Irregular Warfare Podcast - The Defense of Europe: The Trans-Atlantic Relationship after Two Years of War

Episode Date: December 15, 2023

Be sure to visit the Irregular Warfare Initiative website to see all of the new articles, podcast episodes, and other content the IWI team is publishing! Nearly two years have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine. In the lead-up to the war, European states largely agreed on the importance of supporting Russia, but disagreed about the optimal form—and scale—of that support. In many ways, the invasion served an extraordinary unifying function within Europe and strengthened the trans-Atlantic alliance. But what is the state of those relations now? And where does European defense policy stand after two years of war? To explore those questions, we’re joined in this episode by Ravi Agrawal, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy, and retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of US Army Europe and coauthor of the book Future War and the Defence of Europe. Intro music: "Unsilenced" by Ketsa Outro music: "Launch" by Ketsa CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

And the fact that you've got nations that are in a queue wanting to join NATO, wanting to join the EU, despite the various problems, is an acknowledgement of the value in terms of security and lifestyle. I had a German tell me one time, he said, the two pillars for us are NATO and the EU. NATO is for life. EU is for quality of life. But most of all, if you step back and, you know, pull away from just the here and now, and you look at the last 20 months, Putin has failed in all of his objectives. He wanted this to be a quick war. He thought he was going to take over Kyiv very, very quickly. He was misinformed by his advisors from the start. The longer this war goes on, yes, I mean, Ukraine obviously is facing immense damage, immense human cost, but the cost of Russia, we should not underestimate. Welcome to episode 94 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

I'm Laura Jones, and my co-host today is Louis Taberki. Today is a special episode where we have partnered with Foreign Policy Magazine and their weekly podcast, Foreign Policy Live. We talk with Ravi Agrawal, the Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Policy, and retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges about the state of European defense policy and the war in Ukraine. Our guests begin by framing the current state of European defense policy in posture. They go on to discuss policy failures that led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and they continue by offering analysis of ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.

They end with their thoughts on the implications of the war on broader geopolitical policy areas. Ravi Agarwal is the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy. He's also the host of Foreign Policy Live, the magazine's video channel and podcast, on which he regularly interviews world leaders and policymakers. Before joining Foreign Policy, he spent more than a decade at CNN and spent time as a New Delhi bureau chief. He's the author of the book, India Connected, How the Smartphone is Transforming the World's Largest Democracy. Thank you. is now the Senior Advisor to Human Rights First, a non-profit, non-partisan, international human rights organization. Prior to this, he held a Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis. In addition, General Hodges serves as NATO's Senior Mentor for Logistics, where he consults for several companies in Europe, NATO, and the European Union.

He is co-author of the book, Future War and the Defense of Europe, which provides the foundation for this episode. You are listening to the Irregular Warfare Podcast, a joint production of the Princeton Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point, dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. Today, we're also in partnership with the podcast Foreign Policy Live. Here's our conversation with Ravi Agarwal and Ben Hodges.

Here's our conversation with Ravi Agarwal and Ben Hodges. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Ravi Agarwal, Foreign Policy Magazine. Thank you so much for being with us here today at the Regular Warfare Podcast. Louie and I are super excited to have you, and I think our listeners will really learn a lot from today's conversation. Well, I am thrilled to have a chance to be a part of this. I jumped on it as soon as I heard who was hosting it and also that you had Ravi as a part of this. So I'm very happy to get this opportunity. Likewise, I'm so excited to be on. Big fan of your show. So the main theme of our conversation today is the current state of European defense policy and the relationship between Europe and the United States and the United States and NATO.

So can we start off just really framing what the state of European, both NATO and EU defense policy is, and how the back-to-back shocks of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed things? So this war in Ukraine now is what failed deterrence looks like. I mean, we, the West, did not respond in any meaningful way after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. We didn't respond after the Russians jumped over President Obama's red line in Syria. And we didn't really consequentially respond after they invaded Ukraine in 2014. In fact, we did nothing. And the Russians were pretty sure that that would continue, that we would not really respond.

NATO was not in bad shape, but the American president, former President Trump, talked about pulling the U.S. out or questioning American commitment. If Montenegro, for example, had been attacked, I'd never in my life did I think that I would hear an American president of any party say something like that. And then President Macron said NATO was brain dead. And then we had the January 6th chaos and the way we ended the mission in Afghanistan. All of these things contributed, I think, to Russia thinking we could go ahead and finish the job in Ukraine and the West is not going to be able to deal with it. Fortunately, they were wrong in that the alliance has responded in a way where we're in a better shape now than probably any time since the

end of the Cold War in terms of readiness, American forward presence, robustness and quality of exercises, those kind of things. But we still have a long way to go in terms of interoperability, modernization efforts. Obviously, we don't have enough ammunition and we have a long way to go in terms of interoperability, modernization efforts. Obviously, we don't have enough ammunition, and we have a very, very serious problem with air and missile defense. It didn't occur to me that Russia would be launching missiles, precision weapons against apartment buildings and civilian infrastructure. Seeing that they've done that in Ukraine, that means we have to do more than protect Ramstein. We, the West, have got to protect half a billion European citizens. So we're back on track,

but we're not where we should be if we're serious about defeating Russia, should they make another terrible miscalculation. So I completely agree with Ben over there. You know, one thing that is so clear now is that Russia made a series of miscalculations and in doing so has really sort of mired itself in a war that looks to be dragging on for quite a while. But in terms of the state of the relationship, I think some of the same things that led to Russia making its decision, so imagining that America was extremely weak as seen through the way in which it left Kabul and Afghanistan, imagining that America would be too focused on China. I think all of those miscalculations are also tension points of

sorts in the emerging relationship between the United States and Europe. So for example, while it's been so heartening to see the way in which the transatlantic relationship has been strengthened since Russia invaded Ukraine, the way in which the two sides have cooperated and built and strengthened their partnership, especially on defense. There also are emerging cracks, for example, on China policy. There is some sort of resentment, I think, in Europe for the way in which the United States left Afghanistan without fully consulting allies. So some of those cracks, which I think largely have been surpassed by the way in which the two have cooperated. But Russia's role within this is very interesting because

it has been looking at the world, it has observed serious concerns, serious flaws, but it overestimated all of them. And so in sum, it's so clear that the transatlantic partnership and relationship was just much stronger than Russia imagined it to be. Yeah, and I'm sure that the Kremlin never dreamed ever, here we are 19 months since the beginning of the special military operation, that we would have 54 nations still together supporting Ukraine, or that Germany would have 54 nations still together supporting Ukraine, or that Germany would be the number two contributor to Ukraine. That's a huge miscalculation. But when we talk about failed deterrence, that's the terrible part of this. This war should have never

happened. I mean, if American leadership was unquestioned, or American commitment to NATO, I should say, as well as right levels of readiness, these kinds of things, there should have been no miscalculation by the Kremlin. So Ben, jumping off from what you said earlier, harkening back to some of the history of 2008, 2014, where Europe and the Western allies didn't do a whole lot in response to Russian aggression, do the mechanisms of European decision-making require an existential crisis in order to make things work? I would say the United States usually requires a major crisis to do certain things also. But NATO and the EU are both two institutions that each of which has problems and flaws and

challenges. But that's the nature of coalitions. It's been the nature of coalition warfare forever that each nation will bring their own agenda, just like we do, to the coalition, or in this case, an alliance or the European Union. And so, yes, of course, you've got different perspectives inside the European Union and within Europe, more broadly, about Russia, about Ukraine, about the different issues. You know, the Italians and Spanish and Portuguese are like, why aren't we focused over there? The real problem is coming across the Mediterranean from Africa. And the Greeks and Turkey, our two NATO allies, are eyeing each other all the time,

buying expensive equipment to deter each other. So these are all real challenges, which I think is what makes the fact that we have 54 nations still together even more impressive. And the fact that you've got nations that are in a queue wanting to join NATO, wanting to join the EU, despite the various problems, is an acknowledgement of the value in terms of security and lifestyle. I had a German tell me one time, he said, the two pillars for us are NATO and the EU. NATO is for life. EU is for quality of life. And I thought that was a good way to kind of capture how Europeans look at these two institutions.

Yeah, I mean, big decisions almost always come out of crises, right? And the thing is, there were crises before that the world just didn't respond to. And I think those were mistakes. I mean, Ben mentioned 2014, going back further, 2008. We're in a moment of our own making. And I think it's one thing to say that, yes, Europe and America came together 19 months ago, but it missed that opportunity several times before. And we are where we are because Putin looked at the way in which the world had been responding to him and his aggression all over the world, in Africa, with the Wagner Group's activities there, in Syria, going back further, in Afghanistan, so many other arenas where Russia has played a spoiler role of sorts. And they have felt emboldened over time. They have

felt that the West's power is waning. They have looked around the world outside of these arenas and looked at a rising China, a rising India, a growing focus and energy around Asia. And I think much as though we're all agreeing so far that clearly Putin has miscalculated. He miscalculated the resolve of the West, the strength of the partnership between America and Europe. I think we shouldn't forget, however, that there are some things that he did not miscalculate, such as the fact that the West let him get away with it for as long as it did, such as the fact that the center of gravity of the world is shifting eastward. And that comes with its own set of policy changes, its own set of challenges, I think,

for partnerships in the West as well, because there isn't unanimous agreement on how to deal with this shift in center of gravity. So many of these issues, I think, are still live and in play and will be for several years to come. As winters arrive in Ukraine, there's a lot of success in the summer counteroffensive, but no significant decisive victory. So as the war closes in on the two-year mark, at what point does the crisis reaction wear off for the West and normal decision-making processes take over, which has implications on appetite for risk and greater concerns for domestic political concerns. Look, this counteroffensive is so much more than what we see of people trying to get through minefields and trenches. That is a piece of it.

But I think many observers think that's the counteroffensive. But as you know very well, because you're an intimate part of it, the United States, NATO, most of our Western allies practice multi-domain operations, MDO. We used to call it joint, but it's a little bit more sophisticated now when you think in terms of multi-domain, air, land, sea, cyber information, special operations, all of these elements. And what the Ukrainians are doing, they are practicing multi-domain operations, and they are running rings around the Russian general staff. I mean, think of all the things that have happened recently in Crimea. These were not coincidences. This was a very sophisticated

set of operations that started with special operators taking out an important radar on the west side of Crimea. Then shortly after that, special operators recaptured two oil and gas platforms in the Western Black Sea upon which the Russians had mounted radar. Those are gone. So now Crimea is sort of blinded on their western approaches. The next thing that happens, a combination of cruise missiles and what we think are probably shore-launched anti-ship missiles repurposed, and they destroy the dry dock in Sevastopol. And this is a great target because that's the biggest dry dock of the Russian Navy on the entire Black Sea. So you're taking away their ability to do important

maintenance. And I mean, getting the Kilo-class submarine, that was like a bonus. The other ship that they got, LST, a landing ship tank, which would normally be used for Russian amphibious operations, but they were starting to prepare to resupply Crimea through the Sea of Azov because the Russians could see that they might lose their land bridge or Kerch bridge. So the Ukrainians, very sophisticated targeting. And then, of course, the latest in this series of events that are all very well connected was the destruction of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. Of course, information domain, you've all seen the weekend at Bernie memes of, is the admiral actually dead or is he being propped up or whatever? What was more damaging, you know, the admiral can be replaced whether or not he's dead. I think we killed the emir of Mosul six times. That guy kept getting replaced. It didn't matter. But taking out 30 staff officers around the admiral, that will be much more difficult to replace. That will have a much more significant impact on the operations of the Black Sea Fleet. I think it's important

that we not get sucked into the mud of Zaporizhia and think, oh my God, the counteroffensive is bogging down, literally. There's so much more going on. There's enormous pressure on the Russian general staff. And I think that we are not going to see a pause in operations as the weather changes. Of course, the mud in Ukraine is legendary, and it will still be legendary. The Ukrainians know this, of course. But I think that they know they cannot give the Russians one free day to work on their defenses or bring up new stuff or reposition or put more mines in. So they're going to find ways to keep up the pressure rather than go into winter quarters. Now, Ravi, do you think that nuance and, you know, the operational level

nuance there gets into the mainstream narratives in the analytical publications? And do you think that that's what our policymakers are seeing and have a good grasp on? So I think our policymakers have a grasp on it. I don't think the mainstream media narrative fits what Ben has been describing. And I wish it did, frankly. I think there's been a lot of frustration in the media, in public, mostly in the West, about the quote-unquote slow pace of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. And I think part of that frustration stems from a lack of understanding of how counter-offenses work and of how wars work. And far be it for me to sort of speak to the three of you about this, but from my understanding of this war and of others is that it's not linear.

There are many fronts and many dimensions to it. But most of all, if you step back and pull away from just the here and now, and you look at the last 20 months, Putin has failed in all of his objectives. He wanted this to be a quick war. He thought he was going to take over Kiev very, very quickly. He was misinformed by his advisors from the start. The longer this war goes on, yes, I mean, Ukraine obviously is facing immense damage, immense human cost, but the cost of Russia, we should not underestimate to their economy, to their morale, to their development. All of this has been ruinous for Russia. And as much as we ask the question about how long the West can support Ukraine, it is worth absorbing and

examining just as much how long can Putin keep this up? At what cost? What kind of Russia will emerge from this? How long does Putin have? Those are all questions we should weigh equally. And when you do that, I think it's a mixed picture. The Ukrainians have surprised on the upside time and time again. And, you know, I think it would be wiser to put one's money on them continuing to do so. I think the challenge in the coming months, however, is whether the West can sustain its support. I find some of the policy discussions, especially the political discussions among some of the Republican candidates, for example, for president, I find those discussions to be a bit disturbing. I think there's a lot of focus on a very bland, zero-sum understanding of

the world, of politics, of foreign policy, and of war. And I think that's dangerous. But, you know, a layer down, I know that we have policymakers who think much more deeply and analytically about these things. So I can see why there's frustration in the media, especially in Ukraine, when they look at debates in the United States. But that's something that will play out for all of frustration in the media, especially in Ukraine, when they look at debates in the United States. But that's something that will play out for all of us in the next few months. Ravi, you nailed it. And I think the way you just described all that is very accurate. Our president has done a good job keeping 54 nations together, but he is failing at the most important task, which is to describe the objective. What is the purpose? The president has got to failing at the most important task, which is to describe the objective.

What is the purpose? The president has got to sit at the presidential desk, look into the camera and speak to all of us as adults and say, look, again, this is why we're doing this. This is in our interest. This is not just because we really like Ukrainians, even if we do. This is because stability and security in Europe are necessary for European prosperity and American prosperity is directly tied to European prosperity. If we don't stop Russia now, we could end up with NATO being in a conflict. That's going to suck us in.

And then the third major reason, of course, the Chinese are watching this. And if the Chinese see that we're not really willing to defend things like freedom of navigation, respect for international law, respect for international law, respect for international agreements, respect for sovereignty, respect for human rights, if we're not willing to do it there, where it's much easier than it will be out in the Indo-Pacific region, then I don't think they'll be terribly impressed with anything that we say. So the president has got to lay that out. If he does that, and he says, it's in our interest that Ukraine wins, that they eject Russia back to the 1991 borders, then all the excuses about not enough attack them or, you know, how long it takes to train an F-16 pilot or how much gas Abrams tank burns,

those excuses go away. And this could be over very quickly. I think you're right. The Russians are very weak right now, both domestically and in the military. You could not fill up that studio right there with the number of Russian troops that really want to be in Ukraine. You know, there are many kinds of wars, Ben, and there's also a battle here of storytelling. Putin has a story that he is spinning and selling to his people and to the world. a story that he is spinning and selling to his people and to the world. President Zelensky in Ukraine obviously has his own story that he needs to tell to Ukrainians to keep them strong. He has another story he needs to tell the world about how Ukrainians are strong and need the world's help and why they need it. But as you point out, the battle of storytelling in America is crucial,

and we need policymakers to paint a picture for why this is necessary, why it is important. And so of all the battles taking place, the one on the ground, the one in the air, the one at sea, the one in diplomatic circles, I think the most important one, perhaps, and the one we often don't talk enough about, is the storytelling battle and the battle for narratives that presidents must win. Jumping off from that discussion, in previous episodes on the podcast, we've talked a lot about security assistance. And one theme we've explored is how the expensive prestige weapons systems often look glamorous, and they can perform extremely well, but they can also take the focus off of more mundane, but still vitally important, lower-tier

weapons and training. Do you see an overemphasis of focus on prestige weapon systems and Western Ukrainian aid? Or do you think that we've got the focus doubting correctly on proper prioritization? Yeah, and on the Ukrainian side, are they asking for that just because they can ask for it? Or, you know, is there actual utility asking for prestige systems vice just more artillery shells? First of all, you have to go back to what are they for? What's the purpose? And of course, that flows from the objective. And then you develop a strategy to achieve the objective. And it's clear to me that Crimea is the decisive terrain of this war and that whoever controls Crimea at the end is going to be the winner of

this thing. Ukrainians know they'll never be safe or secure, nor will they be able to rebuild their economy as long as Russia controls Crimea. So that's the key. So how do they liberate Crimea? And I think this counteroffensive is aimed at liberating Crimea. And you do that by first isolating it and then making it untenable where the Black Sea fleet can't stay there. The Russian Air Force can't keep flying out of there, the logistics can't keep operating from there. And then eventually, you can reoccupy it, liberate it. So what are the capabilities that you need to achieve that? I prefer to focus on capabilities versus specific platforms, because if you talk about platforms, you get pulled down into this swamp of how much fuel it uses, or all the different problems and this and that. And there's probably several different weapons systems that can accomplish or provide the capability.

that will pound Sevastopol, pound the air base at Saki, pound the logistics hub at Jankoi on the Crimean Peninsula so that the Russians would have to reposition. I mean, they can't sit there and lose submarines and ships day after day after day. They're going to have to reposition if we have provided Ukraine with enough of these weapons in terms of types and the actual munitions. these weapons in terms of types and the actual munitions. I listened to the Supreme Allied Commander recently, General Cavoli, and he pointed out, and I agree with him, precision can defeat mass. The only advantage that the Russians have is mass, and they don't care how many of their own guys are killed. So how do you defeat that when you're outnumbered? And of course, if you can take away the headquarters and you take away the logistics, ammunition, and take away artillery, then what you've got is a bunch of poorly trained, unmotivated

infantry sitting in these muddy trenches. The Ukrainians can deal with that. But you've got to have long-range precision strike to knock out headquarters, artillery, and logistics. I think that's what they're asking for. That's what they need. And we have fallen short. The only metric, the only number that matters is the percentage of requirement have we filled. The requirement to win needs this list of dot, dot, dot, whatever system there. How are we doing on meeting that requirement?

We've delivered a zillion tons of ammo. It doesn't mean anything if they needed five zillion tons to win. I think we have to think about what's the objective, what capabilities are required, and how are we doing on fulfilling those capability requirements? So, Ben, I'm going to follow up on that with a similar question. So, as you're trying to define those capabilities you need to accomplish those objectives, you're looking into a lot of planning. And one of the things that you addressed a lot in your book with Jen Retired Allen and Julian Lindley French and the book you published in 2021 was a lot of means, ways, and ends for European defense and security. A lot has happened since you published that book. In what ways were you proven right and wrong? And what are the most consequential lessons from that book that you think we can still of a book writing team. It is hard as hell. It was much harder than I imagined it would be. Everything from finding a publisher to actually going through the process. I learned so much from it, though, and having somebody like Professor Julian Lindley French,

who, thank God, did most of the actual typing. And then, of course, General John Allen, a legendary figure himself. It was fun. In fact, we're already getting started now on after the future war in defense of Europe, we're going to do future war in defense of the Pacific, aiming for 2025 to get that out. Following a similar format with more emphasis on some of the tech things, specifically, you know, cyberspace and implications and where are our vulnerable points that the Chinese could attack if we're not prepared. I think the two or three things that hold true, we did anticipate, as did many people, the use of drones, artificial intelligence, these things were on the rise, but I did not anticipate the volume, the sheer mass of how many would be out there. I didn't anticipate that many

and how effective they would be. I'm sure everybody that listens to your excellent podcast has seen the video of the Ukrainian drone that they fly right into the window of the little bunker. I mean, weaves between trees. My gosh, I hadn't even seen that in a movie. That was incredible. I didn't anticipate the volume of those things. Also, in our book, we did not truly appreciate the willingness of the Russians to go after civilian targets. Now it seems incredibly naive, but I didn't envision that they would be doing wholesale slaughter of civilians. And then the third thing, we probably did not address the nuclear question enough, that

the possibility that Russia might use a nuclear weapon. And we could have explored that more. And now after the past two years, it's very clear to me that the Russians are not going to use a nuclear weapon, that their nuclear weapons really are only effective when they don't use them. I mean, the president said, you use a nuke, catastrophic. There are no battlefield benefits for the Russians to use a tactical nuclear weapon. There's zero positive outcomes for them if they use a nuclear weapon. Even the Chinese have said, do not do it. And so we have deterred ourselves out of a fear that they might do it. And I think that's a bad message for Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and other countries that have nukes or want nukes to see

that we can be deterred just by the mention that they might move a tactical nuclear weapon into Belarus. I think that's something we did not explore enough in that first book. Ravi, I want to kind of swing back to the previous question about weapons requirements and weapons deliveries and the nature of support and how that affects policy decisions. And pair that also with the next question of this war in Ukraine and this dramatic pressure on the transatlantic relationship comes at a time when the U.S. still wants to pivot to Asia and look to China. Can you talk to where you see the broader geopolitical strategic competition coming in when we talk about Europe and what China's place is in that conversation and other BRICS members and other influential members of the global south as well? Well, it's just increasingly clear to me that the world has been realigning a bit for the last few years.

China's rise, I think, is something that dramatically shakes up the state of play in the global order. I think the world over, whether American policymakers agree with it or not, other leaders perceive that we are moving from an era of unipolarity to a world that is dominated by competition between India and China, and perhaps a multipolar world even, were you to ask emerging powers such as India. I think whichever way you define where we're headed, whether it's multipolarity, whether it's more of a duopoly, what is clear is that perceived change is on its way and countries are already reacting to that and are conducting policy based on that. So in many ways, competition between the United States and China, as we were discussing earlier, it is a factor in why Russia decided to invade Ukraine. a thought that America would be too distracted by Asia or that its focus would be there. I think competition between the United States and China is also a factor in how much of the rest of the world, the global South, is beginning to try and sort of conceive of its interests and act on those interests. So it's been very interesting to see that while so much of the world has rallied

around supporting Ukraine, if you look at population, most of the world resides in parts of the world that have not formally condemned Russia. So India and China, of course, but many of the countries with big populations in Asia and Africa, Pakistan, Bangladesh, both countries with populations between 160 and 200 million, take Indonesia, more than 200 million, Nigeria, about 200 million. These are all countries that have chosen in some sense or the other to sit on the fence. And there's a flaw here in some of the storytelling of the West and trying to portray what is going on in Ukraine as purely a fight between democracies and autocracies. It is much more than that. This is actually about

sovereignty and sovereignty is something that a lot of these other countries can get behind. But the reason why the China aspect is important here as well is that if you're in New Delhi, if you're in Islamabad, if you're in Dhaka, if you're in Jakarta, if you're in Lagos, you are looking at this big new rising competition between the United States and China. These are two of your biggest trading partners. You want to be friends with both sides, essentially. You want to do trade with both sides. And you are wary of picking a side in any battle between East and West, North and South. And in many ways, I think geopolitics today is just marked by that trend of the global south countries to want to pick and choose their

battles, to want to pick and choose who they ally with, to want to pick and choose the issues that they center and agitate around, whether it's climate change, whether it's anything else. Now, this is a long way of saying that what is going on in Ukraine is a theater of war, but it is not taking place in isolation. And I think for Western policymakers, especially to look at the rest of the world, I think, and what is going on in Asia and how global South countries are thinking about what is going on in the world and who is leading the world, I think the answers to those questions are really important as Western policymakers think about policymaking towards Ukraine and Russia in the next year and ahead. I think Ben mentioned this earlier, but a lot of Asian countries are very curious to see whether

America will continue supporting Ukraine because that telegraphs what America would do with Taiwan. So if you are the Philippines, you really want to see a big show of support. If you're India, you want to see a big show of support as well, even though India itself is sitting on the fence. So it's just a fascinating time of flux, whether or not American policymakers believe that the unipolar era is over, because the rest of the world believes it is. I don't disagree with anything, Robbie, that you just said, but I do think it feels like we're finally starting to get our act together. The West, the philosophical West, is starting to get organized. I mentioned earlier that I

thought NATO was in a better place now. The addition of Finland made us immediately better. That'll go down in history as one of the biggest strategic mistakes by Russia ever to create a situation where Finland and Sweden both apply to join NATO. Sweden will eventually get in and now we'll be in a much better place. The meeting that the president hosted recently where the prime minister of Japan and the president of South Korea were hosted there at Camp David. That was historic. And so to have these guys now in the Philippines and Vietnam and others, so it's not just the U.S. and Australia and the Indo-Pacific region, but I think this idea of getting organized requires engaged American leadership, but not only. We obviously do not have the capacity or the capabilities to do any of this by ourselves. We know that. And so working with our allies in both regions globally is an important part of

this, to have the reach, to have the access, but to have the capabilities. What we don't have is, at least as far as I can tell, an effective strategy for doing all this. I think we are geographically ignorant in the U.S. I think that we don't connect all the dots together. And I'll stop with just this one little anecdote. When I was the commander of Allied Land Command based in Izmir, Turkey from 2012 to 2014, this was at a time where Erdogan had already come to power. Turkey did not trust the United States, but they were a problem. But I went to have breakfast up in Ankara with the J-5 of the Turkish general staff. The J-5, of course, is the most important staff officer on any joint staff because that's the guy that controls planning and policy and priorities. So I'm

meeting with him. I said, sir, how's it going this morning? And he said, Ben, I'll tell you what. I wake up and I have Russia to the north, Iran, Iraq, Syria to the south, the Caucasus to the east, and the Balkans to the west. It's a hell of a neighborhood. And I kind of laughed. And then I thought, you know, on his map, Turkey and the Black Sea are not down in the bottom right-hand corner of the map the way they are in almost every other headquarters map in Europe, because you're trying to make it fit. And for him, Turkey and the Black Sea are not down in the bottom right-hand corner of the map the way they are in almost every other headquarters map in Europe because you're trying to make it fit. And for him, Turkey and the Black Sea are in the middle of his map, and he has to deal

with all of that stuff. Now, that seems so obvious now, but at the time, I thought, man, we've got our boundary between U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command happens to be the border between Turkey and Syria. You'd have a hard time finding the worst place to be the border between Turkey and Syria. You'd have a hard time finding the worst place to put the boundary between two combatant commands. And that's how we end up making decisions like giving weapons to YPG, which is a Kurdish terrorist organization. And we tried to explain it away. Well, they're sort of the, you know, not quite PKK. And the

Turks are having a hard time with trusting us with that. And I think this goes to a little bit of our, The Turks are having a hard time with trusting us with that. And I think this goes to a little bit of our, we don't think strategically enough. And we're all discovering where the Black Sea is now. And what potential it has is an east-west economic corridor. And we've got to get the right map. Ben, I couldn't agree with you more. And what you're describing is really about perspective.

You spin the globe a little bit and you center a different part and the world just looks very different. And I suppose it does for every other country that is often yearning, I think, for America to see things from its perspective. But you know, to your point about America getting it right vis-a-vis China, vis-a-vis, you know, its global posture, I agree with you. I just think that there are some emerging contradictions that need to be dealt with. So human rights, for example, or democracy. And these are issues that are big ticket issues that have often been a large part of US rhetoric around the world. And they get in the way when China and aligning against China or constraining China becomes an overriding sort of principle of foreign policy. Because where does Saudi fit into that? Where does India fit

into that? And, you know, the more we sort of create a black and white world, all of the gray in the middle, that's when they take advantage of it. And so much as though I think U.S. foreign policy is reorienting in the right way. And of course, from the challenges of a few years ago, it has reemerged in multilateralism in a big way, which I think is to the advantage of the world, but a little bit of the messaging and the contradictions are things that I think this administration still needs to work on as we head into an election year. I think this administration still needs to work on as we head into an election year. That is an excellent point.

I think we are back into the debate about values versus interest and that some will tend to be black and white. Like you said, hey, you know, there's no way we can deal with these guys because they have a terrible human rights record. But is that the best way to look after our interests? a terrible human rights record. But is that the best way to look after our interests? And I think there are ways that you can protect your strategic interests and invest in these things while applying pressure with regards to human rights. I mean, otherwise, we shouldn't buy a drop of oil from the Saudis. We shouldn't do anything with them if the human rights aspect is the most important thing. But other people are going to say, wait a minute, you have no credibility because you're spending zillions of dollars selling patriots to the

Saudis despite their human rights records. So I think finding that balance is an important part of this. And I think this is also why the current administration has made it a point to ensure that our own domestic policy and are we living up to our own talking points? I would say, actually, no, we're not. We have got to make sure we are doing things the right way as a democracy here. Otherwise, when we start wagging our finger at other countries about their human rights and so on, and they put it back on us, it does not help our foreign policy. We do have to sort of be the example on these things. So Ravi, many in your audience have not had the breadth or depth of international experiences that you have had. How do you try to communicate the complexities of Europe to an

audience that might have had little exposure to European dynamics? I think leading with curiosity and humility, because no matter how much anyone has experienced anywhere, there's so much more that we do not know. And I feel like, you know, I mean, you are all experts in your fields. I'm sure you feel the same way that the more you learn about your craft, you realize that there's actually a lot more out there to learn. And I think so it is with the world. And I think, you know, our leaders need to be more honest about what they do and do not know about the world. And I think the way in which U.S. rhetoric gets crafted in its diplomacy, in speeches, all of that matters because I think

leaders around the world, they watch these things, they listen, they observe closely. And these are also parts of the world that have long, deep histories that are, you know, different from America's, but also much older, more complicated. You're often dealing with countries and rivals that have a lot of pride in their history and in their diversity and in their stories. So curiosity and humility, I think, are the two most powerful tools in diplomacy that I think leaders, when they're very successful, it's partly because they've deployed those tools effectively. But I use the word deploy, but it also has to be genuine. I think, you know, we were talking about storytelling earlier. I think people can sense

when a story feels real. They can sense when a story feels real. They can sense when someone feels their pain. They can sense when someone truly is looking out for the good of the world or stands for higher values. You know, when leaders talk about human rights and they mean it, I think people know and they know when it's not real. So that's sort of the way in which I would lean into that rather than thinking about educating people or condescending towards them. That, in my experience, never works. You know, for countries around the world, especially countries that were colonized, for example, they don't want to be preached to. There's a real sense across Africa, across Asia, as these countries rise up, as they

grow and expand their economies, as their people have higher levels of literacy, make more money, they have pride and they have a sense of trajectory, a sense of destiny that is really important to take into account when we conduct policy with them, when we speak to them, when we communicate with them. What are the broad implications for policymakers, practitioners, and academics working in the European defense space? Specifically, what's the role now of irregular warfare going forward and the implications of irregular warfare in European defense policy? Europe had been right with the U.S. during the last 20 years of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Now, has the war in Ukraine shifted focus to large-scale conventional war? And is there still room for IW in the conversation? There's a brilliant young woman that y'all should invite onto your program. Her name is Mina Olender. She's from Finland. I met her when she was working for a think tank in Berlin, and then she went back to Finland. She is exceptional. I mean, what a gigantic brain. And she had lived in Germany and in Finland. She said, you know, Ben, she said, you know why Finns are never scared, even though we have 5 million population living next to Russia? I said, why is that? She said, because we're always prepared. They have this resilient society. Not only are they individually fit, but they have always been

prepared for the possibility of a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. The underground bunkers in Helsinki can accommodate more than the population of Helsinki. I mean, I've been in these things. It's incredible. They can put 200,000 troops in the field in about two weeks that are mobilized. My point is that you have to choose between something like Afghanistan or fighting against the Russians. I think you have to be prepared against all the different threats, and it boils down to, do you have quality people? The best organizations are always, in my experience, we're learning organizations because you're never going to get it right from the beginning. How fast can you adapt? And do you have women and men in your formation and in your organization that are able to make the necessary adaptations? I think we actually are pretty good

at it. After about the second year in Iraq, when we realized, oh man, this is not going like we thought and it's going to last a lot longer, the giant army just turned and started, okay, you know, I had the same helmet the first 20 years I was in the army. I had four different helmets over the next 10 years I was in the army. I mean, we get going and we are pretty good at it, but you have to have quality people. You have to invest in people and education and making them want to stay. But you have to have a resilient society as well where people trust their institutions. We are so vulnerable now to Russian disinformation and Chinese disinformation because so many

Americans don't trust the Congress or the elections or the courts or the media or whatever it is. We are so vulnerable right now. That's how you deal with irregular warfare is having a strong, resilient society and quality women and men in our formations that are able to learn and adapt. Gosh, I agree with everything Ben is saying here. I mean, I think so much will change in the next decade with AI and technology. And I just think we're not even in a place where we can predict what kinds of threats might emerge. So the notion of focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of others is terrifying.

I think policymakers have to really be nimble, have to build capacities and capabilities in a range of areas and disciplines, and have to leave open a lot of capacity and string to be able to react to new and emerging threats that we haven't begun to predict yet, but will be coming our way with AI. What does the future hold for Europe and its relationship with the United States on the defense policy side? How does the war in Ukraine factor and its relationship with the United States on the defense policy side? How does the war in Ukraine factor into that? And what are the implications of that across policy, academia, and practice? I'll say two things. There's a short and medium-term challenge, which is the fate of Ukraine and how long

the United States will support arming and supporting Ukraine. how long the United States will support arming and supporting Ukraine. It's very clear to me that with the 2024 election coming up and the chances of a candidate emerging or winning who believes that America has gone as far as it needed to go in terms of supporting Ukraine, if such a candidate were to eventually win, in other words, were such a policy view to become the will of the people through an election, then I think that would serve as a real rupture in relations between the United States and Europe more broadly, because Europe would be left dealing with a war on its borders that it isn't fully equipped to fight on its own. It needs American support.

That's very clear. It's been very clear through the course of this war, and it's very clear that it will remain so for as long as this lasts. So that strikes me as a short, medium-term, potential rupture and pivot point, I think, for the state of the transatlantic relationship. The longer-term one is, as it always is, China. I think it's very clear that as the world gears up for a longer range competition between the United States and China on a range of arenas, Europe is, of course, allying with the United States broadly when it comes to technology vis-a-vis China, when it comes to trade vis-a-vis China. But it's a very uncomfortable alliance, I think, and there are cracks and fissures within

Europe in terms of how to think about China. We've mostly spoken about Europe in this discussion as if it were one, but Europe, of course, has many divergent points of view within it. And one of the issues that tends to play up those diversions is China. Western Europe has very different views than Eastern Europe on how to think about China. If you ask President Macron, he will have an entirely different set of objectives on how to think about China. And of course, earlier this year, took a whole bunch of CEOs to Beijing to actually build ties, not to sort of constrain them or restrict them. So those differences, I think, in the coming years will only be highlighted more. I think Beijing is for sure going to try and test those fissures and cracks between Europe and the United States, but also within Europe. And that's something that I think policymakers on both sides need to be thinking long and hard about and really need to up communication between policymakers to make sure that they can withstand

Beijing trying to exploit any cracks between them, but also that they have an ability to grow together and to compensate for any loss in trade or other opportunities that come with de-risking from China. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Ravi Agarwal, Foreign Policy Magazine, thank you so much for being with the Irregular Warfare podcast today. Thanks for the privilege. Great to be on. What a wonderful podcast, and it's a real honor to be with you. Thank you again for joining us for episode 94 of the Irregular Warfare podcast, in collaboration with the Foreign Policy Live podcast. We release a new episode every two weeks. In the next episode, Ben and Alyssa talk with Professor

M. Taylor Fravel and Lieutenant General Retired Charles Cooper on China's military strategy. Following that, Shauna and Laura talk with the UK's Chief of the Defense Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, and Dr. Joe Felter. Be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare podcast so you don't miss an episode. The podcast is a product of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. We are a team of all-volunteer practitioners and researchers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn. You can also subscribe to our monthly e-newsletter for access to our content and upcoming community

events. The newsletter sign-up is found at irregularwarfare.org. You can also find Foreign Policy Live on the Foreign Policy website and wherever you get your podcasts. If you enjoyed today's episode, please leave a comment and positive rating on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to the Regular Warfare podcast. It really helps expose the show to new listeners. And one last note, all that you hear in this episode are the views of the participants and do not represent those of Princeton, West Point, or any agency of the United States government. Thanks again, and we'll see you next time.