Investing Billions - E69: How Texas Municipal Retirement System Deployed $1B into Venture Capital
Episode Date: May 29, 2024Peter Teneriello, former Senior Portfolio Manager at Texas Municipal Retirement System, sits down with David Weisburd to discuss how TMRS deployed $1B into venture capital. In addition, they discuss i...nstitutional allocation pacing models, the importance of aligned investment teams and why investors may allocate to median performing managers. The 10X Capital Podcast is part of the Turpentine podcast network. Learn more: turpentine.co -- X / Twitter: @dweisburd (David Weisburd) @_PeterT_ (Peter Teneriello) -- LinkedIn: Peter Teneriello: https://www.linkedin.com/in/peterteneriello/ David Weisburd: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dweisburd/ -- LINKS: Texas Municipal Retirement Systems (TMRS): https://www.linkedin.com/company/texas-municipal-retirement/  -- NEWSLETTER: By popular demand, we’ve launched the 10X Capital Podcast newsletter, which offers this week’s venture capital and limited partner news in digestible news bites delivered straight to your email. To subscribe please visit: http://10xcapital.beehiiv.com/ -- Questions or topics you want us to discuss on The 10X Capital Podcast? Email us at david@10xcapital.com -- TIMESTAMPS: (0:00) Introduction (0:55) Diversification strategies in venture capital investing (3:32) Co-investment practices and fee management (6:58) Importance and role of pacing models (9:39) Incentives for LP Consultants and their impact (12:25) Strategy for setting up a billion-dollar single family office (15:39) Building effective LP / GP relationships (16:22) Career insights and investment philosophy from Peter Teneriello
Transcript
Discussion (0)
If a fund is second quartile in the venture world, but otherwise outperforming other asset classes,
then yeah, that could be interesting. If a group is second quartile, but they're delivering second
quartile returns while, say, deploying a billion plus a year, then that is interesting.
Do you think the incentives for pension funds in the United States are inefficient? Peter, I've been really excited, really looking forward to the chat. Welcome to the 10X Capital
Podcast. Yeah. Thanks for having me, David. Peter, when you were at TMRS, you deployed
roughly a billion dollars across managers. Break that down for me.
Yeah. So that billion dollars, that was specifically in the venture capital category.
The total amount ended up working on there actually ended up being over $5 billion in commitments. That billion was split between seven managers, a mix of what's called more software-focused groups to biotech from early stage to later stage.
Ended up being diversified across the spectrum of strategies and sectors.
But that's not necessarily how I went about building it.
I didn't have diversification as the top line goal of this portfolio.
I mean, venture is a game of alpha generation.
It's a game of capturing and getting exposure, being a part of these outliers journeys.
And diversification is kind of at odds with that.
So really for me in building that portfolio and filling it out with those seven managers,
what I was really keying on was looking for and backing artists.
What do you mean by that? Artists?
I might use artists and force of nature interchangeably. But when I talk about
creativity and conviction, I'm talking about people, I'm talking about investors that are
willing to do things differently from the pack. Investors are actually willing to take risks that aren't necessarily just looking to
get into the hottest round led by Sequoia or led by Benchmark. These are people with
actual differentiated views on the world and how to build their firms.
You mentioned seven managers for roughly a billion dollars. How did you go about building that book? We had to find managers that had the potential to substantially
outperform the managers in those other parts of the books. From there, though, it became a task
of boiling the ocean, turning over as many stones as I, to find those seven during the time at EMRS. The total plan was over, over $30 billion because of that.
I mean, the tail does end up wagging the dog in some cases here,
but you do have to find opportunities where,
where we define opportunities where we could put substantial amounts of
capital to work. We had to, we had to find opportunities where we,
where we could put where we could make $50 million in upsize commitments
to these groups. How did you sequence that? How do you practically build a billion-dollar venture
book? I called it a hub-and-spoke approach. The very first commitment of that process,
of this program, was to Foundry. It was doubling down on their fund-to-fund work. We created a custom fund
with them that, I mean, the initial commitment was a hundred million. It was just going to
co-invest alongside them. We were able to write a very large check, tow our way into the venture
world with a strategy that, with this fund-to-fund strategy that was inherently de-risked.
And it also had these upside notes to it where we could, where over time, the relationships
that we were indirectly backing could become direct relationships of ours.
That boundary fund that we created with them was that, I mean, it was fee advantage.
There was less, I mean, we were able
to negotiate the fees and there was much less fee drag involved there than with, say, just going to
XYZ fund of funds and committing to their blind pool vehicle. In this case, we had a good idea
of what was likely going to be in this fund. And we also knew that there wasn't going to be a
management fee on it too, reducing
the fee drag up front. So you invested into their fund of funds with management fees and carry,
and then you invested as a co-investor without management fees. Is that correct?
Yeah. Yeah. So we were already in Foundry's main fund. We then went to them with this idea
and created this separate vehicle, the separate fund
that co-invested into, it co-invested alongside Foundry into the venture funds where they had
excess allocation. And that, and that custom, that, that new customized fund would, didn't have
a management fees. But there was an underlying management fee in carry. They were just on the
incremental vehicle. There was only carry. Yeah, correct. But from an investment standpoint,
from a portfolio construction, from a governance standpoint, what mistakes did you make on that
venture book? I almost felt like I found myself falling into the trap of filling, you know,
wanting to fill this venture bucket and, you know, ultimately filling this private equity bucket
that we had. But so most institutional LPs, you know, they have these strategic asset allocations and pacing models that show,
okay, how much do I need to commit annually in order to meet that target or maintain that target
or vice versa. And in the case of TMRS, our PE allocation had been doubled or the target had
been doubled from 5% to 10% around the time we started making
these commitments. And so I felt this inherent pressure to increase the check sizes,
to put more money out more quickly. Joshua Berkowitz on the podcast from a family office,
and he said that it's very important to think about the pacing model in terms of how do you
make sure that you deploy across every single year so that you're able to recycle the capital in year seven, year eight, or however.
His model is he invests roughly a sixth over six years.
How do you look at institutional pacing models in venture for an institutional LP?
We look at the growth assumptions of what we already have under management.
We make assumptions around, again, how much capital is going to be called down over time, how much capital is going
to be distributed. But in, you know, in this case, and this gets back to the tail wagging the dog,
there is a pressure to reach, you know, to reach these target allocations that are set in a timely
manner. The most important thing in these pacing models is to actually be able to
have exposure to multiple vintage years. So you're not overexposed to just one single vintage or
avoiding just being exposed to 2021 venture, for instance. Absolutely. What is the biggest lesson
you learned at TMRS, Texas Municipal Retirement Systems? Making sure the organization is aligned in its goals and how to achieve those goals.
I mean, what that looks like for an LP really is just that you, I mean, is that the investment
team, the investment team and the non-investment teams within these organizations and the board
of trustees as well, that they all trust what each other is doing, that the investment team has delegated investment
authority, but that the investment team is also keeping the rest of the organization,
the rest of the stakeholders apprised of what's going on. Again, it's governance, it's alignment,
it's trust. You mentioned that you managed $5 billion at DMRS. Where were the other $4 billion
invested? That was going into other private equity and private equity oriented type of strategies.
So buyouts, growth equity, special situations, which was a catch-all for strategies, for
managers that didn't quite fit the private equity bucket neatly.
Let's talk about governance.
We talked about our friend at State of Wisconsin Investment Board, that they got the governance right and that they trust their
investment staff. We just saw recently the investment to Bitcoin and crypto as an example.
Tell me about governance and how that leads to returns for LPs.
There's all sorts of governance models that you could say range from, again,
delegation forward to being on the other end, no delegation, you know, delegation forward to being, you know, to on the other end, like no delegation,
you know, working more with fund to funds and relying more on consultants that governance,
you know, and, you know, of these more forward thinking groups, it's, again, like it relies
heavily on delegation, that is the investment team, being able to being able to invest the way,
you know, the way that they want to the way they see fit, and to do so, again,
with the trust of the rest of the organization.
I mean, what that looks like in practice is that typically it comes down to a matter of
size with investments.
As long as a potential investment recommendation is below, say, a certain percentage of the
total fund, then the investment team has full discretion, again, that delegate investment authority to
invest in how they see fit. Not every LP is like that. I mean, you'll have some firms or some
organizations that have to take every one of their investments to a board of trustees for approval,
or they might need sign off from a consultant, or they may just rely on a board of trustees for approval, or they might need
sign off from a consultant, or they may just rely on a fund of funds to make all their
investments for them.
I mean, those are all examples of where there isn't delegated investment authority, where
the governance model isn't really built on trust.
We were talking offline about the incentives for LP consultants, how there's misalignment
between principal and agent. Tell me about the incentives for LP consultants, how there's misalignment between principal and agent.
Tell me about the incentives for LP consultants.
Consultants, I mean, they're typically paid on a retainer on an annual or multi-year contract
of some sort.
I haven't heard of consultants being paid with incentive comp or carry or some, again,
like some form of incentive to, you know, to drive
high upside type outcomes. The incentives are instead, again, like, you know, not to,
not to get fired, to keep the contract going. And I mean, again, like that's like, like that's,
that's an inherent misalignment. I mean, it's, it illustrates just like that illustrates again, like the
principal agent problem. The goal is to continue the contract to not get fired. They'll leave
consultants, you know, usually recommending like, you know, groups that aren't emerging managers
going to these more established options after the alpha has really been generated.
So again, like it's, yeah, like it's one of those reasons why emerging managers have a more difficult time raising than established firms with long multifund historical track records.
I mean, they're right in the crosshairs of a principal agent problem that they may not even know about.
You oftentimes hear venture capital is an access class.
Are there LPs that are self-aware that are continuing to invest in the asset class that know that they're getting exposure to second quartile or
even third quartile funds? There have to be. Yeah. There's only so much capacity available for LPs
that you're going to have to find other areas of the world, other groups to commit your capital to.
Again, if you want to be in venture, you you're going to get naturally pushed to, you know, to groups that may have historically underperformed. I mean, yeah, like the quantitative
story may show that this group has historically underperformed, but under the hood, there might
be, there might be green shoots, there might be some sort of, yeah, there might be a new strategy
or a new team, you know, coming forth from, you know, from this historically underperforming firm
that makes it actually makes it interesting to
back.
Is there a rational reason for LPs that can't access top quartile to invest in second quartile
or median performing venture funds?
Is there financial rationale for that or is it purely just to check the box and make their
ICs happy?
If a fund is second quartile in the venture world, but outperforming, you know,
otherwise outperforming other asset classes, then yeah, like that, that, that could be interesting.
If a group is second quartile, but they're doing, but they're delivering second,
second quartile returns while, while say deploying, you know, a billion plus a year,
then that's like, that, that, that is, that is interesting. I went to my, my mentor who was setting up a billion dollars, single family office,
and he asked me what he should do. And I said, you should go to all the top funds inside,
let her hire Carrie. What do you think about that? That's one way to get access. Um,
have you ever seen that? I, no, no, I've, I've, I've never, I've never seen that. Um,
a public institution could, could never like they, they can never do that. A public institution could never, like they can never do that.
Like the investment team would get raked over the coals.
I mean, but it's one way to get immediate access day one.
I imagine most investors, most GPs would take that offer.
Speaking of incentives for pension funds,
do you think the incentives for pension funds
in the United States are inefficient?
Yes.
Many public funds don't incentivize their investment team.
I mean, the team itself, the teams in these cases, they care about not getting fired,
but there's no incentive to like take a risk, walk, you know, walk to the edge and find,
turn over the stones and find interesting opportunity as a higher likelihood of underperforming
than, you know, a $10 billion buyout fund, but could deliver, you know,
multiples upon multiples upon multiples of, you know, better, better return.
I think the Canadian pension funds are much closer to seems to be principal
agent alignment.
And the way that they do it is they pay seven figure salaries to the very
best in class and the top people.
And those people typically would have gone on the GP side. They go on the LP side. And there's a lot of research and a lot of evidence
that that system is working really well for the Canadians. If you were running a pension fund,
let's say you were CIO, how would you go about attracting and retaining top talent?
Well, I mean, you hit on it. You just hit on it. It's following whether that Canadian model
or the Singapore public sector model.
If you want to build a strong, cohesive team that isn't going to be constantly worried about jumping or constantly worried about their own compensation growth or their own skill set growth, then you just have to pay them and compensate them really well. We'll get right back to interview.
But first, to stay updated on all things
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If you could change one thing
about the investment management industry,
what would that one thing be? It would be a step towards solving that alignment issue.
It's giving the investment teams at every one of these organizations, the delegation,
the authority, the discretion to do their jobs, to invest. There's all sorts of strings attached
to delegation, to these governance models and, you know, just being
able to put the trust back in place with the investment team, you know, to allow them to
invest without, you know, without interference from all sorts of other stakeholders, I think
would go a long way towards, you know, towards, you know, delivering great financial outcomes
to making, you know, to making staff feel more empowered, to reducing that
revolving door that we're talking about even. But again, it comes down to trust. It comes down to
people trusting the investment team and the investment team trusting each other.
We're speaking offline about LP-GP relationships. What is the best way for LPs and GPs to build a relationship
with each other? It just comes down to, it just comes down to time. We all went through COVID
years. I mean, I mean, we all committed to groups where, you know, we, you know, we spent more time
with them, you know, over, over zoom or over the phone versus in person. But again, that, that,
that in-person time is just so important to, uh, you know, to,
to getting to know, um, to, to, you know, these people to really like to really start building
the mosaic that is, you know, the, the, that is your investment thesis for like, why,
why are you going to partner with them for, for, for years to come building real relationships,
um, for first and foremost. Peter, it's been a fascinating interview. I've learned a lot and I
know the audience has as well. What would you like to shine a light on for the audience?
I spent most of my career on the private investing side, again, but mostly as an LP,
of course, as we've touched on today. And during that experience, through that $5 billion or so of
you know, of commitments that I've been able
to make. I've come to realize again, it's important to look for, look for these investors that are
playing at the intersection of creativity and conviction. It's important to look for these
investors that, that are artists who, you know, who, who treat their work with this duty and this
feeling of care. Absolutely. Well, it's been really great to chat, Peter. I look forward to
meeting, I'm in Austin often, so look forward to sitting down there or in New York city. Yeah, absolutely. Thanks, Peter. Thanks, it's been really great to chat, Peter. I look forward to meeting him in Austin often. So look forward to sitting down there or in New York City.
Yeah, absolutely.
Thanks, Peter.
Thanks, David.
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