Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Justin Singer - How Regulation Unlocks Opportunity - [Founder’s Field Guide, EP.2]
Episode Date: October 8, 2020My guest today is Justin Singer, the founder and CEO of Caliper Foods and Stillwater Brands, two leading companies in the cannabis industry. We start our conversation with a fascinating discussion on ...how regulation creates or destroys business and investing opportunities, and then go on to discuss the ins and outs of the cannabis industry in detail. You’ll be able to tell quickly how high-quality Justin is as a thinker and operator, and you’ll learn a ton about this nascent business. Please enjoy our conversation. This episode is brought to you by Microsoft for Startups. Microsoft for Startups is a global program dedicated to helping “enterprise-ready” B2B startups successfully scale their companies. If you’re a founder running a B2B company targeting the enterprise, you should definitely check them out. This episode is also sponsored by Vanta. Vanta has built software that makes it easier to both get and maintain your SOC 2 report, at a fraction of the normal cost. Founders Field Guide listeners can redeem a $1k off coupon at vanta.com/patrick. For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag Show Notes (2:51) – (First question) – How changes in regulation create market opportunities (5:38) – Why VC’s need to pay attention to regulatory changes (6:50) – Story of Section 230 of the communication decency act (8:54) – Relationships between rules, laws, and free markets (11:56) – How regulatory changes impacted recent business ventures (13:30) – His initial interest in the cannabis space (17:28) – How the industry participants have changed over time (21:04) – An overview of the cannabis industry and different pieces of the chain (25:51) – What has led to delays in the legalization of the marijuana industry (28:52) – How the dosage of the product impacts the business (31:34) – CBD vs THC industry differences (32:53) – How much of this industry is left to be unlocked and potential timing (35:55) – Business and investing opportunities in the space (38:16) – Competitive frontier in cannabis (40:37) – The timeline and pending changes coming (43:03) – Margins and business factors of his business (45:51) – First big break for the business (49:47) – What he learned working under Tim Wu (50:34) – Why we are in the golden error for fraud (52:11) – Avoiding fraud (55:12) – What he wants to learn more about in the cannabis space (56:50) – Kindest thing anyone has done for him Learn More For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club and new email newsletter called “Inside the Episode” at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag
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This episode of Founders Field Guide is brought to you by Microsoft for Startups.
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Hello and welcome everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Founders Field Guide.
Founders Field Guide is a series of conversations with founders, CEOs, and operators building
great businesses. I believe we are all builders in our own way and this series is dedicated to
stories and lessons from builders of all types. You can find more episodes at investorfieldguide.com.
Patrick O'Sonnessy is the CEO of O'Shaunishanee.
Ashton Asset Management. All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own
opinions and do not reflect the opinion of O'Shaunsi Asset Management. This podcast is for informational
purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of
O'Shaughnessy Asset Management may maintain positions and the securities discussed in this podcast.
My guest today is Justin Singer, the founder and CEO of Caliper Foods and Stillwater Brands,
two leading companies in the cannabis industry. We start our conversation with a
fascinating discussion on how regulation creates or destroys business and investing opportunities,
and then go on to discuss the ins and outs of the cannabis industry in detail. You'll be able to
tell quickly how high quality Justin is as a thinker and operator, and you'll learn a ton about
this nascent business. Please enjoy our conversation. So Justin, I thought that an interesting place
to begin our conversation is with your prior life and this interesting view you have around
changes in regulation creating market opportunities. Maybe you could highlight what you
mean by that relative to, say, new technologies creating opportunities in the early stage space or in the
nascent equity space. Why is regulation so important? And one are some of your favorite examples of that?
I am a little odd in that I've got the classical business and legal education, sort of the
antithesis of what the last 15 years have driven people towards. But it's actually given me,
I think, a much more holistic view of where markets come from that's not inside out from
a technology perspective. It's much more outside in. Like what else is involved in creating this market?
that started. The initial interest was in the mid-2000s, late 2000s, when I was in law school,
and I was looking at telecom market. So there was all the spectrum auctions going on.
There was, where did the property rights in the advertising time reside? Are they owned by the
content owner? Are they owned by the cable provider? Are they owned by somebody else?
These were all big questions, and they all determined both the quality of what was going to be
able to produce, what the axes of competition were, and what the ultimate growth potential of the market
it was. So you put that all together, add in a little mix of time spent in early stage,
seed stage venture at IA ventures. And the synthesis of all that is my belief, the best
venture opportunities are where you have the overlap of massive extant demand, known demand,
and some sort of regulatory unlocking event. Some of my favorite examples, I mentioned things
with telecom, the broadband spectrum auctions back in the 80s to the 90s, those really
opened up a whole marketplace where lots of fortunes were made, lots of economic activity. You look at
the inversion of the capital gains tax rate versus ordinary income, and you saw the explosion of the
funds industry that comes after that. Another one that I really like is the reorganization
and turnaround industry, where with the passage of the bankruptcy laws, suddenly you're able to build
all sorts of industry, whether it was high-yield debt or junk bonds or whatever it might be, but it was
built on top of this platform of certainty where everybody knew how things were going to function
in different scenarios. Same thing could be said more closer to my industry, supplements, which
for better or for worse exploded after the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health Education Act
DeShay back in 93. Basically, every massive market that you look at, you can trace to some sort
of regulatory and locking event. Unless we like ignore what's going on today, I think we just saw
in the last couple months, lots of people saying you wouldn't have the modern internet without section
230 of the Communications Decency Act. Well, I don't know that that's quite the argument in favor
that people make it out to be. It is an argument and admission that the regulations matter.
Does it follow that VCs or I guess all investors should have an analyst just tracking new regulatory
changes and sort of trying to match those against demand? I don't know if you can do it with an
analyst. I think it behooves VCs to actually pay attention to the whole picture. I'm a bear on things
like autonomous cars. And it's not because I don't believe the technology is possible. It's because
I don't think the insurance question is answerable. And I don't think the legal questions are
answerable around it. That's not because I have some special understanding of the laws around this.
It's just, I have seen laws matter. Not at the margins. They matter at the core. Technology alone
never creates a market. There has to be some enshrinement of the competition of that technology,
of the ways that you want it to go in the law. And that's the platform on which companies can
stand and fight each other and develop economic activities. Do you need a dedicated person? No,
because it's also sometimes hard to predict a priori which technological changes or which legal changes
are going to lead to massive shifts. I mean, Section 230 has like a very strange history.
The section that is remainder is the least important part of the Communications Decency Act.
The rest of it was all struck down due to a lawsuit with Jordan Belford. It's actually a really
fun little history there. Can you describe that history? I'm unfamiliar with this entire
area. So what is Section 230? Why is it important? What's the story there? With the caveats that I have not
refreshed my memory on this stuff in a long time, so I might get some of these details wrong. And I encourage
everybody to go look it up and vet me on this. But there were basically three different parts of the
Communications Decency Act. This passed during the Clinton era, and the idea is the Internet is coming up.
We need to preserve decency. We need to watch out for porn, all of the bad stuff. And that was really
the thrust of the Communications Decency Act. More of like a moralistic view of how do we
prevent things that might be dangerous to children from getting online. And as a part of that,
there was this threat of case law that had been coming up that was distinguishing between the
publisher and the platform. Trying to figure out it was also, there was also debates around like
whether it's an interactive website or a read-only website. The law in general is always trying
to make analogies to prior technologies and prior cases. The internet was no different, especially
the age of BBMs and message boards. But what ultimately happened is then, I think it was
Yahoo Stocks, Jordan Belfort, so Wolf of Wall Street,
People from his firm were pumping up penny stocks on Yahoo forums, doing pump and dump with them.
And Yahoo got sued as part of it that they were the publishers and therefore had liability for this.
And the ruling that ultimately came down was no publishers can't be held responsible.
At least they aren't strictly liable for the content on their platform.
There's a lot of more nuance around it than just that.
At a broad level, that is it.
And that sort of became the basis for things like UGC, for that.
user-generated content for Facebook, for Twitter,
that there was belief that there was this broad exception
where they couldn't be held liable for the content posted on their platform.
And that unlocked a lot of activity around UGC.
I think without that term, without that clause surviving
and remaining surviving clause of all this
because all of the decency parts of the CDA
were all struck down as unconstitutional First Amendment reasons,
then you would have a very different internet.
I would argue a better one.
but I know many people would argue differently.
It's kind of coupled with this idea of regulatory change being important is just the basic
idea of rule sets to begin with.
I'd love you to expand a bit more on that.
You know, use clever examples from like how football came together, how soccer came together,
and how this relates to what we think of as free markets.
So talk about kind of the relationship between rules, laws, and free markets.
As a lawyer, like I've just been taught, there's no such thing as a free market.
You want a free market?
Go to Russia.
Whoever is the biggest gun wins.
That's a free market.
If you want the rule of law, if you want the bundle of rights for property rights,
that is infringing on the true free market,
but it is also creating a shared platform of understanding from which people can transact.
These were the same insights that underlied the original stock exchanges.
Somebody was there to put down and build trust on them.
There are common laws, how you create contracts that could be exchanged.
The example that you mentioned about football,
the thing that I always like to say is 22 guys beating the shit out of each other in a field.
doesn't at least suddenly become the Super Bowl. It requires rules. It requires regulations. It requires
contracts. All these things have to be commonly agreed to. The early days of football, college football
in the late 1800s, people were dying quite constantly. And there was no rulebook. It just became a free-for-all.
Enough players, enough kids died that somebody said, okay, let's put some rules in place here.
What does a first down actually mean? What does a catch actually mean? How many downs are there?
Once you got these shared set of rules, then the play all became much more
constrained around those rules. It wasn't just a free-for-all where whoever was live at the end was the
winner. You actually had to abide by certain things. And those rules have to be tweaked over time as people
learn to exploit them. This is not some system where there's a perfect set of rules. There never is
that suddenly things are all going to work in a healthy way. You can create competition through rules.
My favorite modern example of this is F1 racing, where every couple years they change the rules
around the build of the cars, because if you leave the rules in place for too long,
the cars get too fast. They get dangerous. Teams that are able to exploit certain things about
it also are able to pull away. You get this fundamental inequality. But if you change the rules
and vary them up a bit, then suddenly everybody is looking at this new jumble and they're kind of
on a level playing field all over again. You get a lot more competition out of that. You get a lot more
innovation, activity. You're not just focusing on spending 95% of your effort to get the last
five percent of the way there, you're spending all your time getting that first 95 percent all over
again. And that's where economic activity innovation really lies, or in the opportunity to create
things out of whole cloth, but you still need some shared basis of what is right, what is wrong,
how are we going to interact with each other, how are we going to exchange things? It's a wonderful
book. It's called Reinventing the Bazaar, Stanford, 20, 2008, that talks about just the limits of
markets. They can be used, they can be misused, but you have to make a conscious decision
about how you use them if you want to get a economic activity as a result.
Are there any other interesting angles on the regulatory change that have happened recently
before we move on to the cannabis space for the majority of our conversation that you've
washed with interest? And this could be, say, in the last five years.
Crypto and blockchain are looking for the same thing. They're desperately trying to get
the Fed to declare them a store of value. I don't follow the space nearly.
as closely anymore. Every time I hear blockchain, I hear shitty database. They also clearly recognize
that some sort of government sanction is required for this to be what they all believe it can be.
The obvious one is Uber, car shares. This whole industry arose because we weren't enforcing laws
around taxis and how they worked around employment versus independent contractor. You look at Uber,
I don't see technological innovation or Lyft. I don't see technological innovation, although there is
some like the distributed dispatch is a technological innovation. But fundamentally, that whole business,
that entire, when I say that business, multi-billion dollar behemoth of a business that it is,
the capital hoard that it is, is built around a use of independent contractors at a scale
that has just never been done before. And that is built all entirely on a legal issue.
And you see now AB5 is out there in California and they're claiming that that's going to kill
the business. Clearly laws matter. They would not have been able to build that business in the way
that they did if they were required to employ the full-time drivers. And they got to build a very different
business that was very favorable to their capital because of that independent contractor relationship
and interpretation that was at odds with the preexisting definition of what an independent contractor was.
Let's move on to your area of interest and operation specifically today in the cannabis space.
I don't know that I've ever done a full episode on this topic. I don't think I have. So I'd love me to begin by
maybe your origin story, why you got interested, I'm imagining a lot of perceived opportunity
is the potential for regulatory change. But talk us through your initial interest and then we'll get
into everything you've learned since. It's a story that I think a lot of investors would recognize
themselves. I got interested in this space towards the end of 2013. I was teaching entrepreneurship.
I was kicking around town doing strategy and operations, work, variety of startups. And I was
looking for what to do next. And as part of that, I was kind of interested in getting back into
investing. But I didn't necessarily want to go back into venture. I wanted a broader
mandates. I have always kind of felt allergic to the siloing of technology as its own sector. Most
companies that put themselves up with technology, I'm like, great, you're a CPG company that
uses technology, just like every other CVG company. Using technology and being technology were two
different things. So I was looking for something broader than that because I love technology. I've
been deep in it, but I see it as a tool to affect other things, not as an end in itself.
And part of that process of pitching myself to funds was developing pitches on market places
and market spaces that I thought the fund should invest in.
And two of the spaces that I was really interested in were underbanked and cannabis with Colorado
and Washington on the verge of legalizing, which they did in January of 2014.
And I kept getting laughed out of the room.
Nobody was taking me seriously.
Like I got a lot of stoner jokes.
But I kept taking it really seriously.
I'm like a big fan of the early days of venture back in like the Don Valentine days
when everything was unstructured. There were no clear deal terms. There was no standard
sheets. There was no anything. It was just the lack of structure was the opportunity. I'm like a
believer that once there's a vault guide to something, all of the real opportunity is gone. There's
been a vault guide for 15 years now. There was no vault guide to cannabis. This was all brand
new and was changing rapidly. And that was really attractive. And the fact nobody could have built
up expertise in this already because it hadn't existed was a real attractive thing to me. So
started looking at the space first in a search vehicle format. We were thinking about it as a fund manager,
which was to my background in line with that. I was looking at different companies to invest in.
We were trying to be safe by investing more on the technology side, trying to avoid plant touching operations,
dealing with all the legal complexities of touching the plants, given state level laws, was a big concern.
And a couple things happened more or less all at the same time. First, we saw this race to potency going on with edibles,
where everyone was just trying to shove as much THC as possible into the smallest container possible.
We also made the decision that like, hey, if we're going to be in cannabis, let's be in cannabis.
Why are we nibbling around the edges?
Let's take this full risk.
If you're going to take a risk, just do it.
And then the third thing that happened was my grandmother asked me for a pot brownie.
And those three things all happened within a week of each other.
And what was really interesting with my grandmother is that she didn't want to get high.
She just wanted to feel better.
and I couldn't offer her anything that would make her feel better.
I had this one brownie.
There was 100 milligrams.
I cut it up into 20 pieces.
I individually bagged them.
I told her to eat half a morsel and wait two hours.
Scared the hell out of her.
She was never going to try it.
Even offered her a joint.
And she was like, no, I'm not a marijuana user.
Self-identity was a big part of this.
So we just started looking at this as an opportunity in terms of functional foods.
These are compounds that we know have effect.
There's no question about it.
That's usually the biggest question with any new food or supplement is,
does it do anything in this?
Pretty obvious, THC does something.
How can you put it into formats that are mass acceptable,
that don't change people's identity,
and that are consistent enough that they can feel comfortable using it any time during the day,
and that we can feel comfortable investing in building a brand against
because we know that the experience is going to be the same from day to day.
That's when we oriented ourselves very much as a food company focused on cannabinoids
rather than a cannabis company playing with food.
And it's been like that ever since.
You said before we started recording that in the early days and maybe still today, this industry is filled with a lot of bullshitters.
I'd love to hear your take on sort of what the evolution has been like of the quality of the industry participants before we get into some of the kind of market sizing stuff, which I find so fascinating.
I don't want to denigrate the early participants in the industry anyway.
I don't think they were more full of shit than today's participants.
Today's participants are better credentialed, but they're also full of shit.
it's not even intentional. Most of it is just unconscious ignorance or just arrogance.
Gotten a lot of people who are like, oh, I'm well aware of how this market works.
That's great. I've been in here six years and I've been studying it every day of my life and I
don't even know that I know a thing about it yet. Good for you. I'm proud of you.
So in the early days, you had a lot of people who were renegades. They were doing something
that was quite strictly illegal. When we joined the industry in 2014, I like to joke that we were
taking handcuff risk at that point. We were, but not nearly to the extent that people were a couple
years before us. You had to really be comfortable operating without any sort of business controls,
operating fully cash, don't worry about accounting, just flying by the seat of your pants to operate
in that business. And I think when that all went legal, a couple of things happened. Investors came
pouring in and they looked at the marketplace and they treated it the way they normally look at a
marketplace that they're new to. Let me see what the leaders are and I'd like to invest some money in them.
they forgot that schema doesn't really work.
The largest players in an illegal market who have been given the color of law are still the
same people they were before they were given the color of law.
They just were people who were willing to take risks that nobody else was willing to take,
criminal risks that nobody else is willing to take.
Those are not generally the traits associated with building a responsible business that has
cost controls, good accounting practices, governance, good project management.
But they were characteristics of the early market.
It was really interesting in the early days.
Back at the beginning of 2014, I went to what was then probably like the world's largest marijuana conference, which was held at the airport holiday and express by Logan Airport in Boston.
And it was me in a room with 30 guys.
Fifteen of them were stoned out of their mind talking about the great shatter and flour that they were growing.
Another five of them were lawyers and doctors understood what this could do and were really interested.
And then the rest of them were real estate guys who owned a bunch of warehouses that really wanted to get great.
in them so they could get that really good cannabis IR that everyone was shooting for in those early
days. It's obviously changed dramatically. I think up until last year, at least, or up until this year,
yet a lot of people who still thought this was all just going to be easy. I graduated from grad school
right into the teeth of the Great Recession. 2009, I had two advanced degrees and no work experience,
so I got a very clear taste of what things look like in a down market. And I think there are a lot
of people in this industry now who have no conception of what a down market is add to that the whole
promise of marijuana and this imagination that it's just suddenly going to go legal and everything
is going to change on a dime. Now, these things are complex. The retail system is complex. The
distribution system is complex. The production system. These all have to be brought up individually.
There was a lot of people up in the early days who thought they could be first and be the Warren
Buffett of weed, never mind that none of them even knew what Warren Buffett did. They just thought,
I'm going to integrate everything, I'm going to take a piece from everything, and it's going to be
fantastic. Yeah, but then you never do anything well. And everything is expensive. And none of the
accounting actually works. And what if the market changes? It's just there were a lot of these hopes and
dreams that didn't bear any relationship to how the world has ever worked in reality.
I would love to walk through the industry a little bit for the uninitiated, myself included.
I think of as sort of supply chain and value chain. What does sort of the end-to-end industry
look like? What are the major stops along the way? And then we'll get into Caliper and Stillwater.
There's two things we've got to differentiate. One is the CBD industry versus the THC industry. Those are wholly different industries with wholly different infrastructures and wholly different regulatory structures. Let's start talking about the THC industry because that's the one that everyone's tried to nationalize, even though it is federally illegal. And when you look at the THC industry, you're really looking at 50 different industries. Each state has its own set of laws and has its own market structures. Someday there is just going to be an absolute glut of economic research papers.
on the natural experiments of new markets with different market structures in the context of
marijuana, which products they create and which behaviors they incentivize.
So I could talk to Colorado directly and a couple other, but in Colorado at least, there's a
three-tiered system that's based on the same model as alcohol. So you've got cultivators, you've got
processors, and you've got retail. There's a couple other that come up, but broadly speaking,
you've got tiers. You've got the people who grow the pot. You've got the people who extract the pot
and make the products. And then you've got the people who sell it.
there is no distribution infrastructure.
There is no co-manufacturing infrastructure.
This was a big learning for us in the early days.
When we first came to Colorado and said,
we want to launch microdose tea product,
we talked to people who were in CPG,
and they were like, oh, you've got to go find yourself a comat.
Well, Coman aren't legal allowed to manufacture marijuana in Colorado.
You actually have to go and get a license to be a marijuana manufacturer,
and you can't manufacture anything else.
To get that license, you have to attach to real estate.
Well, that real estate, based on whatever the same,
ordinances are might have to be a thousand feet back from everything imaginable,
whether it's schoolyard to a halfway house to just open space that might one day be zoned
residential. Then you have to find a building that doesn't have a bank note on it because if the
bank has a mortgage on it, they're going to veto the lease. So you've got to find a wholly owned
building that meets all those setbacks and is in a city or county because it's not really the state
that legalizes. It's the state that allows for legalization of cities and counties that legalize.
So you've got to find it in a city or county that has legalized and has rules that you can actually live with.
So that's all part of getting the license, huge pain.
Then you've got to start producing your stuff.
So we, from the beginning, we did not want to cultivate.
We looked at cultivation as a commodity.
You do really well in the early days when the prices are high.
Demand is high.
Supply is low.
And everyone will just buy out anything on the shelves.
There's an expiration date on that.
Markets mature.
And you could make a lot of money as a retailer.
But you also have to understand that most customers in this market are either tourists or highly price elastic.
So it's a really hard market to make that in.
We were more interested in branded goods because we felt like it was going to be much more generalizable beyond one state.
We felt like that was really the linchpin between what we viewed as a raw material, which is the cannabinoid, and a finished good product that actually had a consistent experience around it.
And that's really been the locus of our investment in R&D ever since, is just understanding.
how to qualify a good cannabinoid.
What does that actually mean of raw material?
These are things, we've got a ton of food scientists now, all from major food companies,
and they like to say they're very good at qualifying agricultural materials.
They have learned how to do that in the large food, and cannabis has its quirks,
but fundamentally, you're qualifying an agricultural commodity,
trying to convert it into something that is useful for processing,
and then you're trying to actually manufacture it.
There's a really interesting sidecar conversation to be had about things that held the cannabis industry back.
one of them is the U.S. over the course of the last a number of decades has evolved to a co-manufacturing
infrastructure for consumer goods. So the same way, it's sort of a parallel story to AWS has with
technology where you used to have to build everything soup to nuts. You have to manufacture it all
yourself. And then there came these people who just built up the manufacturing infrastructure and you
could rent time on their lines. So you didn't have to invest in it. Well, all the equipment that they
had to rent time on was national scale. Even if the state allowed you to work,
work with them. Turning on their lines would produce 10 times more inventory than you could ever sell.
So there was this mismatch. As a side beyond that, too, the equipment manufacturers themselves
stopped manufacturing small scale equipment. It was really hard to just find stuff that could be used
in a single state environment. So there was just a lot of complexities to be worked out in this market
for it to actually function because everyone was trying to assume like, okay, what I see in CPG,
that's going to work in THC. It's like, well, no, there's 15 reasons why that structure doesn't
work here, all of the tricks that you've got, you've now got to figure out new tricks. None of those
work. Any other interesting backstory or timeline points just in terms of why it took so long for this
to happen that you think are important antecedents to kind of where we sit today, whether that's
laws or regulatory or kind of the social stigma of it? There's no scientific excuse for marijuana
to have been sitting around Schedule 1 for as long as it was. This was known when the schedules first
came out, there was the Schaefer Commission report that immediately recommended rescheduling the
administration put in a drawer. In the early laws, all the way back to the Stamp Act and tax
acts, it was racism against Mexican immigrants, the word marijuana. Prior to the Marijuana Tax Act,
cannabis tincture, which is marijuana tincture, was one of the top three most used drugs in the
country. You can go back to the U.S. Pharmacopia and find lots of tinctures there. You can find
bottles from bayer with cannabis tincture in them. And then it was decided that this was associated with
unwanted Mexican immigrants, and therefore we need to illegalize as much as possible. Then,
you've got coming up on the Controlled Substances Act in the late 70s, there was an interview
with one of Nixon's AIDS where he's straight up admitted we couldn't criminalize being black,
we couldn't criminalize being anti-war, but we could criminalize the one thing that they had in
common, which is the love of marijuana. And that hard on crime and tough on crime mentality,
the racist elements, all of that just hung around for a long time. And then you just had this
cohort issue where you've got a whole generation of political leaders who still believe that this is a
political third rail, despite the fact that it's got 67% approval among the population of large
and even 51% approval among Republicans. It's just one of the strongest mental models that I have
is cohort replacement. Some things don't shift until the people who are holding them back are gone.
And I think this fits that bill very much. It's fascinating and so screwed up in so many ways
when you really dive into the history here. It's this sequence of bizarre events that lead to a very
large macro outcome. So I appreciate those little touch points there. I think
definitely something for people to go look up because it's hard to believe some of this stuff
until you go read the laws. It's hard to believe it. It's also, it's hard to conceptualize. The concept
of a drug is a mental frame and the concept of any illegal drug is a mental frame. I can't tell you
how many conversations I had more in the early days of this company where people would be like, well,
I don't do drugs. I'm like, you got a nice wine cellar over there, man. Well, no, that's not
really a drug. I'm like, there's some nice prescription opioids on your cabinet. Well, that's not
really a drug. My doctor prescribed it. I'm like, your coffee, really enjoying that caffeine.
right? No, not a drug. These are all drugs. They all augment physiology. The question is really,
what is the safety profile? What is the effect? Marijuana, THC, CBD, these are fundamentally no more or less
dangerous than caffeine. It's interesting to compare how caffeine has been regulated over time
versus how marijuana has been regulated over time because it is just a very natural counterfactual
that is fascinating about what is accepted and what is rejected and what that does to two things that have a very
similar safety profile, if anything, marijuana safety profile or THC safety profile is better than
caffeine. It raises an interesting question of degree. So I think the impact of smoking a joint or something
is, at least in my experience, it's a little bit more impactful than a cup of coffee. But I think one of the
things you've learned is that I think you mentioned understanding the actual molecule better and sort
of dosing and what that range might do to people. Say a bit about how that figures into the business
plan, the products, and sort of how you build the brand. I basically throw out almost all research done
before 2016. I throw out all research done around inhalable marijuana because we just don't know.
All joints are not the same. Every joint is different. Every person is different. The amount that you
are actually consuming is unknown. Edibles were actually sort of our first opportunity to control that
input and reduce the variable there to something that what came out on the other end was actually
observable and useful. We do a lot of work at our company with some academic partners on studying
the pharmacokinetics of our products. We want to know how much THC is actually absorbed into the bloodstream
in different formats. How much CBDs actually gets into your body? How much do you take in a pill,
but how much shows up in your blood? And it turns out that everybody is different. It's wild.
Person-to-person variance in terms of who absorbs what and how much, even in water-soluble
versus water insoluble formats is crazy. Some people just can't get high. Some people don't absorb
CBD. Other people can only get high through edibles, which absorb through different pathways than
inhalables. And this is all great science that should have been done 30 years ago, but has been
delayed until now. So look at a lot of the old studies, and I'm just like, I don't know what to
draw out of that because there's a question of magnitude. I think it's almost criminal to ever
talk about direction of effect without talking about magnitude of effect. And this is,
is in pretty much any circumstance.
There are absolutely risks with THC.
I'm never going to play that down,
but the magnitude of those risks
have been wildly overblown.
And we are learning more and more about that,
especially at different dose levels.
THC is kind of three different drugs at one.
A sub-5 milligram dose for most people,
it's like a light anxiolytic.
Perfectly fine.
People can function, operate, no problem whatsoever.
Five to 10 or five to 15,
you're starting to get real stoned.
You're getting high for most people,
although it changes again, like different people have different challenges, at least with THC.
Once you start getting like above 50, it's a psychedelic experience almost.
It's not one that most people care to repeat.
But before you can really start discussing, what's the effect of marijuana?
That question has as many multitudes as what's the effect of computers.
There's a lot of nuance that has to be baked into there before you can start answering that question
with any sort of specificity that's useful.
What's the most interesting difference between the CBD industry and the,
the THC industry and what are the relative sizes? I couldn't even wager a close guess as to how
kind of revenue basis or something, what the difference between the two was. I've seen good numbers.
The legal THC industry, I think, is sitting in like the 10 to 20 billion range today. The illegal
industry is sitting in the 60 to 70 billion range for THC and this is in America. CBD, I've seen
estimates that this year you're talking like two to four billion. I think those are probably a little bit
high. It's really hard to tell. CBD is just unregulated. THC.
is actually more regulated than CBD right now.
THC, like, yeah, the FDA won't touch it,
but at least the states are paying attention to it.
Before product gets on the shelves in well-regulated states like Colorado,
it has to go through cannabinoid testing,
which is an imperfect science that is developing,
but at least it's something.
So you at least know what you are taking
to a greater degree than you used to.
CBD? No, there's none of that.
Companies are self-regulating, but self-regulation isn't a thing.
Self-regulation is just asking for trouble.
There's no incentive to actually abide by the rules. When I lobby on this issue, I keep saying, the returns on lying are far greater right now than the returns on doing the right thing. And that's a regulatory fault. That is something that regulators can change. The answer is by putting in place regulation. How much do you think is left to be unlocked and on what timeline? So it sounds as though it's just still early days when I asked what are the top three variables that matter for the future here? You said regulation, regulation, and regulation. So what does that mean and look like? Almost all of it is left.
be unlocked. When you think about, like I said, the THC market right now is 50 individual states
that operate all on soups and nuts supply chains, more or less. The national industrial food,
supplement, and beverage supply chain is in the U.S. is probably the most robust in the world.
The marijuana supply chain looks nothing like that and could benefit wholly from that.
There's a degree of scale and structure that hasn't been put in place yet. There's a breadth of use
that has been put in place yet. There's no reason why a lot of products can have one to two
milligrams of THC. That is not a intoxicating dose. There's no reason to treat that the way that we do.
The 10 milligram stuff, yeah, that should be treated like alcohol. That's great. It should be.
I think the CBD, God, we know so little. We know that it has bioactive effect. We know that, I mean,
it was proved as a prescription drug. It clearly has bioactive effects. It's got good anxiolytic
properties. It's got good anti-anxiety properties, good anti-inflammation properties. But we don't know at what
levels. It has those and for which people and for what conditions. This is the sort of thing that only
really comes through research and experience and just putting in the markets and structuring the
market so that you can continue to collect good data, especially as a regulator. And so you can
make good decisions on how to build for this forward. I mean, CBD, the tinctures that are the most
popular part of the CBD world right now, CBD 1.0 was all these tinctures that would go everywhere.
Well, the best research we have suggests that those things are 6% bioavailable, 94% of what you
consume is it getting excreted out without entering your bloodstream. It's not one of the people don't
have a good experience at that product. It's also basically an intermediate good. Nobody runs out and says,
you know what my favorite thing in the world is to do is to drop raw crude oil on my tongue with an
eye dropper. That's not a consumer product. There's also sets of claims that have to be developed
around this, but that takes time in research. Once you get past CBD and THHC, there's cannabinoids in general.
This is a category of ingredients. I think people make overbroad claims when they say it was a hundred
and 13 identified cannabinoids that all have bioactive effect.
Yeah, maybe to some degree, but the real question is going to be which ones of those
can be produced in an economically efficient way and brought to market with a safety
profile that matches what we as a society are comfortable with and sold for a profit.
The answer to all of that is probably going to be, I don't know, I think I'd be happy with
three to five additional follow-on cannabinoids in the next decade that would come up there.
This is a set of materials that are the most fast.
fascinating bioactives that anybody on my team has come across. I've got people who spent the last
25 years at M&M Mars working in their functional ingredients divisions and wave and horizon
organic. These are food scientists who have been paying attention to neutra to bioactive and functional
ingredients. This is the most exciting space of new science any of them have ever seen.
Can you talk a bit about the kind of business and investing angles here? So one interesting question is,
Does some of the opportunity exist because it's so fragmented and the big brands, big CPG brands can't deploy their scale and their marketing advantage to just go win the space right now?
Talk about that transition period and sort of where you think the pockets of potential value are for entrepreneurs and investors.
So there's two things that I think are holding back the big brands.
One is you're absolutely right.
Federally legality is holding them back.
Anybody who has an existing business line to protect can't afford to take the risk of operating this.
We've said from the beginning that one of our big benefits is that Coke isn't sold on the same shelves as we are, we're not sold in the same shelves as they are.
It sucks that we can't sell on their shelves, but it's great that they can't sell in ours.
Dispensaries are a unique environment, operate much more like jewelry stores than CVS.
Bud tenders drive 70% of the sales of new product sales because people come in and they know they want an experience, they don't know which product to get it with.
So this is all opportunity that is available because the big players aren't coming in and able to spend time on that.
so you can succeed at a small scale and really make it work.
The other thing is the lack of federal legality just cuts all the advantages out from those big players.
Those guys have all built up infrastructures that are designed to serve massive markets.
If you told Coke, I need you to produce enough soda to serve one person a day.
They're like, great, we do that five times a day.
No problem.
If I'm like, great, I need you to produce enough Coke to serve 100,000 people.
They're like, shit, I don't know that I have equipment that I could turn on and turn off without
losing all my money on it. That's too large of a scale. They also don't know like that thing that I
want to produce. What's the right formula for it? How do you get to the right formula? You have to start
small and work your way up. Big companies are not great at that. I think that has been a real advantage
to the marketplace. Just all of the things that make it hard are the things that keep Coke and Pepsi
out and the things that keep innovation and small operators and opportunity in. At some point,
they're going to come in and that'll be a different world. But in the meantime, as long as you,
have the right understanding of what the opportunity set is, which has to take into account
what the demand side looks like, where you can ship to, truly what the market is, and you've
build your production platform to match that, then you've got a great opportunity. If you
overbuild relative to the opportunity, you could get into trouble real, real quick.
What do you think is the competitive frontier for your businesses, consumer brands,
versus others? Is it the quality? Is it the brand itself? Is it relationships with Bud,
tenders. I've never heard that term. That's hilarious. What is the competitive frontier? Where will
this battle be won or lost? Again, it depends on timing. It's very easy for a lot of investors
who've gotten used to just investing in DDC brands on Instagram or as a friend of mine calls it like
QVC for millennials where they just have platforms. They spin up a brand. They slap it onto a commodity
product and make some money off Facebook ads, no other than profitable, move on with their lives.
We're not there yet. A brand without consistency is just a logo. You actually have to produce a
consistent product. And that is actually really hard. Specialize in turning cannabinoids water soluble.
The reason why we do that is so they can be placed into water-based food systems and as well,
so low-fat food systems. And we've also discovered that there's a much better absorption profile.
So people actually get what they have bought into their bloodstream. To do that consistently,
it's taken years of R&D investment. And I think when people go too fast with too much money,
they go in the wrong direction. I think you saw this with Constellation, had the
whole thing when cannabis 2.0 came down where they were like, oh, like can liners, the aluminum can
liners, we're eating the THC. So we have to delay the launch. Well, yeah, that's because you treated a
$2 million problem like a $2 billion problem. That was a solved problem already, the canliner's,
and it's solvable if you have a small line and good food scientists who can operate flexibly.
But again, there's new science here. What is the shelf stability? Work in an acid versus a base.
Will a base break down CBD? The answer is yes. Do you need a high acid environment for it to actually live in?
long does that CBD stick around? Does it degrade below the label claim? These are all like the
structured parts of the food and supplement supply chain that have to be verified before they can be
scaled. And I think a lot of people were just, especially if you're trying to do brand,
you want to go straight to scale because you want the cheapest way to get there. We're in an
infrastructure phase in this industry. You've got to be in it for that. You've got to understand
what you're getting into. Some day, well, brands win. Sure. Brands win when you have commodity infrastructure
that everybody has access to. That's the only way to differentiate. But today, quality and
capabilities are how I think you differentiate yourselves. You actually have to build the platforms
on which you operate. You don't get to go out and just rent somebody else's. What are your thoughts
on sort of where this all goes from here? So if the first part of this was the handcuff risk,
the second part is sort of the state by state period of time and maybe the third piece is some
sort of federal unifying law, what is the timeline for something like that? And
when will we look back on this and just think, wasn't that a crazy period of transition?
So on THC, I think you could see a lot of movement next year, depending on the outcome of the election.
Obviously, marijuana reform and social justice reform and criminal justice reform are all tied very closely.
And for many obvious and deserved reasons.
CBD, you had Senate Majority Leader McConnell legalizing the production of hemp at the end of the 2018 Farm Bill.
But FDA has been slow to actually accept responsibility for the derivatives of hemp.
that that legalized, namely CBD.
FDA's claim to three to five year timeline.
I think it's wild for a food public health regulator
to just ignore a market where 20 to 40 million people a day
are consuming a product totally unregulated
because they don't have enough information.
You regulate the market where you can
and then you improve regulations over time.
You don't look for perfect.
And in the meantime, leave consumers to twist in the wind.
So that goes back to my point of like,
you need regulators who want to regulate.
And I don't think we have that right now.
I think hopefully we will have that by this time next year.
And if you have regulators who are dedicated to the concept of public health,
who are dedicated to imposing the will of Congress and enshrining that in administrative policy,
you could have CBD regulation next year.
You could clear up the banking issues around THC next year.
You can get THC probably starting with decriminalization,
but heading towards legalization within the next 24 months.
These are all things that could have been said at any time in the last four years.
But one thing that I do believe is,
If THC and CBD have managed to make this much progress throughout the administrations of Attorney
General Sessions and Bill Barr, the two most anti-marijuana people I could imagine, God,
I can only imagine what happens when there's somebody who is making their life's work to destroy it.
So we could be looking back on this three years from now, I think, with wonder.
I kind of hope that the next president, whoever he might be, would embrace marijuana in a similar way to how
President Obama embraced gay marriage.
Maybe he was circumspect at the election, but then he got it across the finish line once he was in office.
And I think that's totally a plausible analogy that could happen here.
Can you walk us through the business itself and sort of what it looks like in terms of almost like an income statement walkthrough?
What kind of gross margins are we talking in a business like this?
How does sales and marketing figure in?
What are other notable key aspects of a business that determine its long term kind of margin potential?
Again, it's different at each stage in the supply chain, so I can really only speak to my point as a products manufacturer.
The margins are quite good. You're talking 30 to 40 percent, EBITA. And the key thing there is we don't have a huge sales force. We've only got 330 stores to sell to. We got a sales force of three. This is on our THC business side. So that's Stillwater Brands, our THC business. It operates. We serve 360 dispensaries covering a population of around 8 million, total population of state population around 8 million.
we self-distribute to them through a mix of couriers and our salespeople directly dropping off.
There's not a lot of advertising to be done.
So I don't think people fully appreciate that Google and Facebook won't take money from CBD or THC companies.
If you have seen those ads, then they were placed there against public policy and usually through some sort of workaround that was probably enabled by the sales team at those companies, but frowned upon by the legal team.
So it's not like you can spend your burn a whole north performance marketing even if you wanted to.
I mean, the way you do it is you have to, if you want to put an ad on Instagram, first you have to go out and buy like an affiliate placement and get an article written on some third party sites.
And then you have to have them buy an ad against that article that links to your website.
The transaction costs neoclassical economics are just massive in this space.
And yet still, 35% EBIT up.
So one thing we said a lot is we really pay a lot of attention to.
operational control. We pay a lot of attention to our margins, pay a lot of attention to good
process because we believe that if we can learn to function in an environment as fucked up as this,
the headwinds are only receding. So it's just we're moving from the advance level. As we get
towards clear federal legality, you're retreating towards and more of an easy mode. And hopefully,
just more and more opportunities open up for us. But for right now, you're just facing problems
everywhere you look. Everything takes five times longer, if not ten times longer. It takes three vendors
to find one who can do the job. Each one of those vendors takes two months to figure out whether they
know anything. It is a blanket rule in the space for my staff. Don't believe people when they tell you
things. It was a blanket rule for me as an investor, but it's especially a blanket rule for me here.
And it's not because people are even lying. I think people are just, their optimism,
they can't distinguish between optimism sales and lying. So,
I've seen like raft after raft people come through with just huge plans that never made any sense and never materialized.
Thinking back to that founding story, I love the pot brownie story as sort of the origin insight or something.
What after that would you classify as sort of the first big break for the business?
So if you've had any step change improvements and sort of the prospects of the business, what was the first big break that stands out in your memory?
After we decided to become a food company, we wanted to produce a product that would serve my grandmother.
90-year-old seniors.
And the product we came up with was called Stillwater Tea.
It was two and a half milligrams of THC.
And it was explicitly designed not to get you stone.
It was supposed to replicate the feeling you would get from taking three deep breaths
and have that last for a couple hours.
And we went out to sell us to dispensaries and we're met with a collective WTF.
We had one bud tender was like, dude, I take 300 milligrams for breakfast.
Why are you pitching me a two and a half milligram product?
To which the response is, first man, you've got a problem.
But second, this product isn't for you.
This product is for other people.
Some would get it.
We would get people, would give it to their mom,
buddenders and her mom or their grandmother,
and they would love it, and then they would become real advocates for it.
It never really took off, and it turned out
because you have to account for what your retail channel is,
and the people walking into dispensaries just weren't that interested in the low-dose products.
We couldn't market to try and bring in more people,
and the dispensaries themselves didn't really have much interest
in going outside that core customer base.
They were making money,
and they didn't have to do any work. Everybody loves making money when they don't have to do any work.
So we couldn't get that target customer that we had built this product around to even get in front of us to even try to make the sale.
And that was a big learning for us. It's sort of like you can't fight the Fed. You can come in with the market and want to say, have all these big ideas for how things should work.
Why aren't these products merchandised? Why are they all behind glass? Why am I listening to a bud tender as if he's a pharmacist?
why can't we advertise and talk about the things that we're doing?
But then there's like the market as it is.
And you've got to figure out a way to sell into that.
Fortunately, we had on the back end this nice little innovation story where to produce the water
soluble component of the teas, we were basically creating these crapes of slurries,
which is like an Elmer's glue type feeling, texture.
And then breaking them up by hand.
And we were dumping the granules into tea sticks.
The tea stick was our form factor. It looks like a stick pack with a bunch of perforations. It functions as a
tea bag. But as part of that, we had to have granules of a certain size. So all the granules that were
smaller, the fines, we were basically throwing out. Well, our yield was turning out to be like 50% of our
THC, which is our core input there. And that was fine with a two and a half milligram product,
but when we realized we had to introduce a product that would get bud tenders excited, so we made a 10
milligram tea, we realized that, man, you can't get by with a 50% yield on a 10 milligram product.
We're just getting destroyed on margin. So we looked at a couple different things we could do,
whether we could try and find a different way to granulate. But we ultimately decided it was,
hey, this powder part, the water soluble piece was really the most interesting piece. Why don't we
just package that up into packets and sell it as its own product? And that became ripple.
Ripple is like a little stick pack, odorless, soluble, flavorless, clean label soluble,
THC and CBD mixes, drops straight into a beverage and dissolves instantly. And that was the product
that came out of those two things together. The need for a high-dose product that would get
bud tenders excited, the need for a process or a use of the waste so that it didn't destroy our margins.
And suddenly that what was before waste became our growth engine. That was the product that took off.
Everyone got really excited by the idea that you can make anything in edible. And then they got
really excited even further because we started discovering that people are giving us these anecdotal reports
that they were getting high faster with ripple than they would when they were taking other edibles.
And we believed them, but we couldn't prove it until we went out and actually did the studies.
What a fascinating turn of events. It's a really cool story to look back on. I'd love to bookend our
conversation with another couple questions, just bigger picture, kind of harkening back to your
background as an investor first and then wrap up. So my first question is you mentioned studying
under Tim Wu. What specifically you learned from Tim? What made him special? What do you take away from
your time learning from him? I don't want to oversell my relationship with Tim. I don't think he would
know me from Adam at this point, but he did have the best class I took and he was my major writing
professor. But the big thing from him was just that market structures matter. That was what he was
really talking about back then. I think it's still what he's talking about today. These things don't
just exist in a vacuum. Markets don't come out of a vacuum. They're not naturally occurring. There's
nothing natural about them. They are created by man. Therefore, they need to be created with
intention if you hope to get out of them what you expect. You also mentioned that you're intrigued
by Jim Chanos's idea that this is sort of the golden era for fraud. I'd love to hear why that
idea is interesting to you and kind of what it means to you. That just feels like sort of violently
true at this point. There is absolutely no penalty for lying or bullshitting at this point.
We are rewarding the bullshitters from top to bottom. And that's,
That's fine, I guess. I think there is a belief that you need founders who almost bullshit themselves
to create companies out of nothing. But I think that that's a form of idolatry that I think is just
straight up wrong. There's absolutely no reason. Founders are not different from other people.
They may be more tolerant of uncertainty. Some of them are good businessmen. Some of them are
bad business people. They are also humans. They are leaders of humans. And I think actually putting
together an organization where everybody is treated as a human, where everybody is not,
not asked to participate in a cult where they're not asked to put the company over themselves,
where they just said, like, this is a job, and I need you to be good at it. And then I need you to go
home and enjoy your family. That's a much healthier way of doing business. And I don't think you
would see any reduction in good innovation that actually has societal benefits off of that,
if anything, you would see the exact opposite. I think most innovation these days is geared towards
things that can really raise the value of equity, but not necessarily the standard of living of all
the employees within the company. Yeah, I hate this notion that founders are aliens who are just really
good at some sort of thing. Most of the time, they're actually atrocious human beings who are just
being carried by competent people within their organization while they're being treated like
children internally. If you had to reenter that world and be backing founders actively,
how do you avoid that problem? What would your advice be to investors who are primarily making
bets on people to avoid that type of person? So you have to structure it. Jerry,
and I talk about this all the time, and I am fully on board with him, that we're both on board
with Economen and Gary King, that there's no such thing as intuitive investing when it comes
to people. Those are complex, open systems. If you tell yourself, I just like the cut of his
jib, they turn out to be great. That's luck. Good for you. That was not something that is repeatable.
But what you can do is you can create structures, decision-making structures that try and look for
landmines, weed those out. You can try and raise the floor of whomever you hire. Don't
think it's possible to hire a perfect person. What perfect means is different in the context of an
organization, a team, a time. But I do think you can at least construct a hiring process to probe for
things like integrity, to probe for things like a willingness to play games with the truth,
to probe for just the difference between somebody who can describe things versus somebody who can
actually do things. I think you focus on those. And Jeff Smart has this great... Smart hiring thing,
yeah. The book is fine. His PhD thesis is much more interesting about how you
actually set up decision structures for unstructured decisions. My best resource for this and something
I think a lot about too is the CIA. CIA's internal library on making structured decision making
in unstructured situations is as good as it gets. You think about what an investor is doing,
they are trying to predict an inherently unpredictable complex system, which is itself impossible
to predict a point outcome, but you can at least start predicting ranges of outcomes if you structure
you're thinking well. And you can avoid falling in love with a specific outcome,
given that the same facts might also align with a multitude of other outcomes.
These are just things that I think are really important. I also think it's super important
to always play the counterfactuals. Anytime anybody on my team is like,
when you guys did this, that was so smart. I was like, yeah, that was smart. But let me tell you
about the three other things we wanted to do before we landed on that one that were stupid, that could
have worked. And we could have been going in a totally different direction. I tell the story about,
you just heard the story about what happened with Ripple. That just,
story could have gone in a bunch of different directions. We could have doubled down on low dose.
We could have decided we need to spend more money on performance marketing. Maybe that would have worked.
I can't say that it wouldn't. But I think it's really dangerous to get into the mindset.
It was always going to be this way and it was always going to be this way because I'm so good.
Bullshit. I don't care how good you are. The world is complex. Luck is massive, a massive factor.
The best thing that you can do is put yourself in a position to have better, larger options than you had before.
As long as you keep on doing that, eventually you're going to find the option that you can really lean into.
I'd say that a lot with this company.
This company is the largest lever that I ever hoped to hold.
And it got that way because we just started with a very small lever and kept putting ourselves in a position to go out and find things to add on to that lever.
We couldn't pick exactly which one was going to be the thing, but at least we had the opportunity to go after them.
In the cannabis space specifically, what do you not understand well today that you wish you did?
cultivation is fascinating to me. I know I don't understand it. I know enough of it to know that it's
complicated. I think that everywhere you look in the cannabis supply chain, it's easy for it to look
simple, especially once you start scaling it up, things get very variant very quickly. Just because
you understand something the way it operates at one scale doesn't imply you understand how it will
operate it another scale. That's one that is always scaring me is just trying to understand what's the
next model that's going to work for thinking about this industry. I knew a guy once who got his PhD
in the philosophy of friction, and he described it to me as the way that friction works at a
molecular level is different than the way it works at an inch level is different than the way it
works at a mile level. The philosophy of friction is when do you change your model for what works,
something that describes the molecular level, and now you've got something that describes
the step up. If you try and take the molecular model and apply it,
to the inch model, you're not going to get anything predictive. And the models I have for marijuana,
are they just Colorado-specific? We're going to find out soon. We're going into Michigan next year.
Is this as unique of the market as I believe it to be? Or are there lessons in this market that are
transferable to other states? Or is each state truly unique from top to bottom and everything has to be
relearned? We don't know yet. And that's both scary and wildly exciting. That's what keeps it new and
fun. Well, Justin, I've learned a ton today. I feel like I really didn't know anything about this
space coming in and now do. So I really appreciate your time. My closing question for everybody is to ask for
the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for them. I will tell you, at least in my professional
career, the kindest thing that anyone has ever done in my professional career was Roger,
Eric Berg, paying me out of his own pockets to be an intern at IA when they were a friends and family
company, which got me out of a job in San Francisco that I hated, which got me back to New York
with my wife or at that point my girlfriend, now wife, which led to me having a kid, a dog,
and a company, and all just because he was willing to spend not much money to get somebody
who he thought was smart and could help the fund. Fantastic. Yeah, could easily have pinch pennies,
but he did it and man, am I grateful. It was kind. Fantastic. Well, Justin, thanks again for your time
today. I've learned a ton and I hope to say in such. Yeah, thank you. I appreciate it. Best of you.
This episode was brought to you by Microsoft for startups. Microsoft,
for startups is a global program dedicated to helping enterprise-ready B-to-B startups
successfully scale their companies. In our five-part mini-ser, we were talking to Evan Reiser,
CEO of Abnormal Security, about his experience with Microsoft for startups. In this week's
episode with Evan, we talk about technology shifts and picking a cloud provider.
What has changed about companies sort of cloud adoption? I would count us and our business
in the same category of like slowly and then suddenly, you know, we had to adopt this sort of thing.
So maybe just describe what exactly, because this sounds like a technology platform shift that often makes new companies possible.
What exactly has changed? And why is a company like yours positioned well for that?
Yeah, I think there's two things. One is just how do enterprises work. And then the second is, what are the new platforms that allow small teams to do a lot with very little?
So I think in the former category, like the general shift is enterprises, IT stacks moving into the cloud.
And the prevalence of Microsoft 335 is just an example of that. So that enables all,
all this IT security data to be available in the cloud and therefore accessible via APIs.
And so if we wanted to build our product 10 years ago, we would need a fundamentally different
architecture that wouldn't allow us to get as much data at the same level of detail and deploy
so quickly.
And I think with the general rise of cloud infrastructure and cloud computing, and even more
specifically, some of the higher level services like Azure AI cognitive services, those are
tools that allow relatively small engineering and data science team to go build these
world-class enterprise-ready applications very quickly.
So you were just started in 2018, so you're a very young company, even though you're moving
quickly. I'm curious what the experience was like at the beginning, as you thought about
what tools to deploy. This is one of the more interesting things for me now because
the toolkit available to founders, say, eight years ago, is very different from what's
available today. You can do a lot less building of commoditized stuff or stuff that's not
your core competency. So how did you think about that? How did you address
the problem of what stack of third-party partners are we going to use to build this company on top of?
We hardly made some mistakes really on, and just there's some areas we're very thoughtful
and some areas where we were less thoughtful. When we started, right, we knew just like the speed
to market was going to be very important for us. So we started off by just using the,
we're almost familiar with, right? We didn't do a lot of research, a lot of areas. One example,
you know, inside cloud infrastructure, when it comes to things like cloud infrastructure,
it's not really just a technology decision. It's really a business decision. And the
reasons why, you know, we decided to invest on Azure, I think there's kind of two sides.
On the technology side, we had to have the most secure and the most kind of privacy-centric
platform to build on top of. I think the second thing is purely for my business, and we need
a technology platform that would enable us to spend more time focusing on customer problems and
not on kind of rebuilding commodity technology. So being able to use higher level services,
especially around AI and machine learning and computer vision, getting that out of the box,
just allows a startup like us to do a lot more faster.
Of course, I realized the irony of me being an enterprise technology CEO and saying it wasn't a technology decision.
But I really think the reason we ultimately decided to invest in the Azure platform was really around some of the business benefits.
A lot of that came down to just say, what is most valuable to the company?
For a company like us, we currently work with maybe, you know, three or four percent of Fortune 500.
So the biggest challenge for us is, hey, how do we see the other 95 percent?
We wanted to reduce the cost required for us to go and market and acquire customers.
And so there's great programs like the Azure Co-Sale program, which actually enables Microsoft
sellers to go sell a solution, right, and help work with us to help solve customer problems.
I think the other thing that was really important on the business side was we want to increase
our success right with customers by aligning to their strategy.
So a lot of CIOs today are interested in consolidating their architecture into the Microsoft
ecosystem.
They want fewer and fewer point solutions.
They're independent.
And they want one interconnected ecosystem that works well.
So, you know, the ability to enable our infrastructure.
customers to basically invest in the Microsoft ecosystem, to buy our solution and then get
Azure consumption credits as part of that, to reward them for their Microsoft ecosystem investment.
That was another key piece.
Big thing for us is that we realized that cloud infrastructure was much more of business
decision.
And in the past, I would have offloaded that to maybe the engineering team and had them
kind of decide.
But for us, we brought that to the board and we said, hey, we think that all in, right,
this is actually more important for the business.
We can get a lot of benefits for both the company and for our customers by investing
as Microsoft platform overall.
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Thanks for listening to Founders Field Guide.
