Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Katherine Boyle - Investing for America - [Invest Like the Best, EP.290]
Episode Date: August 16, 2022My guest today is Katherine Boyle, a general partner at Andreessen Horowitz. Katherine started her career as a reporter for The Washington Post before moving into VC at General Catalyst. She now leads... a practice at a16z called American Dynamism, investing in companies that are solving critical issues in areas like defense, housing, and education. For the full show notes, transcript, and links to mentioned content, check out the episode page here. The content here is for informational purposes only and should not be taken as legal, business, tax or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. For more details, please see a16z.com/disclosures. ----- This episode is brought to you by Tegus. Tegus streamlines the investment research process so you can get up to speed and find answers to critical questions on companies faster and more efficiently. The Tegus platform surfaces the hard-to-get qualitative insights, gives instant access to critical public financial data through BamSEC, and helps you set up customized expert calls. It’s all done on a single, modern SaaS platform that offers 360-degree insight into any public or private company. As a listener, you can take Tegus for a free test drive by visiting tegus.co/patrick. And until 2023 every Tegus license comes with complimentary access to BamSec by Tegus. ----- Today's episode is brought to you by Brex. Brex is the integrated financial platform trusted by the world's most innovative entrepreneurs and fastest-growing companies. With Brex, you can move money fast for instant impact with high-limit corporate cards, payments, venture debt, and spend management software all in one place. Ready to accelerate your business? Learn more at brex.com/best. ----- Invest Like the Best is a property of Colossus, LLC. For more episodes of Invest Like the Best, visit joincolossus.com/episodes. Past guests include Tobi Lutke, Kevin Systrom, Mike Krieger, John Collison, Kat Cole, Marc Andreessen, Matthew Ball, Bill Gurley, Anu Hariharan, Ben Thompson, and many more. Stay up to date on all our podcasts by signing up to Colossus Weekly, our quick dive every Sunday highlighting the top business and investing concepts from our podcasts and the best of what we read that week. Sign up here. Follow us on Twitter: @patrick_oshag | @JoinColossus Show Notes [00:02:42] - [First question] - The origin and overview of the term American Dynamism [00:05:01] - Why the shift to a move slow and make sure nothing breaks mentality [00:07:31] - What about the American system today feels broken and stale [00:09:48] - Becoming a journalist at The Washington Post [00:11:35] - Describing the power landscape of media as it exists today [00:12:28] - Major categories of American Dynamism that matter most [00:14:29] - What matters more or less to her as an investor in these categories [00:17:31] - Whether or not there’s anything fundamentally broken about our government [00:19:36] - The Systems Bible; What excites her about aerospace and defense and what creates opportunity and demand in these sectors [00:26:01] - An overview of how lobbying works and who does it and why [00:33:09] - The biggest problems that currently exist in the K-12 school system [00:37:34] - The role immigration will play in range of outcomes in these main categories [00:39:32] - Key takeaways about housing in light of American Dynamism [00:42:09] - Her interpretation of the chart that shows inflation in categories over time [00:47:56] - Whether or not expected returns and risk profiles are different in this area [00:49:55] - Overview of the anatomy of a great story [00:51:30] - The story she tells founders at this stage so establish a partnership [00:52:46] - The kindest thing that anyone has ever done for her
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Hello and welcome, everyone.
I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Invest Like the Best.
This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will
help you better invest both your time and your money.
Invest like the best is part of the Colossus family of podcasts, and you can access all our podcasts,
including edited transcripts, show notes, and other resources to keep learning at join colossus.com.
Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of O'Shaughnessy Asset Management.
All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect
the opinion of O'Shaunacy asset management.
This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment
decisions. Clients of O'Shaughnessy asset management may maintain positions and the securities
discussed in this podcast. My guest today is Catherine Boyle, a general partner in Andreessen Horowitz.
Catherine started her career as a reporter for the Washington Post before moving into VC at
General Catalyst. She now leads a practice at A16Z called American Dynamism,
investing in companies that are solving critical issues in areas like defense, housing, and
education. In the past year, I've spoken to Mark Andreessen, Josh Wolf, and a number of founders about
this need to build societally important businesses, so I was excited to explore the topic in even
more detail today. Please enjoy my conversation with Catherine Boyle.
Catherine, I've been really excited to talk to you about this theme of what you're calling
American Dynamism. I've actually explored in our other podcast, a couple of companies,
Hadrian and Anderl that I know you've been really involved with. And I just think this theme is
on everyone's mind. Politics and geopolitics have become incredibly important again for the first time
in a long time. And maybe to begin our conversation, you can just sort of outline for us the
overall idea here. And maybe the origin of the idea itself and why to devote an investing practice to
it and why devote your career to it? What does American dynamism mean? And what is it about it that
motivate you? There's a tipping point that I think happened where it became essential that we started
investing in these categories. And it was definitely started with Marx. It's time to build
essay. Why are things not working? Why is it that we live in the best country in the world? And we can't
find PPE during COVID in New York City. For me personally, it started a little bit before that and that I
spent 10 years in Washington, my early career as a reporter at the Washington Post. When I was leaving
media to understand what this technology thing was, I moved out to Silicon Valley and just became
sort of shocked by the disconnect between the two ecosystems. And I think there's a number of reasons
why there's no connection between Silicon Valley and Washington and why we're trying to bridge that
gap. The shocking point of it was most of the technology story in America starts with Washington
working together with technologists, government initiatives, government investing. And I think it's only
recently in the last, say, 15, 20 years, where that story really became divided and where you have
technologists that don't necessarily, it sort of became taboo to even say I would sell to government,
or I would work closely with certain government agencies on hard tech or deep tech or these sorts of
things. So the way that we define American dynamism is we're actively investing in companies
that support the national interest. So that's everything from your classical government companies,
aerospace, defense, national security, where there are procurement requirements, requirements from the
government that are put out to work with various private companies. But it's also things that aren't
working directly with government. It's housing, education, highly regulated industries where these are
important civic goods that touch all Americans. And most of the, I would say, progress that is going
to come in these sectors are going to come from technological improvements, not from policy improvements,
in our opinion. And so the American Dynamism practice, it's a broad practice. But it's the issues that
are touching and facing all Americans and the belief that technology is going to be what solves a lot of
these core issues and not policy. If I think about one of the most famous phrases in technology of
the last 20 years, it's move fast and break things. And then having investigated DOD quite a bit,
it sort of seems like it's the opposite, like move very slow and make sure nothing breaks.
What created this change? You sort of referenced the early ties between government and technology,
whether that be in semiconductors or defense or the DARPA initiatives, a lot of these things that
were incredibly important. What happened? Why did that critical linkage change during this recent
period. I think there's a number of reasons. And I always point to what I would call a very
non-obvious reason why I think Washington has a hard time working with Silicon Valley. And it's because
the cultures are so disparate. So if you think about Washington media or even electoral culture,
it's a zero-sum game. Every two years, there's an election. If you're talking about media,
it's every day. I would say journalists actually function more like hedge fund managers and that they
have their remarks every day. Did they go viral on the internet? Did they get the front page of the
newspaper? And so they're playing a repeat game every day. We're only,
one person can win. So very used to zero sum and very used to short time horizons, where Silicon
Valley operates in positive some games and long time horizons. The abundance culture of Silicon Valley is a
real thing. The more companies that exist here is actually good for the ecosystem. You see the same
investors investing in multiple companies. That's great. And so I think that there's a fundamental
just misunderstanding between Washington and Silicon Valley of how the cultures work. And so when you
actually look at that at a very micro level in government or say the DOD, where the DOD is used to
to, as you said, move very slow, make sure nothing breaks.
I don't want to lose my job.
I don't want to get fired because I invested in the wrong company and now we don't
have drones.
There's this culture of, let's make sure everything is going to have cover that everyone,
you know, crosses the T's, dots the eyes.
And meanwhile, we are competing against competitors that do not have that same sort of
view of how technology should be built.
Russia and China, our adversaries, have very different views of their countries and their
authoritarian regimes that can actually tell their.
their innovators, their engineers, exactly what they want them to do.
Palmer Lucky talks about this in very stark terms, where it's actually easier if you're an authoritarian
regime to get the technology that you want. It's actually hard, I think, in some ways,
to work through a procurement regime where you're trying to convince people that they should work
with the government. But what I'd say has changed over the last few years that's really
dramatic is that Silicon Valley wants to work with government. When I moved here almost 10 years ago,
it certainly wasn't the case. And so I do think there has been a sea change where founders in particular
are excited about these categories and are excited about working with the DOD.
I'm sure there's tons of nuance around the arguments on both sides of whether or not America is
exceptional in some way. But in some ways, it clearly is. Historically, it's got, I don't know,
5% of the world population and 60% of the enterprise value or market cap of companies.
There are just kind of raw data points that would suggest something about the American
system has produced exceptional outcomes and innovation. Where do you think that's most broken today?
I would assume that you think there are things that need a lot of improvement.
That's why you're investing in this space.
What has become sclerotic or stale or frozen that needs unfreezing?
I think this is a very good question because a lot of times people ask it in the reverse of,
well, why doesn't venture capital work for these categories?
And I think our sort of contrary in view is that it 100% will.
That actually like when you think about where is innovation coming from, not only in the
U.S. but all over the world, it is coming from risk capital.
It is coming from a very, I would say, open system where,
a bunch of smart people who can tell a story can get capital, not from banks, from kind of
non-traditional needs, from what used to be a niche asset class, and build extraordinary companies
doing very specific things. We've seen that work over the last 50 years. We've seen that work over
the last 30 years with commercial internet and enterprise, but it hasn't worked for government.
And so I think the actual question is, why is it that government hasn't received the spoils of
this? Why is it that civic goods that are highly regulated by government or where there's a lot
of capital coming out of the federal government into these systems, why are they not receiving
the benefits of technology? I think it has less to do with, you know, impetus of founders wanting to
work in these sectors. I think it is more to do with this question that I always come back to,
which is why are the cultures of Washington and Silicon Valley so different when we want a country
that believes in abundance culture, where things happen fast, where things are delivered on time,
where roads are paved, we want this. What is the issue that is stopping this from happening?
I would argue that it's much more on sort of the regulatory side, but also,
also this cultural difference where I do think for too long, a unique feature, I think, of Silicon
Valley being so far away from Washington and having developed so far away from East Coast
institutions, they are very different ecosystems that really have to learn the same language.
Where I've been hopeful in the past few years is that I do think the DOD has actually done a
very good job of learning how Silicon Valley works. Silicon Valley is doing a good job of learning
how institutions in Washington work, and we just need more of that crossover between two different
cultures. I'm curious to learn a little bit about your lessons from that period as a journalist. I guess
the first question is why you did it in the first place. Like, what drew you to that career at the
Washington Post? And then I'll ask what you learned along the way good and bad. But what originally
drew you there? There's a lot of similarities between investing and between journalism. Truthseeking is
sort of the cliche, obvious thing. But if you're someone who's deeply curious, deeply passionate about
knowing things, about knowing the truth, then I think it's sort of an obvious place to land. I think
where I was actually very fortunate. I didn't see it as fortunate at the time, but living through what I
would call one of the most historic business stories of the last hundred years, which is watching
extreme monopoly, newspapers in America, especially like the Washington Post or the New York Times,
where monopolies not only in their regions, but monopolies across the country, watching a monopoly
just be destroyed within five years by innovation. It was all that we talked about. I saw many, many
colleagues get fired. This was before Bezos bought the paper and invested a lot of capital and
subscription really took off. But they sell two of their three business models die, syndication and
advertising. When you're watching that as someone who's deeply interested in the why question,
I felt like I was missing the biggest story of my time, not in tech. We knew why this was happening,
but why am I in Washington when all of the innovation that's happening that's creating sort of
this historic moment is happening in Silicon Valley with these companies? And so I was really
fortunate. I was early enough in my career that I could hop over to tech and through Hail Mary
Pass and ended up at Stanford Business School, approach moving to Silicon Valley almost as
sort of a research subject of how do I understand what's going on? And then, of course,
venture capital, I think is very similar to that, where if you're obsessed with being on the
forefront of cultural shift and movement and new ideas, there's no better career than an early
stage investor talking to people all day and trying to understand what's happening and what will
happen in the future. How would you describe the power landscape in media,
today to someone that was trying to understand it for the first time?
It's interesting because I do think that when I was at the Washington Post,
it was the story could have gone a very different way.
There's a number of reasons why the consolidation happened in the media where there used
to be probably a dozen regional newspapers that mattered.
Now there's a few.
There's a handful.
And I would say that they are playing a very different game than they were 10 years ago.
When I was at the Washington Post, there was no sort of Twitter culture.
This was 10, 12 years ago.
So now the games that are being played in terms of how do you win the news,
cycle are very focused on this integration with tech, on this sort of distribution through Twitter.
That is new. So where is the power cycle? You could argue that it's still the New York Times,
still the Washington Post, because they did consolidate their business model. And with the investment
that they have, they can certainly lead the new cycle. But I also think they are playing a tech
game. And that was not the case, maybe 10, 15 years ago. I wonder if you could list for us where you
think the major categories of interest are in this kind of American dynamism umbrella. And then I'd love to
go through, maybe not all of them, but several of them, just kind of understand the state of play
today. Defense is one. We'll definitely talk about defense. What are the other major categories that
you think matter most in terms of potential impact? It's a broad category. So I would say aerospace and
defense are the classical things. What's changed about those categories is that now there are winners.
So 10 years ago, you could say we've always had a robust aerospace industry. We've always had a
robust defense industry. But new space and sort of new defense coming out of Silicon Valley,
like those did not exist. And so now there are winners. Now there are examples of how to work
with DOD. So we're really bullish there. Say there's also sort of an underlying sector beyond that,
which is suppliers in those categories. So I know you've talked to Chris Power at Hadrian,
which is innovation on manufacturing for those sectors and for sectors even beyond that at a
certain point. So we're interested in how do you bring automation to manufacturing, what sectors
are going to benefit most there. Coming out of COVID, especially, I think there's sort of a
broad view, not only in Washington, but in technology, that education is ripe for transformation.
Not only education at the earliest of stages, say K through 12, but education, higher education,
where when you go through two years of everything moving online and then every parent seeing what
their children are learning and how they're learning, there becomes a huge push for, well,
maybe the 19th century model that we've been using is not the best way to educate all children.
And maybe there should be some variance in how we educate.
You're seeing that not only in the technology sector, which I think has always kind of made that
argument, but you're also seeing it now in the political sector, which is things like the state
of Arizona going to a universal ESA.
education and savings account, where now parents can opt out of the public school system and put
their kids into a variety of alternative education programs. So when you look at states making those
decisions, that leads to just a rebirth of companies that will be suppliers because of that
policy change. It's not only companies that are selling direct to government, but it's also
companies that are, you could say, competing with government, where they see themselves as an
alternative to the government solutions that have historically served most citizens.
How do you think about the lenses through which you have to make investment
decisions in these categories relative to a software company that's down the fairway for Silicon Valley
these days. A lot of these businesses are old school in some sense. They're building something
physical. There's a technology innovation behind whatever they're building. There's complexity and
capex and cost and the business models are just really different. So what matters more or less
to you as an investor relative to maybe some of your colleagues? I was going to say down the hall,
but now you guys are your headquarters of the cloud. Around the corner of the cloud or around the corner of the
cloud or whatever. What's the difference? Silicon Valley has always divided itself on business model.
And I agree with you, this is not a category where business model is at the forefront.
You're either a consumer business or an enterprise business, but a government business,
what does that mean? I'd say the thing that I have noticed most about the founders that found these
companies, they're unique historians of the sector. While an enterprise or consumer, you often see
young, maybe college dropouts or people who are just obsessed with a certain type of technology or
is technological movement who sort of find themselves solving a very unique problem to themselves.
A group of kids coming out of a university can build something in consumer and build an extraordinary
company. I think it's less so in government. I think there has to be some sort of domain expertise.
At the same time, expertise in government can lead to sort of nihilism. It can lead to sort of this
belief that like, oh, you're never going to get it done. So where we've seen founders really excel
in these categories is they often know the problem cold in a way that just other founders don't
often know the answers. They have been studying students of history of these sectors for a very,
very long time. And that comes out in your, you recently had a conversation with Brian Schiff,
Anderl. We talk about someone who just knows the entire history of defense procurement,
someone who came to the problem, just knowing all of the intricacies of it. And all the founders
of Anderl sort of had that knowledge and expertise of here's how you have to really push
the business model in order to build. You can make the same case that SpaceX had that intense
knowledge of not only the technology and what needed to happen, but also how to work with
government. I think that's what we have noticed is that there just has to be a true understanding of
the sector and what needs to change. And then a lot of evangelism of what needs to change. As you probably
saw with someone like Chris Power when he was talking about Hadrian, these are founders that truly
are evangelizing oftentimes a business model change or technological change are constantly talking about it
because they are at the forefront of this change. So I think that's something that we very much look for
is founders who have that capability who not only have the historical knowledge of what they need to do. Also,
It helps with recruiting.
It helps with raising capital.
All of these companies, I would say, are extremely capital intensive.
And so being able to make the case that, yes, this is how things have been, but here's the
paradigm shift that's happening and being at the forefront of that, it's almost table stakes for founders.
We often say this about deep tech companies where there's a graveyard of companies with great
technologists who've spun out of universities where the technology was great, but they couldn't
make the case.
They couldn't tell the story.
They couldn't raise enough capital to get through the valley of death.
what we've seen with the founders who've been successful in these sectors is that they are just
incredible at convincing people that this paradigm shift will happen.
Say a bit about, again, maybe harkening back to your time in Washington and understanding of government
at a deep level from both angles. Is there anything fundamentally broken about government?
If we think about the levers or the variables that would most positively impact the odds
that we'd develop great technologies that are sort of national interest technologies,
is one of those major variables that the government itself is the approval rating is whatever it is.
crazy low, typically lots of extremely entrenched Congress people. What are the problems there that
you've seen? Do you think that we need to maybe fix some of those before we have the best possible
outcome on the innovation side? There's a really interesting website called WTF happened in 1971,
and it shows all of the different charts of how many laws and pages have been added to the federal
registrar since 1971. You could make the argument that the fundamental shift with government and why
things have gotten slower, even though government has historically been set up to be slow moving and
compared to the private sector is that we've just gotten so good at making laws. Not only laws,
just making regulations that make things very, very difficult to move. And that's not necessarily
lawmakers who are democratically elected. Those are bureaucrats who've been in Washington
operating in different agencies for 20, 30 years. So when you just let that compound over time and just
look at how many pages have been added to various regulations, any smart entrepreneur who's looking
at that is going to say, okay, I'm not going to wait 36 months to get something through planning
when 36 months in the private sector, which has been accelerating since the 1970s because of technology,
there's a crucial thing. So I actually think it's become harder if you see this kind of acceleration
in the private sector versus this sort of lag in the public sector for anyone truly looking at
can something get done in government to want to enter the public sector. That being said,
I think there has been an educational shift in very small pockets of government, the DOD being one of
them where it's become just so catastrophic to not move that there are changes being made to work
with, I would say, enterprising AI companies, startups that can move really fast around certain
pockets. You're still fighting against that entropy in government and sort of that pain of getting
through all of the regulatory morass that has been kind of piling up in sort of this acceleration
in the 70s. You remind me of this idea of this guy named John Gall who wrote a book called Systems Bible
where the goal of any system is not the thing it was designed for, but it's actually to keep itself alive.
and that Congress is maybe a, or government's an interesting example of that.
As you think about these categories, maybe we can zoom in on aerospace and defense.
What excites you about this?
What is the, I guess, the end demand that is driving so much of this opportunity to create
innovative new supply, selling to DOD, selling to government, in and around aerospace and
defense? What is the thing in the world that creates the opportunity?
The opportunity actually does come from people who are working hard in government to try to change
the procurement system and who say, actually, we need new technologies that we haven't been able
to acquire. So there is a paradigm shift happening in the DOD, which has said, you know, we used to
need battleships, we used to need tanks, we used to need hardware. And we have a procurement
system that was set up in the 60s and 70s to acquire from the industrial base, tanks, battleships.
Now we actually need software. And we have not been able to acquire the best talent, acquire the
best technologies in the software domain because of the way we are set up. There used to be a view,
I'd say maybe even 10, 15 years ago that defense primes that were set up to work directly with
government would be able to solve that problem. I think there is now an understanding that the
best talent does not go to work at Lockheed Martin, that they go to work at exceptional startups. And that is,
I would say, a new trend that's happened over the last 15 years. And the government is aware of that.
So there are smart pockets in the government. Some of the best technologists that I've met working in
government are at the DOD. And they sort of know what's needed. They know what the warfighter needs.
And there's these crucial moments that have happened in recent years.
And I would actually say Ukraine is also leading to an acceleration here,
where there's an understanding that what we've been talking about for five, seven years,
about Russia and China actually becoming resurgent and becoming true adversaries to the U.S.,
like that is happening.
It's no longer theoretical.
It's no longer something that just talked about behind closed doors.
There's an understanding that we have to get our best and brightest who are in Silicon Valley
to work directly with the DOD.
So that paradigm shift excites me because before it was a lot of lip service.
And now it's sort of a how do we do this?
I think the how question is really hard.
But the second thing that I'd say excites me is that you often see this with categories that are very difficult to build in as you only really need one winner.
It opens the floodgates for everyone understanding the playbook.
And one of the things in aerospace and defense that's happened over the last 20 years is that Elon has been building in public.
There are now thousands of people who've worked at SpaceX who can leave SpaceX and go build space startups with the playbook, understanding that the factory is the product, understanding how to work with government, understanding the pace that needs to happen.
And I'd say the same thing is true of Anderl, where a five-year-old company has really shown by building in public that you can work with the DoD, this is how you get contracts.
This is how you have to get through the valley of death and that kind of one to two years out trying to convince the government that you have the best product.
And so all it really takes, I believe, is one company to really teach others who have been in that company and others in the ecosystem how to work with these agencies.
I think in some ways we're indebted to be market leaders in these categories where SpaceX, Palantir, Anderil have really.
change the game in terms of educating other companies in the sector. And that's why you're seeing
a lot of fast followers, a lot of companies that aren't making the same mistakes that Palantir did,
that are using the playbook that I think is replicable. Can you explain this idea that the factory
is the product? I haven't heard that before. It's the idea that in some ways, how you do the process,
Chris Power at Hadrian talks a lot about, like the actual process and decisions you make about
the system are the resulting product. If you're building a manufacturing plan, if you're building a
machine shop and you're adding automation, the crucial decisions that you are making,
inside the factory about how you build actually leads to greater scale.
When you met with Chris before and heard his story, the early factory, factory one,
factory two, all of these sort of things that you're doing, which will take a lot of capital
in order to ensure that you're building that scale that in a way that can be replicated quickly,
the every third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh factory beyond that, you are benefiting from
those early decisions that you have made.
And the products that are coming out of it, the quality of the product is getting better,
not just because of the decisions about the product itself, but about how you've built
the system. That becomes incredibly important in something like aerospace and defense, where these
supply chain questions that a lot of the primes have are really about how the systems are
architected and engineered and less about the underlying product that comes out of the factory.
How big is this market? Like how much spending is happening today, setting aside what might happen
in the future, I assume it'll grow. But what is the state of it today? I think maybe people might
be surprised by just like how much money is flowing in aerospace and defense just now.
You can slice it and dice at different ways, but I'd say like the NDAA is $780 billion, I believe,
in the last NDAA that was passed. And then you also add on other five-eyes countries,
so the countries that we are allies with, that we work very closely with, UK, New Zealand,
Australia. You add on those countries where their budgets are obviously much smaller,
but that's over $1.2, $1.3 trillion in spend. And then you add on the countries we do business
with through the State Department. So we do, as a country, supply a lot of the rest of the world
that we see as allies and that we see as strategically important. That's annual spend.
obviously there's a lot of operational spend as well. The thing that makes me somewhat stoic
about how you look at the market is that something like 40% of that sort of procurement spend
is spent on five companies that supply the DoD. So the big five, the Primes, the Lockheed Martin's
Raytheons of the world. What I think has made it very difficult for startups to get part of that
spend is that a lot of those decisions are made based on tailored RFPs, tailor requirements
that go out specifically for a company where a lot of lobbying has happened. So while the market
is exceptionally large, the piece that a lot of startups that are going into defense have to look
at is much smaller than that. It's usually the money that has not been put forward for programs of
record, which are usually only going to go to companies that have been around for many cases
100 years and consolidated over 100 years. So the thing that I think companies in New Space and
New Defense have done quite well is they're going after pockets of spend that are seen as almost like
a political pockets of spend. What I mean by that is there's not like a bunch of companies trying to
get dollars around some of these areas, the brilliance of something like Anderil was they were
focused on a product that a lot of the primes just wouldn't make. And so if there are sort of key
requirements that need to be met where you're not competing against the primes, you know,
for a lot of startups, starting with those smaller pockets of money that really don't touch the
larger players is sort of the way that you get an entry point, a proof point. And then you move up
the categories of spend, oftentimes categories that have existed for 20, 30 years and not just the
emerging technology categories of spend where you're just going to be competing to.
against other startups. It sounds sort of like classic disruptive innovation or counter positioning,
you know, whichever term you want to use. You mentioned lobbying. I don't know how to ask anything,
but like a really simple version of this question, which is how does lobbying work? I don't really
know much about lobbying. It sounds like it's an ingredient that matters for the defensibility of
the prime's business. So like what is going on? Who is doing what and why in the world of lobbying?
This is such a broad question. And who is doing what and why? I'm going to take us on a tangent,
but I feel like this needs to be said.
It recently came out on the NDAA that it struck a provision that would have prevented DGI, which is the number one Chinese drone manufacturer from selling to government agencies.
This is something that DOD has been worried about and has actually stopped from happening for the last five to seven years.
The financial time said it was $4 million over 2018 to 2022.
The DJI and the CCP have been able to successfully lobby the U.S. government to stop that sort of blanket ban on DGI selling to American law enforcement companies.
Of course, DJI is collecting very sensitive data from the government, and that's why they had been banned, I believe, since 2016, 2017.
And yet this is something where, because of the ridiculousness of our system, a foreign company can come in and lobby to work directly with the U.S., even though the people in the DOD are terrified of what this company could possibly do.
The hard thing about lobbying is that there are so many, going back to our question about federal registrar and just like how many laws there are and just how many different ways you can work with government, there's so many sort of inroads to stop legislation from either happen.
or not happening. I have traditional answer to why does lobbying matter in the sector is that Congress
authorizes a spending bill. And there are line items that go for different programs. And it is very much
understood that if you get a line item in a spending bill that is tailor made for you, that ultimately
that is sort of saying that you will work with that company in perpetuity. It's very hard if this has been
sort of tailor made from legislation perspective. It's very hard to actually say, okay, now we're going to
work with a different company or rebid. The thing that makes lobbying very important is for a
of these programs, companies very much want to become a program of record. They want to be institutionalized
as this supplier that will ultimately work with government. Yes, there are times where these contracts
are re-bid or rec competed. Ultimately, the primes do a very good job of making sure that they continue
to be the supplier and that there's perpetuity in that. The thing that I think makes it very hard for
startups is you go from small business grants, which are non-recurring, to these other types of small
dollar grants that ultimately hoping to get a program that can then be institutionalized by Congress.
if you're working with Congress on lobbying to make sure that your company is ultimately chosen,
it does require sort of not only just working with procurement officers at the DOD for a lot of
these big companies, it's making the case in front of Congress as well. And that's sort of, I think,
the unique system of our government, which is that Congress does have, you know, tremendous oversight
of the DOD. And so there are positives of that where we do have sort of oversight of how our bureaucratic
institutions or how our executive branch is functioning. But it does sort of lead to this lobbying as being an
important part of building a company in these sectors. It's not just the best technology wins.
And someone who's very smart and the DOD is going to choose which one that is,
there's a lot of, I'd say, different levers that exist in Washington that make decisions around
which companies are chosen. Do you have to think hard about how something like warfare is going
to change in the future? Or do you rely on more of a bottom-up method when investing to say,
you're waiting for someone to come to you with something that you can then underwrite and
and is compelling? Or are you coming at it? Like, we think the world's going to end up looking
this way, going to be more autonomous drones or something? So we're going to look for drone companies.
Do you send yourself going more top down or more bottom up? So I think it's definitely more bottom up.
And again, it goes back to the nature of founders have a deep understanding of sort of what's
happening in their own sectors. Classical technology, if you're talking about infrastructure
technology or consumers can kind of see, okay, where are things headed, potentially where are
the pockets where we're missing. I think in these categories, it's usually the founders who are the
most up to speed on. Actually, this is what the DOD cares about. I know this because I've been inside
company where this is something where they are looking for it. You could argue if you're on the ground
in Washington talking to lawmakers, they're going to tell you like, okay, we really care about hypersonics
now, understanding where technology is headed. But I'd say the founders are usually the most educated
on what is going to be important in these sectors. So we listen to them. It's not something
necessarily where you can predict geopolitical strife and say, okay, like this is something that's
going to be needed. You could have made the case that we are moving towards a more automated,
potentially less kinetic world where drones are much more necessary, where the
there are technological advances that the government is excited about that will allow for that,
but I'm not necessarily sure that it makes the most sense for us to be dictating what government
wants.
As we start to escape the DOD as the buyer, that huge budget as a buyer, where else do you find
yourself most commonly pull?
You mentioned education earlier.
That's something that I feel like lots of people feel is fundamentally broken in certain ways,
but also incredibly entrenched.
It seems as though the rebel attacks against the entrenched system have just failed.
for the most part. Do you think that's true and what might change that?
I think it's true that, yes, if you're calling them rebel attacks that they failed,
that's partially true. But I do think that COVID was the inevitable sea change that forced,
and particularly, I'm much more bullish on K-12 education at this point than higher ed,
that COVID changed how parents view the decision about how to educate their children.
I don't think you can come out of two years of school closures, worried about continued
to school closures, also just understanding, hey, we live in a world that's very different
in the 19th century, and yet these are the types of subjects our students are learning.
There's a number, I'd say, of cultural factors that have led parents to say, I want an alternative.
And that sort of pressure that grounds up, say, like state and local pressure on politicians,
you are seeing states get very excited about the prospect of treating education the same way
we treat healthcare.
So the ESA movement, education saving account movement, is a really exciting movement because
it looks a lot like FSAs.
It looks a lot like, okay, we can actually give taxpayer dollars to parents to make their own
decisions about how they want to educate their children. What's interesting about that, too,
is that there are some states that want to do it as a universal ESA where every parent can make the
decision. There's others where it's because of the influx of new migrants, I'd say Texas, Florida,
Arizona, states that are growing with people from other states. You can't build schools fast enough
to educate kids. So you have to deregulate that, okay, we need five years of funding and we need
five years to build a schoolhouse. Like, actually, we can do this online. We can put a school in a
park and allow for alternative education and give those dollars to those parents. And
for them to make their own decisions. There's a lot of sort of popular arguments on both sides for
the politicians who are asking themselves, how do we educate kids in this unique time where maybe
things will close and maybe we've gotten an influx of 200,000 students that we don't know what to
do with that's led to people rethinking a 19th century model that everyone knows is broken. I also think
there's another argument here where people opting out of the system often improves the system,
the underlying system at hand. And that's become, I think, a much more popular argument among
K through 12 advocates that actually we've been talking about small class size for a long time.
And so if we have more schools that are deregulated in many ways, like that's actually a good
thing for the underlying public schools where you move from a class of 40 to a class of 18.
There's a lot of arguments on both sides that have actually led to a political movement that
will ultimately lead to a technological movement.
What are the ways in that 19th century model?
What is most broken?
What do you think is the biggest or a couple of biggest fundamental problems with the current model in K through 12?
I think we know that best way to educate kids is in a small environment, a two,
tutoring environment has always been kids learn at very different rates. You learn at very different levels.
They have different interests. I have an 18-month-old son and I'm even seeing now, I think once you
have a kid, you realize, wow, like all children are different and they have different needs.
And so I think parents have always fundamentally known that. But the ultimate reason why public education
is so important and why sending kids to a traditional school is important is because it operates as a way for
oftentimes what has become the norm to income households in America where everyone is working.
Like there needs to be a place where children are watched. I think people know that that fundamental
issue with education is that you have to do it in a way that's scalable, but by deregulating the system
in many ways so that parents can make the decisions about actually, I'd like to send my child to a
micro school where I know the teacher, where I know the other parents, or actually I like the homeschooling
model where I can hire a tutor among many. The exciting part about this movement that happened
during COVID is that it was sort of an organic movement where there was a lot of experimentation led
because we were an emergency situation where a lot of parents sort of take it into their own hands.
And as we saw the same way with sort of workforce culture where we were pleasantly surprised by remote work,
pleasantly surprised by how well it worked, I think a lot of parents had the same reaction where they were pleasantly surprised by hiring one teacher for five students,
how that was actually much more economical for certain families, especially if they're getting vouchers or if they're getting ESA dollars,
and how that was actually something that allowed parents to have a little bit more control over the subjects that they're learning.
To your other question about what's changed about the 19th century model, I think we've moved from thinking that grammar,
and reading and some of these other subjects that are so core to how you educate baseline things
of universal literacy, which is an important noble goal in the 19th century, that actually like universal
STEM education would be something that is 100% necessary going into the 21st century.
And that's not something that's happening at public schools across America.
If parents are realizing that now that the economy has completely changed, that the subjects
kids are going to need to learn, are very different than the subjects that they needed to learn
before. And if there is culture wars happening in certain cities where making math something that
kids don't necessarily have to learn or making math a bad word, parents are getting upset about that.
I'd say there's a third issue happening where parents are realizing that in some ways, if they want
their children to learn higher level math, they'll have to take matters into their own hands.
And a lot of states are excited to give them tax dollars to do that.
What have you learned about how states are in might in the future competing for citizens?
It seems like the product of a state is becoming higher and higher variance.
Some of that's imposed through things like Roe v. Wade being overturned.
Some of it is optional and has been like tax rate.
It just seems like states are positioning themselves more and more.
Do you think that's going to happen more in the future?
How does that play into all of what you're trying to do?
It seems like an interesting trend that matters.
I believe the resurgence of federalism is real.
And it is technology enabled.
I've made the case that Starlink will enable a new type of federalism in ways
that other technology hasn't. Because if we move to a remote work culture, the most important
thing is internet infrastructure. And if you can move to a state where you're surrounded by people
who share your values, where you are surrounded by policies that you prefer, it opens up
this incredible migration that I think we've only begun to see through COVID. So I was certainly
part of that. I left California in 2020 and moved to Florida, joined the Miami movement.
I think that Mayor Francis Suarez is a perfect example of this as sort of an unknown mayor was
able to get on Twitter and able to evangelize his city to an entire demographic, basically go after
an entire industry and say, hey, come here. Not only do we have favorable policies, but you're actually
going to love it and we're going to embrace you. I think in some ways he started this, we can actually
differentiate through policy. We don't need everyone to come here, but if we can get one industry
we're excited about, that's actually a good thing. And so I think you're going to see more and more
in that. That's one of, I'd say, the benefits of the American system is federalism. And so if someone
is really allied with the mission of a certain mayor in Miami, they can move there.
they can keep their job in many cases and they can operate remotely, whereas before 2020,
that was not the case.
There was always the question of, if I decide to move to another city, what will I do for a living?
What will my community look like?
But now you see people moving in pockets, keeping their jobs, living in multiple places,
say spending six months in one place and six months in another.
And I think that's actually good for states organizing themselves around certain values
and certain things that they care about.
Kind of like my question on something about government need to change to create the best outcome.
I have a similar question on immigration.
I don't have the stats exactly handy, but certainly some crazy percent of that market cap I referenced earlier was created by first generation immigrants or second generation immigrants.
Obviously, America's story is one of immigrants in sort of deep fundamental way.
In some ways, that can, and as we've seen, conflict for certain people with the national interest and who's here already.
What role do you think this plays in the range of outcomes that we're going to see from here?
If national interest is the North Star, where does immigrant?
fit in in your mind?
I think the statistic that I've read is that you have unicorn co-founders, so companies that
are valued over a billion or more, something like 50% of companies have a foreign-born founder.
That is an extraordinary statistic.
It's insane.
The U.S. has done an excellent job over the last 50 years of making sure that the best talent
from other countries decides to come here and work and build.
That is a feature of the system that we've been able to construct.
I mean, one of the things that I love about Miami is that it's mostly foreign-born as a city.
The energy and enthusiasm and the seriousness that exists in the city,
is people coming from countries that are collapsing or have collapsed or are authoritarian,
coming to the U.S. and waving the American flag very proudly.
One of the things that I'll say about moving from California to moving to Florida is,
I see more American flags in Miami than anywhere else that I've lived.
Washington, D.C., California.
People are proud to be in this country and they're proud to build in this country.
And there's a hustle culture, I would say, that comes from having left somewhere that
is collapsed, where you are excited to be in a capitalist system and you were excited to be in a place
where you can build a new life for yourself and your family. And that is the American story.
So I think Silicon Valley embodies that. And it always has embodied that. And we should celebrate that
that people come from all over to build. As you saw, Chris Power of Hadrian came from Australia a few
years ago. And one of the things he says is that like being embraced by this country, being
embraced by entrepreneurs to help build for the defense industrial base in this country is something
that is a feature of the country and certainly something we should celebrate.
One of the categories that you've listed before elsewhere that I just find so interesting today is
housing. You know, this is something that it all goes well, I think it could be a problem. And it also
seems super nuanced. I don't know a ton about housing supply and what drives it. I know it's a category
that you have some interest in. Maybe teach us a little bit about that interest. Why is housing a relevant
subcategory of American dynamism to you? It's an important category in that where you live and being
able to afford housing is probably the most fundamental human good. It's probably the most fundamental
thing that people worry about. In the past few years, we've seen an influx of housing startups,
It's mostly related to ADU legislation or accessory dwelling legislation in California, which was sort of the deregulation of you can put a new small backyard home in your house on your property very easily without having to get sort of the extreme permitting to build news housing, something that is pre-manufactured.
And ultimately, it drives incomes up for people who are homeowners or maybe you have a child that wants to move back in with you and you want to give them a little bit of space.
So it was supposed to be a deregulation in California that addressed affordable housing.
And we've seen a ton, a ton of companies operating in that space and trying to build in that space.
One of the things that I've noticed and that I'm hopeful about is that I actually think there are states where it's much easier to build housing.
One of the things we've seen is that a lot of the companies that are focused on ADUs are focused on the top of the market, like the Tesla model where if you build very fancy houses, if you build very fancy ADUs, you could then come down the cost curve.
I'm actually very bullish on what does a new mobile home look like.
We actually have prefab manufacturing in this country that is very robust.
I think there's a marketing challenge around prefab that just really isn't discussed.
Prefab is much more common in other countries around the world.
Here, it's usually, I'd say, looked at as more of a low income solution.
Can there be design fixes for middle class populations to do prefab in states where there's already
kind of a deregulated environment to make solutions that already exist much more modern?
That's one thing we're thinking through.
The hard thing about housing is places that have the hardest time, because they are so regulated
in terms of permitting, are the ones with the dire housing.
housing shortages, obviously. Again, it becomes a government problem and not necessarily a tech problem.
But I will say, like, the kind of push on now remote work and the federalism point has let a lot of
people who were trying to make it in places like San Francisco and New York move out of these cities
into ex-urban environments where it is deregulated where you can build a house and afford a home
for your family. And that is going to put political pressure on a lot of these cities to deregulate
the permitting issues that have often kept housing out of places like San Francisco. And so if enough
people leave, I do think that there will be changes there and that technology can then move into
some of these sectors and actually make it much easier to build.
How do you interpret that now very famous chart that shows inflation in certain categories over
time? There's like blue on the bottom and red on the top. I'm sure you know the one I'm talking about.
And a lot of the categories that we've talked about are in that red grouping of, you know,
the cost of a college education, for example, has ballooned like crazy over the last 30, 40 years,
whereas the cost of like a Samsung TV or something that's like unregulated driven by technology
has completely plummeted. What is your interpretation of why that chart is so important?
It's really housing education and health care. And when you think they are the most regulated sectors,
they're also the most subsidized by government. And there's a least competition. We haven't talked
about higher education, but I think one of the most meaningful things that could happen and one of the
things that just isn't discussed enough is that for a very long time, both Republicans and Democrats,
and there was kind of a universal push that the way we solve our problems in this country is by sending
all children to college, which has made college 10 times more expensive for our generation than
our parents' generation because it is so subsidized. It's also left a generation of millennials and
younger in extreme debt, which then leads to these other questions of health care and housing that
make it almost impossible for the middle class to exist. I think there needs to be a broader
conversation around why we've been subsidizing institutions that are failing to help get jobs for
young people, which is why they are going to college, and bring back a culture of manufacturing,
a culture of working with your hands, a culture of being a tradesperson, which we know are where
the most extreme labor shortages are in this country, which we do not celebrate as a culture.
We still have sort of this bias to every kid needs to go to college and that will show that we are a
successful country. One of the things that we're excited about is we are seeing a lot of companies
that are focused on how do we bring more young people into trades? That's sort of, I would say,
a secondary mission of Hadrian as well is how do you teach more young people machining,
make it easier for them with updated tools and updated technology so that it is, again,
a job that people want and they find valuable. I'd argue that a lot of the reasons why
that chart is exclusive for the public goods that used to define middle class life is because
they have been so regulated, subsidized, and there has been such lack of competition in those categories.
You could also make the same case for defense that because of the rampant consolidation of going
from 17,000 companies to five companies that are getting 40% of the defense budget, that the
cost of defense has gone up dramatically because there is no competition. That, I think, is the sad
story of companies that operate in government is oftentimes where you need competition. There really is
just sort of monopolistic forces that lead to one or two companies being able to raise prices,
the case of universities, that's certainly the case, without having to make changes or innovate
or truly open up their model because of technology.
How different are the investing dynamics in all this stuff? I'm picturing Hadrian Factory
1 and 2 and how much harder and more expensive they must be to build than a mobile app or something.
What are the round sizes like compared to a traditional like software investment?
How do you think about valuation in this world?
founders end up owning less because there's just so so much capital required to get SpaceX to where it is today or whatever.
Does it take longer?
I'm just curious about the nature of the investing side and the dynamics you've been covered so far.
I'll use a case study we haven't talked about yet, which is a company called flock safety in our portfolio.
And they are a company that works with public safety around the country that created a license plate reader.
They are a hardware software hybrid, small license plate reader empowered by AI that tracks cars, not people, founded Atlanta, Georgia, founded in 2017.
by a terrific second-time founder.
And I would say that the tailwinds for this company are extraordinary.
They're now in all 50 states.
They're now operating selling to law enforcement.
They actually started out selling to homeowners associations.
And what's interesting about their story is with a lot of these companies that are
harbor software hybrids or that take more capital upfront, the early sort of stage
investing is actually very difficult.
And I would say, like, this is actually one of the things and one of the reasons why we're
excited to create this practice and say that we're investing at seed is that.
for a lot of these companies, yes, they take a little bit more capital, and it also just takes
a little bit more time for these companies to work. Not only are you building a hardware product,
but you're also selling to government. Our government is a major stakeholder. So the up and to the
right that you expect to see at Series A in these companies, these companies go a little bit further
down the J-cur. Oftentimes at Series A, they have no revenue. Oftentimes, they're still working
on V2 of the product, where it takes a founder who can tell an extraordinary story, who can
rally the troops of the company, even if the revenue numbers do not look like up in the
right that you would see in fintech or you would see in pure software. But what happens after these
companies get to contracts with government or they hit critical mass is that oftentimes they're
not competing against a wide swath of other startups. They're usually competing against legacy
incumbents. They can move much faster. There's a network effect that exists in government that I think
a lot of people don't talk about, which is if one county does something and it's working, all of the
other neighboring counties wants to look great too, wants to be a hero for their citizens. And so
they'll move much faster. So oftentimes these companies,
accelerate at Series C or at Series D, and they become explosive competing against no one,
which is very different, I'd say, than SaaS or sort of pure software, where if something is
doing really well in a category, oftentimes there's a lot of fast followers. And because there's
no sort of fundraising moat or hardware moat or team moat, you actually do see a lot of fast followers.
The reason why SpaceX doesn't have fast followers, Anderl doesn't have the same sort of fast followers
competing in the same way. Flock certainly doesn't. What you see is that these companies,
are hard to build seed through Series B, and then they hit Escape Velocity, and they look very different
than other companies. And oftentimes become these sort of large legacy entrenched companies. So
people get excited about these companies at later stage. We're excited about them early because there is
a founder profile, there's a company profile that we look for early stage. And it does look
different. It's not driven by looking for a certain ARR at Series A where we get excited about sort of
the progress they've made. Are the expected returns any different? Do you think then like a traditional
similar stage venture investment? Obviously, there's example, you know, the big primes are
$100 billion plus companies. So obviously there can be enormous companies in this area, but they're
well-endrenched. They've been there forever. There's been a lot of consolidation. Do you think differently
about the returns, risk or return? Is the profile different? There's a reason why SpaceX is the most
valuable American company, private company, it is because once they hit a certain escape velocity,
there are no competitors in many ways. These are the companies that really become dominant.
The real difference is, I'd say, in the earliest of stages, you're taking on a little bit more risk
because oftentimes they're doing things that haven't been done before. They're competing
against legacy incumbents who, if they get wind of them or worried of them, they will get
squashed. But if they can get through the earliest of stages, these companies can compound for much
longer. Have you seen any success in a company like this where the founder isn't a great storyteller?
I love this question. I really anchor on story. There are probably some unique cases on the edges of
say aerospace where someone can be taught. I do think you can teach someone how to fundraise,
especially at Seed Series A. It is just so important from a recruiting standpoint, from a capital
raising standpoint. And when I see story, I'm not talking about like hype men or hype women.
I mean, I'm talking about really understanding the history, really making the case that you
going to be able to survive the hard years, which are the first three years. That is just so important
in being able to build the company that I've always anchored on how well does this founder know the
market? How well can this founder explain why the technology is so important to the customer?
I'd say it's not just storytelling, though. The thing that Andrew really got right was just this deep
empathy for the customer and understanding the customer in a way that few could if they had not
worked in government before. So I do think there has to be a historical knowledge, which might be
a different facet of storytelling, but just like a historical knowledge that leads to a deep
empathy that can allow for a customer to really take a bet on these companies.
You're sort of the ultimate person to ask this question, given the background in journalism
and also with these companies and their storytelling. What do you think the anatomy of a great
story is? The thing that I always look for is something I call seriousness. I define it as a
unique combination of capability and will, where there is just such a ferocity in the founder that
you know they are going to run through walls, that they are going to get it done, where it's not just
this is an interesting story or this is someone who has a thesis about it, but it's someone who you
just have 100% faith is grinding and working ridiculously hard to move mountains. That is something
that I don't think you can necessarily quantify, but it is this will component that exists not just
in companies, it's in nation states, just seeing the ferocity of someone who has a will to get
something done that I think has to be there for the story to make sense because oftentimes the
story that's being told is this has never been done before and this is going to be incredibly
difficult to do. But if you don't believe that the person has the capacity to not only do that
himself or herself, but also be able to recruit just extraordinary talent who are on board with that
mission, oftentimes it will be impossible. The thing that often is lacking in founders who may
want to take on these sort of noble missions is how serious are you about this mission?
So in some ways, it's like the medium, not the message that matters.
It's how it's delivered and by whom, as much it is the content of the thing itself.
And not necessarily even how it's delivered.
It's more about the grounding of, is this person serious?
What is at the heart of this company?
This is why we love to get involved early.
Harder just sort of assess that at later stages except just to look at their growth.
But I think early on, this is something that I think is so core to whether these companies can succeed.
How do you win?
Let's say there's a founder that is clearly exceptional and there's 10 investors that want to be his or her partner early on.
What is your story, I guess, to founders at this stage as to why you and your firm are the best partner in this category?
One of my favorite quotes is actually a Margaret Thatcher quote that I've sort of amended where she said Europe is built on history, America is built on philosophy in all of investing.
If you can't compete on history, compete on philosophy.
And I used to give this advice to people who are starting out their careers.
The question of winning becomes less the obsession early on in a career when you're trying to work with companies like Anderrol as sort of junior.
partner or someone who is really early in their career, philosophy matters to these founders.
In a way that perhaps in other sectors, it doesn't matter as much. But I'd say these are very
difficult missions. The story of Anderl is one of incredible success and people lauding it now. But in
2017, when a lot of people made that investment, there was a lot of people who laughed them out
of the room, said horrible things about them, said that they were doing terrible things. Why would
you ever build a defense company? This is not good for society. And a lot of the investors
had the same thing. And so you have to be mission aligned with these companies and they have to
believe your mission aligned. My advice to investors who are trying to work with these companies is,
if you don't have a true mission alignment with what they're doing, you're likely not the person
who should be working with them. Well, Catherine, this has been so much fun. I think the broad
category is just so fascinating and interesting and has had these features like this crazy cost,
inflation, sort of lack of progress. But I think you correctly point out that there's nothing
stopping progress here. I mean, there are things impeding it, things that maybe need to change,
but there's nothing that says it can't happen. I think it will take a lot of investors thinking like
you are to try. So I've really enjoyed learning from you today. I ask everyone the same traditional
closing question. What is the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you? I love this question because to
me, kindness is really selflessness. And the most selfless thing that anyone has ever done for me is
actually happening in the other room right now. I don't know if you could hear my son screaming,
but right now my mother is watching my 18-month-old son. And I am a firm believer in multigenerational
living. The nuclear family in many ways was actually bad for society. We used to live in multi-generational
households where grandparents would help take care of children so that parents could work. And this is
sort of a modern thing where we've moved away from that. I'd say the most selfless thing that anyone
has ever done for me is my mother committing her twilight years to help us raise our child.
It's one of these things where a willing grandpa or grandma is necessary in order to live in a
multi-generational household. And I'm just beyond grateful that she's sacrificing her twilight years to
help us raise our child. And I will never be able to repay her, but I hope to be able to pay it
forward one day. Wonderful answer. I don't think I've had that one exactly before. I always like
to add a new one to the list. This has been so much fun. Thank you so much for your time.
Really appreciate it. Thanks so much.
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