Irregular Warfare Podcast - Special Operations Forces and Great Power Competition

Episode Date: November 5, 2021

Will the role and capabilities required of special operations forces change in a geopolitical context characterized by great power competition? How will SOF balance enduring counterterrorism missions with new requirements to deter great power rivals? This episode examines those questions and more and features a discussion with General Richard Clarke, commander of US Special Operations Command, and Linda Robinson, a leading researcher on special operations forces and author of two books on the subject. Intro music: "Unsilenced" by Ketsa Outro music: "Launch" by Ketsa CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Most folks when they think about deterrence, they're thinking about the high-end strategic deterrence of nuclear weapons. I think there's a role in the deterrence sphere in the competition space. I think that's an area where both policymakers and practitioners are going to have to look at heavy and we got to play a role within SOCOM inside that. I'd like to answer the question about the key qualities that are needed in the future cadre of SOC. Yes, you're always going to need those attracted to and competent in and highly competent in direct action and special reconnaissance. But what I think the coin of the realm is in the future are really those who want to work

with population and those who truly understand the strategic impact of developing partners in other countries. Welcome to episode 39 of the Irregular Warfare podcast. Your hosts today are myself, Kyle Atwell, and my co-host is Shauna Sinnott. In today's episode, we discuss the role of special operations forces in great power competition. Our guests consider how U.S. special operations forces will have to reconcile seemingly competing missions and competencies, from maintaining counterterrorism capabilities to integrating into great power competition. Key to mapping the way ahead is a substantive understanding of the contemporary competition environment and in recognizing that the requirements for SOF have great variation across regions

and mission sets. Our guests then discuss the SOF competencies that are likely to be most relevant to future conflict and how Special Operations Command and the Department of Defense can cultivate soft talent that is ready to meet these dynamic requirements. General Richard Clark currently serves as the 12th Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. He has held command positions at all levels in both conventional and special operations units, to include serving as the Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and as the regimental commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Linda Robinson is director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy and a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

She has conducted extensive research on special operations forces and is the author of three critically acclaimed books about SOF, Tell Me How This Ends, 100 Victories, and Masters of Chaos. You are listening to the Irregular Warfare Podcast, a joint production of the Princeton Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point, dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. Here's our conversation with Linda Robinson and General Richard Clark. General Richard Clark and Linda Robinson, General Richard Clark. General Richard Clark and Linda Robinson,

welcome to the Irregular Warfare podcast. We're excited to have you both today, and we appreciate you taking the time to join us for this conversation. Kyle and Shauna, it's great to be here. Thanks for what you do with this podcast, and it's an honor to be here with Linda Robinson, who has researched extensively and written brilliantly on regular warfare and soft forces.

Thank you so much, Kyle. I am delighted to meet you and Shauna and be part of this terrific series you're running. So today we're going to talk about the role of special operations forces over the coming years in great power competition. When you think about the role of special operations forces today, as we transition from 20 years focused on countering violent and extremist non-state threats to implementing a strategy oriented on near peer competitors, what keeps you up at night and where are the biggest blind spots for the special operations community? Kyle, I'll start first. Terrorism hasn't gone away. And we absolutely can't forget that. There are still those that would love to attack inside the United States. And what we have to do is ensure that we keep the American people and our interests at hand when it comes to terrorism. But what I think we've focused on over the last few years and as we go forward is this threat has metastasized. We have to look at the sustainability of those efforts in the counterterrorism fight, while at the same time, be able to properly allocate resources

that will allow us to compete with those near peer adversaries. The one thing, if anything, that concerns me, and I won't say I don't sleep well at night, but the thing that as we look going forward, are we modernizing and adapting quickly enough to account for both? And do we have the proper balance within SOCOM of the peer threats, but of also the terrorist threats? I would like to say first, I think there has been important work done in this transition already. The deployment operational tempo has really been reset by General Clark. And that was, I think, a critical piece in order to do the work that's needed to take on the new challenges, but as General Clark just mentioned, to retain

the mission set of the counterterrorism and counter Rio. And just two quick things, I think the regional assignment, having special forces groups go back to their assigned regions and having Naval Special Warfare refocus on its maritime mission are just key pieces where their core competencies are. Also, the training centers, the training rotations that are going on there have shifted to some of the key scenarios and provided a test bed for what's coming next. But what keeps me up at night, and I guess I do feel quite concerned, I think the balancing act is tremendous because there is going to be an ongoing demand for counterterrorism operations with a declining or probably flat or declining

budget. And I think we've grown used to having really kind of a zero tolerance for, we expect every mission to go well. So it's a more, I think, a political issue that the public needs to understand that you cannot have perfection, even though we have a high level of competence. And the second equally important challenge is really understanding, particularly China, the peer competitors, we've not got the language skills, we don't have the depth of understanding that we need. And equally important, the nuances of how our partners and allies around the world see China, because they don't all see China the way we do. And frankly, we also need to have a very nuanced view of China and what is a threat and what

is something to be managed and where we need to cooperate very aggressively as in climate change. Linda brought up a great point of how we have reset the force a little bit. One, because our department said, hey, you have to get to a minimum of a two to one deployment to dwell ratio. But also, you know, so for every one day away, you've got to be home for at least two days with a goal of getting you to three-to-one because there was almost a one-to-one overuse, continuously deployed soft presence

because of the requirements in Iraq and Syria and Afghanistan. But what that has allowed us- Who pushed for that? Was that the, who was actually pushing for that ratio? Who was pushing for the ratio was the department. It was actually put into policy that this is what the entire joint force will get to. And it has actually been a good thing for us to build both readiness for the force, because a ready force actually helps to compete. But it also, when you're doing, when you have that time back at home station,

allows you to train the force, allows you to experiment with being attacked by near-peer threats to get to our training centers to work with the rest of the joint force. So that readiness buildup is crucial. And truthfully, our peers also, you know, are those near peer threats also see the readiness levels of our force. So moving to that, that has allowed that so we don't catch ourselves coming and going back and forth to Afghanistan or Iraq or Syria has allowed our folks to sit back and reflect and think. Is there an inherent dilemma there, though? Because we've just described two things. One, which is we need to be able to balance a persistent kind of counterterrorism and

non-state threat mission. But we also need to reorient ourself and reskill ourselves for great power competition or near peer threats. It almost sounds like we need to do more stuff, but you're also saying we need to reduce our operations tempo. Is there kind of a challenge with doing more with less, or do we find that with the withdrawal from these kind of large footprint campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that we actually have more time to give? Kyle, I look at it that this has given us a bit more trade space. And then it's also allowed us, as Linda was just pulling on and discussing, is a bit more of a regional focus so that our elements, and that's across the force, can go back to the Indo-Pacific region that we work with.

And being able to focus significantly in that area is key for us and has been a focus for us over the last few years. Yeah, it's interesting you say that because we had General McConville on the chief of staff of the army. It's interesting you say that because we had General McConville on the chief of staff of the army, and he made the argument that with the withdrawal of Iraq and Afghanistan, there'll actually be more irregular warfare around the world for the exact reason you said, is that it allows our forces to focus and increase their attention regionally, which means we'll be able to have a kind of broader influence and presence, even if it's not all concentrated in one place, essentially. And we also, Kyle, to that point, China is not just in the Indo-Pacific region.

And we can compete with China across the globe. They're in Africa, they're in South America. And getting understanding of what they are doing in those regions, I think is also key in this competitive space. Linda, what General Clark is describing is the scope of competition that the U.S. finds itself in now with its near peers. Could you give us some more context on what are the characteristics of competition and particularly where you think special operations forces are best equipped to integrate into

this competition space? think special operations forces are best equipped to integrate into this competition space? So if you mean in terms of functions, I'll address that first. But I think the geographic locations and the partners, as General Clark just mentioned, is important too. And I think that one area that is quite critical for which SOF, and particularly I would say Army SOF, is well suited is the Army Psychological Operations Forces, but it's also more broadly this cultural knowledge that they gain and the understanding what messaging is being employed by the competitor or the adversary, as well as the ability to work among the population with both PSYOP and civil affairs. So I think that is really a key area. And that blends into the cyber area, which is something that is not a doctrinal competence of SOF, but they have

been making some significant investments in working in cross-functional teams with cyber experts, but also doing some training for types of tactical cyber activities that they're able to master. And that, I think, is very important given that that is one of the most high-demand new specialties, and the joint force in general is really, I think, struggling to train and retain the type of cyber warriors that we're going to need increasingly. And I agree with General Clark that it is so important to understand our partners and allies. And it is quite clear that the Middle East is a critical arena for China. It imports 90% of its oil, 44% of it comes from the Middle East, and they have a very heavy reliance on Saudi oil and an increasing reliance on Iraqi oil. They also have a 25-year cooperation pact with Iran, which poses this sort of interesting balancing act for China.

But you look at these countries and how they are entwined with China as a very important market for them. Israel, also very important tech partner and trading partner. So I think we have to really understand, A, what China is doing in a given region, where it is a competitive threat that we have to deal with as a country, and where it shades into a security threat that would involve the joint force and SOF using some of its competencies. We're in perpetual competition. We always have been and always will be, and it's infinite. But there's this concerning trend, I think, that we're looking at competition like a phase. Okay, we do competition and then we get into crisis and then maybe into conflict, like they're separate things. And I think that is something that we have to be wary of, because it's not binary.

And we could have crisis in the competitive space. I think what happened, and you all focused a podcast on this with Russia, Russia and Syria and Yusuf Wagner group, that was in some ways high in conflict that existed within a competition state of which we're in. So I look at this that we are always campaigning below the threshold of conflict, but conflict could come into this. So as we talk about compete and what we're competing for, I think we got to look at what we're competing for and what we're competing against. We're competing every day for allies and partners.

We want to be seen as the partner of choice with them because of the values that we share. But then we want to be able to pull together those allies and partners and discuss with them what we're for all the time and not necessarily what we're against. And to be able to work with those to gain that access placement influence in countries and in regions to forward our national security interest. So General Clark, you talked about how the idea that competition is perpetual and that it's not a phase. And I guess the question is, as you look at the U.S. government and as it pivots to great

power competition, you hear a lot of arguments from different services of the Department of Defense that we need to orient on certain capabilities. It seems like a lot of it is focused on large-scale combat operations. But what you're saying is that this competition is not a phase where we're going to shift to large-scale combat operations, but that rather there's a perpetual state of competition. Can you explain what the role of SOF is there's a perpetual state of competition. Can you explain what the role of SOF is in addressing this perpetual state? And then also, when you look at the conventional forces, what is their role in competition as well, or should they just be focused on large-scale combat operations? I'm very careful that I don't use the word shift or pivot in this. And I'm very,

very explicit and use the word rebalance when I say this, because we got to look at the proper allocation of where we are and what we're doing and prioritize so that we don't get to overstretch the force and make sure that we prioritize those things that only soft can do. And then we also look at where allies and partners can absolutely contribute in this space. You know, to go to the specific point on the joint force, that their ability in this space is huge, posture, access, placement, but then created things like the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigades, Advisory Brigades, are tremendous and are a complementary effect in the competition or irregular warfare. The irregular warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy was not written

force off. It was written for the joint force. And I think we got to just continue to come back to that. While our joint force has to be prepared for the high end conflict, it still has to be in the normal everyday campaigning phase in a regular warfare. So I appreciate the work that has been done down there at SOCOM General Clark. And I think we're always struggling to find the right words to describe what we are talking about. Competition, I think, is an excellent, easily understood term. I understand the department may be moving toward integrated deterrence as a term of art. And I, to further enrich the word soup here, I'll just bring up the George Kennan term, political warfare, which I think is an important term that shows both our history with that. It was a defining term when special operations forces were founded.

George Kennan coined this term to really convey the sense of employing all the means at a nation's command and also to conduct operations that are overt and covert. And they range widely from the political to the economic to the intelligence sphere and military that can include clandestine operations as well as resistance. So I think what's important here is that we understand that competition is going to occur in a variety of venues. And from the study that we did on this topic, I think that the headline here is this competition is going to be primarily non-military. I think that the country has to really understand it's going to win or lose in this sphere primarily because of what we do as a nation, both domestically, but also operating as a true interagency force and even a whole of society

force. And I think much more needs to be done and discussed about this. And also, I think another piece of this will be for SOF to see itself as in support of a wider mission. It's part of this reset that Kyle asked about at the very beginning. SOF, in its counterterrorism mode, very often was out there alone as the only operator. And I think operating as part of a collective is an important thing, whether it's at the unit level with cyber and intel and new competencies arrayed around them. Electronic warfare comes to mind, for example, or working, again, out of the embassies or in different formations with partners in their countries is really important of how we need to think about the way SOF is going to be operated. What Linda said, and this will be primarily a non-military effort in the

competition space, I think where SOFT ties in very well with this is after 20 years of fighting primarily a counterterrorism, counter-violent extremist organization, the one thing that we did to enable us to do that effectively was tie into the interagency. With liaison networks throughout the vast majority of the interagency and the intel community has set up those partnerships that allow us to see and sense and work with them to ensure that if there are military capabilities needed or if there's some way we can assist them in this competition space, that we are poised to do that. And I think that's been built up over decades of trust and working relationships that I think will continue to bear out as we go forward.

Can we compare this to how the U.S. peer and near peer competitors are approaching competition in this space? Like when we think about the level to which they use military solutions versus other tools of the state, does the U.S. tend to over militarize it? Even if we say that we're going to be doing it in a way that incorporates other, other types of tools. I'm just curious if you could contrast this, the US approach to the way that Russia and China approach irregular warfare and competition. Yes, well, of course, if we're talking about China, of course, the Communist Party of China is the organizing element of that entire society, not that we're, I hope we should not view this as a new Cold War, but some of the organizational attributes of that era have been lost. And I'll go back again to this critical area of the information sphere. We no longer have

a U.S. information agency. Public diplomacy used to be a very strong discipline within the civilian or foreign service cadre, and it was linked up quite closely as well with CIA approaches to their black psyop, if you will. There were a range of information capabilities across the government. There were a range of information capabilities across the government. And what has happened, I think, more recently is that the military has seen a vacuum and it has moved into that vacuum withps Enterprise that's been set up that is directly supporting all of the combatant commands in recognition of the global nature of this information fight. the Information Warfare Center at the Special Forces Command. That is a critical endeavor to try to integrate PSYOP with other capabilities and give them more heft above the tactical level. They've also been very instrumental in supporting the State Department's one operational node, which is the Global Engagement Center. But that bears really no resemblance to what the USIA used to do, which was a full spectrum. I just actually

had lunch yesterday with a Lebanese American, and he was talking about growing up in Beirut, and how important the US information agencies, libraries, and cultural programs, and all kinds of activities that were going on, and we're just not doing that right now. And I would make one other note that China is very, information is a central pillar of its doctrine and what it's doing. And it is moving out in so many ways. They're buying up radio stations across the globe, really. I mean, they are very heavily investing in information. I absolutely agree with Linda. And she described very well the activities that SOCOM has taken on and truthfully, the investments that we are making in our people and our processes within SOCOM has taken on and truthfully the investments that we are making in our people and our processes within SOCOM as we realize how important the information operations and the

information space is within this. And that goes everything from public diplomacy all the way through covert influence. And we have to understand that range and where we fall in that. The thing I would go back to is what I said earlier, but this has got to be well-coordinated within the government so that we are on message and linked in with our Department of State and having our liaison team specific. We have a team, as Linda just talked about, in the Global Engagement Center from State. And they now have a team in our Joint MISA Web Ops Center to ensure that those communications and the messages that we are getting out through the different modes are what our U.S. government is for. And to make sure that that disinformation that some of our adversaries and competitors

that we're trying to sow in, that those are in fact combated. And we have to continue to look at those because working against the myths and disinformation in the future is going to be key. We can't give our adversaries a free pass in this space. Yeah, Linda, it's interesting that you mentioned the Cold War and you stated that it's not necessarily an exact blueprint for what a competition would look like between China and the US. Some have argued that for special operations, we do need to look back to World War II and the Cold War as models of where to invest our capabilities. Other people have argued that it's not quite as relevant.

I'm wondering if you or either of you really have historical or recent cases that you see as kind of good examples of how soft should be applied, of where they should be applied. And you've already brought up the importance of information. And you've also talked about the information of working through partners, Linda. Are there some soft capabilities that are more important to invest in than others when you look at specific historical cases that should be guiding us moving forward? at specific historical cases that should be guiding us moving forward? The one that I think resonates with me the most is the original Special Forces mission was, of course, to be the stay-behind force should Russia invade our European countries. And these soft units were going to be a critical support to an organizer and supplier of resistance to that

occupation. And what has happened in recent years is an interesting evolution on that, as the Baltics in particular have been very concerned about the various types of threats and encroachments from latter-day Russia. And the time I spent out in the Baltic countries, I really understood them to say, don't call this unconventional warfare. We're going to call this preparation for resistance. You know, they were not interested in having our uniformed people on the ground out there on the pointy end of the stick. They really wanted us to be in support of their understanding of what needed to happen and their own networks, because again, they know their own population terrain much better. So I think the thing here is really

to understand these countries need to be in charge of what they consider as important. I'll mention very quickly, a lot of what we did in Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines, I think is very transferable, working very closely to build the capacity of the Philippine SOF units to a very high level, very deep and long-term relationship, but also in every case working with our civil affairs units, working across two USAID programs, and some very interesting PSYOP teams work. So that triad was very important. And then the final example I think that's important is Indonesia, where for many years the U.S. didn't have a robust presence, but we have partners that do, allies that do. Australia comes to mind. And I think it's very important to look at some of these cases where

our allies may be the lead entity and we play more of a supporting role to them. and we play more of a supporting role to them. Linda gave some tremendous examples and some specificity there. I'm going to take it up a notch a little bit for SOF and some of the basic principles when I think we are working in other countries that we want to maintain. One, when we're operating within another country and training with their forces, we always are going to apply a by, with, and through approach. Our teams are going to come in with the cultural and in many times the language expertise so they can quickly adapt and work closely with those partner forces in whatever country in the examples that Linda gave. But then in all cases, we're at the behest of the host nation.

It's what that country is willing to bear. And then it's also in conjunction with our embassy. We're working very closely with the chief of mission and chief of station in those countries, wherever they may be, to help forward their and our national security interests. In Linda's example, the Baltics, where we have maintained presence and have increased presence with special forces teams, civil and psyops teams

to help them. I just recently came back from there and the things that I got to witness and those trusted partners is fantastic. But the last thing I'd say in this is consistency and persistency matters that we maintain there. And I can go, the example that I would throw in, in addition to what Linda did, is a place like Columbia. And you've talked about Columbia in this podcast. Lieutenant Puckett, in the early 1950s, who was just awarded the Medal of Honor, he went to Columbia recovering from his wounds from Korea to help set up their special forces training. And you think about doing that almost 60 plus years ago and how that has manifested itself and a continuous presence with the Colombians that has helped our interest, but also helped the role of the Colombians, I

think is key. But then the last thing, and this goes a little bit to your point, those are the good news stories, but we have to look at precautionary tales too. And that sometimes we can't let enthusiasm ever go past, you know, capability. And, you know, I look at cautionary tales like misuse of SOF, like World War II and throwing in a range of battalions, Cisterna Italy, as a conventional force and the entire element gets wiped out. And I think as we look at capabilities going forward to make sure, I have to, and so do

all subordinate SOF commanders, educate and form the joint forces, we can't do everything. I think we should definitely dig into the misuse of SOF, but I want to push on something you said, which is the idea that we can work with other countries to help achieve mutual interest. But it seems like a lot of times the reason that we're involved in a country is because they're not pursuing our interests in the way that we would like, either because they're ineffective or because they have strategies or approaches that we deem to not work, or maybe they just don't care about the same interests at the level we do. And so I think the next kind of question there is, do we have the ability with SOF or other capabilities within the DOD to influence other countries and armies to do what we want on our behalf, even if it's not fully aligned with their interests?

It is really important to understand this. I use the simple term of Venn diagram. You have to identify some key overlaps in interest. to identify some key overlaps in interest. I think it is kind of the hubris to think that we can enforce our will on any country around the world. I think it has to be a matter of identifying where there is enough of a common interest to go into an endeavor together and be clear in those cases where the limits of those interests are. And we've also, I think, had another lesson about hubris, which is in the case of Afghanistan, we just, I think, applied a model that was a centralized, building a centralized security force. And that was overlaid on a concept of a centralized government in a country that's fundamentally regionally focused and very

tribal. And I think it had, you know, SOF did have one very important experiment there, which was the ground up approach, the local defense forces and village stability operations. That was the subject of my last trade book named 100 Victories, which few realized I was referencing Sun Tzu. It was about doing it their way. And I think this is really one of the key insights that the veteran special operators that I've come to know really incorporate that. They have to understand the person and the culture across the aisle. Yeah, Linda's hitting a great point that we can't just enforce all of our interests when we're working with others. And we absolutely have to find those intersections from a commander SOCOM

perspective. What I think we also have to be aware of, we can't create all partner forces in our own image. And we can't always train partner forces with what we know and what our experiences are. We have to adapt ourselves to what they need. And I think this is going to be an important lesson coming out of Afghanistan. But I think it's also going to be something that as we look at with other nations, who is the best force to partner with? Who is going to actually help their country? And what does that country need? And align it with our capabilities and capacity. and align it with our capabilities and capacity.

And most people, when they think about this, they automatically go to, all right, what's the ODA Green Beret team that is in fact going to be there or the SEAL team that's going to work in the maritime domain? But I think we have to think across all soft functions. What is the best civil affairs team and what does this country need and how can we train with their civil affairs? Or potentially, as Linda's talked about, they also have information support teams. And so how do we, in fact, train with them and increase their capacity and capabilities that may work inside their country? So on that understanding that we've identified a number of different applications of soft,

the ways that soft might function in the Baltics versus the Pacific versus the Middle East could have very different manifestations. So does soft look different by theater? And does that impact what soft capabilities SOCOM should be investing in? I wouldn't even put it by theater. I think we got to get specific to country. I can't even look at the Baltics the same. As an example, there are some congruity between the different Baltic nations, but they're all different. And they'll be sure to tell you they're different. So we got to understand their requirements. But yeah,

there's a difference in that theater, vice what there could be in the Indo-Pacific. But I think we're looking even more specific for what partnerships, what the training may be, what the teams we send them to work with them, and each one individually. And that goes across the spectrum of training and partnership. That goes all the way back to bringing the training of their individuals and some of the IMET training that we do. SOCOM plays a role in making sure that we get future leaders from those countries into some of our courses and schools, which plays huge benefits, I think, for their countries and for ours as we tie in the training of their current and future senior leaders.

itself, what its approach is to the adversary or the competitor, and mentioning Africa, of course, China is now Africa's number one trading partner. The continent is in many ways, the continent of the future with such a vast young population. I've already mentioned the equities of China in the Middle East that is a two-way street. So I think that that is my starting point. But then operationally, there are some very important things. And I would say with regard to Africa, for any type of soft operations, there is the tyranny of distance. That is such a vast and austere continent that SOF is going to be challenged to operate, for many years. Of course, they've been reliant

on contract air and ISR platforms that they acquire directly and so forth. These things, I think, really matter if you're trying to do more than, let's say, information operations from within the confines of an embassy. If you're out there in the hinterlands, you're going to need very robust forms of support. And then I'll mention one other capability requirement that goes, I think, across theater, one way in which I think we soft critically needs to enunciate a very specific demand signal, and that is to acquire the systems that are appropriate for small units to operate, whether they're man-portable, man-packable, or on tactical airframes, so that they can detect the presence of adversary forces, detect adversary weapon systems, and protect their own communications and forces. I think that while the services are investing in systems that are appropriate for

large formations and appropriate for conflict scenarios, there is a very critical need to acquire systems for the soft units. As we look at capability requirements, and you talked about potentially the lack thereof as pressure comes on, I think this highlights why multilateral approaches and working with partners are so important. And you gave Africa as a specific example. And as I look at West Africa, I just talked to my French soft commander counterpart last week. They're doing a great job in pulling different European countries in to West Africa with different capabilities to include the air, to include the overhead unarmed area vehicles that provide some of that protection and some of the targeting capabilities. So wherever we can leverage exporters of security

and pull them in with shared interest, we absolutely have to. And we're going to continue to do that. But I absolutely agree with you. We have to identify what are those minimum requirements that will allow a soft element that may be working in a place where there is a threat to them. What are those minimum things they're going to need to be able to do their job? There's a lot of ways we could take the conversation. If you could see the text box between Shauna and I in the background, you'd see us fighting over who gets to ask the next question. But I'll say that I'd like to shift a little bit. We talked about how this focus on competition has a lot of implications for SOF capabilities and applications. I'd like to talk about how it

impacts personnel capabilities. So a previous guest and former SOCOM commander, Admiral Eric Olson, argued in this forum that the Special Operations Command needs to change some of its personnel policies. Do you think the system is promoting the right types of leaders and talent to engage in political warfare, as Linda called it, or great power competition? And what are the key qualities of future SOF operators? That was one of your best podcasts, by the way, with Admiral Olson and Michelle Flournoy. So kudos to you both on that one. A couple points I'd start with, and I could go into a 10-minute dialogue, which I'll avoid here, but I think it's important to start with

the law for SOCOM commander. It is monitoring the promotions of special operations forces and coordinate with the military departments regarding retention, training, and professional military education, and it goes on. I take that role seriously. That includes the assignments of our officers, and it includes the assignments of our senior enlisted leaders within and outside the SOF formation. I have to manage that closely. I work very, very hard with the service chiefs to manage those promotions and assignments. I mean, if someone had said 10 or 15 years ago that we would have five soft operators on the joint staff in key positions at the flag officer level. Someone said, that's crazy. But we continue to make sure that our people are put in positions

that are good for their careers, but are also really good for the joint force and then subsequently the soft formation. We have two flag officers at Space Com. And so who would have believed that? So we got to envision what the joint force needs and what SOCOM needs in the future. And Admiral Olson is right, because I still go to what is the key that we need to do? We got to continue to, you know, professionalize our soft forces so that we recruit, retain those,

and assess the entire segment of our population to bring the best in and then retain them subsequently. Because it does go back to really our first two soft truths. Humans more important than hardware and quality over quantity. And those are five soft truths. those always stick in heavy with me. In terms of the personnel issue, and I know Admiral Olson and respect him enormously for the quiet work that he did for many, many years to promote the understanding ofF and to really try to identify the people that needed to ascend to lead SOF. And we have today a very robust general and flag officer cadre in special operations. And I think that needs to continue the leadership. Cadre is absolutely important as I think the one enduring lesson of the 9-11 period has

been how SOF can punch above its weight, that SOF does not just operate at the tactical level, it operates at the operational and strategic level, and that means you need general and flag officers. But what are the bureaucratic systems to achieve that? I think that requires some further consideration. I'd like to answer the question about the key qualities that are needed in the future cadre of SOF. Yes, you're always going to need those attracted to and competent in and highly competent in direct action and special reconnaissance. But what I think the coin of the realm is in the future are really those who want to work with populations and those who truly understand the strategic impact of developing partners in other countries. Also, I think we have to have

soft leaders that are comfortable operating in the policy environment and in the diplomatic environment. But is that training? Is that what you do with the officers? I think it's a combination, selecting for those aptitudes, but then making sure those programs exist where they can be trained and acculturated to operate at these different levels. There's a couple of things I'd like to hit on as it pertains to some of the competencies and some of the things that have happened within Special Operations Command. One is we inherently work as a joint team and an IA team at a much lower level and much lower echelon than most officers get to do. And I think that's a value-added proposition to

be able to bring joint and IA solutions to the joint force. And so fostering that in our own population, and we're doing that at the lieutenant colonel and colonel level that folks are getting, our people are getting that opportunity. And then the other piece as we look going forward, we're going to have to have soft leaders that are technically savvy and aware of the capabilities to be able to apply things like data and AI-driven solutions because if they can't, it goes all the way back to beginning of what Linda said, they have to be able to operate in contested environments and make decisions faster than our adversary may be.

So understanding the command control communications architecture and how it's going to enable them is going to be key. And having AI-ready leaders is going to be really important for us going forward. In general, as we're looking at talent management overall within special operations forces, is the key issue this transition to new capabilities and moving towards the information and space capabilities, or is it in retention of a force that has pretty strong competencies in CT and may or may not be comfortable with being able to move forward? Sean, I think people that can operate in one environment, if they're problem solvers and can figure out what challenges that they are facing and how to adapt to those changes, that's the individuals we're looking for.

We've had to adapt and ensure that they are promoted and are put in the right positions to enable them for future positions inside SOCOM and, truthfully, outside SOCOM to the joint force. We're bumping up on time right now, so I'd like to close it out by asking, what are the biggest implications from this conversation for policymakers and practitioners as we move forward? I'll take a couple quick ones at this, Kyle. One, we've been talking about it all throughout, and that's going to be the continued role of information operations in what I would say is a highly interconnected world where information is rapidly and quickly available to the masses of population. And we have to understand what our risk calculus and what we're willing to put out there and how quickly we're willing to put things out there because there's always this tension of being out

there first with the truth and not wrong. But I think we really have to understand that because this is an area where senior leaders, I believe, have to be able to accept more risk in the future. And then the other one, as we start talking about deterrence and integrated deterrence is understanding where that fits in the competition space. Because most folks, when they think about deterrence, they're thinking about the high-end strategic deterrence of nuclear weapons. I think there's a role in the deterrence sphere in the competition space. And I think that's an area where both policymakers and

practitioners are going to have to look at heavy, and we got to play a role within SOCOM inside that. we got to play a role within SOCOM inside that? Well, I think there are a number of implications at the policy level that we've been of this topic today. The relationship with Congress is absolutely critical for the way ahead for SOF. As you all know, the Congress has issued a number of, legislated a number of requirements. They've also requested very sweeping assessment of special operations and SOCOM. And I think there is a lack of deep understanding in many quarters, certainly among the new members of Congress, and this isn't a fault of them. This is a highly specialized field. But I think they're struggling to understand we have an array of missions enshrined in doctrine. We have an array of numbered authorities and alphabet soup of units. I think they really just struggle to understand who are the special

operations forces, what are they doing, and what are the rules and authorities that bind and guide them. And that really imposes, really, I think, a pretty heavy burden on the leadership of General Clark and the leadership of the department to make sure there is an intensive dialogue and constant effort to inform the Congress. The other two issues that I think are really begging to be addressed through some intensive dialogue is what is the future size and budget of SOF? And these are really macro issues, but they're going to affect everything that SOF does. My personal view is if you have a smaller military, you're going to have a smaller SOF force from which it's drawn. And it's very important to maintain the standards to achieve the diversity that SOF needs to be successful and retain enough budget to invest in some of these higher end systems that are vital to the survival of the force in whatever mission it's assigned in a highly contested world. And the final issue that has

yet to be, I think, really clarified is the civilian oversight role and what is the precise function of the ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for special operations and low-intensity conflict and the reporting chain there and its relationship to the service-like responsibilities of SOCOM. These are very big issues, but I think it's really important as framing a dialogue and a baseline understanding across the decision-making apparatus of our government. understanding across the decision-making apparatus of our government. SOF is a great value proposition for our government. With about 2% of the force and about 3% of the budget, we provide great options for our military. And I think we always have to look at that. And Linda's point is implications to policymakers is what are the force sizing constructs that are applied to special operations,

which is primarily looked at from a deployment to dwell or who's deployed, whereas sometimes with the joint force, it's looking at O-plan commitment. And so is that really the appropriate force sizing construct for SOF as we go forward. And we look at internal, what are the force development and force design implications as we look at our force that are going to be key going into the future. So we can't just look at what's happened in the past in this, go tie it all the way back to the competition space, but what is going to be required in the future for the joint force and the joint soft force in this.

And I think that's key. General Clark, Linda Robinson, thank you for joining us today to discuss the role of special operations and great power competition. General Clark, we're big fans of the soft cast that USOCOM puts out and appreciate you taking the time to join us on this venue. And Linda, your research continues to be an exceptional resource for us and the irregular warfare community. So thank you again. This has been a great conversation on irregular warfare. Hey, Kyle and Shauna from here in Tampa, really thanks for teeing this up and to Linda Robinson. It was clear to me before,

even more so today after listening to your great comments throughout, how well you know our force and you've continued to be a great advocate for us, but also challenge us in the things we need to be challenged on. And to the audience, Kyle, thanks for the plug on Softcast. I'd highly encourage you to listen to it, to hear our people talk about the things

that they're encountering inside our formation to help inform our force, but also to inform a broader audience. So thanks. Thank you so much, General Clark. That's very generous of you. And Kyle and Shauna, great questions and probing. I found this a very enjoyable and informative session. informative session. Thanks again for listening to episode 39 of the Irregular Warfare podcast. We release a new episode every two weeks. In our next episode, Abigail and I discuss the intersection of cyberspace and irregular warfare with Admiral Mike Rogers, former commander of Cyber Command, and Dr. Jackie Schneider.

After that, Andy and Laura discuss organizational change in irregular warfare context with retired General John Allen and Simon Acom. Please be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare podcast so you do not miss an episode. The Irregular Warfare podcast is a product of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. We generate written and audio content, coordinate events for the community, and host critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn. One last note, what you hear in this episode are the views of the participants and do not represent those of Princeton, West Point, or any agency of the U.S. government. Thanks again, and we will see you next time.