Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Ted Seides - Investment Industry Paradigms - [Invest Like the Best, EP.390]

Starting point is 00:00:02 Hello and welcome, everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy, and this is Invest Like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. Invest Like the Best is part of the Colossus family of podcasts, and you can access all our podcasts, including edited transcripts, show notes, and other resources to keep learning at join colossus.com. Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of Positive Sum. All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of positive sum. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of positive sum may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. To learn more, visit psum.vc.

Starting point is 00:00:54 My guest today is Ted Sides. Ted is the host of the Capital Allocators podcast and an investment industry expert. It had been seven years since Ted and I last talked on the record, and he was one of my very first guests on Invest Like the Best. Now that Ted has a full-time focus on all things capital allocators and has stepped away from traditional investing roles, he shares with us the wisdom he has gained from being a neutral third party in the conversations with countless industry experts. We discussed the evolution of the LP and GP relationship, the scale of institutional investing, and the nuance of asset allocation, and much more. Ted also has a new bookout, called Private Equity Deals that recounts many of the individual case studies that he has explored

Starting point is 00:01:36 on the show. Please enjoy my conversation with Ted Cydes. So it's been seven years since we did this on the record, which is insane because originally my plan was to make seven episodes of this thing. And now here we are both seven years later, having made, I don't know, a thousand between us or something like this. How has your view of the investing industry changed the most as a result of being this neutral third party that gets to talk to everybody. The first is the institutional investing world is just a lot bigger than I realized. That was the big joke when I started.

Starting point is 00:02:14 How many of these can you do? And is anyone actually going to be out there listening? And the last thing I did was to do it for personal branding or anything. I thought I knew everybody in the world. So that's a big thing. And then with that comes different people, different ideas, everyone trying to figure out incrementally how can they be better than what they had looked. learn before. So I don't know that there are like these big revolutionary changes now people think

Starting point is 00:02:38 about investing as sort of on the allocator side. But there's incredible brain power in thinking about how do you improve things on the margin. And it feels like each person on that side that I have on the show, there's two or three nuggets. You're like, oh, wow, I hadn't thought of that before. So I think that's the biggest thing. Broadbrush, I got lucky. I started in the business working for Swenson. There's almost nothing that he's said that's been proven incorrect in his thesis about how I went about investing. And so I don't know that there are like significant changes in how I've thought about investing or learned from it, but there's just so many things in the implementation of it from like the high level down that have come through.

Starting point is 00:03:17 Is there anything from the Swenson model that feels now antiquated to you or needs to change? Yeah, there's one. I think it's incremental more than antiquated, which is the asset allocation model is in exact when it comes to measuring the assets that you're trying to have. So think of risk and return of a mean variance optimization of U.S. equities or private equity. And now with an availability of data, you could have a multi-manager portfolio of 100 managers with much more granular information about what you actually own underneath. You see this in the model called the Total Portfolio approach, which some of the big sovereign wealth funds, Canadian pension funds, New Zealand's super uses. And it's not that the risk-striarchs.

Starting point is 00:04:00 structure is that different. So maybe you're a 70-30 investor, 80-20 or whatever it is. But in the past, if you were 80-20, that might mean you have this much in U.S. equities and this much in international equities and this much in hedge funds and this much in fixed income. Well, what's the hedge funds? There's some cash risk in there and there's some beta, but how big is that beta? And what does venture capital compared to U.S. equities? What the total portfolio approach does is it starts with a simple like 80-20 and then says every investment you make, you're going to fund that risk. So if it's venture capital, maybe it's twice the equity markets and you have 5% in venture capital, that counts for 10 points of the equity risk. And because you know what's

Starting point is 00:04:40 happening underneath with data, you can just be a lot more precise about calibrating risk. That's the piece that's antiquated in the asset allocation structure, but it's not different. It's just the way you communicate it and the way you implement can be a little bit more fine-tuned than, say, when David wrote his book 24 years ago. There are some really important. innovative LPs in terms of how they run their portfolios. Are there any innovative approaches that you've seen become categories? I think of Washu as a great example, as a partner of ours, who has this very specific, well-honed approach that's very much them. And I think others, they feel like a modern-day Swenson or something like others are looking to them as an example.

Starting point is 00:05:20 But I wouldn't say that we met like a ton of LPs that can do what they do. Do you see any categories emerge that are like alternatives to the Swenson model of running the portfolio? Not much. The Wash use of the world, and there are a few other comps, like if I were throwing out Brown or Rice under Allison as she's just resigned, the commonality of some of those is that the CIO came from a direct investing background. And so they are not looking at this pool of assets as we're investing in a group of managers. They're looking at it as we're investing in a bunch of assets that happen to be supported by managers. And so you see in Washington Washington use case, lots and lots of co-invests. And their first lens is trying to analyze the deal or the

Starting point is 00:06:03 investment, and then they look at the manager that's doing it. So that's not that different. It is a different skill set. It moves the manager of managers approach closer to being in the markets. But ultimately, Scott and Adam and the team are a small group of people sitting in St. Louis, investing everywhere around the world. They're not going to have an edge in all of these different categories. So they still do use partners. That's kind of all. almost like how's the bottom-up implementation a little bit different? And then the top-down gets to the other question about the EL model, which is, what do these asset classes actually mean? So you see some places like Australian Future Fund and New Zealand Super are the best examples

Starting point is 00:06:41 where their quote-unquote asset categories are things like market structure. What's that? Or domestic economy. And so you saw some of that in the risk parity. Is it like growth, paradigm, inflation, deflation. But the way people think about, okay, you have a bunch of cash and you have to invest it, well, one approach is these assets. Another approach is factors. Then people can define these factors in different ways. But for the most part, none of that I think is revolutionary, but it's definitely evolutionary. Does anything feel like fundamentally broken about the system? You've become my like go-to guy for the linkage between LPs and GPs, this very important relationship that has all these different kinds of LPs, all these different kinds of GPs. Does

Starting point is 00:07:25 the system feel healthy to you overall? It's pretty healthy. There are two things that I think have always been broken. One is that when you're blending, say, private assets with commitments, with public assets that mark all the time, you always have a situation where you're committing nominal dollars on the first bucket and you have a flowing pool of capital on the other. I experienced that for this first time when we were running protege where we were seeding managers with $25 million or $50 million, but our fund was a billion or $2 billion. And the billion or $2 billion could move around, but the $50 million didn't. Same thing in private equity.

Starting point is 00:08:00 You make a commitment for $50 million to a fund, but then the market's crash or the market soar, and it changes as a percentage of the denominator. I don't know you say it's broken, but it's always suboptimal. So that's one. The other is what you said, which is bridging the gap of understanding between LPs and GPs, most LPs and GPs don't quite understand each other. They do if they've been in the business for a long time and they have great relationships with who's ever on the other side.

Starting point is 00:08:28 One of the things I learned coming out of Yale that's so different is except we're in very rare occasions of the top 1% of a manager in any category, benchmark and venture, something that you could clearly identify, can do whatever they want. One of the things that happens is LPs want their managers to outperform for a long time. And they forget that to outperform for a long time, you have to be in business for a long time. Sounds simple. So what does that mean? What are the levers that go into having a successful business where it's things like customer diversification and different products?

Starting point is 00:09:04 So all the things have you looked at a business that's that's more sustainable over time. That's kind of the antithesis of the David Swenson of one fund, do one thing, have the best performance. So that has led to this sometimes these subtle misunderstandings between LPs and GPs. That's a lot of what I'm trying to do now is when I see that knowledge gap, try to either write something or bring people together to talk about it to Bridget. What would you tell GPs listening about the choice between multi-product firms and not? I wrote a piece about this earlier this year. It's less what I would tell the GP because it's obvious for the GP and more what you would

Starting point is 00:09:38 tell the LP. So what you would tell the LP is they need to understand the growth is health. for an organization. That idea of one model, one fund, just focus on performance is amazing when it works. And in any other circumstance, including a wobble along the way, it's treacherous for the business. And if the business doesn't succeed, even if that manager was great, they can't have long-term outperformance if they're not around for the long-term. So at every node in a decision tree, so you start with one product, one fund, you have success. You have an opportunity to grow your assets or move into a tangent area of expertise that would make sense, but it's a little bit

Starting point is 00:10:16 diversifying. Now, there's a prudent way to do that and an imprudent way to do that. It has to do with scaling and the pace of scaling and how your organization keeps up. But the concept that you should never really grow comes from Swenson. And I think a lot of people that adopt that as is, as he said it, don't really appreciate the tensions that go into running a business. What do GPs most misunderstand about LPs? I think what would, What GPs most misunderstand is that the decisions that get made by LPs, when an LP says, well, we're not going to invest in your fund, 90% of the time has nothing to do with the GP. That there's a whole portfolio that an LP is managing and a team and a board and a decision process and that the GP doesn't see what happens inside the LPs organization. So the best example of that is when there's a new CIO that comes in.

Starting point is 00:11:12 The easiest way to think about it is if it's like a new family office with a pile of cash, there's going to be a period of time when they're furiously going to be putting money to work. And then they're going to do that and they'll probably make some mistakes. A couple years later, they're going to have to make some changes and they're going to optimize that. And then at some point in time, they're going to have the portfolio that they like. And they might still make some changes, but it all slows down. So that path might take six or seven years. But when you're talking to them, if you're talking to them in year one and they

Starting point is 00:11:38 like you, they're giving you money. If you're talking to them in Year 7 and they like you, but they don't love you, you have no shot. So there's a whole thing that happens in the life cycle of an LP that is tied to who's sitting in the seat more than is your product the right one for them. What about the literal way that GPs position themselves with LPs? What common mistakes do you see where the GP knows their business inside of it out and then sometimes gets frustrated that the LPs not understanding what they do? Anything that you've seen. seen the very best or the great people at doing this well, share in common? I'd start with saying, you and I both know this from having spent time in the GP seat,

Starting point is 00:12:17 which by definition, your LPs are the smartest ones in the universe and the ones who don't invest with you are just idiots. So there is like a confirmation bias mindset that GPs have. So I think that the best GPs have two aspects of what they do. The first is they deeply understand what they do and they can describe it. and that it's sufficiently personal that there's differentiation because of that. Sometimes there's differentiation because of the strategy, but for the most part, most organizations, they're doing a variation of the exact same theme and they're competing with everybody else. But the more

Starting point is 00:12:51 authentic it is to the principles. And sometimes that comes out in small ways, the more that, say, the LP side can say, that's differentiating. The only other thing I'd say is that GPs really don't understand most of the time the breadth of opportunities available to LPs. So that you may think you're great, but they're looking at your great compared to whom and compared to what other asset classes or investment opportunities are available. That's great, Patrick Positive sums, awesome. But we just found this venture fund in Africa and the risk reward is way better than what you're doing. You wouldn't even think about that. And so that role of the CIO on the LP side is so broad and they see so much that any individual GP can lose sight of the perspective that an

Starting point is 00:13:35 LP is bringing and how they're trying to assimilate what you're doing into their investment process. If I were forced you to create a taxonomy of LPs where like college endowments could be one or large state pensions could be another, what would be the major buckets that you would draw? And maybe for each, just say a word about what defines them. What are they each like? So there's a couple of ways of ascribing that. And I'll define it in two ways, and I'll just dive into one of them. So one of them you can think of as time to adoption.

Starting point is 00:14:06 So how innovative are those people? And another lens is what's their governance structure like, which also relates to the size of the pool. So if I tie those two together, think about something new, brand new. So 30 years ago, it was hedge funds and 20 years ago it was private equity and venture capital. Maybe in recent years it's blockchain, though that's probably more a set of something. Private credit maybe for different reasons. but something that's brand new. Private credit's not really new. It's credit in a private buck.

Starting point is 00:14:35 What you see is that the early adopters are entrepreneurs. And so it's someone who has built a business that was on the forefront and they've been successful and maybe they have a family office and they find something. And then if that thing they found was successful, they might be on a nonprofit board. And when they see that it's successful and it feels a little comfortable, they might bring it to a foundation or an endowment because they're on the investment committee. So what you're seeing is that the endowments and foundations have tended to be early adopters of something new. And then once that gets the institutional stamp of approval, then you see it flow through.

Starting point is 00:15:08 And you can think of this as going up on the X-axis time and on the Y-axis asset size. So now you have corporate pension funds and public pension funds. When it's really late, you get retail. Democratization of private equity now. Okay, it's like 30 years later and we're trying to see how to. The one thing that subverts that is that some of the newer pools that are huge, so I think sovereign wealth funds have been super innovative from very early on. And that's where you get to the governance piece. So the governance piece is the ability to do something new and different is inextricably tied to the willingness of whoever is responsible ultimately to let something like that happen. So in Downments and Foundations, you generally have sophisticated investment professionals on the investment committee. In a public pension, you might have firemen and policemen, and therefore there's a consultant in the way and the consultant doesn't want to mess up. So they want to see what's okay and has worked. That's why you have something different in the sovereign wealth funds,

Starting point is 00:16:03 because the governance structure is incredible. You have senior people well paid in government who have tasked other people to say, go manage money for future generations of our citizen population and do it the best way you can. So that's one way of thinking about it. The last piece of that is, where are you in adoption? So if you're an endowment and foundation today, you're fully baked in your investments in venture capital and private equity. And so if they're going to invest in a new manager, it's got to replace somebody in their portfolio. They're not going from 10% to 30%. They're already at 30%. Whereas a public pension fund might be at two trying to get governance approval to go to four. And the two to four, if you're $200 billion, is a lot of money. So that's where you see

Starting point is 00:16:47 when people talk about private equity today and what happened in the last couple of years and now there isn't capital flowing. Well, a lot of that is because there's a fair number of the investors who have their assets already exposed to the asset class. And they're just one. in one out. Then the question is, where is new demand coming from? So it sounds like the smartest thing any GP could do would just do a way better job of categorizing LPs in these meta-criteria, not as individual entities. Obviously, you want to work with the best teams that you're most compatible with. Run a pre-screen on like, find the ones that have, they're moving from point A to point B, not at the mature setup. That's not what people do. No, if you're a GP trying to raise money,

Starting point is 00:17:29 there's a couple different lenses. One is in your space, where is capital coming from? Is it coming from private wealth? Well, you better figure out how to distribute it in that channel. Is it coming from sovereign wealth? Well, if you're small, they're probably not investing in it. Then you have this function of time and like, is there a new leader? Because when you have a new leader, sometimes they're making changes. But it's hard. Make no mistake about it. There's no silver bullet that said, all you have to do is tell this story to this person in this way and you're going to be as large as you want to be. What about the cut at it where it's, the question is, what are the pros and cons of these different pools of capital. So like pros and cons of sovereign wealth, pros and cons of retail

Starting point is 00:18:03 private wealth, pros and cons of endowment's foundations. I think that the pros and cons don't necessarily cut across the asset types. You could generalize a little bit. It starts and ends with who owns the capital and who the decision maker is. So the closer you are to an end owner with a long time horizon, the more likely you can have a long relationship with them. So sovereign wealth funds is kind of the greatest example of that. In the Endowment Foundation world, in theory, these are really, really long live. David Swenson's at Yale Endowment's perpetual assets. Well, that's a long time. Perpetual is a long time. But in practice, it tends to only be as long as the people in the seat. And maybe the average tenure of a CIO is six or seven years.

Starting point is 00:18:44 So it's not as long as a sovereign wealth fund. Then there's a question of sophistication as well. So one of the things that's tricky is the Endowment Foundation world, I think rightfully has a reputation for having very sophisticated investors relative to say the public pension world. It's not consistent. Some of the most sophisticated investors in the U.S. are sitting in public pensions. But a lot of that is because of the governance structure and the public pension fund who's got a report to a bunch of firemen and policemen, they may know what the right thing to do is. They just might not be able to get it done. If you think about the old outliers, like I'll never forget that Wall Street Journal front page of the business section of the guy in Nevada who just put everything in the S&P 500.

Starting point is 00:19:24 and does nothing all day. And I remember reading that, this is a long time ago now, and thinking, oh my God, it's going to happen, like it's going to turn over. And me and my friend Jeremy were looking the other day at the annual statement from that same pool of capital. And now they have this huge private equity position. Like, they went back on it, which I just thought was so interesting and so funny. And that's underperformed the S&B 500 over like a very long period of time for them specifically. Are there any other approaches like that? Why don't you think that happens more? often that a big pool of capital is just like, you know what? Maybe the Norwegians are an interesting example where they basically just own the market. Why don't we see that more where people just

Starting point is 00:20:02 opt out of the game? The most important word in your question was people. If you're cynical, you would say it's just incentives. This is someone's job. There are very few people who have said your job is to do nothing for the next 30 years. That's your job. Hope it works. What you do see is in a huge pool. So Norway, the Japanese pension fund, like trillion dollars, they know they have to own the market. And the question for them becomes, okay, is that good enough? Or if you have to own the market or the things you can do to make the market return better? Nikolai is running Norway or Norgest Bank, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, has done two things that are fascinating. One is, he said, well, I'm just going to let people know what this is. And so

Starting point is 00:20:48 you had this pool of capital that's been one of the biggest in the world forever, but no one's ever known what it was. And he has this incredible podcast called In Good Company because he could have him lost on his pocket. They own shares of everything. And he's done a really good job of promoting the people on the team. The other thing they've done is a little bit within ESG lens, but in a very thoughtful way, is say, okay, if we own the market, what do we think are drivers that make the whole market better over time? So if you really think that sustainable investments matters, just drive that into the market more because you have to own the market over time. But generally speaking, these are people, and Charlie Ellis has always said this well when people

Starting point is 00:21:24 talk about passive investing. He's like, who wants to be passive? Do you want to go sleep with someone who's passive? There's a degree to which it's just not what people are wired to do. They want to compete and win. Yeah. Yeah, it's a fascinating tension for sure. If you were at a dinner and you got a bunch of bottles of wine into like a lot of the best LPs, what do you think would be their most understandable gripes about GPs? Well, the first thing I'd say is the gripe you hear the most is not about GPs. It's about their own governance. So their own ability to implement decisions. So if you're sitting at a university endowment, which had been the plum job for 20 years and you go through protests last year, it's not so much the plum job anymore. People think very differently

Starting point is 00:22:07 about that. As it comes to GPs, it's probably this question of greed. The whole GP community has gotten wealthier beyond what anyone envisioned. I've seen it over the last 20 or 30 years. And it takes a rare GP to be truly in it for investing. And sometimes you see it, but it's very, very rare where it's kind of obvious what would happen. If you said you really would be happy getting paid, if you'd pay somebody to do this and people say like Warren Buffett's a tap dance to work type thing. Well, as you grew, wouldn't you lower your fees? Yeah. Almost nobody does that. There are a few who have. And you could look at that and say, well, why are they doing it that way? That's stupid for them. Yeah, but that's one way to boost your returns. Like if you really want to be better, you can

Starting point is 00:22:53 guarantee 20 basis points higher a year, every year, all you have to use a lawyer management to. Yeah, it's funny to think about that. It makes me wonder about this question of scale because it does seem like there's this tension between the ideal GP to an LP is this focused, keep the main thing, the main thing, one fund. Don't overscale with success. But almost all the world's assets are with massively scaled multi-product firms. So there's like stated and revealed preference here. The reality is most of the money's at Blackstone and KKR in places like this. Coach us through this question of, okay, I'm doing well. I have the ability to scale. Scale obviously comes with natural advantages and disadvantages as the money manager. How would you coach people to

Starting point is 00:23:36 think about the tradeoffs? Well, you laid it out perfectly. One way to think about it, particularly for a manager, the matter of from public markets or private markets, when you evaluate businesses or industries over time, they all gravitate to having a certain form. And that is, they get concentrated in winners. And then everybody else, you can get stuck in the middle. And if you're small and you find a niche, you'll have a place in the ecosystem. Asset management and particularly alternatives has gone through that significantly in the last 10

Starting point is 00:24:03 years. So whether you're looking at venture capital or probably more relevant private equity and public markets, you see a concentration in assets with the people who become winners and they deploy more and more resources at it. There's consolidation, there are purchases, and a lot of that gets tied to distribution. So if you're a $5 billion hedge fund manager, well, 10 years from now, is that going to work? Or is $500 billion today going to look like what $500 million would be today? and you're going to feel squeezed, just as one example. So when people think strategically about how do I continue to play this game at the highest level I can, you see more and more activity gravitate towards, you've seen it with the Citadel's

Starting point is 00:24:45 and Millenniums and hedge funds and you've seen it in the public company, private capital shops. And so how do you play if you're in that ecosystem? Well, if you're not one of those guys, you better have your own niche. Because as long as you can add value doing what you're doing, you're going to have a place in that ecosystem. You just can't compete. Go try to compete against Blackstone and private equity by being faster or more knowledgeable with data or having better industry knowledge or better operating executives. You can't do that when you're smaller. But there are ways you see a lot more,

Starting point is 00:25:18 say, in private equity like industry specialization, because if you take the very top people and just hone in on one sector, you can end up with a Vista or you can end up with a Toma Brahma. What trends are you most interested in right now? You mentioned Millennium. at Citadel, which makes me think about this question, where they have sucked so much of the talent that in two decades prior probably would have started their own firms. And now they're like, why bother? I can get more money, more freedom, easier, lower friction, more flexibility. Like all these features of just going to Citadel or something. And that's obviously been a seismic change in the way that like public active investing works. You could talk about that one or any other

Starting point is 00:25:54 trends like that that you have your eye on. Well, that one I've watched for a long time because I was in the hedge fund space for a long time. And it felt like it was inevitable. It's easier to talk about it, asset class by asset class. So in the hedge fund space, the big question everyone is watching is those businesses are predicated on a small return levered. And the thesis, I think the core thesis is that a citadel or a millennium has really done a great job at risk management. What they are selling is the efficient use of leverage to amplify a very small alpha. Leverage is the killer. We all know that in every cycle and something goes about. So there's this big existential question of, is there some scenario, whereas these platforms have gotten

Starting point is 00:26:36 bigger and bigger and they have bigger moves on single stocks independent of fundamentals, can something bad happen there? And so I think most of the people I know that don't invest in those platforms, that's the big question in the hedge fund world. And then the other piece is, what happens to fundamental investing? That does all the shorter end quarter to quarter insane amounts of information of that CEO was giving a presentation and his left eyebrow winked higher than his right, and when that happens, it means the stock's going up one point tomorrow. A little bit of an exaggerated example, but not that much. It's really incredible how deep these firms get into understanding a small subset of companies

Starting point is 00:27:11 at that individual PM level. But then the question is fundamental. When you have that much stock volatility, what's happened to fundamental active management? You get the concentration in the MAG 7 is the index that everybody points to, the S&P 500, representative, I guess it's representative of the economy that's being driven by seven companies. But is that what you want to own when you're thinking about long-term returns? In the public markets, there's a couple of things. In the private markets, and particularly I'd emphasize private equity, the big question

Starting point is 00:27:40 has always been, there's just too much money there. And Mario Gianni says in the book, for 20 years, people have been saying, oh, there's too much money and just keeps growing, and it still has been working. But you've had every tailwind you could imagine for a long time. And most of those have either flatlined or maybe reversed a little bit. And what you're left is, can people who own these businesses make them better operationally? Because you're not going to have a tailwind from rates. You're probably not going to have a tailwind from multiple expansion.

Starting point is 00:28:06 There's that and then in a short-term cyclical period of time, what happens with this bottleneck in exits? So you had pre-2020 one private equity firms coming back larger and faster and getting funded. And now if you think about owning a bunch of businesses in a private equity strategy, there's only a couple of ways to exit, right? You have the IPO market. Well, companies don't want to be public. There's plenty of money in the private markets to keep funding them. There's no reason to think the IPO window is going to open wide.

Starting point is 00:28:35 You have strategics, and this has been the greatest economy and bull market that no one's believed in all along. So the strategics don't want to swallow big acquisitions because they're just nervous about the future. And then you're left with sponsored sponsor transactions. And there you have an issue of price because there has to be a price reset when rates go up. And if you own the business and you bought it and you had to, some plan and it's a little short of that plan, you don't really want to sell it at a discount. If you look at like why aren't businesses being transacted at the same pace they were, I think that's a lot of it. There's a question of, is this just hope and optimism or is it a rational

Starting point is 00:29:10 strategy? If you had to spend a whole month as a shadow inside of a single LP where you're just trying to maximize like enjoyment and learning and a good experience for a month, who's someone that comes to mind that you would want to do that with? Well, I wish I had a year. I can do a month and 12. Let me throw four or five just for fun. I've always thought the best summer job in the world would be Bridgewater because I'd want to get my face ripped off and in that process learn more about myself than I could in 10 years of therapy. That's the only reason why. A place like a Citadel or Millennium, if you were sitting high up enough in the organization to be able to see the people who are looking at the risk sheets, that would be fascinating.

Starting point is 00:29:51 and the way that they work with PMs to understand how are you adding value. And then I think when you get to the private markets, there are senior seats at places like KKR or in Andresen, where the flow of what comes in would be fascinating. From deals to strategic deals to everything under the sun, or like Aries in the credit market, same thing, where they've been active, very active on investing, but then also active on thinking strategically and really brilliantly about their business. Yeah, it's fun to think about the seat in which you would learn the most. And those gods eye view ones seem like really good examples. Maybe we could talk a little bit more specifically about private equity. It seems to been an area that you have really double and triple-click on. And I'm curious why that versus something else. Give us kind of a high overview of your interest in the space. And then we could talk about some of the underlying dynamics.

Starting point is 00:30:45 I got exposed to private equity a long time ago in my early years at Yale, but I spent most of my professional career in the public markets. So you had the private markets sitting alongside, and it's the same thing. You're just owning businesses. In the last five, 10 years, private equity has exploded and is so much larger than venture capital. Venture capital, you have these ridiculous power law outcomes, which you don't have. And when I say private equity, I'm thinking corporate buyouts. But the size, you're talking about $6, 7 trillion. Some people say it's 10. I don't know what the numbers, but it's a number is. very, very big, and it's growing. And yet, at the same time, people don't know about it. It's a little

Starting point is 00:31:25 opaque. And that was a little bit of the thought seven years ago when I started podcast, which is, okay, I sat in the seat between GPs and LPs, and I kind of understand the LP community, but most people don't. Private equity is a little bit the same way. It's huge. And yet the public perception is so negative. And I think that's just flat out wrong. If you look at an industry that big, you are absolutely going to have bad actors. You're going to have really bad outcomes and you're going to have people go in and slash jobs and strip out dividends and bankrupt companies. All that stuff is true. But there's also 10,000 businesses. It's the economy. That's what's in the news because it's sensational. Most of it isn't sensational. Most of it has just been

Starting point is 00:32:05 really, really good. And so on the podcast format, I was kind of like, hunt. And these conversations, by the way, happen all the time between GPs and LPs in offices around the world every single day. but they're not in the public. And so from the seed I had, I was like, well, why don't I just do something that'll be a little different and walk through deals? Business breakdowns, you're like breaking down a company. And there's a little bit of that if you're going through a deal, but you also have a perspective on the firm. Who are they and why they like the deal? And then you also have the deal dynamic, which sometimes isn't that interesting.

Starting point is 00:32:36 Sometimes it's super interesting. And then you have a game plan because they have control. So what are they going to do with the business? Then what they actually do with the business? And there's just so many different levers that makes a great case study. So I thought, I don't know, that might be fun. Sounds like fun. And so I started doing it that way and did the podcast.

Starting point is 00:32:51 And then after a while, I realized, boy, these couple of deals encompass everything. There's one deal that was traded from private equity firm to private equity from private equity firm. They all won along the way. Then KKR buys it and becomes their best deal in almost their history. Wait, what's that about? And then you have sports, of course. Everyone's interested in sports. And you have distress deals and you've got turnarounds, carveouts, all these different things.

Starting point is 00:33:12 And I had done like one or two of each. And I was like, wow, if you took a slice of this and put it together, it would at least give people a sense of what actually happens in private equity as told by the people doing it, not by me, just helping them walk through it. It seems like one of the highest levels of taxonomy here is like market price deals, auction deals, and I guess we'll call them distressed or like non-market deals. Why that is the highest level of separating the two? I put that in the book because there's no particular reason for that.

Starting point is 00:33:43 Feels right, though. There are deals that, particularly when you get to larger size, if you're Blackstone or your KKR, not a lot of situations where you have the quote unquote proprietary deal. Everyone's running around trying to find something proprietary. But if you think about it, if you're a company and you're of some scale, yeah, you're going to talk to around. Yeah. So there are a bunch of deals that happen that are just whatever the market price is, that's

Starting point is 00:34:06 what it is. Then you have this whole other subset. that there's something wrong, period. And private equity firms will generally take one or the other of those approaches. So it's a very simple taxonomy, but both of those are included in this large subset of deals. What do you think the competitive frontiers are now between these firms? What are the reasons that whatever, KKR beats Blackstone or TA Bates, whomever, like, what is causing winners and losers?

Starting point is 00:34:31 And you could hesitate and say that's just price, like you're willing to pay a higher price and you win a deal. And so you accept lower return and you might then say the edge is like lower cost of capital or something. But like, what do you think it is that determines who wins these things now? So one of the things I've learned from doing this that I didn't fully appreciate is let's just talk about the auction type deals. While that's true, the firms that have size, scale, and history are preparing to do deals five years from now today. And so they'll be a business that yet goes to an auction. But if you show up for the auction, there are third. three other really good firms that have been on top of this company for years. And probably

Starting point is 00:35:10 one of those has a better relationship with management than the others. And then you get into these dynamics of, well, is that the management team that's driving who's going to win the auction? Or are they cashing out and it's somebody else? So I think most of the time, you do get this pairing of the right owner with the right seller and it can rotate around. What expertise are you bringing this time around? By the way, if it goes from private equity firm to private equity firm to private equity firm, those are like different chapters in a company's life. And depending on where they are in that stage, a new private equity firm might bring a different expertise that's going to really help the company for the next three to five years that the current owner doesn't have

Starting point is 00:35:48 because the current owner did something else with them in the prior three to five years. So on the one hand, I'm sure there are deals that happen. It's just like who's paying the best price. And particularly, if you're in that middle, you're not differentiated in any way. You're just playing the game. Well, you may have to play that game, not a great game to play. But more often what I've seen is that there's so much work that goes on in advance because these firms are so sophisticated and understand their business so well and have these armies of people of both operating executives and deal teams and they're deep in the verticals of the industries that they know the companies. They know the teams. And then when a company is ready to do transaction, they try to be there before everybody else. What is the most entertaining deal that you covered in this series? It's probably the Yellowstone Club. So the Elstone Club is this private ski club in Montana, Big Sky, Montana. And I knew about it because I was brought there pre-restructuring, which is important to talk about.

Starting point is 00:36:44 But this was a private ski mountain that was built by an entrepreneur guy named Tim Blixeth. And he had aggregated a bunch of land parcels and turned this thing on and wanted to make an exclusive ski resort. Where it got entertaining was he spent wildly. And so they had this spectacular club. clubhouse and people would have to build homes. But then in a great story of the pre-financial crisis credit markets, he took out a very large loan. I think it was $250 million from credit sues. And he basically paid himself a dividend. He'll recap. One of the problems with paying himself a dividend, if there were other equity owners, he didn't include in that dividend,

Starting point is 00:37:27 including Greg Lamond, the Tour de France cyclist. And that wasn't public. until he went through a messy divorce, and it came out in the divorce papers. So people that were in the club loved the experience, and this thing was in trouble. And Sam Byrne and the team at Cross Harbor Capital, which is a very opportunistic real estate private equity fund, Sam had been a member, loved the experience, and started working with the family to try to figure out, they provided a, lo, like, what do we need to do here? And they had a deal signed up in early 2008, and they had signed the papers and it was done. And then the family, they were fighting so much, they never counter signed. And then they went into the financial crisis. Nothing went bankrupt. So Cross Harbor

Starting point is 00:38:09 took this out of bankruptcy at like half the price they would have paid a year before. And it was a real estate play. So they spent tons of money improving everything around the experience. And then they built real estate, sold it. And one of the things that Sam said that's so funny is you'd think this is billionaires row. I mean, this is the exclusive of the exclusive. And they had nine hundred homes to sell. We're going to find these people. And as they got closer to selling out, he's like, these people would just come out of the woodwork. And the prices kept going up and up and up. So they ended up having a great investment result, which was not predicated on an exit. It was just a pure real estate play. And they're very close to now turning the keys back over to the members for the

Starting point is 00:38:48 whole thing. But just the combination of some people have heard about the Yellowstone Club, this private ski experience. If you're lucky enough to have been there, you can experience it. And this wild and a whole restructuring deal and then what these guys were able to do with it. It's just extraordinary. Another one that I found really interesting because a number of friends were involved in one way, shape, or form was the Burger King one. And if you think about 3G and what they did, and their weird, cool structure where they raised this big fund to basically do one transaction. I think it was a billion dollar fund and they had just insane return on that capital. What did you learn from that one? Like, everyone's eating at Burger King, but they probably don't know

Starting point is 00:39:22 the interesting backstory. As far as I know, the Burger King, the 3G Burger King deal has been the highest returning private equity deal ever. So not venture capital, private equity. So 3G, a while back, was known for this zero cost budgeting. They slashed out all these costs. And they bought Burger King. It was just sort of a funny story of the affinity of theirs to Burger King. And they started running it better. And that helped, but really helped was international expansion. So they really grew this business. And it was doing really well. And then they had an opportunity to buy Tim Hortons. And they literally re-levered the entire thing, like almost did. They had this wildly successful LBO, and then they risked it all again. And they made it work again. And then they did it again.

Starting point is 00:40:06 And so they've owned this for something like 14 years. I don't remember the multiple, but it's something like, I was going to say 29 times, maybe it was 39 times your money. And they still own it. And they've dividended it out multiples. It's a great story because there's a combination of like this operating model that 3G has and this vision, ability to take risk. also a very different private equity structure. So they don't have a fund. These are all single asset funds. And they didn't really have a problem rolling it. And now it's 14 years and they find ways to get some people, some liquidity if they want. But most people are like, no, no, no, keep doing what you're doing. It's working really well. That's one of the things we're doing now

Starting point is 00:40:42 with those is finding these one-off classic deals. That one, unfortunately, didn't make it in the book because it was too late. What other deals that you've studied, if any, have made the biggest investing impressions on you? Having now learned about them, you view the investing world differently or something. Well, there are two or three things. I'd say quick lessons and then I can give examples of deals. One is how incredibly collaborative some of these deals are, which is the antithesis of how they're perceived in the public.

Starting point is 00:41:11 So that was one. The second is I've known all along that multiples were going up. And I kept thinking about leverage buyouts, leverage buyouts, leverage buyouts. Well, it turns out that lenders will only lend, say, six or maybe seven turns of EBITDA. So when you go from paying eight times to 15 times, these leveraged buyouts aren't that levered. So that was a big realization. It was all this equity capital is coming in. The leverage part, yes, rates are going up and that hurts, but it doesn't hurt as much

Starting point is 00:41:39 as people think because there's a lot more equity in these deals. And then the third really is all in and around carveouts and how unbelievably complex these transactions are. You could go to any one of those three, like the collaboration piece, the expansion of multiples and then carve-outs. And there's examples of each of those in the book. I'm especially curious about the first and the third. Maybe we'll go backwards. What do you mean by carve-outs and the complexity? So most people think of doing private equity transactions. Like, Patrick, like, I'm going to buy this business from you. And we agree. And that day,

Starting point is 00:42:10 we close it. You go to the Bahamas, you drink a bunch of cocktails, and I go try to run this business and make it better. And I own this thing. What happens in a carve-out, and it's typically a conglomerate can use an example I had in the book of Blue Triton Brands, which was Nestle's bottled water business. So included Poland Spring, they did a tuck in acquisition of Saratoga, the firm's one rock capital. When you go and buy that business, you have to live with the seller for a long time because it's a division of a company. It doesn't have its own financial systems. You have customer contracts and supplier contracts that are embedded inside Nestle and you have to figure out which ones you want. There may be R&D and you have to decide who owns R&D. There's another

Starting point is 00:42:51 example of the book of Taylor Made where they had 500 contracts with athletes. You have to transfer all those contracts over from Adidas, the seller, to KPS the buyer. And so what happens is it's this forced collaboration between the buyer and seller, and they create what's called transition services agreement. And sometimes there are 20 of those, and more likely there are 80 different ones. And that has to get negotiated in the deal. And then they live together for 6, 12, 18, more like 12 to 24 months as co-owners of the business. And so that also means that there should be some earnout involves because you've got to make sure the seller is behaving. So it's just a super complicated transaction. And it's just not as simple as

Starting point is 00:43:27 I bought this thing from you and now you get to enjoy your cocktails. And what about the collaborative? What's your favorite example of deep collaboration? There's a deal called Partstown. And Partstown makes lots and lots of different small parts for restaurants, this screw for this friar type of thing. And it's a great business. They've been much better than Amazon in what they do. And it's been around for a long time. The firm that bought it is called Berkshire partners up in Boston, and they are known as being collaborative. And inside that organization, there's no corner offices, there's no managing partner. When they say deal teams, their teams, the people have all been there for 20 or 30 years together.

Starting point is 00:44:04 And almost every deal they've done, maybe like 70 or 80 percent, the sellers have rolled into their deal. They keep the management teams in place. They don't slash and burn. They look at growth opportunities. And in this case, you had this great business. They had studied the industry. They saw it was the best one. it was owned by Summit partners, another Boston-based private equity firm. And in Summit's period of

Starting point is 00:44:25 ownership, Berkshire got to know the management team, and they looked at an add-on acquisition alongside of Summit and the management team ended up not working. And when Summit came time to sell, Berkshire was the natural owner. And so Berkshire buys this business. Summit rolls in, the management team rolls in. This business had grown month over month for years until COVID hit. And then they managed through it. And it's just everything about the firm, everything about the deal, everything about the company was just collaborative from beginning to end. So after all of this learning, now you've got this, what do you call it, a nonprofit investment banker role? You know everyone on both sides of these strategies, fund investments, transactions.

Starting point is 00:45:07 You've seen it all. Before you did this, you did the famous bet with Buffett on hedge funds versus S&P 500. It's like the NASDA-N Talib thing. Like, don't tell me what you think. Just tell me what's in your portfolio. How do you express all this in your own, all this learning? in your own investments. Poorly. I think the truth is all of this is so interpersonally fulfilling and intellectually stimulating. I don't even have time to do real work on my investments. If there's a change in how I invest, it's that almost all of the investments I make,

Starting point is 00:45:39 still mostly invest in funds, they're with people and relationships where I feel like I can help in some way. And that doesn't necessarily have anything to do with maximizing returns. But even though my dollars are tiny compared to what I used to push around with the podcast, with the nature of the relationships, with a joke around about like, I love bringing people together to create value. So I refer to it as a nonprofit investment banker that the investments I've gravitated to are the ones with people who I both have incredible respect for as investors and are friends.

Starting point is 00:46:14 And I don't do the work like I used to. It's my own 80-20 rule and judgment. And I probably don't optimize opportunities like I used to, whether or not that actually adds value. But that's been the biggest difference is that there's much more of a relationship focus on the margin than optimizing on the investment opportunities. If you think about the things other than returns, obviously everyone wants good returns. But I think the not so hidden secret of this industry is there's a lot of other variables that GPs and LPs are solving for with their behavior. What are the key ones for people to understand? So I think relationships is a big part of that. And it's not so much what I'm talking about.

Starting point is 00:46:56 Like, you're my friend, therefore I want to invest. It's not that at all, actually. It's that nobody knows what returns are going to be. And maybe there's some pattern and some strategies in the past you expect to repeat. But people want to trust that they're doing the right thing. And I think a lot of times when people just chase returns and it's not tied to like who the people are and the nature of a relationship, you just run into situations where you know you're going to make the wrong decision. Something goes wrong and you don't want to stand by it. It's a very vague answer, but it gets tied to communication. And people, I think on the LP side, they want access to information. They want transparency. It's like transparency a little bit in the people and the investments, but also like process. And they

Starting point is 00:47:40 want to know that they're your partner in the private strategies. It's called a limited partner, but they want to be a partner, not limited. And so that's a big part of it because any individual who's running a pool of capital in a different seat is solving for different things. And those things can also change over time. So you need the nature of a relationship and an open dialogue to be able to figure out, if you're my partner, I want to be able to call you and ask like, hey, I'm trying to figure this thing out. Can you help me solve it? One of the things that I've seen you get interested in in spurts over and over again across the eight or nine years is communication, messaging, marketing, and how to do this really well. What keeps you drawn back to those set of topics? And what would you tell people about what you've learned in the various expirations that you've done? I don't know exactly why I keep coming back to it. My most recent one's been on storytelling, because I guess that's what we're doing. I decided this year I was going to read a whole bunch of books about storytelling and see if I've anything. And sure enough, there's a lot to learn. I think what I learned in my years investing

Starting point is 00:48:45 is that that pure analytical exercise of trying to figure out, is this investment I want to make or not, is just so tied to behavior and psychology and that someone who's a great investment manager but can't explain it usually doesn't get very far. They're exceptions, but they usually don't get very far. And so proper communication ends up being, at the least, the driver of, hey, you had a bad period of performance and people are going to give you more time because that's all you can ask for. If you suck for long enough, they're gone. They're all gone. But if you suck for a little period of time, which everybody does. I mean, that's the path to investment success. Embrace the suck. But if people really understand what you do,

Starting point is 00:49:30 why you're doing it and how you do it, they're just going to give you more time. And most people in this industry grow up learning the investment discipline. but not that piece of the equation. And then it's kind of like you start as a junior consultant at McKinsey and you just do analytical work and you rise and at some point in time, you're just a salesperson. But those two things are completely different. It's something that even in my years at Prodege when we were working with managers we see it, I kind of naturally liked trying to help people tell their story.

Starting point is 00:49:59 And I've seen so many thousands of pitches that I can tell to some extent what resonates and what doesn't. And so I just enjoy sharing that information and then trying to learn because that's what I see more than anything, I can't at this point in time tell people how to invest better. I'm a good seven, eight years out of it myself. But that's only part of the equation. And that's one of the things that most investment managers miss. So what does resonate? Is it originality? Is it clarity? Is it a story? Is it all of that? It's all of it. But I think all of it unites under authenticity. To try to say, well, I think I should tell this story because this is what I'm hearing from someone

Starting point is 00:50:39 else, you can only be as straightforward and honest. If you're a very difficult person, you probably should be a difficult person in front of your LPs because you need that consistency that comes from being deeply authentic with who you are. But all of those things matter. Being able to articulate what you're doing matters a lot. It matters particularly when you want to make a change, because most investment strategies evolve in some way, shape, or form at some point in time, and being able to communicate that, signal it, let people know ahead of time is really important because LPs do not want surprises. So I think all of it goes into telling a proper story, but it's not even so much storytelling. As I'm reading about storytelling, I'm like, yeah, that's not

Starting point is 00:51:21 what this is. I mean, it's fun to learn about it, but it's really just transparent communication and being able to explain what it is that you're doing. Why is there not a YC for investors? The idea behind YC being, of course, like, if you can get some general exposure to like a huge index of these startups, you get enough outlier coverage that you make a lot of money on it, and you can have an expensive program behind it and justify the cost. Whereas an asset manager, like, we've kind of named all the firms so far. It's not necessarily a thing you want an index of or something like that. It's existed at times.

Starting point is 00:51:56 I spent a lot of years in the seeding business of hedge funds, and you've definitely seen some seeding of asset managers. I think over time it's just proven not to be a great risk reward. And maybe it's because it's really, really hard in the later mature stages of an industry to build a startup. And so you don't have the unbounded upside that goes alongside the failures. But it's not a new concept. There is a long wave of cedars of hedge funds, and I was part of that for a long time. Basically, none of them exist because there aren't a lot of new successful hedge funds these days. And if they are, it's an already proven person who doesn't need that kind of seed capital. And I think it's probably also true. Active management. No one's chomping at the bit to give incremental

Starting point is 00:52:40 money to active managers these days. So if you back a new one, is that really going to be a great proposition? I think that's why it doesn't really exist as much outside of startups. What's next? What things are you excited to do more of? What things are you excited to do for the first time? Well, the thing that has been newest, you and I even haven't talked that much, about is bringing together some of these people that I had on the show. So we've done a couple of boutique gatherings, we call them Cap Allocator Summets, and it's senior decision makers on both sides with no panels and no presentations and no one-on-ones. It's just really interesting small group discussions. I just love being in the room with that. So continuing that is super fun. We're going to do

Starting point is 00:53:18 another one next year for smaller managers. And my favorite thing about doing all this is that there's so much optionality that comes from knowing all these people and ideas that come from having the platform that I have no idea what that next thing's going to be. There will be something new that we play around with next year. I just don't know what it is yet. And showing up every day, wondering like, oh, is this the day someone's going to say, hey, we've thought about this. I get a lot of you shoulds, that you should do this. And most of that I've thought about and there's some reason to do it or not do it. But I don't know exactly what that's going to be going forward. In those small group discussions, what has worked? What are the sorts of prompts

Starting point is 00:53:57 that had been the most juicy, entertaining. We've done four of them, and we've got our fifth coming up next month. So there are a couple of little things you figure out along the way. The first is having facilitators to the discussion. So you bring six people together, and they're all participants. And if you just leave them to talk together, the extrovert ends up taking over. So we bring in people, my partner called it Ted's Adult Bar Mitzvah. So it's like my friends from the industry come and help facilitate that discussion.

Starting point is 00:54:24 And that's a big deal. The other one is that. In most of these industry gatherings, you really have like opposing sides. You have the LPs who are protecting their time and their energy from the GPs who are like trying for their money, feeding frenzy to sell them. This is like the bait. And so we've done a few things in ours to completely change that dynamic and say, no, no, no, we are all investors. We are not here to sell each other. It's both relationship building and information sharing. And there are a couple a little fun tools that we've figured out from doing it that just help bring that dialogue together.

Starting point is 00:55:01 Anything you can share or is it's a secret sauce? Yeah, no, I don't think it's a secret sauce. I mean, one is describing that dynamic. Each year, I'll have a new presentation. And this year, it's about tribes. So I talk about tribal affiliation. And then I have a slide up that shows these two warring tribes and you say, one's the investors and one's the allocators.

Starting point is 00:55:17 And so just explaining that, that's not why we're here. Another one is in our small group discussions, we always start with a personal question. We call it an icebreaker. It's not too deeply personal, but it's personal enough that all of a sudden you're sitting around with a group of people. And at least in that moment, you forget, oh, wait, which side of the table are you on? And then you go into the discussion. That helps a lot.

Starting point is 00:55:39 And then the last one, which I think everyone who's come to one of our events has talked about is there's like a very strict and stated everywhere, no assholes rule. and in our events, I define precisely what it means to be an asshole. And fortunately, we've never advertised it. It's a little bit on our website, but it's already like in an excess demand situation. So people actually come like, okay, I'm not going to be an asshole. What's the definition? You got to tell us.

Starting point is 00:56:04 Yeah, definition is you do not take out your cell phone when you're in one of these small group discussions. And if you do, we're not telling you you're a prisoner for the next hour. Just go walk away from the group and go on your cell phone. So you figure out things along the way, but I take notes on my cell phone. So we're like, okay, you do that. And then I noticed if you're swiping left and right, it means you're single. And if you're swiping up and down, it means you're like on Instagram or Twitter.

Starting point is 00:56:25 But neither one of those things is taking notes. So that's one. In these small groups, you really try to balance out introverts and extroverts. So if someone's truly dominating the discussion and not looking at others, that's considered an asshole. One conversation happening at a time. So the person who diverts on the side conversation and won't stop, that's called being an asshole. That's about it. You're not trying to say, you better be polite in me.

Starting point is 00:56:47 It's just, there are a couple of things that show respect for each other and that you would never do if you were trying to engage with those other people around you. It's been so cool to watch you build this. All the news that's fit to print equivalent in the LPGP world over all these years. I love every new thing that you do. It's so interesting to watch. People should definitely read the book. It's such an interesting categorization of these deals. And I think you leave it with a pretty clean understanding of like how this world actually works versus the outside perception.

Starting point is 00:57:14 All right. You know my traditional closing question. What's the kindest thing anyone's ever done for you? I love having this opportunity. In the early years of doing the podcast, I was really in between what this has become as a business and like trying to figure out what I was going to do. And I mean, you know this. You remember from back down pretty stressed about life. And in the early years, I had Paul Black from WCM Investment Management on the show. It's a growth equity firm that had this incredible growth trajectory. And he felt that coming on the show was the single best thing they had done for their marketing. About nine months later, they called me up and said, look, we just had this great year. We think you're a big part of it. We want to pay you a bonus. And at the time, he had no idea how important that was to me.

Starting point is 00:58:00 I've had a lot of people on the show that have benefited economically. He may be the only one, certainly the first one, who then paid it forward and did something about it. I've let them know since how important that moment was and that time was. And then I did some consulting with them and we created a whole history of their firm through podcasts. I remember it. It was cool. Yeah.

Starting point is 00:58:21 How we built this. But it is by far the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for me at a time where they didn't really even know how important it was. Incredibly cool. What a cool story. I didn't know that story. Great place to end. Thanks, but. If you enjoy this episode, check out join colossus.com.

Starting point is 00:58:41 There you'll find every episode of this podcast complete with Transcendant. transcripts, show notes, and resources to keep learning. You can also sign up for our newsletter, Colossus Weekly, where we condense episodes to the big ideas, quotations, and more, as well as share the best content we find on the internet every week.

Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Ted Seides - Investment Industry Paradigms - [Invest Like the Best, EP.390]

There aren't comments yet for this episode. Click on any sentence in the transcript to leave a comment.