It Could Happen Here - GlobeCon: Can Technocratic Neoliberalism Save Us? Um no wtf?
Episode Date: August 12, 2026Garrison talks with sociology professor Ben Rose Porter about the Center for New Liberalism’s anti-populist vision of "technocracy, cynical maneuvering, and liberal nationalism.” Sou...rces: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/256-the-new-liberal-podcast-30949602/episode/the-crisis-of-liberalism-338635572 https://cnliberalism.org/posts/nlas-2026 https://nlas.cnliberalism.org/schedule https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/30/bennet-loses-colorado-governor-primary-00983357?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter https://cnliberalism.org/posts/press-release-greg-schultz-joins-center-for-new-liberalism-as-senior-advisorhttps://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/ https://www.progressivepolicy.org/release-young-neoliberals-link-up-with-ppi/ https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/22/upshot/poll-democrats-times-siena.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/11/us/mamdani-nyc-voters-election-demographics.htmlSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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Welcome back to It Could Happen here.
I'm Garrison Davis.
Last episode, I detailed my experience at GlobeCon, 2026, or the new liberal action summit.
a three-day convention for young liberal professionals to socialize and listen to panels about
zoning reform, energy policy, and broad-based taxes. The summit is put on by a nonprofit called
the Center for New Liberalism, a digital advocacy organization that promotes center-left policies
and neoliberal economics. The Center for New Liberalism, or C&L, basically started as a group of
policy wonks on Reddit and Twitter, making political memes during Trump's first term, but in
2020, C&L was brought into the Clintonite think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute.
Since then, C&L's been doing yearly summits and more IRL political engagement, in hopes of
filling in the role of something like the DSA, but for more technocratically aligned, moderate
Young Libs. The 2026 New Liberal Action Summit took place in the backdrop of an ascendant
Democratic Socialist and left-wing populist movement, winning congressional primaries in New York,
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and now Michigan, beating the more moderate establishment-type
candidates. A few days before the summit in D.C., the New Liberal podcast, release an episode about
the current crisis of liberalism, where CNL co-founder Jeremiah Johnson talks about why he thinks
people are, quote, abandoning the idea that liberalism can help them and are turning to populism,
whether from the right or the left. The clear trend over time is that we are getting more
and more extremely progressive members of Congress, representatives, et cetera, that we're getting
more socialists and more DSA-aligned candidates, and that the far left is simply out-organizing
and out-hustling the moderate wing of the party or the liberal wing of the party, however
you'd like to say it. And this is troubling.
Jeremy Johnson cites the Mamdani DSA sweep in New York last June, where socialist candidates beat
establishment incumbents. And this episode came out about a month before the populist wins in the Michigan
Democratic primary. But Johnson does bring up the Colorado primary, where one of CNL's favorite
politicians, Senator Michael Bennett, just lost his primary for Colorado governor to the state attorney
General, who, to quote Johnson, quote, frankly, was not even necessarily more progressive than him,
but simply rode the wave of, I'm the populist, anti-establishment, I'm more angry, etc., etc.
Michael Bennett is an interesting case. In 2020, he ran for president as like the most centrist
candidate of that entire bunch and only qualified for the first two debates. He used to be like
one of the least populist senators in the country, like a very CNL-type politician, who,
weeks after losing his primary bid, opened the new liberal action summit with a 45-minute
fireside chat with CNL's deputy director Tobin Stone. Senator Bennett's remarks earned a very
tepid response from the attendees. Bennett blamed the Democratic Party for losing to Trump
because they had no ideas.
He talked about the need to build housing and transit
from a bottom-up approach
that helps regular people, not just those at the top,
how his constituents in Colorado
can't afford to live where they grew up
and how people in their late 20s and 30s
can't get a real job.
He often mentioned, quote, working people
and, quote, affordability,
and referred to Bernie Sanders
as his, quote, friend.
The whole talk felt kind of Bernie light, which was especially odd because the summit schedule
said that this fireside chat was going to focus on the threat of the ascendant populist left.
But to the extent that Bennett targeted populism, it was the Trumpian right-wing authoritarian variety.
And like, don't get me wrong, Michael Bennett is still very much immoderate.
but if even a long-time ultra-centric like him feels like he has to make overtures to progressives or populists,
even when he's speaking to the completely wrong audience, then the libs must be really feeling the pressure.
On that new liberal podcast, CNL co-founder Jeremiah Johnson, asked his listeners to consider,
if things continue on their current course, what the socialist movement could look like in 10 years.
But just ask yourself, you know, is this type of candidate winning Democratic primaries more or less often than they were five years ago than they were 10 years ago?
And five to 10 years from now, do you expect that they will have more energy or less energy?
Because I think any honest appraisal of where we are at right now is that the socialist wing,
of the Democratic Party has the energy and the momentum.
Their organizing infrastructure is far better, far more serious than the moderate or the liberal
wing of the party.
They have more people who are out there willing to do the work, knocking on doors, phone
banking, posting on social media.
That is where the grassroots energy of the Democratic Party is.
And we can talk about whether or not the voters are there yet, but the
voters ultimately follow elite opinion? Voters are not just mindless sheep that follow elite opinion.
See here the 2016 and 2024 elections. They can be influenced by the power of capital,
but voters do evaluate their material conditions and compare that to how different candidates
promised to change or not change those conditions once in office. There may be an elitist side of the
academic left, but the unspoken assertion here that the DSA is uniquely representative of the
elite, as opposed to the centrist Democrats who do not represent elite opinion and are more in
touch with voters? That's patently absurd, and CNL's new senior advisor agrees. Here's Greg Schultz,
Biden's campaign manager and general election strategist, who spoke on a Globecon,
about winning back Maha voters.
I think part of the reality is a Democratic Party is a self-righteous, no-it-all party,
and voters can feel that, and they can see it.
We think we know it's better for you and your family than what you know is better for you
and your family.
So one is we are increasingly a party of academic elite,
who I don't think actually talk to real,
where you understand the real concern.
So while Greg, at least admits among friends that,
The Dems are an elite party detached from the concerns of voters.
C&L co-founder and podcast host Jeremiah Johnson remains somewhat confused as to why people just don't support the smartest policies, as defined by him, and are instead turning to populism.
Any honest appraisal of where we are at says that liberals are losing ground to socialists in the Democratic Party.
To some degree, the establishment has done this to themselves.
I think it would be wrong for any analysis to leave that out.
But having said that, in America, living conditions are still quite good.
Even in his explanation of why liberalism is failing, he still insists that things are actually fine.
He talks about how real median income is, quote unquote, as high as it's ever been,
which doesn't actually mean that things are going great.
It's barely keeping up with inflation.
But Johnson relies on this narrow batch of macroeconomic statistics
to insist that, quote,
America is still thriving, life is still good.
Last week, I forced Ben Rose Porter,
a professor of sociology at the City University of New York,
to listen to this whole crisis in liberalism podcast.
and then discuss his thoughts.
The mainstream capitalist order, which is to say the liberal order, as its political correlate, is breaking down, is failing.
So you would expect to see a political moves away from it.
There's a very famous graph of worker compensation to productivity.
So worker compensation, that's wages, basically.
How much of profits, more or less, is going to the workers, right?
So how much our workers compensated tracked with productivity, which is to say how much our firm's producing relative to inputs, right, input to output productivity over time. And this is over the course of the 20th century. And what you see in that graph is that for basically the whole of the 20th century, wages, worker compensation, tracks very closely with productivity. So as firms, industries produce,
more and more stuff are more and more efficiently producing,
are creating more and more wealth.
Workers, wages, are going up and keeping pace with that.
So the share of wealth between the owning classes, the bourgeois,
and the workers is staying about level, right?
As there's more made, workers are getting some of that, right?
And they're getting an even piece.
And around 80, 81, you know, the collapse of the labor movement in the 70s
and especially with Reagan, right, you see.
worker compensation flatline. And it basically has been inert since the 80s, since the beginning of the 80s.
Productivity has continued to go up about the same rate. So we have been producing more and more wealth in this country,
right? This is what capitalist production does. It's basically almost always growing in productivity,
right? We've been producing more and more wealth. And the share of that wealth that the workers get has flatlined.
You cannot spin that as things are basically fine.
That has all kinds of major effects.
One of the big ones is, you know, inequality,
even if workers are not being paid starvation wages,
living in that profoundly and a profoundly unequal society
has all kinds of effects, socially speaking, right?
It does for the middle classes, too.
People who are, you know, comfortable, who are doing well,
who have captured a bit of that growth,
because it gets worse the further you go down the line,
that when you look at wages for the lowest paid workers,
they've often even decreased, right?
But even for those middle class professionals and such,
who may very well be comfortable,
and many of them, we should stress, are not.
I think that when you go through and you look at the data,
there's a lot of indicators of all kinds of ways
in which people might not be comfortable.
But even those that are comfortable,
you know, they still have to live in a society
that is profoundly unequal
that is letting
the bottom strata
just rot, right?
That is just
letting people die
on the streets.
That has an effect.
Anyone with a soul,
with a conscience,
is, you know,
affected by that.
Having foreclosed
the idea that there is
anything
economically or structurally
wrong with society,
Jeremiah Johnson
is left to conclude
that this, quote,
crisis in liberalism
appears to be
a crisis of confidence, a crisis of storytelling.
So to Johnson, it's simply that the liberal story is no longer as compelling as the
alternative populist narratives.
Johnson mentions two, potential explanations for liberalism's decline, one coming from the
right, the other from the left, neither of which he finds convincing.
Johnson says that the right wing is promoting a cultural explanation for liberalism's decline,
arguing that liberals have moved too far to the left on cultural issues and lost voters.
While the left wing offers a quote-unquote materialist explanation, claiming,
Living conditions have actually deteriorated and your statistics do not capture this,
and people can tell when their lives are getting, you know, materially worse, you know, when things
costs too much and they don't have as much income. And that is why people turn away from liberalism
towards alternate explanations. Of course, in this entire 52 minutes of podcast, Johnson never talks
about like wealth inequality as a real problem in society because someone from his self-described
neoliberal economic worldview just does not believe that skyrocketing wealth inequality is
actually a real problem in and of itself. But then he has to pretend to be confused as to why more
and more people are falling for this materialist explanation of why there's a crisis in liberalism
and why people are not convinced by the quote-unquote story that liberalism is telling them
with macroeconomic statistics. You know, the stock market is booming. Unemployment is low.
Things like that don't actually indicate what types of jobs.
are available. Service industry or gig economy work is crushing and offers no path for a sustainable
future. Buying a house seems impossible. Rent keeps skyrocketing. Energy costs are ballooning,
all while the rich get even richer. Even if, on average, the median wage has kept up with
inflation at about 3.5% per year, there are, of course, many people who are not seeing that wage
growth, and even if they are, that 3.5% is far below, the 30% rise in the price of groceries
over the past few years, or the 25% jump in residential electricity rates.
And of course, minimum wage workers are not keeping up with inflation, let alone the massive
bumps in housing, education, and health care costs. A New York Times poll from last May
showed that among Democrats and Democrat-leaning voters, only 5%
said the economic conditions were good or excellent.
88% said the economic system in this country is generally unfair to most Americans.
63% said that the political and economic system needs major changes,
and 20% said it needs to be torn down completely.
But Johnson would have you believe that the materialist explanation is without merit
because DSA candidates actually get a lot of support from middle,
class workers. The people who tend most to be sympathetic to this kind of leftist story
tend to be the people with the most education and the highest incomes. If you look at, you know,
the demographics of Zohran Mamdani's win in New York, he won the highest income brackets.
And this is despite, you know, having kind of a,
eat the rich kind of persona and very, very DSA-aligned politics.
And this makes me doubt the materialist explanation.
As we discussed last episode, this is just patently untrue.
In both the Democratic primary and the general election,
former governor Andrew Cuomo performed best in the city's highest income districts
and with voters who made over $200,000 a year.
But no, it is actually the DSA who are truly representative of the elite
and the richest of the rich are Zoron's main base of support.
Johnson needs that to be true because, as we will learn after this ad break,
he contends that liberalism might actually be suffering from its own success.
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Welcome back.
CNL co-founder and new liberal podcast host, Jeremiah Johnson,
doesn't buy into either of the populist explanations for liberalism's decline.
The cultural one pushed by the right or the materialist one argued by the left,
Johnson thinks that, if anything, these explanations should be reversed.
He discounts the right-wing, a cultural explanation,
because the places where those progressive cultural advances have gone the farthest
are in deep blue districts that are still deep blue.
And as for the materialist story told by the left,
if you look at the places that have actually suffered potentially under the liberal era
of the last 40 to 50 years,
I think the places you could most point to authentically that you could make the strongest case for would be the kind of rust belt towns, small towns in Ohio and Pennsylvania and Michigan and so forth, where the decline of manufacturing, you know, the decline of the auto industry or the steel industry or whatever may have hollowed out the local economy.
Now, this is a very left-leaning explanation, but the people in those towns have not bought into the left explanation.
They've turned into Republicans is the thing.
You know, the materialist argument pushed by the left is actually most applicable to the areas that now vote for Donald Trump.
Yeah, that's the whole point.
It's the economy, idiot.
Just flatly dismissing any materialist analysis on the basis that such analysis, as argued by the left,
is actually even more applicable in places that are voting for Trump rather than Democrats,
is completely missing the entire point of the left's analysis.
Trump ran as a populist, a right-wing populist, but that is, like, evidence for what the left is arguing.
That is the left's explanation why those places, which used to be Democrat, working class union districts, why they have gone to Trump.
It's because he's offering a populist solution.
Now, is Trump's right-wing populist solution actually going to be a real solution to the base problems?
No, because instead he's going to do economic nationalism, he's going to do tariffs, he's going to scapegoat immigrants as the reason for why housing is expensive, why the job.
job market sucks. So he is offering a populist solution, but not a good solution. While campaigning,
he was addressing the poor economic conditions, price of eggs, as opposed to the liberal assertion
that things are great actually, or something as tone deaf as biodynamics is working.
Here's a better start, like a better explanation for that is just paying attention to the actual
history. I'm from the South, right? The South is, is so much of it is the core for, you know,
a kind of reactionary cultural, right-wing cultural politics. The South is also where the labor
movement, the unions, were just decimated. I mean, it's brutal there. Union density is in the shitter
and has been for a while. And so one way of explaining this is like, yeah, people in these places,
people in the South often gravitate towards a kind of cultural reaction.
confused politics, precisely because there's no other option. They don't have a kind of
coherent socialist project. And so they go towards these other things. Where there's more of a
labor movement where it has held on to some degree, somewhere like New York, for instance,
there is an alternative route, right? And it took us a while to get there, you know? This is a
relatively new trend of the rise in socialism, but I don't know whether this is like cynical or if he just
genuinely does not conceive of how, well, yeah, it may be that these are real material stressors and
pressures that are then interpreted through cultural lenses for all sorts of reasons, that the idea
that it must be one or the other, that if, well, if these, if people favor a cultural explanation,
then there must not be material problems. It's also the whole thing is just fraught. I mean, like,
the idea that the only place is suffering from deindustrialization or, you know, dried up economies are just Republican states and cities.
That's just not true in any sense. There are lots of places where a dying economy is responded to with very left materialist analyses.
Nor also the idea that, again, I mean, just very hand-wavy, like just citation needed or moving back.
Things are fine. Outside of like a limited de-industrialized red states, you know,
where things maybe are a little bad.
Everything else is fine.
Like is the idea that in major coastal cities, everything's fine and just completely ignores
that like service workers and the lowest rungs of workers in these places are being crushed right now,
many of which have to then leave the cities they're in.
And then, you know, people who may be able to maintain a comfortable income and comfortable there is,
you know, a little strained.
I mean, gig work is on the rise. People are having to work all sorts of strange hours at beck and call of their employers.
Alienation from their kinds of work and the ability to choose one's job is really profoundly wrong.
Incomes for college graduates have dropped. So professionals, while they may be able to maintain a somewhat comfortable income, are often still declining in that capacity.
Enfranchisement in people's worlds, both in their economic world and in saying how they labor, how they work.
but also in the wider political world
and getting a say in how government is happening.
People feel totally disenfranchised.
They are disenfranchised from those things.
So it's just a very thin patina of things are fine
that falls apart upon any examination.
Ironically, these people represent the whole project
of things are fine because we maintain full control.
The other side of the coin of things are fine
is we need not empower anyone else.
Just let us, the technical experts, run everything.
So instead of a cultural explanation or a materialist explanation for the current crisis in liberalism,
the Center for New Liberalism seems to kind of embrace this sort of liberal affluenza,
as if people are actually suffering from affluence.
For this, Johnson turns to Francis Fukuyama.
Fukuyama, in his book, The End of History and the Last Man,
very famously said that he believed man needs struggle, essentially.
You know, in the 20th century, we got the great struggles of World War I and the Great Depression, World War II, and then the Cold War.
And liberalism flourished under these conditions because it had an identifiable enemy to fight.
It had a struggle that, you know, men and women could throw themselves into, you know, that we could defeat the Nazis. We could defeat the communists. And then he predicted that if history really did end, in air quotes, that men might struggle just for the sake of struggle. They would struggle against the very system that created this prosperity just for the sake of having something to feel.
of having something to feel useful for.
The idea is, now that liberalism has conquered the globe,
people don't actually require anything materially different,
but will still desire for self-worth, dignity, and recognition.
This is a sort of post-modern crisis of a struggle for meaning,
totally divorced from a materialist desire.
But Fukuyama argues,
that while modern liberal democracies can provide peace and material wealth, they leave people
feeling alienated by not delivering that sense of higher purpose. And that that is what leads
people to nationalism or populism or identity politics because people want some sort of
recognition. To Johnson, ultimately liberalism is struggling because, quote, there is no more
great struggle. Yeah, there is no real struggle that this is all made up. It's all smoke and mirrors.
Like, everybody's fine. I mean, if you pursue it to its logical conclusion, it's the most
condescending politics there is. It's literally just, you don't really have problems. You are just
rebelling against us because things are so good and you don't have meaning other than opposing us.
It literally, I was listening to that and I was like, this sounds like bourgeois revolutions of early modernity, right?
This is like how the monarchy reacted to so many times you get like, you know, absolute monarchs just saying like, well, the people, there aren't really problems. You're fine. It's, it's fine. Just chill out. Like, I'm your king. We're doing fine. It's all good. Right. And of course, that worked out brilliantly for them. Yeah, it's the same politics. It's just, well, there's basically no struggle. People are, people are mad because, you know, they don't have.
enough meaning.
I just, I don't know, how that plays out to anyone is insane to me.
The idea that, you know, all of the struggle and strife in the world today is just, it's not real.
It's somehow a made-up, pretend we're all doing.
It's ridiculous.
Johnson's contention is that things just got so good under neoliberal technocracy
that it created a postmodern crisis of meaning resulting in people struggling against
the very system that provides for them to gain a new sense of purpose.
Basically, self-sabotaging by electing bad populist candidates, which then do make economic
conditions worse.
But then Johnson's solution to this problem is just to put neoliberal technocrats back
in power, but this time be even more cynical and also more patriotic.
In contrast to the United States, Johnson points to Canada as an example of where liberalism is
currently succeeding, and he credits this to, quote, technocratic ability, cynical maneuvering, and
liberal nationalism, adding, quote, we need technocrats more than ever.
I introduced the idea last episode that one of the main tendencies among these so-called new liberals
is the belief that politics is just the application of technical knowledge.
You know, conflating having technical knowledge with the ability to govern well
and do decision-making at the highest level.
A view of politics without politics.
The technocratic point of view sort of works like this.
It understands that, like, okay, there's technical expertise.
Let's say you're trying to, you know, reform tax policy.
Tax policy is very complex. The way that taxes work, the way that, you know, government revenues work is very complex. So if you're going to rearrange that, yeah, you are going to need some people who understand how that work, who are intellectuals, you know, who have the technical knowledge required to make your policies work. That's a crucial part of any politics. You absolutely need that. Any political faction that seeks to have a chance of successful governance needs a level of technical expertise. Absolutely.
But that is an entirely separate question from what does one choose to do?
Your technical expertise is a key part to successfully doing what you set out to do.
But politics at the highest levels, right, at the level of like party line, of like what party
strategy is about what are you trying to do?
The technocratic view basically thinks that that question is already decided.
it. To them, it's obvious what you should do. What you should do is grow the economy, maximize
economic growth, because in their view, that's good for everybody. You know, rising tide,
lifts all boats. That's good for everybody. There is no conflict here. And so if there is no
conflict here, then that's the obvious pick. And then the only difficulty is just getting people in
to do that job well. And so for them, politics is just about, okay, well, our team has the people who
know how to do this job well, and the other team doesn't know how to do the job well. And they
have trouble sometimes even conceiving that, in fact, no, the debate would be about what we're
choosing to do. Johnson explains that liberal governance has to walk a dangerous tightrope. If you lean
too far to the left, you stifle the economy and feed radicalism and extremism. Johnson points to
Europe as an example of this. But if you lean too far to the right economically, people will
revolt if they don't share in the prosperity. If you don't successfully walk this tightrope,
then you risk entering a kind of doom loop where, you know, oh, everything seems really bad,
we're all dooming. And so people are going to choose an illiberal candidate. And that
illiberal candidate is going to do stupid things that make things worse in society, and that's
going to make people even more illiberal, even more tilted towards extremism, which will lead to
worse candidates who will make things even worse than before, and so on, et cetera.
There is real risk of entering that kind of doom loop, and that's why it's important to
actually have smart technocratic leadership.
The doom loop theory glosses over the fact that Trump came after Obama.
The sentiment that this technocratic leadership wasn't working didn't just come from the right.
Bernie Sanders also rose to prominence by arguing this from a left-wing perspective.
And the capitalist class were more threatened by Sanders,
so they mobilized to take out the threat of left-wing populism,
even if that meant Trump's right-wing populism would win
because they know that the left-wing version
is the one that could actually empower labor
against the interests of capital.
Johnson also claims that Joe Biden had big goals,
but, quote, his technocratic ability wasn't there,
meaning there was too much red tape
prohibiting his policies from having an impact
because he, quote, went about policy in a stupid way.
Now, Johnson knows that calling for a technocracy isn't an election strategy.
For that, he proposes more, quote-unquote, cynical maneuvering,
and that liberals should get more, quote-unquote, ruthless.
In terms of running elections, he says Kamala Harris should have forcefully distanced herself from Joe Biden,
or the party should have pushed her out for being too compromised due to her association with Biden.
Of course, Johnson does not acknowledge that the party is very capable of cynical, ruthless maneuvering
when it serves their interests and the interests of their donors,
once again consider the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries
and the concerted efforts to take down Bernie Sanders.
something that quite possibly lost the Democrats at the 2016 election.
But Johnson also talks about the need for cynical maneuvering in implementing policy.
The main things he talks about seem to be flatly at odds with each other.
Because he says, well, you know, we need technocratic politics, which is to say,
you just need the right policies.
You need the ones that are correct to do the job well.
Again, what the job is, what we're trying to do is totally like not on the table.
That's a given, right?
And then you just need the people who can technically do that well.
But then he also says you need some cynicism.
You need to be able to just be ruthless electorally and operate politically in order to win, which seems to directly contradict.
It's like, well, what should you do?
Should you pick the policies that are correct, pursue technocracy, regardless of whether or not it's popular, whether it can win elections, right?
Which is this whole contention is that the right?
are somehow, somehow not popular among the people? Or should you, you know, be electorally ruthless
and try to appeal to the masses and win elections by perhaps, I mean, he gives an example
with the carbon tax where he says, like, I think this policy is great. I think this is the
technically correct policy. But you have to abandon it. Again, I'm sure if you asked him,
he would say, well, you have to strike a balance between the two, but as strategy, that's
useless, right? It's like, well, how should you ride a bike? Well, you don't want to lean too far,
left, but you also don't want to lean too far right. You want to kind of stay right in the balanced
middle. Okay, that tells us nothing. You should pick the right policies, but not so much. You need to
also be ruthless and be able to win elections. Pick the right policies and win, win elections.
Don't see your Stalingrad. Take it immediately. Johnson argues that the final necessary step
in exiting the populist doom loop is, quote unquote, liberal nationalism.
basically the idea that liberals need to become loudly more patriotic and reclaim and be proud
of the progressive parts of American history. But liberal patriotism isn't enough to win elections,
and the Harris campaign already kind of tried this. Liberals have got to be better at telling a story
of how America is great. Liberalism made America great. Liberalism is why we're
we're all rich and successful and awesome.
This is the massive contradiction at the heart of their project.
They want to say, we're all rich, the economy is great, living conditions are fine.
But the newer liberals do have at least some awareness of material problems because most of the
conference panels were about affordability, especially in relation to housing and energy costs.
So are there massive economic factors?
driving voter behavior or not? How can you pretend that everything is great actually? And then also
put on a whole conference focusing on how housing and energy are way too expensive. You do know that
there are material problems. What's actually happening here is that you're frustrated that people
aren't buying into your neoliberal solutions to the problems caused by neoliberalism. But to the
technocrat, it can't be the policies that are wrong, so instead it must be that we are not
telling a strong enough story. We need to be able to figure out a pro-growth, patriotic, muscular,
liberal message that works. Because people respond to two things in the end. They respond to
material conditions. If the material conditions are bad enough, they will get mad at you. But they also
respond to stories. And it's hard to identify the story that liberals tell today.
At the very end of this podcast, Johnson finally admits that people do in fact respond to
material conditions, but only if things get bad enough. But he also believes that the economy is good.
We are rich. We are successful. So the problem has to be something else. And that something else is
stories.
Liberalism just isn't telling the right stories.
Again, it's not material problems, it's storytelling problems.
And Johnson says, quote,
the story we should tell should be rooted in two things,
a return to history and a vision of abundance.
Johnson truly believes that this is all about stories
and not actually about politics.
And this is where the entire,
technocratic version of politics hits its own massive limitations. This is where it runs up against
its extremely narrow view of what politics is and what is politically possible.
They're totally whipped by capital. Like that's the thing is like capital sets the agenda.
Because, you know, they, as I said, they've they've ceded the territory of like political decisions
properly put, right? They concern themselves with the technical administration.
of the system, but are totally uninterested in the commanding heights of the system of, like,
how is the economy structured? But seeding that territory doesn't mean it's neutral. It just means
that, like, yeah, capital gets to call the shots then. And so capital basically says, well,
here's what's possible and here's what's not, right, based very much on capital's interests,
right, in order for us to maintain our profitability at the levels we would like and the ways we
would like, these things are not possible. And the technocrats, they just accept that.
Right? Like, it's a real belief for them. It's not cynical. You know, there, there is a time where with shrewder and more aware liberals, liberals who are aware of like class struggle, I think, and who were throwing in on the side of capital. Like, originally, like, the classical liberals as well as liberals in throughout the 20th century, right, when they really when they had to contend with like real socialist politics. They knew, like, they were self-conscious about, well, we are on the side of capital.
Right? That's the biggest difference between sort of the past ages of liberalism and this, you know, upstart young liberals. They're so in the pocket of capital. There's so what capital is bidding that they don't even really know it's there anymore. And so they just perceive this as like, again, what capital wants is basically just the natural state of the world. What is possible, period, with, you know, like just such an impossibly narrow historical focus on like what is possible.
I just don't know how anyone looks at the past, you know, 100 years of history and feels they can conclude very solidly what is and is not possible.
But they just feel that what capital says is basically the natural constraints of what's possible in society.
And so given that, which they take as a given, the only question is competent administration.
It's a fault from previous liberals, you know, who argued for like, no, we want to empower capital over labor to a certain extent, right?
or we want to achieve a balance between these things, usually with capital leading in some way.
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The definition of what is a movie has kind of changed anywhere, too, right?
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It's images and words being spoken, captured by some sort of technology.
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Welcome back.
Johnson proposes the way out of this populist doom loop is what he calls a brightness loop,
or basically like a positive feedback loop, which will be achieved through technocracy,
ruthless politics and liberal patriotism, embracing America and our history and loudly proclaiming
We are rich and we are successful and we are awesome. America rocks.
I wonder how that's going to go over with voters who are struggling to pay bills and household expenses every month.
Might they turn to another candidate who actually addresses the fact that maybe things aren't so great for everyone?
The limitations of the technocratic mindset is a big part of why center-left candidates are losing to left populists in very high-profile races.
I really don't know how C&L expect to grow their organization
and build momentum among young people to advance their own candidates
to claw back the Democratic Party away from the socialists,
away from the populists, from the progressives,
when their political project is calling for technocracy, cynicism, and liberal nationalism.
How do you think that will attract and then mobilize an actual energized, motivated base?
because the only people I can see that appealing to
are those who aspire themselves to be technocrats.
And true to form, that is who attended the new liberal action summit last month in Washington, D.C.
It was a group of people who identify with and submit themselves to the mainstream neoliberal order
and who understand themselves through identifying with the base structure of capitalist
American society. That's where they get their self-identification and in many cases their jobs and
their income. This is people who want to work in politics, who want to work as a consultant,
a campaign manager, a lobbyist, or a congressional staffer. In contrast, a lot of the people in
DSA don't have an actual interest in politics as an industry. In fact, they might have a,
frankly, aversion to electoral politics, and they're kind of involved in DSA somewhat begrudgingly,
in a sense. Most DSA members that I interact with would not want to work in politics as their job,
but they are doing this because they believe in it and because there's material forces that are
driving them towards wanting this sort of change, versus the C&L approach of trying to base all
on-the-ground mobilization, unlike other aspiring technocrats and professionals whose lives
are built very materially around these politics, around doing politics. And so their efforts to
promote neoliberalism could be interpreted as a form of class reproduction, an attempt to
maintain their particular position within a class dynamic. Now, of course, the socialists do have
their own flock of aspiring professionals and intellectuals who are seeking roles within
civil institutions and political positions of authority. The difference lies in what political
project you are a part of, what kind of class politics you're tied to, what class you're
trying to empower, are you intending to maintain or alter class relations, and ultimately,
what does political success look like? Just growing the GDP and, you're trying to empower? And,
as much as possible, increasing the total amount of wealth, or is it economic equality and
democratic control of society and production? In their attempts to claim liberal history, right,
the new liberals will associate themselves with, you know, FDR, the New Deal, maybe if they're
shrewder, the great society. One of the most frustrating parts of the conference for me was
hearing these lobbyists talk about, you know, the great legacy of FDR, while in another breath
strongly arguing against wealth taxes, against taxing the rich. At the end of the
crisis and liberalism podcast, Johnson says, quote, the populist left says that you don't actually
need to have any form of economic growth, as long as you can categorize people into good
and evil groups and tax the evil ones and give all their money to the good ones, unquote.
And I just don't think that is how they would describe New Deal or Great Society era tax rates.
They would never describe those tax rates and the reasons for why they were instituted as like,
we decided there are good and evil groups and therefore we must punish the evil ones
and give all their money to the good ones.
the new liberals have to play it both ways because they still want to associate themselves
with the sort of heights of liberal democracy in the United States, which they point to these
eras as, but they're both fundamentally opposed to what these eras actually are, the economic
policies and tax base that made those policies possible, and also vehemently opposed to the
organized labor apparatus that fought for those policies.
So they want to claim the legacy of those things for liberalism, but shorn of all content.
They have to completely ignore both the substance of those politics and the forces that drove those
politics, which was chiefly the labor movement, and socialists were a huge part of that,
but neoliberals don't want to acknowledge or promote labor because organized labor runs
contrary to the interest of capital, and because they know they can't compete with DSA if you're
going to play that game. In somewhat breaking from Ezra Klein, C&L's strain of neoliberal abundance
explicitly blames unions for why it's so hard to build housing and infrastructure. They think
labor unions are bad for the economy, and thus are evil, and that the general public are
stupid children, throwing a temper tantrum, sabotaging the greatest country ever by electing
populists, because liberalism made the world too good. There's no more struggle, and liberals
just have to tell the sheeple a better story so that neoliberal technocrats can stay in power,
that those with technical knowledge can rule. It's a profoundly undemocratic politics.
You pursue it to its logical ends, and it is literally,
really well. The people do not really know what their interests are and in fact will go against them
just for the sake of having meaning, I guess. So it's up to us those who do know what the right
politics are to be in charge and to basically call all the shots. And who has the authority to say
that we have the right politics? Well, us, of course, right? It's why, you know, these people exist
at the whim of capital. Without capital, they're nothing, right? They have this idea that they produce
their own authority by having the correct policies. They know the world, and that's where their power
comes from. They exist at capital's whim, right? And if capital decides to move in a different direction,
they have no authority. They have nothing. It's capital or labor. You either get your source of
authority and political power from the economic powers that be, the property owners who control
production and have an enormous amount of power in that sense, or you get it from the masses,
from the people, the laborers who actually power society and power all production, those are
the two forces. This idea that correct knowledge in itself supplies authority is not only
obviously undemocratic, but it's, I mean, just profoundly confused. It's completely oblivious to
political reality. It doesn't believe in politics. It doesn't think there is a realm of
politics. With that, though, you are forgetting that we're rich, that we're successful, that we're
awesome. Yeah, we are, we are rich, we are successful, we're awesome. America rocks. America rocks.
God, what a, yeah, he pairs that one with talking about, like, you can't be a depressing nerd and talk
about what America has done wrong. I love the idea of, like, trying to set yourself up against,
like, nerds being like, don't be a nerd and then being like, America rocks, we're rich, we're successful,
where all that is like the nerd line. It's like.
This is a whole nerd conference.
This is like the most policy wonky,
like Will Stansel, Mattaglacius, like nerd central.
Well, maybe you're on the football team, but I have an A in math.
Like, it's literally that.
It's the, well, we're rich, we're successful and we're awesome.
We, we won World War II.
We beat the communists.
We beat the communists.
It's just very, yeah, it's, it's hollow, too.
I mean, I'm a red-blooded American, you know, there's a lot to like.
about the American society, but this, like, America rocks. America is awesome. Like, I don't know.
Maybe there's a reason people aren't really feeling that one right now, you know? Just shouting it into
the faces of the misery of the masses is not the best move. You don't think that's going to go
well with voters who are maybe not rich and who are struggling. Yeah, I don't know, man. Look around.
It's been a pretty bad, like, yeah, no, I don't, I think this got of, God, we're awesome.
As much as the new liberals are upset and confused why the political momentum is with DSA and not them,
the center for new liberalism will never be able to build an organization of young libs
capable of rivaling DSA because technocratic liberalism categorically rejects mass politics.
So while CNL and the new liberals make a big show online, ultimately they are just a front
group for PPI, the Progressive Policy Institute, the centrist think tank that convinced the
Democratic Party to abandon the working class in the 90s, abandon redistributive new deal
liberalism, and embrace deregulatory free market neoliberal economics under Bill Clinton.
So while the Blue Globe emoji people will continue to post prolifically online, I suspect that is
where their political impact will largely remain.
Here is a final note from sociology professor Ben Rose Porter.
I mean, look, economies are hard to figure out, but I think it's just worth saying, like, what are you growing the economy for?
Right? The whole point is to provide people with better lives, you know, raise their wages, give them more power and control over their lives and their society.
And they just seem to have it very reversed where the point is to grow the economy at whatever cost.
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