Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy - Tren Griffin – Pulling the Thread - [Invest Like the Best, EP.87]
Episode Date: May 15, 2018My guest this week is a bundle of curiosity, and that is one of the nicest things I could say about someone. For several years, Tren Griffin has been writing a weekly blog post that highlights things ...he has learned from various investors, businesspeople, musicians, comedians, and more. Lately, he has also been tackling individual businesses, and broad topics like scaling, competitive forces, and product market fit. Tren’s full time job is serving as a director at Microsoft. He’s also worked with or for several well know businesspeople and investors like Craig McCaw, and written several books including one on lessons for entrepreneurs, one on Charlie Munger, and another on negotiation. We discuss value creation vs. value capture, alpha in investing, sales, hip hop, and why he’d teach high school students about convexity through a drunk driving analogy. I could have talked to Tren for much longer than I did, but sadly, we both had flights to catch. If you take anything away from this, I hope its just how much fun it is to just be curious about business, and how you can learn a tremendous amount if you just keep reading about the things that interest you and talking to others. Please enjoy my conversation with Tren Griffin. For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club, where you’ll get a full investor curriculum and then 3-4 suggestions every month at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub. Follow Patrick on Twitter at @patrick_oshag Show Notes 2:26 – (First question) – key levers of the universal business model 4:26 – How do you know when you’ve achieved real value creation 6:24 – Importance of value capture and how they enhance value creation 6:31 – Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future 9:08 – Price power 10:28 – Are discussions of moats more useful to businesses than to investors 13:12 - What Tren learned during his early years working with Craig McCaw 16:28 – The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success 16:36 – The skill of capital allocation 18:37 – How would Buffett and Munger bet on tech if they were starting out today and their philosophy of betting against change 21:57 – How Tren became so fascinated with Charlie and what he’s learned from him 22:32 – The Alchemy of Finance 23:17 – Damn Right: Behind the Scenes with Berkshire Hathaway Billionaire Charlie Munger 23:19 – Poor Charlie's Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. Munger 25:21 – Most memorable moment or lesson from Charlie 19:20 – How he thinks about factor investing 31:25 – What are the scalability features that make a business attractive 31:28 – A Dozen Attributes of a Scalable Business 35:37 – Exploring some of the other important levers of businesses, such as subscriptions, customer acquisition cost, and more. 36:20 – Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 37:11 – Wholesale transfer pricing 39:18 – Pros and cons of subscription business models 43:14 – Magic of getting products distributed 44:58 – Best sale Tren’s ever made 46:46 – Most important lesson for young people 50:16 – Tren’s interest in hip-hop and how it helps him reach more people 53:49 – A look at some interesting quotes from Jim Barksdale 58:22 – Learning by doing 1:00:48 – Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 1:01:06 – Period of his career that he felt most alive 1:03:03 – Advice for young people thinking about business and entrepreneurship 1:04:56 – Why are so few people passionate about what they do for a living 1:10:44 – Kindest thing anyone has done for Tren Learn More For more episodes go to InvestorFieldGuide.com/podcast. Sign up for the book club, where you’ll get a full investor curriculum and then 3-4 suggestions every month at InvestorFieldGuide.com/bookclub Follow Patrick on twitter at @patrick_oshag
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Hello and welcome, everyone.
I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy and this is Invest Like the Best.
This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, methods, stories, and of strategies
that will help you better invest both your time and your money.
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My guest this week is a bundle of curiosity, and that is one of the nicest things I could say about anybody.
For several years, Trent Griffin has been writing a weekly blog post that highlights what he has learned from various investments.
business people, musicians, comedians, and more.
Lately, he's also been tackling individual businesses and broad topics like scaling,
competitive forces, and product market fit.
Trend's full-time job is serving as a director at Microsoft.
He's also worked with or for several well-known business people on investors like Craig McCaw
and written several books, including one on lessons for entrepreneurs, one on Charlie Munger,
and another on negotiation.
We discuss value creation versus value capture, alpha in investing, sales, hip-hop,
and why he'd teach high school students about convexity through a drunk driving analogy.
I could have talked for Trent for much longer than I did, but sadly, we both had flights to catch.
If you take anything away from this, I hope it is just how much fun it is to be curious about business
and how you can learn a tremendous amount if you just keep reading about the things that interest you and talking to others.
Please enjoy my great conversation with Trent Griffin.
So let's start to break into that universal business model.
We'll talk about all sorts of different things that you've written about over the years,
scalability, acquiring customers, virality, all these kind of interesting topics that are hot-button
issues in the business world. Maybe you could give your overall sketch. You mentioned the important
terms, but maybe one or two layers of detail deeper into the sort of universal business model as
you see it, the key levers that you're thinking about as you're looking at any business.
I think the key thing is Steve Blank sort of has this definition, which I've shortened a little bit,
but basically in a business model you're trying to do things. You're trying to create value
and you're trying to capture value. And they're very different things.
things. And most people focus on creating value. And the problem with creating value is most people
don't actually create it. And so they try and find product market fit and they try and they try and
most people don't get it. And even if they don't get it, they say, I'm running out of money.
I better go try and grow it. And they're growing a product that's nobody wants to buy.
And so the key thing is there you get a death from premature scaling, which is they never find
and create true product value that people want to buy. As the Y Combinator, people like to say,
if you don't create something that people want to buy, it's over.
You know, you may just put a fork in it.
But even if you do that and you have a product that people want to buy,
then there's capture value.
And this is where Buffett was really important for me,
which is to understand that just because you have a product
that people want to buy doesn't mean you're going to have any margin.
You know, a lot of great products that people love,
like flying in a commercial airline or weed or meat,
cattle or potatoes or whatever.
Charlie said a meeting two years ago or something like that.
Someone asked them,
What do you think of the cattle business?
And he said, it's a terrible business.
One year out of 20, you have a good year.
But the point here he was making is people do it because they love it.
People do it because it's a lifestyle.
Buffett added that, well, maybe if you owned a bank on the side, you'd do okay.
But also making cattle and making food, it's an important thing.
Operating an airline, making wheat.
But these businesses are commodity businesses that have a hard time to capture any return in excess of their opportunity cost of capital, as Mabazone would say.
So let's step back and dig into those two things to begin with.
value creation. I always think of Andy Rackleff's term, the dogs are eating the dog food.
Yeah, absolutely. So that's a simple understanding of it. But I'm curious if there's a more
nuanced take on when you know you've achieved that. So you don't have that full scaling problem.
You've got the Justin Stevens quote about you know it when you see it. Yeah. And, you know,
in this situation, we have a situation where you know it when you see it. Usually it's because
everybody in the company's thinking, my God, how are we going to satisfy all these orders?
You're not sitting around in a conference from thinking, well, maybe we should add a feature.
And the sales team is really letting us down or whatever.
And technically driven companies oftentimes with technical founders can follow in that truck.
I think, well, if only these salespeople could sell better, the stuff would be moving out the door.
So when you have product market fit, stuff is moving.
And as Andy likes to say, I've learned as much from Andy as anybody in venture capital,
is that the word of mouth should be growing on an exponential basis.
Yeah, and the key thing about a company is we'll get to scale a bit in a minute.
But if you really want to scale and you really want to scale and create value, it shouldn't be with marketing.
And so if you look at the early days of Microsoft or early days of Costco or the early days of Amazon or early days of Starbucks, it was word of mouth.
It wasn't TV ads. It wasn't radio ads.
It wasn't a guy with spinning a mattress sign, you know, all the stuff you hear on the radio.
It was hard to sell.
If you have strong word of mouth, then you've got something magic.
and then you really have product market fit.
But unfortunately, most people, they have 24 months worth of money.
They're at month 18.
They know they've only got six months left.
They think they have product market fit, but they really don't.
And they go for it, and they die of premature scaling.
So the phrase that you use to describe that is most people don't die of starvation.
They die of indigestion, which there's another aspect of that is you try and do too much.
But the point here is that you really need to solve what Andy calls the value hypothesis.
and before you proceed to the growth hypothesis.
Yeah.
So we'll come back to scalability in just a minute, but I'd like to talk about value capture
for a second.
I think it was in Peter Thiel's book.
I really have not been able to get this chart out of my head ever since I saw it,
which is basically that exactly what you're describing, value creation and value capture.
And value capture gets too little attention.
So this begs the question of kind of general thoughts on this general idea.
Where there are opportunities to capture value, where there are not, you've mentioned
a few examples already.
You know, I always think of things like opacity.
Like, everyone thinks transparency is a good thing, but a lot of times, opacity can be a good sign of potential margin.
If you don't know exactly how something's made in this kind of era of abundant information, people see something as more valuable.
So talk about your key points on value capture relative to value creation.
So value capture really is best described as Warren Buffett describes it as a moat.
It is a metaphor that you use to sort of help people understand that you can't just focus on demand.
You have to focus on the supply of competing product.
And so you really have to look for some sort of sustainable competitive advantage is what Professor Porter talks about.
And in order to find that, you really have to search in a couple of buckets.
And the most important one today are network effects, which is basically a feedback loop where the product becomes more valuable, the more people use it.
And so demand-side economies of scale is your first source of capture.
You acquire a moat, you acquire a sustainable, competitive advantage.
The second one is economies of scale.
If you have as many Amazon warehouses as they have, there are certain scale advantages that they have that are hard to keep up with or what Netflix has.
Now, both those companies also have network effects, but they also have economies of scale.
And then you go into the next bucket and then you can say, well, you can have really strong intellectual property.
And in the old days, it used to be patents or trademarks or whatever.
These days, a lot of the key intellectual property is actually just hidden in a server and can't get added and is protected in that way.
And then you can have a range of brand-based competitive advantage.
And Charlie Munger talks about the fact that, you know, used to be in the days of television advertising.
If you had French's mustard or whatever, the brand was worth a lot.
That source of a competitive advantage is sort of eroding.
And you look at their 52-week lows of the brands over the last couple of months.
They're struggling because brand doesn't mean as much anymore.
Werdemoff means more.
And to the millennial generation and younger, they're not as hooked on getting a pines or hunts or whatever.
or they want some product that Yeezys, you know, using or something.
It's a different world today, and they're struggling with that.
But those are basically the buckets that you look to find something that allows you
to get enough of a barrier to competition to get you the most important thing in business.
Buffett says the most important thing in business is, does the business have pricing power?
If you don't have any pricing power, you're in a tough situation.
Yeah.
I always love that litmus test because it's straightforward.
Some of the sustainable fortified forces stuff and sustainable competitive advantage, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is so hard to pin down.
But pricing power is pretty straightforward.
What would happen if you raise prices?
Do you have to have a prayer meeting, Buffett says?
But the key thing here is one of my other mentors is Michael Mabison, who was introduced to me by Michael Arson, who's a guy who works and manages one of the best investors in the world and least well known.
Yeah, I don't know that.
Ed Cascade.
He manages the Gates Foundation money and a huge pool of money, but he's a fantastic investor.
But he introduced me to Mabason, and Mabison has this classic memo on basically essay on measuring the moat.
And basically what he's saying is, is what creates a mode is quantitative.
And it's an art and it's a skill and it's dynamic and you have to do it.
But the test is quantitative.
And so you know you have it because you can measure it by ROI and sustain ROI over the years.
Sustain ROI over the years generated the fact that you have some pricing power and you're not just selling a commodity product.
And so Michael's work has been sort of clarifying for me in the sense of the qualitative
side of business is about creating the moat and the quantitative side is about measuring it.
And keeping the two buckets in separate places mentally is helpful because most people tend
to just confuse the two.
This is a really key place that we can differentiate between being a business person
and being an investor.
I think that the moat stuff and sustainable competitive advantage, I'm curious if you agree,
is far more useful as a business person than as an investor just because of what we know
about quantitatively high ROIC firms or firms with expanding ROICs, a popular measure of a moat,
presence of a moat, don't necessarily do that much better than the market do versus like a simple
statistical value factor or something, which I know you've written about is not true value
investing. We can get into that as well. But I'm curious if you agree that this kind of moat
competitive advantage stuff is more useful as a business person than as an investor. Yeah, the way I would
describe it a little bit differently in that what Charlie Munger says and what Buffett says is they don't
know how to build a moat. They may be about one with reinsurance.
but they never built one.
And Charlie says, we don't build them, we buy them.
And if you look at what Constellation is doing,
or you go down the list of Robert Smith
and other people who are doing things in software, for example,
they count on some founder who's totally driven,
who spent their whole lives trying to build up this business
and building this moat.
They're in the right place at the right time
with the right skills, and they built this thing.
And they're artists and their genius.
In some sense, many of them are savants
about how the product should be built
and what the customers want.
That's a separate question.
is what's that worth? And that's where the investing skill comes in. And so Buffett will come in and say,
hey, my hurdle rate's 10, this is what I'll offer, I won't strip your business, I'll let you continue to run it.
And so he is a quantitative analyzer of moats. You almost have to be an artist to create one.
It's just such a dynamic, because you're talking about complex adaptive systems. You're talking about
multiple factors. You're talking about competitors, nests of complex adaptive systems. And so
the guys like Craig McCaw, Jim Senegal at Costco, Howard Schultz at Starbucks.
You know, I'm just listening to Seattle once I could go all around the whole country.
But these people, they're artists.
And they're oftentimes, when you actually talk with them, they're not like you and me.
They're not linear.
Yeah, they have this, yeah, this gestalt sense, analog sense of where value is and customers want.
And it's easy to look back and say, oh, yeah, cell phones, they were going to get cheaper and they were just going to take off like crazy.
The hard thing would have been that phones weighed a couple four pounds and they were $4,000
and a lot of them put in cars and it took a day to install them.
The bills were $250 to understand that someday this thing was going to be magic.
And looking forward is the real test of genius.
Now you can say some of it is it's just survivor bias.
Those people had some luck in there.
And there's some of both.
Everybody who's successful, anybody who's successful who doesn't feel like some of it is luck,
is fooling themselves, right?
But they also had special skills.
Maybe we could talk about the cellular business and McCaw specifically.
That's been something that public market investors have been fascinated by, I would say, in large
part because of John Malone and his force as a capital allocator and as an investor.
I just think of him as an investor and a fantastic business person.
So maybe you could begin by discussing your early experience there.
We're going to spend a lot of time on business models, what makes for an interesting business,
how that's evolved through time and tie that all back to this notion of investing.
So it would be great to hear about those formative years with Craig and kind of what you were learning.
So the interesting thing about cellular was Craig, because he thinks differently than the average person,
he's very analog in that sense.
And his favorite plane is a De Havillan Beaver seaplane, which is flown in with analog instruments and all that.
But he's a very analog person.
And he understood that people don't like to live and work in cubes.
and where we're at right now there are lots of cubes around and that's an ennathema to him.
He thinks that people are essentially nomadic, that seeds sort of made human beings sort of stay in one place.
And there's one theory that's because they wanted to grow seeds because that would make a nice beer.
But whatever the theory was, he thinks we like to move.
And so he understood deeply that the cell phone was going to be, it wasn't called the mobile phone then, it was called the cell phone,
was going to be something that freed people from being in a specific.
place. And for that reason, he understood the value was a lot higher. And so when McKinsey did their
famous study about how many cell phones they were going to be in the year 2000, McKinsey assumed
that anybody who had any sense would never use a mobile phone when they could use a landline phone.
And so the demand is sort of like, I'm using my mobile fall all the time with my desk phone
right next to me. And so he had this feeling that it was going to be hugely valuable. But in those
days the phone weighed a lot and it cost $4,500 and the bill was big and talk time was 30 minutes
and he had the vision to see, no, this is going to get cheaper and there's going to be demand
elasticity here and this is going to free people to do what they really want to do. So we saw the
value that other people didn't, but he also had his father's example, Erroy. He knew how to raise
money and buy assets because unlike software, the business I'm in now, cellular is very capital
intensive. And so it just happened. This guy, Milken came along just right then and was raising
money for Malone and everybody else, and you were able to raise a lot of money, and he was able to
roll up the cellular industry. And it was fascinating to watch that, and to watch him basically
always have enough cash, but always pushing the edge of the envelope. And at one point, a key point,
he sold all of his, he started in cable TV, and he sold everything he had in cable TV was
the 20th biggest cable operator in the country, and he sold it all to Jack Kent Cook, the
Washington Redskins guy. And he basically doubled down on cellular. So he was a guy who believed.
And so it was fascinating to watch him go through that process. And then to be around when he had to
sell it to AT&T because the debt service was so big, that was a huge. It was his child that
unfortunately he had to sell because there was just the cash flow was going to be requiring a
bigger owner. And then him rolling into an X-Dill after that. So you got to see it firsthand.
Many people listening will have read Will Thorndyke's book, The Outer,
outsiders and be familiar with some of these kind of general stories.
But given you were sort of there watching all this happen, I'd be curious to get your take
on effective capital allocation that you watched Craig when he's buying stuff, when he's selling
stuff, and kind of how you think about that from then to now as an important skill for a
business operator as something that's important for investors to consider or care about.
Maybe if you could riff on capital allocation a little bit, that would be great.
So Craig knew that these licenses, which were all allocated by regions and there were
was no national license, we're going to be more valuable.
And so he knew that if he bought a cable system and if you did some good things to it and
you consolidated operations a little bit, you could basically take the cash flow from the two
systems or the three or the four or the five and buy yourself another system and classic
roll-up.
But the value of this spectrum was increasing so rapidly that the speed and the power of the
roll-up was sort of pretty unprecedented and he was braver than everybody else.
Like, for example, when he did Berlin broadcasting in New York, that was like, you know, nerves of steel.
But also he'd seen his father who started in radio do the same kinds of.
He was with Danny Kay at one point, the White Christmas guy.
There was all kinds of early radio stuff that he had in the back of his mind.
But he knew that this asset was going to be valuable so quickly that he was always going to be able to take the equity value and roll it into the next one.
And they also knew that when I first had my first brick phone, my Motorola brick phone, I couldn't take it.
down to Portland and use it. Roaming was like there wasn't what's called the North American
cellular network then. And so Craig knew that when that happened, that was going to be something
like super valuable. But most people were just thinking this is a toy, you know, no one's a desk
line. And even this is the remarkable thing. When AT&T bought McAugh cellular in 1994, they thought
it was to save the long distance business. In other words, even in 94, they didn't understand what
they're buying. And so the irony is AT&T bought McCaw Cellular to save their long distance. They thought it was to
distance business, and so they made the right decision, which is to buy a wireless for the wrong
reasons.
For the wrong reasons.
So they just got lucky.
And, you know, sometimes it's better to be lucky than good.
You've probably written more about Charlie Munger than certainly anyone I've ever talked to.
And so I thought we were communicating back and forth and we thought it would be fun to play
sort of a quote association game.
And this is a great spot for the first one.
So I'll read a Charlie Munger quote and we can kind of talk about it.
So we avoided text docs because we felt we had no advantage there and other people did.
And I think that's a good idea not to play where the other people are better.
This is a common refrain around Berkshire Hathaway in general that they are betting against change, not betting on change.
I'm curious given all the reading and work you've done on Munger and Buffett, if they were 30 years old today and just starting Berkshire and looking to the future, do you think that that stance on tech companies would be the same?
And do you think that betting against change is a strategy that will continue to work in the future?
Yeah, I think I would phrase it a little bit differently in that, first of all, they've said flat out, if they were younger today, they'd,
acquire a circle of competence in the technology business. They'd have to. And the other thing
to understand about them is every one of their businesses is a technology business, because every
business is technology business. So they actually understand technology fairly well, too.
But they don't have a substantial advantage over other investors. And what they're looking for,
he talks about it, is he likes shooting fish in a barrel. He wants a shotgun and a barrel full of fish.
He wants the easiest possible things he's looking for. And he's looking for situations like 2008
when he dumped all the data-led to journal money into the right stocks at the right time.
But he's looking for those sort of easy bets.
But also in terms of technology for them, they just don't feel like the nonlinear nature of the business avails itself as easily to their particular style of investing.
And it's also, they have this specific niche where I built this business.
I love this business.
I love this business in some ways more than my own children.
But I don't want to sell it to Exco because if Exco gets it, they're going to strip it,
and they're going to load it up with debt, and they're going to take it public again,
and then it's going to be off, you know, in a circle of bankruptcies.
And so a tech seller is unlikely to say, oh, I want this to be bought by Berkshire
and run in a Berkshire sort of way, and I can continue to run it, or somebody I know can run it.
And so you're not handing off sort of a legacy of your distribution business or your brick business
or, you know, you go down the list of those companies.
And so they don't have that sort of magic thing on the private equity side when they're buying the private businesses.
So for them, it's really, the last point I'll make is also is that a key to Charlie's philosophy is the way to get rich is to not be stupid.
Don't make dumb mistakes and look for really easy decisions.
And so he describes his personality as, and it's almost contrary things, but he has to be amazingly patient.
and yet when an opportunity like 2008 arrives, you've got to be willing to jump in both feet.
So it's a combination of patience and aggression when the time is right.
And those are almost contraindicated, but to do those things, those are the people that jump in.
And that's why Howard Marks, Clarmann, all these people have this ability to say, now.
They can raise a lot of additional money.
Clarmine and Mark can raise additional money quickly when the time gets good, when there's a 2008.
And then when you're in a 2012, 2013 to 2015, you just got to sit on your hands.
I mean, occasionally you get a deal.
But, you know, it's you just got to be patient.
Tell me a little bit about the backstory of your fascination with Charlie and why you've learned so much from him.
I thought I knew a lot about business.
And I'd done a startup for six years and I'd studied it and fascinated by it.
And by 1998 and 1999, things were nuts.
And people were getting rich in ways that I couldn't imagine.
was getting rich in ways that I couldn't imagine. I didn't think it was real, and I didn't
know where to turn to. And I was listening to Value Investors and Michael Erson was nearby in the
next office over, and I just didn't know what to do. And so Michael gave me the alchemy of finance,
which is long ways from Munger. But he gave me that book, and that just set a fire under me
to said, I've got to read more books. This book is the hardest book I've ever read, maybe.
But it made me think in completely different ways. I got to read more books like this. And I
kept reading and then I started reading more Buffett books and I read Hagstrom's books again
and I said, who's this Munger guy? And I couldn't find anything written about him. So I said,
okay, well, I'm going to go out and collect every Charlie Munger book quote I know. I'm going to
make my own book. And it's on my website right now. He's a Charlie Munger quotes. And I assembled it
for my own use. Like I was writing a book for audience of one. So I wrote a book that it was
those quotes and it was just like, what does you think about accounting? It's all advertising,
accounting, and then there's Bs and C's and Ds.
But I wrote a book just so I can understand what the guy's philosophy was.
And then later, the other books, Dan Wright came out and the Almanac book came out.
But really, I want to understand the way he thought because he was such a critical thinker.
And this whole idea of mental models and worldly wisdom and all that, I know you're this way.
When someone says something and just like, whoa, light goes on.
Like, this is a whole new way of looking at the world.
And you become a collector.
Yeah, of ideas.
But it's also looking at metal models is a mental model.
Yeah.
It's a Russian doll kind of a thing.
You know, it's like, whoa.
And the fun thing about it for me is I love to think and I love to read and I'm like
a munger a book with legs sticking out and paper sticking out and things like that too.
But the point here is that you can just learn when you find somebody like that.
And then if you chase them down and read the books that they recommend, then you find
other strands.
And it's like the root system of a redwood tree.
You're just tracking down all these things.
And you're Maubusun.
He's reading Annie Duke.
Somebody else does.
and I hear something from you and Ritholtz or somebody, you know,
and you're constantly getting this rich broth of stuff to read.
It all fits together.
The more you know, the more you know you don't know very much.
I always say that the more you realize that there's just more and more questions,
but also that you're kind of always reading about the same couple things.
It seems like they're about different things, but it's really about the same few things.
Monger says there about 100, I think, is what he said.
Mental models that are sort of essential and 20 that are critical.
and understanding those is important.
But then there are many, many other ones.
And there are all these, like, specialty ones.
And then you learn something about physics,
and then you find out like, whoa, that's all the work at Santa Fe.
I just love because it's cross-disciplinary.
And you become wise, which is different than being smart,
because wisdom is about understanding when you don't know something.
And you can know everything in the world about a nebitone worm,
and you can be really smart about nebitone worms,
but you're going to be terrible at managing your portfolio
and you're being a good father or a friend or community-minded or whatever.
And so this whole idea of being broad pays dividends.
That really pays dividends.
And plus it's fun.
Do you remember the idea that most, say your hair on fire, that kind of most sparkled,
maybe it's a mental model or something like this, that it came across by a Charlie
that stands out in your memory?
The whole worldly wisdom speech is one of the great speeches of all time.
and God knows how many times I've read that thing.
It would be even more if you added up the times that I just went back and reminded myself
but reading a section of it.
But those two speeches, the two human misjudgment,
those two speeches were just like ones where I just, whoa.
And I go back and read them again and again.
And it's also not just what he taught, but the way he thought.
And the whole idea of if you go through a year and you haven't changed your mind on one
key topic. You're doing something wrong. You're doing something wrong because you're not challenging
your own ideas. It's almost like a litmus test because it should be more than one actually.
But if you haven't even done one, then are you really challenging yourself? Are you really listening
to diverse opinions? Are you listening? Are you trying to learn new things? And so, for example,
you would maybe relate to this, which is the older I get, the more I realize there are more pools of
alpha than I thought. And when I was sort of younger, I used to think, no, these are the ways you can
invest in. These are the best ways. But then you start a real thing.
realize there are different pools and people efficient in them in different ways. Even this Mark Leonard
Constellation guy who I wrote about recently, he has this idea that basically dis-economies of scale.
There's an example of something that, to me, was a new idea that I had to think, like, wow,
there can be the flip side. Or example, I remember at one point, I was thinking, well, gee,
network effects are really good. And I started to realize, like, whoa, on the downside, when they're
They're bad.
Yeah, they're terrible.
And, you know, when something, what happened to Blackberry happens, it doesn't happen like slowly.
Yeah, like that.
Right.
The same thing that sent you up, sends you down.
Or just even the whole chart of the Internet bubble and the telecom bubble, which were different bubbles.
But if you separate them out, they have the same slope and it's up and down.
And it was, it was, you know, that to me, Gurley has talked about that.
That experience of going through the Internet bubble, that has forever changed my muscle memory.
I think about the world differently, and I think people who didn't go through that have a different attitude about risk and life than somebody like me who went through it.
It was especially the kind of amount of it part when you couldn't raise a cash.
There was a moment where we could raise $3 billion in January of 2001.
We could raise $3 billion just by making a phone call.
By April, you couldn't raise a nickel for anything.
people were scrambling for cash.
You couldn't sell.
And to have something changed that quickly makes you realize that you have less control and less ability.
I thought things were funny and unusual and odd and didn't seem real, but I had no idea
it was going to correct that quickly.
No idea.
Can you say more about the idea that maybe there are more pockets of alpha than you
originally thought there might be?
Specifically, what's behind that?
Is it just a bunch of examples?
Are there commonalities across those examples?
It's actually interesting to watch people who are doing factor investing and watching them find pools, people doing private equity deals in specific sectors and different kinds of roll-ups or like I said Constellation or what Smith is doing it at Vista or whatever.
And there are different ways to find value that I think, wow, I should have thought of that.
Or I wish I thought of that.
But what it makes me think when I look at the overall pattern is, I bet there are a lot more of them out there, just people aren't seeing them.
You know, it's hard to see what nobody's seen before.
And it takes those people who have that savant quality to say, no, there's something here.
There's this thing here and you should back me.
And I just think the constellation thing is just brilliant.
His letter just came out a couple of days ago.
I've already a lot of admiration for what he's done.
And the pools of Alpha that he found that other people didn't realize existed.
There's always the Me Too problem where one of these models is proven by some pioneer.
And then there's a million copycats and something gets popularized.
and typically that's the worst possible way to invest is in one of these copycats.
But it's interesting that you bring up factor investing.
Obviously, that's what I do.
And like anything else, I think that there is, there are perennial strategies,
there's stuff that may work to some degree forever.
And we don't have to get into the reasons why today.
But I would be curious, given I've seen you write quite a bit about the contrast between
I think what you would say is true value investing and let's say like a basket of statistically
cheap low price to book stocks or something like that as being very, very different things.
Yeah, I think it's important to think about a different,
I call it value as an analytical technique.
Okay.
Let's hear about that.
So you're looking at the fundamental DCF of a business, looking at all the factors and
lifetime value and all that.
You're building models bottom up and top down.
And you're basically trying to discover whether the business is a good value.
And so I think you can look and value Google or, to me, Apple right now is a value stock
because it's priced attractively.
I don't like to pick stocks.
Yeah, I understood.
But for me, I would say Apple is a value stock.
It's priced attractively. It has a margin of safety.
And people say, well, but it's not cheap compared to its past or whatever it is.
And I'd say, it doesn't matter.
The important thing is when you do your DCF and you look at the value, this is a value stock.
Google can be a value stock.
Lots of stock.
Amazon can be a value stock.
But that's using value as an analytical style.
You may not do it because that's not in your circle of competence.
But then there's another style of investor, which is factor investing, which is using value as a statistical factor.
But, you know, there's momentum.
There's many.
Many.
A stable.
But I bet there are more of them out there waiting to be discovered.
With machine learning and modern data science, I'm sure that more of them will be discovered.
The problem is, of course, is once somebody found them and they try and market it, then everybody piles in and then that Alf can get harder to generate.
I think it was Mandelbrot.
That said something like the trend is killed by its discovery or something like that.
It's amazing to watch that happen in real time in markets.
Let's talk about scalability. One of my favorite posts in reviewing on the plane out yesterday, your big backlog, was the 12 features of a scalable business.
We don't need to go through all 12 necessarily, but we talked a little bit earlier about product market fit, a value hypothesis, which is you know it when you see it.
You know, the demand for the product or service is very high.
The other side of that equation in Andy's way of thinking is the growth hypothesis, and this is kind of scalability.
So maybe tell us a bit about what you think are the most important components of a business that has that.
that scalability baked into it, presumably, which makes that more attractive as a businessperson
to run one, as an investor to buy and own one. I think this idea of scalability is fascinating
in this kind of tech landscape that we're in today. One of these things like product market
fit and scalability is the kind of concept where there are many factors involved in it's super
dynamic. And what you're looking for is a confluence of things, and you may not have everything
in a particular business, but something is sort of critical and some things are nice to have.
And so usually if you're looking for scalability, the VCs will tell you, like Don Valentine was famous for this, which is he wants a big market.
And he didn't even want a market that might be big someday.
He wanted it already to be big.
So the classic chart on the slide deck of a lot of startups is huge pie chart and they're only getting a small part of it and everybody, you know, is going to have their own private island in the Caribbean, right?
And so huge markets really help because it's hard to scale a business for horse bridles or horse blankets or, you know, something like that.
So big market.
thing is businesses that are highly people intensive, like a law firm or an accounting firm,
they are hard to scale. It's just so many people, people get jealous, or they see a chance
to make more money and they break off and whatever. So if you have very people intensive service,
it's hard to scale. So you have size of the market, that, and then you have basically a tech,
if you have a technology where costs are dropping as volume increases, if you have true economies
of scale, business is more scalable. If you have demand side economy,
of scale, which are network effects. And you have a lot of virality, a lot of new product getting
more valuable than more people use it. Then that creates the business as scalable. And probably
the key thing is you can't scale a business very well if you have inorganic approaches to acquiring
customers. If you have to go out and buy radio ads, if you have to go out and do the stuff
that these meal delivery firms are doing, it's a hard slog. If you have a product that is
naturally viral like Facebook was or whatever, you're acquiring customers for almost nothing.
The business is growing quickly.
You don't need that many people.
They still don't employ that many people, given how their market is.
Yeah.
And go down the list of these things.
And there's sort of an additive effect.
No business is perfect.
And they're not all quite the same.
But those are the sorts of factors which determine the scalability of the business.
And sort of last one, this is one of the trickiest ones is elasticity, which is if you take
a business like SpaceX is in, in just the launch business, it's only a first.
five and a half billion dollar business only, but there's a lot of competitors. There's Russians and
Chinese and Indians and U.S. government traditional launchers and the Europeans have an area on a spas.
And so they're all fighting it out for launches. And if you get to a month, you have a big 30, 40%
market share. So the market can only get so big. And so for launching payloads into space,
also the payloads are getting smaller because of Moore's Law and a number of factors and
they're coming lower orbit. And so the only way you can really grow that market is if humans start
taking rides up there. So what's the market for taking rides into space? How many people have
the kind of money they're going to go up and for four minutes can float around in space and come
back down? And predicting that kind of thing is like what Craig did with the cellular business. He
knew that these things were going to be popular someday when they got cheaper. So maybe there's a business
doing that. It's certainly dicey. And so one of the things that SpaceX has done is said,
okay, well, we want to have a backup.
So we're going to put up our own broadband satellite communication system called Starlink.
That's a completely separate business, and they're creating a customer that's going to be within the same P&L, presumably, unless they spin it off, because the business is only so big.
So that's an example of a company that has, I believe, some unanswered questions about the elasticity of demand.
Maybe we could use a recent post you did on MoviePass as a way of talking about some of these other levers that we haven't gone deeply into.
You mentioned Gurley, who's...
probably my favorite writer on this concept of lifetime value to customer acquisition costs.
And reading you, reading Gurley, reading others on this topic has really made me try to think
about a lot of businesses in these terms in these really, really simple elemental terms.
It makes life easier, which is great.
But it's always easier to learn by example.
It doesn't need to be movie pass.
You can pick your business.
But I wonder if you'd be willing to pick a modern business, one that people might be aware of,
and maybe use that as an excuse to talk about things like lifetime value, customer acquisition costs,
cost of money, how you think about these inputs into that equation?
So one of the key things in life is Roger Fisher's getting the S-Book as a concept called
Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement.
Basically what he says is if you're negotiating for something and you only have one choice,
you're screwed.
And that translates into another concept that another professor has across the river at Harvard Business
School.
And Michael Porter said basically there's these five forces that you have to think about.
And one of the five forces is supplier bargaining power.
And so what I did in my own life with Craig was I got to have this conversation where I was listening to John Malone talk about wholesale transfer pricing.
And basically it's supplier bargaining power all the way back to basically opportunity costs.
And the movie past business model is fundamentally dependent on the price of those tickets.
And they're buying them at retail.
And they only have one supplier because every movie isn't, you don't buy tickets in the movie industry.
you buy tickets to
Black Panther or whatever.
You have to go into that movie, right?
So they're buying at retail
and they're selling at a discount
in a subscription
and they have as big
a wholesale transfer pricing problem
as I've ever seen anywhere at scale.
Can you describe that term in more detail?
You talk about this a lot
and it's such a great concept,
wholesale transfer pricing.
Yeah, it's basically, imagine you had a bakery
and you were making bread
in the city, they got a lot of bread bakeries
and you go down there
and you had to buy your flour from Joe.
You couldn't buy it from Ben or any of you had to buy a flower from Joe.
You have wholesale transfer pricing problem because he can price the flour, whatever price he wants.
This is Spotify's fundamental problem in that they have these.
Their margin gets taken.
Their margin gets taken.
And if they ever got some margin, they just up the price.
And so that is the same principle as Roger Fitness Batna, is Charlie Munger's optionality,
is poor just sustainable competitive advantages.
You never want to have one supplier of anything.
And that's something like Tal would talk about Luigi or whatever,
but some basic guy who's making pasta knows that he doesn't want to be completely dependent upon his brother-in-law for vegetables.
Because if he does, his brother-in-law is going to basically take a lot of his profit.
And so that applies in SpaceX.
Elon very smartly and brilliantly sort of doesn't rely on other people who can have.
He's avoided wholesale transfer pricing.
The inverse of that is movie pass, which is completely dependent on these movie studios,
selling them actually goes through the theaters,
but they've got to buy from the theaters like Regal at retail.
And you can't make that up on volume.
It just negative gross margin is awful.
It's sort of like another point we should sort of get into,
which is I'm in the software business, and I tell you,
I look at other businesses and I see the gross margins,
and I go, my God.
What a nightmare.
How do they survive?
They got no money for anything.
They got 2% net margin and gross margins tiny.
And, you know, if like it snows, trucks don't roll.
It's like, whoa, these guys, they better have some cash in the bank to go through these bumpy points.
But I'll go back to my own business.
I go, God, we're lucky.
This is great.
These gross margins are nice.
You've written a ton about SaaS businesses, the SaaS business model, software business model.
I'd be curious if there are other chunky categories that you think are worth explaining versus, say, the SaaS business model in today's terms.
Well, I think one of the things that's interesting and exploring on the SaaS business model is the idea that subscriptions are somehow magical.
Subscriptions are a way of charging for a product.
And they're a way of getting a customer in a situation where you're not constantly fighting for renewal.
And so there are some aspects of it that are good.
But unless you have dog food that the dogs want to eat, subscription is going to get you buckets.
And so you still have to have a product that people really love and want to buy.
Subscription can make the product better.
And it can make the model better because if somebody signs that for a year, you don't have to worry about them leaving for 12 months.
That's the good news.
Everything has a flip side.
The bad news is you have to pay a little bit more to get them.
Unless the product is truly viral, your caca is going to go up.
And this is the point I talk about, about all your variables in the LTV equation, which is they're all linked.
They all have ropes to attach to each other.
You tug on one and the other ones all move.
It's like a spider's web or whatever.
And so everything's dynamic, everything's related.
And that's the fun of it.
It would be boring if everything was just linear and not dynamic.
That's why it's a game.
You know, that's why Buffett does a tapdowns on the work to work every day because it's fun.
To me, it's the biggest game of all.
Yeah, it's something I have to remind myself of all the time as someone that's prone to want to stuff everything into a formula,
that you can't always do that.
And there is art to all this stuff, even if you're building quant models.
There's an art component to it.
And I think that that's a fantastic reminder of it.
Let's take a business like Apple as an example where, I guess, are there any subscription areas of the Apple business model?
Oh, sure.
Yeah, they have a lot of them, yeah.
And they're also a wholesaler of people who sell subscription models.
Right, sure.
And they're a fascinating model that Bill Gurley and I talked about.
So during the dot-com era, I was sent down to Silicon Valley every week.
I went down on Monday, come back on Friday, and I spent a lot of time with Benchmark.
And Gurley and a guy named Bruce Dunleavy and Andy Ratcheliff and Bob Kegel.
You go down the Steve Spurlock and all that.
They were all mentors of mine.
And they taught me a lot of things.
But at the time, I was in the telecom business.
And in the telecom business, we had on the private equity firm, we went on Next Dell,
next to international, X-O, we had a bunch of different investments.
And I was just pining for software margins.
And I was pining for pricing power because it was just a tough business, selling a long haul, you know, against a level three or whatever.
And I got this idea for a thesis, and what I called it software in a box, which is basically, you know, sometimes you have to sell a box to sell software.
It's like Peloton.
Yes.
And that's the classic software in a box case, which is you sell this thing, which enables you to sell
this service. And the margins are in the service. The stickiness is in the thing, and the enabling
the thing is the thing. It's like there are no Peloton clones you can just go out and buy. But the
bad news is you have to create these and sell these things. The good news is that if you get
actually a feedback loop going, you can make them really more cheaply with everything else.
And the thing that differentiates a GoPro from a Peloton is GoPro, I think never, my opinion,
is they never invested enough in software and creating the software that came with that box?
Because that would have given some staying power, because then you're not just competing against the latest thing to come out.
Most cost producer, yeah.
And so, you know, software, it becomes critical.
But sometimes the hardware is an enabling thing.
Even if you take, like, the chips, you know, that Qualcomm or other folks make,
company like Intel employs more software engineers and hardware engineers.
Software is key, and that's software in a box, too.
So software is truly eating the world, as Andreessen says.
But sometimes hardware is enabling the distribution.
Distribution is people who are able to get products distributed, they're magicians in their own right.
And having somebody on your team who knows how to distribute and sell products highly underrated.
Can you say any more about that?
This might be just that.
We'll skip over this one because it might just purely be art.
But do you think there's any commonalities across the VP of sales who's really effective that you've seen in your career?
The personality types I've seen succeed in almost every line job.
I always shocked at how different they are.
but, you know, there are certain things that you can just sense, and some people just know how to sell.
And it's funny because to be a founder, you really have to know how to sell because you can't recruit if you don't know how to sell.
And there's just a natural affinity to selling that you find in these people.
But they have different styles, some are more direct, some are more of a relationship sell, some are a million different ways to do it.
but they all have this sort of common core of they're not afraid of rejection.
They're not willing to just keep being relentless.
They have grit.
There are these, some personality traits that are almost always there.
But the amount of diversity is actually almost surprising.
Who's the best salesperson you've ever met?
Probably when he was doing recruiting, David Byrne, who was a partner at benchmark at one point,
he could sell somebody on going to a startup from a big company.
he was magic at selling like that at a high level he'd convinced some CEO to leave AT&T and come run
some little tiny startup he had that ability to it was also the big sale i saw i was in meetings
when erwin jacoits was selling his first cdemea system he was a good salesman he was a different guy
had great math he was very technical he did it sort of a great job selling it's just sort of different
in terms of that personal sale of selling someone and get this cushy job you're top of the heap you should
leave that and go join this startup, that takes the salesperson, somebody who really knows how to sell.
What's the best sale you've ever made?
Probably selling ideas, because that's my job.
And the ideas of the best sell I ever made was the internet bubble was upon us and things were rough.
And everybody who was a capital allocated who was an investor in private equity had to decide where to put their chips.
And we had to decide whether to put our chips in XO and fight a battle with ICON or whether to double down on next time.
and the best sell I ever made was to say we need to double down a next doll and we can let Icon have XO because there was never going to be there, that level three was just going to be too problematic and it was just going to be a long haul. And I proved to be right. So I sort of believed in wireless and the product of scarcity. But that was selling an idea and that's a lot of what you do as an investor is selling an idea as opposed to selling a new cell site or something like that. But selling ideas requires its own.
skill. And then the other thing, I guess another one I would say is when I decided to go with
as the fourth employee of a startup, I had to sell my family on the idea that I was going to go do
something that I was going to be traveling 500,000 miles a year for five years, and I was going
to throw myself into it, and I was still going to be able to good dad, and they still be there for
them. So I had to sell that phase of my life to them, and I think they just did it because
they love me and they'll forgive me for it someday. But I had to sell my family on, you know, like
doing a startup because startup is hell all in it's just totally all in and you're the fourth person
there and there's no health insurance yet you haven't figured out things like that eventually you get it
but you know all that stuff and it was also you know i was gone a lot so i had to sell them on the fact
that this was going to be worth it and it would be good for them and good for me and something i needed
to do and so i had to sell that they'll forgive me someday if you could teach every high school or
kind of one core idea or impose on them one one reading i'm assuming the munger speeches were
probably be one and two, given your love of them.
But maybe those, maybe Munger excluded.
What do you think the most important lesson is for younger people that's broadly applicable?
With my children.
With my children, it's sort of a Taliban idea, but it's also a Mandarot idea or whatever,
which is this whole idea, or Sam Zell, you know, they all have the same thing, which is
this concept of convexity, which you would never use that word to teach you to high school.
The way you tell the story is, okay, I know you're going to be at high school and you're going to
go to parties and there's going to be drinking.
and you're going to be in a situation where maybe you haven't drunk that much,
but your friend has and your friend wants to drive you home.
You need to understand this math, which is probability times magnitude,
which is the Mubison classic line.
It's magnitude of correctness that matters.
But the important point is even if there's only a 0.1.2% chance
that your friend's going to drive into a tree and kill you,
the magnitude is a great.
You just don't take that risk.
You call me, I won't be mad at you, I'll come get you, but never take that risk.
But then the converse of that is occasionally.
in your life, you're going to get an opportunity and someone's going to say, hey, the
Rotary's just offered you a scholarship to go spend your junior year in Fiji or France or someplace
like that. And they're going to say, I miss my friends. Are you going to do this? But it's like,
whoa, think about the positive optionality of going to another country, learning new things. And so it's
the flip side of getting into a car with a drunk friend to take the ride home where you have big
downside, you know, small.
Magnitude. Yeah, it's magnitude. But on the other side, you should take the Rotary Scholarship
and get the heck over to whatever a country it is
and have that growing experience
and the upside of that is just potentially so massive.
So that core idea of probability and statistics,
I think it should be taught before calculus in high school.
I think it's even more important than Lugar said recently
like two years ago.
I was like, I've never used calculus in my whole career.
You have to use it to send someone to the moon
and engineers use it and all like that.
But in terms of as an investor,
it might be a bad thing if you're using calculus.
You know the line.
Someone who doesn't understand probably the statistic is like a one-legged person
and an ass kicking.
You need to understand probably a statistic.
And this is a Talib, Mandelbrot, you go to the list of ideas.
I love that as a key lesson.
You mentioned movie pass as a business that has a bad wholesale transfer pricing problem.
I'm curious if there's a counter example, I like the two ends of the poll, of a business
that you've seen recently that just really intrigues you.
Maybe you haven't done a deep dive on it yet, but something that has your attention
in the positive sense.
On the positive sense, I'm always interested in what Reed Hastings is doing.
I think he's sort of a brilliant move.
I especially admire the bravery he had when he knew that he was going to have a massive wholesale
transfer pricing power when he lost what's called the first sale doctrine on the
discs in the mail where he was guaranteed a reasonable price.
And he basically just did what they did in South America when the Contesiodors landed,
which is they burned the lifeboats.
And they said, we're going to go all in, we're going to make this content.
He's just brave.
and he's not willing to just throw the chips down and say, this is what I'm going to do.
And that level of spending and that bravery about this is customer acquisition cost and
KAC, it's both.
He uses that better content to acquire customers, not just that.
And the LTV of that and the magnitude of the betty's placing, that to me is just one
of the most compelling stories in business because it's just sort of unprecedented bravery.
Just burn the lightboats and go for it.
I love that.
You've written a ton about music.
music, and specifically hip hop music, which I found interesting and kind of fascinating.
What got you into that and why the people that you focused on, the snoops and Kendricks
and Jimmy I've seen a post on him? Why are you so interested in hip-hop?
First of all, anybody who's my age who has kids for a time in their life drove them in carpools
to swim meets or whatever it was. And so that music was playing, so I actually know that
music very well. Yeah. And particularly what would now be called old school. And I was in a
situation and someone said, he said, guy, you're writing all these posts of all these people.
He said, I bet you couldn't write one about Biggie. And I said, I can write one about anybody.
And I said, the reason I can't is because I don't think I've ever met anybody. You can't
learn something from. And that replies in what Talib calls inverse role models, which is
some things you can learn from people is what not to do. And so somebody's example of somebody's
life. But with Biggie, you go through with things, and he was a street smart guy who pushed his
way out of a situation that was it was very hard and he learned on the street how to sell how to
take care of himself who his friends were and all that and so I wrote the first one on biggie and I said
I just felt pretty good but also part of my blog I'm not content marketing I don't have any ads on it
there's no business associated with my last book all the province which charity I'm just trying to
teach as penance in a charlie munger style way he says it's penance I got lucky as moham and ali said
part of rent and life, we're getting lucky is you got to pay back. So this teaching stuff for me
is that way. And so how do I reach younger people? And I said, well, this big a thing that was
really popular, I can see the stats. And I bet it's a different audience. So maybe I can reach
more people by saying, okay, well, I'm right about Wu-Tang, I think was next. And then there was
Yeezy and Kendrick. And I go down the list. But the point was, I also did one about Sammy Hagar
for equal opportunity time. Sure. I should probably do, you know, some country, western one sooner.
But the point is I'm trying to reach people who need an introduction to the basics of a business.
And frankly, with my blog, I'd rather help a plumber in Akron than a hedge fund guy earn another two basis points.
Because they're the people who are struggling.
They don't know what to do.
They're getting sold all kinds of rubbish.
And they're getting these messages from people who are just trying to take them.
So if I could reach a few of them with a biggie post or a post on Sammy Hagar or a,
whoever. And then plus he just lightens it up, you know, because I got 120 post, but when I did
the biggie one. And now I'm up to like 275 or something.
One a week, right? Yeah, yeah, one a week every Saturday, you know, without fail, without break.
But the point here is, though, how do you reach people and how do you teach young people?
And I've even thought about writing a post about what should a high school finance course
look like? What should be in that class? Who could teach it? Should it be online?
Can a high school sociology teacher segue to teach that?
Probably not.
So anyway, but how do you – the people who need it the most have it the least,
and they don't know what to buy.
And they're loading up on dent a coin or – and it's just – this stuff is just mind-boggling.
And I feel sorry for them because it's going to be bad.
And then I feel bad for society because these people are going to be old and poor
and are going to be a negative externality for everybody.
We don't want old, poor people.
And so how do we prevent that?
You know, what's the right degree of education?
How much of that should be Australia style where they have some things they have to do in terms of saving?
All hard questions.
There's a name that I think you might have mentioned it, but we didn't go in any detail.
And I just, the richness of some of his quotes is a great excuse to talk about some interesting ideas.
It's Jim Barksdale.
So maybe you could describe who Jim is for those that don't know.
And I'll read a couple of these quotes and just love to get your reaction to them.
So the first one is this idea that the infantry is always ahead of headquarters.
So this is classic Jim, and the story of him is a long history of, it was at Federal Express,
and then came to McCaw to turn McCaw into an operating company from an M&A company.
He was a CLO at FedEx, right?
Yes.
And then he came to McCaw to basically, Craig was building a roll-up company, but it needed to have operations.
It needed to make the trains run on time.
He was there until the sale to AT&T, and then he went down to Netscape.
And, you know, he's from the south.
He's from Jackson, Mississippi, been to visit down there.
And he's just like a monster operator guy.
And he just knows how to make things work.
And what he knows is people in the field are out there trying to sell stuff.
And they're at the point of the –
Tip of the spear.
And he knows what the hell's going on.
They're not some guy back, you know, sipping coffee at the officers club, you know, thinking,
well, I think we should outflank these people.
They know what the hell is going on.
You know, their tanks coming at us, you know, whatever.
But it's the same thing in business.
And Jim understands that.
And the great operators, guys I've seen like John Stanton was that way, which is they get out of their chair and they go find out.
They go visit and meet with the infantry.
Like at McCaw, in the old days, it was like, if you were exhibiting tea in the officers club kind of mentality, they forced you to spend a whole day in a call center.
There's nothing like a whole day in a call center to give you a good sense of what the customers are thinking about your product.
Do you have product market fit?
You come out a day like like, holy crap.
We got some stuff to fix.
But he's also, you can't measure something.
It's hard to focus on it.
There are plenty of things you can measure that you can fix.
The whole thing about when you encounter a snake, shoot it.
Don't write memos about it.
You know, if you've got a damn snake in front of you, shoot the thing.
And then if you shoot it, don't want, and then don't write a lot of more memos about, well, this is really dead.
You know, is it still out there, you know?
It's like, if you see a snake, shoot it.
He's got these other ones.
The one that I love, it's sort of off color, but a little bit, the saying in the South, which is, if someone comes up to you and said,
here's this horseshit. Would you keep this for me? You know, would you hold this in your hands for me?
And a lot of life is that way. Someone's saying, here's this trouble. Will you please have this?
And you have the ability to say, well, no, that's mighty fine horseshit you got there, but I'm not grabbing it.
That's yours. I'll give you some advice about it. And I'm going to get out here quickly because it kind of smells.
But I'm not going to grab that from me just because you asked me. And he's got all these southern stories and homilisms that. Someone's a good salesman.
He could talk a dog off a meat truck, you know, things like that. But real operating.
focus things on generating results, making sure you make quota, making sure you make the numbers.
And he was a role model for a lot of other people.
A couple more.
You don't have to react, but if you have reactions, great.
I love this one.
Quit spitting on the handle and get to hoeing.
It's kind of what you just talked about.
Yeah, I was sort of like there are certain people, particularly if they come out of consulting firms,
that just love to talk, they can talk an issue to death.
They love to, well, I think we should do here, you know, and think about pivoting here and all that.
And eventually someone's got to go out and sell some stuff.
You got to make a sales call.
And you've got to, like, not sell some stuff and get some feedback and actually have real data.
And so the really great founders are doers.
They roll up their sleeves and they do stuff.
And like John Stanton, when it was sell site was out, he'd get on a plane and go there and make sure he got fixed.
And he was – they'd like to do stuff.
And you need a mix of doers and thinkers.
And in your own mentality, you need a mix of thinking and just all doing and no thinking is not going to have a good result.
But all thinking and no doing isn't going to have a good result either.
this idea of diversity in the broadest possible sense in terms of what you do and how you think
and who you read and how you listen. You know, diversity is a big, important concept that's really
big in terms of the books you read. I know you're huge on that, but the books you read and the
people you talk to and the friends you have, the team you recruit. Some of the teams I've seen like
Craig McCau's team or the team at Microsoft early, very, very different personalities, all of them.
The difference between Bill and John Shirley and Frank Odette and Mike Maples, they're all very different.
But as a team, they were like just magic because it all sort of jelled.
And you can see it as sort of like pattern recognition, but you've never seen that exact pattern before, but you've seen it.
The last quote I'll read from him just so we can move on to a few closing topics is nothing happens until somebody sells something, which you've talked about too.
but I want to pick up on this idea of doing as a means of learning.
I guess I had it on recently at a phrase, which was when he's looking at a startup or really any
business, the thing he cares most about is product velocity because he views that as learning
itself.
The company's ability to actually put stuff out and do stuff is a demonstration of their
ability to learn.
I'm curious about how you think about that balance in your own life.
You're a huge reader.
I'm a huge reader.
And I've kind of had this existential reader's crisis lately where I feel as though, wow, maybe I
spent too much time reading, maybe I should have taken third of that time or half that time
and only been thinking about doing. So how do you strike that, how do you strike that balance personally?
So this is a magical time because so many devices are connected and so many processes are connected
now that somebody like you and I, the two of us who read so much, have actually the ability
to actually have data scientists and other people's statisticians. I'm sure you have some work on for you
right now. Who can give you this feedback of these experiments? And you can say,
well, what if you did this?
You know, do an a history.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And the velocity at which you can do that is stunning.
And the ability to turn that thing around.
And if you have good systems, you can conceive up and run an experiment in a day.
And an A.B.
Test if you're an instrumented or hour.
Yeah, exactly.
And that kind of thing allows you to test more doing than you've ever tested before.
And what it is is the scientific method on steroids.
You know, if you look at lean startup.
or all these other processes or some of the things that we're talking about in A and all that.
Scientific method is really super, super powerful.
And if you can instrument it and you've got the modern processing and cloud power behind it,
you can actually see doing more than ever.
But I think in the end, though, somebody like you and I also need to go out on sales calls.
And we also go need to talk to some customers and sit in on some focus groups.
And there's diversity required.
And you really need to get out there and sit with a customer.
There's just nothing. Bill Gates said once, unhappy customers are our greatest source of learning.
This is back in the days of Microsoft Basic in the early days. But basically, you know, you just got to get out there. And being in a call center.
Yeah, it'll do it. Your eyes will get big. Like, whoa, you can't I think about this?
Have you ever read the book, Seeing like a State by George Scott? No. You should definitely check it out. So it's all about this concept of, I think it's a Greek term, Medis, which is local knowledge. So it's the same idea of the infantry versus the general. That's the only like really valuable knowledge for.
versus this centrally planned, you know, line the trees up perfectly and it works great for one
generation of trees, but it destroys the soil. It's a fascinating book. Your point about getting
out there makes me think of this question, which I don't ask all that often, but it seems really
appropriate for you, given the diversity of experience you've had. What was the period or the time or the
episode that you felt most alive in your career specifically? I felt most alive in my career
when I did the startup when there was only four of us and we were going to build a system that
was going to cost $9 billion when to have any money and we had to go out and do it. And nobody had
ever thought about it, or it was a clean slate, and I couldn't turn to anybody and say,
you have to do this. And I think that life experience, I wouldn't trade it for anything,
but it was hell on my health and some of my relationships. I had to go back and repair some things
because you're just completely, you know, when you're flying 500,000 miles a year.
That's insane.
It did for five years. You know, and you've got to be a dad at the same time and all those sorts
of things. And I really felt alive, but I also felt like I had to rally. And even though I was
getting home late on Friday night. I had to be there at the swim meet or there, you know,
whatever the event was for both my kids. And it's tough, but it did make me full alive.
You know, there's this whole idea of fear, and I think fear is a good thing. The absence of any
fear is like you're dead. So you've got to have some tension in your life. And so that was the
time where I was most terrified. Not terrified. Just alive. Because if I messed up, my assistant
It's not going to be able to make her mortgage.
But the important thing was, I cared about her and her family, and I didn't want to screw up.
And I think about founders out there today, they're all that way.
And, you know, most businesses, startups, they don't make it.
And if you're a feeling person, you feel horrible if you don't make it.
And some people go into startups and they just don't realize the odds.
I know the odds.
They don't realize that it's a power law.
They don't understand.
They heard about this one good one, and that sounds pretty good to them.
Right.
But, you know, if you're a caring person, you care about this people.
So you got to throw yourself into it.
And it's like being on a great roller coaster.
Any closing advice for, we'll say young business people out there, would be founders,
maybe those that don't have the entrepreneurial bug but are just fascinated by business.
We've covered a lot, which is great.
But I want to make sure I don't leave any major points left unsaid since you've got such interesting viewpoints.
I think on the young founder thing, I think it's really critical to think about who you raise money from.
because too many people think, okay, I'm going to raise some money,
and I can raise some money from my Uncle Fester and my Aunt Morticia
and, you know, a couple of other friends of theirs or whatever.
And it's not valued money.
You're not getting any intelligence from it.
It's not going to help you do your A round.
And they're maybe going to be calling you all the time.
And they have no idea that it's a 15-year, maybe 12-year, 10-year exit if it happens.
And then you're maybe spoiling a relationship you have with your Uncle Fester
who you've loved since the Adams family days, you know, all these times that people are raising money
where they're not raising money from professionals is a lost opportunity to get really professional,
valuated money.
And then the other thing is be a missionary.
Don't be sitting around in your office and saying, well, Bitcoin's hot.
I don't think I'll go do that.
And you don't love the idea of it.
You don't love the underlying technology.
You don't love the math.
You don't love the product.
You don't love the thing.
It's like if you're going to do something and you're going to throw yourself into it
and it's going to dominate your life for like seven years.
And those people around you, you're going to be with constantly.
And you're in the same life.
Why would you do something that you weren't like super, super passionate about that you didn't want to throw yourself into?
And that's what investors look for because those people get over the hard times.
Mercantaries say, oh, this is bullshit.
I'm out of here.
And so they might have succeeded.
seated if they just hung in. And I guess the last piece is...
Can we pause before the last one? Because I've got to follow up question there.
Sure.
So my guess is if you polled the entire working population, let's say middle class and up of the
United States, and said, binary, yes or no, are you passionate about what you do?
Do you feel like you're a missionary in what you were doing? I don't know what that
percentage would be, but it's pretty low, it would be my guess. A lot of people aren't satisfied
with their job, with their work. And you've described what a pleasure that can be to be,
you know, sort of all in on a topic.
Why do you think there's that gap?
Like, what do you think drives the lack of people doing missionary work?
I think some of it is, first of all, some people grew up in an environment where the job
is just a place where you go so you can get home.
They just don't know.
Get to the lake and the speedboat.
And they just think that's work is something you do so you can do things you really want to do.
And then they didn't have a choice or they had to support their family or whatever
it was and they got into something and they're just doing it and they hate it.
There's that.
But then there's also just not ever having seen somebody who was like,
like truly stoked to say, I'm going to go do this.
I'm going to go create this payment system for remittance overseas or whatever it is,
what's their true passion?
They've never had a model for it.
And then the third piece is I won the lottery.
I had models to see.
I got a college without any debt.
I had great mentors.
One thing after in the other.
And I also had some money put away.
And it's one thing for me to go out and do that startup when I have a little money put away.
it's another thing to put up,
but you don't got, there's no fallback,
and you've got young kids and all those sorts of things.
So I feel lucky that I had a chance to be a missionary,
but if you can't be a missionary,
and you don't have all those things,
it's the worst of all possible worlds.
Because at least if you're a missionary
and you don't have any fallback and whatever,
at least you have your passion,
and if it doesn't work out,
you at least say, well, I live my dream.
To go out and throw yourself at something
that you don't care about,
that you were doing it just for the money. I mean, they're the worst CEOs. The worst CEOs in the world,
a founder and CEO. It's like, we're going to do this and we're all going to get rich. It's just,
it doesn't work. Those people don't succeed. They can. I'm not saying it never happens, but they don't.
They're not people you want to invest in. Certainly if you ever see that with me, it's like, no.
But having that passion about that is essential. So if you're going to take that level of risk,
be passionate. Find something if you really love.
X. If you really love, you know, I read about somebody the other day was doing landscape supply
roll-up. I might know that. Smallish business. They're trying to do first national brand of
landscape supply. You're going to do better in that business if you're really passionate about that.
You love plants. You love the organization. It's your thing. You're stoked. Me, I'd rather drop a large
rock on my foot than be a dentist. Do I have anything against dentists? And next time I'm in,
I hope he doesn't take it out on me, you know, for, give me a root canal I don't need because I was
But just for me, that's just not what I would want to do.
Same thing over and over and over again.
It just wouldn't make it for me.
But the important thing is be passionate about something
if you're going to take that level of risk in your life
because it is a huge risk.
Most stuff fails.
But that's evolution.
You know, most evolutionary trails.
And.
And.
Badly.
I diverted you.
I think there was one third lesson.
No, it doesn't matter.
It doesn't matter.
We can go on a talk forever.
You know, we are natural kindred spirits
and we're always thinking about things and we're curious about things.
And for somebody to have a career like mine,
somebody comes in and says,
well, I want to do what you're doing.
That sounds pretty fun.
And I'm saying, boy, I got lucky.
And this thing fell together and that thing filled together.
I'm like, how do you do that?
And I guess my advice to them is usually, well,
the way life works is usually one thing leads to another.
Yep.
I started doing this and I met this person and they introduced me to this person.
And I started doing this.
And pretty soon I was in Afghanistan and I was, you know,
selling water to groups and water systems.
And then private equity guy met me.
And we started investing in South America.
You know, this thing is like, and you meet people who are older and you ask them about their lives.
A lot of times you'll get a story like that that it's just fantastical.
You never, you could never, you couldn't write it.
You couldn't script it.
And so life just unfolds.
And it's dynamic.
You can't predict stuff.
We haven't even talked about all these issues about the difficulty of forecasting and predicting things.
And so the good news is it's fascinating.
There was this John Cleese monologue that I was at recently, and he said, his favorite line
is with a woman who was dying, sort of elderly English woman.
They asked her what her last words, and she said, this has all been very interesting, which
is like this conversation we're having today, which is for certain people, you know, having
an interesting conversation, reading an interesting book, that's its own reward.
And nobody taxes it.
It's great stuff.
You get to keep it forever.
You can learn from it.
You can profit from it too.
But it is interesting life is its own reward.
I might call this episode something like follow the thread or something like this.
And I wanted to say a thanks.
When I first started doing this, this format of learning, which is its own kind of interesting adventure versus, say, reading.
Conversation is a great way to learn.
Your writing was one of the few sort of, I'll call it like content examples that has sort of been a guiding
light for me. And there's one very specific thing that echoes what you just said, which is this
this like openness to new stuff. The variation of topics that you cover, the formats you do it in,
the people you use as exemplars of these ideas is truly unique. It's one of the only things I read
every week. So thank you for that. I think it's an amazing way to learn. And too many people want
the whole curriculum when they don't realize that the best curriculum is one that you build
sort of step by step, just pulling on a thread. So a huge thank you for that. The last question,
which I ask everybody is for the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you.
I guess just stuff that all the stuff that Bill Gates Sr. did for me, taking time to have breakfast
with a young person and just talk about life and talk about judgment and talk about getting involved
in the community and the importance of just showing up. That's the title of his book is that.
And just the mentoring time that this one man gave to me. I've written a
post on what he meant to me, Bill Gates Senior, lessons from.
And just hours and hours of lunches and breakfast and sessions where I was able to talk and
he was able to come back and just sometimes him just listening to me.
And so he's a giant person in my life.
If it wasn't for that family, for the Gates family, I'd be working in plumbing supply.
I don't know about that.
Some place.
I mean, just all of the breaks I've had and all the things I've learned is mom,
was spectacular, Mary, and of course, all the things that's happened to Seattle because of Microsoft
and me.
But just him taking time to mentor me would be the simple answer.
Taking the time to help a young person.
It's a great way to close the conversation as well.
So thank you very much for your time.
Great.
Hey, everyone.
Patrick here again.
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