Vercel. ----- Rogo is the AI platform for finance. They're building agents for Wall Street that are trained to understand how bankers and investors actually do work: from diligence and modeling, to turning analysis into deliverables. To learn more, visit rogo.ai/invest. ----- Ridgeline has built a complete, real-time, modern operating system for investment managers. It handles trading, portfolio management, compliance, customer reporting, and much more through an all-in-one real-time cloud platform. Visit ridgelineapps.com. ----- Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant. Timestamps: (00:00:00) Welcome to Invest Like The Best (00:02:07) Gavin Uberti and Rob Wachen (00:03:54) Two 21-Year-Olds Taking on NVIDIA (00:07:52) The Two Technical Bets Behind Their Architecture (00:14:15) Why Inference Becomes the Biggest Market (00:20:23) Rob and Gavin's Origins Stories (00:28:38) How They Recruit Industry Legends (00:36:30) Moving a Dozen Engineers to Bangalore for Six Months (00:38:01) Speed Wins (00:43:58) Getting More Concurrency Out of Every Megawatt (00:52:44) Vertical Integration (00:57:43) Hardest Obstacles to Overcome (01:01:09) Raising The Largest AI Chip Series A Ever (01:06:29) TSMC (01:13:20) Designing Gen 2 for Gigawatt-Scale Production (01:16:42) Why Machines Don't Think Like People (01:20:03) A Year of Compute Compressed Into a Month (01:23:44) The Trillion-Dollar Data Center (01:26:19) The Kindest Thing
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Hello and welcome everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Invest Like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. If you enjoy these conversations and want to go deeper, check out Colossus, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing. You can find Colossus along with all of our podcasts at colossus.com.
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My guests today are Gavin Ubirtee and Rob Lockett, the founders of Edge. A few years ago when
they set out to build a better AI chip than the largest companies in the world, almost everyone I
called told me it could not be done. They have since done it, taping out a working chip on their
first attempt and becoming the first hardware company founded after ChatGPT to do so. There you have
more than a billion dollars of customer demand for their first product and have raised $800 million
to build it. Etch to build chips and systems designed to run AI models faster and at lower cost.
They started the company in 2023 and the product is a complete rack for inference. The chip,
along with the boards, the power delivery, the interconnects, and all the manufacturing to produce it all.
We talk about the technical bets behind their architecture, how they hired industry legends and paired them with elite 22-year-olds,
and why they believe inference will become one of the largest markets in the world.
I think you will find a story of what they have built, hard to forget.
Please enjoy my conversation with Gavin and Rob.
All right, gentlemen, it's been three years or so, Gavin, since you and I last did this, which is nuts.
And at the time, I was just wildly intrigued by your story and what you were going to build.
I didn't know a lot about chips at the time.
I was considering investing in the company.
And so I was calling everyone I could conceive of that could give me an opinion or something.
And at the time, basically the consensus was these kinds of companies are not built by young people.
That the semis world, the best companies are founded by 40, 50-year-old.
People that have had a whole career's worth of experience, have learned all the problems, have shipped multiple chips.
two 21-year-olds are like not going to do this. It's just not going to work. It was indicative of a
theme, which was nobody believes in us. That's obviously changed a lot now, you know, just walk the
halls and talk to the people that have chosen to come work here. But in the early days, it felt like
this was something that you had to face down. What was that like facing that down? Where a set
of incumbents and an industry worth of people and investors and everyone else sort of didn't believe in you.
And what did that anneal in you to build the company the way that you are? Like, what was the impact of
that. I think there's a certain level of naivety required to think that you could build a chip better
than every other AI chip ever built and build a company to do it way faster than ever has been
done. And we have the naivety. There's many times where we would say, like, why isn't this
possible and, you know, really push on it? And it turns out that, like, everybody's answers are
extremely siloed to a set of constraints that aren't true anymore. And the reality is the entire
semiconductors and data center industry is built on buffer. And what I mean, that is, you know,
by that is every part of the stack from the EDA tools to the power modules to the circuit boards
to the chip design and standard cells. Everything is built to be general purpose for everything,
not just in the data center, but IOT on the edge and so forth. And when you have a specific
use case you're really trying to design for, you can change the constraints a lot. And I'll
give you just a very simple example that we're not the only one who does, which is one of the
things you care a lot about is the clock speed of your chip. It's proportional to the throughput
of your system. When you are doing sign-off for different timing, what clock speed you're actually
going to be able to run on when you tape out your chip, there's this concept called corners,
which is, you know, what temperatures are you going to be able to run at this clock speed?
The default configurations for a lot of these EDA tools assume that you're going to be running
your chips in freezing temperatures. Now, I don't know about you, but I've never seen an AI data
center with ice in it. So, you know, we can feel pretty confident that our ships don't need to
run at full speed at zero degrees Celsius. In fact, like, they're never really going to be
running below 80 degrees Celsius anyway.
And just by knowing that that's a constraint that doesn't matter, we can make a ton of changes
throughout the entire system.
That's like a very simple one, but there's many more that you get 20% here, 50% there,
2x here, and these compound to a system that can be radically better for inference.
I think you found two kinds of people.
There are some folks who went purely on heuristics of, hey, young founders, they claim they can
go beat the biggest company in the world our performance.
It cannot happen.
And there is no thing you could go say to me that would make me change my mind.
But there's also people out there who, of course, skeptical,
but are willing to go ahead and say, I'll spend the time, I'll do the work,
and is it actually possible?
Like, for example, one of our earliest, earliest supporters was Mark Ross.
And Mark was a very prestigious semiconductor expert.
He used to be CTO at Cypress SEPA that sold for $9 billion.
And when we met him, we were just a couple of guys in a dorm room,
and we came to him and say, hey, you want to go build hardware for inference?
We think we can be much faster than NVIDIA
and Mark's like, no, you can't, it will not work.
But if you want to go convince me, she'd write a white paper,
she'd go ahead and build a functional simulation and show me.
And so after a lot of very long nights,
went back to Mark and said, hey, here's a simulation.
What do you think?
And he was like, huh, this works.
But to go do a company like this, you'll need a large amount of capital.
At least $3 million even to get started.
End up we went ahead and raised five,
I raised a lot more after that.
And then he was, again, surprised, but got more involved.
And then he became an advisor, a half-time advisor, and eventually a full-time CEO,
as he saw more and more of the development of progress.
And I think in general, the skepticism has filtered really heavily,
folks who want to go ahead and be right regardless,
which are willing to be a very truth-seeking and say,
sure, I'm skeptical, but I will go ahead and work with the numbers myself.
And if I can go figure out why this is possible, well, let's go build it.
The specifics that you've made bets on, the way that you built this system are immensely interesting to me.
And because so many people are trying to do this now, build new chips that will do a better job of serving inference at massive scale.
The world is interested in the research approaches, the different architecture approaches that people are taking to building a new AI chip.
And I'd love you to just start by describing what this thing is, what it does.
but maybe more interestingly and more importantly, the process that you went through to decide
what bets to take, what technologies to invent, and compare and contrast those with what you've
seen the rest of the marketplace tried to do.
Yeah, I think that you can start with the product.
We're not just building a chip.
We're building a full inference solution, and that means a rack.
That means the chip.
That means the power delivery into the chip.
That means the border in which it sits.
That means the interconnect by which the chip talk to each other.
That means the production for this mass volume of racks.
Really, the production is the product.
We think about how we get our advantage.
There are two key parts of running inference.
There's pre-fill and there's decode.
Now, we have two key tech batching both of these things.
Pre-fill is reading in a huge volume of text, and decode is then using that data and generate output tokens.
When you go out in a run pre-fill, your key job is not to go to predict tokens.
You already know the text.
Your job is to go and get the model's memory, what we call us KV Cash, into the right stake.
then you can go ahead and run decode
with that same K-FeeCache.
So we will often go to do as we call
PD disaggregation. Pre-filled
decode deseg. You will have
more cluster of servers running these pre-fills.
You'll then transfer those model memories,
those KD caches, over to the
decode cluster, and then go ahead and
use that cluster to go generate the next tokens.
So sort of like loading the gun and then firing
it, like if I think about it in super simple terms.
Yeah, you got it. It's
giving the model to remember the right things
and then using those things to go do tasks.
Candidly, people think about this market a bit lazily.
They say, are you a pre-fell chip?
Are you a decode chip?
Are you an HP?
Are you an S-Ram chip?
Are you a 3D RAM chip?
Are you using optics?
Using copper.
When we started this, we just wanted to understand why extremely smart people were working
on these different directions.
We seriously looked at architecture as like having a bunch of DDR memory in like a shared
memory pool and looking at advanced packaging to basically break out of the shoreline.
We looked at things like, is there are ways to put memory dyes on top of compute dyes.
In doing so, we realized that there's no free lunch.
Everything has a trade-off, right?
3D RAM, you have a thermal issue, you have a supply chain issue, you have to figure out hybrid
bonding, you have to figure out the flops, so now you're a decode chip.
So we went through everything, both on the pre-fell and the decode side.
In doing so, we realized there's a few design spaces that nobody had seriously tried to explore
because they were never done in AI chips.
And we asked ourselves, what are the actual metrics that are going to matter the most?
On the pre-fill side, the thing that matters is flops and flop's density.
And people talk about flops often as a headline number.
But in reality, you should care about the flops you're getting when you're running real workloads.
There's this concept called MFU or model flops utilization, which is, you know, for every peak flop advertise,
how many cents on the dollar are you actually getting?
And on GPUs, you often get somewhere between 20 and 50% depending on the workload.
And actually, you can provably not run at 100% because you have a thermal issue,
where as you increase the flop utilization, you have more transistors going on and off,
you draw more power, and the chip will self-regulate and actually lower its clock speed to make sure it doesn't overheat.
So as we looked at inference, we said if we want way more flops, because we want to run at way higher throughputs,
we fundamentally need to solve the thermal problem before we even think about adding flops to the chip.
If I just add more flaps to a GPU today or another AI chip, I'm not actually going to get more performance because it's just going to thermal throttle.
So fundamentally, the essence of that is this concept of the Nard scaling, which is voltage is quadratically proportional to power.
So if I 2x my voltage, my power goes up by 4x, if I cut my voltage in half, my power goes down by quarter.
So we asked ourselves, how could we run voltages lower than GPS?
And we talked to a lot of people about this.
We flew out to Silicon Valley after dropping out and basically asked dozens of people and semiconductors
at all these different chip companies how they did it.
And the answer we got was like, you can't.
You can't run at voltages lower than GPS.
And this was very dissatisfying because there was many different industries of chips that run at voltages lower than GPS.
Bitcoin miners run at under a quarter of the voltage of GPS.
So this is obviously physically possible.
The question is, are there issues with GPU architectures that make it unable to run at these
voltages?
And when we looked at the problem for a long time, we were able to create a new mechanism of running
at much lower voltages, a new type of power delivery that we call low voltage inference.
And we think all AI chips in the future are going to be low voltage chips.
They're going to have to cram way more flops in the same silicon area and without thermal
throttling run at way lower voltages.
So that's pretty so.
decode, it is all a memory gain. More memory bandwidth. You can load the model faster, load the KV
cache faster, and serve more tokens per second per user. We think people ask the wrong question here.
People often ask how much memory bandwidth is on your chip. You should be asking how much memory
bandwidth is on your full scale up cluster. What we're able to do is add way, way more bandwidth
and a much lower latency for the chip to the chip to our interconnects that allows us to be able to go
serve models at this much higher speed because you can go use the SRM and the HBM from the
full scale at Cluster as a single pool. And that's our second key technical bet, what we call
Cluster Scale Memory. And on GPUs today, the Cluster Memory bandwidth is often very badly utilized,
because the time to go hopped from one GPU to another is extremely long. For example, on Blackwell
chips, it can be about 4,000 nanoseconds to go point to point. And that means that if you go
head and go to an 8x TP setup, you will get way, way, less than an 8x improvement in your
tokens per second per user. And what we did is built our own totally custom interconnect stack.
We took everything above the second layer of Ethernet, built a full custom. And we can go out
and do far for better latencies and in balance this way, too. We can go ahead and cut this by
more than a factor of 5x, and that allows us to then use the memory of other chips much more
effectively. As you scale the world size, you're a time per token, you go down proportionally.
Yeah. And it's not that surprising, given all these architectures were built before chat,
GPT. So if we're trying to build a chip for the modern workloads, it's going to look very
different. The way we organize our flops, the way we do our voltage domains, the way we do our power planes
are going to look super different, the way we do the packaging is going to look super different,
the way we do the board design is going to look different. And then the decode side, the way
we connect everything is going to look very different. So we're now bringing forward our
first generation of this low voltage inference technology, which is running at under half the voltage
of any other AI chip.
If you zoom all the way out, why is this so important?
Like, why is the delivery of much higher throughput, much lower cost per token, better tokens per
watt, like all of these metrics that the universe is going to start talking about more and more.
Everyone knows the supply set of the equation is a big problem right now.
Why is this in a bigger picture looking out a decade, the bottleneck in the technology world?
Well, I think it comes down to productivity, where we are.
are at this extremely interesting moment in the history of civilization where there's real
artificial intelligence, not like sci-fi stuff, but like these models can solve problems
that most humans can't. And like it's going to create new scientific discoveries. It's going
to create instant access to medical care, instant access to education. And now it's just about
how many people can use this at the same time, how many products can serve this at the same time.
And also the speed of doing different tasks. So when you think about wall clock time, if we can
take an agent that can run at a certain model quality and could take a year to solve a certain
task using inference time compute. If you have way faster decode speed, you can compress
that into a month. So the amount of scientific innovation and the amount of actual proliferation
of technology will happen much faster. And then the second part is concurrency, where today, it's just
not possible for a billion people to use these models concurrently. Ultimately, some people are going
to get downgraded, some people's model is going to be slower, some people just won't be able to access
the hardware. A few years from now, there's going to be giant models serving billions
of users. We're very much in the early innings of AI today where the paid plans, there's only a few
million users in the world using paid plans of AI models. So we're at one one thousandth of the global
population actually using this stuff. So if you want to serve a giant scale, a lot of things change.
And one of them is the number of chips that communicate together, where people usually think about
this in the context of training. You know, you have these giant training clusters. You have
colossus with over 100,000 GPUs that are all networked together. And the inference side, today,
people usually think about it as an eight-chip cluster or maybe just, you know, NVL-70.
to the scale up domain. But very quickly, this is going to become thousands of chips and tens of
thousands of chips. And the way to get the most performance there, the time between sending
data from one chip to another, that primitive matters way more than is getting credit right now.
So when we think about optimizing memory bandwidth for the system, you have to think about
how fast these chips can communicate together, because if they can only communicate really quickly
with themselves and very slowly with other chips, you're not going to actually be able to
serve giant model is at 10,000, 20,000 tokens per second. So we need multiple orders of
magnitude of infrastructure built out throughout the entire stack from the wafer to the watt,
transistor to the token to actually bring this stuff to the world. And I think that you look at
most other goods, like the iPhone, for example, they've gotten into this economy as a scale
where as a result, more money does not really buy a better iPhone. That if you're a billionaire,
or if you're just the average American, you buy the same phone. And tokens aren't like that yet.
We're still in the very early days where the general purpose system, relatively small one,
is kind of hand-crafting these tokens, like they made screws back in the Renaissance.
And I wanted to live in the world where you have the same economies of scale for token making
that you do for making, say, iPhones or cars or anything else.
I think that is one of the huge unlocks that allows a huge group of people to go use the best quality models.
Economies of scale have all made capitalism very, I don't know, fair.
I think that allows you to go ahead and have the same product in many, many different hands,
and you're able to go then serve way more users on a single scale up cluster.
It allows you to get closer to that point for token serving too.
Yeah, and also just certain products aren't usable if they're slow.
So if you want to serve coding models and you want people to actually use them,
like there's a certain number of tokens per second you need to hit.
So the question is, while maintaining that per token speed,
how many users can I serve at the same time?
And you can basically decide, I'm going to shut off a bunch of the world from
using this stuff or everyone's going to get a worse experience. So fundamentally, you need to find
ways to push out the curve, and that's why there's such a pressure for new hardware.
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I'd like to take some time to step back and hear both of your stories,
for how you came to this idea and this company,
and then kind of walk through what it's been like to build it,
because I think in so doing,
we'll understand the system that you've built for the company itself
that will then be able to power subsequent generations of products like this one
for this crazy inference feature that we're staring down.
Rob, maybe starting with you, just take it however far back you want.
But what I'm curious about and your personal story was actually the very first thing
I ever heard from either one of you was your personal story many years ago now,
which really kind of blew me away.
I'm most interested in your motivation,
ultimately, for being here doing this thing.
It starts back, actually, in high school for me.
I've been very unlucky and lucky
at different points in life.
This was one of the tougher times.
At the end of my sophomore year of high school,
I got injured at a martial arts tournament
the next day.
It couldn't walk for some reason.
I thought it was something wrong
with my SI join or something.
I went through physical therapy.
I did different types of scans.
I couldn't figure it out.
And eventually, they found this big bump on my back
and an MRI and told me it was a
tumor. Stage four bone cancer was told I had under 30% chance of survival. It was like a two-year
crazy chemotherapy, surgery, learning to walk again, experience. And when you go through something like
that, it changes the Overton window of human experience and makes you appreciate like what actually
matters. And you also ask yourself, what are you going to do if you have the chance to live?
If you actually want to get through something like that, you need to be hoping for something. And I
always knew I wanted to do something very impactful if I had the chance to get through it. And it took me
a couple years to figure out what that was going to be. And at the same time, as I got to college
and met a bunch of other people building cool tech, I got extremely excited by AI models, especially
once GPT3 came out. And I was like, wow, this is the first model that can kind of speak English.
And these things are going to get really smart. What happened was when GPT4 came out, there was
GPT4V, which was the first model with image uploading. So I went through my camera roll, and I found
a picture of my back with this bump on it before I was diagnosed. And I said, hey, chat GPT,
pretend you're an expert doctor, a patient comes in, and they says they have this bump on their back.
What could it be?
And it immediately says, like, this could be a tumor, you should get an MRI, and immediately
go to the doctor.
And I just kind of sat there still.
It was like, that took me six months.
And yesterday, this feature wasn't there.
Today, it's here.
I go to show my parents, and I got this, like, notification being like, you're all out of
image credits today.
Like, you need to get a pro plan.
And I was like, holy crap.
Like, this is going to change everything.
and we clearly don't have the infrastructure to serve it.
And there's very few things you can work on
that can actually bring this technology at scale to the world faster.
I mean, there's like plenty of people that are super smart working on models.
The fab seemed maybe unreachable to work on,
but it seemed like the hardware was all designed before chat GPT.
Every GPU, every TPU, every AI chip that was serving these models
were just fundamentally built before this
and are retrofit to serve these modern models.
There's going to be an entire new wave of architectures that came out.
and what a more exciting thing to work on than bringing this to everybody?
Very different angle at the same time.
I was running a startup incubator called prod,
which has incubated a bunch of different companies,
some of the earliest ones being cursor in any sphere,
which merged and Mercor and etched went through it,
a handful of others.
At the time, as these models were getting smarter, it was 2020.
I was realizing all of these companies are spending all the money they raise on compute.
And I had this realization as I was working on some of my own stuff,
that like, oh my God, all the products I want to build
are going to cost tens of millions of dollars a year in inference.
this is not going to be tenable, like the cost structure of every software company,
and the COGS is not going to be like zero anymore for an incremental user.
It's going to be quite high and it's going to be a function of inference.
And then the optics of every business is going to also be inference as people use more and more coding agents.
So fundamentally, it seems like inference is going to be really important.
And it feels like we are on a decade march for inference to become, you know, the biggest market in the world.
So when you think about that, 10 years from now, there's going to be these giant projects
where everything in that data center fundamentally hasn't been designed.
today, we should go pick something and work on it. That's kind of how it got started.
David, I'm really excited for you to go back about as far, probably early in high school,
maybe even earlier, and tell your favorite hash marks on the timeline that ultimately led to
your ambition to drop out of Harvard and start this company. My first job ever was at a company
called Exnor, or I did Colonel's Development. I was 17, and a 17-year-old can't sign a legally
landing contracts. So I was then going to go ahead and do a traditional CIA. They went ahead and sat me
down and said, Gavin, don't share this information. And X-Norm was one of the only companies that
saw, hey, maybe this is a good trade, and got to work building kernels. And a number of other companies
since, X-Nor got bought by Apple for $200 million, did the same thing at Octo that got bought by
Nvidia for hundreds of millions of dollars. But when you do this sort of kernels work,
what you realize is that the math is relatively easy, but to get high-speed decode, the thing that
matters is data movement. Almost all the work that you do is optimizing how do you move data,
around a single chip or across multiple chips.
That's why we went ahead and built this cluster scale memory tech.
We bring that interconnect time way, way lower.
You can go do way more movement.
And as a result, get a much faster time to generate each subsequent token
and build these crazy things Rob's talking about
for doing a year's worth of work in a month or more than that in the future.
Can you talk about the competitive drive that's evident in some of the high school
competitions that you participated in and won?
We did a couple.
For example, I was very active in FTC Robotics.
I was lucky to have a very talented partner, Sanford.
For a long time, we were part of a traditional school team,
where it was about 20 guys, all working together
as is often typical in first tech challenge.
And the goal is to go out and build a robot
that scores the most points, and a bunch of other things too.
And first, they put a lot of emphasis around collaborating with other teams,
around trying to do really good documentation,
around trying to go ahead and get others inspired
to go do the same thing.
Sanford and I decided, rather than to go ahead
and do it this way, we're going to win.
And we did nothing else besides the bolder about that scored the most points.
As a two-person team.
At a two-person team rather than a 20-person team.
That we were much, much smaller than almost every other team in the competition.
We figured that if we were going to go specialize, if we were going to go out and do this, win the damn games really well,
we wouldn't need to go ahead and advance based on the quality of our documentation or over outreach.
We were just going to go win.
And so we did.
We had branched off built a two-person team that built a robot and decided we were going to go ahead and redesign it every three months.
And we did. We actually had the world record for the highest score during this competition at one point.
We were rated by OPR third in the world for software development, and it was a damn good machine.
What from that episode can I translate as an analogy onto how you've built etch the company?
We think about how you want to go ahead and do a full rack scale product like this. There's a couple key ideas.
One of them is like velocity, velocity, velocity, that you win by shipping. You're not going to go out and win by having
the best outreach or the best communications, you imagine building the best product. And similarly,
we think we can do it with a lot fewer folks, that if you're willing to go ahead and just focus
on product, product, product, and parallelize relentlessly, you don't need 20,000 people like the big
companies have. You can do the best product in the world with far fewer people. You know,
there's a saying, the best part is no part. I think for us, it's also the best vendor is no vendor.
As much as possible, we want to vertically integrate the entire product, both because we get more
performance, but we can move way faster. So everything from the chips to the boards, to the
cold plates, to the interconnects, to even the production, we want to do all of it as in-house as
possible. I think we're the only startup right now that's building its own rack as well as its
own chips. And we did it all at the same time. A couple years ago, the last time we were public,
at that point, we just started building our rack team. And we brought over Brian Loyler,
who built all of Nvidia's HGX and DGX systems, which is like 80% of their revenue.
And we said, we're going to build the rack at the same time. We actually went through multiple
iterations of the rack before the chips even came back. Before the chips came back, we made thermal
chips that had the exact same hotspots as we expected our chips to have so we could build the cold
plates, we could overpressurize them and blow them up. We haven't had a single leak since our chips
came back with the cold plates because we already validated them. We have a factory in Taiwan,
we have a few dozen people out there. We built a clone of a bunch of the test stations in our
office. We have a two megawatt data center on this floor and we did 24-7 development cycles.
People are doing day shifts and night shifts to actually get the hardware up and running as quickly
as possible. It's that extreme vertical integration and extreme paralyzation of the schedule that lets
you get products to market way faster. If you think about the building of the early team and what it
required as two young guys building this company, there's lots of very talented young entrepreneurs out
there, maybe for the first time of this scope or magnitude in a long time, all of whom probably
could benefit from the lessons that you've learned, getting very sophisticated talented people
to come join you even after careers at the other great companies. If you were teaching this as a class,
Like, here's how to get elite talent when you're young and inexperienced and naive.
What would be the syllabus?
We have a pretty bimodal talent philosophy.
It starts with what we call it a legends,
which is when we're trying to solve an incredibly hard technical problem
and generally do something that hasn't been done before,
we need to find the very best person in the world.
And often the number one guy in the world versus the number 10 guy versus the number 100 guy,
huge difference and whether it's actually possible to solve the problem.
We created the system we called project-based recruiting,
where we map out all of the hardest technical problems across all industries that anyone
has ever had to solve.
We look at temporality.
So who are the people who did the zero to one?
Who is in charge, quote unquote, who actually did the work?
We talked to as many people as possible.
And then we just track it.
And you'd be surprised by the amount of people who say yes after the first conversation
is pretty low.
But the amount of people who say yes after the 20th conversation is surprisingly high.
You really got to keep Adam.
When you hear know from somebody who really is the best in the world, then that really means,
hey, should go ahead and come back when you had a few more milestones for proven out.
I think it's one of the most convincing things to see is, hey, we make bold claims.
And when you go ahead and hit those again and again and again, that is really belief inspiring.
When we decided we wanted to build a rack and not just a chip, we were looking at this and we're saying,
you know, how many products have actually shipped that scale for a rack scale system that actually have the power density that we're trying to solve?
And we just kind of said, if we were going to wave a magic wand, what would the best possible person in the world look like?
And be like, well, if we could find somebody who, like, started at Nvidia and built the entire
rack team through all their different generation, learned all this different stuff, but is still
scrappy, still understands the startup culture, but a scene scale, like, that would be the best
possible person.
So we mapped all of the different teams that related to all of the different rack scale products
of Vivida.
And we found three people that we thought could fit the bill.
And we talked to all of them, and two of them have just retired.
and one of them was planning to do one more generation for Nvidia and then retire.
His name is Brian.
And over time, we convinced him to join.
Brian started the HGX and DGX team at Nvidia, which was, you know, a majority of
Nvidia's revenue, tens of billions of dollars a quarter.
And the other two guys end up investing, by the way.
But when you have somebody like that, they just know what good looks like because they've
seen it.
And there's so many times where we'd talk to Brian and you just point to us and be like,
that's a billion dollar, like a billion dollar lesson I learned, a billion dollar lesson I learned.
And like, you know, that just saves the cycles.
And you pair someone like Brian with somebody like Sanford.
Do you have a name for them?
So Brian's a legend.
What's worth Stanford?
Yeah, we say chips on shoulders put chips in data centers.
Yeah.
So Sanford and Gavin in high school were world robotics champions.
And Sanford was finishing a senior year of college.
And we called him up a couple years ago.
And we said, hey, can you come check out what we're doing?
We need some help on the platform side.
He comes for a week.
And we say, can you build a cold plate this week?
and if you asked like any thermal engineer, anything like that,
they would think you're just like totally naive, right?
I mean, these things take months to do.
And like, to be clear, they do.
But you can make real progress in a week if you put your mind to it
and you think it's possible.
And he built a contraption in a week that like actually derrished like a pretty
key power question we had.
And you put those two together and they've done incredible things.
One is that possible without the other because you need the extremely driven people
that just keep asking why and don't know where the bodies are bearing.
to like take tons of aggressive risks, and then you need the people who've seen scale and
still have the startup scrappy mentality to help them along the way.
So it's really the legends plus some naivete, raw first principles type talent.
It's not just that you have both in the company and said they're working together.
That's right.
If I think about that funnel, anything else more interesting to say about how much better
you've gotten at recruiting and like why those metrics keep getting better?
One of the shocking things is, I wish you of being such a contrarian vet kind of self-selects.
That like, you're the kind of person who is some opportunistic,
she's going to go join whatever the hot company is,
rather than go ahead and do deep diligence, you will not come work here.
And it's one of the things I worry about as we announce more and more of the product than the specs.
We may lose some of this if we're not very careful.
You kind of have to be sick in the head to join our company.
You think about it on paper, it's like you, a person who is probably a very accomplished engineer,
making a good amount of money, it's liquid, it's predictable somewhere else,
you're going to convince your family to move to San Jose and live in this apartment on this housing program
for the semi-connector company run by two, what, 24-year-olds now, that's pre-product,
that is going against the biggest companies in the world and the most supply-constrained environment ever created
with a design that they're saying is not going to be like 10% better, but it's going to be 10x better.
Something must be wrong with you to do that.
People are just wired differently here that they really want to not prove people wrong who don't believe
but prove people right who do believe. They just take it personally. And, you know, that's really
fun to find those people. And frankly, just the nature of the company makes it very easy to
whittle out the people who aren't like that. One of the very first things you and I talked about, Rob,
was I started asking about Sohu, which is the name of the first product here. And you said,
we can talk about that in great detail. But the thing you should know is that what we're really
focused on is building a machine that can, at scale, produce these things and generations of
them as efficiently at the highest possible quality levels. So we want to be able to be able to
to build, like the company or the machine that is the company is the thing that will produce this
thing and then subsequent things. So I'd like to talk about a few principles or cornerstones of the
company. We've alluded to some of them. You've said velocity, you've said vertical integration,
have become more popular topics. Parallelization is something maybe that we should talk about.
But I'm especially interested in your guys' willingness to take huge risk to go faster. Maybe tell your
favorite story about why this is the philosophy, what it's allowed you to do that maybe
other companies haven't done.
There's a number of stories here.
But one of my favorites is there was a time where we were getting close to taping out of the chip,
we realized, wait a minute.
One of our vendors is way, way behind schedule.
And we had two very bad options.
One option is to keep the current vendor and push our timelines out on the order of a year.
Another option, let's switch vendors start over and also get pushed timelines out by a year.
Neither of these was a good option.
So we had to go look for option number three.
And what that was was we figured out they're all in Bangalore.
They're actually going and doing the work.
We went out and shipped a dozen of our top engineers across the world to Bangalore for six months.
I was there as well.
I lived in Bangalore for four and a half months personally.
And every morning, we'd go ahead and walk across the crazy, busy Bangalore streets into the office.
We'd be the first ones in.
We'd go out and built a wide variety of tools, both things like, hey, auditing a huge amount of the code that was going in,
building a bunch of tools as well to make this go even faster,
making sure we're making the right design decisions on the spot right there.
No 12 hour back at fourth.
Go ahead and decide immediately.
And then at 1 a.m., we'd go walk back through the now empty Bangalore streets
and do it all again the next day.
We'd still have a bunch of the team in the U.S.
We ran these 12-hour on each side handoffs,
where we had 24-hour development cycle.
We're at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. every day.
We'd all get on the Zoom.
We'd share all the data.
We'd say, when I wake up, like, this must be done.
Like, we must get this chip out.
And it was extremely intense.
At the same time, we saw other chips at the same stage as us with that same vendor that ended
up taking years that still aren't out today.
I still have even taped out today.
And it's that level of extreme urgency that's required to bring products to market.
What is the key to doing this while?
This has become a trope because of Elon mostly that, like, his special skill and
others that seek to emulate him would try to do this too, is figure out, like, what the
binding constraint is and just flood the zone personally on that.
thing, which is kind of like going to Bangalore or something, it seems like this is a central
tenant of the business and of any business that's going to do this kind of vertical integration,
what's the key to doing that well? Like, again, what have you learned about that specific act?
For me, I think there were two key tricks to this. The first one is that you can't build a chip
alone. It's got to be a team problem. And your most important job is to go get great people to go
with you and great people to go ahead and be inspired and excited to go ahead and do crazy things like
this. It is a huge ask to go say, hey, guys, uproot your lives for six months or in one case
12 months that we had sent one guy out well ahead. It sucks, but we're likely to have team members
who are in it for the right reasons. But I think the second big thing, too, is being able to
make decisions very fast. That one of the worst items is when there's a factory or there's a vendor
who is waiting for you to go ahead and make some call and has been just stalled. And this happens
all the time, even for very small things.
So send folks,
Dully get a big amount of responsibility to them,
and say, make a reasonable call.
Okay, if you're wrong every now and then.
But I would have much, much rather be right
most of the time they give an answer immediately
than wait every time for the perfect response.
Speed wins.
What about spending money to go faster?
There's this learned by doing thing,
which has become so interesting
and as the world has gone away from software
and towards more hardware again
in the world of technology that we've outsourced so much of the learn by doing,
by shipping stuff overseas and effectively just being the idea guys here in the U.S.
Seems like that obviously is reversing, and you've adopted this way of learning by do.
Like, you want to be in that iteration learning loop.
Absolutely.
And part of that is willingness to spend and take risk with dollars.
Yeah.
Can you talk about that a little bit?
I think there's a great quote of like, the biggest risk is not taking risk.
Very similar here, which is like, every day there's over a billion dollars of revenue in this category.
and a lot of its inference.
So every day we don't ship,
we're just leaving tons of opportunity on the table.
So your willingness to spend money
should be extremely high
if you can get a very clear ROI out of it.
So we have this concept that we call pre-fetching,
which is when you're waiting for one thing to get done,
when you know you're going to do other things once you have it,
is there ways that you can parallelize the entire schedule?
So for example, like,
we know our trip is going to come back on a certain date.
We want it to be that everything possible
that could be done without the chip
is done before the chip lands.
And this costs a lot of money.
This means that, like, we want to build our entire software stack beforehand.
Like, we shipped racks to customer data centers without our chips in them, with all the
networking, all the CPUs, all the storage, all set up so we could bring all that data center
software up before the chips came back.
And meant that we took over 700 FPGAs and put the entire full reticle chip on an FPGA cluster
and ran a dozen different models with our full inference stack on them before the chips
came back.
It means that we built a thermal chip to mock the first.
thermal profile of our chip and built cold plates based on that before the chip came back.
It means we had the entire production line ready. It means we did many revs of the circuit board.
It means the entire product was ready to go before the chips came back. And this is what it gives you.
There is another very famous AI chip company that took 10 months to go from getting their silicon
back to having them running inference in Iraq. And this was publicly announced to their investors
and it was a really big deal. We were able to do it in 40 days. And it's because by the time the
chip came back, everything was boring. The software was already written, the rack was already there,
the production line was already set up. We were just go, go, go, go, go, go, get everything together.
You don't always catch everything. You make some tweaks on the fly, and then off you go.
In that particular case, too, that was a big part of it. Also, like the shift, I think made a big
difference too. Totally. We went out and literally had a day shift and a night shift.
There were team members who would come in at 10 a.m. and leave at around midnight.
She would come in at midnight and leave at 10 a.m. You're running around the clock to get to
40 days.
Yeah.
I mean, over half the company lives next to the office.
So it makes it easier to do that type of thing.
You pay them to do that, right?
Pay them extra.
Do you still do that?
The Invisible Hand does wonders.
I mean, hey, it works for me too.
We're both there.
I'd love to think one big step back and talk a bit about just the broader ecosystem here.
The amount of shortages on the supply side, the exposure of risks in the global system
and the supply chain around this stuff has become like every day.
Wall Street Journal from page news, like the stocks that people are watching and investing in
and excited about, about the memory stocks, these were, you know, boring commodity like
Nothing Burgers five years ago. And now that the center of global attention, if you just
assess because you've been building in it, the global connected supply chain that's required
to make stuff like this possible, just riff on it. Like what scares you, what's working well,
what needs to change? What do you hope you change by virtue of how you build this thing?
What's your assessment of this story right now?
I think that one of the most undervalued pieces of a supply chain story is almost none of these things are you buy them and they don't talk to the vendor again.
You have to go collaborate.
That is the most important part being successful, I think, in ships with TSM or with memory vendors.
You need that partnership.
I think that for TSM in particular, people don't understand why it is so valuable.
People look at the tech and the tech is the best of the world.
But for me, the real value is all in these service.
TSMC customer service is way, way better,
and I have seen any other company and any other industry.
It's the kind of thing where if you say, hey, you can approve your yield by making this change,
you can go make them a recommendation, and then we'll go run an experiment.
On their own dime, in our case, see if they could actually get the higher yield.
And when we found that we were right and these agreement worked, they moved over the rest of the line.
And that kind of thing doesn't happen in most industries.
If I go to like the Steelworks plant, say, hey, I want you to change the competition of the steel.
And they'll say, screw you.
Not TSM.
It is why they are the number one and why they're going to win.
One of the things that matters a ton is power availability and time to power.
And the problem is the more power you want, the more shortage of the risk.
It's actually very similar to chip clusters, which is like, why is Colossus charging $12 an hour for Blackwells?
It's because they're the only place you can buy 20,000 of them.
at once, right? Why is the 500 megawatt data center so hard to find? It's the exact same reason.
You know, one of the things we need to think about is like, how do we get way more juice
out of each megawatt? People are looking throughout the entire stack, whether it's just
improving the PUE, but also entirely new hardware to get the most tokens per megawatt
to solve this problem. But fundamentally, building new buildings is hard. It's much easier to
go from 100 megawatts to a gigawatt than from a gigawatt to 10 and 10 to 100. And we are pushing the limits
of what's possible on these timelines. So there's a lot of people trying to scale in their data centers
as much as trying to scale them out. One of the interesting things about a system like this is what it
replaces. Yeah. If I think about a rack like this versus, I don't know, a set of Blackwells or something
or Rubens or whatever's coming next, how should I conceptualize that? It's not just Watts. It's also
physical space. The Reber's talked about this in their recent readings called that literally this is a problem
that there's literally no space to put the systems. How should I conceptualize what this represents or
replaces in terms of other units of compute. Here's how customers think about deploying models generally,
which is when I'm building a data center or I'm building a cluster, it's not like in the abstract
of like, oh, I like these chips and like, yeah, this is the power footprint and so forth. It's like,
I have a real production workload I'm trying to serve. And for my product to be useful,
there's a certain speed I need to serve for that. And for certain products, it's really fast and
certain products, it's really slow. Whatever the speed is, this is my speed. The question is,
in a given amount of power, how many users can I serve while guaranteeing that speed?
So another way to put it is ISO, what's called interactivity, what is my throughput?
We are just finishing kind of the early innings of the AI infrastructure boom where people really
just cared about speed.
You know, GPUs were not able to reach a lot of the speeds of other types of chips like all
these S-Ram chips, thousands of tokens per second, and that enabled tons of new use cases that
got people very excited.
There's an entirely new wave of AI chips, us being one of them, that are all going to be able
to hit these speeds.
The question then is, if you're hitting these speeds, what is the number of users you can serve at the same time?
And by proxy, if I have 100 megawatt data center, how many software agents can I run at the same time?
So when people are doing that evaluation, our hardware is going to generally be able to get you an order of magnitude, more concurrency at a given level of interactivity.
So that directly translates into tokens per watt, tokens per dollar, all the things people care about when they're actually serving these giant mixture of expert models at scale.
There's these now famous interactivity curves.
Not many people publish them, but you can see a Blackwell curve.
You can see an A&D curve, which is a little bit worse than Blackwells, and it's still an $800 billion company.
So if you think about what then the impacts are of shifting that curve, not just a little bit further out, but much further out.
Yeah.
What are the things that most excite you about what this will enable?
I mean, I want to go out and solve some of the hardest problems, and I want to go solve these and much less time.
There were things growing up, but I was not sure I'd be able to live to see.
For example, both the unit is it in texture, one of the things we talked about in college.
And I was not sure I'd see that proven in my life.
And this was done by an AI model, and it was not over a long period of time.
But if you're able to then run the same model 10 times faster, you can go shrink the time to go have these breakthroughs.
And there's a huge number of other problems in math like this as well, that I worry it will take 1,000 years to go prove a thing like this.
You can either have a much smarter model or a model of the same intelligence running much faster.
You can then shrink that and I can see it.
It's so cool seeing these breakthroughs get made.
I am so so excited to see much more of this happen.
I think too often people think about tasks and applications and stuff in these very short time horizons.
Doing a chat and it's like 50% faster is nice, but it's not like game changing.
As these agents go longer and longer time horizon and the models get more and more capable,
you're going to see gigantic bodies of work
that would take months of compute.
And we think about this in wall clock time.
Like if you talk to a pre-training researcher at a lab,
they'll tell you that wall clock time
often is one of the most important things that matters.
And what wall clock time means is the time from starting your run
to finishing it to actually get data back.
If you can shrink this time from a six-month run
to a two-month experiment,
you're going to be able to do many more iterations
and people will make changes on the model architectures
to actually improve the wall-clock time.
Very similar here in terms of how we think about the use cases, which is the exciting part about
super low latency decode is wall clock time on long horizon tasks becomes much shorter.
So a year-long compute build would now take months, and a month-long compute build will now
take three days, and that three-day compute build will now take seven hours and so forth and so
forth.
So that's the thing that I think is really hard to internalize because the models are just getting
capable enough to do this stuff.
I thought it was really cool months ago when Cursor published that they had a bunch of coding agents built an entire browser from scratch in a week. Totally nuts. And that will soon happen in under an hour. And there's going to be many of those types of things that are going to happen with these massive parallel agents all working on a given task.
One of the ultimate limitations of these systems. Is it just like a physics question? Like how many times faster, cheaper can we get theoretically?
There's a lot of room at the bottom, that they say.
If you think about chip-to-chip late cease.
On an Nvidia product, you're looking at 4,000 nanoseconds to go from one tip to another.
We'll be able to do much better than that.
What's the mathematical limit?
His speed of light.
You can do it in just a handful, like 2-3 nanoseconds.
And there are 4,000?
4,000 today.
There is a lot of room at the bottom.
The same thing for things like power efficiency.
That, sure, we're able to go and save a huge amount by bringing the voltage down by so much.
But you could go lower.
You could go much, much lower.
is very challenging, but when I think about 20, 30 years in the future, then I think it's inevitable.
And also for economies of scale, for cluster scale up.
For a long time, 8-tips was the biggest scale-up domain.
Invid even had the Ndil-S 72, bringing it to, well, 72.
But you can be way, way bigger.
You look at like a fab, for example.
You have a $40 billion, single monolithic building with only a handful of lines running through it.
You could have the same kind of thing for some futuristic mega cluster, $40 billion, $100 billion, as a giant mega toka factory, serving one or a handful of models for a massive number of easers to get that same economies of scale thing.
Same model, massive number of people.
You mentioned colonel's engineering and that being your first job.
That has emerged as a thing that nobody had ever heard of in their lives to now something that you hear about all the time, the importance of it, to eke more performance out of.
the bare raw metal. When will that just be something that AI doesn't entirely as well? Are humans still
the best kernel engineers? Are they doing it with the assistance of AI systems? Like, how far down
will humans still be in the loop of designing these things? Like, when will that go away?
Today, it's all very hybrid. And the best kernels are still written by human AI collaborations.
Also, any AI models have built up of these fundamental primitives, like mat mules, like convolutions,
like a chip-to-chip operations collectives.
And making these overlap and making these really fast matters enormously.
And it's the griddle designer's job to go ahead and figure out,
or can I overlap, how do I allocate memory,
how do I verify that if there's some issue like a retransomeney
and doesn't stall the whole pipeline?
These things are very challenging,
but they can go and make your performance be, say, 3-4% better per optimization.
And you can do so many.
And when we thought about our software stack,
we wanted to go get at where the puck is going to be.
And three years ago, they were kind of two ways you could build software.
One of them was to invest heavily in graph compilers.
These things are not very performant, but they work out of the box.
They don't require a human to go come in and tweak all the kernels.
But we went the opposite direction.
We are kernels first programming, and that means that it for a long time did not work out of the box.
But if you were a colonel's expert, you could get incredibly, incredibly high performance.
And the thing about this is that now, how the coding models get better,
better, they're doing more and more of the kernel generation task.
And when the models keep getting smarter, it'll eventually do all of it.
It will become superhuman.
So we're going to build for where the world is going.
And even today, we think about our profiling tools or debugging stack.
We think about it from how will the model use these tools, more than we think about how
will humans use these tools.
We sometimes run experiments internally, and we had Codex actually get GPTOSS running from
scratch just based off of our docs completely by itself. And it did it, I think, overnight.
We think about game selection a lot. And what we mean by that is making sure we're investing
our energy in the right bets. Because regardless of what you choose to work on, it will take
tremendous effort. And one of the things that we started with was, you know, the decision explicitly
not to build an arbitrary graph compiler, not to support arbitrary pie torch, not to support
arbitrary Qaeda, not to support arbitrary onyx graphs. But instead, we envisioned a world where there was
going to be under 100 models that actually mattered, and they were all going to look very similar
from the underlying mathematical perspective, and that we were going to build primitives using physics
that were going to accelerate these as much as humanly possible, and we were going to allow the
most sophisticated customers to have direct access to the hardware and do whatever they want.
And that has saved us a tremendous amount of time not having to build a compiler, and that has
allowed us to actually get much more performance.
And funnily enough, when we started, a lot of people dismissed this idea, and the only people
that took us seriously were in high-frequency trading. They all hate compilers, too. They all write
their own kernels. And we've had dozens of people from high-frequency trading join the team
because they saw this philosophy too. What are the limits to vertical integration? Like,
how do you know where to draw the line? And I'm starting with this question to talk a bit about
the broader market. The circumstances of the broader market are really interesting to me
where the vast majority of chips, of AI chips get bought by a very small set of customers.
many of those customers are themselves trying to design their own AI chips.
Open AI announced Palapeno.
It seems like this very funny circumstance for like the most valuable thing in the world
all kind of flows through a couple chip makers, a couple chip buyers.
They all seem to be thinking about doing each other's job.
And then you've got the circumstance where like, okay, then these things go into data center
and you've got neoclouds and inference providers and this other part of the stack.
You've got model builders and providers.
Like I can imagine a world where because you have the best hardware,
where you design models and you build data centers.
You leak outside of your current vertical.
So, like, how do you think about where to draw the lines for the business?
We have a saying that production is the product.
Ultimately, what matters here is we know inference is going to be the biggest market in the world.
Whoever produces the most tokens is going to be the most valuable company in the world.
So all the decisions we make is how do we get the most token capacity online as possible?
And part of that is building a really good product that has way more throughput,
that can run a way better latencies and so forth,
so we can per chip we make, get way more tokens online.
Another part of it is not doing parts of the stack
unless we absolutely have to to get to giant scale.
So there are parts that we decided to do
because it was absolutely required to get to scale.
Like building the rack instead of just building the chips,
like doing a CM model instead of doing a JDM model.
But there are parts of it that are kind of noise to us right now.
Like we're not going and building our own data centers today.
That doesn't actually help us get more capacity online.
In general, our customers are actually making power and moving their clusters around to get our chips online because they're such high throughput.
If there was a world where other things were a constraint, we would totally go and integrate with them.
But the reality is we're just purely focused on getting as many tokens online as possible.
I think it's coming down to economies of scale again.
A certain part of the stack, there are huge economies to scale and others there aren't.
For example, on designing models, huge economies of scale there.
For chip fabrication, same story.
But for example, if you think about building some small metal part of the side of the,
that rack, there's not that same effect. We think the natural boundaries are on the chip side,
on the bottom, and the model layer at the top, and we'll fill the whole gap between. A few weeks ago,
there was a guy who was running a next generation AI chip for one of the frontier companies,
and he's trying to recruit one of our architects, and actually kind of did an UNA reverse card,
and started recruiting the person trying to recruit our guy. And within a week, we hired him. And I was
going on a walk as we were kind of finalizing the offer. I was like, you're leading the super
important project, why are you deciding to join? And his answer is super interesting, which was,
it fundamentally is not existential for my company for this product to win. For Google with TPUs,
the revenue comes from search. Google won't fail at TPU's failure. That's right. Meta won't fail if
MTIA fails. Microsoft won't fail if Maya fails. And opening I won't fail if Halapeno fails.
Ultimately, this is our product. It is like completely unsurprising that the best chip in the world
is built by a company that only builds that chip. It's invidia, right?
And like, for us, like, it is completely existential for us to get as much token capacity online as possible.
It recruits a set of talent and recruits a support from suppliers and from customers that view it with the level of intensity that we do.
Look at the raw flop stats.
You go compare any of the chips built by the labs or by the hyperscalers.
The flop density for, say, FBA8 times FB8 is lower than the black will be 300.
And that makes sense because they don't have to go take the risk.
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As I think about you guys building the solution, the process of doing so is solving a sequence of really hard challenges.
What has been the single episode that was the hardest to overcome?
We were designing the chip.
We built this massive, massive FPGA cluster to go out and verify the full chip workdasses.
And FPGAs are digital entities.
You can go test digital logic, but not analog logic.
And it turns out that when the chip came back,
we began to go see issues in our attention of incorrect results.
And we realized, wait a minute,
there's a problem where the back-pressuring logic across a clock domain crossing is failing.
And this is going to cause the chip to produce wrong results,
and it is very, very hard to solve.
And we realized there was one and only one way to solve it,
as we had to do to line up two clock signals on our chip
to within 50 picoseconds.
That is literally 50 trillionths of a second.
And we had to go get the signals aligned to this super small granularity
and do it on every chip,
two billion times a second.
A lot of people said this was impossible.
We had people quit.
Yeah.
That people literally were like,
this problem is unsolvable.
And that's a luck, guys.
Well, when you have a problem like that,
step one is, okay, let's assume the problem is solvable.
How would it be solved?
Well, first, we realized.
What we have to be able to do is find a way to go ahead and move our clock phase by a tigosecond, 10 ticoseconds.
And we had an idea.
What if we had these two clocks?
I had them just a little bit apart from each other.
We figured out that, hey, if we go out and figure out the phase, if we then go out and use a drifting mechanism to go ahead and wait for just the right amount of time to get that always lined up, we can do this extremely reliably, and then lock the phases exactly where they have to be.
We can guarantee this never happens.
People were, I think, blown away that this worked, and it worked as well as it actually
did, but we made it work.
How long did that take?
It was actually about two weeks.
It was a very scary two weeks.
But it was the kind of thing where when that kind of thing happens, that is the most important
time to go ahead and be an investing effort.
That is the hardest time to go do it when you feel like things are hopeless.
But the sooner you solve that problem, the sooner you can get back to building and scaling up
production to mass volumes. I think a lot of our story is like, as Gavin says, assume it is possible.
Like, assume it is possible to have a chip with way more flops on it. Assume it is possible to have
a system with way lower latency between chips. Assume it is possible to create a shared memory
pool that can run away higher bandwidth. Like, how would one do it? A lot of the time when we do
experiments, we will do dozens of experiments and all of them will fail. But we only need one to work.
There was multiple times, I mean, Gavin, I think, was leading the charge and our chip bring up with,
I think 30 different board experiments, and three of them worked.
And all three of them are worth their weight and gold.
This is one of the things that are people coming to me to say, Gavin, almost none of your
experiment works.
I only got to get lucky once.
So one idea for one of these stories that I'm asking about, you know, difficult moments
in the company's history is around the ability to raise capital to fund the thing.
I think when you started it, you knew you'd need capital, but you did not know you'd need
the quantum of capital that you've ultimately raised and are spending to build a solution.
and you hadn't raised money before.
These are all new things, right?
There was moments where it was really, really difficult, because I was there, I saw it,
moments where it was extremely difficult to raise the money that you did,
that without which the company would not exist, it would have died.
And like many great stories, there are many near-death moments.
But money specifically in this new world, this isn't software.
You don't just need a little bit of money.
Maybe you could tell the story about the true hardest part about raising money early on
before you had something that you could show people and be so proud of
in performance that you could show them
other socks off.
It was just you guys talking about an idea.
But talk about the early difficulties raising money
because it was pretty hardcore.
We've had some intense moments.
It reminds me of probably early 2024
before we raised our Series A.
And we were at this point
where we had done enough of the architecture,
done enough of the design,
that we knew that the chip architecture was sound.
We had to go build it.
There was a lot more to do.
We were ready to go into
what's called the physical design stage.
We needed to sign.
an agreement with a physical design vendor, which it will cost you at least $40, $50 million.
And then we had this realization as the models were getting bigger and bigger, and you're seeing
these giant MOUE models come out, that we were going to need to build the entire cluster,
not just the chip, but we were going to need to build boards.
We're going to need to build interconnects.
We're going to build cold plates.
You're going to need to figure out all of the networking and everything, and that this was going
to cost a lot more than the $15 million we had in the bank.
And you're like, man, that was scary.
Yeah.
That's like, you're sitting in that moment, they think, holy crap, we can't afford this.
And I began looking at like, huh, how hard is it to go back to Harvard?
At the end of 23, we put together this like memo.
And we spent like 100 hours on this because we're like, we have no idea how people are going to believe us when we ask for the amount of money we're about to ask for.
And it was like 30 pages.
It was like extremely technical and in depth of all the different things we needed to build and like all the milestones we needed to hit and how.
the market was going to evolve and all the new use cases and the cost per token and all this
modeling. And then we went and talked to investors. And every major investor in the Valley
passed immediately. They were just like, okay, two kids that just finished Harvard, haven't taped
out a chip, no test chip, inference, who knows if this is going to be a big market. Everything's
going to be training. The model is still hallucinate. This could all be a bubble. At the time,
the biggest semiconductor fundraisers for a series A was around like $40, $50 million. We were looking
at this and we were just like tallying the bill. We're like, we think we're going to spend
a hundred million dollars in the next 12 months. If we really want to do this, like, if we want
to actually get to scale and like actually get the performance we're talking about, like,
this is going to be extremely capital intensive. How the hell are we going to pull this off?
I think that one of our key ways we got started in this process, we thought to ourselves,
what is the cheapest possible way we go do this? Decided, well, it made almost nothing.
Yeah. And if I ate nothing but ramen, then we would go ahead and spend basically just the
money for the mass of 11-9 meter tape out, and that would be that.
Right. And if so, we could probably do it on $30 million, an obscenely low number.
And we actually went out and got a debt provider. They wanted to go ahead and lend us the money
we need to go across the chip threshold. From there, I think it was first to go catalyze
a series of other, hey, maybe we can go do one more thing, one more thing, one more thing.
Yeah, so we're at this moment where we're like, if we really want to build this company,
because we're not going to half-ass it.
We're not going to go do a test chip
and spend years on it
and let the entire AI market boom
while we could be building the product.
If we're going to do it,
we're going to go all the way.
We're going to need to find a way
to get $100 million.
I mean, I remember Gavin and I were like
sitting down in the office
in Kupertino late at night,
just like looking at each other
and we're like, could we cut 500K here?
Could we cut 100K here?
How long could we convince everyone
not to take a salary?
And we're like, holy fuck.
The math is not going to close.
We really need to solve this.
And there was a period of a few weeks where you kind of just go into survival mode,
and you call every person that could possibly know an investor, and you're like,
we need $100 million to do this.
If we do this, we think this could be one of the most important companies of all time.
Do you know somebody that wants to take an aggressive bet that wants to believe in us?
Like, here's all the information.
Like, we're an open book.
Here's the team.
It's great people.
We've been working super hard.
We've done these things in record time.
But we have these, you know, 100 things to go.
do you want to do this? And like the snowball starts and you get a million here and two million here and you're like, okay, we're not going to run out of money this month. You get a $5 million check, $10 million check. You're like, okay, maybe I can buy those FPGAs. And you know, the snowball happened where, you know, we were very lucky that we ended up putting it all together. We had a board meeting. I show you the spreadsheet and we look at it and it's like $103 million. It's like these are all like soft commits. And well, look at each other and we say, we're going to take it.
And that was a Series A.
And it's been much easier since then.
And we've raised almost a half dozen rounds since that.
Many of them from those investors just doubling and tripling down.
That's allowed us to get to market so quickly.
Like, this rack would not be possible.
How do we not have been so aggressive?
I also think like suppliers, too.
I think there's a little bit of a commendation here.
Yeah.
That TSM was willing to work with us back before we'd raised any of that $100 million,
back when it was still really, really scary, synopsis.
Actually went ahead and let us get some of the...
their emulators on extremely favorable terms where you pay over many years, basically a big loan.
It takes a lot of belief from your partners to do you to do this.
But at the end of that you come out with this very strong team and all the folks who back you
are not in it just out of pure financial incentive.
They believe.
Why didn't TSMC believe, do you think?
This is a great story.
Even before you joined in, they were a conference, a semi-event.
And I was one of the only young CEOs of semiconductors.
and I think that's kind of a novelty.
Ask me to come in there and speak.
I get to the semi-event.
And I am the only speaker there under 40,
and only person there under 30.
I was at the time of 22.
I go up and I speak.
There was a speaker's dinner afterwards.
And by pure luck,
happy to send me to this very senior TSMVP.
It's a very nice dinner.
There's like the former CEO of Arm there.
It's very boozy.
Everyone's in a suit.
And I'm there with this VP.
And it turns out,
we both studied math in college.
we go out and get a little piece of paper.
We begin talking in great detail about
how do modern AI models work
at the actual per tensor by tensor level.
And the guy just gets it.
And we begin talking about, hey, how do you run this very effectively?
Why is Globalhood such a critical technology
to make this work?
And the following day, I get an email from TSBC saying,
Gavin, I want to work with etched.
To find a way to make it happen.
Crazy.
They've been a great partner ever since.
It's amazing to think about some of the tropes.
And obviously, like, you should break the fourth wall here,
I'm a big edge investor. I've been involved for a long time. I think that's the world of you guys.
So I'm incredibly biased in this conversation. I'm trying to ask questions that are broader and
interesting and could be objections to what you're doing and we'll keep doing that. But it's so
interesting to me that when you read about investing, everyone cites this idea of like contrarian
and right as the quadrant that makes all the money. And it sounds really nice. But contrarian means
like everyone else thinks you're stupid. And so when you go and you get the media,
it knows from literally everybody. It is a fascinating quadrant to exist in before you become
consensus. What was it like for you? I'm super curious. Well, it's interesting at the time,
it was the largest by a lot first check that I had written. If I used to say, I'm not a math expert
or a semiconductor expert or an AI expert really at the time. And so it was much more of believed in
the concept of this market potentially being huge, you having made very, very clear bets on how
the future was going to look, having positioned the company in order to attack those things in a
hardcore way. And then just the two of you, and what I felt about you was the majority of the
reason why we made the bet when we did in 2023 or whatever it was. But at the time, it was the
biggest. And I think the same thing you said about naivete applies to investing as does to maybe
building a semiconductor startup, which is like I didn't know what I didn't know. And when I called
experts, they were basically like, this is stupid. They laid out in very logical terms.
like why this wasn't going to work and why it was such a low probability bet. And I think one of the
things I've learned from it is just like you kind of have to damn the base rate. Like if you invested
on base rates, you should do something other than what we and I do. There's always the index fund.
Yeah, there's always an index fund. Exactly. So it's actually never been scary for me. I think probably
most of that is because there's a lot I don't know. And if I knew more about what you guys have done
in the difficulty, I probably wouldn't have done it. I don't know what that says about like maturing as an
investor, like maybe I don't want to know, you know, a lot more and have some of that healthy naivete,
I don't know.
Funny.
I mean, a lot of the traditional semiconductor funds missed the entire AI chip, like all the AI chip
companies.
And like, all the coding experts missed all the coding companies.
I think it's very hard to realize the constraints have changed.
And when you've looked at tapeouts for 20 years and you've seen so many of them not work on
the first try or the second trier, the third trial, like, you couldn't even run a workload.
You totally forget the EDA tools are way better.
and that FPGA exists today in a way that they didn't exist before.
And all the types of validation you can do today just wasn't possible.
For us, a lot of our believers, either they were kind of on two sides of it.
They were just believers in the market and the team,
or they were building chips today and extremely technical,
like the high 50 trading firms,
where they would literally audit everything
from the micro architecture and the RTL to like the board designs
and like the schedule and the software stack.
And we would sit down with like 10 of their people who build their own chips
and they're asking us such detailed questions that we're wondering, are they going to build the chip?
It was really on either of those sides. And if you were anywhere in the middle, you just wouldn't
understand it. In the investing world, they often talk about variant perception, something that you see
or believe that others don't, right? And that perception creates the opportunity.
I think I've invested, I don't know, five or so times enched. And every time when you do it,
stakes are getting bigger and bigger. It does get a little scarier and scarier. And because you guys
have been so quiet in the marketplace, I think it's very easy to dismiss.
miss you. As the stakes get bigger and bigger, those dismissals are harder to hear. I do think betting
on something that you see when what you hear from the outside world is very different. That
perception gap equals opportunity. Exactly. The last thing I would say is the accumulated evidence
of your guys and your team's ability to solve seemingly impossible problems is one of the most
interesting things a company can have. It's like a binary. Like companies do this or they don't.
That's the thing is a big advantage of people who have been here for a long time.
You get some new joiners who are scared shitless.
You see a thing like this and there are old timers who've been here for all of two years.
Smoking cigars in the trenches.
Another one.
Yeah, there's definitely a find-away mentality.
If you're here, you're here because you assume it's possible.
So, like, we can't be saying it's impossible.
Everything is solvable and we're just going to work at it until we figure it out.
A favorite story I have, this guy who's kind of a legend,
in Silicon Validation, who joined our team.
And we were doing the early stages
of what's called Wafers Sort.
When your chips are coming out of fab,
they go out on these wafers,
and you have this thing called a probe card
that attaches to the wafer
before you dice it with these probe pads,
and you send these electrical signals
to basically test which chips are good and bad,
so when I slice the wafer into a bunch of chips,
I can package it and only package the good ones.
We go through our first wafer.
It's like 2.3 a.m.
Because we're doing it with TSM over the phone in Taiwan.
We have the screen with the wafer
that's all gray,
and each ship is gray.
And then as you start running the patterns,
the squares are supposed to turn green or red.
And they all turn red.
We're like, fuck.
Like, this is really bad.
Like, everybody's like, guys, take a breath.
He leads back, he's like, the puzzle begins.
Like, that you have to have the attitude of like, yes,
you will go and you will go stare into the abyss,
and you will go see scary things.
And we'll solve them.
When did you see the first green square?
Within a day of that.
But in the moment, it's extremely scary.
And there's a certain type of person who just like is addicted to that feeling.
I'm just feeling the fear and solving it.
And we are lucky to have a lot of those people here.
If you think about applying all of this earned know-how from this last several years and now thinking ahead to gen 2, gen 3 and beyond.
Sure.
What will you be doing most differently as a result of everything that you've learned?
Just like from a conceptual standpoint, like the way that you will attack designing and producing this next one based on.
what you learned doing it the first time.
It took us a while to get to the primitives that we think are really what matters for scaling inference.
We tried a bunch of things early on, from compilers that would turn different models into FPGAs,
to burning weights in silicon, to splitting your HBM to KV cash and weights,
and all of these different things.
And there was a lot of cycles of learning until we got to the point that we realized that, like,
fundamentally, if you want to run a majority of tokens in the world, you need to do three things.
You need to build a chip with the most flops, and a given power budget.
You need to build a chip that has the lowest latency between other chips, so the biggest scale-up domain possible,
and you need to produce as much of it as possible.
And I think probably in the first half of our journey so far, we learned the first two, and that inform the design a lot,
and that informs a lot about the bets we're making in the future, with the low-voltage inference and the cluster-scale memory.
But the production part, I think, in the past year has become extremely obvious, how much people want to deploy this stuff if you can have it available today.
The best ability is availability.
If I have a thousand chips today, someone's going to use them.
And we need to build a chip that's not just way better than what's been built before,
but it needs to be available at many gigawatts scale.
We need to be able to be building a product that is producible at gigawatts per month in the limit.
As we think about that, a lot of the design decisions we're making with our next gen,
which you've seen already, is just about simplicity,
removing tons of parts, trying to assemble and disassemble the thing again and again
and learning how to make it as quick in the cycle times as possible in production.
making sure it's going to be reliable, making sure it's going to be serviceable,
and making sure it's going to be producible at gigantic scales.
What about other problems in the ecosystem that are outside of your control,
such as capacity at the leading nanometer at TSM,
or availability of HBM4 memory, or some of these other things
where everyone is fighting for a scarce unit of capacity or whatever?
How do you face up against those realities when you're trying to produce as much as humanly possible?
The people deploying the most computer in the world do think about supply a bit zero-sum,
which is there's only so many wafers being produced on a given nanometer node, on a given fab, right?
And there's only so much memory being produced.
And that's why, actually, for our first-gen product, we built it on a different supply chain than the Rubens.
We're on four-nanmeter, Rubens on three-nanmeter.
Yeah, we're on a different HPM than Rubens and so forth.
So it actually is not a zero-sum thing.
It's a positive-sum thing where more is more.
So often when we're talking to people deploying at scale, it's not a decision between a gigawatt of a GPU and a gigawatt of us.
It's two gigawatts.
And I think as much as possible thinking about supply chain early in the design decisions, because if you have the most performer product and you can't produce it, then you're just a podcast.
That's the other big thing about vertical integration, too, is, well, certain things like for the chips and for the memory, you have to go ahead and partner.
For most of the other stuff, those are also very highly in-demand components.
And the more that you build yourself, the more stuff you can go do on top of what the world can currently build.
It is not, oh, you're taking availability with somebody else.
You're adding way, way more.
I think that's how you win.
One of the things that realize we haven't talked at all about is the models themselves, which is kind of crazy, the things behind all of this demand.
Anything interesting that you would say about the way that you see models progressing based on what we've seen so far?
I guess I'm more interested in how you as thinkers about hardware, think hardware might impact.
where the models themselves go in the future.
One of the most important ideas that we believe in is that machines don't think like people think.
You look at airplanes, for example, airplanes don't fly like birds fly, that when you think about
how mechanical devices have to work, it's often very different.
And in much the same way, for people, storing data and loading memory is very cheap for neurons,
and doing math is relatively expensive.
And it is the exact opposite for chips.
Generally, Lenn data is very expensive, and doing math is very cheap.
And as time goes on, then you'll end up finding that math gets cheaper at a rate that
is faster than a memory gets cheaper to do this fundamental limit on any kind of D-RAM
device.
You should have to think about how can I make my model use a huge, huge amount of compute.
What if I had, for example, many copies running at the same time?
What have activated a huge number of experts?
What if I had gigantic experts, I could go ahead and run on multiple server racks at the same time.
That is how I think you'll build models that are the next generation of intelligence.
In context, too, there's been a lot of work on a very efficient inference.
What if I don't load the full context in the memory?
And most of the time, I think that makes a lot of sense.
You want to go build a super intelligence.
Why can't it go look at a billion tokens of context?
Why can't it spend a huge amount of compute to go ahead and read all in a super fast?
I would love to be able to talk to a machine that was able to go attend to every book ever written and short-term memory.
And I think that's up to you're going to get to a point where you can't.
A theme in models right now is this focus on something called dynamism,
which is this ability to control the level of computation and memory spent at a per token or per user level when doing attention,
as well as this ability to dynamically in your chip on the fly, send data to other chips for different MOUE models,
doing certain types of operations.
And the reason is fundamentally,
as we are scaling context length,
as we're scaling model size,
as we're scaling the amount of computation per user,
we're looking for ways to be more efficient.
So, you know, the first thing is like Gavin says,
you know, mixture of experts,
architecture is where, you know,
maybe we don't need every parameter being used for every token.
But maybe there's things where even at a token level,
we can say, well, this token needs this context
on this other token.
They can share that memory,
so we don't have to have overhead
of using the memory as much.
maybe this token is really important,
so we should spend more compute,
we should have longer context on that token.
So hardware that really accelerates
these types of very dynamic computations,
extremely important.
And you can imagine current hardware
that was designed before those types of architectures
have lots of overheads and doing them.
So you basically end up in these really bad worlds
where you have inefficient hardware at doing this dynamism,
so therefore you can't run it very well,
or you have these very blocky architectures
that are kind of applying blunt force
to many different tokens,
that all need more or less computation.
I have two questions about the future.
We've talked a lot about what you've built so far
and how you built it.
The first is about the new ways
that people might start using these systems.
The raw technology, logger runtimes,
things of this nature.
When inference gets much cheaper, faster, more accessible,
there's more tool supply and it's better.
What are the things that you think people
will use that capacity to do,
that are the most interesting, exciting to both of you?
Yeah, there was a viral tweet by Noam Brown.
We said that as these models are having longer and longer time horizons,
they can use tasks that take, say, six months,
and there's often not enough time to go and evaluate them
for such a long period of time
because by that point, you'll have a new model out.
You'll want to go evaluate instead.
And with tech like, we built our cluster scale memory,
you can go ahead and run that six-month job much faster.
But there's a second piece of this, too.
I'm talking to know him about it. He's now an angel as well,
where it's not just the time.
There's also the number of people,
or agents who are working on this.
If you're trying to go and evaluate,
can a human build a rocket?
You will find that the answer is no.
No one person can go build a rocket.
Instead, you have to go and put a team together.
And I believe the same thing will be true of agents too.
If you want to ask, can an agent go out and build
some crazy futuristic piece of software,
you will probably need a very large team.
Maybe that's 10.
Maybe that's a million.
You have to go out and have this enormous amount of both cluster scale memory.
to go ahead and have that very short time per token,
and a huge amount of flops to be able to go run that whole fleet.
I'm going to be a little futuristic.
I firmly believe we are on a global march
of inference becoming a majority of global GDP.
It may take more than 10 years, but it's going to happen.
And right now, we measure productivity as a society as GDP per capita,
but really it's going to look much more like agents per megawatt,
or maybe agents per gigawatt by then.
And while we're being futuristic,
I think this is the second time
to last year or a majority of the workforce is going to be human. I think in 2027 you're going
to see there's going to be more agents doing knowledge work than humans. And it's going to be
extremely interesting to see what happens. You could imagine a world where for countries,
a majority of their energy ends up going into data centers doing inference. And the energy
efficiency of those data centers basically governs how many agents and therefore, you know,
how big their workforces. So you're going to see, like as Gavin is saying, one agent or a team of
five to 10 agents working on group projects for a couple of days. So you can do pretty cool stuff
because they're smart, but it's not going to be civilization scale. What happens when you have
countries that can have literally a billion concurrent agents, like a billion people in the
workforce working 24-7 concurrently on the same stuff? It's just kind of unfathomable what's going
to happen. And it's going to be the biggest proliferation of technology humanity's ever seen.
I think it's well, like when you have these huge, huge amounts of demand, you get this idea of
economies a scale again.
Yep.
We're thinking about people, I have a brain.
I'm not using the whole thing all at the same time.
That's only a part of us going to be active, and this is the way healthy brains work.
MOWE models, it works much the same way.
On an MOWA model, only a small fraction of parameters is being used for any given token
at any given moment.
But if you have a large number of users on a piece of hardware, you can go kind of take that
brain, cut it up into many different experts and many different servers, and run a huge amount
of volume through it.
So you'll have a bunch of different piece of the traffic.
You'll have many of them using each part of the brain any given point in time.
And you'll also make the cost per thought, cost per token, way, way lower.
So you're going to end up with these giant scale distributed brains.
The form factor of this is a big data center with a bunch of chips, a huge amount of flops,
and a huge amount of scale up interconnect.
You think we'll see a trillion-dollar individual data center?
Absolutely.
It is a matter of time.
It's like asking, what you see, a billion-dollar fab, or $10 billion-dollar fab,
or $100 billion fab.
It is inevitable that the economy's a scale don't stop at, oh, $40 billion of the magic number for fabs.
No, the Kafka keeps going down as you keep spending more money.
And the same thing will be true of plants that go out and make steel or plants that go out and make tokens.
A very smart alien lands on Earth and wants to know from each of you how you would frame up this opportunity that you guys are tackling.
What do you say to them?
I'm trying to me to us, thinking is really valued, that every company in the world runs on
thinking.
And we are entering this really unique moment in time where you have machines that can go think
almost as good and as soon as good and as soon better than the best humans can.
Building these machines is going to go to be a huge opportunity.
But more important than that, the way in which you go ahead and run is kind of thinking
is going to be very, very different as demand goes higher and higher and higher and higher.
There's a unique moment right now to go build a huge.
a new set of solutions, a new roadmap for how do you run the future quadrillion parameter
models for a billion people all at the same time on a gigantic scale-up cluster?
We are in a new era of intelligence where the cost of producing intelligence is dramatically
so much cheaper than the value of the intelligence that we are in a many year, probably
many-decade supply shortage of these tokens. And basically any chip or any system that
that can produce tokens is likely to be extremely valuable,
and you should find some part of the supply chain of the token.
I can be everything from model training
down to what we're doing in the Silicon and otherwise
to spend time on and push the frontier,
and that the companies that are the largest
are frankly going to be the companies
that produce most of the global supply of tokens
and own a majority of the supply chain of that token.
And importantly, it's people who build systems
that as they get more and more chips put together,
get cheaper. The way you want this to scale is not that, oh, if I want to go serve 10 times more
tokens, I buy 10 times more servers. It must be some solution where if I want to go serve 10 times
more tokens, then I get some economies of scale benefit with my SAC cluster scale memory tech.
It allows me to then not charge as much as 10 times more for those tech tokens.
What a ridiculously exciting future that you guys are building to enable. When I did this with Gavin
last time, I asked him my traditional closing question. So this time I'll ask you, what is the
kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you. During my cancer treatment, there was a big decision I had
to make. The doctors came to me and said, it's time for you to decide, do you want to get surgery or do you
want to get radiation? Here's the trade-off. If you get surgery, you're more likely to live,
but you have to assume you'll never be able to walk again. If you get radiation, you'll be able to
walk again, but it's not the same probability that you'll live. You may die. What do you want to do?
And I was 16, and my parents said, you have to make this decision for yourself. I thought a lot about
it for a long time and decided, I'm going to do the surgery. I get the surgery. One of the things you do
when you get a tumor resection is they do something called a necrosis analysis, or they look at all
the different cells and say, is a cell dead or alive? Because if you have a bunch of cancer cells that
alive, you have a problem. And they looked at it and they said, you know, you usually want 98, 99%
necrosis for us to say, you're in the clear. You're below that. You should go get radiation.
And there was only a few machines in the world that actually could do the type of radiation I needed.
One of them was in Boston.
I was in a wheelchair, and I needed to move to Boston for multiple months.
And both of my parents decided to move out and drop everything they were doing and live with me.
And I'm eternally grateful.
Peace.
Beautiful.
Thanks, guys.
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